The Korea-Manchuria issue was a complex many-sided one. In the last two chapters we have described the relevant internal developments in Japan and Russia. There was in both countries an expansionist group tussling with a more moderate one which was equally determined to pursue national interests but in ways which would avoid confrontation or offence to other powers. The attainment of rational solutions was often lost because of the factional infighting. By the summer of 1903 the possibility of war emerging between Japan and Russia was being studied on the Japanese side, but probably not on the Russian. In Japan contingency military-naval plans were being pushed forward. But the Russians were also increasing their forces in the area. The Japanese intelligence services were observing this and trying to assess among other things the future potential of the Russian railways' carrying capacity.
In the next few chapters we shall write of the diplomatic negotiations which accompanied the military activities. These too were infinitely complicated. But it is not enough to look at the bilateral negotiations between Russia and Japan. We must also look at the continuing saga of Russia's supplementary demands to China which resulted in the further default of Russia over the third evacuation of her troops from Manchuria. But first we must mention the diplomatic activities of the Open Door powers and in particular the Manchurian aspects of the American and Japanese treaties with China.
From the perspective of the Open Door powers, the situation in Manchuria was gloomy. Dalny, the apple of Witte's eye and his ideal of a commercial port, had failed to develop trade and was, according to Dr Morrison, who spent time there in August, 'being transformed into a garrison city' with 16,000 troops and two war vessels, the Amur and Yenisei. Since its early promise as a port had not been fulfilled, the Russians were holding on under one pretext and another to Niuchuang. Meanwhile to the west at Port Arthur, Morrison saw ten new barracks of stone and brick under construction and the west harbour being steadily dredged: 'Where two years ago men could wade, battleships now are anchored.'1 Evidently there was no serious intention to move from the leased territory to north Manchuria.
One way in which Japan and the other powers could deal with the 'monopolization' of power in Manchuria by the Russians was to strengthen the hands of the Chinese. This they could do by insisting on 'Manchurian safeguards' being included in the new commercial treaties which they had been negotiating with the Chinese since the Peking protocol of September 1901 which had brought an end to the Boxer troubles. The way had been led by Britain which had concluded the Mackay treaty with China (September 1902). Japan and the United States were negotiating the revision of their treaties of commerce and navigation with China separately through special commissioners from January 1903 onwards. While the general run of the clauses does not here concern us, it is significant that both countries had included in their demands the opening of further ports in Manchuria. They asked for the opening of Mukden on the Liao river and Tatungkow on the Tatung river, both ports being firmly in the hands of Russia.2 Initially China was not particularly anxious to open new treaty ports, especially when it would inevitably attract the disapproval of Russia. On the other hand, she was not unaware that, if she accepted such a demand, it would identify outside powers with her cause and possibly improve her prospects of forcing Russia to evacuate Manchuria. But, if China went too far and granted the demand for both ports, it would be interpreted by Russia as an act aimed against her and might lay China open to penalties. This was the main point which held up the conclusion of the two treaties for four months. When, however, the Russians failed to withdraw their troops in the spring, the way was clear for a stronger stance against the Russians.
The Chinese attitude became tougher as it became apparent that the Russians were not going to fulfil their evacuation without additional severe demands. Whereas the Chinese negotiators, Lu Hai-huan, Sheng Hsuan-huai and Wu Ting-fang, together with the elder statesmen, Chang Chih-tung and Yuan Shih-k'ai, who were consulted behind the scenes, had earlier kept their counsel about the Manchurian ports, they gradually became more amenable. In August, they agreed first to the inclusion of secret notes to the effect that Manchurian ports would be opened after the evacuation of Manchuria by Russia. When, however, the Japanese, following the Americans, insisted that a clause should be included in the open treaty to this effect, China conceded even this in September.3 The American treaty was signed in Shanghai in its Chinese text on 8 October and provided for the opening of Mukden and Antung, while the Japanese treaty signed after an all-night session at 9 a.m. the following morning included the following clause: 'The Chinese Government agree that, upon the exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty, Mukden and Tatungkow, both in the province of Shengking, will be opened by China itself as places of international residence and trade. (Art. X)' As occurs so often in history, the negotiations over the commercial treaty were an essential part of the background to the main Russo-Japanese negotiations on political and strategic considerations. These reflected the deteriorating relations between Russia and China and the more resolute opposition which China felt strong enough to offer at the behest of the Open Door powers. In reality, the existence of the clause did not alter the situation on the ground in Manchuria; but it gave Japan, as it also gave the United States, some locus standi. They might later have to protect the rights that had been conferred on them by the new commercial treaty, even against Russian action.4
The Chinese knew that the Russians would not be pleased to see such references to Manchuria in public treaties with the Open Door powers. They had therefore paused and tried to argue that the opening of Mukden and other ports should be included in secret treaties. In this Prince Ching had the support of Yuan Shih-k'sai, the governor of Chihli, who was no coward in the face of Russian menaces but felt that this opening of Russian-held ports would be provocative. Yuan knew that he was in the firing-line and was scared to use his New Model Army so soon after it had been formed in 1902. After the treaties were signed, he recommended the Waiwupu not to ratify the American and Japanese treaties. But his view was not upheld; and the treaties were ratified. The publication of the treaties made the Russians furious. They argued that, since China was not in any position to 'open' Mukden to any foreign country, it was a meaningless and provocative gesture. But the Chinese, having moved cautiously, decided to ride the storm. They now had one argument for use with the Russians in calling for the evacuation of their troops: the three Open Door powers were insisting on China calling for withdrawal of Russian troops.5
Uchida Yasuya, the Japanese minister in Peking (1901-6), whose biography is one of the important sources for this period of crisis at the Chinese court, had been encouraging the Chinese in their resistance. Chinese officials had always been varied in their foreign allegiances. Uchida, therefore, played on the feelings of the pro-Japan group. The appointment of Natung as head of the Waiwupu was a sign of increasing Japanese influence. In 1902 and 1903 Uchida had discussed with Japan's friends the possibility of a Sino-Japanese alliance against Europeans. Its appeal was not sufficiently widespread for it to come to anything practical. But it did serve to encourage the Chinese to defy Russia. Uchida also cooperated with the other diplomats of Open Door powers in Peking in urging the Chinese in their resistance to the Russians. Considering the weakness of their position, the Chinese did respond to this kind of encouragement.6
While the slow-moving negotiations were proceeding between China and Russia, little change was taking place on the ground. The Chinese were waiting with eager anticipation for the Russians to fulfil the third stage of their evacuation, knowing that, if they did not pull out, China could not act against them. It had been left that, with the return of Lessar in place of Planson, the Russians would show a more sympathetic face. But on 6 September Prince Ching received new Russian demands. If they were accepted, Russia undertook to put part of the evacuation into immediate effect but to defer evacuation in Kirin and Heilungkiang provinces for from four to twelve months. The conditions imposed on China were that Manchuria should never be ceded to any foreign power, no piece of land should be leased or pledged or disposed of; 'Russia shall construct wharves in different places along the Sungari river and post there necessary troops for the protection of trading vessels'; no special heavy duties would be imposed upon goods conveyed by railway; in order to prevent importation of plague from Niuchuang, necessary measures would be taken in all territories pertaining to the Chinese Eastern Railway, including the employment of a Russian physician.7
Prince Ching, aware of China's reputation for feebleness in the face of Russian pressure, had problems to face. Naturally the Russians had given the Chinese an indication that the Japanese were trying to do a deal over Manchuria and Korea by which Russia would have discretion in Manchuria. This implied that China could expect no help from Japan in future over the evacuation. There was also the feeling that, if China responded uncooperatively on this occasion, she would lose the opportunity for an evacuation of the Russian armies. This appears to have been the viewpoint of the empress dowager, who wanted the restoration of Manchuria at almost any price and summoned the prince to the Summer Palace to tell him so. Not unexpectedly the prince preferred to keep his own counsel. He was, however, offered the advice of the Japanese, American and British ministers who all urged him not to act hastily and in any case to oppose the demands.
On 25 September Prince Ching addressed a note to Lessar, refusing the new conditions and insisting that the Russians should first evacuate Chinese territory and then discuss the pledges they sought. The viceroy for the far east, Admiral Alekseyev, as one of his first acts, broke off negotiations; and relations between Russia and China became worse than they had been for a decade. Shortly after the third phase of the evacuation agreement was due to be executed on 8 October, Alekseyev rather provocatively organized a military parade through the streets of Port Arthur. Some Russian ground troops pulled out of Mukden at the time but then reoccupied it about 27 October; and several hundred manned the gates thereafter. No attempt was made to evacuate Heilungkiang as had been laid down in the original treaty.8
The world powers who because of their treaty rights considered that they were entitled to some explanation did not receive any. It should be said that Russia gave assurances to the powers through diplomatic channels that she was ready to hand over Niuchuang before long to the Chinese authorities and did not intend to hold on to banking and customs; all she wanted was the formation of an International Sanitary Commission where, in view of her great interests and the proximity of her frontier, she should have a privileged position. But foreigners were interested in Manchurian cities other than Niuchuang. Moreover, the pleading of Russian representatives overseas was often contradicted by events. The Russians seemed to ignore the fact that communications had so much improved in China in recent years and put about statements which were at odds with the facts.9
The Chinese for their part kept up their pleas for positive evacuation. They knew of course that they could not use force and had to make the best terms they could. Moreover, they had intelligence that Japan was going to give up her protests over Manchuria in return for receiving a free hand in Korea. This intelligence was inaccurate; but the Chinese deduced that they could not rely on Japanese support. Eventually at the end of the year the Russian minister in Peking told China that Russian evacuation of Manchuria was impossible as in that event Japan would enter Korea which would be a serious menace to Russia's Manchurian railway. Perhaps this was Russia's thinking all along and, despite pious arguments, she never intended to make a full-scale pull-out.
The third set of international negotiations was more crucial than the others — those between Japan and Russia. Although Lamsdorf was willing to open negotiations, it was not until 12 August that the Six Articles could be handed by Minister Kurino to Lamsdorf, because the foreign minister was so busy. The articles were in English and the first five read:
By these terms Japan would place Korea entirely under her influence and Russia's forces in Manchuria should not exceed the strength that was necessary and should be withdrawn immediately after the discharge of their duties. These provisions were intended to oppose the Russian policy of exploiting Manchuria and Korea.
Soon after the Japanese terms were passed over came the bombshell of the imperial ukase appointing Alekseyev as viceroy of the far east. In Kurino's view this was issued without the knowledge of Lamsdorf or Witte and was the work of the expansionist party behind the scenes.11 The British ambassador thought that Lamsdorf was not too unhappy at the development since he no longer wanted to deal with these negotiations with the Japanese. On 23 August Lamsdorf proposed that their negotiations should be transferred to Tokyo. He could not in any case give the tsar's view because he was away for a week at military exercises. Moreover, he now had to consult Alekseyev. When Lamsdorf consulted the tsar on his return, he confirmed that, if Russo-Japanese negotiations were to be dealt with expeditiously, they should be moved to Tokyo on the ground that he would be touring from 31 August onwards and then going abroad direct; and the relevant ministers would not be at St Petersburg. Japan was furious at this, feeling that she was being treated like a colony or a second-rate, subordinate power which was not entitled to normal diplomatic courtesies. At first, the Japanese refused to transfer the negotiations. Under the surface, they thought it was an indignity to receive such a suggestion and probably feared it was some subtle Russian trick. In any case, Rosen, the Russian minister, was not thought to be persona grata with officials in St Petersburg or to have their full confidence.12
Lamsdorf promised to convey Japan's preference to the emperor at his audience on 31 August. But the Russians asked that Tokyo should be the venue for discussions. Kurino had to admit that there was no other alternative since Lamsdorf himself was due to leave on 10 September to go into attendance on the tsar in Germany. Japan, therefore, accepted Kurino's advice and agreed to the transfer.13
Komura was in two minds. On the one hand, Kurino had been two years in Russia and was proving to be popular there. Moreover he had been posted to Paris before that and had plenty of relevant experience for the negotiations which were to take place. On the other hand, Kurino did not have Komura's complete confidence. There had been personal disagreements in the past; and he had once or twice had to reprimand Kurino for exceeding his instructions.14 Moreover, Kurino, as a protégé of Itō, had the general reputation of being pro-Russian.15 Despite all this, Komura had hoped that the negotiations would be conducted in the Russian capital in order to keep the Russian court involved in the decisions reached. He failed to understand the Russian court's conception of holiday-making or to sympathize with it and felt that Russia had made a nonsense of the negotiations and decided that too much of a concession should not be made. So, while Komura agreed that the talks would be held in Tokyo and Komura and Rosen were appointed plenipotentiaries on 7 September, the fact was that the Japanese drafts would always be addressed to the Russian foreign ministry in St Petersburg. Japan was thereby insisting that the Russian court should be implicated and should not foist the negotiation on to a junior like Alekseyev.
Rosen himself had his difficulties, being unable to get Alekseyev to commit himself to precise instructions. So he left on board the Rurik from Nagasaki in order to have personal consultations with the admiral in Port Arthur on 22 September. They discussed the draft of the Russian counter-proposals exhaustively before Rosen returned on 3 October and handed over the Russian terms which had been approved by his government.16 The gist was that no part of Korea should be used for military purposes and free passage of the Korean straits should be guaranteed; Russia would recognize Japan's position in south Korea provided that Korea north of the 39th parallel was recognized as a neutral zone; Manchuria and its coastal islands were to be regarded as entirely outside Japan's sphere of interest. No guarantee was given about the evacuation of Russian troops. Komura received the draft with disappointment, seeing it as incompatible with anything Japan had in mind but recognizing that it could be merely an uncompromising statement of Russia's initial position.17
Keeping cool and preserving an optimistic exterior in spite of his disappointment, Komura in October held five meetings with Rosen at which amendments were proposed to the Russian terms. But there was little practical outcome. On 30 October such amendments as had emerged from these consultations were officially passed over to Rosen while a copy was sent to St Petersburg for onward transmission to the foreign minister. Japan agreed to set up a 50-kilometre neutral zone on both sides of the Korean frontier with Manchuria where troops should not be sent. In Manchuria, Japan was prepared to recognize Russia's commercial rights but wished to have assurances about her own existing treaty rights there. Admiral Alekseyev, as if to indicate his unconciliatory reaction, reoccupied Mukden with 1000 men late in October and drove out the Chinese troops.
The text was passed over to Prince Obolenskii, the deputy foreign minister, who was acting in Lamsdorf's absence. He first referred them to the tsar at Darmstadt. When Lamsdorf returned, Kurino met him to discuss the terms on 12 November. Ten days later Lamsdorf apologized that he could not refer the matter to the tsar because of the indisposition of the empress. His next audience with the tsar was cancelled because of the tsarina's continued illness. Naturally Kurino asked for urgent attention.18
Japan's counter-proposals offered some positive concessions in order to avert the prospect of an immediate war. Following the approach of 12 August, they had called on Russia to recognize Korea as being outside Russia's sphere of interest in return for Japan recognizing that Manchuria was outside her sphere of interest. Japan was ready to accept Russia's political rights there (as distinct from purely railway rights) and her need to take special measures in an emergency. Japan was even willing to consider a neutral zone, provided it operated on both sides of the Yalu. She wanted the concessions made to Russia to be reciprocal, that is, that Japan would be permitted by Russia to enjoy political and strategic rights in Korea, but undertook not to fortify the Korean coastline in a manner which would menace the navigation rights of the Russians. Obviously some relaxation of terms was to be expected in the second stage of negotiations. But, since Komura was a hard-liner, we may speculate whether the more conciliatory approach came from the genro who had held two meetings on 14 and 24 October. Japan's concessions here were greater than anything Russia had offered on 12 October.
When these terms reached Russia, the country was in some disarray over eastern questions. In November a leading Russian diplomat confessed that 'there are two parties in Russia, one for evacuation and the other against, and at the present moment the Russian government does not know its mind'.19 This assessment by Benckendorff can be further substantiated by some of the memoranda circulating at the time. In a memorandum presented in October to Kuropatkin, a senior general with long experience of Manchuria, General D. I. Subbotich, reached the surprising conclusion that Russia should give up her enterprise in Manchuria; with war now a real possibility, two hundred thousand roubles daily would be required to keep the army in a state of readiness for combat; unfortunately it was already too late to give up her enterprises as fully as was desirable because of the degree to which Russia had become embroiled over the past five years. But the writer thought that it would be quite proper for Russia to give up south for north Manchuria. Naturally a pull-out from an area where substantial investment had been made might stipulate some financial compensation but Subbotich was unspecific on this point. This was an unusual view for a senior Russian officer on the periphery; but he was clearly worried by the consequences of over-extension.20
Whether it was under Subbotich's influence or not, Kuropatkin himself addressed a penetrating memorandum to Nicholas II on 23 November. He proposed to return Kuantung to China with Port Arthur and Dalny, to give up the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to receive in return from China rights in northern Manchuria and 250 million roubles in reparation for the expenses Russia had incurred on the railway and the cities. These views were presented (apart from the tsar) only to Alekseyev, Lamsdorf and Witte, licking his wounds after his enforced retirement in August, but won little approbation. It was unthinkable to Alekseyev that his 'capital' should be sold off to China. Kuropatkin's strange and pessimistic proposal, therefore, lapsed and does not appear to have been raised again.21
The movements of the tsar and his entourage in Europe were not without meaning for the far east. Even the meeting of the tsar and the emperor of Austria in the alpine resort of Mürzsteg on 4 October and the signing of the Mürzsteg Punctation can be interpreted as a means of taking tension out of the Balkan situation and allowing Russia to gird her loins for any trouble which was brewing in east Asia. After the tsar's visit to Italy in October, Lamsdorf went to Paris bearing a letter from the tsar to President Loubet This was a letter of reassurance that the Russians were still faithful to the French alliance. The feeling had been growing in Paris that Russia was coming closer to Germany and that the substance of the alliance had been lost, while the sentiment in St Petersburg was that France had been cavorting with Britain too gaily for comfort. Doubtless Lamsdorf was also seeking reassurances from France.
There can be no doubt that the French mood was a complaining one. In Paris Count Lamsdorf was told by Foreign Minister Delcassé that France was kept in the dark over Russia's intentions in east Asia and had not been adequately consulted. Though dislodged from far eastern policy-making, Lamsdorf still tried to impress Delcassé that Russia's demands upon Japan were of a very moderate character but said that he was extremely anxious about how Japan's policy would be affected by her hope of English support. The Frenchman suggested that a little more frankness was desirable and would be calculated to smooth difficulties. Delcassé, who had had the advantage of conversations with British leaders beforehand, said that they were far from desiring to follow a provocative policy; he urged extreme caution on Russia, even suggesting that the Japanese had the better case. Lamsdorf seemed to be in conciliatory mood. In the background there was the suggestion of a new French loan to Russia and, while this gave Delcassé some leverage in his negotiations, he was inevitably having difficulties over the terms with the finance minister, Maurice Rouvier.22
Britain, which was already far advanced towards what later became the Anglo-French entente in April 1904, had planted the idea with Lamsdorf through Delcassé that some accommodation could be reached with Russia. This depended on Count Benckendorff who had gone from London to Paris in order to have discussions with his foreign minister. Lamsdorf sent back the message that an endeavour should be made to remove all sources of misunderstanding between Russia and Britain and discuss the various questions outstanding between them — a statement of the utmost cordiality and vagueness.23 On 17 November Lansdowne saw Benckendorff but concluded that he had not been authorized by Lamsdorf to make any specific proposals and was leaving the initiative with Britain. Speaking more relaxedly to Charles Hardinge at Windsor Castle on 22 November, Benckendorff acknowledged that the moment was ripe for a friendly understanding but insisted that Manchuria should not be discussed since it was an area where Russian interests preponderated and Britain should not press them hard on the subject of evacuation.24
Again on the most personal and confidential basis, Lansdowne gave Benckendorff on 25 November an idea of the kind of arrangements which he would be ready to lay before his colleagues and the government of India, covering Afghanistan, Tibet, Manchuria, Persia and Seistan. It is only relevant here to note that Lansdowne was prepared to contemplate some undertakings over Manchuria as part of an overall Anglo-Russian settlement. His line was: we should recognize the predominating interest of Russia as the limitrophe power in Manchuria; we had no desire to interfere with the control of her Manchurian railway system, having agreed in 1899 that railway development in this part of the Chinese empire should fall to Russia; we should not take exception to any reasonable measures of precaution which Russia might adopt for insuring the safety of the line; but we insisted that our treaty rights in all parts of the Chinese empire should be respected and our trade should receive equal treatment in those regions.25
After his sojourn in Paris, where he had some uncomfortable moments, Lamsdorf rejoined the tsar who was staying at the tsarina's home. Before her marriage Alexandra had been princess of Hesse-Darmstadt and she liked to return occasionally to her family home on the lower Rhine. Their stay at the palace in Darmstadt was a combination of business and pleasure. On the one hand, the tsar accompanied by Lamsdorf had a meeting with the German emperor at Wiesbaden on 4 November. On the other, they transacted some of the business of state. As an example we may quote one of the incidents which is supposed to have arisen. The tsarina, we are told, received at Darmstadt a telegram from Admiral Alekseyev complaining that Lessar at Peking was not obeying his instructions. The tsar drew up a severe reprimand for Lessar and was only with difficulty persuaded from sending it by Lamsdorf who was in attendance and had a higher opinion of Lessar than he had of Alekseyev.26
Towards the end of their stay at Darmstadt, Alexandra, never noted for robust health, fell seriously, even critically, ill. The tsar in remorse refused to attend to state business. Rumour had it that the empress was suffering from acute earache and that the emperor with characteristic concern for her would not meet anyone to discuss the responsibilities of state. Ministers and courtiers were unable to transact their business.
If the Russians found Japanese policy-making quaint, the Japanese certainly found the long absence of the royal family mysterious. They have never fully understood the western attitude towards regular holidays and certainly found the behaviour of the tsarist court and ministers at the peak of negotiations lacking in seriousness. It suggested an attitude of condescension towards an issue to which the Russians evidently accorded a low priority. Disspirited by the lack of progress in the Rosen-Komura dialogue, the Japanese were doubly annoyed at the delays which these forays into Europe entailed. Spring-Rice, left in charge at the British embassy in St Petersburg, made fun of the Russian style of diplomacy: 'Japan asks for an answer. She is told, the emperor is taking a holiday. Then that the Empress is ill; finally that the Viceroy must be consulted. There is no sign that Russia imagines for a moment that Japan would be justified in pressing for an answer, even if the Empress were ill. Everything must wait for that.'27 We do not know whether Alexandra at the imperial Skernevitsy estates in Poland was indeed sick with earache or with symptoms of pregnancy or with the ailments which came to dominate the last decade of her reign. But there can be no doubt that the Japanese saw them as a mere pretext for delay in vital negotiations.
In a court where ideas of divine right were never absent for long, it was necessary to consult the tsar. Between August and November this was not easy and the exact shape of decision-making was far from clear to participants. Alekseyev and Rosen assumed that they had the prime duty of conducting the negotiations with Japan; and Rosen always insisted that the talks were held 'under the Viceroy's direction'. But in the last resort the tsar had to be consulted at some stage through his ministers and had to give his final approval. The fact that the foreign ministry had a low status under Lamsdorf meant that the issue did not become a major problem. But when late in October Alekseyev seemed to be responding excessively to Japan's and China's 'provocations' by first holding his military parade in Port Arthur and then reoccupying Mukden, the tsar stepped in and cabled him that he did 'not want war between Russia and Japan' and wished all measures to be taken to prevent it occurring. After conferring with Kuropatkin, he clarified the viceroy's powers, reminding him that he could not order mobilization. This curb on Alekseyev's powers did not ease the negotiating process.28
1. The Times, 29 Aug. 1903.
2. Sino-Japanese Additional Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, signed Shanghai 9 Oct., ratified 9 Dec, 1903. Ratifications exchanged, 11 Jan. 1904.
3. NGB 36/II, no. 975.
4. NGB 36/II, no. 947; Bland to V. Chirol, 15 Oct. 1903: 'The Jiji [Shimpō] reports that the opening of Mukden and Tatungkow is an accomplished fact since the signature of the Treaty but this I cannot believe. . . . All the imitation of Mackay's lead in these Treaties should be very gratifying to him; the Japanese and US Commissioners have in many instances simply lifted his ideas and the method of their expression bodily from the British Treaty.'
5. NGB 36/I, no. 374.
6. Ikei Masaru, Uchida Yasuya, pp. 70-1.
7. B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, pp. 462-3, fn. 211.
8. MacDonald to Lansdowne, 29 Oct. 1903, in BD, vol. 2, no. 254.
9. NGB 36/I, no. 393.
10. NGNB, vol. 1, pp. 212-13.
11. NGB 36/I, no. 13.
12. NGB 36/I, no. 22.
13. Ibid.
14. NGB 36/I, no. 398.
15. MacDonald to Hardinge, 18 Jan. 1905, in Hardinge Papers 7.
16. Rosen, Forty Years, vol. 1, pp. 222-8.
17. NGB 36/I, nos. 27-33; for a comment on the Russian reply, see the remark of King Edward VII: 'Russia wishes to make a good bargain to the detriment of Japan' (FO 46/568, minute by the king, 7 Oct. 1903).
18. NGB 36/I, no. 408f.
19. BD, vol. 4, no. 181(b).
20. Romanov, op. cit., pp. 28-9.
21. Ibid., p. 27.
22. DDF, 2nd series, vol. 3 (1903).
23. BD, vol. 2, no. 258.
24. BD, vol. 4, nos. 181(a) and (b).
25. BD, vol. 4, no. 182.
26. Spring-Rice to Villiers, 26 Dec. 1903, FO 800/23 (Villiers).
27. Spring-Rice to Mrs Roosevelt, 9 Dec, 1903, in S. Gwynn(ed.), The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, vol. 1, p. 373.
28. A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p. 243.