The problems of Korea and Manchuria were matters of primary concern in Japan. But the Katsura cabinet which had been formed to counter the activities of the political parties was in serious political difficulties and faced bitter opposition whenever the Diet was in session. We are not arguing that Japan in her stiff resistance to Russia was puffing up an artificial issue in order to divert the attention of politicians and people from domestic, and especially parliamentary, disputes. But domestic politics did put pressures on the government as it considered whether to embark on negotiations with Russia — the subject of the present chapter.
The focus of opposition between the parties and the non-party ministry was the budget which contained proposals for the continuation of the unpopular land tax. This had led in December 1902 to the dissolution of the Diet. It was still an issue in May 1903 when the house of representatives met after elections in which government supporters were seriously outnumbered. If the Katsura ministry was to survive, it had to cultivate the goodwill of Itō Hirobumi, who was the leader of the Seiyūkai. He was both political opponent and elder statesman. In the latter capacity, he had to take into account national, as against purely party, interests and to try to prevent the collapse of the ministry. While this weakened Itō's position and popularity as a party leader, it gave him great strength in his bargaining with the government, especially over relations with Russia, where his viewpoint differed substantially from that of the Katsura government. In the mid summer sitting the Diet approved the bill providing for naval expansion. Admiral Yamamoto steered through an eleven-year programme covering the building of 3 first-class battleships, 3 first-class cruisers and 2 second-class cruisers. But the Land Tax bill was thrown out. This did not deprive the ministry of funds because the budget for 1902-3 continued in force. But it was a defeat for the government and, while it did not resign, it brought the session to a speedv close on 4 June.
As we have seen, Russia defaulted on her promise to withdraw her troops. Uchida Yasuya, Japan's minister in Peking, reported on Russia's failure to evacuate and on her fresh demands and asked for instructions on how to proceed.1 It so happened that several of the cabinet were in Kansai district for the fifth Domestic Industrial Exhibition (Naikoku Kangyō Hakurankai). It was therefore opportune to have a meeting at Murin'an, Yamagata's country villa at Kyoto, on 21 April. Itō and Yamagata had already had a preliminary endeavour at a meeting of minds on 15 March when there was a gathering of genro, which reached the conclusion that: 'Russia seemed to wish no immediate clash with Japan over Korea; therefore Japan should endeavour to maintain the status quo and, should an opportunity arise, negotiate with Russia to reach an agreement on Korean independence and to prevent the Korean problem from becoming a cause for war between Japan and Russia.'2 This is quoted from Itō's account and may be over-optimistic. On this occasion Katsura and Komura from the government side met Itō and Yamagata from the genro side and agreed to the following propositions:
Thus Katsura and Komura took their initial steps towards opening negotiations with Russia in full anticipation of, or even determination for, war.
Already means of influencing public opinion were emerging. On the one hand, the Russo-Japanese Society had been founded in the autumn of 1902 under the patronage of Marquis Itō and Count Inoue and, though it was running out of steam by mid 1903, it had done something to improve neighbourly relations. On the other, there had been set up in 1901 the Kokuryūkai, literally the Black Dragon society, because 'Kokuryū' represents the Chinese title for the Amur river. The intention of the society was to drive the Russians to the Amur river, then the frontier between Manchuria and Siberia. The implication was that Japan should be prepared to go to war for this purpose. Together with the Tai Ro Dōshikai and Tai Gaikō Dōshikai, which have already been discussed, it constituted a formidable lobby and exerted a continuing pressure on governments of the day.4
There were other pressures of a less political kind. On a more secret level there was the activity of the seven professors who at the end of May 1903 were assembled by Konoe Atsumaro and his associates to make representations to government leaders to adopt forceful measures against the continued Russian occupation of Manchuria. They did this by calling on government leaders individually and arranged to have a statement submitted to Katsura, Komura, Yamamoto and War Minister Terauchi on 10 June (and later to Kodama, then governor-general of Taiwan) critical of their policy of drift and neglect. It was finally made public on 24 June and sharpened the case for war.5 In Japan at the time it was incredibly bold for civilians to pontificate on defence policy which was regarded as the professional preserve of certain clans. Six of the professors were professors of law at Tokyo Imperial University, one came from Gakushūin. By a strange irony the Law Faculty was the place where the young diplomats for recruitment to the foreign ministry were trained. One of these, Yoshida Shigeru of the graduating class of 1906, studied under one of the jingoist professors, the professor of constitutional law. This was what gave Yoshida his distaste later for academics and their interventions in politics.6
Another group which emerged in May 1903 was the Kogetsukai, really only a dining club which met at the Kogetsu restaurant in Tokyo. Though its membership was flexible and secret, it appears that it consisted of members of the army general staff (in the majority), the navy general staff, and the foreign ministry. They constituted a discussion group which tried to formulate a programme for lobbying their superiors. As in the case of the professors, divergent views probably emerged. But the common ground seems to have been a conviction that 'war with Russia was ultimately inevitable and that the sooner the war started, the more favourable the military situation would be for Japan'. The Kogetsukai decided to carry their ideas to the cabinet and genro individually and sought to persuade them to adopt an attitude in favour of war at an early date.7
The Kogetsukai views had a varied reception among the top political leaders. But they seem to have commanded some support among the middle reaches of the bureaucracy where it was solidly based. The elder statesmen were congenitally suspicious of lobbies of this kind, consisting of younger men with their rash schemes to quicken the pace which the genro wanted to set. Evidently Katsura as prime minister and Yamamoto as navy minister were not ready to be propelled into war and resisted their approaches. Those within the cabinet who proved to be more amenable were the foreign minister, Komura, who was less cautious and circumspect in his dealings with the Kogetsukai, Terauchi, the war minister who doubtless saw the strategic advantages of taking on the Russians without delay, and General Kodama, the home minister who with his Taiwan experience had ideas of Japan as a colonial power.
The middle months of 1903 saw a crisis in Japanese decision-making. It was in this context of dithering and uncertainty that these lobbies, each in its own way, tried to influence opinion among those placed at strategic points in bureaucracy and government.
These various lobbies did not differentiate between the thrust of Russia's expansion in Manchuria and Korea, since they were primarily interested in the expansion of Russian railways and Russian armies. Early in 1903 there seemed to be signs of a 'new' Russian interest in Korea. In February Russia asked Korea that a concession for the construction of a railway from Seoul to Uiju should be granted to Baron Ginzburg, a Russian entrepreneur with official blessing, whose name has appeared before. The concession had been given before to the French and, when that concession had lapsed, to Koreans with French specialist advisers. But work had been suspended for many months. It was now renewed by application from the Russians. The Japanese, who were engaged in the Seoul to Fusan line, objected, even though they had no plan to build from Seoul to Uiju at that stage. A railway battle was in the offing between Russia and Japan.
In April and May the Japanese received reports of a Russian settlement being established at Yongampo 15 miles from the mouth of the Yalu on the east bank to the south of Uiju. The Russian minister told the Koreans that it was necessary as a site from which to ship the timber cut in a concession granted in 1896. Originally belonging to a Russian trader, Briner, the concessions had been bought in 1898 by the court on the recommendation of Bezobrazov. Apart from the commercial motive of making a profit, the enterprise had the political motive of holding Russia's position in Korea and limiting the operations of other countries there. This enterprise drew fire from writers who argued that it should come under the commercial umbrella of the finance ministry and Witte and not be in the form proposed. After the Boxer episode, Bezobrazov had returned to the attack, suggesting that Russia should not be so obsessed by Manchuria that she neglected Korea and promoting again the interests of the timber concession. It was this timber company (or companies) which brought on the crisis in the east, but underlying it was a crisis between Witte, the Russo-Chinese Bank and the Bezobrazov and Grand Ducal interests.8
It was hard to obtain reliable information about the happenings in such a remote part of the Korean firmament. Laporte, the collector of customs at Chemulpo, the port of Seoul, was accordingly sent as a neutral observer to the area. His report stated that at Yongampo he had seen about sixty Russians in ordinary dress who had obtained possession of 50 acres of land for timber concessions. Moreover, Shahotzu, on the Chinese side of the Yalu, was held by Russian troops, who had two steam launches operating on the river and had installed the telegraph from the Chinese side. The companies were evidently engaged in exploiting the timber resources on the Chinese and Korean banks of the river which they were hoping to ship from Yongampo. Bezobrazov had visited the site in the spring and had evidently won the attention of the tsar and the Grand Duke Alex Mikhailovich, who was one of his confidants and an important figure behind the throne.
While the Russians were positively entrenched on the site, intense diplomatic activity was taking place in the excitable diplomatic atmosphere of Seoul. The Japanese saw the Yongampo activities as an unwarranted intrusion into Korea, claimed to be a Japanese sphere of interest, and as the thin end of the wedge. Her supporters in the Open Door group were also seriously disturbed by this development. They suggested that Russia was not observing the Open Door for Korea and was not likely to do so for Manchuria, as she had so often proclaimed. The three therefore proposed that the Korean government should open the Yalu river to all traffic in accordance with the Open Door. But Minister Pavlov in Seoul opposed this idea successfully and played on the basically anti-Japanese sentiment of the Korean court. By an agreement of 20 July, the original concession of 1896 was confirmed and supplemented.9
Just as the Russian actions on the Korean frontier were not reported to, or fully known to, the authorities at home, being known only to the men on the frontier, so the detection of the Russian actions was largely a matter for the Japanese military on the frontier. This was the responsibility of military attachés overseas who reported to the war ministry and the general staff. Early in May Major Nozu, the attaché at Seoul, telegraphed to Chief of Staff Ōyama that, according to his subordinates, Russian forces had occupied the district of Yongampo in the north of Korea and were engaged in building-works. The general staff set about examining Russia's enterprises in northern Korea and prepared an appreciation of her actions. Since there were details in the draft which were disadvantageous to the group which favoured an early war with Russia, the appreciation was amended by several middle-ranking officers including General Iguchi Shogo and Major Tanaka Giichi whom we have earlier seen in St Petersburg and who had since returned to join the general staff. In its final form, it reached the conclusion that Russia was aiming not simply at preserving her interests but at occupying both banks of the Yalu, at invading northern Korea and at making preparations for war against Japan. Such was the appreciation of Russian activities which Ōyama presented to the throne on 22 May.10
As against that, Komura received on 15 May a telegram from Consul Segawa at Niuchuang, saying that the real purpose of Russia's actions in Manchuria and Korea was not to make preparations for war but to obtain mining and forestry rights in every part of Manchuria and on the banks of the Yalu.11 The foreign ministry had confidence in Segawa who was a Russian linguist of distinction and believed in his observations which were sent to the emperor and all departments of state. They took, it goes without saying, a much more moderate view of Russian intentions than was to be found in the army staff appreciation.
This clash of opinions came to a head at a meeting within the general staff on 8 June. In the memorandum circulated beforehand by General Iguchi, who must be regarded as one of the leaders of the pro-war party, he set forth the army's views systematically. Basically he considered Russia to be in a mood of expansion to west and east and south and expressed the opinion that she was devoting all her strength to expansion in Manchuria and Korea and should be resisted on both. After comparing the army and navy strengths in the far east, the memorandum suggested that an early war would be of advantage to Japan. The following points were adopted as the conclusions of the conference:
This was not a unanimous stance; but it was backed by a sufficiently vocal and influential majority amojig middle-rank army officers that it could not be disregarded. General Ōyama to whom it was addressed was far from convinced of its logic and regretted that it appeared to reject Man-Kan kōkan. None the less he allowed it to form the basis for the general staff memorandum of 17 June which we shall discuss later.
While the upper echelons of the defence staff were discussing war preparations, they received a visit from General Kuropatkin. On 22 March Kurino in Russia had been told by the war minister of his plans to travel to the east and conduct a tour of inspection of Vladivostok and Port Arthur and his hope of visiting Japan. He asked his government to extend the necessary invitation; and Tokyo showed no hesitation. By 3 April Kuropatkin was able to report that the tsar had consented to his journey to Japan. He set off from St Petersburg at the end of the month but, because of problems with his timetable, his original plan to spend a week in Tokyo had to be reduced to four days. He arrived at Shimonoseki in western Japan on 12 June and travelled by rail to Tokyo with a large retinue. He was treated as a state guest and accommodated at Shiba Palace. Since he carried with him a letter from the tsar, he was received in audience by the Japanese emperor. He had substantive discussions with Katsura and Komura.13 But for the rest, he was the guest of the Japanese army, inspecting units and assessing the infantry, cavalry and the officer corps. Before his visit to Tokyo was complete, he received a telegram from Russia, inviting him to stay on in Japan since there was no point in reaching Port Arthur for the forthcoming conference before Bezobrazov arrived. Kuropatkin had no choice but to pass time in the Kansai area before boarding the cruiser Askold at Kobe. This carried him through the Inland Sea to Nagasaki whence he travelled on 28 June to Port Arthur.
Naturally Kuropatkin's visit was surrounded by all manner of rumours about his having a 'mission'. Some newspapers were bold enough to print the treaty which he was supposed to have signed in Tokyo. While there had been long and penetrating discussions between the Russian war minister and his Japanese opposite number and also with Katsura and Komura, there is no evidence that anything in the nature of a treaty was envisaged. The various accounts we have of the talks suggest that they were revelatory, that is, that Kuropatkin explained Russia's up-to-date attitudes on Manchuria and her railways there, while the Japanese expressed their worries about Korea. The attitudes were cordial; the talking was tough. It was certainly a bonus for the Japanese leaders to have met the Russian war minister face to face. Likewise Kuropatkin was favourably impressed by what he saw of the Japanese army and reported accordingly when he spoke at the Port Arthur conference.14
No sooner had Kuropatkin left by the back door than talks began to see if Japan could reach consensus on a policy towards Russia. The initiative came from the army which prepared a draft memorandum for circulation on 17 June. The army, having foreknowledge that Admiral Itō, the chief of naval staff, and Admiral Ijuin, the deputy chief, were in favour of its line (that Korea was a basic lifeline for Japan's security), hoped that its memorandum would secure also the approval of the naval general staff. But the Satsuma-based naval leaders would not give their assent without the approval of Admiral Yamamoto, the navy minister. He, however, dismissed the army memorandum, asking 'what if Korea is lost to Japan? It will suffice if Japan secures her own island territories.' This interesting clash of views prevented the two services joining in a united front, and the memorandum 'on settling the Korean question' went forward to the emperor on 22 June as the opinion of the army only.15
Meanwhile Katsura and Komura were pushing ahead with obtaining approval for a moderate civilian line which advocated opening negotiations with Russia. In preparation for an imperial council which was due to be held on 23 June, Komura drew up a document arguing his ministry's case at length, the standard practice in Japan when a major issue of state was to be considered. It included some echoes of the army's phraseology: 'Korea is like a dagger pointing at Japan's heart and she could never endure its possession by a foreign power. Russia's activities in Manchuria and Korea are leading eventually to her domination over Korea. . . . In order to ensure Korean security, Japan should limit Russia's activities in Manchuria to those permitted under existing treaties.'16 As always the Korean and Manchurian issues were inextricably linked. Komura proposed a basis for negotiations but added as a postscript: 'it will be very hard to get Russia to agree to such a deal so it is essential that, before embarking on negotiations, we are fully determined to secure our objectives regardless of the ultimate sacrifice.'
A council in the presence of the emperor was held on 23 June. Among the elder statesmen in attendance, Itō and Inoue favoured a more moderate and circumspect line than that of the cabinet. A compromise resolution setting out the conditions for an approach to Russia was finally passed:
This formula seemed to tilt towards the Itō line of Man-Kan kōkan once again and to represent a slight climb-down by the cabinet and the army. These guidelines were of course for internal reference. It was left to the government, and the foreign ministry in particular, to formulate the terms to be laid before the Russians.
The foreign ministry lost no time in informing Britain of its intentions, inviting a full and frank exchange of views and asking Britain's blessing on its intended independent initiative. In reply Britain suggested that Japan should approach Washington over the action she proposed to take. From this the Japanese deduced that Britain was inclined to propose a joint approach to Russia on behalf of the Open Door powers and hastened to ask Britain not to think of taking part in any such approach. They gave the assurance that their negotiations would not prejudice their obligations under the alliance. In conveying Japan's thinking, the British minister reported:
They intend to alone approach the Russian Government with certain friendly proposals, as the project does not, in their opinion, lend itself to joint or parallel action. As common action thus forms no part of the scheme of the Imperial Government, and as its strict secrecy is of the utmost importance at this juncture, they can see no advantage in communicating with United States Government on the subject.18
It appears, therefore, that consultation with the United States which was notorious for leaks and indiscretions to journalists, was not on the Japanese agenda. The Japanese wanted a free hand and no intrusion from friendly powers. It further appears that Britain, who had been consulted as a friendly gesture because of the alliance, did not consider herself sufficiently committed to get involved in this issue and thought that the United States was the outside power with the prime interest in Korea and Manchuria.
At all events Britain's suggestion for combined action found no responsive chord in Japan. Since the Japanese may have been hopeful of securing for themselves acceptable concessions from Russia, they naturally did not want others to share in the concessions or monitor them. So far as we know, no approach was made to the United States. It is perhaps worth remarking that the Japanese historian, Kajima, who is not generally critical of Japanese tactics, writes: 'The author believes that, in order to have averted the war, it would have been absolutely necessary for Japan to have conducted negotiations hand in hand with Britain and the United States, because the Russian Government, particularly the Czar, felt it humiliating to conclude a treaty with Japan on the basis of reciprocity.'19 We have no way of knowing on what evidence Kajima offers this opinion but he often had access to confidential sources.
Another factor which may have dissuaded Japan from a shared initiative was the extent of disagreement within Japan itself. Itō went around making no secret of these divisions. He told MacDonald that Manchuria was really no longer a part of China and should realistically be allowed to be taken by Russia, provided Japan was compensated in Korea. He may have hoped that he was feeding London with an indication of Japan's long-term intentions. MacDonald initially reported on the basis of this conversation that 'it is not improbable that the nature of the arrangement with Russia would be a free hand for Japan in Corea with equal facilities for Russia in Manchuria on the part of Japan'.20 In other words, Itō purported to suggest that the Man-Kan kokan formula had been adopted at the various top-level meetings.
MacDonald received hostile reaction when he told the foreign minister on the following day of that conversation. He reported that 'Komura exhibited very considerable annoyance when I told him what had occurred at my meeting and when I informed him that I had communicated Itō's words to London.' He asked that the impression should very speedily be corrected and himself authorized Hayashi to put the record straight. Komura's account was that Japan's proposal
would be based on the principle of maintenance of integrity of China and Corea and of the open door and commercial equality for all. He said that views expressed by Itō were his own personal ones and were not shared in by the Cabinet. The principle of the proposed arrangement had been drawn up by the Cabinet, approved of by the great majority of elder statesmen and had been sanctioned by the Emperor.21
The significance of this is to reinforce the point that the Japanese leaders had not proposed to go ahead with negotiations purely on the basis of Man-Kan kōkan as Itō wanted. The majority were opposed to a trade-off between Korea and Manchuria. In other words they did not want complete désinteréssement of Japan in Manchuria, the position that had been taken by Itō in Russia in 1901. Secondly it indicates that the genro view was no longer automatically adopted or even respected; that statesmen like Komura had to steer decisions away from genro views that they did not like. MacDonald like many foreigners at the time thought that what Itō said would call the tune; but it was not so.
Since the government's defeat and the suspension of the Diet sittings on 4 June, Prime Minister Katsura regarded himself as a dead duck prime minister. He was between a belligerent army, which by the end of July was raring for war, and the top policy-making body, the imperial council — where the cautious voices of Itō and Inoue carried (as he thought) disproportionate weight. In the midst of jockeying for position, Katsura, claiming ill-health, resigned and asked that the genro should choose his successor from among themselves as had been the earlier practice. By this ploy Katsura was complaining about Itō's excessive influence in policy-making in his dual capacity as genro and president of the majority Seiyūkai party. He retired to his seaside villa, leaving the navy minister to lead the cabinet. The crisis was only resolved when the emperor, on the recommendation of Yamagata who was Itō's rival, issued a rescript on 6 July appointing Itō as president of the privy council, an office he could not hold jointly with the leadership of a political party. Katsura was then commanded by the emperor to return to his duties as prime minister and went back to Tokyo, miraculously restored in health. It had been a protest against the genro and their powers of interference. It was Katsura's attempt to put Itō in his place. It did not entirely succeed because Itō was too experienced to be overlooked and too important to be ignored. It was, however, a shot across his bows, a warning that he could not expect to get his way as he had for four years, when his view was a minority one.22
On 28 July Komura informed Russia that Japan wished to exchange views over their respective interests in Korea and Manchuria. Count Lamsdorf agreed three days later to the opening of discussions. Komura, who was well rehearsed for the part because of the protracted cabinet crisis, passed over a note containing the draft terms on 3 August.23
Consensus in Japan had been hard to find and was still by no means achieved. But a minimum set of terms had been agreed and would be enough to test the Russian reaction.
1. Uchida Yasuya, p. 90.
2. Itō-den, vol. 3, pp. 589-90.
3. Tsunoda Jun, Manshū mondai to kokubō hōshin, p. 154f.
4. Ibid., p. 158; Okamoto Shumpei, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 61-2.
5. Okamoto, op. cit., pp. 65-7.
6. Inoki Masamichi, Hyōden Yoshida Shigeru, vol. 1, pp. 61-3.
7. Tsunoda, op. cit., p. 158.
8. Bezobrazov's developing interests in the Yalu region are best described in A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, pp. 208-23.
9. E. M. Satow, Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, p. 228.
10. Ōyama Azusa, Nichi-Ro Sensō no gunsei shiroku, Tokyo, p. 30; Tsunoda, op. cit., pp. 157-8.
11. Segawa to Komura, 15 May 1903, NGB 36/1, no. 838.
12. Ōyama, op. cit., p. 31; Tsunoda, op. cit., p. 160.
13. Meiji Gunjishi.
14. Krasnyi Arkhiv, ('Dnevnik A. N. Kuropatkina'), 2 (1922), p. 43.
15. Tsunoda, op. cit., pp. 160-2.
16. Komura to cabinet, NGNB, vol. 1, pp. 210-12.
17. Kōshaku Katsura Tarō-den, vol. 2, pp. 119-22.
18. BD, vol. 2, nos. 237-8.
19. Kajima Morinosuke, The Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 2, p. 101, fn. 7.
20. BD, vol. 2, no. 236.
21. MacDonald to Lansdowne, 3 July 1903, FO 46/566.
22. I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 265-6.
23. NGNB, vol. 1, pp. 212-13.