Russia had acquired specified rights and unspecified privileges in both Manchuria and Korea. She was to build on these in company with her partners of 1895 during the crisis in east Asia at the end of 1897 and the beginning of 1898. These events, like all events in history, were affected by the personalities of the politicians involved and the struggles between them. It is desirable, therefore, that we should first take a look at some of the domestic changes which had taken place in Russia and Japan.
Tsarist government, unlike that of Japan, was not subject to the quick change of its cabinets. It was, however, swayed by changes in the tsar's advisers. After the sudden death of Prince Lobanov-Rostovskii in August 1896, there was no candidate available who was acceptable to all the parties as foreign minister or at all comparable in personality to the dominating Lobanov. In April 1897 the choice fell on Count Mikhail Muraviev, who had been counsellor at the Berlin embassy (1884-93) until he had fallen out with the kaiser and had then been posted as ambassador to the small but influential court at Copenhagen (1893-97). The new arrangement was that he should hold office along with Count Vladimir Lamsdorf as deputy minister. Lamsdorf had been the anchorman at the ministry under Lobanov and M. N. de Giers before him, and was renowned as a conscientious, devoted but self-effacing official. Muraviev had little direct knowledge of east Asia and had to play himself in. Lamsdorf for his part also knew little of the east but had long experience at the ministry and had a reputation for following moderate policies in the light of international opinion.1 If anything, there was an inclination on the part of both to look at the far east in terms of European 'higher diplomacy', in which they were more experienced.
The new partnership came to power at a time when Sergei Witte, the self-confident finance minister (1892-1903), was in the ascendant. For the diplomats, this aggravated the problem of where the writ of the finance ministry ended and that of the foreign ministry began. That dividing line was particularly hard to establish in east Asia where railway diplomacy was the primary activity. This led to ups and downs in relations between Muraviev and Witte and numerous attempts by one to out-manoeuvre the other. Though Muraviev was a comparative newcomer to the St Petersburg scene, he was well known to the court and had good relations with the tsar. Thus, he was sometimes able to carry policies against the opposition of Witte, even in the far eastern field. Muraviev was not universally regarded as being up to his new office and, inexperienced as he was, he was probably unsure of himself and jealous of rival influences. Earlier in his career he had had a reputation for being a bon viveur; but after he became foreign minister he seems to have moved much less in society.2
Muraviev had inherited a diplomatic team in the east who were ambitious for Russia. From an earlier generation, Count Cassini, minister in Peking from 1891 to 1898, was appointed ambassador to Washington. His place was taken as charge by Aleksandr Ivanovich Pavlov, a former naval officer who had acted as Cassini's private secretary. Weber, who had for ten years been head of legation at Seoul, stayed on alongside Aleksei de Speyer because of the unexpected turn of fortune which had brought the Korean king to the haven of the Russian legation. Although he had served off and on for a long time in Tokyo, Speyer was anxious to leave no stone unturned to improve Russia's position in Korea. The move of two younger men to the eye of the storm did affect Russia's approach to the courts of Peking and Seoul and certainly marked a tougher attitude at the periphery.
The place of the tough-minded Khitrovo in Tokyo was taken by Roman Rosen. He had served in Tokyo from 1877 to 1883 and was appointed from a post in Belgrade in June 1897, reaching Tokyo in August. On appointment he prepared for Muraviev a note in which he warned Russia with the 'heaviest and most unanswerable arguments' against the possibility of war breaking out with Japan. His criticisms were directed at the war ministry and its policy of encroachments, especially in Korea. Rosen claims to have persuaded Muraviev to his views and ensured that the memorandum was presented to the tsar. Perhaps this is a sign that Muraviev was coming round to a policy of concentration on Manchuria rather than Korea.3
Japan's reaction to the crisis was determined by the state of disarray in which her domestic politics were during the winter of 1897-98. At every stage of the oncoming crisis the ministries were so preoccupied with internal argument and financial crises that they could not seriously consider intervening in international affairs either by themselves or in company with others. Since 1896 a coalition cabinet had been presided over by the experienced elder statesman, Matsukata Masayoshi. He had difficulties with both his coalition partners, the Shimpōtō (Progressive party) and Jiyūtō (Liberal party), and positively lost the support of the latter in November 1897. When the Diet met in the following month, the opposition put forward a motion of no confidence and the Diet had to be suspended. The ministry resigned on 25 December but a new cabinet could not be formed till 12 January 1898. The choice fell on the elder statesman, Itō Hirobumi, who was expected to offer strong leadership. But the new prime minister devoted his main attention to preparing for the general election which was scheduled for 15 March. It will be clear that this was not a time when the government could be expected to take important initiatives abroad, though it had of course to attend to the sentiments of a noisy public opinion.
The foreign minister of the day was Nishi Tokujirō, a Russian linguist and former student of the University of St Petersburg. From 1886 he had acted as minister to Russia for ten years and witnessed a series of crises at first hand. As an accomplished diplomat, he served as foreign minister at the end of Matsukata's term and succeeded into Itō's. While he could not be described as pro-Russian, he was more sympathetic to Russia than the majority of Japanese. He was deeply disillusioned about the state of Japanese politics. His feeling was that, until Japan sorted herself out economically and politically, there was little scope for her to aspire to a high profile in world affairs: hence this was not a time of active initiatives abroad.4 Japan became an unobtrusive observer rather than the spearhead of action that she had been three years before.
In the aftermath of the Triple Intervention, Germany had been planning to establish a coaling station in east Asia. Surveys had been made and proposals were first put to the Chinese government in December 1896. It seems that the Germans had decided tentatively on Kiaochow bay. The problem was that the Russians were thought to have 'priorité de mouiller' (priority of anchorage) there; that the Russian fleet had used it in the winter months; and that — but this was rumoured only — a port there had been promised by China to Russia. With these factors in mind, the German emperor went to St Petersburg for discussions in August 1897 and obtained an impression that the young tsar had told him that Russia's interest at Kiaochow would only last until she acquired a port somewhere to the north and that he would not stand in Germany's way. Other accounts suggest that the tsar made no secret of the fact in private conversation that 'if the Kaiser had desired to make himself unpopular at Petersburg he had been very successful'. This seems to imply that there had been some unwelcome browbeating by the kaiser of his cousin and that the tsar had resisted, knowing the kaiser's unpopularity in Russia. When Nicholas next met the kaiser at Darmstadt and Wiesbaden on 18-19 October, the kaiser again broached the matter and thought he had obtained even more positive approval.
The German fleet was instructed to proceed to Kiaochow on 6 November, using as a pretext the fact that two German Catholic missionaries had been recently murdered in Boxer troubles. When Nicholas was asked for his formal sanction, he replied on the following day that he could neither approve nor disapprove, since the harbour had only been Russia's temporarily in 1895-96. The German action had been taken without advance approval and before this damaging message was received. It appears that behind the scenes the Russians were furious, feeling that they had been hoodwinked and let down. Muraviev protested vigorously and concocted a claim to Kiaochow, based on the use Russia had made of the anchorage in 1895-96. He added menacingly that the commander of the Pacific squadron would send his ships into Kiaochow if Germany sent her squadron thither. Germany was appalled by the 'insolent tone' Muraviev had adopted; but the disagreement was slowly patched over.5
On 14 November the German squadron entered Kiaochow bay. China reacted to Germany's action in the only way she knew, by calling on Russia to neutralize and discourage the Germans. When news reached Peking that the Germans had landed at Kiaochow, Li Hung-chang issued under the Russo-Chinese alliance of 1896 a direct invitation to Russia to occupy temporarily a Chinese port as a countermeasure to the German action. When Muraviev received this information from Pavlov, he prepared a lengthy memorandum in which he advocated accepting the Chinese invitation but disapproved of taking the port of Fusan, recommended by the navy, and suggested the acquisition of a port on the Liaotung peninsula, preferably Talienwan or Port Arthur (Lushun). When this was sent to the tsar on 23 November, he replied that the ice-free port chosen should be either on the Liaotung peninsula or in the north-east corner of the Bay of Korea. By this time Muraviev had conceded Kiaochow to Germany.6
The tsar quite properly convened a conference of affected ministers to discuss the various proposals which were in the air. At the meeting on 26 November, Muraviev developed his arguments but found he was opposed by the finance and navy ministers. Witte opposed the recommendation to take compensation for Kiaochow on the ground that it would be improper for Russia, which had undertaken to defend China's integrity against Japan, now to appropriate Chinese territory. Expressing the naval line, Admiral Pavel Tyrtov, the director of the navy ministry, was doubtful whether Port Arthur would satisfy the needs of the Pacific squadron and still considered the ports of southern Korea more suitable, while realizing that it was not an appropriate time to acquire them. He therefore counselled that no action be taken. Though supported by war minister Petr Vannovskii, Muraviev had been opposed by the giants. The conference decided not to occupy Port Arthur or any other port. The tsar accordingly accepted this recommendation.7
Muraviev thought that a great opportunity had been lost. He reverted to the matter in conversation with the tsar, informing him that British ships were operating near Talienwan and Port Arthur and suggesting that Russia should seize the ports before Britain did. The Chinese had allegedly warned him of this danger. Senior army officers were in favour of occupying them. The tsar therefore gave his sanction. On 11 December Muraviev informed the Chinese that Russia would accept the Chinese invitation and send a squadron of ships to Port Arthur. This represented a clear change of plan. Witte was highly incensed with the foreign minister and the tsar and, as was his wont when his advice was not taken, spoke indiscreetly to foreign diplomats. His world-view of the Russian railway had been rejected in a short-sighted gesture. He predicted dire consequences would result from this action. The Russian squadron reached Port Arthur on 19 December. The kaiser was quick to offer his congratulations, thus indicating that German—Russian tensions had been resolved without recourse to war. Moreover, from the Russian side, their public communications were modest and full of good intent. The conduct of the naval commander at Port Arthur, who insisted on not landing his troops, suggested that the Russian presence at the port was purely 'temporary'.8
Because of the vagueness of Russian intentions, it was hard for other powers to make any response. The British sent ships to Chemulpo and Port Arthur in ways that Russia found to be menacing; the Japanese did likewise. But Lord Salisbury, the British foreign secretary, gave the assurance that the British ships had not received orders from home and would be withdrawn shortly. Britain and Japan were content with an observer role. The Japanese troops over the water at Weihaiwei were viewing the Russian movements vigilantly — and the German movements equally and at close quarters. Japan had upwards of 4,000 troops in Shantung who were legally entitled to stay there so long as the indemnity due her by China remained unpaid. The Japanese fleet was moreover on alert at Tsushima. Thus, Japan was not without bargaining counters in her dealings with Russia.
The proceedings of Germany and Russia caused a great deal of excitement in Japan. With her armies in Weihaiwei, she did not welcome the German move at Tsingtao. But the Russian action at Port Arthur was several degrees more objectionable to Japan, because it menaced the territory which she had been forced to evacuate under Russian pressure three years before. Had the strength of public opinion been the sole factor, she might have protested. But Russia, in a message of 17 December, stated that her ships had anchored in Port Arthur with China's permission purely in order to resist the earlier German action. Foreign Minister Nishi took note of the statement and made no protest. But this was illusory. The Japanese army and navy leaders were not prepared to accept a diplomatic apologia over a port which had formerly been theirs. Also we know from the Japanese documents that the Japanese were highly suspicious. From Chefoo where they had a consulate, from Weihaiwei where they had troops and from the legation in Peking where Minister Yano was skilful at probing for information, Japan kept Russian actions under close scrutiny and appears to have been well informed about the goings-on at Port Arthur and Talien.9 Reports also told of the progress at Harbin where the headquarters of the Chinese Eastern Railway was being set up.
By the end of the year the Chinese were aware that their ploy of setting one barbarian off against another had failed. Some among them — the so-called Anglo-Japanese-American party — were hopeful of enlisting the support of Britain and Japan against Russia and Germany. The Yangtse viceroys, Chang Chih-tung and Liu Kun-i, were the sponsors of this tactic. But it held out few attractions for Britain because of European considerations; and Japan would not act on her own, though she was a force to be reckoned with.10
It would be easier for Muraviev to achieve some settlement over Liaotung if China were given a loan and paid off the final instalment of the indemnity due to Japan under the Shimonoseki treaty. This raised the question of the financial links between powers and their international rivalries. After hot competition the first payment had been made to China from a Franco-Russian loan for £16 million in June—July 1895. The funds were mainly raised in France and guaranteed by Russia; they were secured on the Chinese customs revenues and yielded 4 per cent interest; China undertook not to conclude a further loan for a period of six months. British banks and, more especially, German banks, which felt betrayed by Germany's Dreibund partners, opposed the Russian-organized loan unsuccessfully. But in March of the following year an Anglo-German combination arranged a second loan for a similar amount, again secured on the Chinese customs.
It became clear during December 1897 that China would need a further loan before the indemnity could be fully paid and the Japanese occupation armies could be removed from Weihaiwei. Intense lobbying developed between supporters of the Franco-Russian and Anglo-German groups. Although they were not involved in the financial struggle, the Japanese needed the money desperately for their reconstruction programmes and welcomed the prospect of the immense payment being made on time. One might say that, in order to resist the expected trouble from Russia and her friends, they wanted the indemnity funds more urgently than a base like Weihaiwei in the Yellow Sea. So far as the other powers were concerned, the existence of these delicate loan negotiations had its influence on any demands for Chinese territory. Until the Chinese leaders had decided in favour of one group or the other, it was inopportune for Russia, Germany and the others to make explicit demands from China for leases or concessions. There was therefore a period around New Year when political developments were held up, pending the outcome of financial negotiations.
When Li made the initial approach to Russia, he found the leaders divided. During the loan negotiations in December it was brought home to Muraviev that in matters financial he had to take a back seat to the ministry of finance and Witte. Witte agreed to take on the loan provided that Russia would have exclusive rights of railway building, etc. in Manchuria and would be given the right to build a port. Li Hung-chang, however, would not relinquish Manchuria to Russian hands nor would he offer Port Arthur, the port which he imagined Russia to have in mind. He had no hesitation in approaching the rival loan consortium. It was necessary, therefore, for Russia not to put a foot wrong and for the purpose behind the squadron wintering at Port Arthur to be left vague and uncertain. Hence Li was given an ambiguous assurance on 4 January that Russia had no immediate intention of making any territorial acquisition but relied on China's friendship to be offered a suitable port in the area and a railway linking the Russian lines to Chinchow. This statement was intended to be reassuring to the Chinese; but with the Russian squadron already at Port Arthur it was hardly the expression of Russia's intention to withdraw as Malozemoff implies.11 The statement may have been framed with a view to reassuring China of Russia's peaceful intentions; but it was hardly likely to strike China's statesmen that way.
Russia's appeal for continued solidarity with the Germans and French had also fallen on deaf ears. While the French were presumably prepared to back the China loan if Witte had successfully negotiated it, the Germans were disillusioned with Muraviev. Instead the German bankers continued the cooperation with the British bankers who had operated together in the China loan field since 1895.
China, confronted by tough terms from both groups of creditors, asked Japan on 2 February to agree to the postponement of the final instalment of the indemnity. But Japan immediately refused. It has to be assumed that she was not sufficiently worried by a possible Russian presence in Port Arthur for her to retain her garrison in Weihaiwei: she needed the money more than a garrison in the area of conflict. The Anglo-German loan agreement which had been initialled on 21 February was finally concluded in March, thereby ensuring that the funds were made available for Japan, whose forces were withdrawn in May when the territory was transferred by lease to Britain.
The way was now clear for Russian action. The German lease of Kiaochow was concluded on 6 March for ninety nine years and consummated with the visit to China of Admiral Prince Henry of Prussia in April. Early in March, therefore, the Russians asked pointedly for the lease of Port Arthur and its environs, about which they had been hinting for some months through Hsu Ching-cheng in St Petersburg and others. Russian military operations cleared Port Arthur and Talienwan of Chinese soldiers and sailors on 16 March. They asked for the same terms as Germany had received. Eventually China signed a treaty on 27 March after daily negotiations at the Yamen. It conferred on Russia the lease of the harbours of Port Arthur and Talienwan for twenty-five years (less than had been granted to Germany), with a neutral zone along the frontier of the leased territory. Port Arthur was to be an exclusively naval port closed to the vessels of other nations, while Talienwan (except for an inner harbour to be reserved for naval use) was designated as a trading port, a free and open port which was less convenient to trading countries than a treaty port. (By article VI it was laid down that a customs house be opened under Russian management at Talienwan.) The treaty extended the concession granted to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company in 1896 to permit the construction of a branch line from that line to the leased territory. China was to retain sovereignty over the lease, though civil and military administration was to be in Russian hands. Li had to overcome opposition from the empress dowager and others over these concessions and was, it is alleged, induced to do so by reason of a substantial bribe from Russia.
An Additional Agreement of 7 May 1898 set out the boundaries of the lease and its neutral zone. The terminus of the new branch railway was to be at Port Arthur or Talienwan and at no other port in the peninsula. Various other provisions prevented any other national from acquiring rights or privileges. In other words, Russia by the second treaty obtained something approaching monopoly rights in the southern half of Manchuria.12
The position in the neighbourhood of Port Arthur was defined in two further treaties. On 6 July the Chinese Eastern railway entered into an agreement with China for the construction and operation of the line contemplated from Harbin to the leased territory. On 11 August 1899 the tsar announced the building of a modern port at Talienwan to be called Dalny (lit., 'far away') and confirmed that it was to be free and open. Clearly Russia had procured the ice-free port that she sought.
These changes were significant and of course unpopular in the rest of the world. Sir Robert Hart of the Chinese Customs, who was no mean observer, said that the Ching government was in effect under a Russian protectorate and that the concessions obtained by other powers paled into insignificance by comparison with the terms which Russia had extracted.13 The other powers reacted in the weakest way possible by making demands from China, rather than opposing Russia directly. True enough, there had been a battle over the loan to China; but over the concession there was no overt action, though a certain amount of covert pressure was placed on the Yamen. Without positive promises of foreign support there was little resistance that the Chinese could make. At a popular level too there was evidence of hostility and jealousy abroad. Thus on 11 June in Nagasaki there was a set-to between Russian and Japanese seamen, which was thought to derive from popular emotions over the Liaotung peninsula and Russia's actions there.
Successful as Muraviev's bid for the Star of Empire was,14 it was by no means unopposed in Russia. There were indeed several options open to Russia and at the conferences held over the winter months to find a consensus to put before the emperor there were frequent debates over whether to take a lease (which was deemed to mean territorial annexation) or merely extract railway privileges. Each course was equally imperialistic. In fact, Muraviev went ahead in the face of hostility from Witte, from the admiralty who probably wanted Masampo but were indecisive, and possibly even the army and General Kuropatkin. By March the others rallied to Muraviev's lead when they saw that the Chinese had obtained their loan elsewhere. But they were later to remind Muraviev of his 'folly' in insisting on Port Arthur.15
Russia realized that Japan had a strong sense of grievance over her acquisition of Port Arthur. Naturally she tried to insulate herself against Japanese 'opposition' until the lease had been clinched with China, so that Japan could not pull strings at the Chinese court. Rosen, the minister in Tokyo, felt that Russia's purpose could be achieved by making concessions to Japan in Korea. Muraviev may also have favoured this view and been prepared to cut down Russia's commitments in the peninsula; but his bona fides cannot be satisfactorily tested. At all events the two external powers in Korea began to negotiate early in the new year.
Fortunately for Russia, the government in power, presided over by Marquis Itō, was probably more inclined to find a peaceful solution with Russia than any which held office in our period. It would be unfair to call Itō — as some Japanese were inclined to do — pro-Russian: but he and his foreign minister, Nishi, had a great fear or respect for Russia and were more ready to trust her word than most Japanese leaders. It was also fortunate for Russia that Itō's bureaucratic cabinet was squabbling with the up-and-coming party politicians over a wide range of issues, political and financial. This meant that Ito was anxious to avoid the sort of adventurist policy which had been adopted in 1894-95 when the issue of Korea and Manchuria had come up before. The watchword was 'safety first'. The Japanese, though they hated what was going on in Port Arthur, were not prepared to act alone against Russia and, though they explored possibilities, could not find any country willing to act with them over an issue limited to north-east Asia.
Outwardly the Japanese did not oppose Speyer or K. A. Alekseyev. Despite China's pleas, Japan had made no serious complaint about Russia's intentions over Port Arthur either. From St Petersburg the Japanese minister, Hayashi Tadasu, who had only reached there in May 1897, urged that this was a good opportunity for Japan to consolidate her position in Korea by obtaining Russia's recognition for it. Muraviev had asked him on 7 January whether they could reach some arrangement to avoid complications there. Foreign Minister Nishi agreed to enter into a new treaty over Korea. On 16 February Hayashi gave the Russians an outline for a new agreement. A month later, Muraviev returned a counterdraft, promising that Russia would not intervene in Korea or interfere in Korea's domestic concerns.16 This was a considerable volte-face from the forward policy being currently pursued in the peninsula by the Russian minister, Speyer. But Russia was not sufficiently interested in Korea to sustain the ambitions of the man on the spot. Instead Muraviev, who had no knowledge of east Asia, was content to treat Korea merely as a pawn on an international chessboard, dominated by European kings. Accordingly the military instructors to which Yamagata had taken such exception and the financial adviser, Alekseyev, against whom the Japanese had made no protest, were withdrawn in March. The Russo-Korean bank which had been set up with a flourish the previous autumn held over its operations. Evidently Muraviev was pursuing his 'Port Arthur first' policy and was prepared to sacrifice the forward policy in Korea to that end.
Naturally the Russian position was a surprise to the Japanese leaders. But it accorded so well with Itō's own hopes that it was taken seriously. At all events, Russia's moderation over Korea was one among several factors preventing Japan from intervening over Port Arthur. It was not the sole one. Itō's cabinet was unstable and, even after the general election on 15 March had given it victory, it was still prepared to turn a blind eye to Port Arthur.
The Japanese initiative appeared to get lost in February. To be sure, it was taken up by Russia but without much enthusiasm or speed. When it arrived on 17 March, the Russian counterdraft suggested that Russia was not really in such a placatory mood, but was more concerned with winning time. Nonetheless, despite its election victory, the Ito ministry was inclined to do a deal with Russia. Ito's thinking was that Korea had always been a stumbling-block between the two countries so long as Russia was searching for an ice-free port; but Russia's penchant for Port Arthur was welcome in so far as it might remove a formidable cause of friction between them. It was at this time that Japan first formulated the doctrine of Man-Kan kōkan (exchange of Manchuria for Korea). On 19 March, therefore, Foreign Minister Nishi handed over the following note to the Russian minister:
The Japanese government is not unwilling to conclude a self-restraining understanding with the Russian government. That is, it would not be unwilling to undertake mutually to recognize the autonomy and independence of Korea and not to interfere directly in the internal affairs of that government. But the case may arise when Korea will need the advice and assistance of foreign countries. If one or other of the two governments does not give it, Korea will inevitably ask some third country. This is basically undesirable in the interests of our two countries. Accordingly the Japanese government is of the opinion that the obligation of giving advice and assistance should most appropriately be borne by Japan, considering her territorial propinquity to Korea and her present interests there. If the Russian government agrees with this view, the Japanese government will recognize Manchuria and its coastline as being beyond the sphere of Japan's interests.17 [my italics]
This was an offer based on a modified form of Man-Kan kōkan: while Japan promised to 'disinterest' herself in Manchuria, Russia was not to be required to 'disinterest' herself in Korea. It was equivalent to applying a policy of spheres of interest to north-east Asia. While Muraviev with his 'Port Arthur first' doctrine may have been favourably inclined, the Russian military was opposed to making any concessions over Korea for fear of the effects on the security of the Maritime Provinces. The Russian reply was therefore a polite refusal.
The sphere-of-influence formula clearly did not appeal to Russia. Once the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan was in the bag on 27 March, the Russians became distinctly less forthcoming in their assurances to the Japanese. Nishi was told of the lease by Minister Rosen on 29 March. Soon after on 2 April Rosen reported to Nishi that his government could not agree to exclude Russian power completely from Korea, though it was delighted to hear that Japan considered Manchuria and its littoral to lie outside her sphere of interests. Nishi, we are told, heard this reply with a wry smile.18
This presented the Japanese cabinet with a dilemma. A lengthy session of the cabinet was held that day to discuss whether to pursue negotiations with the Russians now that Man-Kan kokan had been rejected. It decided that Japan had no option but to pursue the necessary steps for what she could dredge from them. But they had to consider some of the contrary views that had been coming in, like those of Hayashi. On 26 March Minister Katō in London had sent on an elaborate memorandum attacking Russia's southern advances and the notion of a Russo-Japanese understanding, even if one could be reached. Instead he appealed for serious consideration to be given to an alliance with Britain as a counterpoise to Russian expansion.19 It was rejected at the cabinet on 2 April. But it may have had an effect on the other decision taken on the request of Britain for Japan's agreement to Britain applying for a lease on Weihaiwei when Japan pulled out her troops thence after she had received her indemnity payment from China. The Itō cabinet duly gave its blessing to this proposal. Japan's decisions on that day represented an attempt to balance her approaches to Russia and Britain.20
Despite her disappointment, Japan persisted with her negotiations on the Russian terms and clinched an agreement with Rosen in Tokyo. The Nishi—Rosen protocol which was signed on 25 April 1898 is so important that it is reproduced in full (apart from the preamble):—
The new protocol which made no mention of Manchuria aimed at reaffirming the balance between Japanese and Russian rights in Korea. It therefore improved the standing of Japan against that which she had in practice enjoyed over the past two years and which had been laid down in the Weber—Komura and Yamagata—Lobanov protocols. It could not of course be interpreted as a Russian pull-out. But it suited the thinking of Prime Minister Itō who wanted to avoid any confrontation with the Russians — a view which was shared in essentials by Foreign Minister Nishi. So Japan had to be content with the practical concessions given in clause 3, which gave the green light to Japanese companies desiring to develop their enterprises in Korea. It was an example of low-posture diplomacy on the part of Japan. Considering that Russia had embarked on the talks in a mood of offering compensation for her gains at Port Arthur, she did not greatly diminish her position in Korea. To that extent it amounted to a negotiating victory for Muraviev. But the talks were shrouded in secrecy and only insiders on both sides knew the details of the protocol.21
Taking together developments in Manchuria and Korea, Russia had gained and Japan had lost. There were various defences which the Itō ministry put up against the attacks it received for mishandling the crisis. One was that Japan had originally received enticing promises from Muraviev and Rosen. W. L. Langer justifies Muraviev's action in a typically realpolitik way by saying that the Russian foreign minister 'embarked boldly upon the only sound procedure, buying off the Japanese [over Port Arthur] by making concessions in Korea'.22 But, as soon as he reaped his reward in China, Muraviev appeared to the Japanese to have gone back on his word. Russia had come forward with no real concessions for Japan in the Nishi—Rosen protocol, while she herself emerged with substantial strategic, political and commercial gains from the spring crisis. Bearing in mind the humiliation Russia had inflicted on Japan in 1895 over the tip of south Manchuria, the conduct of Russia's ministers in 1898 was very insensitive.
The other defence of Itō's position was that he was taking the long view. Japan could not, he believed, defeat Russia in arms so Japan's primary aim should be to keep the peace as long as possible. The new feature of the 1898 crisis was Ito's conversion to Man-Kan kokan, a doctrine very different from the course of action which Japan had adopted in 1894 and 1895. Under it Itō was not going to make a fuss over leases which Russia acquired at Port Arthur and elsewhere, provided Russia gave similar undertakings over Korea. In 1898 Russia would not admit any intention of disinteresting herself in the Korean peninsula. But it was still open to Japan in later years to raise the formula with Russia, even though it had been rejected in 1898. Itō and a number of diplomats like Tsuzuki Keiroku and Kurino Shinichirō were enthusiastic supporters of this doctrine. But it was a minority view; and the army and many in the foreign ministry were opposed. It is doubtful whether Japan would have declared indefinitely in the future that she was 'disinterested' in Manchuria or accepted compensation for turning a blind eye on events in Manchuria by improving her position in Korea. Still, in the state of Japan's defences in 1898, and her political chaos, there was something to be said for Man-Kan kōkan.23
1. Dnevnik V. N. Lamsdorf (Moscow 1926 and 1934).
2. Scott to Salisbury, 27 May 1898, Scott papers 52,297: Muraviev 'is evidently not regarded in influential circles, or even by many of his subordinates, as being as yet quite "a la hauteur de la situation".'
3. R. Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, vol. 1, pp. 145-6 (hereafter cited as Forty Years).
4. Nishi to Katō (London), 18 Feb. 1898, NGB 31/I, no. 338: 'Since things are all going badly in the political and economic fields here, I have hardly any strength left to deal with affairs abroad.'
5. N. Rich and M. H. Fisher (eds), Holstein Papers, iii, nos. 636 and 639; Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904, pp. 97-8.
6. Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 99.
7. Ibid., pp. 100-1.
8. Ibid., pp. 101-2; S. Iu. Witte, Vospominanya, vol. 1, pp. 120-4.
9. Taguri to Komura, 4 Jan. 1898, NGB 31/1, no. 195.
10. G. E. Morrison, who was an acute commentator, thought that Japan could take on not just Russia but France and Germany as well.
11. Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 103.
12. Ibid., pp. 104-5.
13. Hart, in J. K. Fairbank et al. (eds), The I. G. in Peking, vol. 2, no. 1112.
14. Hart to J D. Campbell, 5 Dec. 1897, in J. K. Fairbank et al. (eds), The I. G. in Peking, vol. 2, no. 1090:"The Star of Empire' glittering in the East is distinctly Russian.'
15. Scott to T. H. Sanderson, 30 June 1900, Scott papers, 52305; Witte, Vospominanya, vol. 1, pp. 131-3.
16. NGNB, vol. 1, p. 186.
17. NGB 31/I, no. 583.
18. G. A. Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, vol. 2, p. 809.
19. Katō, 'Teikoku seifu no hōshin taidō', 26 Mar. 1898, in Itō Masanori, Katō Takaaki, vol. 1, Tokyo 1934, pp. 292 ff.
20. I. H. Nish, 'Japan and China: the case of Weihaiwei, 1894-1906', pp. 29-35.
21. Rosen described the protocol as 'lame and pointless'. Forty Years, vol. 1, p. 159.
22. W. L. Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, New York 1951, p. 471.
23. Itō, Katō, vol. 1, p. 29: 'The crumbling of Japan's foreign policy-making is accounted for by four flawed pillars: party controversy; financial problems; the Russophil views of the Elder Statesmen; and Itō's penchant for extreme caution.'