Was our fleet off Copenhagen, . . . the Danish Minister would seriously reflect how he brought the fire of England on his master’s fleet and capital; but to keep [the fleet) out of sight is to seduce Denmark into war. . . . I hate your pen-and-ink men; a fleet of British ships of war are the best negotiators in Europe.
Lord Nelson
AFTER ALMOST NINE CONTINUOUS YEARS OF WARFARE IN EUROPE, the opening of the nineteenth century saw a shifting in the balance of power. France had conquered Austria once more, while Russia had effectively withdrawn from the war. Russia’s unstable Czar Paul I had developed a bitter hostility toward Austria and Britain, while conceiving a solid admiration for Napoleon Bonaparte, the “first consul” of France. In addition, Paul was particularly angered by the refusal of Britain to yield to him possession of the Mediterranean island of Malta, which he felt was his due as titular grand master of the Maltese knights of St. John.
France’s star was ascending as Britain’s prestige and influence correspondingly declined. Moreover, the manipulative first consul of France, the mad czar of Russia, the mindless king of Denmark (and Norway), the indecisive king of Prussia, and the unbalanced king of Sweden were about to precipitate a terrible crisis in northern Europe, adding a new threat to Britain as grave as had yet been faced since 1793:1 “Towards the end of 1800 Bonaparte, playing upon the resentment of the Northern Powers at British interference with their trade, encouraged those States to revive the League of Armed Neutrality, which, comprising Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, was pledged to resist the belligerent rights at sea claimed and enforced by Great Britain. The customary rights of search and seizure were boldly challenged. The neutral rights now proclaimed struck at the very foundations of British naval power.”2
Map 9-1 The Baltic Sea and Its Approaches Mahan, Life of Nelson
Britain had no routine naval presence in the Baltic; however, the British trade that flowed through this sea was essential, particularly with regard to materials for the navy. In addition, “between them the Armed Neutrals disposed of a fleet of well over a hundred sail of the line, twenty-four of which were immediately available. The Armed Neutrality threatened both to disrupt the blockade of France and to close the Baltic to British commerce, thereby depriving [the] country of Baltic grain and the timbers and naval stores which were vital to the Fleet.”3
The passage of trade was crucial. So was the blockade; at this stage of the war it was practically the only weapon effectively working against France. In fact, prior to the much later invention and deployment of railway systems, one of the most effective weapons of sea power was the blockade of enemy ports: “The prevention of the transport of goods by sea meant over a large area the transport of goods at all.”4
On or about 9 December 1800, the British secretary of state for the Foreign Office, William Wyndham (Baron Grenville), was informed—probably verbally from either the Swedish or Danish ministers in London—that the League of Armed Neutrality was reforming. Grenville immediately sent this intelligence to his envoys in Copenhagen, Berlin, and Vienna, writing them that the accuracy “cannot be doubted,” and instructing them to seek out more information.5 On 14 December it was confirmed that the Armed Neutrality agreement was signed and ratified by the aforementioned powers. Moreover, Russia simultaneously seized three hundred British merchantmen that were in Russian ports, and sealed all warehoused British property in those ports.6
Fig. 9-1 Battle of Copenhagen; View from Amager.
Looking northward across Nyeholm. Note the mast of the telegraph station, silhouetted in the very center of the image above the row of buildings along the waterfront. The painting was done by C. A. Lorentzen; the engraving was done by I. F. Clemens; the original is owned by the Frederiksborg Museum, Denmark.
© National Maritime Museum, London
Britain just could not allow this threat to coalesce and build, which if allowed much time at all could be backed with more than fifty operational ships of the line. Denmark was the greatest immediate threat. Relative to Prussia, Russia, and Sweden, its navy was efficient; in addition, Denmark was strategically placed at the entry to the Baltic. Toward the end of December the British envoy in Copenhagen, William Drummond, sent intelligence to the Admiralty that “the Danes pretend they will have at least twenty ships-of-the-line ready before Spring. The number may be about fifteen[,] . . . with five frigates, three brigs, and two cutters.”7
James Talbot, British chargé d’affaires in Stockholm, relayed the Swedish situation to Lord Grenville on 13 January 1801. He reported that there were “no batteries worth mentioning” along the coast of the Skagerrak, and that “upon a great emergency” the Swedes perhaps could sortie eleven ships of the line—although several were old. On 16 January his intelligence dispatch reported that six Swedish ships of the line and several frigates were “immediately to be got ready” at Gothenburg, but “whether or no the number of good seamen necessary to man this Fleet are to be procured, I cannot pretend to say. . . . The government sailors for the most part have not been exercised since the Russian War [1789].”8
Meanwhile, the British government was having some concern with a complicating intelligence problem: the newspapers were publishing information that the government wished to remain secret. The nation’s press was having great success keeping the British people, as well as foreign diplomats and agents, very much apprised as to what was going on, for
the Press, and thus the people, was well informed . . . because it had good sources of news inside the Government itself and, perhaps more important, because influential people gossiped. Nor was there any form of voluntary or compulsory censorship to prevent the publication of secret information of use to the enemy. Politicians, admirals, and generals made their plans and sent off their orders marked “Secret”—and then all too often discussed them at dinner or in the drawing room after joining the ladies.
It was almost impossible to launch a large-scale operation secretly against the enemy, so that surprise, the essential element of any attack, was almost always missing. The only thing that saved many expeditions from disaster was the fact that although the enemy had learned of British intentions, he had no chance—because of the blockade or the difficulties of transport—to make proper dispositions. Fortunately for Britain . . . other nations conducted their business in a similar way.9
On 5 January, the London Times reported, “The Public will learn, with great satisfaction, that Lord NELSON is about to be employed on a SECRET EXPEDITION, and will hoist his flag in the course of a very few days. . . . There is reason to believe his destination is to a distant quarter, where his Lordship’s personal appearance alone would preponderate over the influence or the intrigues of any Court in Europe.”10
This information was true enough, and sent reasonably clear messages to British and foreign readers. On 6 January the government probably attempted to throw off the scent by causing the following to be printed in the Times: “Vice Admiral Lord Nelson will hoist his flag in a few days for the supposed purpose of proceeding with a squadron to the Dardanelles, [perhaps] to chastise the insolence of the Russians in that quarter.”11
Fig. 9-2 The Battle: of Copenhagen, 1801
Painted by Nicholas Pocock (1740–1821) in 1806.
© National Maritime Museum, London
The Times also had this to say, on the sixth, commenting on Adm. Sir Hyde Parker’s recent marriage to an eighteen-year-old girl: “It is said that Sir HYDE PARKER has solicited his leave of absence from his command to be extended, as it could make [his] honey-moon much too short, and the bliss too transient.”12
On the tenth there appeared more confusing reporting—either poor speculation on the part of the Times or planted information by the government: “Lord KEITH is certainly coming home. It is believed Lord NELSON will have a detachment from the Mediterranean Fleet placed under his command.”13 Then on 13 January the Times reported that “yesterday Lord NELSON took his leave of the Lords of the Admiralty, and this morning his Lordship will positively leave town to hoist his flag. We have reason to know that his destination is NOT for the Baltic.”14 On Thursday, 15 January, it reported, “Lord NELSON left Town on Tuesday morning for Plymouth, and will proceed immediately to the Mediterranean. . . . We are led to believe his Lordship will visit Constantinople. . . . Nor can the appearance of a British Fleet in the Dardanelles be without its effect upon that Power of the Baltic [Russia] whose ambitions extend to Byzantium.”15
It is interesting to note Nelson’s reaction to these reports. In a letter to his friend, Hercules Ross, he wrote that “there is not the smallest foundation for the report of my going to the Mediterranean, nor of Lord Keith’s coming home at present. I rather believe my destination is Northwards.”16
During this time the Admiralty (under the Earl Spencer as first lord) was, of course, gathering intelligence, considering plans, and making preparations. They had received another intelligence report from envoy Drummond in early January: “Scarcely fifteen [Danish] sail of the line can be fitted out, although eighteen may be put in a condition to defend the Sound. All the frigates and small vessels are supposed to be in a state of readiness.”17 As noted earlier, Drummond’s communications with London were almost always sent in cipher.
At this point the Admiralty was comfortable in its order of battle information concerning the Royal Danish Navy. In fact, intelligence was coming into the Admiralty from many different sources. Note this belated thanks from Adm. Lord St. Vincent to Lt. Gen. John G. Simcoe, in charge of the Western Command: “I am very much ashamed not to have thanked you for the important communication . . . of the state of Cronenberg and Copenhagen, when besieged by the King of Sweden. . . . You may rely on my care of it.”18
Moreover, on 2 February, Nelson wrote to the newly appointed prime minister, Henry Addington, and described a conversation he had had with this same General Simcoe at Plymouth, wherein he had gained valuable information about Zealand and Copenhagen’s fortifications. Nelson further commented that while he appreciated the intelligence, he did not disclose much information to Simcoe in return, not feeling at liberty to discuss that it was likely he would be soon employed there.19
In fact, events were picking up speed. On 13 January, upon receipt of a letter from the Danish foreign minister indicating a peaceful solution was all but impossible, the government of Prime Minister William Pitt moved for decisive action. King George endorsed his minister’s alarm, writing on 15 January that he had long wished to bring the Armed Neutrality’s threat to an issue, and that he had not “admired the constant attempt for above twenty years to avoid it. . . . If properly withstood, we must get the better, and truly, if we do not, the boasted power of Great Britain, as a maritime State, is entirely delusive. If this will not rouse men, we are fallen low indeed.”20
With the king’s concurrence, a secret war letter was sent out by the secretary of state for the Home Department, William Henry Cavendish-Bentinck (the third Duke of Portland). Addressed to “The Governors of All His Majesty’s Possessions in the Mediterranean, North America, Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena, East Indies, West Indies,” it read: “In the present state of affairs between this country and the Powers of Russia, Denmark and Sweden, His Majesty has judged it expedient that all Ships of War or vessels of any description belonging to those Powers . . . which are at present arrived, or which may arrive within the limits of your Government should be prevented from putting to sea until further orders.”21
The secretary of state for War, Henry Dundas, required the Admiralty to order all captains “to detain and bring into the nearest port belonging to His Majesty all ships belonging to Russia, Denmark and Sweden ‘which they may meet with at sea.’”22 The secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, Lord Grenville, communicated the news to his envoys abroad. The enciphered dispatch to Drummond, at Copenhagen, stated that as there was reason to believe that “measures may immediately be adopted in Denmark for laying an embargo on British property there, you are immediately . . . to destroy all your ciphers and secret papers.” Drummond’s reply had a twentieth-century ring about it: “I have destroyed all my secret letters; but, from the apparent omission of a cipher, I was thrown into some perplexity. Imagining, however, that your Lordship apprehended the forcible seizure of the archives I caused all the ciphers . . . to be burnt.”23
The Times continued to be helpful; on Friday, 23 January, it reported: “We learn from the most respectable authority, that Sir Hyde Parker is to have command of the Fleet destined to act in the Baltic.”24 The following day it said, “Yesterday arrived the Mail from Hamburgh. . . . All the intelligence brought by it breathes the language of war and preparation in the Baltic. From the tone and tenor of the answer of the COURT OF COPENHAGEN to the categorical Memorial of Mr. DRUMMOND, there is no longer any room for hope from negociation and adjustment.”25
These newspaper articles actually gave Nelson himself the only information he had had for a few days as to what was going on. Another article two days later stated that “Captain DOMMETT will be Captain of the fleet destined for the Baltic, under the orders of Sir HYDE PARKER.”26 Another, on the twenty-seventh, reported that Lord Nelson “is about to hosft his flag on board the St. Joseph in the Channel Fleet, on which service he will continue till the opening of the Baltic . . . and act as second to Sir HYDE PARKER.”27 One more, on the twenty-eighth, read that the fleet “destined for the Baltic will begin to be assembled next week. Sir HYDE PARKER and Lord NELSON are both going to Portsmouth to make the necessary arrangements. Lord NELSON is to lead the [main body] into action.”28
In fact, the government had taken further steps vis-à-vis decisive action. Previous newspaper speculation notwithstanding, they were going to send a fleet into the Baltic under the command of Admiral Parker. The ships were to be drawn from the Channel Fleet blockading French ports. The risk that the French fleet, blockaded in Brest, would take advantage of this shift in forces and sortie was assessed as acceptable.29
Lord Nelson was designated as second in command, while Rear Adm. Thomas Graves and Rear Adm. Thomas Totty were the third and fourth flag officers to be deployed. The fleet included eighteen ships of the line and thirty-five smaller vessels, judged as a full admiral’s command. Sir Hyde was selected because he had a fair reputation as an able administrator, because he had been involved in planning a similar expedition in 1781, and, of course, because of his seniority.30 In Adm. Lord St. Vincent’s opinion, Parker was best suited to engage in negotiation—he was certainly not “known as a fighting admiral but neither was it certain that there was to be any fighting.”31 In any event, if there were to be battle, St. Vincent thought that “Nelson will act the fighting part very well.”32
The situation continued to gain complexity. On 22 January, Drummond forwarded the following intelligence to Lord Grenville: “I have very good reason to think that a proposal for an alliance between Russia and Holland has been made on the part of [Holland], and has been acceded to by the Emperor.”33
Plans and preparations for the expedition accelerated, unaltered even by the major changes in the British government precipitated by the early February resignation of Prime Minister Pitt. The new administration of Henry Addington—which included Robert Banks Jenkinson (Baron Hawkesbury) as secretary of state for the Foreign Office and Adm. Sir John Jervis (the Earl of St. Vincent) as first lord of the Admiralty—saw the situation in the same light as did the old. They quickly dispatched the Hon. Nicholas Vansittart to Copenhagen ahead of the fleet, in the hope that diplomatic persuasion might turn Denmark from the league. They had some reason to think that his mission might meet with success, for they had recently received a secret “communication from Prince Charles of Hesse, intimating that the Danish Government might be detached from the Northern Coalition. . . . This communication from a brother-in-law of the King of Denmark appeared to the Government to be so important that they wished to avail themselves of it as speedily as possible.”34 As it turned out, this intelligence did not reflect the Danish government’s real views at all; in actuality they were much more “truculent than conciliatory.”35
By 12 February the Admiralty had developed a very detailed plan for the Baltic Fleet, including the following note from an Admiralty Board meeting showing due concern for operational security: “Sir Hyde Parker to hoist his flag when the London arrives at Spithead. . . . The squadron should not assemble, nor should any display of preparations be made until a very short time before it is to sail, that the expectation of it may not render the enemy more active in their preparations.”36
Previously, on 22 January, another board meeting note had shown additional security precautions on the part of the Admiralty: “As there is reason to believe that the enemy have possession of both the private and public signals, it is judged proper to make an alteration in them.”37
Meanwhile, the Times and other papers continued to publish mixtures of highly secret information and wild inaccuracies, such as, “Admirals Sir Hyde Parker and Lord Nelson are expected to sail immediately for the North Sea. . . . As we are doomed to fight our way to peace by victory, we anticipate, with the highest satisfaction, the new laurels which are preparing for our gallant seamen; and soon shall we see Lord Nelson lead the van into the harbour of Cronstadt, and serve the Russians as he did the French at Aboukir.”38
In early February Nelson started to see the plan taking form. Writing to Lady Hamilton on the first, he told her that he had received “an order to hoist my flag in the St. George, as Lord Spencer says I must go forth as the Champion of England in the North.”39
On 4 February, Nelson, on board the San Josef, wrote the following, demonstrating that the weather factor was always potentially disrupting to naval communications in this era: “It blows so very hard that I doubt if it will be possible to get a boat on shore [at times for two or three days together], either to receive or send letters, but if it moderates in time for the post of course mine shall go.”40
By mid-February Nelson received official instructions; writing to Lady Hamilton on 19 February, he observed that he had just “got my orders to put myself under Sir Hyde Parker’s orders, and suppose I shall be ordered to Portsmouth tomorrow or next day, & then I will try & get to London for 3 days.”41 In fact, he spent 24–26 February on leave in London, unnoticed by the press, which predicted twenty-four hours after his arrival that he was likely “to come to town before he sailed for the Baltic in order to attend councils and fix plans of campaign.”42
In the next few days several bits of good fortune enhanced the intelligence ability of the fleet. First, the Rev. Alexander John Scott was recruited by Sir Hyde as his chaplain; they had sailed together earlier in a similar relationship which was to be successfully renewed at this time. As developed in chapter 7—and this is not the reason that Parker offered him the job—Scott was a scholar gifted in languages and he busily acted as a translator. Foreign newspapers and other materials were good sources of intelligence, which he well exploited.43 To best prepare, Scott, on his own initiative, bought a Danish grammar and dictionary from a commercial bookseller. As Russian dictionaries were unobtainable, he luckily was given a copy of Elemens de la Langue Russe by a friend.44
Second, Capt. Nicholas Tomlinson, who had previously commanded a Russian ship of the line in the shoal and rocky waters of the Baltic, volunteered to serve without pay and to share his knowledge. Tomlinson provided charts, plans, memoranda, and key intelligence on the Baltic, the Russian mentality, and the state of the Russian fleet. A grateful Admiralty accepted this offer, for in the days before an organized intelligence office or a fully developed hydrographic department, such information was otherwise unavailable to the navy.45
Captains and masters of ships usually had to obtain their own charts rather than be issued official ones from the government. Here Nelson was assisted by his friend Alexander Davison, who privately purchased a number of charts for Nelson to use (Faden’s at Charing Cross being one commercial source).46
St. Vincent brought another source to the attention of Sir Hyde, writing that a Mr. English had been superintendent of the arsenal at St. Petersburg for eight years: “He is ready to go all lengths with you; and if, after conversing with him, you are of opinion that he will be of use, order him to be received and well entertained by some good fellow of your Squadron.”47 Similarly, St. Vincent recommended Capt. Frederick Thesiger to Nelson, knowing that Nelson always valued any source of good intelligence. Thesiger also brought a wealth of experience, having commanded Russian ships against Sweden. Moreover, he spoke both Russian and Danish.48 Nelson wrote the following to St. Vincent on 1 March:
The wind was yesterday at S.S.W., which has prevented Warrior, Defence, and Agincourt from sailing. Time, my dear Lord, is our best Ally, and I hope we shall not give her up, as all our Allies have given us up.
Our friend [Parker] here is a little nervous about dark nights and fields of ice, but we must brace up; these are not times for nervous systems. . . .
I have not seen Captain Thesiger here, I shall receive him with much pleasure; if he is still in Town pray send word to him to meet me in the Downs or Yarmouth.49
Indeed Tomlinson, English, and Thesiger had gained their experience while on authorized, detached service with the Russian navy and government. This was reasonably common in this era. In fact, during a brief period of frustration Nelson himself had, years before, considered this option; a note in his wife’s hand tells that “he once spoke of the Russian service.”50
As it turns out, Parker essentially disregarded the valuable experience of these officers. This is partially due to his cautious nature, but it is also due to his apparent inability to ask advice of mere captains—and worse—captains who had taken leave from British service to sail under foreign flags. He is reported to have totally ignored Tomlinson’s presence on board his flagship.51
Another insight into Parker’s mindset can be gleaned from his first meeting with Nelson. In early March, Parker, Nelson, and Lt. Col. the Hon. William Stewart met at Parker’s hotel. Stewart was the commander of the small military detachment that was to accompany the fleet, six hundred men of the Forty-ninth and Ninety-fifth Regiments.52 While completely gracious to his visitors, Sir Hyde shortly withdrew to join his new wife; there had been, to Nelson’s and Stewart’s amazement, no discussion of a date for sailing, no reference to navigational issues, no interest in comparing charts, no remarks on any plan to attack the Danes or Russians, nor even any disclosure that there was the slightest interest in crossing the North Sea.53 Nelson, apart from any personal considerations, was appalled for professional reasons: an important part of his own success in the past had been that he always made sure his subordinates had as much information as possible about his intentions and, when possible, gave them an insight into the way he thought.54 Indeed, Nelson was dumbfounded. It was one thing for an admiral to disdain advice from a junior officer; it was quite another for a senior officer to withhold information and direction from key subordinates. “But,” historian Carola Oman notes in her biography of Nelson, “he found himself, as days passed, ostentatiously excluded from conference.”55
On 7 March he wrote to his friend, Capt. Sir Thomas Troubridge, who was currently a member of the Board of Admiralty:
I was in hopes that Sir Hyde would have had a degree of confidence [in me] but no appearance of it. . . . I have . . . no other desire of knowing anything than that I may the better execute the service. . . . [Do] not say a word of it to Lord St. Vincent, for he may think me very impertinent in endeavouring to dive into the plans of my C.-in-C.; but, the water being clear, I can see bottom with half an eye.
Poor [captain of the fleet] Dommett seemed in a pack of trouble. Get rid of us [order us to sail], dear friend, and we shall not be tempted to lay abed.56
Perhaps Sir Hyde felt that caution and deliberation were essential. Perhaps he was in no hurry to discuss his orders with his fire-eating subordinate, who, he may have feared, would likely press him for some aggressively reckless action that could end in a disaster—and thus kept him at a distance.57 After all, as historian C. Northcote Parkinson commented, “It is no real advantage to have a known hero as one’s second-in-command.”
Meanwhile, Sir Hyde had written to First Secretary Nepean asking for the “private signals” issued the first day of the month. He further wrote that since he had discovered the Admiralty had recently published “a new edition of Signal Books with all the corrections, I am to beg you will order a few to be sent to me. . . . Do not forget a copy of the chart of Lord Mulgrave’s of the soundings &c. up to Copenhagen.” Nepean may have wondered why Parker was asking him to obtain the chart, for Mulgrave’s house in Harley Street was well within walking distance of Parker’s.58
On 4 March the Times reported that “the Baltic fleet will begin to be assembled this day. The workmen in the Dock-yards work by candlelight morning and evening to get the ships ready for sea. Orders are issued to detain all Russians, Danes, and Swedes now serving on board any of his Majesty’s ships of war.”59 This was followed three days later by news that “the fleet to which our cause is confided will sail to-morrow from Yarmouth, if the wind permits. The Van will be led by the CONQUEROR OF ABOUKIR [Nelson], to whose immortal name every epithet is detraction.”60
On 12 March the fleet finally proceeded to sea, spurred on by a letter from St. Vincent to Parker; the specific problem had been Parker’s inability to analyze various issues relative to his professional reputation. He had been intending to further delay sailing in order to attend a ball being given by his new wife, but St. Vincent made the situation clear, writing that he had “upon a consideration of the effect your continuance at Yarmouth an hour after the wind would admit of your sailing would produce, sent down a messenger purposely to convey to you my opinion, as a private friend, that any delay in your sailing would do you irreparable injury.”61
The Times next had the following to report: “The wind having changed to the Southward, we have reason to believe that the Fleet destined for the Baltic sailed yesterday from Yarmouth Roads. . . . Should the wind continue fair, we may expect some important intelligence from Copenhagen towards the latter end of next week. Never did a Fleet sail from the shores of England with more just and animated presages of victory. . . . The vigilance and activity of the late, as well as of the present Board of Admiralty upon this occasion, are above all praise.”62
By the sixteenth the news of the fleet’s sailing had reached Copenhagen, where defensive measures were increased. As the fleet approached the Skagerrak in gale-force winds, dismal and freezing weather, and then remarkably thick fog, Sir Hyde lost confidence in his position. As a result, on 16 March, he ordered the hourly use of one of the era’s most interesting “sensors,” the deep-sea lead. This device, cast from the ship’s side, was a weight attached to a long line. The weight had a cavity into which tallow could be placed. Therefore, when the lead was cast not only was the depth of water determined, but by examining the sample of the sea bottom stuck on the tallow, a pilot could confirm his position. Because the sea bottom varied from fine sand to coarse mud, and these areas were reasonably well plotted in the highly used sea lanes, an experienced navigator could—by the sight, smell (and taste) of the sample—correlate his position with courses steered, wind direction, experience, and his chart.63
Nelson was unhappy with the horrible visibility and weather, but even more so with Parker. In a letter to his friend Davison, dated the sixteenth, he wrote, “We have received much snow and sharp frost. I have not yet seen my Commander-in-Chief, and have had no official communication whatever. All I have gathered of our first plans, I disapprove most exceedingly; honour may arise from them, good cannot.”64
On 17 March, HMS Cruizer was sent to reconnoiter, returning with the information that the British fleet was sixty miles off position. Definite news of the fleet’s approach reached Copenhagen on 25 March, when the British finally arrived off the fishing village of Hornbæk. This confirmed a secondary source of news that had been transmitted by the Kronborg-Copenhagen telegraph discussed in chapter 3.65
In fact, negotiations had failed. Drummond’s passport had been returned to him; Vansittart’s mission had been for naught. The Danes were far too intimidated by the Russians to withdraw from the league. Indeed, they appeared actively hostile. Drummond had sorted out the embassy’s archives, destroying some papers and packing the rest. He and the British consul at Elsinore, William Fenrick, left Danish territory on board the frigate that had brought Vansittart to Denmark.66
This ship, HMS Blanche, reached the fleet on 23 March. Drummond informed Sir Hyde of the situation, including his personal assessment of the state of Danish preparations. Unfortunately, Drummond, while an excellent diplomat, was a poor military analyst. More unfortunate, Parker took his information at face value as if it had come from a military expert. He was totally intimidated by what he heard, and so wrote the Admiralty, focused upon the “many additional Batteries at Cronenburgh [Kronborg] Castle, [and] also the number of Hulks and Batteries which have been placed and erected for the defence of the Arsenal at Copenhagen.”67 Moreover, Sir Hyde then discussed the situation with his civilian pilots, but not with the captain of the fleet nor with his subordinate flag officers. These pilots, with no enthusiasm for any possible approaching combat, fed Parker’s misgivings as to the dangers of an attack.68
Parker began to base major decisions upon one man’s assessment of the Danish defense. He did not take into account that Drummond was a layman, nor did he realize that he had other sources of information he could draw upon. Capt. Graham Hamond of the Blanche had spent three days at Kronborg and studied it very carefully. Lt. Thomas McCulloch had made the Kronborg-Copenhagen journey twice, with plenty of opportunity to observe the Danish fleet as well as the batteries defending the city. Moreover, both of these officers were not laymen and had made their observations with trained eyes. Yet Parker was content only to seek advice from a diplomat; asking the opinions of two inferior naval officers apparently did not occur to him. He also missed an enormous intelligence-collection opportunity by sending the Blanche to Elsinore, versus Copenhagen, to take dispatches for Vansittart; Captain Hamond could have easily returned with detailed plottings of the Danish order of battle as well as the count and size of the batteries.69
Fig. 9-3 Battle of Copenhagen; Diagram.
This illustration is gratefully borrowed from Capt. A. T. Mahan’s classic book, The Life of Nelson.
However, Sir Hyde did finally signal Nelson to come aboard the flagship. “Now we are sure of fighting I am sent for,” thought Nelson, “when it was a joke I was kept in the background.”70 There Parker, Nelson, and Vansittart met alone. Vansittart’s views on the situation echoed Drummond’s, for the same reasons. But now Nelson was given the opportunity to question Vansittart and later Drummond in detail, and in so doing was able to extract more precise intelligence about Copenhagen’s defenses than either man realized he possessed.71 Moreover, Parker gained a new appreciation for Nelson from these conferences. Indeed, it was clear that Sir Hyde had begun “to realize Nelson had a remarkable ability to pick the significant point from a welter of bewildering facts—or, as in this case, realize its omission.”72
Nelson now thought he knew enough to proceed and was determined to get Parker into action. There had been considerable debate as to what was the safest passage to take; Nelson was indifferent, though he would have pressed through the Sound had he been in command. Colonel Stewart, in a report he wrote later on the campaign, saw it as follows: “The formidable reports which had been made by Mr. Vansittart, and by the Pilots whom we had brought with us . . . induced the Commander-in-Chief to prefer the circuitous passage by the Great Belt. Lord Nelson, who was impatient for action, was not much deterred by these alarming representations: his object was to go to Copenhagen, and he said ‘Let it be by the Sound, by the Belt, or anyhow, only lose not an hour.’”73
Nevertheless, Nelson was this time more diplomatic in dealing with a superior officer than may be usually credited. He returned to the St. George, further evaluated the situation, and then drafted a long letter to Parker; he intended to send it across to the London the next day. It was a brilliant analysis and a precise, focused communication of the strategic issues. As it turned out he delivered it in person, reading the draft to Parker in “his high-pitched, nasal voice.”74 This is the essence:
Not a moment should be lost in attacking the Enemy: they will every hour be stronger; we never shall be so good a match for them as at this moment. The only consideration is how to get at them with the least risk to our Ships. . . . On your decision depends, whether our Country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or whether she shall rear her head higher than ever.
I begin with supposing you are determined to enter by the Sound. . . . You are now above Cronenburg [Kronborg]; if you attack you must expect Ships crippled, and one or two lost; for the wind which carries you in will not bring out a cripple. This I call taking the bull by the horns. It will not, however, prevent the Revel [in the Gulf of Finland] Ships, or the Swedes, from joining the Danes; and to prevent this is absolutely necessary—and still to attack Copenhagen.
One way is to pass Cronenburg and up the deepest Channel past the Middle Ground, and then down the King’s Channel, to attack their Floating batteries, &c. This must prevent a junction between the Russians, Swedes and Danes, and may allow us to bombard Copenhagen.
Should this be impracticable, the passage of the Belt could be accomplished in four or five days, and then the attack carried out and the junction of the Russians prevented.
Supposing us through the Belt, would it not be possible either to go with the Fleet, or to detach ten Ships to Revel, to destroy the Russian Squadron? I see no great risk in such a detachment, leaving the remainder to do the business at Copenhagen.
The measure may be thought bold, but I am of the opinion the boldest measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed with judgement.75
Parker was convinced to press on. He continued to gain an appreciation for Nelson’s “grasp of both the strategic and tactical situation . . . his remarkable ability to pinpoint . . . advantages and disadvantages, and his instinctive knowledge of when to accept and when to reject a great gamble.”76
Nelson himself realized that Parker was looking at him in a new light; writing to Lady Hamilton, he remarked, “Sir Hyde Parker has by this time found out the worth of your Nelson and that he is a useful sort of man in a pinch. Therefore, if he has ever thought unkindly of me, I freely forgive him.”77
Most likely at Nelson’s suggestion, on the twenty-seventh Parker sent the Cruizer to examine several merchant ships that had come through the sound from Hamburg; they reported “consternation and confusion” at Copenhagen.78 Nelson then sent the Cruizer, the Blanche, and two bomb (mortar) vessels close in to Kronborg. The Cruizer’s captain, James Brisbane, was able to report that the Danish batteries there were “of a low and weak construction,” and that the enemy “appeared to be evidently under considerable alarm,” unknowingly contradicting the information of Drummond and Vansittart.79
What no one in Denmark, nor in the British fleet, knew at this time was that on the night of the twenty-fourth Czar Paul had been strangled in his bed by some of his own nobles and officials in the Mikhaylovski Palace. This news, which would have radically altered the sequence of events, would be three weeks in getting to Copenhagen.
At this point Parker received a coincidental communication from the Danish crown prince; translated somewhat imperfectly by Reverend Scott, the tone and phraseology of this message nevertheless implied a new willingness to negotiate. Unfortunately, Parker did not recognize this change in attitude; moreover, he did not show the message to Nelson, who may have seen its significance. Nelson probably would have recognized the shift in the enemy’s posture “and seen it as a chance to deal with the Danish Fleet quickly by diplomatic means while leaving the British Fleet undamaged to go straight on to deal with the Russians.”80
At first the fleet proceeded toward the Great Belt, between the main Danish islands of Zealand and Fyn, which Parker had decided to use as his route to Copenhagen. However, when Robert Otway (the London’s captain) learned of this plan—thus far not having been included in the flag-level deliberations—he brought forth personal knowledge of that route which he had gained in previous Baltic operations. When he outlined the difficulties and dangers to Sir Hyde, the latter concluded that running past Kronborg presented a lesser risk.81
In anticipation of action in the shallow Danish waters, Nelson transferred his flag to HMS Elephant, captained by his old friend Thomas Foley, for it was smaller and of less draught than the St. George.
At 6:45 A.M., on 30 March, the fleet sailed past Elsinore and exchanged fire with “Hamlet’s” Kronborg Castle, which Parker incorrectly interpreted as a declaration of war on the part of Denmark. Later that day the French ambassador in Copenhagen sent an intelligence report to French foreign minister Talleyrand in Paris: “The war between England and Denmark has broken out.”82
Upon arrival off Copenhagen, the British found that the Danes had taken obvious practical measures and had removed all buoys, beacons, markers and other navigational aides from the area. These, of course, were reasonable and obvious tactics for the Danes to employ. On the larger scale, however, the modern Danes find great fault with their ancestors’ strategic crisis management. A 1980 study found several problems with this campaign: the irresoluteness and uncertainty of the government, adverse pressure of time, inadequate preparation, a psychological factor best described as a hope that the danger would pass, and a fundamental lack of information on the intentions of the British (and Russians) as well as erroneous interpretation of the available information.83
In any event, as a result of this removal of buoys, nothing remained to indicate where the two key North and King’s Channels lay. In addition, the British had no decent charts; furthermore, “few if any of the pilots agreed on any single fact about the area.” As a result, feeling the responsibility incumbent upon themselves, Sir Hyde, Lord Nelson, Admiral Graves, and Colonel Stewart gathered together and, in Admiral Parker’s words, personally “reconnoitered the enemy’s line” at some significant risk.84 Equally remarkable is the difference in analysis of the three admirals. Parker decided to go on with the attack, but with the concern that the enemy’s line “was found to be far more formidable than we had reason to expect.”85 He reported later to the Admiralty that, with admirals Nelson and Graves, he reconnoitered “the formidable Line of Ships, Radeaus, Pontoons, Galleys, Fire Ships and Gun-Boats, flanked and supported extensive Batteries on the two Islands called the Crowns, the largest of which was mounted with from fifty to seventy pieces of cannon. These were again commanded by two Ships of seventy guns, and a large Frigate, in the inner Road of Copenhagen, and two sixty-four gun Ships (without masts) were moored on the Flat.”86
Graves was gloomy and decidedly against the attack, concerned that they might be “playing a losing game, attacking stone walls.” Nelson, however, wrote to Lady Hamilton,
We this morning passed the fancied tremendous fortress of Cronenburg. . . . More powder and shot, I believe, never were thrown away, for not one shot struck a single ship of the British fleet. . . . The Elephant did not return a single shot. I hope to reserve them for a better occasion.
I have just been reconnoitring the Danish line of defence. It looks formidable to those who are children at war, but to my judgment, with ten [ships] of the line I think I can annihilate them; at all events, I hope to be allowed to try.87
On board the London, Parker then dictated orders to various officers. Essentially, Nelson was directed to take ten ships (two more added later) to attack the enemy’s line. Sir Hyde would hold the remainder of the fleet in reserve a few miles away. Parker accompanied an additional reconnaissance mission; with admirals Nelson and Graves, and captains Dommett and Otway, he “again reconnoitred the enemy’s line, and determined on the mode of attack, the boats and launches fitting their car-ronades, &c.”88
Later that night several ship captains and masters personally went out on even more reconnaissance; it was a vital intelligence requirement to know where there was forty, or four, feet of water, so these officers went rowing around the “floating ice, with seamen busy with leadlines quietly passing back the depths they found. These were noted and bearings taken, using boat compasses lit by guttering candles and shielded with strips of canvas. Oars were muffled because any moment they expected to meet Danish guard boats rowing through the channels to prevent them carrying out just this sort of survey.”89 The British also laid down a considerable number of buoys to replace those removed by the Danes.
On the morning of the thirty-first, Parker called what was actually a council of war. This meeting consisted of himself, Nelson, Graves, Dommett, and several other captains. It would seem that he was still unsure as what to do; unable to personally analyze the situation, he required the three senior officers to give in writing their views on “the propriety of attacking the enemy.” Graves was still opposed, but Nelson and Dommett were strongly in favor.90
At this point almost everything rested on Nelson’s shoulders. Nelson observed that the Danish ships moored in a line probably revealed the western edge of the channel. Danish Commo. Olfert Fischer’s defenses were not entirely well conceived; yet “the defenses that Fischer had managed to prepare in the time available were a little short of miraculous.”91
Sir Hyde finally made the decision to attack. He gracefully offered Nelson more ships than Nelson had requested (which weakened Parker’s position if hostile Russian or Swedish ships should appear). He then left the specific arrangements for the attack to Nelson’s direction.
Many intelligence concerns remained unresolved: “From the Elephant’s position it was hard to distinguish the precise types of several of the Danish ships as one overlapped another. . . . It seemed that there were twenty Danish ships which Nelson had to attack with his twelve. The problem was to arrange the best permutation, since Danish floating batteries were scattered among the blockships, and Nelson did not make the mistake of underestimating their fire power or the difficulty of dealing with them because of their low profile.”92
Moreover, by this time Nelson had lost all faith in both his British and the local pilots—as well as most of the charts he possessed. Nevertheless, he felt he knew enough to proceed. Working with several of his key captains, he established his plan of attack and line of battle and then drew up orders for the individual ships. Then the final drafts were handed to “six clerks, who had been waiting in the forward cabin with quills, ink, paper, sand boxes to blot the ink, and knives to keep the quills sharp. Copies of the complete orders were needed for each of the captains, with supplementary orders for certain ships.”93
Despite his great acumen in intelligence and operational expertise, it cannot be assumed that Nelson made no mistakes. In fact, “he completely underestimated the Danish gunnery and the tenacity of the men serving the guns. . . . He had miscalculated the very nature of this particular battle for a brave and tenacious seafaring people like the Danes. . . . They were as desperate as men can only be when fighting for the direct safety of their families and homes.”94
At 7:00 A.M., 2 April 1801, Nelson’s temporary flagship, Elephant, hoisted the signal “The Captains of the Fleet are to come to the Admiral.”95 Each captain was given a copy of the “Orders for the Attack.” Nelson then met with the civilian pilots (mostly mates of vessels which traded from Scottish and northern English ports to the Baltic),96 who as a group were gloomy and effectively refused to take charge of the ships. The sailing master (a British naval warrant officer, as opposed to a hired civilian pilot) of HMS Bellona, Alexander Briarly, stepped forward and volunteered to lead the line. Briarly had fought with Nelson at the Nile, having been then the master of HMS Audacious. Nelson’s comment later to St. Vincent was, “I have experienced in the Sound the misery of having the honor of our Country intrusted to Pilots, who have no thought than to keep the Ship clear of danger, and their own silly heads clear of shot. . . . Everybody knows what I must have suffered; and if any merit attaches itself to me, it was in combating the dangers of the shallows in defiance of the Pilots.”97
Nelson seemingly never had very good luck with pilots. In fact, as a young frigate captain he had had the interesting experience of having his ship (HMS Boreas) run aground by a pilot even while in English waters. That experience may have colored his opinion of pilots for the rest of his career.98
At 8 o’clock the Elephant hoisted the signals to “Prepare for Battle, and for anchoring, with springs on the anchors, and the end of the sheet cable taken in at the stern port.”99 Briarly can only be complimented on his skill, coolness, and highly developed sense of situational awareness; he successfully led the line based on the fleet’s earlier reconnaissance and rebuoying of the channels, as well as adroitly utilizing some key landmarks he had previously noted, including a small red house, a mill, a church, and a wood.100
The rest, as the saying goes, is history. One could briefly note that Parker was totally unable to assess the progress of the battle—a fact which did not prevent him from hoisting his famous signal to “discontinue the action” at a critical point—as well as Nelson’s much better battle-damage assessment, which convinced him to ignore that signal and achieve a monumental victory.
As mentioned earlier in the book, Nelson’s famous disobedience of this order is the stuff of legend. He is reported to have reacted somewhat as follows: After having Parker’s signal repeated to him twice, he shouted at the Elephant’s signal officer, Lt. Frederick Langford, “I told you to look out on the Danish commodore and let me know when he surrendered. Keep your eyes fixed on him [and not on HMS London].”101 He then muttered, “Leave off action.” He repeated, “Leave off action!” then added, with a shrug, “Now damn me if I do!” Next, turning to Captain Foley, he said, “You know, Foley, I have only one eye—and I have a right to be blind sometimes,” and putting his small telescope to his blind eye, he exclaimed, “I really do not see the signal.” A few moments later he was reported as saying bitterly, “Damn the signal. Keep mine for closer battle flying. That’s the way I answer such signals! Nail mine to the mast!”102 However, with that aside, the intelligence and communications aspects of this campaign basically ended as Nelson’s ships assumed their stations across from the Danish line.
By the end of the day at least 1,000 Danes were killed or wounded, as well as about 950 Britons. One Danish ship was destroyed; the remainder of their line was disabled and captured (and, to be fair, most of the British ships were seriously damaged, and six were aground). Nelson later told the Danish crown prince that he had been in 105 engagements, but that the Copenhagen action had been the most severe.103
The Danes accepted a truce, initially conveyed by Captain Thesiger and enormously facilitated by his ability to speak Danish. As mentioned earlier, and at the time completely unknown to the combatants, Czar Paul I had been assassinated some weeks previously. With the publication of his death, and the Battle of Copenhagen, the League of Armed Neutrality effectively collapsed.
In the final analysis, Nelson’s approach contrasts remarkably with Parker’s during the events leading to April first. Lord Nelson, in addition to his other aspects of genius, was masterful in his data gathering, analysis, exploitation, strategic insight, and all-around awareness of intelligence information in general. To say that Sir Hyde was fundamentally oblivious to the value of intelligence would not be much of an exaggeration. In fact, Nelson towered above his superior in character, determination, fighting quality, situational awareness, and general superiority of judgment.104
