With the advent of 1903 there was a turning-point in the attitude of Russia towards the far east. Its features included a change of attitude both at home in St Petersburg and at the frontier in China, Korea and Manchuria. It is not easy to define this turning-point. But indisputably it contained the following elements: a change in the balance of forces at the Russian court; the rise and fall of Bezobrazov and his circle; decentralization of power in dealing with east Asian issues and the rise of Admiral Alekseyev. Beyond this, it is hard to go. It is doubtful whether the conventional phraseology of the 'old course' being replaced by the 'new course' is wholly satisfactory. There were too many resemblances between the old and new courses; and there was continuity in some of the key roles, even if Finance Minister Witte was forcibly retired. We shall, therefore, suggest that, while there were continuities, there were also new dimensions and that, even within these 'new dimensions', there were many contradictory elements.
Perhaps ambivalence was of the essence of the tsarist autocracy. If Tsar Nicholas was to maintain his position and prestige, he had to play a balancing game between his various advisers. Hence his dismissal and rejection of the over-weaning, over-bearing and possibly disloyal Witte. But the tsar never sold himself completely to one side. Thus his attraction to Bezobrazov and later to Alekseyev was a partial one. All the while he was balancing the various forces and making compromises very often behind the backs of the participants. Uppermost in his mind were probably the economic crises and the possibility of revolution. The state was too rich, the people too poor; and the autocracy, based on military and police power, was unpopular. Nicholas therefore needed some success to compensate for what he saw as his record of failure. Hence the haphazard decisions: the alternation between reckless courses and more moderate ones, between internationalist courses and ones purely based on Russia's and Romanov interests.1
The tsar's search for successes seems to have led him to concentrate in the years after 1900 on Asia to the neglect of Europe. It is not so much that these were years of startling expansion as that Russia wanted to hold on to what had fallen into her lap in China so easily in 1900. Specifically, it was hard for the tsar to order the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria without risking great loss of face and reputation. Moreover, to focus attention on Manchuria and Korea cost money which Russia could ill afford in her uncertain financial position and on which she would gain no dividend in the short term. Further, by concentrating on east Asia, Russia was turning her back on the crying problem of the day, the poverty and hunger of her people. In order to remedy these, the critics wrote, she ought to have been cultivating the granary of Europe. Novoye Vremya, one of the most penetrating and thoughtful organs of the press, stated the alternatives for Russia thus: concentration on Asia or concentration at home and in Europe.2 It favoured the latter course. In the public debate on the subject it was being said that the stomach was being sacrificed to the fingertips. In other words, Russia had a choice between extending her fingertips to east Asia or attending to pressing problems at home; the eastern adventures could only be pursued at the expense of the 'stomach'.
To use this vivid imagery, the Russians, by devoting so much attention to the east, were risking acute stomach ache. There was grave dissatisfaction with the Russian government over the neglected issues of poverty and hunger. Hitherto protests had tended to be met by police repression; but, while this had been effective in the neighbourhood of St Petersburg and Moscow, it had not been so easy to maintain control in the countryside and especially in the south by means of police power. It was widely thought that this could not long continue without some explosion and that, if this were to be prevented, some of the repressive powers of the autocracy would have to be removed and a programme of reforms introduced. This again was a divisive issue among the Russian leaders. Witte and his group were mildly in favour of reform, while the emperor and the grand dukes seem rather to have leant towards tougher repression. This explains why Witte was losing the tsar's favour which was being shown instead to Plehve, the interior minister and the agent of repression.
Another symptom of this change appears to have been a rise in the fortunes of Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, the emperor's brother-in-law, who began to play a more notable part in court circles early in 1903. An enthusiastic sailor, he had a reputation for being hardworking and unusually intelligent. He had connections with Korea going back to 1898. The emperor allotted him the department of navigation and ports, a newly-created department of state, which was transferred from Witte's charge. A bitter opponent of Witte, he sought to remove all commercial business from the finance ministry and have it transferred to his own department. But his role, like that of the grand dukes in general, can only be described in terms of general influence within the court.
Associated with him was General Alexander Mikhailovich Bezobrazov, an army officer, who had earned a formidable reputation in frontier posts in Iran and west Siberia. Since retirement he had dabbled in various money-making projects on the frontier. He became associated with the grand duke's affairs and was identified as a powerful member of the anti-Witte camp. Bezobrazov had charisma and seems to have enjoyed remarkable access to the tsar's presence, and to have exerted some influence over his thinking. He and his group seem to have been able to manipulate the tsar and his authority. In this Bezobrazov had a valuable ally in St Petersburg in Rear-Admiral Aleksei Mikhailovich Abaza, who was his cousin and was to be appointed in mid 1903 as secretary of the Far Eastern Committee.3
Opinions will probably always differ on the 'sinister influence' of Bezobrazov and the conspiracy to which it may have led. I take an intermediate position. Bezobrazov was certainly not all-powerful nor was he, on the other hand, lacking in political clout in the capital. His power was spasmodic, some would say short-lived. Sometimes he convinced the tsar; sometimes he was sent on tour to get him out of the tsar's way. While Bezobrazov's bluff soldierly manner seems to have appealed to the tsar, it excited the opposition of Witte, Lamsdorf and Kuropatkin, who found him to be vain, self-centred and difficult to handle. There had been a running battle between him and the triumvirate since Bezobrazov became involved in the Korean concession project in 1898. His activities received a setback two years later at the hands of Witte who did not favour Korean adventures and managed to prevent independent projects being pursued there outside the control of the ministry of finance. But Bezobrazov was one of the main beneficiaries of Witte's declining fortunes in 1902 as he had been one of his most influential and eloquent opponents.
Yet how meteoric was the 'rise' of Bezobrazov? The evidence is hard to interpret. Typical of this difficulty is the incident in the autumn of 1902 when Bezobrazov was in attendance on the tsar at Livadia in the Crimea and seems to have discussed with him the report presented by Witte on the return from his trip to the far east, and criticized it severely. Thereafter Nicholas decided to send Bezobrazov as special emissary in November with a vague assignment. The tsar ordered Witte to make available large funds through the Russo-Chinese Bank for his stay in Port Arthur. Bezobrazov remained in the east two months. This episode is capable of two interpretations: first that Bezobrazov had the complete backing of the tsar for the enterprises which he was pursuing; or second that this was a good opportunity to get rid of an awkward busybody and give the tsar some breathing-space from his lobbying at a time when important ministerial conferences were being held. Both views can be supported by evidence. Perhaps it will suffice to say that it was another example of the tsar's balancing the influence of factions and lobbies.
Nicholas certainly found some of Bezobrazov's views infectious and exciting. He may have been swayed by his memorandum on far eastern policy:
Russia should demonstrate her energy and determination. Withdrawal of Russian forces from Manchuria is out of the question. A problem such as this concerns only Russia and China and should not be made a subject for international negotiations. Russia should increase her forces in the Far East with a view to silencing any opposition. She should construct defence works on the Yalu river with the object of forestalling a Japanese attack on Manchuria's flank and making it possible for her to threaten Japan from that region in case Japan attacks. Russia should discard Witte's timid policy which will only lead her into difficulties. Real economic benefit should be obtained from the Far East, and this could be achieved on the Yalu river basin by aiding the East Asian Enterprise Company based on Briner's concession. In Korea, it is possible for Russia to acquire further concessions. With the object of ending American support to Japan and attracting American sympathy for Russia, attempts should be made to become associated with American capital. In Manchuria important industries should be controlled [and arrangements made with the governor-general]. But, in order to soften the dissatisfaction of Americans and others, the Open Door should be observed there for foreigners.4
These ideas are quoted at length to indicate how radical was the policy being advocated by the Bezobrazov group and how superficially attractive it could be to the tsar. It was a plausible variant to the 'old course' which was becoming increasingly discredited as its author-in-chief, Witte, fell from grace.
The 'new course' represented innovations not only at the European end but also at the eastern end. One of the features which we shall be noticing is the greater decentralization of power there. That is not to say that it greatly changed the character of the 'Russian team' in the east or enhanced its quality. Nor does it imply that the 'Russian team' had hitherto been weak. On the contrary, we have already quoted Dr George Ernest Morrison, the Peking correspondent of The Times of London, who was no mean observer, as saying that the Russian combination was 'one very difficult to compete with'.5 Who were these talents who drew this praise from Morrison? Pavel Mikhailovich Lessar had gone to Peking in 1901 after winning diplomatic laurels for serving under de Staal at the London embassy and was regarded as a star of the Russian Foreign Ministry though he was suffering from a fatal disease. Basil Kroupensky was also an accomplished diplomat, though a junior one. He had served in China since 1900. Dmitrii Dmitrievich Pokotilovhad come to China as a young man in 1888 and become highly proficient in the Chinese language and adept at handling the Chinese. He had been manager of the Russo-Chinese Bank from 1896 to 1903 and director-general of the Chinese Eastern Railway. All commentators speak favourably of his skills. Thus Morrison wrote of him:
The subjection of Li Hung Chang to Russia was largely due to his influence and it would be difficult to over-estimate the services he rendered to his country during the friendly negotiations which have secured the separation of Manchuria, with the fortress of Port Arthur, from Chinese dominion. Probably no abler servant of the Russian Government ever came to the Far East.6
His talents were rewarded; and he ended up as his country's minister to China (1905-8). Since Russia's actions were essentially military ones, an important part was played by Colonel Konstantin de Wogack (Vogak), the military attaché for China and Japan, who had taken a large role since the Boxer emergency in northern railway matters. In this he complemented the role of Baron G. G. Ginsberg who was associated with the Peking legation through de Wogack and had enterprises in Manchuria and Korea. He was a director of the Russo-Chinese Bank and chief contractor for the Russian Pacific squadron. From January 1902 he was increasingly involved in Korea, engaged in negotiations for a loan connected with mines, and soon became a vital participant in Bezobrazov's concession on the Yalu. He was described disparagingly by his enemies as a 'Jewish speculator' but he was an active and subtle operator on behalf of Russia.7
Slightly outside this group was Admiral Evgenii Ivanovich Alekseyev. He came to prominence first as commander of the Pacific squadron in 1895. Three years later he was appointed as governor of the Kuantung lease territory and commander-in-chief of Russian naval forces in the Pacific. During the Boxer emergency he was appointed by Kuropatkin as an army corps commander. Alekseyev was generally distrusted by the army leaders but enjoyed the favour of the tsar and the grand dukes. Just sixty, he was a bachelor and a hard-working but rather remote official.
This was a remarkable combination of diplomats, bankers, soldiers, sailors and entrepreneurs who were conscious of the new opportunities in the east created by the near-completion of the railways. Whether acting together or separately, they made up a formidable team. Writing of Russian activities, Guber speaks of the 'adventurism' of the time; and certainly there was more than a whiff of frontier adventurism in their actions, beliefs and reports.8 There had been a Russian tradition of adventure in central and east Asia for several decades and a tendency to act independently of central authority. Dr Morrison, who was no Russophil observer, wrote of the Russian officials in China as not being governed by timidity or fastidiousness and propriety as was the British minister in Peking and his officials. The impression he conveys is that, while the British were tired, the Russians were lively and that, while the Russians were tough-minded, often brutal and insincere, they were more energetic in their actions, more adaptable to their oriental environment and more successful than any other European power.9 As against that, moves were made to limit individual initiatives. As the rest of this chapter will show, attempts were made because of improved railway communications to bring these disparate elements together at meetings in order to hammer out an acceptable consensus. But even these endeavours did not greatly limit some of the adventurism of the frontier.
There was also an expansion of Russian forces in the east Asian area. Whether this was the result of cries from the periphery or the result of Kuropatkin's initiative from the metropolis cannot be said for sure. At the end of June 1903 the Russians by way of testing the carrying capacity of their new railway sent to Siberia two infantry brigades and two artillery battalions together with appropriate cavalry. Russia thereafter continued to send forces to east Asia. She was also increasing her naval strength in the area. She was improving the fortifications of the naval ports of Port Arthur and Vladivostok and their capacity to accommodate an increased fleet.
But the motive for sending these reinforcements does not seem to have been any expectation of war breaking out with Japan. Russia did not believe that Japan would make war on her; and there is no evidence that she was sending out forces for the purpose of making war on Japan. If anything, the Russians played down the military qualities of the Japanese army and its strike capability. Indeed Colonel Vannovskii, who had occupied the position of military attache at the Tokyo legation since 1900 and was the man capable of reporting most authoritatively, seems to have taken the view that the Japanese would need about a century to develop a modern army comparable to that of the weakest army in Europe and that their army was one of infants.10 Whether this was a reference to the Japanese being undersized in comparison to European armies of the time cannot be said. But Vannovskii's views were by no means uncommon in the ranks of military attaches in Tokyo. So persistent were they that one wonders whether the Japanese deliberately tried to plant this idea in the minds of foreign representatives. The gradual expansion of Russian forces can have had little connection with a perceived risk of hostilities with Japan.
Having tried to show some of the changes in the balance of forces within Russia, we must now turn to Korea. Since 1898 Russia had been keeping a lower profile there; but gradually under the active Pavlov, she was again pressing her case with the Korean court. There was in Korea, as there had been in China, a pro-Russian party, at this time led by Yi Yong-ik. There was still a residual respect for Russia for having given the emperor asylum in her Seoul legation in 1896. In particular the Koreans seem to have found the personality of Weber, the former minister who had returned to Seoul to act at the legation during Pavlov's absence on leave in 1902-3, congenial and sympathetic. On the other side, the Koreans often found the Japanese concession-hunters very trying and difficult to handle and sometimes turned to the Russians to offset their pressure.
As we briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, the focus of Japanese attention turned on Yongampo, a spot on the Korean bank of the Yalu river, where disturbing developments were taking place. The Russians had secured a 'preliminary lease' of the area from a pliant deputy sent up to the place, though its terms were not wholly satisfactory to either the Russians or the Koreans. In June 1903 the headquarters of the timber company was set up there, even though it was recognized that this action would be regarded by the Japanese as provocative. Japan viewed the Yalu enterprise as more strategic than commercial and as a Russian attempt to obtain and consolidate a foothold in northern Korea from which they could contain Japanese activities in the peninsula. This view seemed all the more plausible when the management and work-force seemed to have been drawn from demobilized soldiers. The Japanese, aided by the British, opposed the Yongampo enterprise.11
Bezobrazov, with his considerable experience of Korea in the past, had a major hand in this. His enthusiasm for the Yalu concession took shape after his group acquired the interests originally obtained from the Koreans by the entrepreneur, Briner, in 1898. Two timber companies were set up in Vladivostok to exploit the timber rights in valuable forests on both banks of the Yalu river. As soon as Bezobrazov took over the timber companies, he set aside 180,000 roubles for the construction of a sawmill at the mouth of the Yalu and began to build up a labour force. For this purpose he planned to bring large numbers of discharged soldiers to the concession area. Admiral Alekseyev in Port Arthur, however, did not like the shape which this enterprise was taking and only sent 40 out of an expected quota of 300 ex-soldiers. Bezobrazov, who had secured through his relative, Abaza, in the Russian capital permission in principle to proceed on these lines, was furious at this and submitted a critical report.12
The Yalu project was running into criticism from all sides. On receipt of the report, the tsar thought it best to recall Bezobrazov from Port Arthur on 2 April. Meanwhile Bezobrazov's enemies in the capital decided to raise the Yalu project for discussion and convened a special conference in St Petersburg on 8 April. They did not wait for Bezobrazov to return but received his views as embodied in a memorandum from Abaza. The Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, who was a sort of protector of Bezobrazov at court and an advocate of the Yalu project and a person whose relations with Witte were far from cordial, was not invited. Witte felt able to resist the more extreme proposals and was supported as usual by Foreign Minister Lamsdorf. On this occasion Kuropatkin, who found Bezobrazov's general ideas on Korea distasteful, came out in full support of their opposition. It was not only that the three found little to be said for commercial undertakings on the Yalu river and for Bezobrazov's commercial sense but also that they could see little merit in going out of their way to antagonize the Japanese whose hostility to the project was already clear, for such a small commercial return in northern Korea. While agreeing that the company involved in the concession should be purely commercial with only the routine services of government, the conferees wanted to establish themselves on both banks of the Yalu, thereby preventing the opening of the river by others. Against Witte's idea of imposing more control, Kuropatkin proposed that the commander of the Kuantung Leased Territory be given authority over the concessions on both the Korean and Manchurian banks and obtained approval for it. This was an early and surprising anticipation of an increase in powers for Alekseyev.13
On 18 April Bezobrazov returned from the east in high style. By this time he may have earned some support for his notions from Alekseyev and may have won the positive support of the tsar because of this. This must be partly explained by the impact of his rumbustious personality on Nicholas. But it was not an overwhelming vote of confidence for there are several witnesses who contend that, when Kuropatkin was sent to the east on a fact-finding mission, he was specifically enjoined by the tsar 'to efface the traces of Bezobrazov's activities'.14 Kuropatkin's trip removed the member of the triumvirate who carried most weight with the tsar and may therefore have played into Bezobrazov's hands. He benefited from Witte's continuing unpopularity and was supported by Witte's rivals, especially Plehve. In a sense, Bezobrazov seems to have turned the tables on his critics.
The official start of the new course was on 15 May. It was then that Nicholas, without consulting his ministers, appointed Bezobrazov 'state secretary' (in Russian 'stats-sekretar'). From that point on the timber company at Yongampo could not be regarded as a private speculation. It now had official blessing since its president had an official title. Moreover, the manager, Ginsberg, had long-standing connections with the Russian legation in Peking. Even if, as some scholars argue, the appointment of state secretary did not give Bezobrazov a vital role in the state apparatus, it must have had some symbolic significance. It surely implied that the tsar and his advisers were so frustrated by the unwillingness of the existing ministers to seize the opportunity offered by the railway in the east that they had decided to give a token of approval to one who would. On 15 May the tsar, again acting on his own, appointed Admiral Alekseyev as supremo over all departments in the east, thus rationalizing the structure of decision-making there. This too was a mark of favour to one not popular with the St Petersburg triumvirate.15
In his instructions to Alekseyev, Nicholas gave some guidelines for the new course (novyi kurs). In effect these consisted of two unobjectionable propositions: that the activities of Russian entrepreneurs were to be promoted in Manchuria, especially in areas which were significant politically and militarily, and foreign enterprise was to be excluded; and that, regardless of the expense involved, Russia's defensive capability in the east was to be brought into line with her interests in political and economic fields, thus indicating to the world her resolve to uphold her right to an exclusive sphere of influence in Manchuria.16 This was the personal policy of the tsar, doubtless nudged by Bezobrazov and Abaza. But it was a positive policy, not dramatic in its novelty, and a gesture of protest against the attitudes hitherto taken by his 'stick-in-the-mud' ministers.
These new instructions reflected a new consciousness of the need for defence expenditure in the east. It was recognized that, despite the vast expenditure in the past, Manchuria, the railway and especially Port Arthur were vulnerable. Whereas Russia had in the past relied on Japan not having the courage to risk confrontation with her unless she occupied fresh territories, this was no longer certain. There was now a determination that there would be land and sea reinforcements and stronger centralized leadership in the east through Alekseyev. The tsar did not carry his ministers with him over the new course and did not try to.
The next landmark was the summit conference held at Port Arthur between 1 and 10 July. It severely taxed the limited hotel resources of the town. From Japan Kuropatkin reached Port Arthur in the cruiser Askold and stayed with Alekseyev at his official residence after his exhausting tour of inspection. Bezobrazov arrived by special train from the Russian capital and stayed comfortably in the sidings. The minister in Seoul, Pavlov, arrived with his family by the Greimyashich and stayed on board ship, while the minister in Peking, Lessar, sailed in later in the Zapiak where he too stayed during the period of the conference. The other delegates included Rosen from Tokyo, Grosse, the head of the Russian civil administration in Niuchuang, Chichagov, the army commander for the Harbin region, D. L. Horvat, director of the Chinese Eastern Railway and commander of the railway police, Vogak, the military attache at Peking, who had accompanied Kuropatkin to Japan, and Pokotilov. It was a remarkable gathering of experts and showed the systematic way in which the Russians sought to reach some sort of consensus over policy.
During the five sessions of the conference, there was considerable friction, despite the fact that some of the more important participants had met in the capital not long before to work out a national policy. Bezobrazov who had travelled east specially was the outsider, not having been present at the earlier talks. He and those of his persuasion were in a minority. He had received en route the tsar's instructions as communicated by his agent Abaza. They stated rather evasively that Russia would permit Japan to occupy Korea even up to the limits of the Russian timber concessions — a declaration which would be made from strength after Russian forces in the area had been reinforced. Perhaps because he did not like them, Bezobrazov seems not to have transmitted them to the delegates. He was not inclined to pull out of Korea and was in favour of war if Russia was challenged. Kuropatkin and Alekseyev made common cause against this and seem to have obtained majority support. It may be that they discussed the possibility of making Kuropatkin commander-in-chief of the army in the area, while Alekseyev became naval commander-in-chief. For the present that proposal was shelved.17
The broad conclusions reached were: (1) not to support with Russian government funds any enterprise either in Manchuria or in Korea (where the Yalu enterprise was to be solely of a commercial character); (2) to carry out the evacuation of Manchuria provided China accepted the new demands which the conference devised. Both points went against the grain of Bezobrazov's thinking, especially the first.
Though Kuropatkin was recalled to Europe without delay, he did manage to fit in inspections at Dalny, Liaoyang, Mukden and Harbin (16-17 July). He returned to Russia with a favourable impression of the capacity and efficiency of Japan's armies. His view of Russia's strength is not so clear. Bezobrazov for his part returned to St Petersburg before Kuropatkin and began to lobby against the findings of the Port Arthur conferences. He submitted a note setting out his dissent with their major conclusions. But by this time his charisma had failed. The tsar was not impressed by his arguments. By 16 August Kuropatkin won acceptance from the triumvirate for his line against Bezobrazov and the latter's influence seems to have faded. Yet he may have had some residual effect on some of the later events. Bezobrazov became ill with his exertions later in the year and retired from the scene. He may have been depressed with the lack of ready success which his enterprises on the Yalu had had. His appearance at the front of the stage was an important and dramatic one but it was shortlived.18
The Manchurian and Korean findings of the Port Arthur meeting were subjected to scrutiny by ministers at St Petersburg. Witte, Lamsdorf, and Kuropatkin (by this time returned from the east) met on 14 August and reduced the demands to be made to China from the original ten to five. These revised terms after approval by the emperor were telegraphed to Minister Lessar on 5 September.
In trying to assess the new course as devised in the various conferences up to August, one must conclude that there were vast contradictions within it. There was a gap between the rhetoric of the decisions and the actuality and between the hope and the reality which emerged. The hopes of the majority included: pursuing the Yalu concession but without giving it official support and encouragement; withdrawing from Manchuria gracefully and gradually but only after obtaining guarantees from the Chinese about Russian interests; and pacifying the powers whose opposition to Russian actions had been bitter by contriving some means of giving them assurances and appeasing Japan as far as possible in Korea. By the imperialist standards of the day, these aspirations were reasonable, unexceptionable and moderate. But there was in several respects a gap between these statements and the actual performance. Think for example of the terms which were now to be presented to China and were still very tough. Did this mean that Russia wanted to evacuate or did she merely want to impose terms which China could not accept in order to get a pretext for staying on?
Moreover, there was a gap between the findings of the conferences and the thinking of the executants on the spot, the military groups and the concession hunters. Minister Pavlov in Seoul had no compunction about giving 'official encouragement' to the Yalu concession and clearly did not hold himself bound by the decisions taken at Port Arthur. Thus, he drew up a new agreement for the Yalu concession and used all his powers of persuasion and menace to get the Koreans to sign. He and Baron Ginsberg spent two entire afternoons and evenings trying to persuade the foreign minister and threatening dire consequences if he would not agree. But without success! The Japanese and British ministers in turn threatened consequences still more awful if the Koreans did so agree. But Pavlov's action was not in accordance with the spirit of the Port Arthur decisions.19
The proceedings at Port Arthur had been monitored with considerable perseverance by the Japanese, both military and civilian. In the case of civilians it was the consuls at Chefoo and Niuchuang (Yingkow) who bore the main responsibility. In the case of the military, it was left to the naval authorities to make their reports on matters arising in China.20
There were many reports of the possible outbreak of war between Russia and Japan (Nichi-Ro kaisendan). None seemed to be especially authoritative and some seemed to have been extracted by bribery of Russians in the know. As an example let us cite the report of Consul Segawa at Niuchuang which was telegraphed in English:
According to private information from Port Arthur, in conference which was held there, Russian Minister of War, and most of military and naval officers insisted upon peace. Imperial messenger [Bezobrazov] and most of civil officers insisted upon war, but the latter was not successful. In Port Arthur, Minister of War intended to leave on Wednesday, but having received telegram from St Petersburg, he has left on Monday in haste.21
This was a typical example of much of the intelligence material reported by Japanese agencies in north-east Asia. From what we can understand from the Russian side, it was not a misleading picture of what took place at the five Port Arthur conferences. While to the Japanese Bezobrazov was always a sinister figure who had the ear of the tsar, the fact was that their reports were focused upon Kuropatkin, whom they had observed at close quarters. It would appear that Japan was not seriously misinformed about the outcome of the conferences, despite all the menacing things which were being said and written about it.
It will be clear from this chapter that there were in Russia uncertainty as to objectives and confusion as to actions. These were closely related to personal rivalries within the ruling elite. The main influences on the tsar at this time appear to have been the naval grand dukes (Aleksei and Alexander Mikhailovich) who were hostile to Witte and supported Alekseyev and forward policy in the far east, and Plehve, the only member of the council who carried any weight with the tsar and an unapologetic enemy of Witte. These opposed Witte on all fronts, abroad and at home. In the east Witte had been the architect of the railway projects and the genius behind their financing. He was open to criticism for the high costs entailed and the corruption which arose over the contracts. At home, Witte was a man of many political enemies: he was often over-zealous and ruthless, sometimes disloyal and often lacked finesse in his dealings. He lacked social graces at court where his manners were thought to be rough. As had happened between William II and Bismarck a decade earlier, the monarch felt that he was being in some respects outshone by a brilliant and overbearing minister. So Witte was in jeopardy from the jealousy of the tsar. The fireman of the Trans-Siberian railway was in danger.22
It was against this background that the emperor staged his tour de force. Relying on the cooperation of Plehve and the grand dukes, he issued the ukase on 12 August, establishing the viceroyalty of the far east. Its purpose was to integrate the diplomatic, military and economic administration in Russian territories to the east of Lake Baikal. Admiral Evgenii Ivanovich Alekseyev was appointed to the important office of viceroy with his headquarters at Port Arthur. But his exact functions were ill-defined; and he himself was unclear about the extent of his autonomy.
A watchdog committee, consisting of the tsar, Plehve and the war, foreign and finance ministers and called the Special Committee on Far Eastern Affairs, was to supervise Alekseyev's actions from Europe. Its secretariat was run by Abaza. Thus there would be decentralization in east Asian affairs and experts residing in the area would be able to formulate policy, subject to the ultimate approval, in effect rubber-stamping, of this committee. Because of the tsar's absences from the capital during the autumn, the committee was never to meet even during the critical negotiations with Japan. There was sense and nonsense in this arrangement. It was good sense to make use of the greatly improved telegraphic communication between European Russia and the far east and to have a mechanism for closer consultation and coordination. It was nonsense to link the new arrangement by way of a new committee to the already creaking top-heavy bureaucracy at St Petersburg (or wherever the tsar happened to be). In any event Alekseyev, who already had been given in May very great powers of coordination, did not greatly welcome the new title and almost declined to accept it.
Who were the gainers and who the losers from this change? Lamsdorf, Kuropatkin and Witte were certainly losers because some of their customary functions were absorbed by Alekseyev, who was ill-qualified for diplomatic, army or financial decision-making. (We should in parenthesis state that the existing ministers were not consulted about this change of structure so far as we know.) All three of the old guard lost out in so far as Alekseyev was more expansionist than any of them, even if he was more moderate than the Bezobrazov group.23 Bezobrazov was in any case forced to retire in September. It is debatable whether he had ever exercised overwhelming influence. He had cashed in on Witte's undoubted unpopularity in ruling circles and had found a ready response among Witte's enemies, notably Plehve. His overall object seems to have been a commercial-political one: to secure Russia's new base in Manchuria by the creation of a buffer territory on both sides of the Yalu which should be financially viable. Bezobrazov was the mouthpiece of this idea. How far he was the leader of the group and how much leverage he had in court circles, it is hard to assess. After he bowed out, he was accorded great stature by Witte in his various writings which sought to lay the blame for the Japanese war and the Manchurian disaster on Bezobrazov's shoulders. He was to be one of many scapegoats for the war; but probably his credentials for this role were not unique.24
The question was whether in a country like Russia where control of the periphery from the centre was so lax there would be any check on Alekseyev's activities through the Far East Committee. This body never met and seems in any case to have been packed by Alekseyev's friends and the 'behind-the-scenes' apostles of the 'new course' — the jingoistic Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich and Abaza. It was unlikely that such a body could be a major corrective to the policies of the man on the spot, though naturally those in St Petersburg were more aware of financial realities and were not anxious to encourage the great expenditure which a policy of 'adventurism' would entail.
Meanwhile rumours were circulating that Witte had said some uncomplimentary things about the tsar to one of the private secretaries and that these had leaked out.25 On 28 August Nicholas summoned Witte into private audience at Tsarskoye Selo and told him that he was being appointed chairman of the council of ministers, which had hitherto been a post of an honorary nature without great responsibility. Behind the immediate issue of the personal insult to a sensitive tsar, there was the more enduring issue that Witte had been growing very powerful and this power had been resented by a jealous tsar. Witte's demotion had been a long time coming. He was astonished and disbelieving when the moment came because he had come to regard himself as indispensable to the administration.
'The triumvirate' which had been the custodian of the 'old course' had collapsed. After Witte, Kuropatkin offered his resignation in protest against the viceregency ukase which reduced the say of the war ministry in dealing with far eastern problems and placed security in the east under a naval officer. The tsar asked him to withdraw it and Kuropatkin agreed to stay on for two months to work the new system. Kuropatkin's diary shows that there was a substantial residuum of goodwill between him and the tsar in their talk of 1 September.26 The third member of'the triumvirate', Lamsdorf, had suffered several heart attacks. Although he had been forty years in the ministry's service, he had not the same leadership qualities as Witte and Kuropatkin. With the collapse of'the triumvirate', a brake had been released.
It was perhaps Lamsdorf and the foreign ministry that were the greatest sufferers. The viceroy was henceforth to have overall charge of diplomatic negotiations with 'neighbouring states', that is, China and Japan. True, this was not as yet clearly defined. But it could only mean that Lamsdorf's wings were being clipped. If the foreign ministry was to retain any great role in eastern policy, this could only result in a 'dual diplomacy'. In months to come Lamsdorfs statements were in some cases found to be contradictory to those of the viceroy for the Far East. Nor did he have to be consulted as a matter of course. Understandably Lamsdorf offered to resign on several occasions but was persuaded to stay on out of a sense of loyalty. It is likely that the grand dukes had contrived this demotion for they had little respect for Lamsdorf; but others have seen the hand of Bezobrazov in it.27
Whatever the merits of these changes, it must be said that they were a disaster for the series of important negotiations which was about to open with Japan. Even without a dual diplomacy, Russia often spoke with a divided voice; now that dual diplomacy was more likely to occur, equivocation and buck-passing became the order of the day. Alekseyev, while he was experienced in the east, was inexperienced in conducting international negotiations. Moreover, to leave negotiation to Russia's old China hands meant that the European perspective on the Manchurian-Korean problem was lost. Thus Russian newspapers like Novoye Vremya could write that annexation of Manchuria would be fatal because the russification of the territory on the lines of what Russia was doing for her European territories at the time would be a colossal task and an intolerable expense; that it would divert her from her true interests in the 'near east'; and that Russia could develop her interests in the far east without 'possessing territory'.28 It is doubtful if such views penetrated to the majority of the new negotiating team. To revert to the image at the start of this chapter, the new course pushed decision-making into the hands of those who believed in the fingertips rather than the stomach.
1. The tsar's policy of 'balance' is well illustrated in A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, pp. 213-18.
2. Novoye Vremya, 31 Oct. 1903.
3. R. Quested, The Russo-Chinese Bank, p. 11, describes Bezobrazov aptly as a 'court favourite'.
4. B. B. Glinskii, Prolog Russko-Iaponskoi Voiny, pp. 589f.
5. Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison, vol. 1, p. 195.
6. The Times, 7 June 1903.
7. These men were highly individualistic and it would be wrong to see them as part of a Bezobrazov team or group.
8. A. A. Guber, 'Imperializma', in A. L. Narochnitskii et al., Mezhdunarodyne otnosheniia na Dalnem Vostoke, pp. 222-4.
9. Lo Hui-min (ed.) op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 194-6.
10. Kajima Morinosuke, The Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 2, p. 93.
11. 'Dubail said that Yongampo was merely a speculation in timber. I said not so, for the President was Bezobrazov [the Russian secretary of state] and the manager Ginsburg, the âme damnée if Wogack'. Satow diary for 24 Dec, 1903, quoted in E. M. Satow, Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, p. 245.
12. Malozemoff, op. cit., pp. 211-14.
13. Ibid., pp. 215-17.
14. Krasnyi Arkhiv ('Dnevnik A. N. Kuropatkina'), 2 (1922), pp. 41-3.
15. B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, pp. 284-5.
16. Ibid., p. 284.
17. Ibid., pp. 303-5.
18. Ibid., pp. 306-7.
19. Jordan to J. D. Campbell, 29 Aug. 1903, Jordan Papers 3; McLeavy Brown to Morrison, 7 Sept. 1903, in Morrison Correspondence, vol. 1, no. 139.
20. NGB 36/1, no. 807.
21. NGB 36/1, no. 806.
22. Witte is described as 'a very transitory functionary'. Romanov, op. cit., p. 307.
23. Ibid., p. 296: 'Long afterwards they still claimed the right to preen themselves on having up to the last moment fought for the "peaceful" way out and opposed the "adventure" undertaken by new advisers, who had, it seems, "hypnotized the tsar".'
24. Witte to Kuropatkin, 12 Mar. 1904 in 'Perepiska', Krasnyi Arkhiv, 19 (1927), pp. 73-4.
25. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 7 Oct. 1905, in Hardinge Papers 6; von Laue, Witte, p. 248. It appears to have been the personal action of Nicholas, without consulting his advisers, as was the case with the appointment of Alekseyev as viceroy.
26. Krasnyi Arkhiv ('Dnevnik A. N. Kuropatkina"), 2 (1922), pp. 58.
27. Cf. BD, vol. 2, no. 250.
28. Novoye Vremya, 31 Oct. 1903.