PREFACE
1. All names and numbers have been modified not only to protect the privacy of our student and the confidentiality of the data we used but also for didactical reasons.
2. E. Tuncel, A. Mislin, S. Desebir, and R. Pinkley, “The Agreement Bias: Why Negotiators Prefer Bad Deals to No Deal at All” (working paper, Webster University, St. Louis, MO, 2013).
3. Many of our students ask us whether the doctor knew his patent would soon become worthless or whether this was sheer coincidence. They are somewhat disappointed when we tell them that we simply don’t know (and we suspect our client was equally in the dark). But in the end, it is simply irrelevant for the point we are making whether the doctor did or did not know about the competing patent. The situation presented our student an opportunity to reassess, and doing so would have revealed the new patent and that buying the doctor’s patent was not the right course of action.
CHAPTER ONE
1. Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
2. In 1970, American women were paid 59 cents for every dollar their male counterparts were paid; by 2010, the ratio was 77 cents to every dollar. A. Hegewisch, C. Williams, and A. Henderson, Institute for Women’s Policy Research Fact Sheet, The Gender Wage Gap 2010 (April 2011), http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-gender-wage-gap-2010-updated-march-2011.
3. M. S. Schmidt, “Upon Further Review, Players Support Replay,” New York Times, September 5, 2006, D2.
4. B. Shiv, H. Plassmann, A. Rangel, and J. O’Doherty, “Marketing Actions Can Modulate Neural Representations of Experienced Pleasantness,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 3 (2008): 1050–1054, http://www.pnas.org/content/105/3/1050.abstract.
5. Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson, Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils’ Intellectual Development (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).
6. C. M. Steele and J. Aronson, “Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69, no. 5 (1995): 797–811.
7. M. Shih, T. L. Pittinsky, and N. Ambady, “Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance,” Psychological Science 10 (1999): 81–84.
8. M. A. Belliveau, “Engendering Inequity? How Social Accounts Create Versus Merely Explain Unfavorable Pay Outcomes For Women,” Organizational Science 23 (2012): 1154–1174.
9. H. B. Reilly, L. Babcock, and K. L. McGinn, “Constraints and Triggers: Situational Mechanisms of Gender in Negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89, no. 6 (2005): 951–965.
10. L. L. Kray, L. Thompson, and A. Galinsky, “Battle of the Sexes: Stereotype Confirmation and Reactance in Negotiations,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80, no. 6 (2001): 942–958; L. Kray, A. Galinksy, and L. Thompson, “Reversing the Gender Gap in Negotiation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process 87 (2002): 386–410.
CHAPTER TWO
1. E. Tuncel, A. Mislin, S. Desebir, and R. Pinkley, “The Agreement Bias: Why Negotiators Prefer Bad Deals to No Deal at All” (working paper, Webster University, St. Louis, MO, 2013).
2. R. L. Pinkley, M. A. Neale, and R. J. Bennett, “The Impact of Alternatives to Settlement in Dyadic Negotiation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 57, no. 1 (1994): 97–116.
3. M. W. Morris, R. P. Larrick, and S. K. Su, “Misperceiving Negotiation Counterparts: When Situationally Determined Bargaining Behaviors Are Attributed to Personality Traits,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77, no. 1 (1999): 52.
4. For a great example of this phenomenon, see chapter 1 in Daniel Ariely’s book Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (New York: HarperCollins, 2008).
5. Some may argue that there is uncertainty regarding one’s reservation price. For example, what if the reservation price were $28 plus or minus $2? But all that this implies is the effective reservation price for the buyer is at most $30, not a penny more! We will continue the discussion of reservation prices in Chapter 3.
6. V. L. Huber and M. A. Neale, “Effects of Self-and Competitor Goals on Performance in an Interdependent Bargaining Task,” Journal of Applied Psychology 72, no. 2 (1987): 197; V. L. Huber and M. A. Neale, “Effects of Cognitive Heuristics and Goals on Negotiator Performance and Subsequent Goal Setting,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 38, no. 3 (1986): 342–365.
7. R. L. Pinkley, M. A. Neale, and R. J. Bennett, “The Impact of Alternatives to Settlement in Dyadic Negotiation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 57, no. 1 (1994): 97–116.
8. S. S. Wiltermuth and M. A. Neale, “Too Much Information: The Perils of Nondiagnostic Information in Negotiations,” Journal of Applied Psychology 96, no. 1 (2011): 192.
9. A. Galinsky, T. Mussweiler, and V. Medvec, “Disconnecting Outcomes and Evaluations in Negotiation: The Role of Negotiator Focus,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2002): 1131–1140.
CHAPTER THREE
1. D. G. Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1981).
2. At this point, we will act as if we have full information about the reservation prices of both parties, and that both parties know their individual reservation prices with certainty.
3. Of course, one of the parties could agree to a deal that violates their reservation price, allowing a deal to be struck.
4. E. Tuncel, A. Mislin, S. Desebir, and R. Pinkley, “The Agreement Bias: Why Negotiators Prefer Bad Deals to No Deal at All” (working paper, Webster University, St. Louis, MO, 2013).
1. In economic terms, an action that makes at least one party better off without hurting the other party is referred to as weakly Pareto efficient. (A process that leaves both parties better off is referred to as strongly Pareto efficient.) The Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) developed this concept to study economic efficiency and income distribution. You may have noticed that we have inserted the qualifier “has the benefit of potentially making at least one party better off without hurting the other.” As we discuss in Chapter 6, the process of value creation can have a detrimental effect, leaving one party worse off than it would have been had less value been created.
2. S. Wiltermuth, L. Z. Tiedens, and M. A. Neale, “The Benefits of Dominance Complementarity in Negotiations,” Negotiations and Conflict Management Research (in press).
3. Literarily, this assumption implies that Thomas would be indifferent between paying $160 if the tires were delivered in 45 days and $610 per tire ($160 + ($10 × 45)) if the tires were delivered instantly. We make this assumption for ease of exposition. In reality, Thomas’s willingness to increase the price is likely to decrease as the delivery time is reduced, say $10 to reduce the time to delivery by one day, $8 for the next day, and so on. While such an assumption would be more realistic, it would only complicate what we are trying to establish for now without adding any additional insights.
4. D. M. Messick and C. G. McClintock, “Motivational Bases of Choice in Experimental Games,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 4, no. 1, (1968): 1–25.
5. For more detail about this type of value-creating strategy, see M. H. Bazerman and J. J. Gillespie, “Betting on the Future: The Virtues of Contingent Contracts,” Harvard Business Review (September–October 1999).
6. Of course, this is not the real name of the architectural firm!
CHAPTER FIVE
1. Jeffrey T. Polzer and Margaret A. Neale, “Constraints or Catalysts? Reexamining Goal Setting within the Context of Negotiation,” Human Performance 8 (1995): 3–26.
2. G. Marks and N. Miller, “Ten Years of Research on the False-Consensus Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical Review,” Psychological Bulletin 102, no. 1 (1987): 72.
3. J. Cao and K. W. Phillips, “Team Diversity and Information Acquisition: How Homogeneous Teams Set Themselves Up to Have Less Conflict” (working paper, Columbia Business School, 2013).
4. A. F. Stuhlmacher and A. E. Walters, “Gender Differences in Negotiation Outcome: A Meta-Analysis,” Personnel Psychology 52, no. 3 (1999): 653–677; H. R. Bowles, L. Babcock, and K. L. McGinn, “Constraints and Triggers: Situational Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89, no. 6 (2005): 951.
5. M. W. Morris, R. P. Larrick, and S. K. Su, “Misperceiving Negotiation Counterparts: When Situationally Determined Bargaining Behaviors Are Attributed to Personality Traits,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77, no. 1 (1999): 52.
6. The car dealer could attempt to get a higher price (distributive issue) for the upscale audio option (integrative issue), but there might be more value created if the upscale audio option was yoked to the financing rate (another integrative issue).
7. T. Wilson, D. Lisle, D. Kraft, and C. Wetzel, “Preferences as Expectations-Driven Inferences: Effects of Affective Expectations on Affective Experiences,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56 (1989): 519–530.
8. L. Lee, S. Frederick, and D. Ariely, “Try It, You’ll Like It,” Psychological Science 17 (2006): 1054–1058.
9. C. H. Tinsley, K. M. O’Connor, and B. A. Sullivan, “Tough Guys Finish Last: The Perils of a Distributive Reputation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 88, no. 2 (2002): 621–642; M. A. Neale and A. R. Fragale, “Social Cognition, Attribution, and Perception in Negotiation: The Role of Uncertainty in Shaping Negotiation Processes and Outcomes,” in Negotiation Theory and Research, ed. L. Thompson, 27–54 (New York: Psychology Press, 2006).
10. B. M. Staw, L. E. Sandelands, and J. E. Dutton, “Threat Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis,” Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 501–524; W. Ocasio, “The Enactment of Economic Adversity–A Reconciliation of Theories of Failure-Induced Change and Threat-Rigidity,” Research in Organizational Behavior: An Annual Series of Analytical Essays and Critical Reviews 17 (1995): 287–331.
11. A. W. Kruglanski, “The Psychology of Being ‘Right’: The Problem of Accuracy in Social Perception and Cognition,” Psychological Bulletin 106 (1989): 395–409.
12. A. W. Kruglanski and D. M. Webster, “Motivated Closing of the Mind: ‘Seizing and freezing,’ Psychological Review 103 (1996): 263–283; O. Mayseless and A. W. Kruglanski, “What Makes You So Sure? Effects of Epistemic Motivations on Judgmental Confidence,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 39 (1987): 162–183; D. Webster and A. W. Kruglanski, “Individual Differences in Need for Cognitive Closure,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67 (1994): 1049–1062.
13. C. K. W. De Dreu, “Time Pressure and Closing of the Mind in Negotiation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 91 (2003): 280–295.
14. S. Chaiken and Y. Trope, eds., Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology (New York: Guilford Press, 1999).
15. J. S. Lerner and P. E. Tetlock, “Accounting for the Effects of Accountability,” Psychological Bulletin 125 (1999): 255–275; P. E. Tetlock, “The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice: Toward a Social Contingency Model,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 25, ed. L. Berkowitz, 331–376 (New York: Academic Press, 1992).
16. R. E. Petty and J. T. Cacioppo, “The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 19, ed. L. Berkowitz, 123–205 (New York: Academic Press, 1986).
17. C. K. W. De Dreu, S. Koole, and W. Steinel, “Unfixing the Fixed-Pie: A Motivated Information Processing of Integrative Negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79 (2000): 975–987.
CHAPTER SIX
1. But even in this extreme case, research shows that dictators take the interests of their “subjects” at least partially into account. See, for example, T. N. Cason and V. L. Mui, “Social Influence in the Sequential Dictator Game,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 42, no. 2 (1998): 248–265; G. E. Bolton, E. Katok, and R. Zwick, “Dictator Game Giving: Rules of Fairness versus Acts of Kindness,” International Journal of Game Theory 27, no. 2 (1998): 269–299.
2. One example of extending the rational approach to one which takes systematic irrationality into account can be found in Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Macmillan, 2011).
3. W. Güth and R. Tietz, “Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results,” Journal of Economic Psychology 11, no. 3 (1990): 417–449.
4. J. Henrich, “Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon,” American Economic Review, 2000, 973–979; H. Oosterbeek, R. Sloof, and G. Van De Kuilen, “Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis,” Experimental Economics 7, no. 2 (2004): 171–188.
5. S. J. Solnick, “Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game,” Economic Inquiry 39, no. 2 (2001): 189–200.
6. S. B. Ball, M. H. Bazerman, and J. S. Carroll, “An Evaluation of Learning in the Bilateral Winner’s Curse,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 48, no. 1 (1991): 1–22.
7. We often see such an affinity to the middle point between the two reservation prices—even though there is no reason why the middle point is any better or fairer than any other point between the two reservation prices. Even if you were to privilege the middle as more “fair,” this would require that you know both reservation prices—an unlikely condition.
8. While such extreme differences in information are unusual (T knows for certain, while you only know the distribution), the result would be similar (although the mathematics would be much more complicated) as long as T has an informational advantage over you.
9. In fact, rational buyers will realize that no offer should be made in this case—the information asymmetry is simply too big to be offset by the 50% synergy. For example, if you were to offer $30, an accepted offer indicates that T has less than $30 worth of oil—or $15 on average. Adding a synergy of 50% leads to an expected loss of $7.50 if your $30 offer were accepted. Indeed, the expected synergies would have to be at least 100% for you to expect to at least break even on average.
10. Because you are indifferent between accepting or rejecting an offer at your reservation price, your counterpart is better off offering slightly more and “tipping” you over your reservation price.
11. Remember that in our example in Chapter 2, $30 was your reservation price for the theater ticket you were trying to purchase!
12. S. B. White and M. A. Neale, “The Role of Negotiator Aspirations and Settlement Expectancies in Bargaining Outcomes,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 57, no. 2 (1994): 303–317.
13. D. M. Messick and C. G. McClintock, “Motivational Bases of Choice in Experimental Games,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 4, no. 1 (1968): 1–25.
CHAPTER SEVEN
1. For example, in Australia, residential real estate is typically not listed for sale as it is in the United States but auctioned off. Thus, sellers in Australia do not make a “first offer.” Rather, it is the prospective buyers who make first offers.
2. N. G. Miller and M. A. Sklarz, “Pricing Strategies and Residential Property Selling Prices,” Journal of Real Estate Research 2, no. 1 (1987): 31–40.
3. P. Slovic and S. Lichtenstein, “Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 6, no. 6 (1971): 649–744.
4. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science 185 (1974): 1124–1131.
5. G. B. Northcraft and M. A. Neale, “Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring and Adjustment Perspective on Property Price Decisions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 39 (1986): 228–241.
6. H. J. Einhorn and R. M. Hogarth, “Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic Inference,” Psychological Review 92 (1985): 433–461.
7. Adam D. Galinsky and Thomas Mussweiler, “First Offers as Anchors: The Role of Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 4 (2001): 657; A. D. Galinsky, T. Mussweiler, and V. H. Medvec, “Disconnecting Outcomes and Evaluations: The Role of Negotiator Focus,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2002): 1131–1140.
8. V. L. Huber and M. A. Neale, “Effects of Cognitive Heuristics and Goals on Negotiator Performance and Subsequent Goal Setting,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 38, no. 3 (1986): 342–365.
9. Galinsky and Musweiller, “First Offers as Anchors.”
10. E. J. Langer, A. Blank, and B. Chanowitz, “The Mindlessness of Ostensibly Thoughtful Action: The Role of ‘Placebic’ Information in Interpersonal Interaction,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36, no. 6 (1978): 635; R. J. Bies and D. L. Shapiro, “Interactional Fairness Judgments: The Influence of Causal Accounts,” Social Justice Research 1, no. 2 (1987): 199–218.
11. N. Epley and T. Gilovich, “Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic: Differential Processing of Self-Generated and Experimenter-Provided Anchors,” Psychological Science 12 (2001): 391–396. N. Epley and T. Gilovich, “When Effortful Thinking Influences Judgmental Anchoring: Differential Effects of Forewarning and Incentives on Self-Generated and Externally Provided Anchors,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 18 (2005): 199–212; N. Epley and T. Gilovich, “The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the Adjustments Are Insufficient,” Psychological Science 17 (2006): 311–318.
12. M. F. Mason, A. J. Lee, E. A. Wiley, and D. R. Ames, “Precise Offers Are Potent Anchors: Conciliatory Counteroffers and Attributions of Knowledge in Negotiations,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49, no. 4 (2013): 759–763; C. Janiszewski and Dan Uy, “Precision of the Anchor Influences the Amount of Adjustment,” Psychological Science 19 (2008): 121–127.
13. A. D. Galinsky, V. Seiden, P. H. Kim, and V. H. Medvec, “The Dissatisfaction of Having Your First Offer Accepted: The Role of Counterfactual Thinking in Negotiations,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28 (2002): 271–283.
14. U. Simonsohn and D. Ariely, “When Rational Sellers Face Nonrational Buyers: Evidence from Herding on eBay,” Management Science 54, no. 9 (2008): 1624–1637.
CHAPTER EIGHT
1. C. K. W. De Dreu and T. L. Boles, “Share and Share Alike or Winner Take All? The Influence of Social Value Orientation upon Choice and Recall of Negotiation Heuristics,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 76 (1998): 253–276; G. A. van Kleef and C. K. W. De Dreu, “Social Value Orientation and Impression Formation: A Test of Two Competing Hypotheses about Information Search in Negotiation,” International Journal of Conflict Management 13 (2002): 59–77.
2. J. R. Curhan, M. A. Neale, and L. Ross, “Dynamic Valuation: Preference Changes in the Context of a Face-to-Face Negotiation,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 40 (2004): 142–151; I. Ma’oz, A. Ward, M. Katz, and L. Ross, “Reactive Devaluation of an ‘Israeli’ vs. ‘Palestinian’ Peace Proposal,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (2002): 515–546; L. Ross, “Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution,” in Barriers to Conflict Resolution, ed. K. Arrow, R. H. Mnookin, L. Ross, A. Tversky, and R. Wilson, 26–42 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995); L. Ross and A. Ward, “Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 27, ed. M. Zanna, 255–304 (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1995); Lee Ross and Constance Stillinger, “Barriers to Conflict Resolution,” Negotiation Journal 8 (1991): 389–404.
3. S. Kwon and L. Weingart, “Unilateral Concession from the Other Party: Concession Behavior, Attributions and Negotiation Judgments,” Journal of Applied Psychology 8 (2004): 263–278.
4. The U.S. tax code provides no taxes on the first $500,000 of capital gains on one’s principal residence. That is, you owe no taxes if you bought your principal residence of $1,000,000 and sold it for $1,500,000 or less. On the other hand, if you sold that principal residence for $1,600,000, your profit on the sale is $600,000 and, assuming a capital gains tax of 25 percent, you owe $25,000 since your profit in excess of $500,000 is $100,000.
5. D. G. Pruitt and J. Z. Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (New York: Random House, 1986).
6. O. Ben-Yoav and D. Pruitt, “Resistance to Yielding and the Expectation of Cooperative Future Interaction in Negotiation,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 20 (1984): 323–353; O. Ben-Yoav and D. Pruitt, “Accountability to Constituents: A Two-Edged Sword,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 34 (1984): 282–295.
7. K. M. O’Connor, J. A. Arnold, and E. R. Burris, “Negotiators’ Bargaining Histories and Their Effects on Future Negotiation Performance,” Journal of Applied Psychology 90, no. 2 (2005): 350.
8. R. R. Vallacher and D. M. Wegner, “Levels of Personal Agency: Individual Variation in Action Identification,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57 (1989): 660–671.
9. C. H. Tinsley, K. M. O’Connor, and B. A. Sullivan, “Tough Guys Finish Last: The Perils of a Distributive Reputation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 88 (2002): 621–642.
10. K. M. O’Connor and J. A. Arnold, “Distributive Spirals: Negotiation Impasses and the Moderating Effects of Disputant Self-Efficacy,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 84 (2001): 148–176.
11. K. M. O’Connor, J. A. Arnold, and E. R. Burris, “Negotiators’ Bargaining Histories and Their Effects on Future Negotiation Performance,” Journal of Applied Psychology 90 (2005): 350–362.
12. J. J. Halpern, “The Effect of Friendship on Personal Business Transactions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 4 (1994): 647–664.
13. Ultimately, this paradox is at the center of George Akerlof’s famous paper, see George A. Akerlof, “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 488–500.
14. T. L. Morton, “Intimacy and Reciprocity of Exchange: A Comparison of Spouses and Strangers,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36 (1978): 72–81.
15. K. L. Valley, M. A. Neale, and E. A. Mannix, “Friends, Lovers, Colleagues, Strangers: The Effects of Relationships on the Process and Outcome of Dyadic Negotiations,” Research on Negotiation in Organizations 5 (1995): 65–94.
16. L. L. Thompson and T. DeHarpport, “Negotiation in Long-Term Relationships” (paper presented at the International Association for Conflict Management, Vancouver, Canada, 1990).
17. E. Amanatullah, M. Morris, and J. Curhan, “Negotiators Who Give Too Much: Unmitigated Communion, Relational Anxieties, and Economic Costs in Distributive and Integrative Bargaining,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95 (2008): 723–728; J. Curhan, M. Neale, L. Ross, and J. Rosencranz-Engelmann, “Relational Accommodation in Negotiation: Effects of Egalitarianism and Gender on Economic Efficiency and Relational Capital,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 107 (2008): 192–205.
18. J. B. White, “The Politeness Paradox: Getting the Terms You Want without Sacrificing the Relationship You Need” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Association for Conflict Management, Instanbul, July 2011).
19. E. Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1967).
20. J. R. Curhan, H. A. Elfenbein, and G. J. Kilduff, “Getting Off on the Right Foot: Subjective Value versus Economic Value in Predicting Longitudinal Job Outcomes from Job Offer Negotiations,” Journal of Applied Psychology 94, no. 2 (2009): 524.
21. M. Davis, “Measuring Individual Differences in Empathy: Evidence for a Multidimensional Approach,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 44 (1983): 113–126.
22. M. Neale and M. Bazerman, “The Role of Perspective Taking Ability in Negotiating under Different Forms of Arbitration,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 36 (1983): 378–388.
23. N. Epley and E. M. Caruso, “Egocentric Ethics,” Social Justice Research 17, no. 2 (2004): 171–187.
24. A. Galinsky and T. Mussweiler, “First Offers as Anchors: The Role of Perspective Taking and Negotiator Focus,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (2001): 657–669; A. D. Galinsky, G. Ku, and C. S. Wang, “Perspective-Taking and Self–Other Overlap: Fostering Social Bonds and Facilitating Social Coordination,” Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 8 (2005): 109–124.
25. A. Galinsky, W. Maddux, D. Gilin, and J. White, “Why It Pays to Get Inside the Head of Your Opponent,” Psychological Science 19 (2008): 378–384.
1. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 40 (1981): 453–463.
2. Example adapted from Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993).
3. M. J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World (New York: Springer US, 1980), 9–30.
4. M. J. Lerner and D. T. Miller, “Just World Research and the Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead,” Psychological Bulletin 85, no. 5 (1978): 1030.
5. On August 20, 2012, President Barack Obama is reported to have said: “We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.” Statement to reporters at White House, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/.
6. M. Sinaceur and M. A. Neale, “Not All Threats Are Created Equal: How Implicitness and Timing Affect the Effectiveness of Threats in Negotiations,” Group Decision and Negotiation 14, no. 1 (2005): 63–85.
CHAPTER TEN
1. We are reminded of the Goethe’s “Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” a poem written in 1797 which in summary suggests that “powerful spirits should only be called by the master himself.”
2. G. I. Nierenberg, The Art of Negotiating: Psychological Strategies for Gaining Advantageous Bargains (Lyndhurst, NJ: Barnes & Noble Publishing, 1995), 46.
3. J. Gross, “Emotional Regulation in Adulthood: Timing Is Everything,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 10 (2001): 214–219.
4. J. Gross, “Emotional Regulation: Affective, Cognitive and Social Consequences,” Psychophysiology 39 (2003): 281–291.
5. E. A. Butler, B. Egloff, F. H. Wilhelm, N. C. Smith, and J. J. Gross, “The Social Consequences of Emotional Regulation,” Emotions 3 (2003): 48–67.
6. R. B. Zajonc, “Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences,” American Psychologist 35, no. 2 (1980): 151.
7. F. Strack, L. L. Martin, and S. Stepper, “Inhibiting and Facilitating Conditions of the Human Smile: A Nonobtrusive Test of the Facial Feedback Hypothesis,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54 (1998): 768.
8. A. M. Isen, K. A. Daubman, and G. P. Nowicki, “Positive Affect Facilitates Creative Problem Solving,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52, no. 6 (1987): 1122; B. L. Fredrickson, “The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive Psychology: The Broaden-and-Build Theory of Positive Emotions,” American Psychologist 56, no. 3 (2001): 218; G. F. Loewenstein, L. Thompson, and M. H. Bazerman, “Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57, no. 3 (1989): 426; M. M. Pillutla and J. K. Murnighan, “Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 68, no. 3 (1996): 208–224; K. G. Allred, J. S. Mallozzi, F. Matsui, and C. P. Raia, “The Influence of Anger and Compassion on Negotiation Performance,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 70, no. 3 (1997): 175–187.
9. G. V. Bodenhausen, G. P. Kramer, and K. Süsser, “Happiness and Stereotypic Thinking in Social Judgment,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 66, no. 4 (1994): 621. See also H. Bless, G. L. Clore, N. Schwarz, V. Golisano, C. Rabe, and M. Wölk, “Mood and the Use of Scripts: Does a Happy Mood Really Lead to Mindlessness?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71, no. 4 (1996): 665.
10. G. V. Bodenhausen, L. A. Sheppard, and G. P. Kramer, “Negative Affect and Social Judgment: The Differential Impact of Anger and Sadness,” European Journal of Social Psychology 24, no. 1 (1994): 45–62.
11. J. P. Forgas, “Don’t Worry, Be Sad! On the Cognitive, Motivational and Interpersonal Benefits of Negative Mood,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 2, (2013): 225–232; L. Z. Tiedens and S. Linton, “Judgment under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of Specific Emotions on Information Processing,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 6 (2001): 973.
12. L. Z. Tiedens and S. Linton, “Judgment under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of Specific Emotions on Information Processing,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 6 (2001): 973.
13. J. S. Lerner and L. Z. Tiedens, “Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 19, no. 2 (2006): 115–137.
14. J. S. Lerner and L. Z. Tiedens, “Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 19, no. 2 (2006): 115–137; J. S. Lerner and D. Keltner, “Fear, Anger, and Risk,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 1 (2001) 146; P. Shaver, J. Schwartz, D. Kirson, and C. O’Connor, “Emotion Knowledge: Further Exploration of a Prototype Approach,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52, no. 6 (1987): 1061.
15. J. S. Lerner and L. Z. Tiedens, “Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 19, no. 2 (2006): 115–137.
16. P. J. Carnevale and A. M. Isen, “The Influence of Positive Affect and Visual Access on the Discovery of Integrative Solutions in Bilateral Negotiation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 37, no. 1 (1986): 1–13.
17. N. R. Anderson and M. A. Neale, “All Fired Up but No One to Blame” (working paper, Stanford Psychology Department, Palo Alto, CA, 2006).
18. M. A. Neale, S. Wiltermuth, and C. Cargle, “Emotion and the Uncertainty Of Negotiation” (working paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Palo Alto, CA, 2009).
19. N. R. Anderson and M. A. Neale, “All Fired Up.”
20. N. R. Anderson and M. A. Neale, “The Role of Emotions and Uncertainty in Negotiations” (working paper, Psychology Department, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 2008).
21. E. J. Johnson and A. Tversky, “Representations of Perceptions of Risks,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 113, no. 1 (1984): 55; A. M. Isen and B. Means, “The Influence of Positive Affect on Decision-Making Strategy,” Social Cognition 2, no. 1 (1983): 18–31.
22. J. S. Lerner and L. Z. Tiedens, “Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 19, no. 2 (2006): 115–137.
23. J. S. Lerner and D. Keltner, “Fear, Anger, and Risk,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 1 (2001): 146.
24. R. S. Adler, B. Rosen, and E. M. Silverstein, “Emotions in Negotiation: How to Manage Fear and Anger,” Negotiation Journal 14, no. 2 (1998): 161–179; K. G. Allred, “Anger and Retaliation: Toward an Understanding of Impassioned Conflict in Organizations,” Research on Negotiation in Organizations 7 (1999): 27–58; L. L. Thompson, The Truth about Negotiations (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2008).
25. J. P. Daly, “The Effects of Anger on Negotiations over Mergers and Acquisitions,” Negotiation Journal 7, no. 1 (1991): 31–39.
26. P. J. Carnevale, “Positive Affect and Decision Frame in Negotiation,” Group Decision and Negotiation 17, no. 1 (2008): 51–63.
27. S. G. Barsade, “The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and Its Influence on Group Behavior,” Administrative Science Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2002): 644–675; J. P. Forgas, “On Feeling Good and Getting Your Way: Mood Effects on Negotiator Cognition and Bargaining Strategies,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74, no. 3 (1998): 565; S. Lyubomirsky, L. King, and E. Diener, “The Benefits of Frequent Positive Affect: Does Happiness Lead to Success?” Psychological Bulletin 131, no. 6 (2005): 803.
28. M. Sinaceur and L. Z. Tiedens, “Get Mad and Get More than Even: The Benefits of Anger Expressions in Negotiations,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42 (2006): 314–322.
29. G. A. Van Kleef, C. K. W. De Dreu, and A. S. R. Manstead, “The Interpersonal Effects of Anger and Happiness in Negotiations,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86 (2004): 57–76.
30. M. Sinaceur, D. Vasiljevic, and M. Neale, “Surprise Expression in Group Decisions: When an Emotional Expression Affects the Quality of Group Members’ Processing and Decision Accuracy” (working paper, INSEAD, Fountainbleau, France, 2014).
31. S. D. Pugh, “Service with a Smile: Emotional Contagion in the Service Encounter,” Academy of Management Journal 44, no. 5 (2001): 1018–1027; S. Kopelman, A. S. Rosette, and L. Thompson, “The Three Faces of Eve: Strategic Displays of Positive, Negative, and Neutral Emotions in Negotiations,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 99, no. 1 (2006): 81–101.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
1. R. M. Emerson, “Power-Dependence Relations,” American Sociological Review 27, (1962): 31–41.
2. D. Keltner, D. Gruenfeld, and C. Anderson, “Power, Approach and Inhibition,” Psychological Review 10 (2003): 265–285.
3. J. C. Magee, A. D. Galinsky, and D. H. Gruenfeld, “Power, Propensity to Negotiate, and Moving First in Competitive Interactions,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 33, no. 2 (2007): 200–212.
4. B. Woodward, State of Denial (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).
5. D. H. Gruenfeld, M. E. Inesi, J. C. Magee, and A. D. Galinsky, “Power and the Objectification of Social Targets,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95, no. 1 (2008): 111.
6. E. A. Mannix and M. A. Neale, “Power Imbalance and the Pattern of Exchange in Dyadic Negotiation,” Group Decision and Negotiation 2, no. 2 (1993): 119–133.
7. Just keep in mind as you read on that because something is simple to explain does not mean that it is easy to implement!
8. A. D. Galinsky, E. Chou, N. Halevy, and G. A. Van Kleef, “The Far Reaching Effects of Power: At the Individual, Dyadic, and Group Levels,” in Research on Managing Groups and Teams, vol. 15: Looking Back, Moving Forward, ed. Margaret A. Neale and Elizabeth A. Mannix, 185–207 (Bringley, UK: Emerald Publishing, 2013).
9. P. Belmi and M. Neale, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who’s the Fairest of Them All? Thinking That One Is Attractive Increases the Tendency to Support Inequality,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 124, no. 2 (2014): 133–149.
10. D. R. Carney, A. J. Cuddy, and A. J. Yap, “Power Posing Brief Nonverbal Displays Affect Neuroendocrine Levels and Risk Tolerance,” Psychological Science 21, no. 10 (2010): 1363–1368. See also the TED talk by Amy Cuddy, www.ted.com/talks/amy_cuddy_your_body_language_shapes_who_you_are.html.
11. D. J. Kiesler, “The 1982 Interpersonal Circle: A Taxonomy for Complementarity in Human Transactions,” Psychological Review 90, no. 3 (1983): 185; J. S. Wiggins, “A Psychological Taxonomy of Trait-Descriptive Terms: The Interpersonal Domain,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, no. 3 (1979): 395; J. S. Wiggins, “Circumplex Models of Interpersonal Behavior in Clinical Psychology,” in Handbook of Research Methods in Clinical Psychology, ed. P. S. Kendall and J. N. Butcher, 183–221 (New York: Wiley, 1982).
12. R. C. Carson, Interaction Concepts of Personality (Oxford, UK: Aldine, 1969); L. M. Horowitz, K. D. Locke, M. B. Morse, S. V. Waikar, D. C. Dryer, E. Tarnow, and J. Ghannam, “Self-Derogations and the Interpersonal Theory,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61, no. 1 (1991): 68; L. M. Horowitz, K. R. Wilson, B. Z. P. Turan, M. J. Constantino, and L. Henderson, “How Interpersonal Motives Clarify the Meaning of Interpersonal Behavior: A Revised Circumplex Model,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 10 (2006): 67–86; D. J. Kiesler, “The 1982 Interpersonal Circle: A Taxonomy for Complementarity in Human Transactions,” Psychological Review 90, no. 3 (1983): 185.
13. S. R. Blumberg and J. E. Hokanson, “The Effects of Another Person’s Response Style on Interpersonal Behavior in Depression,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 92, no. 2 (1983): 196; L. M. Horowitz, K. R. Wilson, B. Z. P. Turan, M. J. Constantino, and L. Henderson, “How Interpersonal Motives Clarify the Meaning of Interpersonal Behavior: A Revised Circumplex Model,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 10 (2006): 67–86; P. M. Markey, D. C. Funder, and D. J. Ozer, “Complementarity of Interpersonal Behaviors in Dyadic Interactions,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29, no. 9 (2003): 1082–1090.
14. S. S. Wiltermuth, L. Z. Tiedens, and M. A. Neale, “The Benefits of Dominance Complementarity in Negotiations,” Negotiations and Conflict Management Research (in press).
15. J. S. Carroll, M. H. Bazerman, and R. Maury, “Negotiator Cognitions: A Descriptive Approach to Negotiators’ Understanding of Their Opponents,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 41, no. 3 (1988): 352–370; M. J. Prietula and L. R. Weingart, “Negotiation as Problem Solving,” Advances in Managerial Cognition and Organizational Information Processing 5 (1994): 187–213.
16. L. Z. Tiedens, M. M. Unzueta, and M. J. Young, “An Unconscious Desire for Hierarchy? The Motivated Perception of Dominance Complementarity in Task Partners,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 93, no. 3 (2007): 402.
17. S. D. Levitt, “Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 163–190.
18. J. A. Hall, E. J. Coats, and L. S. LeBeau, “Nonverbal Behavior and the Vertical Dimension of Social Relations: A Meta-Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 131, no. 6 (2005): 898.
19. For a review, see T. L. Chartrand, W. W. Maddux, and J. L. Lakin, “Beyond the Perception-Behavior Link: The Ubiquitous Utility and Motivational Moderators of Nonconscious Mimicry,” in The New Unconscious ed. R. R. Hassin, J. S. Uleman, and J. A. Bargh, 334–361 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
20. F. J. Bernieri, “Coordinated Movement and Rapport in Teacher-Student Interactions,” Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 12, no. 2 (1988): 120–138; see also M. LaFrance, “Nonverbal Synchrony and Rapport: Analysis by the Cross-Lag Panel Technique,” Social Psychology Quarterly 42 (1979): 66–70; M. LaFrance, “Posture Mirroring and Rapport,” in Interaction Rhythms: Periodicity in Communicative Behavior, ed. M. Davis, 279–298 (New York: Human Sciences Press, 1982).
21. R. B. Van Baaren, R. W. Holland, B. Steenaert, and A. van Knippenberg, “Mimicry for Money: Behavioral Consequences of Imitation,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39, no. 4 (2003): 393–398.
22. R. B. Van Baaren, R. W. Holland, K. Kawakami, and A. Van Knippenberg, “Mimicry and Prosocial Behavior,” Psychological Science 15, no. 1 (2004): 71–74.
23. J. L. Lakin and T. L. Chartrand, “Using Nonconscious Behavioral Mimicry to Create Affiliation and Rapport,” Psychological Science 14, no. 4 (2003): 334–339; R. B. van Baaren, W. W. Maddux, T. L. Chartrand, C. de Bouter, and A. van Knippenberg, “It Takes Two to Mimic: Behavioral Consequences of Self-Construals,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84, no. 5 (2003): 1093; T. L. Chartrand and J. A. Bargh, “The Chameleon Effect: The Perception–Behavior Link and Social Interaction,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76, no. 6 (1999): 893; C. M. Cheng and T. L. Chartrand, “Self-Monitoring without Awareness: Using Mimicry as a Nonconscious Affiliation Strategy,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85, no. 6 (2003): 1170.
24. N. Yee, J. N. Bailenson, M. Urbanek, F. Chang, and D. Merget, “The Unbearable Likeness of Being Digital: The Persistence of Nonverbal Social Norms in Online Virtual Environments,” CyberPsychology and Behavior 10, no. 1 (2007): 115–121; J. Blascovich, J. Loomis, A. C. Beall, K. R. Swinth, C. L. Hoyt, and J. N. Bailenson, “Immersive Virtual Environment Technology as a Methodological Tool for Social Psychology,” Psychological Inquiry 13, no. 2 (2002): 103–124.
25. W. Maddux, E. Mullen, and A. Galinksy, “Chameleons Bake Bigger Pies and Take Bigger Pieces: Strategic Behavioral Mimicry Facilitates Negotiation Outcomes,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008): 461–468.
26. S. S. Wiltermuth and M. A. Neale, “Master of the Universe versus the Chameleon: Comparing the Effects of Complementarity and Mimicry in Negotiation Behavior” (working paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA, 2008).
27. T. L. Chartrand, W. W. Maddux, and J. L. Lakin, “Beyond the Perception-Behavior Link: The Ubiquitous Utility and Motivational Moderators of Nonconscious Mimicry,” in Unintended Thought 2: The New Unconscious, ed. R. Hassin, J. Uleman, and J. A. Bargh, 334–361 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
28. M. LaFrance, “Nonverbal Synchrony and Rapport: Analysis by the Cross-Lag Panel Technique,” Social Psychology Quarterly 42 (1979): 66–70.
29. Maddux, Mullen, and Galinksy, “Chameleons Bake Bigger Pies.”
30. J. S. Lerner and L. Z. Tiedens, “Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 19, no. 2 (2006): 115–137; N. H. Frijda, P. Kuipers, and E. Ter Schure, “Relations among Emotion, Appraisal, and Emotional Action Readiness,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57, no. 2 (1989): 212.
31. Remember our early discussion of the BAS (behavioral approach system) and the BIS (behavioral inhibition system). Clearly this approach perspective (the BAS) is the one most often found in individuals experiencing power or a powerful mindset. Eddie Harmon‐Jones, “Clarifying the Emotive Functions of Asymmetrical Frontal Cortical Activity,” Psychophysiology 40, no. 6 (2003): 838–848; E. Harmon-Jones and J. Segilman, “State Anger and Prefrontal Brain Activity: Evidence That Insult-Related Relative Left-Prefrontal Activation Is Associated with Experienced Anger and Aggression,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80 (2001): 797–803.
32. J. S. Lerner and D. Keltner, “Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of Emotion-Specific Influences on Judgment and Choice,” Cognition and Emotion 14, no. 4 (2000): 473–493.
33. J. S. Lerner and D. Keltner, “Fear, Anger, and Risk,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 1 (2001): 146.
34. G. V. Bodenhausen, L. A. Sheppard, and G. P. Kramer, “Negative Affect and Social Judgment: The Differential Impact of Anger and Sadness,” European Journal of Social Psychology 24, no. 1 (1994): 45–62; J. S. Lerner, J. H. Goldberg, and P. E. Tetlock, “Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24, no. 6 (1998): 563–574; D. A. Small and J. S. Lerner, “Emotional Politics: Personal Sadness and Anger Shape Public Welfare Preferences” (paper presented at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, New Orleans, 2005); L. Z. Tiedens, “Anger and Advancement versus Sadness and Subjugation: The Effect of Negative Emotion Expressions on Social Status Conferral,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80, no. 1 (2001): 86; L. Z. Tiedens and S. Linton, “Judgment under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of Specific Emotions on Information Processing,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, no. 6 (2001): 973.
35. A. W. Siegman and T. W. Smith, eds., Anger, Hostility, and the Heart (London: Psychology Press, 2013).
36. A. R. Fragale, “The Power of Powerless Speech: The Effects of Speech Style and Task Interdependence on Status Conferral,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 101, no. 2 (2006): 243–261.
37. V. L. Brescoll and E. L. Uhlmann, “Can an Angry Woman Get Ahead? Status Conferral, Gender, and Expression of Emotion in the Workplace,” Psychological Science 19, no. 3 (2008): 268–275.
38. J. R. Overbeck, M. A. Neale, and C. L. Govan, “I Feel, Therefore You Act: Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Effects of Emotion on Negotiation as a Function of Social Power,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 112, no. 2 (2010): 126–139.
CHAPTER TWELVE
1. Harris Sondak, Margaret A. Neale, and Elizabeth A. Mannix, “Managing Uncertainty in Multiparty Negotiations,” in Handbook on Negotiation, ed. W. Adair and M. Olekalns, 283–310 (North Hampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2013).
2. T. Wildschut, B. Pinter, J. L. Vevea, C. A. Insko, and J. Schopler, “Beyond the Group Mind: A Quantitative Review of the Interindividual Intergroup Discontinuity Effect,” Psychological Bulletin 129 (2003): 698–722.
3. For a review, see Elizabeth A. Mannix and Margaret A. Neale, “What Differences Make a Difference? The Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 6 (2005): 31–55.
4. J. C. Turner, “The Analysis of Social Influence,” in Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory, ed. J. C. Turner, M. A. Hogg, P. J. Oakes, S. D. Reicher, and M. S. Wetherell, 68–88 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); V. L. Allen and D. A. Wilder, “Group Categorization and Attribution of Belief Similarity,” Small Group Behavior 10 (1979): 73–80.
5. I. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982).
6. K. W. Phillips, G. Northcraft, and M. Neale, “Surface-Level Diversity and Information Sharing: When Does Deep-Level Similarity Help?” Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 9 (2006): 467–482.
7. K. W. Phillips, “The Effects of Categorically Based Expectations on Minority Influence: The Importance of Congruence,” Society for Personality and Social Psychology 29 (2003): 3–13; K. W. Phillips and D. L. Loyd, “When Surface and Deep Level Diversity Meet: The Effects of Dissenting Group Members,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 99 (2006): 143–160.
8. K. Y. Phillips and E. Apfelbaum, “Delusions of Homogeneity: Reinterpreting the Effects of Group Diversity, in Research on Managing Groups and Teams, vol. 16: Looking Back, Moving Forward, ed. M. A. Neale and E. A. Mannix, 185–207 (Bringley, UK: Emerald, 2012).
9. K. W. Phillips and D. L. Loyd, “When Surface and Deep Level Diversity Meet: The Effects of Dissenting Group Members,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 99 (2006): 143–160.
10. D. L. Loyd, C. S. Wang, K. W. Phillips, and R. L. Lount, “Social Category Diversity Promotes Pre-Meeting Elaboration: The Role of Relationship Focus,” Organization Science (in press).
11. J. Cao and K. W. Phillips, “Team Diversity and Information Acquisition: How Homogeneous Teams Set Themselves Up to Have Less Conflict” (working paper, Columbia Business School, 2013).
12. N. Halevey, “Team Negotiation: Social, Epistemic, Economic, and Psychological Consequences of Subgroup Conflict,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34 (2008): 1687–1702.
13. G. Borenstein, “Intergroup Conflict: Individual, Group, and Collective Interests,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 7 (2003): 129–145.
14. M. B. Brewer, “In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 86 (1979): 307–324.
15. H. R. Tajifel, R. Billig, C. Bundy, and C. Flament, “Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior,” European Journal of Social Psychology 1 (1971): 149–178; J. C. Turner, “The Experimental Social Psychology of Intergroup Behavior,” in Intergroup Behavior, ed. J. C. Turner and H. Giles, 66–101 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
16. R. M. Kramer, “Intergroup Relations and Organizational Dilemmas: The Role of the Categorization Process,” Research in Organizational Behavior 13 (1991): 191–228.
17. T. Wildschut, B. Pinter, J. L. Vevea, C. A. Insko, and J. Schopler, “Beyond the Group Mind: A Quantitative Review of the Interindividual Intergroup Discontinuity Effect,” Psychological Bulletin 129 (2003): 698–722; B. Pinter, C. A. Insko, T. Wildschut, J. L. Kirchner, R. M. Montoya, and S. T. Wolf, “Reduction of Interindividual–Intergroup Discontinuity: The Role of Leader Accountability and Proneness to Guilt,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 93 (2007): 250–265.
18. A. D. Galinsky, V. L. Seiden, P. H. Kim, and V. H. Medvec, “The Dissatisfaction of Having Your First Offer Accepted: The Role of Counterfactual Thinking in Negotiations,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28, no. 2 (2002): 271–283.
19. S. Page, The Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); E. A. Mannix and M. A. Neale, “What Differences Make a Difference? The Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 6 (2005): 31–55.
20. J. P. Polzer, “Intergroup Negotiations: The Effect of Negotiating Teams,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (1996): 678–698.
21. R. Walton and R. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964).
22. R. Stout, J. Cannon-Bowers, E. Salas, and D. Milanovich, “Planning, Shared Mental Models, and Coordinated Performance: An Empirical Link Is Established,” Human Factors 41 (1999): 61–71.
23. K. J. Behfar, R. S. Peterson, E. A. Mannix, and W. M. Trochim, “The Critical Role of Conflict Resolution in Teams: A Close Look at the Links between Conflict Type, Conflict Management Strategies, and Team Outcomes,” Journal of Applied Psychology 93, no. 1 (2008): 170; J. M. Brett, R. Friedman, and K. Behfar, “How to Manage Your Negotiating Team,” Harvard Business Review 87, no. 9 (2009): 105–109.
24. J. K. Murnighan, “Organizational Coalitions: Structural Contingencies and the Formation Process,” Research on Negotiation in Organizations 1 (1986): 155–173; J. T. Polzer, E. A. Mannix, and M. A. Neale, “Interest Alignment and Coalitions in Multiparty Negotiation,” Academy of Management Journal 41 (1998): 42–54.
25. J. K. Murnighan and D. Brass, “Intraorganizational Coalitions,” in Research in Negotiating in Organizations, ed. R. Lewicki, B. Sheppard, and M. Bazerman, 283–306 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1991).
26. M. Watkins and S. Rosegrant, “Sources of Power in Coalition Building,” Negotiation Journal 12 (1996): 47–68.
27. J. T. Polzer, E. A. Mannix, and M. A. Neale, “Interest Alignment and Coalitions in Multiparty Negotiation,” Academy of Management Journal 41 (1998): 42–54.
28. J. K. Murnighan and D. Brass, “Intraorganizational Coalitions,” in Research in Negotiating in Organizations, ed. R. Lewicki, B. Sheppard, and M. Bazerman, 283–306 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1991).
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
1. In the second century BC, Cato the Elder (De Agri Cultura, 2:7) recommends agricultural auctions for the harvest and for tools and, in Orationum Reliquae (53:303, Tusculum), for household goods. Plutarch (Vitae Parallelae, Poplikos 9:10) mentions auctions of prisoners of war in the sixth century BC.
2. J. Bulow and P. Klemperer, “Auctions vs. Negotiations” (NBER Working Paper No. w4608, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994).
3. U. Malmendier and Y. H. Lee, “The Bidder’s Curse,” American Economic Review 101, no. 2 (2011): 749–787.
4. G. Ku, D. Malhotra, and J. K. Murnighan, “Towards a Competitive Arousal Model of Decision-Making: A Study of Auction Fever in Live and Internet Auctions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 96, no. 2 (2005): 89–103.
5. D. Malhotra, G. Ku, and J. K. Murnighan, “When Winning Is Everything,” Harvard Business Review 86, no. 5 (2008): 78.
6. G. Ku, D. Malhotra, and J. K. Murnighan, “Towards a Competitive Arousal Model of Decision-Making: A Study of Auction Fever in Live and Internet Auctions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 96, no. 2 (2005): 89–103.
7. L. Ordonez and L. Benson III, “Decisions under Time Pressure: How Time Constraint Affects Risky Decision Making,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 71, no. 2 (1997): 121–140.
8. R. B. Zajonc, Social Facilitation (Ann Arbor, MI: Research Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan: 1965); H. R. Markus, “The Effect of Mere Presence on Social Facilitation: An Unobtrusive Task,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 14 (1978): 389–397.
9. Typically, we associate auctions in the form of one seller and multiple buyers. While this may be more common, there are examples of one buyer and multiple seller auctions. Governmental procurement processes often involve such a process. Recently General Motors announced that it was liquidating its internal parts suppliers and would, going forward, rely on an auction-like process for procuring its automobile parts. In contrast, exchanges (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange) bring together multiple potential buyers and multiple potential sellers.
10. Rafael Rogo, “Strategic Information and Selling Mechanism” (PhD diss., Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 2009).
11. A distribution where all outcomes are equally likely is called a uniform distribution.
12. C. Glenday, ed., Guinness World Records 2013 (New York: Random House LLC, 2013).
13. U. Malmendier, E. Moretti, and F. S. Peters, “Winning by Losing: Evidence on the Long-Run Effects of Mergers” (NBER Working Paper No. w18024, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012).
14. G. Ku, A. D. Galinsky, and J. K. Murnighan, “Starting Low but Ending High: A Reversal of the Anchoring Effect in Auctions,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90, no. 6 (2006): 975.
15. R. Simonsohn and D. Ariely, “When Rational Sellers Face Non-Rational Consumers: Evidence from Herding on eBay” (working paper, Fuqua School of Management, Duke University, 2007).
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
1. J. R. Curhan, H. A. Elfenbein, and G. J. Kilduff, “Getting Off on the Right Foot: Subjective Value Versus Economic Value in Predicting Longitudinal Job Outcomes from Job Offer Negotiations,” Journal of Applied Psychology 94, no. 2 (2009): 524–534.
2. A. L. Drolet and M. W. Morris, “Rapport in Conflict Resolution: Accounting for How Face-to-Face Contact Fosters Mutual Cooperation in Mixed-Motive Conflicts,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 36, no. 1 (2000): 26–50.
3. J. R. Curhan, H. A. Elfenbein, and H. Xu, “What Do People Value When They Negotiate? Mapping the Domain of Subjective Value in Negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 91 (2006): 493.
4. C. H. Tinsley, K. M. O’Connor, and B. A. Sullivan, “Tough Guys Finish Last: The Perils of a Distributive Relationship,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 88 (2002): 621.
5. J. R. Curhan, H. A. Elfenbein, and G. J. Kilduff, “Getting Off on the Right Foot: Subjective Value versus Economic Value in Predicting Longitudinal Job Outcomes from Job Offer Negotiations,” Journal of Applied Psychology 94, no. 2 (2009): 524–534.
6. J. R. Curhan and H. A. Elfenbein, “What Do People Want When They Negotiate?” The Subjective Value Inventory, 2008, www.subjectivevalue.com.
7. As a reminder, a Pareto-optimal agreement is one that dominates all other potential agreements. There is no other settlement that all the negotiators would prefer over the one chosen.
8. B. O’Neil, “The Number of Outcomes in the Pareto-Optimal Set of Discrete Bargaining Games, Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1981): 571.
9. H. Raiffa, “Post-Settlement Settlements,” Negotiation Journal 1 (1985): 9.
10. S. Frederick, G. Loewenstein, and T. O’Donoghue, “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2002): 351–401; G. Loewenstein, D. Read, and R. F. Baumeister, eds., Time and Decision: Economic and Psychological Perspectives of Intertemporal Choice (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003); H. Movious and T. Wilson, “How We Feel about the Deal,” Negotiation Journal, April 2011, 241–250.
11. D. Kahenman, “Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51 (1992): 296–312.
12. N. Novemsky and M. Schweitzer, “What Makes Negotiators Happy? The Differential Effects of Internal and External Social Comparisons on Negotiator Satisfaction,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 95 (2004): 186–197.