A study of the origins of many wars in the past suggests that the final month of negotiations before the outbreak of hostilities is often crucial, dramatic and intense. That was scarcely true in this case. The negotiations from 6 January to 10 February which are the subject of this chapter were in the nature of an adversarial coda. A coda is a musical term describing an independent and often artificial passage introduced after the natural conclusion of a musical work. In our case, the negotiations had come to a natural conclusion without success. They were prolonged not so much with real hope of success as for extraneous and artificial reasons, namely that the sides were not ready for war and wanted to delay matters. Since peace is valuable in itself, the prolongation of peace is also valuable. But this coda, while it is important, introduces little in the way of new material and reiterates old themes.
An imperial conference was held at the palace in Tokyo on 12 January after many private consultations. Its object was to study the latest Russian response which had come in on 6 January. In view of the critical decisions to be made, there were present (for the genro) Itō Yamagata, Ōyama, Matsukata and Inoue and (for the cabinet) all members except the prime minister who was ill. The heads and deputies of the army and navy general staffs were also in attendance. The emperor was present; and the navy minister, Admiral Yamamoto, was acting prime minister. The conference passed a resolution that 'Russia had made no adequate concession over Korea and had even refused to enter into negotiations over Manchuria, while she was at the same time trying to build up her military strength there'.1 First there was evidence of some breastbeating. Yamagata is alleged to have told Itō: 'Although we cannot foretell victory or defeat, we must enter the battle confident of victory. If we should by any chance fail, it would be an immeasurable catastrophe for our destiny.'2 Certainly it was an assembly of anxious but determined men. Second, there was (as Komura reported) 'complete unanimity of opinon'. By this he implied that Itō, who had for three years been the optimist who had held that Russia would be prepared to do a deal, had finally admitted that she had shown no willingness to make any concessions.3 Itō's sentiments are explained in a memorandum entitled 'Nichi-Ro kōshō ketsuretsu no temmatsu' (An account of the breakdown of Russo-Japanese negotiations) which he wrote in retrospect in February:
There is no question but that Russia's aim was from the start to increase her military and naval forces and then reject Japan's demands. In this way she could fulfil her ambitions in Manchuria and Korea without interference. This being so, if Japan does not now go to war and defend her threatened interests, she will eventually have to kowtow to the Russian governor of one of her frontier provinces.4
Japan decided to send Russia a final ultimatum. The problem was over the expected Russian delay. While there was no deadline set for a reply from St Petersburg, Russia was warned to give an early reply; and Minister Kurino was told to say that the reply should not be unduly or unreasonably delayed. The document was courteously worded but made it clear that modifications to the Russian terms would have to be made 'in order to arrive at a pacific solution of the pending question'. After rejecting the article concerning the neutral zone in Korea, the Japanese agreed that the Russian proposal concerning Manchuria could be accepted but with a number of far-reaching modifications, the main one being the 'recognition by Russia of Korea and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest'. The grounds for the various amendments had been fully explained on previous occasions and were not repeated. Japan stressed that she was motivated by 'a spirit of perfect conciliation' and invited Russia's reconsideration. These terms were sent to Kurino on 13 January and passed over in St Petersburg three days later.5 The impression given was one of sweet reasonableness and perhaps it was not clear to contemporaries that it was indeed an ultimatum.
The reason for the delay was a naval one. Here the status of Yamamoto as acting prime minister may have been important. So far as the army spokesmen on 12 January were concerned, they would have been willing to send off the emergency expeditionary force to Korea without delay; but they had to follow the wishes of the navy. The naval view was that it would take longer to assemble the troopships at Sasebo in western Japan. They could not complete preparations before (on one estimate) 20 January or (on another) 26 January. A later estimate postponed the target of readiness into February. This suggests that the delay may have been caused less by the need to gather transports than by the need to form an escort. In particular it was probably connected with the two cruisers just purchased in Genoa. The two cruisers had been built in a Genoese yard for the Argentine in their war with Chile; but the war had been ended by mediation. The ships had been sold to Japan through the British brokers Antony Gibbs on 9 January. Because the Italian yard was practically a branch establishment of Armstrong Whitworth at Elswick, it was left to the latter to supply the crews for the journey to Japan.6 This was of course the cause of protests by Russia; but nothing could be done about it in time of peace. Russia was probably unaware of the tie-up between Genoa and Armstrongs. The Japanese navy would only enter upon operations after the ships were well on their way from Europe, placed under Japanese naval officers. Until the ships entered the south China seas, the cautious naval authorities were not agreeable to war being declared. The ships eventually reached Japan on 16 February, were placed under Japanese crews and renamed the Nisshin and Kasuga. Katsura, restored to health on 24 January, had an audience with the emperor and reported on the options open to Japan:
It was announced on 25 January that the Japanese terms would be referred to a special conference, as had the policy to be adopted for the far east in 1903. This of course involved inevitable delay. But it did imply that the balance of decision-making in Russia had tilted again to St Petersburg and away from Port Arthur. Under the 'newcourse' of 1903, a greater say had been left to Admiral Alekseyev, though final sanction depended on the tsar and the telegraphic signals passed along the railway systems. At this phase of the crisis blame was coming to be attached to Alekseyev; and influence was being restored to Lamsdorf. Some interpreted this as a defeat for 'the military party'. There was an almost naive belief in the possibility of a satisfactory settlement through the skills of the foreign ministry. From our knowledge of the determination on the Japanese side, we know that this was misinformation, misjudgement and wishful thinking. In a way the Russians may have been lulled into a sense of false security by hearing Komura say (as we have reported) as late as December that the negotiations were coming along well and that things were under control.
That Alekseyev had forfeited some of the tsar's confidence may be seen in the order of 13 January that no military action should be taken by him without informing the tsar.8 Evidently it was thought that he was incautious. It is however wrong to imagine that Alekseyev was no longer consulted. The fact was that, until the war started, Port Arthur was the point through which all signals to Tokyo were passed. More than this, he was understood to have the discretion to modify the instructions, though it was understood that this would apply only in the military sphere. While, therefore, Alekseyev continued to have some say and was busily reporting developments, the major decisions were now being left to councils at the European end.9
It would appear that Rosen, who had hitherto accepted a role junior to Alekseyev, now became more assertive. On 13 January he passed over to Komura the assurance that Russia had given to all the powers, namely that she would not 'prevent the Powers from enjoying, within the limits of the treaties in force, the rights and advantages which they have acquired under such treaties'.10 Evidently feeling that this was quite inadequate to satisfy the Japanese, Rosen claims in his autobiography that
the only possible chance of a reversal of [the Japanese decision for war] lay in strengthening the hands of the party which had been standing for a peaceful solution of the crisis .... This could only be accomplished by a complete surrender of our position, so obstinately maintained in regard to Korea .... I despatched the same evening a telegram to Count Lamsdorf, representing to him the absolute necessity of immediately proposing the return to the original offer of the Japanese Government, made in March 1898, implying the complete surrender of all our pretensions in Korea .... No attention was apparently paid to this telegram, as it remained unanswered .... [There followed] a couple of weeks more of a fruitless exchange of proposals and counter-proposals.11
Obviously Rosen felt that, by offering substantial concessions in Korea, Russia might deflect the Japanese away from overt hostilities. It appears to have struck no responsive chord in St Petersburg.
It is indeed hard to reach a fair assessment of Rosen at this critical time. Reports suggest that for three or four weeks before the outbreak of war he was confined to his room with tympanites (distension of the belly) and never saw any of his diplomatic colleagues. Apart from his own staff, the only person he did see was the legation doctor, Dr Baelz. The British minister reported that he had heard from Rosen's doctor, who was also the consultant to the British legation, that Rosen had told him ten days before the war broke out that 'we had only to mobilize one Division and the Japanese will climb down'. Baelz argued that the Japanese would most assuredly fight; but Rosen would not listen to him or anyone else.12 In his diary, Erwin Baelz, the German physician, is more discreet, claiming that Rosen had good nerves but was to suffer from intolerable earache the night before his departure from Japan (6 March).13 It may be therefore that Rosen's advice to his government was not so 'cool' or so liberal as he himself would have us believe.
In St Petersburg they were aware of some of Japan's war preparations. This hardened their hearts against Japan's counterproposals of 13-14 January. War Minister Kuropatkin, who naturally assumed a special authority in such an emergency, wrote to the tsar on 16 January of the absolute necessity for a neutral zone in Korea north of the 39th parallel. For his part, the tsar thought it monstrous that Japan should be insisting on China's territorial integrity in Manchuria.14 This was scarcely the language of concession. Yet, when Alekseyev reported further Japanese troop movements and suggested the need for some degree of mobilization, the tsar was quick to respond on 27 January with a statement of Russian policy, namely, if Japan lands in south Korea or on the east coast south of Seoul, Russia will disregard it and will not consider it a casus belli; Russia can permit Japan to occupy as far as the mountain range forming the watershed of the Yalu and Tumen rivers.15 This was to curb the extraordinary powers that Alekseyev had been given as recently as August. It was a sign of a cooling breeze from the west.
On 28 January a sort of strategic conference was held to discuss Japan's terms and formulate a counter-proposal. Urgency was imparted to the meeting by the repeated warnings by the Japanese minister that time was running out. In the presence of Grand Duke Aleksei Alexandravich, Admiral Avelan, Admiral Abaza, Lamsdorf and Kuropatkin, it was agreed not to mention in Russia's counter-proposals the question of Chinese territorial integrity in Manchuria (to which the emperor had taken such exception); not to insist on the demand for a neutral zone in Korea (this can only be interpreted as a defeat for Kuropatkin); but to insist on retaining the clause about Japan's guarantee not to use Korea for strategic purposes.16
On 31 January Lamsdorf told Kurino that it was too early to predict when the reply would be ready. The views of the court and Alekseyev had to be reconciled; and the tsar satisfied. A damaging rumour reached Kurino the following day from a Japanese newspaper correspondent on the spot that Russia had decided not to reply to Japan's ultimatum. While this was denied by Lamsdorf, the report reached Tokyo on the morning of 2 February. The counter-proposals were in fact approved by the tsar that day and sent to Alekseyev for onward transmission to Tokyo.17
The last Russian terms are often described as the 'compromise.' We shall not discuss them in detail here because they did not influence the course of negotiations. The text is given in Professor White's book. But Malozemoff writes of them as 'a compromise' indicating Russia's amenable attitude.18 B. A. Romanov makes one important observation about them which bears examination. He describes how Japan broke off the negotiations 'notwithstanding the fact that Nicholas at the very last moment agreed to the fundamental wording of the Manchurian demand of Japan'.19 Had this been true, it would have been a great tragedy for the protracted negotiations that they had come so close to fulfilment. But it is not true. It is true that the Russians at the eleventh hour did include two clauses bearing on Manchuria which previously they had solemnly omitted to discuss. But one is merely a statement of Russian demands for an exclusive sphere of interest in Manchuria, which Japan was seeking to challenge. The other was a new addition to the discussion from the Russian side, 'mutual guarantee not to prevent the joining of the Korean and Chinese Eastern railways when these railways reach the Yalu'.20 Perhaps to some extent this was a desideratum for the Japanese but it was of a low level of priority.
On the whole, the final Russian terms were rather unbending. If, as Romanov and Malozemoff argue, they appeared to be generous in the eyes of the Russians, were they generous for tactical reasons? That is, were they intended to 'put Japan in the wrong, if war breaks out'? One thing is certain, whether they were generous or not, the Russian terms were slow in their formulation. The Russian leaders appear to have been blind to the fact that, the slower the Russian response, the more the Japanese would allege that Russia was merely playing for time, was merely dragging her feet while she increased her war-readiness.
Ironically, Russia's decision, delayed so long in the formulation, was also long delayed in the transmission. The telegram seems to have reached Alekseyev on 3 February. But it is alleged that the Japanese purposely delayed forwarding the coded message to Rosen until 7 February. Whatever the truth of this, it was a fairly purposeless act because Lamsdorf had himself informed Kurino of the instructions that had been sent to Japan on 5 February; and Kurino's account of them reached Tokyo at 5.15 p.m. on that day. Even this channel of communication was pointless because the message seems to have arrived after Japan had sent her telegrams dealing with the breaking of diplomatic relations at 2 p.m. on 5 February.21 Nor would the contents of the telegrams have altered Japanese thinking. As so many had predicted over the six months of talks, Russia's concessions were too small and came too late.
In fact, the Japanese had brought down the guillotine rather earlier. Having heard that Minister Kurino had been able to obtain no response, a top-level meeting was held on 30 January. It concluded that Russia was merely spinning things out because time was on her side and was working against Japan. A delay of three weeks in replying was regarded as inexcusable; and it was unanimously agreed that a firm response was needed. Even Itō who drafted the resolution held that further negotiations with Russia would merely paper over the cracks and be no long-term solution.22
After this, events followed in rapid succession. On 1 February Kodama drew up an appreciation of the Russian army and navy in north-east Asia and circulated it with Chief of Staff Oyama's comment that Japan must strike first. On 3 February there were meetings of the cabinet and later the cabinet and genro. On the following day an imperial conference in the presence of the emperor was held and took the fateful decision to go to war at once.23 They may have been influenced in their decision by the intelligence that a large Russian naval squadron had sailed from Port Arthur on the previous day. It was left to the foreign ministry to notify Rosen and Kurino that Japan was breaking off the negotiations and was further breaking off relations.24
The most telling point in the Japanese discussions was the intelligence they had received about Russian troop movements in the area. From their comprehensive network in Manchuria, Korea and Siberia, they learnt (for example) that on 21 January about two battalions of infantry and some artillery were sent from Port Arthur and Talien to the northern frontier of Korea; and that on the 28th Alekseyev ordered Russian troops near the Yalu to be placed on a war footing. On 1 February the governor of Vladivostok asked the commercial agent of Japan to prepare to withdraw to Khabarovsk as he was ready to proclaim the coming of war. This sort of information was grist to the mill of those Japanese who wanted to show that Russia was not as peaceloving as she professed.
After the conversion of Ito and Yamagata to the need for war, Komura was in a position to take the next diplomatic steps. Kurino passed over the lengthy telegrams bearing on the breaking off of the talks at 4 p.m. on 6 February. He was required to do this, regardless of whether the long-awaited Russian reply had reached him or not. By this time it had. According to a Russian source, Kurino expressed the hope in a letter to Lamsdorf that the rupture would be short. He was further instructed to leave St Petersburg and move to Berlin, while the Japanese consul at Odessa was to move with his staff to Vienna.25 The United States was asked to take over responsibility for Japan's affairs. The legation staff eventually left the Russian capital on 10 February. This was equivalent to breaking diplomatic relations rather than a mere rupture of talks. It fell short, however, of being a declaration of war. Indeed Lamsdorf claimed that the talks had been so cordial and their rupture so discreetly carried out that he had no reason to fear that an outbreak of hostilities was about to take place.
The Japanese message on the rupture gave notice of the termination of talks and of Japan's intention to take independent action. Those who understood the coded language of diplomatic communications could see in it a rupture of relations and even a declaration of war. It was stressed that Russia's delay remained 'largely unexplained' and it was difficult to 'reconcile [Russia's naval and military activities] with entirely peaceful aims'. The final document is so important in its implications that it must be quoted at length:
The successive rejections by the Imperial Russian Government, by means of inadmissible amendments, of Japan's proposals respecting Corea, the adoption of which the Imperial Government regarded as indispensable to assure the independence and territorial integrity of the Corean Empire and to safeguard Japan's preponderating interests in the Peninsula, coupled with the successive refusals of the Imperial Russian Government to enter into engagements to respect China's territorial integrity in Manchuria which is seriously menaced by their continued occupation of the province, notwithstanding their treaty engagements with China and their repeated assurances to other Powers possessing interests in those regions, have made it necessary for the Imperial Government seriously to consider what measures of self-defence they are called upon to take.
In the presence of delays which remain largely unexplained and naval and military activities which it is difficult to reconcile with entirely pacific aims, the Imperial Government have exercised in the depending negotiations, a degree of forbearance which they believe affords abundant proof of their loyal desire to remove from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government every cause for future misunderstanding. But finding in their efforts no prospect of securing from the Imperial Russian Government an adhesion either to Japan's moderate and unselfish proposals or to any other proposals likely to establish a firm and enduring peace in the Extreme East, the Imperial Government have no other alternative than to terminate the present futile negotiations.
In adopting that course the Imperial Government reserve to themselves the right to take such independent action as they may deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced position, as well as to protect their established rights and legitimate interests.26
One has the feeling that this document had been drawn up primarily with the aim of publication after the war ultimately broke out. It was in the nature of a justification and defence of Japan's decision to take the initiative in opening hostilities.
Admiral Tōgō received orders to begin operations on 5 February when the squadrons were assembled at Sasebo. The initial operation was to send one squadron to deal with the Russian fleet at Port Arthur and simultaneously to send cruisers to Chemulpo (Inchon), to land troops from transports for the occupation of Seoul and the capture of Korea. The first fleet reached the neighbourhood of Port Arthur on 8 February and squadrons made two surprise attacks on the Russian vessels and put much of the Russian fleet there out of action with their torpedoes. Admiral Tōgō thus acquired command of the seas in the Yellow Sea for Japan. Meanwhile the navy had been engaging Russian ships found in Japanese waters and on the high seas and had seized them, though the news was deliberately kept from the Japanese people.
The second squadron approached Chemulpo on 8 February. The disembarkation operations were undertaken overnight and completed by the morning of 9 February and the Japanese breathed a sigh of relief. An ultimatum was then presented to the Russian ships in port requiring them to leave or be attacked. The cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreetz, though outnumbered and outclassed, left the harbour. They were attacked and badly crippled. They crept back into Chemulpo; but the commanders decided to sacrifice their ships.
The Japanese operation was of course a violation of Korean neutrality. The Russo-Japanese war was not simply a war between Japan and Russia; it was a war fought over the Russian occupation of Chinese territory, using Korea as one of the zones of operations. Such was Kodama's master plan, as approved by the various decision-making bodies, of 'striking first and striking through Korea'.
The impact of the Japanese strategy on China and Korea had been discussed exhaustively by Japan's leaders on 30 December. The decision taken with regard to China had been to persuade her to remain neutral and dissuade her from taking part in operations. On 7 January Prince Ching agreed that, while China should logically have negotiated on her own behalf with Russia over 'Manchuria', she could in the present circumstances see no other course but to observe neutrality in the event of hostilities between Russia and Japan.27
The position with regard to Korea was more difficult. Over the previous years Korea had been calling for world-wide recognition of her neutrality. Fearing that there might be a military flare-up between Russia and Japan over Yongampo in August 1903, the Korean emperor had renewed his appeal to both for a guarantee of neutrality 'so that, if in the future war should break out none of the operations will take place within our borders and we should have no bodies of troops marching through our territory.' Komura evaded discussion of the matter saying on 26 September that it was 'unpropitious and also very untimely to discuss warfare and neutrality now'.28
The decision over Korea at the cabinet on 30 December had been that Japan should seek a secret agreement whereby Korea would request Japanese assistance for the security of her imperial family and her independence and, in an emergency, suitable steps on the part of Japan for the security of Korea and especially Seoul. While Minister Hayashi thought that the prospects were good with the emperor and the proJapanese members of the court, he feared the Russian troop reinforcements in Seoul might tilt the balance away from Japan. Moreover the Koreans wanted an assurance from Japan that her sole object was the safety of the Korean dynasty and the country's independence, as their experience after the last declaration in 1895 had not been an auspicious one.29
The communications of the Russian minister with the outside world were broken by the interruption of Korean telegraphic services largely under Japan's control from mid January onwards. This forced Pavlov to use a mail steamer or a gunboat to neighbouring ports like Chefoo in north Shantung. To the considerable mystification of most governments, a telegram in the French language and originating in Chefoo in the name of the Korean foreign minister was sent round the world. It was a declaration of Korea's intention to observe the strictest neutrality. The eleven Korean diplomats around the world asked the governments to which they were accredited to declare their respect for Korean neutrality. Britain, among others, gave this declaration. This was awkward for Japan. In this gesture of independence the Koreans had been abetted by the Russians and the French; and it was from the office of the French vice-consul at Chefoo (who was also consul-general for Korea) that the telegrams were sent.30
Meanwhile as a result of forceful negotiations between Japan and Korea, the secret agreement was signed on 24 January. But almost immediately the Korean emperor insisted that the ratifications should only be exchanged when the Japanese had replied favourably over guaranteeing Korean neutrality. The Japanese minister urged his government to give the necessary assurances even though it seemed superficially to contradict the secret alliance. He felt that the guarantees would be made public while the alliance would be kept secret and so the contradiction and inconsistency would not be openly apparent. Tokyo however did not heed this advice. On 25 January Hayashi was informed that the conclusion of the secret agreement was not considered of such necessity or of such ultimate interest as to require Japar. to risk the world's misunderstanding of her position and to prevent her freedom of action in the future. When therefore the Koreans pressed for Japan to acknowledge Korea's neutrality, the Japanese merely stated that they did not propose to reply for the time being.3
This was a diplomatic setback for Japan. Her attempt to negotiate a secret alliance was leaked to the Russian minister who opposed it utterly. The rival pro-Russian and pro-Japanese factions at the Seoul court fought the matter out but found that the Russians were the stronger and so the secret agreement had to be dropped. The Koreans very naturally sought to link a Japanese agreement with Japan's acceptance of the inviolability of her territory. From the Japanese point of view, this was a most awkward declaration to be asked to give because the Japanese strategic plan involved the violation of Korean territory in the event of war. The optimum solution for the Japanese would have been for Korea to propose a treaty of alliance which would have invited their armies to come to the aid of Korea against the Russians; but such an invitation was never issued. Hence the Japanese had to face the necessity of invading Korea and violating her territory in fulfilment of their strategic plans.
The worry of the invading Japanese army was firstly with the Koreans and secondly with the Russians. The initial force of 2500 troops which was landed was not likely to be challenged by Korean soldiery. In order to win over the Koreans, the Japanese claimed that the landing 'did not take place before a state of war actually existed between Japan and Russia'. This presumably rests on the doubtful proposition that after the rupture of diplomatic relations a state of war necessarily exists. The Japanese also tried to contend that Korea consented to the landing of Japanese troops at Chemulpo. We can only conjecture that they refer here to the abortive secret treaty. At any rate there was no popular uprising against Japan. For Japan, the danger was rather that the emperor would move to the Russian or French legation for protection. To prevent this, the Japanese minister gave an assurance to the Korean emperor on 8 February that Japanese troops, even if they entered the capital, would neither harm the people nor violate the Imperial Palace.32
On the Russian side also there was no likelihood of a military confrontation. There was only a legation guard of less than a hundred troops in Seoul and they were caught unprepared by the Japanese landing. The loss of the two Russian ships at Chemulpo took Minister Pavlov by surprise and, though it seems to be out of character with his outlook in the past, he sought the permission of the Japanese to leave from Chemulpo by a French warship bound for Chefoo. He left Korea, a broken man with his newly-wed young wife, on 12 February, placing Russian property under French protection. Japanese troops supplied the escort to Chemulpo.
On 23 February Japan signed a protocol with the Koreans, pledging to guarantee their independence and territorial integrity and to introduce internal reforms. Japan could take measures if Korea was endangered by the aggression of a third power or by internal disurbances, while Korea promised to give facilities to Japan and put at Japan's disposal such places as were necessary from strategic considerations. Korea was debarred from concluding any arrangement with a third power.33 The peninsula had therefore come under the military occupation and political protection of Japan.
The imperial rescript on the declaration of war was issued in Tokyo on 10 February. On that day it was circulated to the legations in Tokyo. Baron Rosen, who did not withdraw from Tokyo till 11 February, presumably either received a copy or heard of its contents. There is a slight discrepancy over dates since The Times of London reported that it was issued on the 11th, but it did not make any difference to the course of war which had already begun with the Japanese naval actions in Korean and Manchurian waters.34
On receipt of the notice breaking off the negotiations, the tsar acted immediately. He ordered the minister at Tokyo and all the legation staff to leave the Japanese capital and thus reciprocated the Japanese action on 7 February. The following day, he held a special conference with Lamsdorf, Kuropatkin, Aleksei Alexandrovich, Avelan and Abaza in attendance. After discussion, they agreed to the Russian declaration issued by Nicholas on 9 February. The important part read:
We gave our consent to the Japanese proposal to revise the existing Russo-Japanese treaty over Korea. But Japan has informed Russia of her decision to call off the talks and break off diplomatic relations even before the negotiations have ended and the arrival of Russia's final reply. Without giving any warning that the rupture of relations would result in the start of warlike activities, the Japanese government ordered its torpedo boats to conduct attacks on the Russian squadron lying off Port Arthur fort. On receipt of this message from the Viceroy of the Far East, we have issued the order to meet Japan's challenge by force of arms.35
Though they are not really itemized in the Russian declaration itself, the events complained of are 'a whole series of revolting attacks on Russian warships and merchantmen'.36 Russia claimed that the steamer Rossiya was seized in the waters of south Korea and the attack on the Varyag and Koreetz took place before Kurino had presented his note. In addition there was the attack on the fleet at Port Arthur mentioned in the declaration of war. These claims seem to have been spurious; but they became part of the propaganda battle to rally support.
During the discussion of strategic issues on 8 February, Kuropatkin took the view that a landing of Japanese forces at Chemulpo would give the Russians great advantages in initial deployment. The notion presumably was that the Japanese would not make a direct attack on Manchuria and would be bogged down in Korea to some degree and this would give Russia time to pursue her preparations in Manchuria. There was no evidence of a view that Russia could in any way resist Japan in Korea. A carefully-worded telegram was accordingly sent to Admiral Alekseyev:
It is desirable that the Japanese, and not we, begin military actions. Provided they do not, therefore, direct their operations against us, you should not take any measures against them, whether in landings in southern Korea or on the eastern coast as far north as Gensan. But if the Japanese fleet, with or without landing parties, were to cross the 39th parallel on the western coast of Korea, you may attack without waiting for them to fire the first shot.37
These were fairly explicit instructions and took the decision out of the hands of the viceroy. But they were also crafty. Like the Japanese before them, the Russians were preparing their position for the eventuality of war breaking out and were anxious to show themselves as being unprovocative. They were making a bid in advance for the sympathy of world opinion.
Yet there is evidence that the specific nature of these instructions belied the true mood in St Petersburg and the chaos and uncertainty which prevailed. On the evening that the attack on Port Arthur took place, the tsar and tsarina attended the opera. He declined to cancel the arrangements which were under way for a court ball, until the news of the attack and its results were received at midnight on 9 February. When Rosen reported on happenings at Port Arthur, the tsar apparently penned the marginal note: 'This is absolutely absurd'.38 It would seem therefore that there was wishful thinking in the Russian court up to the last moment that the Japanese would not dare to make war on the mighty imperial forces. Yet preparations were continuing systematically enough. The declaration of war was issued ultimately on 18 February.39
Needless to say, Japan's action has come in for many-sided criticism, both contemporary and subsequent. In the white papers issued by both powers after the war began, accusation and counter-accusation were flung at each other on these and other themes. The Japanese case then and now rests with the argument that a declaration of war is not a necessary condition for beginning hostilities and that the breaking of diplomatic relations is enough to enable countries to take independent action, even of a military sort. This was the argument advanced by the Japanese foreign ministry on 3 March: Japan had made it abundantly clear that she would take 'independent action' which implied that she would go as far even as opening hostilities.
Arguments along similar lines were — perhaps not unexpectedly —developed by one of the 'seven professors' who became notorious in the summer of 1903, Takahashi Sakue, Professor of Law at Tokyo University. Writing in the Kokumin Shimbun, he cited many cases of modern European wars where the declaration of war did not come before the start of fighting.40 From later incidents in Japanese history, we know that in a crisis decisions of a military kind were reserved to serving officers by the doctrine of dokudan senkō (doctrine of supreme command). Thus military or naval commanders had a large measure of freedom of action over naval encounters or expeditionary forces which would hardly be enjoyed in other countries. One has the feeling that Admiral Tōgō exercised these rights without knowing the finer points about Japan's declaration of war.
The Russian view was that the breaking off of diplomatic relations by no means implied the opening of hostilities. In its note of 20 February in its Official Messenger it disputed strongly the view that a state of war existed between Japan and Russia from 6 February onwards.41
So divided was opinion in Russia over the war that there were not lacking those who supported the Japanese arguments. While there was plenty of evidence in public demonstrations that a war against Japan was a popular war, there was much evidence of hostility among the intelligentsia. An example which is relevant to the present discussion is a jurist called Pilenko, a lecturer in international law, who worked under Professor Martens at St Petersburg. He argued surprisingly that 'Kurino's note contained not only the rupture of diplomatic relations but also the declaration of war as published in the Japanese White Book .... It is common knowledge that fifty hours elapsed between the rupture and the attack on the Port Arthur squadron.'42 He goes on to argue that Russia could have used that time by offering Japan certain concessions. It seems to be straining the terms of the Japanese note to call it a declaration of war. But it is none the less interesting that a Russian jurist should interpret it in this way, albeit twelve months later, and say in effect that the Japanese were entitled by the notice given to take the action that they did at Port Arthur.
As defeat followed defeat, Russia became demoralized and a search for scapegoats began. Much controversy surrounded the events of the first ten days of February. In November 1904 Alekseyev, who had been sacked as commander-in-chief, returned to the capital an embittered man and spoke to French newspapermen. He apparently alleged that he had been told that war was not likely to result from the rupture of negotiations.43 Although we cannot substantiate this point, we have seen that Alekseyev had been warned to abstain from acts which might be interpreted as beginning hostilities. Perhaps he had not been fully alerted to the critical situation that had been reached. In the face of the witchhunt which inevitably overtakes the unsuccessful in war, Alekseyev had to defend his actions in the last week. He did so by trying to incriminate Lamsdorf. Lamsdorf s defence was that by the division of authority introduced in August 1903 the responsibility lay with the viceroy and not with himself. In any case Lamsdorf argued that the Japanese messages were equivocal. The wording of the official notes was vague, deliberately so. Moreover Lamsdorf had received a personal letter in which the Japanese minister, Kurino, had expressed his hope for the speedy resumption of relations. The problem of 'decoding' the communications on both sides was certainly a great one. And Lamsdorf may have been taken in by the courteous tone of the Japanese messages. In turn, Lamsdorf may not have conveyed to Alekseyev the seriousness of Japan's intentions. Having said that, it is also true that Alekseyev must be blamed for not having his own sources of information and intelligence about Japan's actions. There does seem to have been overconfidence in Port Arthur which was singularly blind.
As in many a coda, little new of substance emerged. Old arguments were rehearsed and refuted. But the coda was significant. The two events of January — Japan's final ultimatum and Russia's failure to reply — were critical for the outbreak of the war and for the occurrence of a catastrophe on an immense scale. We have hitherto looked at the coda from the standpoint of the two adversaries. In fact there were many other parties looking on. To them we must turn in the next chapter.
1. Japan, Navy Ministry, Yamamoto Gombei to Kaigun, pp. 189-201.
2. R. Hackett, Yamagata Amitomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, p. 226.
3. NGB 37/I, no. 45.
4. Tsunoda Jun, Manshū Mondai to kokubō hōshin, p. 230, quoting Zoku Itō Hirobumi Hiroku.
5. Komura to Kurino, 13 Jan. 1904, NGB 37/I, nos. 20-35.
6. Louis of Battenberg to T. H. Sanderson, 3 Feb. 1904, Scott Papers, Add. MSS 52,299, British Library, London; Marquis Ruvigny, Nobilities of Europe (Edinburgh 1909).
7. Tokutomi: Iichiro, Kōshaku Katsura Tarō den, vol. 2, Tokyo 1917, pp. 197-8.
8. A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p. 248.
9. Note by Spring-Rice, 25 Jan 1904, Scott Papers, 52,302; 'V Shtabe Adm. E. I. Alekseyeva (Planson diary)', Krasnyi Arkhiv 41-2 (1930), pp. 148-56.
10. NGB 37/I, no. 34.
11. Rosen, Forty Years, vol. 1, pp. 230-2.
12. MacDonald to Hardinge, 30 June 1904, Hardinge Papers 3.
13. Erwin Baelz, Awakening Japan: Diary of a German Doctor, entries for 14 Dec. 1903 and 6 Mar. 1904.
14. Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 248.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Yamamoto Gombei to Kaigun, pp. 185-7.
18. Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 248; White, pp. 356-8, Fourth Exchange.
19. B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, p. 331.
20. White, op. cit., p. 357.
21. NGB 37/I, no. 117; Japan: Correspondence regarding the Negotiations between Japan and Russia, 1903-4, pp. 33-6.
22. Itō, 'Nichi-Ro Kōshō Ketsuretsu no Temmatsu': 'From the start the intention of Russia was to build up her land and sea forces, and then to reject the Japanese demands."
23. Kodama's 'Jōkyō Handan' in Tsunoda, op. cit., pp. 227 ff.
24. Message from Consul Mizuno (Chefoo), 3 Feb. 1904, Tsunoda, op. cit., p. 230; H. G. W. Woodhead diaries (transcribed), 5 Feb. 1904: 'Great excitement today as it is said that the Russian fleet has left Port Arthur. News of war expected all today. I personally think that the fleet left there because the Kazan, a transport which left Hong Kong for Port Arthur has not arrived, or else that the Russians want to capture the two new cruisers Nisshin and Kasuga before they reach Japan.'
25. NGB 37/I, no. 121.
26. NGB 37/I, no. 122.
27. NGB, Nichi-Ro Sensō, vol. 1, no. 661.
28. NGB 36/I, no. 700.
29. NGB 37/I, no. 368.
30. NGB 37/I, no. 333; Fontenay (Chefoo) to Delcassé, 2 Feb. 1904, DDF, 2nd series, vol. 4 (1904), no. 235.
31. NGB 37/I, nos. 335-42.
32. NGB 37/I, nos. 343-7.
33. NGB 37/I, no. 376.
34. The Times, 22 Feb. 1904.
35. Asakawa Kanichi, Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. 348-51.
36. Ibid.
37. Tsar to Alekseyev, 8 Feb. 1904, in Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 249.
38. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 13 Dec. 1904, Hardinge Papers 46.
39. Official communiqué, 18 Feb. 1904 in Asakawa, op. cit., pp. 348-9.
40. Takahashi rehearsed hisexploitsin Manshū mondai no kaiketsu, published in 1904.
41. Official Messenger, 20. Feb. 1904, in Asakawa, op. cit., pp. 349-51.
42. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 13 Dec. 1904, Hardinge Papers 46.
43. Ibid.