The idea of reorganising FIFA appears to have been generally accepted by the early 1950s. But, what was far from being settled was how this should be done. The South Americans would play a particularly important role in the ensuing discussion, and their proposal and campaigning would lead to the continentalisation of FIFA. In other words, the South American confederation, created between 1915 and 1916, would provide the model that was to be exported to the other continents.
4.1 A ‘Game’ Between South Americans and Europeans
At the end of World War II, FIFA was still a highly Eurocentric organisation. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the joint effects of decolonisation and the Cold War presented a major challenge to this Eurocentric view. In fact, the new geopolitical context that emerged in the 1940s resulted in non-European voices playing a major role in international discussions whether they related to the International Labor Office (Plata-Stenger 2015) or the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement, as described by Eric Helleiner (2014). This was also the case within FIFA, where the importance of South American football in the world of sport—confirmed by the popular and economic success of the 1950 World cup organised in Brazil (Wahl 2012)—meant Europe’s football leaders could not simply ignore their South American colleagues.1 What is more, South America’s associations were united in their determination to reform FIFA.
This final aspect was made clear during the first meeting of the reorganisation committee set up by FIFA’s 1950 congress (see Chapter 4). At this meeting, held in Madrid in March 1951, Chile’s Luis Valenzuela highlighted an error in the documents presented to the committee’s members, which attributed one of the South American confederation’s proposals solely to Uruguay.2 Valenzuela’s comment was also intended to remind his colleagues on the committee that its two South American members spoke for the whole continent. One of their first proposals was to protect the executive committee seats attributed to North and South America under FIFA’s existing statutes, a move Argentina’s Juan Russo argued was necessary in order to ‘ensure the participation of all associations, in proportion to their importance and activity, within FIFA’s governing body’.3 There was not, therefore, anything egalitarian about South America’s desire to open up FIFA’s executive committee to associations from outside Europe. Rather, attributing seats according to the strength of a continent’s national associations would favour South America, whose associations were powerful but small in number, over Africa and Asia, whose more numerous associations were quite weak. In contrast, choosing executive committee members via a one country, one vote system, as used at FIFA congresses, would place the South American associations at a great disadvantage.
During the first two years of the reorganisation process, and despite their efforts, the South Americans failed to win over the committee’s five European members who were still against the idea of decentralising FIFA. In fact, Europe’s football leaders wanted either to maintain the status quo or, like Yugoslavia’s Andrejevic, to see transferred more power to the national associations, as advocated by the Soviet Union. There were two main reasons for Europe’s reluctance to accept significant changes to FIFA’s structure. First, the European associations felt that football in Africa, Central America and Asia was not mature enough for these regions to be allocated seats on the executive committee and that the leaders of their national associations did not have the stature or experience a seat on the executive committee required. Second, the Cold War division of Europe into two opposing blocs made it difficult to envisage creating a body capable of representing football throughout the continent.
Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union);
Southern Europe (Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia);
Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden);
Western Europe (Belgium, France, Eire, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, plus Germany, if the congress confirmed its reaffiliation);
Great Britain (England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland).
Comparison between the original composition of the executive committee and that proposed by the new draft FIFA Statutes
Functions | Current number | Current voting body | Proposed number | Proposed voting body |
|---|---|---|---|---|
President | 1 | Congress | 1 | Congress |
Vice-presidents | 5 | South American confederation (1), British associations (1), Soviet Union (1), Congress (2) | 5 | South American confederation (1), British associations (1), Soviet Union (1), Congress (2) |
Members | 6 | Congress (mainly composed by European national associations) | 9 | South American confederation (1), Central American confederation (1), North American confederation (1), African associations (1), Asian associations (1), Congress (4) |
The reorganisation committee’s European members saw allocating seats on the executive committee to the African and Asian associations as a concession, but this was not enough for the South American associations. What they wanted was to strengthen their confederation’s prerogatives, which they felt could best be achieved by adopting a more decentralised structure for FIFA based on South American-style continental groupings. Consequently, they tabled a counter-proposal for discussion at the congress in Helsinki in the summer of 1952.7 The forceful attitude adopted by South America’s delegates to the congress, during which they confronted Europe’s leaders over their Eurocentric attitudes, was motivated both by their dissatisfaction with the way the reform process was being conducted and by a desire to extend the debate so the congress would be unable to make a decision on the reform.
Two aspects of the Helsinki congress added to the singular nature of the event. First, Helsinki was soon to host the first Olympic Games in which the Soviet Union would compete (Dufraisse 2015); second, it was Jules Rimet’s final congress as FIFA’s president (Vonnard and Quin 2018b).8 The Helsinki congress would also mark a turning point in the discussions over reorganising FIFA. Uruguay’s Celestino Mibelli set the tone by beginning his speech with the phrase ‘On behalf of the South American associations…’, and then went on to criticise the Finnish delegate, von Frenckell, whose opening address to the congress had referred to the previous congress in Helsinki, in 1927, which had ended with the British associations deciding to leave FIFA. Mibelli saw this as a veiled insinuation that the South American delegates might mimic the British and walk out from FIFA, to which he responded by insisting that the South Americans had come to Helsinki in a spirit of understanding. Despite Rimet’s attempts to calm the situation and von Frenckell’s denials, the atmosphere when the debates began was already quite heated. Unfortunately, this initial expression of South American discontent was just an appetiser for the protracted discussions that were to come. Mibelli’s next target was FIFA’s secretary general, Kurt Gassmann, with whom he raised a variety of issues, ranging from the failure to invite any South Americans to discuss the upcoming World Cup to the procedure for obtaining the minutes of FIFA meetings. In the end, the South Americans’ strategy was successful, as the congress decided not to rule on FIFA’s new statutes in Helsinki but to hold an extraordinary congress on the issue the following year.
One controversy the Helsinki congress did address was the composition of the reorganisation committee. The South American associations, like their counterparts in the Soviet bloc, wanted to see the committee expanded to include representatives from other continents, which would allow them to strengthen alliances with other non-European associations in order to produce a more equitable balance of power within the committee. The leaders of several Western European associations, who had met the day before the congress, reacted strongly to South America’s request.9 Nevertheless, South America’s motion to include representatives from Asia and Africa was put to the vote. Although a small majority of the delegates supported the motion (23 votes for, 21 votes against), it was rejected, since it did not achieve the three-quarters majority required to pass. Details of how the delegates voted were not recorded, but the South American and Eastern European associations are likely to have voted for the proposal, and the Western European and British associations are likely to have voted against it.
Undaunted by their failure to change the composition of the reorganisation committee, the South American associations raised tensions still further by launching a new challenge to the European associations. After the congress had re-elected Rimet for a final term as president, attention turned to the vice-presidents who had come to the end of their mandates, most notably Seeldrayers, from Belgium. The election was expected to be a formality, as Seeldrayers had held the position for more than 20 years, so it was a shock when the South American associations nominated Argentina’s Domingo Peluffo to stand against him. South America’s move was supported by the Central American associations, thereby showing that the Central and South American associations were capable of presenting a united front on certain issues.10 In this case, as one Guatemalan delegate made clear, the aim was to give the Americas greater representation on the executive committee. The European associations (again, except those in the Soviet bloc) took a poor view of South America’s move and contested its legitimacy. Thommen, an influential member of the executive committee, felt that the procedure contravened FIFA’s statutes because South America had already appointed its representative to the executive committee. His opinion was seconded by Belgium’s François Meert, who asked the South American delegates to withdraw their candidate, whereas Denmark’s Ebbe Schwartz deemed the move to be ‘scandalous’. But the South Americans refused to back down and insisted that an election be held. In the end, Seeldrayers won by a large majority.
The confrontations at the Helsinki congress, which France Football described as a ‘tiff between Europe and South America,11 would have far-reaching consequences for FIFA’s reorganisation. In fact, two observations can be made concerning the events in Helsinki. First, the meeting may have been ‘characterised by its disorder and total lack of constructive work’,12 as José Crahay reported to his colleagues at the Belgian FA, but the discussions, especially those relating to organising an extraordinary congress to address the issue, showed there was now a consensus within FIFA on the need for structural reforms. Second, South America’s unity seems to have inspired Europe’s football associations. Looking back on this congress for UEFA’s 25th anniversary book, Crahay recalled that ‘on each of the subjects, a delegate from South America, not always the same, took the floor to discuss the general policy. It was apparent that each point had been considered, and that delegates had probably been appointed to press a point of view’ (Rothenbuehler 1979, p. 76). The South American associations’ modus operandi of holding regular meetings to discuss issues relating to South American football showed how important it was for Europe’s associations to continue meeting at frequent intervals, as they had begun doing at the end of May.
The Helsinki congress finally agreed to launch a new series of consultations on how to reform FIFA’s statutes and gave the national associations until September 1952 to submit proposals. Many national associations had obviously been dissatisfied with the reorganisation committee’s initial draft proposals, because FIFA’s secretariat received a total of 124 proposals, some reiterating suggestions made the previous year, others putting forward new ideas.
The committee’s bureau (composed of Seeldrayers, Gassmann, Barassi and Rous) met in London in November 1952 in order to sort through all the proposals, old and new, and to prioritise them, but the meeting did not include a representative from South America. These discussions produced a summary document, accompanied by a brief commentary co-signed by the four members of the bureau, which would be used as a working document for the subsequent reorganisation commission meeting.13 According to this document, two European associations, West Germany and Yugoslavia, had proposed setting up continental bodies within FIFA, although they differed in the form they felt these bodies should take. The idea of regionalising FIFA, long promoted by South America, clearly appears to have taken root among some European associations, even if the reorganisation committee’s bureau were yet to be won over. In fact, Seeldrayers, Gassmann, Barassi and Rous had come to accept creating regional bodies as a possibility for the near future, but they felt it was still too early to start the process.
Although the West German and Yugoslavian associations’ proposals were seen as ‘revolutionary’, they were both based on a Europe divided by the Cold War. This allowed the bureau to counter their proposals by arguing that a European confederation should include all 32 European football associations,14 a vision of European football that harked back to the situation before World War II (Vonnard 2018a, see Chapter 4). Their argument appeared irrefutable because, even if matches involving teams from both sides of the Iron Curtain were again being played,15 a pan-European confederation including football associations from East and West was still inconceivable, despite some initial discussions, and no such organisation existed in any field (e.g. science, culture, technology). The bureau therefore proposed maintaining the status quo, while confirming the previous year’s proposal to allocate seats on the executive committee to the African and Asian associations.
By a national association in the case of the Soviet bloc’s vice-president;
By groups of national associations in the case of the British vice-president, the South American vice-president and ordinary member, and the Central American, North American, African and Asian ordinary members;
By the rest of the national associations at the congress in the case of the remaining two vice-presidents and four ordinary members.16
These decisions were accepted by the reorganisation committee’s two South American members, who nevertheless proposed replacing the term ‘rest of the national associations’ by ‘Europe’. The new wording would have benefitted the South American associations in a number of ways. First, it would help them convince the European associations of the advantages of creating regional bodies within FIFA, as it showed that South America’s goal was not to completely overturn Europe’s domination of FIFA. Second, allocating the additional executive committee seats to the European associations would limit the number of non-European executive committee members and thereby protect South America’s position as the second most influential grouping within FIFA, with both a vice-president and an ordinary member. This desire to avoid giving the African and Asian associations too many seats on the executive committee was shared by Western Europe’s associations. Third, if executive committee seats were allocated to the European associations, they would have to choose the people who would occupy these seats and the most obvious way of doing this would be to create a continental body. However, Cold War divisions were likely to prevent this body presenting a truly united front and thereby give the South Americans, which had demonstrated their ability to work together at the 1952 congress, wider scope for action within FIFA.
Once again, the South Americans’ failed to obtain widespread support for their proposal among the other members of the committee. This was not due only to diverging views on how FIFA should be reformed; it was also the result of the difficulty the South American members had in creating alliances with their European counterparts. Unlike the other committee members, Ernesto Alveal and Alvaro Ramirez, the two South American delegates, were newcomers to the reorganisation committee, having been brought into replace Luis Valenzuela and Juan Russo in 1952.17 This lack of continuity was unhelpful and undoubtedly made it more difficult for the South Americans to gain the European members’ trust. An illustration of this is provided by a letter Seeldrayers wrote to FIFA’s secretary general, Kurt Gassmann, just after the reorganisation committee had rejected the South American motion, in which Seeldrayers acknowledged that their proposal made sense. Abandoning his usual reserve, he wrote: ‘After all, it may be the best method. As long as the British vice-president voted with his delegates and the president were European, Europe would have a majority on the [FIFA executive] committee and, through the president, the casting vote’.18 At the end of March, Seeldrayers told his executive committee colleagues that the proposed changes to FIFA’s statutes would not reform the federation’s structure and ‘quickly allayed fears that a European confederation could be formed as a counterweight to the South American confederation’.19 The challenge was now to convince the national associations to accept the new statutes.
The first stage in this process was to finalise the draft statutes that would be presented to FIFA’s member associations. To this end, the reorganisation committee’s bureau held a meeting at Thommen’s house in Basel,20 to which they also invited the committee’s Scandinavian representative, Ebbe Schwartz, who was in the city for a match between Denmark and Switzerland. Why the bureau took the unusual step of inviting a non-bureau member is unknown, but it was probably in order to gather as many opinions as possible on their proposed reforms, especially from Western European associations: Rous represented the British, Barassi (and Thommen, who undoubtedly took part in discussions outside the official meetings) represented the 20 European associations that had met in May and June 1952, and Schwartz represented the Scandinavians.
Discussions between the European associations that had co-signed a proposal to reform FIFA’s statutes in May 1952 (see Chapter 2) continued at other football events throughout the summer of 1953. For example, Yugoslavia held a conference in Split on 7–8 August 1953 in order to examine ways of improving the standard of European football21 and the possibility of creating a European youth tournament. Seven associations attended the conference,22 often represented by senior executives, such as Rous and Thommen.23 These men used the event as an additional opportunity to discuss the projected reforms to FIFA, including Yugoslavia’s proposal to set up continental groups.
In the end, the draft statues that were sent to the national associations prior to the extraordinary congress in November 1953 made no mention of South America’s proposal and did not explicitly allocate any seats on FIFA’s executive committee to Europe. In fact, they were more a set of amendments than a radical reform of FIFA’s structure.
So, what was the delegates’ state of mind as they converged on Paris in November 1953 for the extraordinary congress that would decide the future structure of FIFA? Thommen had used the executive committee meeting immediately prior to the congress to reiterate his opposition to regionalising FIFA while accepting the idea of allowing a continent’s national associations to join together in ‘an organisation enabling them to safeguard their interests’.24 His proposal reflects the concern felt by many European football leaders, who appeared to be preparing themselves for negotiations that could lead to a more substantial reform of FIFA’s structure. Thus, for the first time, Thommen suggested to his executive committee colleagues the idea of creating a European body.
Although none of the delegates had put forward any major counter-proposals to the draft statutes, the tension was palpable at a congress which L’Équipe expected to be ‘an rhetorical contest between Europe and Latin America’.25 The South American associations had come together in the run-up to the conference in order to define a common stance. A similar meeting was held by a group of 28 European associations, which, for the first time, included associations from the Soviet bloc. Although the European associations conceded the need to reform FIFA’s structure, they did not want to change it any substantial way without further reflection. Most importantly, they did not want to allocate any seats on the executive committee to the North American, African and Asian associations, as they felt that football in these regions was not yet sufficiently developed.
The [South American] associations wish to take part in this Congress, together with the other delegates, in order to ask for an assurance that South America will have the place within FIFA, to which it is entitled. Their intention [is] to co-operate with all, to work with and for FIFA. The unity which has been created in South America [is] proof of [our] respect for the greatness of FIFA itself.26
This speech showed the strength of the South (and Central) American associations’ will to obtain more seats on FIFA’s executive committee. Georges Hermesse, president of the Belgian FA, took the floor after Rotili and, in a completely new development, spoke on behalf of ‘a group of European associations’, which wanted to maintain the status quo and therefore proposed postponing the final decision to a future congress. Europe’s tactic of obstructing the reorganisation of FIFA was not only intended to buy time, it was also designed to provoke a reaction from the South American associations and, if necessary, pave the way for further discussions with them outside the congress in order to find common ground. In fact, FIFA’s reorganisation would be agreed ‘behind the scenes’,27 most notably at an informal meeting between South American and European leaders on the first evening of the congress.
4.2 The ‘Thommen Compromise’ and the Opening Route to UEFA’s Creation
the South Americans have come to cooperate, and they have been preparing for this for a long time. A step forward was taken at the Luxembourg congress [of 1946] by establishing a vice-president for the South American associations, and it [is] necessary to keep moving forward.30
The result of the meeting between the South American and European associations, which Thommen presented on day two of the congress, led to Article 17 being redrafted in order to give Africa and Asia the right to elect one ordinary executive committee member and the European associations the right to elect two vice-presidents and four ordinary members. Thommen explained that several of his colleagues at other European associations had come to see abandoning direct elections to the executive committee as inevitable. South America’s constant pressure, which could have led to long-lasting splits within FIFA, was undoubtedly a major factor in overcoming the last traces of resistance from Europe’s leaders. Thommen’s proposal also reflected a desire to adapt FIFA’s structure to the changes in international football being brought about by the new generation of European football executives, led by Thommen, Barassi and Rous. Thommen now had to convince the congress to approve his proposal. This would be a momentous decision for Europe because it would require football associations from both sides of the Iron Curtain to come together within a continental confederation. At that time, the only organisation to include all these countries was the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. It was even suggested that the new confederation could extend beyond Europe, as Thommen noted that the invitation to join the group ‘would also be addressed to the associations of the Middle East and North Africa’, many of which were still under colonial rule and could therefore be included within a European confederation. Nevertheless, the individual associations would be free to ‘decide if they wanted to follow up [the offer]’.31
Continuing in his role as spokesperson for the European associations, Georges Hermesse addressed the assembly for a second time at the very end of the congress. He appealed to delegates to approve Thommen’s proposal, pointing out the ‘sacrifice’ the European associations (at least those in Western Europe) had made by attributing seats on FIFA’s executive committee to the African and Asian associations. Given that Europe, with its two vice-presidents and four ordinary members, would still dominate the executive committee, his choice of the word ‘sacrifice’ is highly revealing of the Eurocentric and chauvinistic mindset of Europe’s football executives, who felt it was natural for Europe to lead FIFA. The European associations saw granting two executive committee seats to non-European associations as a concession made in the spirit of FIFA’s policy of defusing conflicts wherever possible and using the term ‘sacrifice’ can be seen as a way of emphasising to FIFA’s non-European leaders that Europe had taken a step in their direction.
Thommen’s proposal was well received by most of the delegates, particularly those from Africa and Asia. According to an Egyptian delegate, who was warmly applauded, it fulfilled the expectations of the countries of his continent. FIFA’s statutes, he added, must be adapted to the global context and safeguard the interests of all, a point of view that was reiterated by Vietnam’s Luong-Van-Hoa and Laos’ Oudong Sananikone. These reactions show the success of the Western European associations’ tactics and the failure of the Soviet bloc’s strategy to persuade non-European associations to support its position. Thanks to this Western European-South American alliance, the continentalisation of FIFA appeared to be moving forward. President Rimet called for a vote on whether or not the associations should create continental bodies, whose main task would be to elect the members of FIFA’s executive committee (Article 17 of the new statutes). Further pressure was put on the delegates by the fact that the vote would be held as a roll-call vote, following a demand from Rotili, representing South America, which was in favour of the reform, and Savin, representing the Soviet Union, which opposed it. Their insistence on using what was a highly unusual procedure for a FIFA congress reflects the continued tension between the two sides, which were prepared to use all available means to win over undecided delegates. In the end, the congress approved the ‘Thommen Compromise’ by a huge majority of 39 votes to 6, thanks to a coalition of associations from Western Europe, South America and other non-European countries. The only dissenting voices were those of the Soviet bloc, which had failed to build the hoped-for alliances with the African and Asian associations, or even with Yugoslavia, which abstained (see Sect. 2.3).
Composition of the executive committee according to the new draft FIFA statutes
Functions | Number of seats | Voting body |
|---|---|---|
President | 1 | Congress |
Vice-presidents | 5 | Group of European associations (2)a, South American confederation (1), British associations (1)b, Soviet Union (1)b |
Members | 8 | Group of European associations (4)a, South American confederation (1), Central American confederation (1), Group of African associations (1)a; Group of Asian associations (1)a |
all those who have had the honour of being placed at the head of the international federation, each appointed by his own country, bring to it a sentiment of unity, harmony and fairness which will enable your federation, which has already existed for 50 years, to go on for many years to come.32
Settling the highly contentious matter of the composition of the executive committee allowed the congress to move on to the many other decisions they had to make. However, these issues did not pose any real problems and were dealt with so quickly that Argentina’s Antonio Carrioli confessed to being ‘surprised at the pace of the debates and by the signs of impatience shown by delegates who had come from nearby countries, when others had come from much further away’.33 In their congress report for France Football, Max Urbini and Jean-Philippe Réthacker pointed out, somewhat mischievously, that the last 42 articles were covered in two hours, compared with the nine hours spent on article 17 alone.34 One of the congress’ final actions was to appoint a committee to draw up the new statutes. It consisted of Seeldrayers, Gassmann, Rous (responsible for the English version of the text) Delaunay (responsible for the French version) and Alvaro Ramirez (who would translate the document into Spanish). Europeans had once again monopolised a highly important task, thereby confirming their continued control over FIFA (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998).
A few days after the congress, one of the main players in the discussion, Georges Hermesse, told his colleagues at the Belgian FA that a ‘compromise formula concerning the composition of the executive committee and presented by the European associations had been accepted’.35 However, he did not mention the grouping the European associations now had to create. Seeldrayers was more enthusiastic, writing to Gassmann that the assembly had been a ‘triumph’36 and that proposals to completely change FIFA’s structure, in particular the idea of creating groups to run football on each continent, had been rejected.
In fact, the decisions taken in Paris did much more than introduce a new system for electing members to the executive committee; they launched a new era in FIFA’s history. As the following chapter shows, they would lead to the federation’s regionalisation and resulted in fundamental changes to how it functioned and a new division of tasks in the administration of international football. They also opened the door to creating a European football confederation. As I have tried to show in this chapter, this process must be viewed from a global perspective (Dietschy 2013) because, even though it revolved around decisions taken by European football executives, these decisions were highly influenced, or even, to a certain extent, forced upon them, by their South American colleagues.