The Peking protocol was signed on 7 September. In accordance with it, the allied troops evacuated the Forbidden City ten days later. Within a month the Chinese court left Sian in order to return to Peking. These factors all seemed to foreshadow a new attitude on the part of the Chinese. The move to Sian had been presented as a visit of inspection to one of the provinces; while the court was there, it made frequent calls for 'no surrender'. For it to have accepted the protocol and to have embarked on the homeward journey so quickly seemed to be a hopeful sign. In fact, however, the court took its time over the return in the manner of a medieval circuit and did not reach the capital till 7 January 1902.1
The need to restore the normal situation was urgent in the eyes of the Russians. Where the powers as a whole had been able to make peace with the Chinese for the province of Chihli, Russia should be able to make a new approach to the Chinese leaders over Manchuria on a bilateral basis. It was necessary to test the likely response of China after the Peking protocol.
Russia had modified her position during the summer. Witte, who had long taken the categorical position that the annexation of Manchuria by Russia would be no solution to the problem, devised a phasing for the evacuation of troops from the area on 24 June. This was a breakthrough from previous negotiations and was to anticipate the formulae which Russia would henceforth put forward. But would a formula on these lines commend itself to Kuropatkin, the minister of war who was most affected by the Manchuria débâcle? Witte expected the support of Lamsdorf who had been a fairly consistent ally until then. A conference was held on 11 July at which the chief of the general staff, Witte and Lamsdorf were all agreed that it would be preferable from their own standpoints (whether political, military or financial) to restore the Shanhaikuan-Yingkow railway to the Chinese owners and withdraw Russian troops from the west of the Liao. The verdict of the three ministries was approved by the tsar on 18 July.2 As the next step, Lamsdorf asked his colleagues whether Russia should retain the rest of Manchuria or merely hold one of its provinces. He also asked Izvolskii and Giers on 30 July what would be the effect on China and Japan of'an official announcement by Russia that she intended to add Manchuria to her possessions'. In a supplement two days later, he added that Russia had no intention of repudiating the promises given earlier that she would withdraw her troops from Manchuria as soon as normality returned to China, provided the actions of the other powers or China did not obstruct her. There were certainly elements of uncertainty and prevarication in the statements which Lamsdorf was making. His representatives on the spot tended to confirm that Russia should evacuate her troops though without making it absolutely clear from how much of Manchuria. On 7 August Izvolskii warned that Japan would go to war if Russia should annex Manchuria but she would in time grow accustomed to 'an established fact' though occasional periodic outbursts in favour of war and joint protests with other powers were only to be expected.3
On 1 August Lamsdorf wrote to the other ministers:
The presence of our troops in Manchuria and the numerous measures that have to be taken by the War Ministry in evacuating that country, connected with the guarding and fortification of certain coastal and frontier stations, and by the Finance Ministry with regard to various questions connected with the construction of the railway, so complicate the general situation that at the slightest lack of caution on the part of the local Russian authorities, one may expect Japan at any time to take active measures . . . If our military and naval position in the Far East is considerably weaker than that of Japan, it would be extremely advisable to take steps to bring the forces of the pri-Amur district gradually and cautiously into full readiness for emergencies . . . The best way out of present difficulties would be as soon as possible to carry out the tsar's will and prepare to evacuate Manchuria before international pressure forces that course upon us.4
The response of his colleagues was guarded. Witte considered that a complete administrative and military evacuation was essential and that railway guards would be enough to ensure the railway's security. This was a solution which suited his own ministry and was a return to the preBoxer situation. Kuropatkin, however, urged neither annexation nor complete withdrawal of troops. He argued that the Amur river was an unsatisfactory frontier against China's inroads because roads were lacking and inadequate for defence and that Russia should create from northern Manchuria either an independent state or a province nominally subject to China but in practice under her influence on the same lines as the state of Bokhara. In order to avert international opposition to such a step, he recommended the immediate restoration of Mukden (Fengtien) province and part of Kirin province while holding on temporarily to the north. This course was supported neither by Witte, who never welcomed counter-proposals, nor by Lamsdorf who, like the chairman he so often was, did not make clear where his own views lay. He tended to preside as a neutral between two strong-minded ministers who were deeply involved in the Manchurian situation.5
Witte had meanwhile evolved a new scheme tor dealing with the evacuation of Manchuria. While there should be official negotiations between Russia and China for the restoration of the provinces, there should also be indirect negotiations between the Chinese government and Pozdneyev, the representative of the Russo-Chinese bank in Peking and a staunch ally of Witte. In return for concessions over evacuation, China would give the Russo-Chinese bank large-scale mining concessions in Manchuria. This would enable Witte to balance his budget over the Manchurian railway through the private enterprise of the bank which was in his control. But he reckoned without Chinese hostility.6
The position on the spot bore little resemblance to the debates going on in St Petersburg. Whereas the triumvirate were all agreed on some programme of evacuation, this message had not penetrated through to the men on the frontier. For example, at the treaty port of Niuchuang (Yingkow), where the triumvirate were agreed that it should be restored to China and Russian troops evacuated, there was no sign of this in the reports of the foreign consuls. The port was in effect in Russian occupation. This was a paradox because the Russians had handed over the government of other towns in Manchuria to the Chinese but continued to hold (of all things) a treaty port under a Russian civil administrator. So far as customs duty at the adjoining port of Yingkow was concerned, it had to be collected by Russia for the time being; and this seems to have applied to Chinese transit dues like li-kin. Admiral Alekseyev had worked out an ambiguous arrangement with Sir Robert Hart (for the Imperial Maritime Customs) whereby the commissioner would conduct the customs business, while the Russo-Chinese Bank would accept the moneys in trust for the Chinese government of the day.7 Duty payments were to be made to the Russo-Chinese bank which had become the bank of the civil administration and the Manchu governor-general of Mukden was encouraged to have dealings with that bank for his administration. Extensive quarters were being constructed adjoining the terminus of the Shanhaikuan-Niuchuang railway for the use of Russian troops. The Russian flag flew over the forts and public buildings; and the Russian customs flag flew over the customs buildings and other craft.
It was the conclusion of the Japanese, the British and the Americans that the Russians intended to hold on to the administration for some time to come. This is not to say that the administrator was unaccommodating to foreign interests; he recognized that foreign countries had treaty rights which he undertook to uphold; but there was no sign of any willingness to depart or expectation of evacuation. It was clear to all outsiders that Russia was not acting in accordance with the Peking protocol and had no intention of doing so. In accordance with the complaints of British merchants at that port, the senior British naval officer at Taku authorized the gunboat Algerine on 27 October to stay at Niuchuang. The admiralty had strong objections to leaving a ship there for the winter on the ground that it was wasteful to tie up a vessel for a prolonged period. The government was inclined to agree but felt it had to be done.8 The Russians were furious and the new Russian minister at Peking, Pavel Lessar, at the request of Admiral Alekseyev, lodged a complaint on 8 November with the British authorities in Peking, on the ground that the presence of a British vessel would cause embarrassment and force the Russians to keep a vessel there for the winter too. Naturally Britain replied that Niuchuang was a treaty port and there was nothing strange in keeping a gunboat there in accordance with her rights. When this reached London, Lord Salisbury, the prime minister, wrote an important minute:
In view of what happened four years ago [1898], I do not think that after Russia's message we can safely remove the vessel. The commercial public opinion on the Chinese littoral is very mendacious and very malignant and we must count on their misrepresenting and distorting anything that we do ... The objections of the Admiralty are professional and of little value. They always have an objection to placing British vessels in any place where the F.O. wants them.9
After this uncharacteristic intervention, orders were given to send the Algerine to Niuchuang on 15 November for the winter and the views of the admiralty were overruled. Immediate action was necessary because navigation was about to close at the port because of icing up and it was essential to get the vessel in position. On 28 November the USS Vicksburg was sent by the Americans to winter there also and the Japanese acted likewise. This drew together the three Open Door powers and forced the Russians to be more sensitive over the treaty rights of other powers. The three ships were lodged in dry docks dug in the river bank in the Russian railway settlement. It was an expensive gesture; but the Open Door powers were determined to prevent Russian possession of Niuchuang.
The motives for this strong line were various. From the standpoint of the Japanese, the major traders in the area, the port of Niuchuang was the point of entry for her goods and it was essential that it be kept open and not subject to the obstacles and hindrances which might arise if the Russians established a monopoly over the port facilities. From the standpoint of the European powers, the key factor was the reopening of the Shanhaikuan-Niuchuang line to passenger traffic in April 1901. From this point the main route between Europe and Peking followed the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern railways, then the line from Harbin to Niuchuang, changing on to the Chinese line to Peking. If this route was to thrive, it was necessary that Niuchuang's status as a treaty port should be reaffirmed. Since the Russians showed no willingness to do so, men-of-war of the powers visited Niuchuang all summer in the hope of forcing home the message that there was going to be serious opposition to their permanent possession of the Three Eastern provinces. When, as was thought to be imminent, Sino-Russian negotiations were reopened, it was essential that both sides should understand that most of the world's powers had an interest in the place and that it was not a port purely of interest to Russia and China. If any Russian forward move was to be effectively challenged, some sacrifice had to be made. Hence the British, the Americans and the Japanese simultaneously but independently decided that their men-of-war should winter in the port, while conceding that it was a costly operation of doubtful effectiveness.
This came as no surprise to the Russians. Alekseyev had been reporting on intelligence he had been collecting about increased British activity in the sector Taku-Chinwangtao-Niuchuang. Indeed he had come across a rumour that Britain was arranging for the landing of a Japanese force around Chinwangtao. There is no confirmation of this in other documents; and it is only mentioned here to show the rumours which were circulating.10
When the Peking protocol was signed, talks began between Chinese and Russian delegates at Peking. On the Russian side it was left to Lessar to conduct the talks. He had reached Peking in twenty-one days from Moscow by the Trans-Siberian, Chinese Eastern and Chinese Extension (Niuchuang) lines on 12 September. Lessar was for some years to be counted among the most distinguished diplomats in the far east and had a much broader outlook than most Peking diplomats who were set in the table-thumping imperialist mould. As an official at the London embassy, he had been instrumental in bringing about the Anglo-Russian railway agreement in 1899. Dr Morrison, who rarely indulged in flattery, committed to his letters this assessment: 'He is infinitely superior to de Giers. The combination of Lessar, Kroupensky, Pokotilov, de Wogack and Baron Gunsburg is one very difficult to compete with. Lessar is indeed very clever.'11 Lessar brought to his new post negotiating skill and knowledge of far eastern problems.
The Russian terms were considerably reduced. To meet the objections of the powers, they no longer claimed a concession for a branch line to the Great Wall at Shanhaikuan. To meet the demands of the Chinese, they were ready to discuss a phased withdrawal. In discussion Li Hungchang asked for further concessions over troop numbers. Elaborate arrangements had been made for appropriate remuneration to be provided for Li who was regarded as the most amenable of the Chinese officials. Yet Li fought his corner tenaciously enough. The St Petersburg desire to evacuate primarily for financial considerations was not shared by Russians on the spot. The army, the railway officials and the bankers on the whole reported their belief that, if evacuation was carried out, the railway guards left would not be able to deal with attacks on the line from Chinese quarters. The other problem was that the longer the negotiations took, the more difficult would it be physically to carry out any pledge to withdraw troops according to a time-limit.
As in the previous case, the draft Russo-Chinese agreement reached Tokyo and London in umpteen versions from umpteen sources, each of which claimed to be 'authoritative'. Towards the end of October there was a strong indication that signature was imminent. Lamsdorf hedged and would not communicate a text to any foreign government while it was under negotiation, claiming indeed that the Chinese had come to him for a settlement, not he to the Chinese. Hence the only course of action left was for the powers to protest to the Chinese against the inclusion of any stipulations which were opposed to treaty rights. Since the Chinese were opposed to a revised banking agreement, they took advantage of the interest shown by the outside powers.
It was a less urgent crisis than had afflicted Katō in the spring. In the first place, the Russian terms seemed from the leaked versions to be more moderate. Secondly there seemed to be some evidence that the Russians were feeling the financial pinch of keeping so many troops tied down in Manchuria. There was therefore a notion that a moderate treaty was in Russia's long-term interest. But Witte wanted some banking agreement as a quid pro quo for the phased withdrawal of Russian troops. On the other side, it was already known in Peking that Li Hungchang was seriously ill. In irreverent mood, Francis Bertie wrote: 'Li Hung Chang is dying, peace be to his pigtail! But I suppose that some other subservient but not equally able servant of the Russian Government will be forthcoming in High Places in China.'12 This illustrates the consciousness of Li's strong commitment to Russia, but at the same time the strong respect for his abilities. In fact, he died on 7 November, working to the end. With him the existing negotiations over Manchuria lapsed. His successor was Prince Ching (I-k'uang) who was a lesser figure and had little claim to being a world statesman as Li was. Ching stayed away from the capital to make sure that negotiations dropped and, as he busied himself with the return to Peking of the Chinese court from Sian, he was not available for further talks.
Li Hung-chang has been an important figure in this study and his death was an important turning-point. He had received bribes from the special Li Fund and had more recently become the apostle of the reluctant acceptance of the Russian protectorate over Manchuria.13 His death was a great loss to the Russian interest; and he left no strong proRussian official as a successor. He had been at his desk up to thirty hours before his death, completely determined, as he had always been, not to let anyone else dabble in affairs while he was still able to cope. This is not to support the contemporary foreign view that he was merely a Russian stooge. Li was a formidable negotiator who recognized the weakness of the hand he had to play. It was his task to make the best of a bad job.
The breakdown in the Russo-Chinese talks was only a temporary one. When it occurred, the Russians announced boldly that, until there was a treaty, their occupation would be prolonged. In fact, however, things were moving adversely against them. On the one hand, even with the railways coming increasingly into operation, the provisioning of their troops scattered over a vast area was a major headache, especially when weather conditions were bad. On the other, there were the budgetary considerations which were the concern of Witte: it was desirable to reduce the cost of the Manchurian operation. In December, therefore, Prince Ching agreed to resume the negotiations with Russia. With the approaching return of the Court to the capital, it was desirable to regularize the position in the north-east and 'normalize' the situation there. The Russians still persisted with the demand for a banking agreement which held things up. Ching positively refused to countenance any such agreement and the issue was allowed to slip out of the discussions in January 1902.14
One of the most important events in the run-up to the Russo-Japanese war is the visit of Marquis Itō to Russia in November-December 1901. But Itō's journey to the major cities of the United States and Europe was on a vast scale and is part of global history. In this study we have for reasons of space to confine our attention to the visit to St Petersburg alone and the Russian reaction to the exclusion of other aspects of the trip.
Towards the end of August Itō announced his intention of visiting the United States in order to help him recuperate. When another of the genro, Inoue, heard this, he urged Itō to travel to Russia for conversations and sought to get the prime minister's approval for this. Katsura only promised to convene meetings of the cabinet and genro. At a meeting of the genro on 13 September, there was a rumpus between Ito and Yamagata who reminded him that, if he went to Russia, he must report to Tokyo and not run ahead to negotiate on his own. This was clear evidence of the widespread distrust of Ito's 'soft' views on Russia so far as they were known. So he did not receive any mandate from the government, though he was not discouraged from going. He set off on 18 September from Yokohama and travelled through the United States until he sailed from New York to Boulogne and finally reached Paris on 4 November. He was there paid every courtesy by the French government.15
Before his departure Itō had met Izvolskii who was overjoyed when he heard that Itō proposed to visit St Petersburg. Izvolskii had long held that, if there were to be negotiations, they were most likely to succeed with Marquis Itō. Itō's resignation as prime minister had been a bitter disappointment to him. Now that an initiative had evidently been taken from the Japanese side, Izvolskii's dreams were revived. The Russian foreign minister was similarly excited and sought the aid of his ally, the French.16 But it has to be remembered that the day after the elder statesman set sail, the new foreign minister, Komura, arrived and took office, uncommitted to whatever had been arranged with Itō.
With the British negotiations so far advanced, the Japanese leaders had to decide how to proceed with Itō's approach to Russia. On 20 November Katsura asked the elder statesman to go to the Russian capital without delay, thus reversing his earlier stand. Itō accordingly speeded up his itinerary and reached St Petersburg on the 25th. But he felt that some clarification was still necessary, in view of the requests he had received from the London legation to confine himself to 'a pleasure trip' or 'an informal exchange of views' in the light of the progress which had been made with the British alliance. Did Katsura share this view? In a message which reached Russia on 27 November, the prime minister asked Itō to confine himself to an off-the-record (zatsudan teki) exchange of views. Such language could only be rarely used to a genro. This suggests that Katsura was putting a partial damper on Ito's activities in St Petersburg.17
On the following day Itō was received most cordially by the tsar at Tsarskoye Selo. He was presented with the Gold Cordon of St Alexander Nevsky and urged by the tsar to return to Japan by the TransSiberian route. Lamsdorf also gave a state reception for Itō who could not have had warmer hospitality. But, in the absence of any clarification from Katsura, he deliberately delayed fulfilling the political purpose of his visit. He knew from telegrams received that his fellow-genro, Inoue, was arguing that Japan should only go ahead with Britain after Itō had found out how far Russia would give way over Korea; but that Katsura, Komura and Hayashi felt that this course was dishonourable. At all events, he declined to have political talks until some points were clarified.
Itō may also have become vigilant after an encounter he had with Major Tanaka Giichi, later to play an influential role in the 1903 crisis. Tanaka had been living in St Petersburg since 1898, not as an attaché but as a ryūgakusei, a student abroad. Since, however, he was aged thirtyeight and had the rank of major, it was likely that he was engaged in intelligence work. He describes himself at this period as 'rambō' (rowdy, violent, lawless) and 'hoju' (self-indulgent). As a clansman of Itō,hefelt bold enough to offer him his advice and, as one of Japan's few Russian experts, suggested that Ito drop his idea about 'Man-Kan kōkan' which would only play into Russia's hands.18
We have full accounts of the meetings on 2-3 December when Itō had his conversations with Lamsdorf and Witte in both the Russian and Japanese versions. Itō was not attended by anyone from the Japanese legation. Presumably the reason was that he did not want his conversations to be regarded as 'official' or authorized, while the legation had in any case been instructed to keep its distance. Instead Itō was accompanied by Tsuzuki Keiroku, who had earlier escorted Yamagata in 1896 and was described on this occasion as Itō's interpreter. Though Tsuzuki was not a professional interpreter, he spoke French and German. But it seems odd that Tsuzuki and Lamsdorf should not have carried on a perfectly good conversation in French, in which they were both proficient. But, whatever the difficulties in communication, the records of the two sides match quite well.
Lamsdorf was cautious, well-prepared and deflatory. His was the voice of a man who thought that time was on the side of his country because of the railway and there was no need to make concessions to the Japanese. Russia was content with the existing Nishi-Rosen note which conferred reciprocal rights in Korea. Hence the earlier roles had been reversed: this time Japan was seeking change and an improvement in terms, while Russia was content with the status quo. At all events, Lamsdorf, though he poured a douche of iced water on Itō's ideas in conversation, asked for a statement of his demands in writing, to which I to agreed cordially enough.
In marked contrast Witte was expansive and typically forthcoming. Russia sought nothing in Korea, he said, and was quite content to give Japan her head there. He mentioned that Russia had just declared that she would withdraw from Manchuria without fail: 'In Russia as in Japan there are those who declare that we must capture the whole world. In our army and navy those who have such ambitions are especially numerous. But our Government and Emperor do not think thus."19 In his bluff and hearty way Witte had highlighted one of the factors which Japan and Russia had in common: the difficulty of controlling the views and activities of the military abroad. Witte left the parleys to see Lamsdorf who had just had his weekly audience with the tsar. There was abundant consultation about Itō's ideas.
The nub of Ito's proposals which were written in English is the clause calling on Russia to recognize 'Japan's freedom of action in its political, industrial and commercial aspects and her exclusive right to help Korea by giving her advice ... and military aid' (my emphasis). His terms were entirely about Japan's demands in Korea and made no mention of Manchuria. Contrary to what might have been expected, there was no specific suggestion of Man-Kan kōkan. There can be several explanations for this: perhaps Itō was influenced by Tanaka and refused to put in writing Japan's true feelings about Manchuria; perhaps Itō, the experienced negotiator, set forth only Japan's initial bargaining position. Itō's concentration on Korea seemed to confirm the Russians in their existing view that Japan's objections were confined to that peninsula. So Lamsdorf in his preliminary reaction and later in his formal reply deals cursorily with Manchuria but emphasizes Korea and Russia's desire to share privileges there. Russia was not prepared to allow Japan political or exclusive rights there.
Conversation turned to how Russia's response could reach Itō. He was due to leave St Petersburg immediately after the meeting in accordance with his (for some reason not entirely clear) inflexible schedule. The elder statesman proposed that letters might be addressed to him in Berlin where he would be staying for 10-14 days. Lamsdorf asked how it would suit if he arranged further discussions in Paris. There then followed (in the Japanese account) whai was in retrospect an interesting fragment of conversation:
Itō: That would make it too late.
Lamsdorf: Is this matter as urgent as all that?
Despite this hint, Russia's foreign minister did not glean that it was a matter of now or never for him.20
Itō left Russia empty-handed and disappointed. He had no mission but he had a purpose that had been frustrated. He had however clearly exceeded the request of Katsura who wanted his trip to Russia to be the occasion of a casual exchange of views and not for the passing over of a set of written terms.
Acting by Russian standards with great dispatch, Lamsdorf obtained the views of Witte, Kuropatkin and the navy and passed them together to the tsar on 13 December. Kuropatkin made his detailed comments on 10 December and actually redrafted the agreement to bring it into line with military and, to some extent, naval thinking. His ideas are constructive:
We have decided to evacuate our troops from Manchuria ... Even if we keep the Northern parts of Manchuria in a certain state of dependence, we have every reason to believe that a break with Japan will be avoided.
Consequently our new agreement with Japan ought not to be bought at too high a price. Complete renunciation of Korea by conceding her to Japan is too high a price ... we should use every means to hinder Japanese forces being moved to Korea and stationed there permanently.21
But basically the army minister and the navy minister when his remarks eventually came in were favourable to an agreement with Japan, albeit a fairly unyielding one.
Lamsdorf obtained the tsar's approval to a counter-draft which was largely his own and sent off his reply on 14 December. It was carried by special messenger accompanying the crown prince to Germany to ensure secrecy and handed over by the Russian ambassador in Berlin on 17 December. It covered:
If Lamsdorf had been unconciliatory in conversation, this draft was even more limiting. It met the needs of Kuropatkin over restricting Japan's military operations and Shishkin for the freedom of passage for vessels moving between Vladivostok and Port Arthur. Clause 7 was a provision formulated by the Russian military authorities. But the final version was basically the work of Lamsdorf with Witte assisting, and Lamsdorf succeeded in persuading the tsar to overturn some of Kuropatkin's more extreme suggestions.
In his explanatory letter to Ito, Lamsdorf first declared Russia's enthusiasm for a permanent agreement with Japan in order to prevent misunderstandings arising. But Russia required assurances, first, regarding Manchuria and second, over zones of Korea adjoining the Russian frontier. Moreover Lamsdorf asked for 'some slight compensation for all the important rights which Russia is to grant to Japan in Korea'. This was to take the form of Japan's recognition of Russia's preferential rights — not exclusive rights — in Manchuria. Since this was the most that Russia would give Japan in Korea, there was only a slight degree of reciprocity.23
In looking at Lamsdorfs terms, we see that they were mainly concerned with Korea where Russia had no intention of désintéressement. But by clause 6 Japan was asked to recognize Russia's preferential rights in all regions of the Chinese Empire bordering on her frontiers and undertake not to infringe Russia's freedom of action in that area. This clause was evidently intended not to apply to all Manchuria, though this is of course doubtful. It presumably referred to the railway lands of North Manchuria on which Kuropatkin and his associates had set their hearts at this stage. This was of course Russia's preliminary bargaining position. But there was no sign here of substantially reducing her claims in Korea. It was not therefore the Man-Kan kōkan for which Itō was hoping.
How did Itō, now spending a fortnight in former haunts in Berlin, and receiving honours and attention from the kaiser, view this message? Almost as soon as he had reached Berlin, he had telegraphed on 6 December that he found the Russian leaders ready to accept the following as a basis for discussions:
If Japan and Russia will guarantee jointly the independence of Korea, desisting from using Korean territory or any portion of it for any purpose of military strategy, and will not construct fortifications such as gun emplacements on the Korean coastline so as to menace the free passage of the Straits of Tsushima, Russia will acknowledge Japan's special freedom of action in Korea in matters industrial, commercial and political and in such military measures as are needed for the suppression of civil disturbances and the like.24
Basically an honest, if optimistic, account of Russia's position. In conclusion he stated: 'today presents a suitable chance of making an agreement with the only other country in the world which has interests in Korea. I heartily recommend an amicable agreement with Russia, which will become impossible after the conclusion of the British agreement.'
Itō's logic did not appeal to those in Tokyo who had Britain's final draft of the Japanese alliance burning a hole in their green-topped tables. Cabinet, genro and emperor agreed that they could not disregard or delay the British draft in the light of such uncertain gestures by Russia and notified Itō accordingly on 13 December.25 This was understandable enough because even Itō's enthusiasm for some form of settlement with Russia had suffered a considerable setback.
When, eventually, the Japanese statesman received the written counter-proposals through the Russian ambassador in Berlin, he found that from Japan's standpoint they were some degrees less favourable than the impression he had earlier formed. Just before he left the German capital for Brussels, he told Katsura: 'Lamsdorf volunteered that, using this draft as a basis, formal negotiations might be opened in Tokyo ... If we miss this opportunity, I fear that such a favourable opportunity will perhaps not recur in the near future.'26
Itō again supported the continuation of negotiations in Tokyo. On 21 December Katsura replied in a strong, almost brutal, telegram in which he argued that, if Japan were to make a treaty in order to deprive Russia of her privileges in Korea, Japan would have to conclude an agreement which would be inconsistent with her former professions over Manchuria: 'Since the crisis in Manchuria developed we have undertaken responsibilities to various foreign powers. Such responsibilities certainly cannot be neglected if Japanese honour is to be respected in the world. This policy started during your Ministry; and I inherited it and have consistently valued it as a wise policy.'27
He went on to explain that in February as a result of combined representations by the various powers Japan brought to nothing the Manchurian convention which was being negotiated between Russia and China.
Moving on to the above-quoted phrase in Itō's telegram, Katsura commented that Russia's position in Manchuria had been recognized in Nishi's memorandum of 1898 and Komura's proposals of 1900: 'Our policy has changed on this with the march of events ... We used to ask that Russia's position in Manchuria might be equivalent to Japan's in Korea. But our current proposals must on this occasion discard such a basis.'28
This was of course the moment of truth. Katsura was saying that, because of the events of 1901 in Manchuria, Japan could not 'disinterest' herself there any longer. This implied that for the Katsura cabinet at least Man-Kan kokan was no longer an acceptable basis. Ito could legitimately counter that he should have been told this in September rather than in December after his negotiations in Russia. Instead he complained that Katsura was misjudging his objectives by looking at LamsdorPs counterdraft: 'My aim is to create circumstances more favourable to Japan than an agreement on a reciprocal basis but, if absolutely necessary as a final concession, to yield even a reciprocal agreement.'29 In other words, Ito was hoping for more than Man-Kan kokan but was prepared in the last resort to fall back on that position, thinking that Russia would, on account of her political difficulties and her financial position, accept his stipulations: 'Even though we conclude an agreement with Britain either to change or to maintain the status quo in Korea, we will not benefit Japan in the slightest unless we on our part reach the milepost of a Russo-Japanese Agreement on the same problems.'
With this indignant blast, Itō set off from Brussels to London. Soon after his arrival he received two lengthy telegrams from Katsura of a suitably placatory kind. While he argued that there was after all no great difference between his view and Itō's on suitable concessions from Japan to Russia, 'you must get Russia to concede that she has no alternative to withdrawing from Manchuria and must not use any part of her territory there for military purposes. In short, the reciprocal principle should confine Russian military activity in Manchuria to suppression of disorder or revolt or protection of railways.' Japan must try to solve the Manchurian problem on a basis that she could accept for Korea — a modification of Man-Kan kōkan.30 In the second telegram Katsura expressed the hope that Russia would make a binding agreement not to hinder the linking of the Korean railway with the Russian Chinese Eastern railway and the Anglo-Chinese railway between Shanhaikuan and Niuchuang. Probably this was further than Itō himself would have gone but it showed that Katsura — and behind him presumably the Japanese army and Komura — had considerable ambitions for his country in Manchuria and was not prepared to give any promise of detachment. (Lamsdorf may of course have had suspicions along these lines on the basis of Izvolskii's reporting.)
Katsura s views arrived long after Itō had already replied to the Russians from Brussels. He had been unable to do so before his departure from Berlin in detail but had taken a week to study the matter amid a heavy schedule of engagements in the Belgian capital. His reply was that he did not doubt the conciliatory spirit of Russian statesmen but from the counter-proposals could not yet see much prospect of the countries easily reaching an agreement of any permanence. Over Manchuria, Itō commented, Russia's counter-demand was both sweeping and unrealistic and lost its meaning by its vagueness: 'Firstly I am anxious to know definitely what policy and measures it is the genuine intention of the Russian government to apply in that region and secondly I cannot obtain any definite impression about the precise zones in which Russia wishes to exercise her power.' Over Korea, he replied that Russia's counter-proposals 'return to the former view that Japan should act as a sort of custodian and be relegated to the status of a party carrying out ordinances on which both countries had previously agreed. Japan's special freedom of action under our former agreement is incompatible with and opposed in principle to conferring beforehand about her actions'.31 Itō confessed that he was doubtful about the advantage of referring the Russian draft to his government as a basis for future negotiations and asked for further time to study Lamsdorfs proposals. He declined Witte's invitation to travel back to Japan by the Trans-Siberian railway.
At this point Ito must have been forlorn. He had not received the expected encouragement from Russia. Even if he had, he never intended to go back to St Petersburg for further negotiations. More serious for his peace of mind, his advice on the British alliance had been rejected by the authorities in Tokyo. He told Katsura on 12 December that Japan's freedom of independent action should not be in any way impaired so that she might, at some favourable opportunity, come to an agreement with Russia at least on the Korean question.32 But in response to a conciliatory but firm telegraphic reply from Katsura, he replied from Berlin the following day in a mood of resignation:
Even if we join in an alliance of a defensive character with Britain, on which you have already embarked, there would still be room for us simultaneously to come to terms with Russia over Korea, that is to say, we must reserve the right of independent action to reach an agreement with Russia, even though it involves perhaps inevitably considerable concessions (say) in Manchuria.33
Even if his schemes had failed on both points, Itō took comfort from the above idea and proceeded with his journey to London. His activities there have been discussed in detail elsewhere and need not be repeated here. In conversations with Lord Lansdowne, he said that he was not himself opposed to the British alliance and asked whether Britain had any objection to Japan's seeking an agreement with Russia over Korea. To everyone's surprise, Lansdowne agreed provided it was not incompatible with the British alliance. Ito did not see why this should be so. In a deeply ironic way, therefore, the major success of Ito's European journey was achieved in Britain.34
How did Lamsdorf and the Russians react to the cool response from Itō in Brussels? We know only inditectly. Lamsdorf was optimistic but had one worry. This was connected with Itō's announced intention to return to Paris en route for his steamer at Naples. It was probable, he thought, that the question of an understanding between Japan and Russia would come up for discussion between Delcassé and Itō. Lamsdorf, perhaps rather fearing Delcassé's brokerage, instructed his ambassador to put the foreign minister in the picture about the discussion which had taken place:
Marquis Itō has presented quite unofficially a notice containing four points and making clear the solution which Japan would like to see given to the Korean question. Count Lamsdorf, after examining this notice, observed to Itō that it only included very large demands for concessions in favour of Japan, while all agreements presuppose the stipulation of advantages equal or equivalent for both contracting parties. Itō having recognized the justice of this remark, the notice was revised and completed by the insertion of conditions on which the Russian cabinet agreed to negotiate; these conditions were as follows:
1. Independence of Korea; 2. Prohibition of using Korean territory for a strategic object; 3. Liberty of the Korean Straits.
... Itō's notice, modified in this way, was sent to him in Berlin in order to serve as the basis for the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese accord.
Shortly after, Itō acknowledged receipt to Lamsdorf by a letter sent from Brussels, in which, while making reservations as regards the Russian cabinet's proposals, he added that he would give a final reply after studying the question deeply. This attitude on the part of Itō leads one to suppose that he does not wish to decide before assessing the chances of success which his mission could have in concluding a loan for Japan in Europe.35
There is no reason to believe that this was not a genuine summary of the position as Russia saw it. She saw France as the likely donor of financial aid to Japan and expected therefore that Delcasse would have some leverage with Itō. In our interpretation, the conclusion of a loan did not enter Itō's calculations and so Russia's appreciation of the situation was seriously distorted.
Lamsdorf comes out of the incident as perplexed as Itō. In February 1902 the British and Japanese representatives were to give him notice of their new alliance. The French ambassador reported that Lamsdorf was greatly affected by this news 'so absolutely unexpected by him'. Evidently he excused himself on the ground that Izvolskii had not in any way prepared him for such a disaster. He was too bowled over to attempt an immediate appreciation of the treaty.36 Lamsdorf must have asked himself whether the counter-proposals which he had sent to Ito had been so unacceptable to the Japanese that they had gone over to the British side. He may have assumed that Itō, in his disappointment, had authorized the clinching of the alliance when he was in London. Such was the common perception of the powers that the elder statesmen had in those days. In fact, it had not happened that way at all. Itō had not taken a large part in bringing about the British alliance, though he had had talks with Lord Lansdowne. He was thinking in a much broader perspective: of talks with Russia under the umbrella of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
We have seen in this chapter an important series of negotiations between Japan and Russia governing the future of north-east Asia. From the Japanese side, it might be described as personal, unofficial and exploratory. Its results were disappointing to those who wanted a settlement with Russia and expected by those who did not. It was an endeavour of one of the political groupings within Japan with doubtful authorization. From the Russian side, there were difficulties about assessing the Itō mission but, granted that, her statesmen were not very conciliatory. Knowing, as we now do, the general consensus about the need for a substantial withdrawal from at least southern Manchuria, they need not have been so rigid in their approach. This was, however, to be the prototype for later negotiations between the two sides in 1903, just as it was the follow-up to the Man-Kan kōkan diplomacy, which had led to the Nishi-Rosen protocol of 1898.
1. C. C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe, p. 236.
2. Lamsdorf to Kuropatkin and Witte, 1 Aug. 1901, 'Eve of War', pp. 234-5.
3. Lamsdorf to Giers and Izvolskii, 30 July 1901 and replies, 'Eve of War', pp. 234, 240.
4. Lamsdorf to colleagues, 1 Aug. 1901, 'Eve of War', pp. 234-8.
5. A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, pp. 168-9.
6. Ibid., pp. 168-70.
7. Hart to Hioki, 2 Aug. 1901, NGB 33, Supp. no. 1858.
8. Tyrrell to Hardinge, 20 Nov. 1901, Hardinge Papers 3.
9. Salisbury to Lansdowne, 9 Nov. 1901, FO China 1510.
10. B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, p. 436, fn. 155, quoting Alekseyev telegram of 30 June 1901.
11. Morrison to V. Chirol, 7 July 1902, Morrison Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 195.
12. Bertie to Hardinge, 5 Nov. 1901, Hardinge Papers 3.
13. G. A. Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, pp. 508-13.
14. E. M. Satow, Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, pp. 163-8.
15. For greater detail of Itō's Russian trip, see I. H. Nish, 'Itō in St Petersburg', pp. 90-5.
16. Izvolskii to Lamsdorf, 16 Sept. 1901, and Lamsdorf to Nicholas II, 6 Nov. 1901, 'Eve of War', pp. 241, 247-51.
17. Itō Hirobumi Hiroku, Telegrams from Itō'sjourney, nos. 19-23 (hereafter cited as Itō Hiroku); Japan, Foreign Ministry, Gaimushō no 100-nen, vol. 1, p. 420.
18. Tanaka Giichi Denki, vol. 1, pp. 175-6.
19. Itō Hiroku, no. 27.
20. Itō Hiroku, no. 30.
21. Kuropatkin to Lamsdorf, 10 Dec. 1901, 'Eve of War', pp. 260-1.
22. Taken from the translation of the Japanese version in Itō Hiroku, no. 52.
23. Itō Hiroku, no. 51.
24. Itō Hiroku, no. 34.
25. Itō Hiroku, nos. 45-6.
26. Itō Hiroku, no. 53.
27. Itō Hiroku, no. 58.
28. Ibid.
29. Itō Hiroku, no. 60.
30. Itō Hiroku, no. 61.
31. Itō Hiroku, no. 60.
32. Itō Hiroku, no. 43.
33. Itō Hiroku, no. 48.
34. I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 201-3.
35. Ouroussoff to Delcassé, 4 Jan. 1902, DDF, 2nd series, vol. 2 (1902), no. 4.
36. Montebello to Delcasse, 13 Feb. 1902, DDF, 2nd series, vol. 2 (1902), no. 84.