The situation on the ground in Korea seemed to the Japanese to become daily more serious. The Russian minister was trying to legalize the position of the timber company at Yongampo. The representatives of Britain, the United States and Japan were in varying degrees urging Korea to open the ports on the Yalu river as the best way of dealing with the awkward lumber concession. The Japanese tended to see Yongampo rather as a Russian base of operations against Japanese activities in the peninsula. Thus, there was a message from Minister Hayashi in Seoul on 4 October, reporting intelligence received that the Russians had installed gun emplacements at Yongampo. Colonel C. M. Ducat, military attaché at the British legation in Peking who was visiting Korea and had a high reputation for intelligence work in the area, initially reported that it was merely a semaphore unit. But, after he had discussions with the Japanese, he confirmed that the Russians had been building sites for 5-6 guns.1
This information about the gun-sites was valuable propaganda for the group in Japan which favoured an early war. Intelligence from army officers was being allowed to leak out and was inflaming public opinion. Intelligence from diplomats and consuls too was not inconsiderable and may have played down exaggerated reports about the Russian lumber company being merely a military enterprise in disguise. On 11 October another inroad took place. A message from Captain Hino in north Korea alleged that woods which had been brought by the Japanese were being snatched by the Russians. Japanese in the locality wanted Tokyo to send troops and, when this was refused, they did not know what to do. Faced by the prospect of danger, they made preparations to withdraw, sending the women and the sick in advance. In view of the situation on the spot being so uncertain, the Seoul legation sent an agent to carry out an inspection on 22 October on the Wakaura Maru. But the company police at Yongampo, using the argument that it was not an open port, did not allow him to land.2 It was incidents of this kind, trivial in themselves, that brought home the Korean problem to the Japanese people and created bitterness towards Russia.
On 1 October General Tamura Iyozo, the vice-chief of the army general staff, who had been a faithful deputy to General Ōyama, died suddenly and unexpectedly. General Kodama Gentarō was invited by Yamagata to succeed him in strange circumstances. Kodama was home minister and a former governor-general of Taiwan and war minister, and his acceptance would have meant a loss of status for him. But Yamagata argued that the new vice-chief would have to be a man capable of planning and preparing for war. Kodama is said to have accepted the appointment because of the challenge it involved despite the fact that it implied definite demotion in rank and a reduction in salary for him. Sympathetic to the Kogetsukai's anti-Russian views, he took up the post on 13 October with a view to preparing Japan for 'the coming war against Russia' and embarked vigorously on war planning for which he had a natural gift.3 By 23 October he had drawn up his first strategic plan which would involve Japan in invading Korea in order to confront Russia. He spent the next months pushing his battle plans through the army general staff by his contacts with leaders of the Chōshū clan who dominated the army. He found the army minister, General Terauchi, and the prime minister, General Katsura, to be pliable. He also made headway with politicians through his 'patron', General Yamagata. By the time the Russian counterproposals were delivered in the middle of December, many exchanges of view had taken place within the upper echelons of society and substantial agreement had been reached. But unanimity had not been achieved with the elder statesmen over the critical strategic issue, the need for invading Korea.4
Kodama, a man of single-minded dedication and enthusiasm, was frustrated. He found that, as deputy chief of the general staff, he did not take part in critical decisions on national policy nor did he know the details of diplomatic negotiations. He became convinced that the Russo-Japanese negotiations were veering towards peace and devoted some attention to mobilizing opinion by calculated leakages of information damaging to the Russian cause, on the lines of the Yongampo information already mentioned.
Kodama was indefatigable also in business circles. On 17 October he sought an interview with the most powerful businessman, Shibusawa Eiichi, in the hope of winning over the zaikai, the commercial and financial world. He tried to demonstrate that Russo-Japanese relations were reaching crisis-point. He recognized Shibusawa as a peace-loving man but the present was not a time when soldiers alone should be worked up. If the zaikai was to come round to the advocacy of war, it would show the Russians the determination of a united people. Shibusawa, we are told, was much impressed by this dynamic soldier although he was well aware of the difficulties which war would inflict on Japan commercially and financially, both short-term and long-term. He promised that he would use his good offices to ensure that the shipping lines would in time of emergency decline to lift private cargo and offer the entire fleet for the objectives of the war. In his own way, Shibusawa gave his whole-hearted support to the army and tried to persuade the NYK and OSK lines to this view.5
The army also tried to convert the newspapers. On 10 November a body called the Tōkyoku Mondai Rengō Konshinkai, affiliated to the Union of Contemporary Affairs, held a rally involving prominent newspaper editors. It was attended by Baron Shibusawa, Viscount Miura, Viscount Akimoto and Baron Maejima. The meeting was unanimous that 'Japan has the heaven-sent mission of preserving the peace of the East'; that the government has public opinion on its side; and that it has the sympathy of the world. This supported the views of the seven professors and the Kogetsukai that Japan had made a fatal mistake in not asserting herself in 1895.6
Public opinion was indeed rallying behind the government. The estimate of some foreign observers was that opinion in Japan was becoming over-heated and too emotional. Secrecy being impossible to maintain in the Japanese capital, there were wild rumours circulating about the negotiations going badly. The government did not succeed in dispelling them by its over-optimistic press statements. Meanwhile, eyewitnesses were reporting that Japan's situation on the ground, in China as in Korea, was clearly deteriorating. Journalists were criticizing the government's policy of undue caution; and right-wing groups in particular were calling on the government to check Russia's activities.
This all came to a head with the December session of the Diet. The two opposition parties, the Seiyukai and the Kensei Hontō, had gained ground against the non-party government in the general elections in October 1902 and March 1903. They decided to announce on 3 December that they were forming a party coalition against the Katsura cabinet. The 19th Diet assembled two days later. The emperor presented the customary opening message, exhorting the parliamentarians to support the government in its negotiations with Russia. The Diet members were told nothing specific about the secret talks and felt frustrated at their derisory treatment. In order to register their protest, they decided to exploit the message of thanks which they were due to return to the emperor. They substituted for the usual anodyne reply a more pointed one produced by the president of the House of Representatives, Kōnō Hironaka, which included the phrase:
In this period of unprecedented national uprising, the administration of our cabinet ministers does not accord with the national demands of the time. Internal policies are based simply on temporary, remedial actions, and opportunities in foreign diplomacy are being missed. We cannot help feeling the utmost anxiety for such misgovernment and therefore appeal to Your Majesty's wise judgement.7
The house voted overwhelmingly for Kōnō's draft which, though vaguely worded, was equivalent to a severe vote of censure against the government. Some politicians pulled back from the brink because they did not want to bring the cabinet down. The resolution was taken to the palace but it was not received. On 11 December the house was dissolved and the cabinet lived to fight another day.
The historian has to take note of this demonstration, which criticized the government for not using its opportunities to assert a strong foreign policy. It reminds us that 'popular feeling' was more extreme and more anti-Russian than government feeling. This was an enduring feature of Japanese opinion which has been observed by the historian Kiyozawa Kiyoshi at various points in Japanese history.8 One cannot say that the Diet was a direct and durable influence on the ultimate decisions of the government. It had been dissolved and was not to reappear before the war was under way. But popular extremism was part of the background which the government could not ignore. Demonstrations of this kind would not disappear, even if the Diet was not available as a forum. The existence of this kind of feeling played into the hands of the tough-liners among Japanese policy-makers and undercut the policy advocated by the genro.
Despite the cautious image which Komura sought to convey, many foreign observers were by the first week of December predicting the likelihood of war. Baroness d'Anethan had described the Japanese as 'most bellicose and equally indignant' on 9 October. Another described the Japanese as 'truculent' later in the year.9 The Japanese — politicians and newspapers — had set their expectations so high that it was almost impossible to imagine Russia being willing to offer terms commensurate with their demands and expectations were bound to be dashed. On the other hand, Minister Rosen, while admitting that 'the strain of the political situation was beginning to tell on the popular mind', felt that the 'Japanese Press displayed a patriotic and unanimous readiness to take its cue from the Government's lead. It also avoided any abusive and offensive expressions.'10 The hope of Rosen who certainly did not seek war was that the Katsura cabinet could hold extremist feelings in check.
This was the background of rising national determination in Japan against which Russia presented her second set of counter-proposals. On 11 December Rosen passed them over to Komura in reply to Japan's set of 30 October. They did not seem to budge much from Russia's earlier position. Alekseyev in Port Arthur had been in almost daily contact by telegram with the others involved in the negotiation — Rosen in Tokyo, Lamsdorf in St Petersburg and the tsar in Poland. It was not just that this caused delay; it failed to give adequate opportunities for consultation on basic policy. In the end, Alekseyev's attitude seems to have been one of no concession but one of hope to prolong the exchanges with Japan. Over Korea, he confirmed Russia's earlier proposal for a neutral zone north of the 39th parallel and thereby rejected the Japanese proposal for a neutral zone on both banks of the Yalu. Russia in her counter-proposals included no mention of Manchuria, which was evidently intended to be outside the bounds of discussion with Japan.11 This was a reaffirmation of the line which Russia had followed since 1900, namely that it was a bilateral issue between Russia and China only.
The implication was that Man-Kan kōkan had been rejected without putting forward any formula of compromise. This was perhaps the consequence of leaving such a large say in the exchanges to Alekseyev who seemed to be singularly lacking in original ideas and merely dug his heels in deeper and deeper. One British observer, Thomas Hohler, felt that Russia had been unwise to reject Japan's second-round terms.12 This doubtless reflected the hope of Britain that war would not result from this. But Alekseyev seems to have held the view that Japan would not fight so that little concession need be given during the negotiations.
The British foreign secretary was able to make allowances for the Russian negotiating style. Over Manchuria, Lansdowne thought that Japan had gained — negatively — by the withdrawal of the objectionable Russian counter-proposal VII in the first set, which Japan had sought to suppress in the October talks but without success. On Russia's silence over Manchuria, Lansdowne wrote that
Russia is now engaged in a protracted negotiation with Chinese as to Manchuria and is driving as hard a bargain as she can. It is not unnatural that she should be reluctant, while that negotiation is still in suspense, to make with Japan a separate bargain as to a part of the Chinese Empire on terms advantageous to China.13
Lansdowne was therefore able to look dispassionately at the negotiations proceeding in Tokyo. But, apart from this aspect, his sympathies were broadly with the Japanese case.
A genro conference which was convened on 16 December laid down that there were no 'concessions' that Japan could make and that Russia should be asked to 're-examine her position' and reinject Manchuria into the negotiations. That is, Japan was not prepared to climb down and was leaving it to Russia to have second thoughts. There was little hope for a peaceful solution of the Manchurian-Korean problem on a reciprocal basis. With only very slight delay, the Japanese passed over their third counter-proposals which conveyed what were thought to be their final terms on 21 December.14
Simultaneously Japan was proceeding with military preparations. On 19 December, General Iguchi of the army general staff expressed the view to the industrious Kodama that Japan would ultimately have to send troops to Korea amounting to one or two divisions and would require special bases; Japan must be determined and must plan for a decisive war (kessen). Two days later the government considered and approved a memorandum by Kodama, confirming that there would be no objection at any time to sending an expeditionary force to Korea.15
Behind the preparations, a major role was being played by intelligence. The general staff tried to estimate the transport capacity of the Siberian and Chinese Eastern railways for carrying the Russian armies to the east. The calculation was that there could be eight trains to Manchuria in a day. On an estimate of six trains per day, the numbers would roughly match Japan's capacity to send troops by sea to the continent via Korea. But, apart from that, there were already six divisions or so in Manchuria; and the Russian forces were thought to be better placed strategically than the Japanese. These points were disadvantageous to the argument for making war so Major Tanaka Giichi of the general staff amended the estimate in the memorandum to six trains in the day, two for arms and four for troops. For his part, the foreign minister was worried that the Japanese army in Korea was limited to four companies, dispersed in all parts, while Russia had vastly superior strength in Manchuria and could use it to attack in Korea at any time.16
The risk of making war on a country as vast as Russia could not be taken lightly. Yamagata, who was the genro closest to the army, revealed in letters of 21 December that the elder statesman had been trying to avoid brinkmanship. Katsura clarified the cabinet's position: it would make no war over Manchuria, unless Japan's Korean proposals were turned down. That was several stages in advance of the genro. Yamagata was still not convinced that Japan should go to war over Korea. The prime minister was anxious to proceed with war preparations but could not do so unless he had the support of Itō and Yamagata, now that the genro were fully involved in decision-making. With War Minister General Terauchi, therefore, he visited them at the resort of Ōiso on 24 December and received their blessing to take the next step.17
On 26 December the Japanese minister in Seoul, Hayashi Gonsuke, came out in favour of the sending of troops to Korea urgently. It would be best, he argued, for Japan to complete her preparations within the shortest possible time; if they were made little by little, it would inevitably be a warning to Russia and encourage her to take steps of her own, while a faction at the Korean court might seek a treaty of protection from Russia. Hayashi hoped that the method chosen to send the troops would not attract too much Russian or Korean attention.18
The general staff felt that the time was ripe for a joint conference between army and navy leaders to be held. Negotiations with the naval general staff began. When the negotiations with Russia had begun in August, the fleet was called back to Sasebo near Nagasaki for refitting. When the negotiations reached an impasse in December, the first and second fleets were amalgamated to become the combined fleet (rengō kantai) and Admiral Tōgō was made its commander. But the naval authorities were still worried about their capacity to carry out the army's expectations, that is, to transport the necessary troops to Korea. The worry was greater because the navy felt that it did not command the Tsushima channel and the Japan sea. To illustrate this, the naval command published at the end of the year a statement of comparative naval strengths in east Asian waters. By a strict interpretation of these figures, Japan was inferior in battleships but superior in cruisers. The Russian strength of nine battleships takes account of the fact that there were Russian reinforcements in the Mediterranean at the end of the year en route to the far east. When such reinforcements reached Chinese waters, Russia ought to be able to win a fleet engagement with Japan. But the battleship Osliaba was delayed for repair and only the two accompanying cruisers reached the east.19
But this was a superiority on paper. Good tactics and good shooting for which Japan was noted might weight the balance in Japan's favour. Then again, many of the Russian ships in Port Arthur were in doubtful shape and had not been rigorously refitted. Being older vessels, they could not compare with the Japanese fleet for speed; and, if they once engaged in battle, they were unlikely to reach Vladivostok, pursued by the Japanese. Japan would also be operating closer to her own shores and bases. All in all, therefore, any Russian superiority on paper which these figures suggest was likely to be less marked in practice. It would appear that Japan was not too inferior, if indeed she was inferior at all, in battleships.
An element of propaganda and illusion entered into these figures. It was part of the debate between the army and the navy over war readiness at the end of the year. The navy, by issuing these figures, was appealing to the public against an immediate war. True, it would suit Japan to fight a winter naval campaign when Vladivostok would be sealed. But the naval anxiety was that Russia had six battleships and six armoured cruisers in Port Arthur, giving her command of the Gulf of Pechihli.20
At the end of the year there was a critical meeting over Japan's strategy in the presence of the genro (Itō, Yamagata, Matsukata and Inoue), the cabinet (Katsura, Komura, Yamamoto and Terauchi), the army general staff (generals Ōyama and Kodama) and the navy general staff (admirals Itō and Ijūin). Yamagata, the most cautious of statesmen, made the crucial speech, speaking both as genrō and as army mouthpiece. In particular, he seemed to be ventilating the ideas of the new vice-chief of the army staff, Kodama, whom he had earlier sponsored: 'What effrontery it is that the Russians are erecting military installations in the neighbourhood ofUiju. As Russia's power increases, she will probably never pull out. I think that we should send troops to Seoul before Russian power in Korea becomes excessive (two divisions) and occupy considerable territory in line with Russian actions.'21 To this pronouncement by one of the genrō, the navy minister Yamamoto replied. While he understood the reasons for trying to forestall the Russians, he was opposed to the proposed two divisions because Japan was not yet ready for the dispatch of troops and in any case it would be improper to proceed with peaceful international negotiations with Russia while Japan was at the same time sending troops.22 In the debate that followed, the army agreed that it had come to be accepted in the war of 1894-95 that it could not send troops overseas if the navy did not first say that it was in order. In these strange circumstances the proposal of an elder statesman was overturned by the opposition of a member of the cabinet. Yamagata, of course, did not concede. Eventually he agreed to reduce his proposal to the sending of one mixed brigade; and on this basis the leaders managed to obtain consensus. But this was a much watered-down proposal and less significant as an indication of Japanese motives.
At a cabinet meeting on 28 December the cabinet dealt with a number of problems central to war preparation. They had four days earlier decided to ask Britain for a substantial loan for war purposes, which Britain in due course declined.23 They arranged for the speedy completion of the Japanese railway from Seoul to Fusan, which required an ordinance of the privy council. They also got the privy council to ratify the emergency regulations for military expenditure. A wider-ranging diplomatic problem was discussed at a further cabinet on 30 December. It was then reinforced for the first time by the chief of the naval general staff, his deputy and Kodama, the deputy chief of army staff. The primary purpose was to debate a critical issue expressed in the draft resolution which was before them thus: 'Although the outcome of the talks with Russia cannot now be foreseen, it is opportune to consider the policies to be adopted towards China and Korea in the event of hostilities and very necessary to make certain that Japan's actions are well thought out.'24 It was the known wish of some Chinese, and indeed some foreigners, that China should not fail to take part in any battles fought on her territories. What would be Japan's policy towards China in the event of war breaking out? There were broadly two alternatives: to get China to oppose Russia alongside Japan; or to get China to remain neutral and keep out of hostilities. The cabinet adopted the second course and concluded that it was most desirable to confine hostilities to Russia and Japan, otherwise, if China joined in and other powers followed, a world-wide conflagration could not be avoided. Japan's motives regarding China — and indeed her whole philosophy at the end of 1903 — are best seen in the extensive resolution passed at that meeting. A lengthy extract from that document is given here:
[If China starts fighting against Russia], it will tempt the Powers who will try to cash in for themselves by intervening straightaway, while Japan will be so fully involved fighting to the north that she will have no occasion to worry about what is going on elsewhere and will even lose her corner in south China in the end. Needless to say, this is equivalent to our pulling chestnuts out of the fire for someone else ... With Japan about to take up arms against Russia, what she must fear most is an intervention by outside Powers. We must do our utmost to prevent this. From the very start of the negotiations Japan has been moderate and patient and has consequently been able to win the goodwill of Britain, the United States and so on. She must now try not to lose this.
Since Japan has, in spite of her wish for peace at all costs, been forced to go to war, it is best for her as far as possible to limit the fighting to one area and to ensure that the damage and loss that other countries suffer are as small as possible. Although Manchuria will inevitably become the war zone, it is important, in retaining the sympathy of other countries for our cause and giving them no grounds for intervention, to keep China neutral and reduce the impact of war on the China trade of other neutral countries to a minimum.
In this way we should hope to confine the war to Japan and Russia and thus avoid intervention by other countries. Since the war will have its origins in conflict between Japan and Russia only, it is best not to involve other Powers in it. If we were to let China enter the war, the situation would become difficult and we could not be sure that complications might not take place. In view of the Franco-Russian declaration [of March 1902] which was issued as a counterpoise to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, it might be that, if a third country like China were to enter the war against Russia alongside Japan, France would have no alternative but to come to Russia's aid. If France were to help Russia, Britain would also be required to support Japan, thus leading ultimately to the involvement of all world powers. We therefore believe that it would be most opportune if China and all other countries stayed neutral and thus restricted the scope of the war to Russia and Japan....
The doctrine of the 'yellow peril' is not too prominent a concern among white people nowadays, but it still persists among some Europeans. There is a risk that it might readily return and induce them to rally together to this far-fetched notion. If, therefore, Japan and China were to join together in any war against Russia, the anxiety over the 'yellow peril' might recur and persuade Germany, France and other countries to intervene.25
This memorandum, which is thoughtful and shows how international Meiji Japan was in her thinking, opens a window on Japan's approach at this time. It is primarily concerned, of course, with the possibility that China might want to aid Japan in dislodging Russia from Manchuria. This was to be discouraged in case it brought into play the old Dreibund of 1895 or the Franco-Russian alliance. So any Chinese suggestions for taking part in the war had to be avoided like the plague. It may be added en passant that the memorandum contains no mention of the possibility that Korea might offer to assist Japan in resisting and dislodging Russia from her peninsula. Evidently this was thought to be an unrealistic possibility.
On the whole, Japan does not seem to have expected much in the way of foreign intervention. She had probably concluded that France was reluctant to join her ally, though it was hard to guess what France's obligations really were. Germany was unstable in her responses because of the emperor's preoccupation with 'yellow peril' doctrine; but she had made it abundantly clear in the autumn of 1900 that Manchuria was not a major concern of hers. If Japan was to prevent Great Power intervention, it was desirable that mediation and other forms of pre-war interference should be avoided.
On 7 January 1904 the Japanese minister in Peking, Uchida, strongly recommended the Chinese to stay neutral in the event of a Russo-Japanese war.26
On 21 December the Japanese had passed over their third set of counterproposals. These reached Russia by the accustomed routes: Kurino passed them over in the Russian capital, while Komura handed them over to Rosen in Tokyo who then sent them on to Alekseyev in Port Arthur. Japan made it clear that the Russian redraft was unacceptable to Japan and made no compromises. Komura presented a note verbale containing four points as Japan's minimum requirements, and insisting on the inclusion of Manchuria among the matters discussed. Alekseyev added his advice on 26 December that 'more concessions to Japan will only lead to a further breach of relations; it would be better in every way that the Tokyo government should gain its objects in Korea without Russia giving her approval'. Lamsdorf, who saw the tsar immediately, was determined to reject Alekseyev's advice which was tantamount to breaking off negotiations, and wanted to continue talking.27
As a device to this end, the tsar convened a meeting of interested ministers on 28 December. Under the chairmanship of the tsar, Lamsdorf, Kuropatkin and Grand Duke Aleksei were present. But Pleske, Witte's successor as finance minister, was absent, as was Plehve. There was evidence of the lack of a helmsman who had a clear vision of Russia's objects in Manchuria. The meeting decided against cutting short the negotiations and was forced therefore to include some clause bearing on Manchuria. Kuropatkin, whose voice was probably the strongest, was unrelenting on Korea, wanting neutralization to the north of the 39th parallel, but took his earlier stance on Manchuria: Russia should concentrate on northern Manchuria and not risk a war over the south. In speaking of 'risk', he was hinting that the Chinese Eastern railway in its existing state might not be ideal for military operations, involving large contingents of men. So far Alekseyev's views had won no support. One person who did support him was Admiral Abaza, presumably as secretary of the committee for far eastern affairs. He had been an ally (as well as a relative) of Bezobrazov. He supported Alekseyev's line that Russia should merely allow Japan to take over Korea because this would not injure her true interests in the area; that Japan would merely follow one concession by another demand; and that Russia should not be a party to Japanese encroachment in Korea, which would be internationally unpopular and would not be profitable for the Japanese.28 St Petersburg gossip suggests that the tsar also supported this view and the recommendations of Alekseyev. But all were agreed on peace. There were thoughts of war and of war preparations. But there was no talk of making war on Japan. According to Kuropatkin's diary, the tsar had led off with the view that war was without doubt to be avoided and time was Russia's friend. There was general agreement for this opinion.29 Troops had been sent in great numbers to the east and, using the resources of the railways, this process could be continued and expedited. There was therefore a degree of confidence without a spirit of encouraging a resort to war.
It was left to the foreign ministry to prepare the Russian riposte to Japan. Steps were taken to bring home to the tsar the need to appease Japan in some form of words to the effect that Russia had no designs to encroach on the treaty rights in Manchuria of Japan or indeed any other power. The reply was therefore to be above all else conciliatory in tone. It was also to be part of a concerted strategy around the world in so far as Russia assured all the powers with interests in Manchuria that she would not injure their treaty rights. This satisfied no one because most of the powers only enjoyed treaty rights in Niuchuang, a town which was being held under a Russian administration at that time. The two treaties under which additional treaty rights had been negotiated, the Sino-American and Sino-Japanese treaties, were still unratified by China; and ratifications were only exchanged on 11 January 1904.30
At the insistence of Komura, Rosen brought over the Russian reply on 6 January 1904. The most important of its six points covered the concession on Manchuria which read: 'Japan recognizes Manchuria and her littoral as being outside her sphere of interest, while Russia, within the limits of that province, will not impede Japan, or any other power, in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of settlements.'31 For reasons already stated, this was unlikely to prove an attractive proposition to the Japanese, who could no longer accept désintéressement in Manchuria nor exclusion from settlements.
Even before the Russian reply came through, the Japanese were becoming firmer in their resolve. Many held that there was little point left in conducting further talks. The problems were twofold: the elder statesmen and the navy. Among the elder statesmen, even the Marquis Ito who was the Japanese leader most understanding towards Russia was coming round to despair at the possibility of a settlement with the Russians whom he now distrusted: they had shown little evidence of the desire to compromise which he had expected. So the political opposition to war had almost broken.32 But the navy's reluctance for an immediate declaration of war was a more serious obstacle. Certain military steps were taken. The Senji Dai-Honei (wartime general headquarters) was authorized on 28 December by a number of ordinances. This enabled the army and the navy to sit down together and discuss matters which could not normally be done in peacetime. The Rengō Kantai (combined fleet) was authorized at the same time. Initial provision was made for an expeditionary force (Rinji Hakengun). Funds were voted for these purposes. Financial provision was made for the completion of the Seoul-Fusan railway, a sizeable expenditure which could not have been passed so easily had it not been regarded as a strategic railway if wai came to the Korean peninsula. These developments were not kept secret: and this led to an infinity of speculation about the inevitability and imminence of war.33
By the beginning of 1904 the Japanese leaders had lost all confidence in a favourable outcome to the talks with Russia. Nothing short of a miracle could bring about a solution satisfactory to both parties. The Japanese were by no means sure of victory but they were determined not to shrink from their duty as they saw it: for, while their intentions regarding Korea were a matter of Japan's national interest, thein intention regarding Manchuria was an aspiration of all the Open Doon powers. They were in particular adamant that they would not entertain any proposals for mediation which, they thought, would only cause pointless delay and play into the hands of the Russians.
1. NGB 36/1, no. 178.
2. Oyama Azusa, Nichi-Ro sensō no gunsei shiroku, pp. 37-8.
3. Tsunoda Jun, Manshū mondai to kokubō hōshin p. 220.
4. Ibid., pp. 225-7.
5. Okamoto Shumpei, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War pp. 91-2.
6. Taiheiyō ni kakeru hashi, Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1970, pp. 135-41.
7. Okamoto, op. cit., p. 90, gives resolution in full.
8. Ibid., pp. 41-2.
9. G. W. Monger, The End of Isolation, pp. 134-6.
10. Forty Years, vol. 1, 229.
11. NGB 36/1, no. 43.
12. Hohler to Spring-Rice, 8 Mar 1904, Spring-Rice papers 1/44.
13. Lansdowne to British cabinet, no date, Cabinet Papers 1.4.
14. NGB 36/1, no. 44-5.
15. Note by Kodama, 21 Dec. 1903, in Tsunoda, op. cit., p. 224.
16. Tanaka Giichi Denki, vol. 1, pp. 232-3.
17. Tsunoda, op. cit., pp. 226-7.
18. NGU 36/1, no. 763.
19. Japan Times, 30 Dec. 1903.
20. I. I. Rostunov (ed.) Istoriya Russko-laponskoi Voiny, p. 81.
21. Japan, Navy Ministry, Yamamoto Gombei to Kaigun, p. 145.
22. Ibid., pp. 145—7.
23. I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 276-9.
24. Cabinet resolution of 30 Dec. 1903, NGB 36/1, no. 50.
25. Ibid.
26. NGB 37/38, Nichi-Ro Sensō, vol. 1, nos. 660-1.
27. A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p. 244.
28. Ibid., pp. 244-5.
29. Krasnyi Arkhiv ('Dnevnik A. N. Kuropatkina'), 2 (1925), p. 85.
30. BD, vol. 2, no. 270.
31. NGB 37/1, no. 20.
32. Itō's memorandum after the genro conference on 30 Jan., Tsunoda, op. cit., pp. 226-7.
33. Furuya Tetsuo, Nichi-Ro Sensō, pp. 81-2.