The Russo-Japanese war started in a blaze of controversy with wordy accusations being met by equally wordy counter-accusations. The two governments had been careful about the documents they exchanged because they saw that war, if it came, would have an international dimension and it would be important to win the goodwill of neutral countries. It was the aim of both Russia and Japan to win the battle of words about the causes of the war.
On the Russian side, frequent appeals were made to European press and public opinion in the early months of the war. They were eventually assembled in 1910 into a collection and published in what was known as the Red Book.1 Information about the inner tensions within Russia came from the report which General Kuropatkin wrote in Manchuria around the end of the war. He was of course a particular expert on the causes and course of the war. Though the report was suppressed when it appeared in Russia, it leaked out to the foreign press in 1906. In defending his own position, Kuropatkin drew attention to the state of Russian military unpreparedness and incriminated Admiral Alekseyev, Finance Minister Witte and the generals who surrounded him at the battle-front. Witte in due course responded in 1911 after a dignified silence by offering his own explanations about General Kuropatkin's version of the Japanese war.2 While these arguments lifted the veil on the problems of the Russian decision-makers, they did not on the whole add very much to the story of the negotiations.
The Russian cause was not without its advocates in Europe, especially after the early attacks on Port Arthur and Chemulpo. This made it all the more necessary for Japan to publish her White Book entitled Correspondence regarding the Negotiations between Japan and Russia, 1903-4 which was an English translation of documents presented to the Imperial Diet in March 1904. It was intended to convey the message that the Russians had been most dilatory over the talks and that Japan was justified in taking the course of war that she had followed.3 This was the main raw material for the truly remarkable The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues by Asakawa Kanichi of Dartmouth College which was published in the United States and Britain in November 1904. It had access to very special materials and was literally rushed to the press in order to reach a world audience. Two other presenters of the Japanese case were Baron Suematsu and Baron Kaneko. Suematsu reached London in March and was thereafter engaged in speech-making and article-writing throughout Europe in order to rebut items appearing in Russian-inspired periodicals. His articles found their way into journals like Nineteenth Century and After in Britain and corresponding ones on the continent. Eventually the most important of these were assembled in The Risen Sun, published in London towards the end of the war. Translations of this work, which was strongly apologetic in tone, were published also in France and Germany. Suematsu's central message was that 'Japan has shown a great moral heroism [in fighting Russia] in the cause of humanity and civilisation.'4 Suematsu's opposite number in the United States was Kaneko. By contributing articles to the North American Review, he was able to combat the arguments of Russian apologists like the ambassador, Count Cassini.5 Asakawa, Suematsu and Kaneko were able pleaders and enjoyed some success. But they operated in an atmosphere which was remarkably even-handed as between Russia and Japan. Indeed, they may have been sent abroad under the impression that the outbreak of war would generate a fresh growth of the 'yellow peril' doctrine. This did not happen. Although the Russians had loyal supporters throughout the war, the Japanese had from the start grave doubts about the extent of the goodwill towards them from around the world and felt that it had to be fortified by presenting the Japanese case in a favourable light.6
Justice cannot be done here to this outpouring of material. Some of the most telling debates relate to matters which cannot be discussed here: for example, whether international law lays down that a formal declaration of war is required before a state of war exists between countries. Since the Pearl Harbour attack this has been a hotly disputed issue over which there is no consensus.
It is necessary to turn to some of the conclusions which suggest themselves as having affected the decision for war and the outbreak of war in both countries. The nature of the Russo-Japanese war was that Japan declared war on Russia on the grounds that Russia had been expansionist in Manchuria and Korea. Russia was expansionist against the weaker states of China and Korea and possibly provocative against Japan. Her expansion was challenged by Japan, first by protest, next by subversion, then by negotiation and finally by war. Russia might possibly have prevented or avoided this war by concessions: she might have honoured her evacuation agreement of April 1902; she might have been more accommodating by improving Japan's position in Korea. In the event she did not honour her evacuation promises and offered only modest concessions too late for any practical outcome.
Russia was at the end of a long road of expansion in north-east Asia. She had passed several milestones: she had acquired the lease for twenty-five years of Port Arthur (Lushun) and its environs in 1898; she had occupied with her troops the critical cities and routes of Manchuria from 1900 to 1904; she had on two occasions failed to withdraw in accordance with her pledges to China in 1902; she had in 1903 taken new initiatives in the north of Korea which were not purely commercial. During the five months of negotiations with Japan in 1903 she showed herself to be unyielding and insensitive.
Yet there are certain points which can be made for the Russian position. Firstly, the Russian expansionist drive, though it may seem to be determined and unidirectional, was in fact diffuse and complicated. It was the result of jostling for power between many parties and individuals who gained and lost the ascendancy from time to time. The basic problem was how to deal with the colossal investment in railways, both the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern railways, which the Russians had made under the aegis of Sergei Witte. Whatever Witte's propaganda claimed, this was not purely a commercial undertaking because the track had to be guarded by 'police' who were synonymous with 'troops'. These expensive railway projects had failed to yield a profit by 1903; and it was natural that voices should be raised in favour of 'capitalizing' on existing investment by military or other means.
Although Russia had been reinforcing her strength in east Asia by land and sea, she was hardly prepared for war. This was made clear in her official communique of 18 February.
The distance of the territory now attacked and the desire of the Czar to maintain peace were causes of the impossibility of preparations for war being made a long time in advance. Much time is now necessary in order to strike at Japan blows worthy of the dignity and might of Russia .... Russia must await the event in patience, being sure that our army will avenge that provocation a hundredfold. Operations on land must not be expected for some time yet, and we cannot obtain early news from the theatre of war.7
The picture here painted was disputed by Japanese intelligence sources which concluded that Russia was already formidable in military and naval terms in east Asia: not less than 30,000 troops had been sent to the Trans-Baikal in the second half of 1903, while two new first-class battleships and two first-class cruisers had been ordered to the far east without any ships there being sent home. The 'official' communique, moreover, does not tally with the general confidence expressed by Russian officers themselves. Alekseyev's naval staff could not contemplate the defeat of the Russian far eastern squadron by Japan; and General Kuropatkin, whose frankness we have earlier observed, was more optimistic in 1903 than he had been two years earlier, though strongly impressed with the danger of fighting Japan. Where the Russian army was unprepared in 1904 was in organization and supplies; it was also weak in the fighting spirit of its troops so far from home. It depended very much on the new rail network which proved in February to be seriously deficient in coal. The railways had therefore to suspend ordinary services in order to concentrate on the movement of troops and supplies. They had to do panic buying of coal from Tangshan in north China through Chinwangtao and also from Niuchuang.8 Thus, by the time the two armies came to confront each other, the unpreparedness had been largely overcome. But there was strong evidence that the reservists in the Russian army did not have a heart for the struggle in Manchuria.
Then there was the unrealistic Russian perception of Japan. Russia's leaders in east Asia seem to have convinced themselves that the Japanese were bluffing and would not ultimately resort to war. Admiral Alekseyev, conscious of a Russian mission in the east, thought it was presumptuous of Japan to challenge this and so made few concessions during the negotiations. A more widespread view in Port Arthur was that the Japanese army would not dare to attack because of its poor calibre.9 This was of course not a uniquely Russian viewpoint; and, apart from Britain which had a high opinion of Japan's strength by land and sea, it was held by many other foreign observers. But many Russians certainly took a view of Japan which was derisory in comparison with themselves. It may be that this derived from a deliberate policy of secrecy and concealment which the Japanese army applied because of the historic coolness between the two countries.
Our broad view in this study has been that Russia did not want war but by sheer dilatoriness over the negotiations let war occur. She did not want war in the sense that her strategic position was improving day by day with the growth and improvement of her railways and time was on her side. It therefore suited her to stall in negotiations. Because she had little sense of urgency, she did not give positive assurances which the Japanese cabinet might have been happy to latch on to. The Russians were adamant in not negotiating over Manchuria and made only minor gestures over Korea, which failed to acknowledge the importance which Japan attached to that peninsula. Perhaps it was hard for the tsar ever to make concessions. There is much truth in the assessment that 'The Czar wishes peace, but he refused to realise how serious matters were until his constant delay had irritated the Japanese to exasperation.'10 It was to Russia's advantage to seek peace and employ delaying tactics. It does not seem to have occurred to the cautious and inefficient ministers that their dilatoriness would push even the peace party in Japan to a determination to teach Russia a lesson. Nor were there any pressures from public or newspaper opinion to take the negotiations seriously and avert the war. The people, especially the alienated intelligentsia, were uninformed about the far eastern situation, mentally unprepared for war and indifferent to it when it came. Those like the Poles or the Finns were either disinterested or deeply opposed.11
In an attempt to analyse the climate of opinion in European Russia, Cecil Spring-Rice, who spent the early months of the war in Russia, wrote: 'I have seen this Government which had every reason to wish for peace — which was warned by Witte and Plehve and Kuropatkin that war would be useless and dangerous — plunged suddenly into a wholly preventible war by the action of a few interested and irresponsible people and the invincible ignorance and conceit of the Directing power' [my italics].12 There is no evidence as to whom he identified as the 'Directing power'. But Spring-Rice says of the tsar and courtiers that they wanted war to take place in the spring of 1904 when Russia would be so strong that Japan would not be able to fight and would not dare; while 'the outbreak of war [as early as February] found the military party which had brought it on unprepared, and the Emperor almost incredulous'.13 Possibly Russia was so elated by the eastern railways coming to completion that she did not immediately capitalize on them by building up overwhelming strength in the area. Perhaps there was conceit; certainly there was 'ignorance' despite the visits to the east of Witte and Kuropatkin.
The problem is to pin down the objectives of the 'military party'. General Kuropatkin as war minister had tended since 1900 to favour withdrawal from southern Manchuria, while advocating a much more rigorous occupation of the northern part of the country. But this view was not universally accepted, even in the army. Nor was it acceptable to the navy. Obviously during the period when the tsar fell under the influence of Bezobrazov and his group, the idea of withdrawal lapsed and a policy of greater firmness prevailed both in Manchuria and Korea. But this lasted only a short time; and moderate counsels were in the second half of 1903 able to exert a certain amount of influence. But even they had no clear objectives. Thus, Plehve confessed to Kuropatkin that he did not know where Russia's leaders were heading for.14 It would appear that civilian ministers were looking for opportunities not to the Balkans but to the east, and were as innately expansionist as the army, even if their conception of expansion was commercial rather than territorial. The truth seems to be that Russia, whether military or civilian, was going through a period of blurred vision.
Japan for her part had also been expansionist though she was not ready to challenge Russia until 1904. She had marked out for herself under the treaty of Shimonoseki a vast area of the south of Manchuria and, while she had been deprived of this by the actions of the three powers, it was presumably still within the 'sights' of some at least of the Japanese leaders. Japan had acted discreetly during the far-eastern crises of 1898 and 1900. She had however been gaining ground on the Russians, both commercially and militarily, in Korea in the years after 1900. She was as much feared by the Chinese and the Koreans as were the Russians. Indeed in Seoul Japan was probably more terrifying. None the less the Japanese entered into negotiations with Russia in 1903 in good faith, hopeful of limiting Russia's encroachments in the area. Although it is unwise of the historian to speculate about hypothetical questions, it is possible that, even if Russia had made concrete concessions over either Manchuria or Korea — which of course she did not — Japan would still have made war in the end though it might not have come as soon as it did. The fact was that Japan herself had ambitions in the area. The older Japanese political leaders like Itō, who still accepted a subordinate role for Japan in world affairs, were not prepared to endorse actions which would lead to the fulfilment of these ambitions at this stage, and were strong enough to control the crisis of 1903-4. But the time would come when they no longer dominated the Japanese stage. Even if the Russo-Japanese negotiations had come to some acceptable formula, it is possible that it might not have lasted very long.
Japan could justly claim in her White Book that she was to some extent operating in February 1904 in the interests of China and Korea. She could also believe that she was acting in accordance with the (unexpressed) wishes of the United States and Britain by taking steps to cut Russia down to size in east Asia.15 She could argue that, while the three Open Door powers were enthusiastic about giving advice to China, only Japan was sufficiently resolute to confront Russia herself in the interest of all three. Japan could further claim that she had been willing to resolve the issue in an amicable spirit but that the Russians had proved to be impossible to negotiate with.
Japan has to bear an awesome responsibility in two respects. Firstly she was the first to declare war. This she did as a conscious act. To be sure, the tsar had given instructions that Russia was to be careful not to do anything that might be interpreted as a declaration of war or as an excuse for the other side to declare war. But the fact was that Japan was ready and willing — and first. She felt that her friends would be understanding about the declaration if they heard the full story of the many months of frustrating negotiation which had produced no tangible result from the Russian negotiators. Secondly, she executed an act of war before the actual declaration of war had been made. This point has already been argued. While the Japanese were convinced of the necessity of this act, most of the powers — even the sympathetic ones — looked askance at it.
In the Japanese view of things, the main justification of the war was Russian expansionism and intransigence during negotiations. But there can be little doubt that Japan was not simply defensively intentioned and that she wanted a stake in Korea for herself and, from her Korean foothold, wanted a share in the Chinese cake as it crumbled. In the hypothetical eventuality that Russia had offered concessions, it is doubtful how readily they would have been accepted unless they had been of overwhelming proportions. Both belligerents had designs on territorial expansion in Manchuria. Japan fought both to curtail Russia's retention of the south of Manchuria and to protect her own interests in Korea and China with a view to replacing Russia in Manchuria in the long term. Considering the sense of threat that she felt from the eastward penetration of the Russian railway system, she was remarkably patient in negotiation. Perhaps it was this patience which led the Russians to conclude that the Japanese were not serious about making war, not determined enough. Misconceptions exist in all countries before wars break out. Japan did not err by deliberately creating a false impression. It was Russian blindness which failed to detect Japan's war-mindedness which other countries saw quite clearly.
Compared to the Russians, the Japanese services were ready for hostilities. They chose the time for opening hostilities in the light of their military and naval position. The initiative was theirs; they chose the ground and the pace of the war. Surprise was an important weapon in their armoury. There were of course faint hearts. Among the top leadership the navy was not prepared to be pushed into a precipitate war, nor was Marshal Yamagata fully confident of victory. But massive strategic preparations had been made since the summer of 1903 and at lower levels there was confidence. At the same time the Japanese were not looking far ahead so that they did not consider the problem which became paramount in 1905: what would happen if Japan was so successful that she defeated the Russians decisively and could not pursue them because of shortage of manpower and armaments? A foreign observer writing in 1904 foresaw this dilemma:
One cannot seriously believe that Japan would ever invade Manchuria, unless, indeed, she be caught by the madness with which the gods first visit those whom they wish to destroy; but if ever her army did occupy Moukden she would only find another Moscow in the ancient capital of the Manchus, and when all is said and done what would be the use? She could never hope to hold the Liao valley for ever against Russia .... The conclusion is that as far as Manchuria is concerned, Russia is even now more or less invulnerable.16
In the planning that took place, these remote possibilities were not explored. Japan's military planners were preoccupied with finding beachheads in Korea and Manchuria.
Japan's population of 45 million was mentally prepared for war against Russia. The press and through it the public had a fair idea of the negotiations which had been proceeding and were much more bellicose than the government. Indeed the ministry had to restrain the people from its enthusiasm for war by painting a deceptively favourable impression of the progress which negotiations were making. It had to preserve this front because the elder statesmen were not persuaded of the need for war until the end of 1903. Undue enthusiasm for war was held in check among the military and the people because of these elder statesmen who tried not unsuccessfully to keep the situation under their control.
War is not made by abstract, impersonal forces. It is necessary, therefore, to look at the men behind the Russo-Japanese war on both sides. Fortunately we can deal briefly with the Japanese personalities involved since an excellent study by Professor Okamoto has already appeared in English on this subject.17 It is desirable to mention those who were behind an early war and those who exercised a restraining influence.
Those who were prepared to accept the necessity and the risk of war were the army, the cabinet and some sections of public opinion. Within the army there had been long-term hostility to Russia; but the actual planning of a war did not take shape before 1903 and is associated with the figure of General Kodama. There were, however, tensions within the army between the cautious General Ōyama, who as a genro came under the influence of Itō's persuasive arguments, and those who wanted to take up arms before the rail network gave Russia too great an advantage. But even Ōyama as chief of the general staff had come round to accepting as a long-term strategic objective Japan's absorption of Korea within her empire.
Through the figure of General Katsura himself, the army had some leverage within the Katsura cabinet. But Katsura was a cautious military bureaucrat. The pace towards war would probably have been slower if it had not been that the strongest and most competent member of his cabinet was Foreign Minister Komura. Before entering the cabinet he had been a diplomat, specializing in China and Russia. As a minister he resisted the influence of the inner clans, Satsuma and Chōshū, and contested the interference in government of the elder statesmen, especially Itō and Inoue. Opposed to political parties, he tended to find his friends among members of the Kokumin Dōmeikai and even made contact with the right-wing Kogetsukai through his underlings, Yamaza Enjirō and Honda Kumatarō.18 It would appear that, unlike most Japanese diplomats, he had a conception of war as an instrument of his political strategy. While he behaved quite properly in the conduct of his negotiations with Russia in 1903, it is unlikely that he thought that there would be a peaceful outcome.19
Those who discouraged the idea of war with Russia — or at least of an early war — were Itō Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru, who affected decision-making through the body of elder statesmen. As we have seen, they had advocated the need for an entente with Russia in order to settle the problem of Manchuria from 1901 onwards. While they were as determined to take Korea for Japan, they were prepared to make a trade-off with Russia over Manchuria, which was in their eyes less vital for Japan and not worth fighting for. Komura and others with like views did not feel that Japan's national interest could contemplate a separation of Manchuria from Korea. Outpointed by the genro in political gatherings, Komura spent the second half of 1903 in negotiations with Russia in order to please the elder statesmen but was probably sceptical that his talks could succeed. Hence the atmosphere of Japan in the year before war broke out was one of division and discord. These served as a brake on the aspirations of the early war party.
The issue was resolved early in the New Year when Itō, the leader of the peace party, lost confidence in the good faith of the Russian negotiators. He came round to the view that war was inevitable. In an account of the failure of the negotiations between Russia and Japan, he explained his position thus:
Undoubtedly Russia's aim had from the start been to increase her naval and military forces and to ignore Japan's demands, thus securing her ambitions in Manchuria and Korea without opposition. This being the case, if Japan had not stood up for her threatened interests by force, she would ultimately have had to take orders from a Russian frontier potentate. This would have meant that we were fiddling while Rome was burning.20
He expressed it later in a letter to the British foreign secretary: 'The high-handed policy of the Russian Government of late has obliged us to begin to think seriously of our future safety .... I need only assure you that we have tried our best for the maintenance of peace and that we had [sic] failed.'21 As a result of this conversion, the anti-war group dispersed. While there were differences of emphasis thereafter, they were of a less fundamental nature.
As Itō's opposition melted, restraint was advocated from another quarter, the navy. It was not that the navy was opposed to the taking of Korea in general or the army's plan for a continental expedition to Korea in particular. It did however insist that Japan should try to ensure command of the seas beforehand. The navy was determined not to be taken for granted. There was a long history of army-navy tension of which this was only the latest example. The army, because of its dependence on the navy for transports to convey troops to Korea and Manchuria and for naval vessels to escort them there had to wait until the navy declared the moment right for starting the operation. Meanwhile the foreign ministry had to spin out the negotiations. Because of the strong personality of the navy minister, Admiral Yamamoto, the army had no alternative but to accept him as the pace-setter.22
Although it had no effect on the actual outbreak of hostilities, we should record among the forces for restraint the activities of the pacifist groups in Japan. In general popular opinion was strongly anti-Russian and favourable to war. There were hardly any supporters for chambers of commerce or merchant houses who pointed out the disadvantages and risks of war for Japan. The pacifist wing was a still small voice. The newspaper Yorozu Chōhō contained from the time of the Boxer uprising onwards a number of articles which justified pacifism and criticized the warrior tradition. The editor, Kuroiwa Ruikō, accepted articles of a controversial kind from Christians like Uchimura Kanzō and socialists like Kōtoku Shūsui, who came out in opposition to war. In October 1903 when sales began to suffer because of the unpopularity of the anti-war articles, Kuroiwa altered the paper's policy in favour of the war effort. The anti-war writers resigned from the company and set up immediately a new paper, Heimin Shimbun (Commoners' News) which tried to reverse the tide of war fever which was engulfing the Japanese islands. When it continued its attacks on the war policy of the government after fighting began, the government tried to close the paper but it obtained a reprieve in the courts from the press law. It was not until January 1905 that Heimin Shimbun, the mouthpiece of the socialist anti-war message for just over one year, discontinued publication.23
It is hard to make an assessment of the role of the tsar and to disentangle his views from those of his servants. The impression that comes through from foreign correspondents who entered into his family circle is of a warm and sympathetic man. Wide in his international interests for family reasons, he was diligent over diplomatic reports and kept a close check on the conduct of foreign affairs. He was so sensitive and religious that he detested the idea of war and violence. The tone of the minutes of council meetings over which he presided is peaceful. Yet, while he was not warlike, he was in general inclined towards expansionism in Asia. It is hard to reach any conclusion other than that it was he who opposed concessions or reconciliation on the part of Russia which would have prevented the outbreak of war with Japan. Valentine Chirol of the London Times who was privy to much of the information circulating in the British Foreign Office, was probably expressing a well-informed opinion when he wrote: 'That the Tsar himself — still entirely dominated by Alexeieff — had been throughout and is today the head and front of the war party is to me beyond doubt .... Like many very weak men, Nicholas II is sometimes mulishly obstinate, and he sees visions! a very dangerous foible in an autocrat.'24 How the war party or the military party operated — if indeed they existed — is not something that is easy to analyse, any more than it is easy to estimate the influence that the grand dukes exerted over the tsar. Living at Tsarskoye Selo outside St Petersburg, he was more vulnerable than most to the narrow circle of associates which surrounded him. Nicholas was proud of his position at the head of the armed forces and could on occasion be disdainful of civilian opinions when they contradicted military ones. He was conscious of being the autocrat of the Russias; and there are grounds for believing that he could be unyielding and uncompromising when it came to discussing Russia's interests and dignity as he conceived them to be. Thus, he probably favoured holding the line in both Korea and Manchuria in the fateful summer of 1903.
Naturally, whenever a country is involved in a war which is unsuccessful and full of humiliating defeats, there is great back-biting and mutual criticism. Certainly Russian officials made errors of omission and commission. Let us look first at those most implicated in the far-eastern establishment, whether at St Petersburg or at the periphery at Port Arthur or at the legations in the far east.
First place must go to Alekseyev, the laird of Port Arthur, of whose personality there is remarkably little in foreign memoirs. Spring-Rice refers to him in the words of Satow as the 'bluff and hearty Admiral Alexeiff to gratify whose ambition ('and that of a few more') they had been spending a huge amount of money.25 A protégé of the grand dukes, Alekseyev had been appointed commander of the Pacific squadron in 1895 and was given the extra assignment of the governorship of the Kwantung leased territory three years later. During the Boxer emergency he was made an army corps commander, thus combining military, naval and civilian ranks. Ambition he may have had but there seems to be evidence that he did not want the greater powers which were conferred on him in August 1903, when the tsar appointed him viceroy of the Far Eastern Provinces. Nor is there evidence that he was adventurous. He appears to have been highly suspicious of Bezobrazov and his group and of Minister Pavlov and his set of entrepreneurs and to have restrained their actions. He was, however, a believer in holding Port Arthur so that he was several degrees more expansionist than Kuropatkin who wanted to pull out of the south of Manchuria which he regarded as indefensible. From the standpoint of the Russian drift towards war, the main criticism of Alekseyev is that he bungled the negotiations with Japan by guiding the Russian side of the negotiations in a direction that the Japanese could not remotely accept. When negotiation failed and war approached, he may have contrived to hold up reports from Lessar and Rosen which drew attention to the dangers which Russia was running by risking hostilities with Japan.26
In this Alekseyev must be partnered with Rosen who must be judged an enigmatic character. We know from Griscom's memoirs and from MacDonald that Rosen was a pleasant person and well liked by the Japanese. We know from his autobiography that he was not liked by Lamsdorf and probably Witte with whom he had disagreements on policy.27 He was a party to all the important committee decisions on far-eastern policy in 1903 both in St Petersburg and at Port Arthur. He was called for consultation with Alekseyev in September and himself conducted the intricate discussions with Komura in October and November. He tells us that Komura only lost his cool once. This may have misled him about the temper of Japanese opinion. Certainly he cannot escape blame for failing to alert either Alekseyev or St Petersburg to the seriousness of developments at the end of the year. MacDonald in another letter wrote that he had been interested to read that Rosen had
said the Japanese had gone quite mad with war fever and would listen to nothing. This is quite untrue; Rosen was convinced that the Japanese were bluffing and would not fight. He said to his great friend in Tokio —the Doctor of this Legation — 10 days before the war broke out — 'we had only to mobilize one Division and the Japanese will climb down'. This friend who is a German and who has lived 30 years in Japan said to him the Japanese would most assuredly fight. But [Rosen] would listen to nobody.28
This evidence, though admittedly hearsay evidence, seems to confirm what seems plausible from other evidence, namely that Rosen had a complacent view about Japan's capacity and Japan's intentions.
It was with some astonishment to Rosen that he was received on his return home with hostility at the foreign ministry but with signal evidence of favour from the tsar himself. While this may have been due to Rosen's services in staving off the crisis with Japan, it was more probably due to the fact that the emperor was going through a phase of coolness towards Lamsdorf at the time. It was with even greater astonishment that Japan learnt that Rosen had been appointed as ambassador to Washington in 1905 in advance of what was to be the important peace conference at Portsmouth. He was relatively successful in this post and stayed on at the embassy until 1911. Rosen saw that Russia's destiny lay in the development of Siberia and in her relations with Asia. This perception arose from his special experience in these areas and his corresponding lack of experience in Europe.29 But he did not press this world view aggressively on his government for he was timid in advice. He was shrewd in judgement and remained popular with his diplomatic colleagues in Tokyo.
When we pass to Korea, the key figure was supposed to be that of Minister Pavlov. While Russia's star was supposed to be receding in Korea, Pavlov seems to have considered it to be his role to keep it shining brightly and to achieve this by any means. The Japanese considered his methods to be objectionable. There was firstly the tension over Masampo; then Russia's scheme for Korea's neutralization — a concept which was intolerable to Japan; and finally the single-minded pursuit of the Yalu concessions. He was certainly a thorn in the flesh of the Japanese. He was not prepared to accept a secondary role for Russia — in this he was supported by many Russians — and was a difficult person to deal with.30 British observers seem to have shared Japan's views of Pavlov; and it may be instructive to quote the assessment by John Jordan, the minister, of his responsibility for the Japanese invasion of the peninsula:
Pavlov is in my opinion largely responsible for what has taken place. He had trod very heavily upon Japan's tender corn — Corea — and treated very cavalierly all the courteous overtures that were made to him to smooth matters by letting Corea open the Yalu. My firm conviction is that had Russia kept in Seoul a man of Waeber's temperament, her position here would not have suffered and things would never have come to the present pass. She has courted the arbitrament of war where time and quiet methods were all in her favour.31
This seems to be a fair indictment, though it is tinged with some anti-Russian bias.
Over Manchuria and China we need mention only Lessar, Planson and Bezobrazov. Over Manchuria they did not count for the decisions were taken from Port Arthur by Alekseyev and his circle. This at least was the judgement of British Minister Satow, who argued that the Russians had blundered badly in taking things out of Lesser's hands to put them in the less experienced hands of Alekseyev. But Lessar, though brilliant, was a dying man and was not able to find a solution to the Manchurian problem.32
Many would give Bezobrazov pride of place in this roll-call. From Kuropatkin in his Zapiski through Glinskii, the biographer of Witte, to Romanov and later Soviet historians, the authors have blamed him for sinister activities in the east and malign 'influence' with the tsar at home. In particular, he worked with the tsar's blessing for the extension of Russia's influence on the Yalu and in Korea and for a firm rejection of Japanese opposition. By his own boundless energy, he was able to promote his schemes both in the capital and in the east. With some adroitness he managed to insinuate his cousin, Admiral Abaza, into court circles and into the office of secretary of the so-called far-eastern committee. While the committee was a non-starter, Abaza was able to establish a role for himself as its senior official. In many studies General Bezobrazov is the main scapegoat for Russia's expansion. In the period of his maximum influence from November 1902 to August 1903 there is no doubt that he planted the idea of expansionism in Korea and Manchuria, which was continued by other hands after his retirement. But the fact is that he was out of power at the time of negotiation and did not influence its course. On 14 January 1904 he left St Petersburg to join his family in Geneva, scarcely the action of an ambitious man, greedy for power in an approaching war. On the critical issue which led to war-Japan's insistence on assurances over Manchuria — Bezobrazov had no voice (though he doubtless had views). To say that Bezobrazov caused the war would surely be a misjudgement; to say that he contributed to the failure of the Russo-Japanese negotiations in their early stages would not be an exaggeration.
Of the St Petersburg advisers of Nicholas II, we must observe the triumvirate Lamsdorf, the diplomat, Kuropatkin, the general, and Witte, the Finance minister forced into retirement. Though there was internal bickering between them, they had some mutual respect and tried to reach a consensus, for example against Bezobrazov, the outsider. But it was still possible for the tsar to 'divide and rule' and get his own way with them. Against Count Lamsdorf the greatest accusations have been made by Rosen: 'It has been the cruel fate of our unfortunate country that the headship of ourforeign department should have been left to purblind incompetence and pompous self-sufficiency.'33 This was a general complaint from someone who was not a well-wisher. Rosen also added a specific complaint, namely that Lamsdorf withheld from Alekseyev the news of the rupture of relations between Tokyo and St Petersburg and thus contributed to the losses of the Russian fleet outside Chemulpo and Port Arthur and to Japan's gaining command of the seas. Though this accusation was common knowledge in the Russian capital, Lamsdorf survived. Yet there is evidence that the tsar cooled greatly towards him during the war period. It would appear that this may have been due to these criticisms.
Foreign diplomats had mixed feelings about Lamsdorf. In his favour, it was agreed that he was hard-working, knew his job, had accumulated an abundance of experience over forty years and was affable and conciliatory. Against him, it was alleged that he was devious, lying, evasive, mystical. All these qualities have been illustrated in this study when on countless occasions he denied the existence of a Russo-Chinese treaty over Manchuria. Perhaps a more serious underlying complaint was that he did not defend his corner: he allowed the emperor to alienate the foreign ministry's power to Alekseyev in August 1903 with disastrous effect.34 Thus the Russian institution most sensitive to peace had no strong voice during the critical months.
Where Lamsdorf was reticent, Kuropatkin was vocal, a great writer of reports, letters and diaries. Written privately, they have been published and are an essential source for this whole period.35 Kuropatkin's remarkable career owed much to his popularity which carried him through as Lamsdorf was carried through by his timidity. Kuropatkin was expansionist and a believer in armies and railways. But he was a cautious professional who was no believer in war for the sake of glory. As war minister, he was a party to Russia's decision to occupy Manchuria in 1900. Indeed, he thought it a divine opportunity. But when it ran into resistance he had second thoughts. Alone among the top Russian leaders (apart from the tsar himself), he had visited Japan and formed a high opinion of the army he had seen there and of the navy at Nagasaki. He was therefore a cautious voice in the councils at Port Arthur (July) and St Petersburg. Soon after his return he reaffirmed the opinion that Russia should develop in northern Manchuria and should therefore withdraw from the south; but this never became orthodoxy; and the negotiations with Japan were conducted on a different basis. Kuropatkin always claimed along with Lamsdorf that he had argued against war. Whereas Lamsdorf was low in the ladder of influence with the tsar, Kuropatkin was at times relatively high. Yet he did not succeed in impressing the emperor with a sense of urgency. Almost incredibly he became army commander early in the war (March), determined that he would retreat to the north until reinforcements came. But this course of action led him to one of his disagreements with Alekseyev until the latter was forced to resign in favour of Kuropatkin as commander-in-chief. Kuropatkin himself lost the battle of Mukden in March 1905 but asked to become a corps commander under the new commander-in-chief, Linievich. After the war he was to become administrator of central Asia. So he too, like Rosen and (for a short term) Lamsdorf, continued in the service of the tsar. They survived the ignominy associated with taking Russia into an unsuccessful war, as could only happen in an autocracy.
What was Witte's relationship with the outbreak of war? In a technical sense there was none. He was out of power, fulminating in retirement with a sinecure that gave him honour without influence. Yet, as chairman of the council of ministers, he was still a formidable political figure; when he spoke, it was with authority. On the other hand, he was no longer the indispensable force in Russian decision-making. But the roots of the war went deep into the soil of the 1890s when Witte was the most prominent national leader: 'a man who has for over ten years faithfully and truly served the autocracy with the full force of his natural abilities and all the experience he had brought over from the private-capitalist "camp" ... the actual guiding spirit of Russian diplomacy in the far east'.36 His policy of peaceful expansion into Manchuria was only marginally different from that of the 'military party': they were prepared to use force and to pursue expansion into Korea. Witte had created the railway as a commercial outlet; others were carrying it forward for objectives unintended by him. The other accusation was that made by the disillusioned Kuropatkin writing his campaign report in 1905 on the lost war. In considering various causes of unpreparedness for war against Japan, he made a bitter attack on Witte for his parsimonious financing. In due course after it had been published, Witte prepared a stinging defence of himself.
A tell-tale factor about the energetic Witte in his unwelcome retirement was his desire for self-justification. Brooding, intriguing and scheming, he developed an obsessive desire to vindicate himself. Charles Hardinge of the British embassy described how 'he fishes for his own advantage in troubled waters and he is likely to stir up the mud until his position is assured'. And again:
Witte himself is very anxious to convince foreign public opinion that he is in no way responsible for the Manchurian adventure. He asked me the other day if I would give a copy of a telegram which O'Conor (a former ambassador) sent reporting an interview with him in which he described the Manchurian adventure as a bêtise. There is no doubt that, whatever may have been Witte's original views, he was responsible for the sinking of vast sums of money in Kharbin, Dalny and elsewhere and did his utmost to make the Manchurian bêtise a success.37
There is much justice in Hardinge's assessment: Witte could not disclaim having some responsibility.
The men of Japan made war, not confidently but deliberately. They were cool and calculating, not bloodthirsty or emotional. The men of Russia — the tsar and his ministers — were not at all lovers of war. They hoped that they could secure their objectives by peace and certainly did not think that there was a high risk of war started by Japan. Untested in recent wars, they had no reason to doubt their capacity, even in a colonial environment. The person who held the unenviable office of tsar had the supreme power and had to make the decisions. There was a signal lack of coordination in the advice he received from the military and civilians on key issues; and he became the victim of cliques. Although shrewd and conscientious, Nicholas II was unsure of himself and, faced with the terms presented by the Japanese, he sanctioned an unconciliatory line of approach which doubtless gave him a false feeling of strength. He maintained an unyielding posture throughout the months of negotiations and did not show any awareness of the dire consequences to which this policy would lead. Nicholas was not alone in his blindness. The machinery of state was quite inadequate to deal with the affairs of empire in Europe and the vast empire in Asia at the same time. The experiment of decentralization by leaving critical decisions to Admiral Alekseyev was disastrous and had to be reversed in January 1904. But even the shortcomings of the imperial system in coping with the events of 1903-4 were not remedied after defeat in 1905.
Cecil Spring-Rice described the Russo-Japanese war as 'a preventible war'38 into which the Russians slid unconsciously. This is easy to write; but it is difficult to imagine an acceptable solution to the problems at issue short of near capitulation by Russia. Yet it is something to which the historian must address himself seriously. Let us take a final overview of the issues on which common ground could not be found.
Over the basic problem of Korea, the Japanese defined their position very clearly. In the cabinet resolution of 30 December 1903, it was agreed:
It is inevitable that we should keep Korea under our thumb by force whatever happens but, as it is desirable for us, if possible, to justify our actions, we should try to conclude an offensive-defensive alliance with the Koreans or a treaty for their protection as was done during our war with China (1894-5). We have been taking steps to prepare the ground for such treaties and will continue to do so in future. We cannot, however, be sure that we will manage this; and, even if we do succeed, success will ultimately rest on military force, since the Korean emperor cannot be relied on to comply with such treaties. Our Korean policy, in short, depends either directly or indirectly, on conducting military operations and must be determined in accordance with military criteria.39
While no mention of Russian activities is made in this resolution, it is clear that Japan wanted supremacy in the peninsula and would only achieve it by removing Russian influence from the court and the territory as a whole.
Korea had been a Russian appendage for almost a decade. The Russian position on Korea is very hard to define because it was a subject of divided opinions. In St Petersburg there was the division between the expansionists and the others (including expansionists who had no interest in Korea). There was also the division between European Russia and the frontiersmen, including entrepreneurs like Ginzburg and diplomats like Pavlov. Whereas Russia had entered into several treaties with Japan giving the Japanese more and more say in the peninsula, there was no diminution of activity on the part of Russian functionaries in Seoul. Her agents, taking advantage of the anti-Japanese feelings in Korea, were always exerting pressure in Seoul to obtain fresh concessions in the north or the south of the country. The scholar, Romanov, considers Korea not to have been regarded as one of Russia's significant national interests and implies that it could have been dispensed with. But the archives in European Russia may be misleading on that point; the situation on the ground suggests that it was a vital national objective. It is hard to imagine Admiral Alekseyev giving in over Russia's right to the passage of the seas around the south of Korea or the tsar over-ruling him about this. Basically it suited Russia to keep the peninsula divided.
Over Manchuria, there was a divided house in both countries. In Russia there was the 'Kuropatkin school' which wanted Russia to hold on to the defensible north and the 'Alekseyev school' which wanted to maintain Russia's existing position in both north and south. In any event these disagreements need not concern us further since both groups in Russia considered Manchuria to be a matter for discussion with China but not with Japan. This excluded the possibility of compromise over the Three Eastern provinces.
Over China, Japan proclaimed that her prime object was to bring within her sphere of influence the southern region adjacent to Fukien province. But this was a low priority compared to improving her position in Korea. She was not talking about seeking a sphere of influence in Manchuria at this stage. As early as 30 December, the cabinet recorded that 'it is advantageous to confine the area of fighting to one region .... Manchuria will have to be the frontline'. But it was equally of interest to China to get the Russians out of Manchuria. The cabinet concluded that 'the present leaders of China are divided between those who favour coalition with Japan and those who wish to maintain neutrality and will thus be unable to make up their minds if the Russo-Japanese negotiations break down'.40 On balance, it was better for Japan that China should remain neutral.
The Japanese military leaders were ready to invade Manchuria and had no thought of confining their operations to Korean territory south of the Yalu. This suggests that Manchuria was a prime object of Japan in going to war. For some Japanese, a major concern was revenge against Russia for the Three-power Intervention of 1895 and the object was the recovery of the Liaotung peninsula and the expansion of markets there. Certainly Japan was closely preoccupied with the schedule of Russian troop withdrawals from the Three Eastern provinces. As against that, the more influential statesmen, and especially the elder statesmen, were reluctant to take the risks involved in going to war with Russia and wanted to use Manchuria as a trade-off for improving Japan's hold over Korea. But Itō mentioned only Korea at the time of his abortive visit to St Petersburg in 1901 and Izvolskii at the Tokyo legation was preoccupied with schemes for Korean neutralization. Hence the possibility of trading off Russia's dominance in Manchuria for Japan's dominance in Korea really never became a talking-point.
If the two sides could not find an agreeable basis for compromise, it is hard to see how the war can be described as 'preventible'.
In its origins, the Russo-Japanese war stands in interesting contrast to other wars. It was not the result of economic pressures, for example the scarcity of resources for the number of people. Certainly Japan was the initiator: she also suffered from a shortage of raw materials and a rapidly growing population. But Korea was not sought for her raw materials or as a place to locate surplus population. Nor was Manchuria at this stage a place for great overseas settlement by Japanese or indeed of great commercial activity (if one excludes Niuchuang). Nor can one say that Japan was in a state of social distintegration and was seeking war as a way of diverting attention from domestic problems. There was not in 1904 an appeal to xenophobia or nationalism or war-lust on the part of the Japanese people in order to deflect them from thoughts of poverty, revolution or political discontent. Certainly Japan was suffering from teething troubles over the activities of political parties; but it would be a distortion of the facts to suggest that resort to war was intended to divert the people from insuperable political difficulties. By a paradox, Russia, it could be argued, was in a state of social disintegration. But there is no evidence that this prompted the tsar to look to war as a way of uniting the nation. A war in far-off Manchuria did not initially have much impact on European Russia. While the war became popular in Japan, there is little evidence that it ever was in Russia.
The decision for war in both countries was taken on a narrow basis and probably owed most to strategic considerations. It was not taken as the result of nationwide emotion for war. The factors which seem to have weighed most were security and fear of armament policies on the part of the other party. These weighed most because in both countries the military-naval authorities had a considerable say in the decision for war, the Kodama group in Japan and Admiral Alekseyev in Russia. These fears were in some respects justified. Both countries had increased their military and naval strength over a decade. The Japanese feared the increase in Russian power in east Asia since 1900, especially after the railways came into operation. Some Russians did record Japan's military growth but the general reaction of the Russian military seems to have been to discount her army and navy. In retrospect it would appear that Japan exaggerated the potential menace of Russia's military and naval power in 1903 or it may be that she merely professed to do so for propaganda purposes. Her sources of intelligence information were very comprehensive and accurate. But elements of distortion crept in since it was necessary to sell the idea of war to some of the top leadership. Russia of course had sources of information; but for some reason which is not clear she was not so skilful in evaluating Japan's strengths and weaknesses. It is doubtful whether Russia could have learnt more since the Japanese military were intent on keeping their preparations secret.
Inextricably linked with strategic considerations was the question of alliances. The Russo-Japanese war took place at the height of the secret alliances in world history. But it would be wrong to imagine that the Franco-Russian alliance or the Anglo-Japanese alliance caused the war. The European allies of the Russo-Japanese belligerents were the main external supporters of their allies but did not wield control over them in either case. Indeed it can be argued that the Anglo-Japanese alliance narrowed the scope of any war. Lord Lansdowne argued that 'although not intended to encourage the Japanese Government to resort to extremities, [it] had, and was sure to have, the effect of making Japan feel that she might try conclusions with her great rival in the Far East, free from all risk of a European coalition such as that which had on a previous occasion deprived her of the fruits of victory.' [my italics]41 Japan feared above all the reappearance of the Russo-German-French coalition of 1895 which was prevented by the British alliance and the Anglo-French ententes. She could take her decision for war with a fair prospect of a straightforward two-party conflict. The events of 1895 with which this study began hung like a cloud over the events of 1904.
1. By 'Red Book', I refer to 'Malinovaia Kniga' (literally, Crimson Book).
2. A. N. Kuropatkin, Zapiski (1909), translated as The Russian Army and the Japanese War; S. Yu. Witte, 'Explanations about Kuropatkin's version of the Japanese War' (1911).
3. The English language version of the Japanese White Book was widely distributed throughout the world.
4. Suematsu Kenchō, The Risen Sun (London 1905), p. x.
5. The standard work is Matsumura Masayoshi, Nichi-Ro Sensō to Kaneko Kentarō.
6. NGB, Nichi-Ro Senso, vol. 1, no. 529, Motono to Komura, 7 Feb. 1904: 'Tendency of public opinion in France is generally against us. Although I am doing my best to attract French public opinion to our side, it seems to me of urgent necessity to defend ourselves in a manner suitable to our position before the world.'
7. Asakawa Kanichi, The Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 349.
8. Two obvious weaknesses of the Russian position were the poor communication between the two groups of troops in Primorsk and Liaotung; and the icing of Vladivostok, the far eastern headquarters, despite the use of powerful icebreakers.
9. d'Anethan Dispatches, p. 158.
10. Spring-Rice to Roosevelt, 4 Feb. 1904, Spring-Rice Papers.
11. Witte's analysis was 'at the start of the war there was a flash of patriotism (in many cases artificial). If the war had ended in a few months, it would even have strengthened the Russian spirit .... But the war has gone sour ... and now all the leading intellectuals and many others have gone against it'. 'Perepiska S. Iu. Witte i Kuropatkina', in Krasnyi Arkhiv, 19 (1927), p. 74. Certainly revolutionaries rejoiced in the war, hoping that they could make capital out of it.
12. S. Gwynn (ed.) The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, vol. 1, p. 405.
13. Ibid., p. 402; I. I. Rostunov (ed.), Istoriya Russko-Iaponslcoi Voiny, p. 34.
14. Kuropatkin, 'Dnevnik' in 3 parts, in Krasnyi Arkhiv (1922-25).
15. 'The war in the Far East was not in reality a conflict which had arisen merely out of a dispute between the two combatants. It was rather to be ascribed to the general revolt of all the civilized peoples of the earth against the perfidy and insincerity of Russia, who for many years past has sought to outwit and overreach the other Powers. It was because Japan felt all along that her interests, more than those of any other country, were involved ... [that she] resolved that she would take up the cudgels, and was content to do battle with Russia single-handed, in advance of the other nations whose prospects were similarly jeopardized.' Suematsu Kenchō, The Risen Sun (London, 1905), pp. 90-1.
16. H. J. Whigham, Manchuria and Korea.
17. Okamoto Shumpei, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War.
18. Okamoto, 'A phase of Meiji Japan's attitude toward China: The case of Komura Jūtarō'.
19. In answer to Galperin's claim that Komura was not negotiating seriously, it seems that he did try to make a success of the negotiations (even if he was despondent) and to keep down the temperature of public opinion while talks were proceeding.
20. Itō, 'Nichi-Ro Kōshō Ketsuretsu no Temmatsu' in Zoku Itō Hirobumi Hiroku, p. 166.
21. Itō to Lansdowne, 9 Feb. 1904, FO 800/134.
22. From Dec. 1903 to Feb. 1904 Yamamoto was the critical decision-maker. Japan, Navy Ministry, Yamamoto Gombei to Kaigun, pp. 155-211.
23. Nobuya Bamba and J. F. Howes, Pacifism in Japan; Okamoto, Oligarchy, pp. 93-4.
24. Chirol to Morrison, 24 June 1904 in Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison, vol. 1, 265-6.
25. Satow to Spring-Rice, 11 Jan. 1904, in Gwynn, op. cit., p. 392.
26. Sanderson to Scott, 24 Feb. 1904, Scott Papers 52,299.
27. L. Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, p. 204.
28. MacDonald to Hardinge, 18 Jan. 1905, Hardinge Papers 7. 'Rosen was an enigma to me for why, he did not warn his people to be prepared for serious trouble I cannot make out. Personally I liked him very much but the lady was a holy terror.' MacDonald to Hardinge, 30 June 1904, Hardinge Papers 3.
29. Rosen, Forty Years, vol. 1, pp. 205-6.
30. d'Anethan Dispatches, pp. 158, 173.
31. Jordan to J. D. Campbell, 15 Feb. 1904, Jordan Papers 3.
32. Gwynn, op. cit., p. 392.
33. Rosen, Forty Years, vol. 1, pp. 241-2.
34. A damaging criticism of Lamsdorf was that he allowed policies to be pursued behind his back with which he disagreed.
35. Kuropatkin, 'Dnevnik,' appeared in three large slabs in Krasnyi Arkhiv (1922-5).
36. B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, pp. 256-7.
37. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 4 Jan. 1905, and to T. H. Sanderson, 12 April 1905, Hardinge Papers 6.
38. Gwynn, op. cit., p. 405.
39. NGNB, vol. 1, cabinet resolution, 30 Dec. 1903.
40. Ibid.
41. Lansdowne to the king, 18 April 1904, FO 800/134.