The drama of Itō's visit to St Petersburg concealed what must be described as the first Russo-Japanese top-level talks. Although the talks were a disappointment to both sides, they were an earnest that both sides wanted to preserve the peace and realized that there was a risk of its being broken. The Russians emerged from the talks unsure of themselves and, when the Anglo-Japanese alliance was announced, rather bruised. They chose to interpret Itō's visit as part of the Japanese 'alliance strategy' — which it was not — rather than the action of one of the opinion-forming groups off its own bat — which it was. Itō was displeased with the Russians who had not conceded the Japanese case over Korea and also with Katsura in Tokyo who had begun to take a new and tougher line over Manchuria while Itō was in Europe. But he was a wise enough statesman to know that he could not expect to attain his object at his first attempt.
The historian, seeing a broader spectrum of events, is able to say that Ito's visit did accomplish important results. By obtaining from Britain the assurance that there would be no objection to Japan negotiating directly with Russia despite the existence of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, he had opened the way to a second round of exploratory talks with Russia without any risk of a charge of duplicity on the part of Britain. In this sense, Itō's 'off the record' talks were followed up on an official level; and the respective positions of the two countries on Manchuria and Korea were further explored, as this chapter will show.
Kurino Shinichirō (1851-1937), one of Japan's senior diplomats, returned to Paris in mid-December. A protégé of Itō, he arrived there in time to meet the elder statesman, who was on the rebound from London and on his way back to Japan via Italy. Kurino heard from Itō on 7 January for the first time that negotiations for an alliance with Britain had made great headway in London. This made him so disgusted that he thought seriously of resigning from the foreign service.1
Kurino had seen service in the United States where he had been an acquaintance of Theodore Roosevelt. In 1897 he was appointed as minister to Paris, where he won a reputation as one who wanted to bring about reconciliation between his country and Russia.2 After something of a fracas with the Japanese foreign minister, he returned home in October 1900 and awaited reposting. On the day following Komura's appointment as foreign minister, Kurino was asked whether he would agree to be posted to St Petersburg. He claims to have replied that, if the Japanese government decided to consolidate its policy towards Russia on the lines that he wanted and conclude a treaty which had a positive character, he would accept this special assignment. He drew up a long memorandum giving his views; and Prime Minister Katsura on 16 October gave a party at his official residence where he, Komura and Kurino exchanged views about it. As a result, Kurino finally agreed to accept the new posting. His memorandum was an important argument for Man-Kan kōkan and stressed Japan's claims for freedom of action in Korea — in short, they were views very close to Itō's.3
It was depressing for Kurino to hear from Itō that a British alliance was at such an advanced state. At Itō's suggestion he enquired whether Tokyo's attitude had changed and passed on his findings to Ito in Naples: 'Katsura and Komura desire to come to an arrangement with Russia on Korea. But, while assenting to views set out in my memorandum, they do not propose to give final orders to conclude a [Russian] agreement but rather instruct me to try when I reach my new post to seek out the basis for an agreement.'4 Kurino thought that this was rather a shifty approach. But it was also cautious and not out of line with Britain's thinking.
One of Kurino's first tasks when he moved to the Russian capital was to inform Lamsdorf about the conclusion of the British alliance on 30 January. He reported that the Russian foreign minister received it with utter astonishment since he had apparently been blinded by the Itō mission and failed to recognize the secret diplomacy which had been proceeding in London. Lamsdorf acknowledged — and it was widely admitted in the press — that this was a signal failure of Russian diplomacy.5
The clauses of the British alliance which are relevant to this study were those which offered a guarantee of independence and territorial integrity for Korea and China (and by extension Manchuria). Regarding Korea, it was stated that Japan was interested in a peculiar degree 'politically as well as commercially and industrially' there and that it was admissible for her to safeguard those interests if they were threatened. By this Japan had been conceded points which Itō had failed to win in St Petersburg. By implication, the whole alliance gave Japan inter alia protection against aggressive action by a third power in east Asia, which could only be Russia.
Like any treaty, the alliance did not represent a complete meeting of minds. Britain had some reservations about Japan's willingness in the longer term to permit Korea's territorial integrity. Moreover, though the alliance had sprung from the Manchurian dilemma, Britain and Japan had separate interests there. Under the Scott-Muraviev agreement (1899), Britain had recognized Manchuria as a Russian sphere of interest, safeguarding only the Northern Extension railway from Peking to Mukden and the interests of British bondholders therein. Japan had no such commitments and was divided over how much leverage Russia should be allowed in Manchuria and what action the Japanese should take if she overstepped the mark. Moreover the alliance made no provision for military cooperation, though a separate note covered naval cooperation. Only in the months before the war with Russia broke out was the looseness of some of the terminology of the alliance revealed.
The other relevant consideration is whether the Anglo-Japanese alliance encouraged Japan to go to war. This was to be a common accusation in Russia which became strongly Anglophobe in 1904. This view was to be echoed by Russian historians later. B. A. Romanov, writing in 1928, speaks of Japan as Britain's infantryman, that is, that Japan would fight Britain's battles for her. Later A. L. Galperin also speaks of Britain egging Japan on to make war on Russia in east Asia.6I have argued elsewhere against such views, stating that Britain had made it clear during negotiations that she did not discourage Japan from entering into practical discussions with Russia. The effect of the alliance treaty was not to egg Japan on but rather to strengthen Japan's hand if she decided to proceed with negotiations with Russia and, in the last resort, to strengthen Japan's hand if she decided to make war.7
The British cabinet generally accepted the cogency of the arguments Itō put before them during his visit to London. Itō's account of these read:
I am myself not one of those who distrust the Anglo-Japanese negotiations and am generally in favour of their success... I realize that for Britain to engage in war with Russia on behalf of Manchuria is something she would not relish under any circumstances. Before my departure Japan seemed to be trying to oppose absolutely any Russian move to push her interests into Manchuria. There is an agreement [of 1898] in being between Russia and Japan regarding Korea; and Japan is on that account much restrained at present but cannot revoke it. This agreement is something which Japan has borne long enough and cannot allow to continue. I have no thought of pursuing a two-headed policy towards Russia and Britain nor do I support a Russo-Japanese alliance. I only desire by the most peaceful methods to reach a complete agreement with Russia by moving the milepost of our existing Russo-Japanese agreement just a bit forward in order to protect our interests in Korea.8
Britain having accepted this, Japan was free to make her approaches to St Petersburg. This is a reminder that the alliance did not turn Japan into a fief of Britain but, on the contrary, increased Japan's capacity for independent action and thinking without placing her under an elaborate obligation to have advance consultations. To cite an example, Japan refused to accept the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese commercial treaty of 1902 (the Mackay treaty) as the basis of her trading with China.
While Britain in good conscience could justify her action as not provoking war in the east, she had, of course, embarked on a risky course. There was a definite risk of war if Russia was not conciliatory towards Japan. But there was the hope that war could be localized, firstly to the 'extreme east' to which the alliance was limited, and secondly to the two powers directly involved. Lansdowne, who, more than any other, was responsible for the alliance on the British side, wrote reflectively to the king:
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, although not intended to encourage the Japanese Government to resort to extremities, had, and was sure to have, the effect of making Japan feel that she might try conclusions with her great rival in the Far East — free from all risk of a European coalition such as that which had on a previous occasion deprived her of the fruits of victory [the coalition of Russia, France and Germany in 1895].9
Lansdowne's reference to the Dreibund reminds us that Japan had some old scores to settle with the Russians: the humiliation of 1895 by the Dreibund intervention; the seizure and leasing of Port Arthur in 1898. The desire for a showdown with Russia was present in the minds of some Japanese well before the alliance came into being. The alliance could offer a naval protective shield if Japan had grounds of her own volition to go to war; but it was not itself the motive force for going to war.
The alliance was aimed not just at Russia but also by implication at the Franco-Russian alliance in east Asia. It was not unnatural, therefore, that there should be some Franco-Russian response. In a way the alliance might have been a blessing for Russia by inducing France to go further with Russia in east Asia — to extend the Dual Alliance to the east. But France was not ready to become involved in north-east Asia and generally stalled discussion. When Lamsdorf raised the matter of responding to the alliance, the two could only agree on a 'milk-andwater' agreement, signed on 16 March 1902. It stated that the AngloJapanese convention had given them much satisfaction since it reaffirmed the essential principles which France and Russia had always accepted and which remained the basis of their present policy. They reserved to themselves eventually to take steps to assure the integrity and free development of China, in the event of the aggressive action of a third power or new troubles there threatening their own interests.10 This applied the alliance to a modest extent to the East: but France almost immediately began to consider her obligations of a military kind under the Russian alignment and, as a way out, veered more and more towards some understanding with Britain. Although the two sides had initially stood together, it has to be said that in 1902 the Anglo-Japanese alliance tested the effectiveness of the Franco-Russian alliance in the east and found it wanting.11 The British foreign office did not see the new measure as specially significant:
The Franco-Russian agreement seems anodyne enough. Just as we were pushed to terms with Japan in order to avoid her running wild, it is natural that the French and the Russians should wish to be assured that neither party will put the other in a hole over Chinese questions without previous consultations.12
As we saw, Komura gave instructions to Kurino that, as soon as he took up office in St Petersburg, he should examine ways of resolving the Korean question, satisfactorily from Japan's point of view, and secretly take preliminary steps to open formal discussions in future. Pursuing these enquiries, Kurino was told by Lamsdorf on 24 February that, if the Japanese government genuinely wanted a friendly understanding with Russia with a view to securing peaceful relations and upholding the mutual interests of the two countries and if article IV of the AngloJapanese treaty did not prevent it, it would be possible to conclude a separate treaty (betsuyaku) between Japan and Russia. To this, the Japanese foreign minister replied on 12 March that the Japanese government earnestly hoped to reach an understanding with Russia on the question of Korea and there was nothing in the British treaty to prevent such a thing. The problem was to find an acceptable basis for the negotiations and an appropriate time to open them. Komura told Kurino that he must be careful that the success of the negotiations was not put at risk because there was internal confusion in the Russian government. On the following day Izvolskii told Komura in Tokyo that he had heard from Ito in detail about the exchange of views he had had with Lamsdorf. He wanted to know what the cabinet's reaction was. Komura, stating only his own personal opinion, assured him that the Japanese government had in the past always wanted an understanding with Russia over Korea and there was no change of any kind in its attitude at present.13
By July Komura thought that the power of the military party in Russia that had attacked Witte and Lamsdorf over the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese treaty was gradually weakening and the strength of the civilian party was being restored. Assuming that it would be opportune to open negotiations as soon as possible, Komura on 7 July instructed Kurino to look into the effect on possible Russo-Japanese talks of the Franco-Russian declaration and President Loubet's visit to the Russian capital to give substance to the Franco-Russian alliance, to analyse whether they had changed the opinion of the Russian government on this issue, and what thoughts the Russian government had about the basis for negotiations. On 23 July Kurino on the basis of these instructions exchanged opinions with Lamsdorf on his individual responsibility and was told that since there was no objection from the side of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, there would be none from the side of Russia; and Ito's exchanges with Lamsdorf could form the basis for negotiation.14 According to Russian accounts, Lamsdorf revealed on 4 August that Japan had suggested to Russia that the previous RussoJapanese agreements be annulled and a new agreement formulated on the basis of recognition of Japan's paramount interests in Korea in return for Japan's recognition of Russia's paramount interests in Manchuria. On 14 September Kurino saw Lamsdorf and had a further private discussion on the basis of Itō's earlier talks. The Russian foreign minister was cordial and said that they could get down to business on the basis of balancing the rights and interests of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Korea. He added, however, that he had to accompany the tsar on his autumn holiday to Livadia in the Crimea and would not return till the second half of December. The matter could not be pursued in this period.15 Since the views of the Russian side had been clarified in such a positive manner, Komura passed over to Kurino what he wanted to be the nub of the talks, though it had not been considered by the government (1 November). Kurino appears to have reformulated them into a personal draft of five points (shian); but Komura asked Kurino to defer action since he disagreed with the formulation. It seems likely that Kurino, the ally of Itō, had erred too much towards Man-Kan kōkan for Komura's liking. 'Negotiations' were therefore held in suspense.16
Lamsdorf was obviously viewing these talks sub specie aeternitatis because he mentioned that Russia was about to appoint Rosen who was persona grata to Japan as minister to Tokyo. The implication was that Rosen might be able to push forward these overtures which had just been launched. But Rosen was not expected to arrive in Japan from Munich until April 1903 so there cannot have been a high priority in Lamsdorf's mind. The unexpected return of Rosen was due to the fact that Izvolskii had asked for family reasons to be transferred to some European posting. This became possible through the appointment of Count Benckendorff as ambassador to London, which left the Copenhagen legation empty. Izvolskii had not been a great success in Tokyo, appearing to the Japanese to be brusque and stand-offish.17 It may therefore be that there was a strong desire for his transfer after three years in Tokyo. Izvolskii records that, on his arrival at the Russian capital, he was received coldly by the tsar and the advice that he tried to give on far eastern affairs — and Japan in particular — was systematically disregarded. It suggests that the climate of the imperial court in the spring of 1903 was such that Izvolskii appeared to be far too conciliatory to the Japanese.18
Rosen, for his part, was happy to return to Japan where he had had a rich diplomatic experience. He was a believer in the expansion of the Russian empire in Asia and in the development of her Siberian empire. Yet he was neither authoritarian nor conservative. Rosen admits that there was a hiccough over his appointment in 1903. It appears that in a memorandum, presented after his reappointment to Japan had been announced, he had expressed views which were unwelcome to Witte and Lamsdorf:
I held the scheme of the 'pacific conquest' of Manchuria, through 'pacific penetration' by means of railways, banks etc., to be impracticable; that, therefore, the huge expenditure incurred in the pursuit of such a scheme did not seem to me to have been justifiable; but that now we were bound in duty to defend the vast interests acquired and created by us in Manchuria at such onerous cost to the State.
These were in fact very trenchant criticisms of Witte's enterprise in Siberia and Manchuria. They were reflections on the Asian scene from the distant standpoint of Europe which were salutary. But, according to Rosen, he had unwittingly incurred the bitter enmity of the two statesmen who tried unsuccessfully 'to cause the Emperor to revoke my appointment'.19
Japan improved her position in Korea during 1902. The policy of the Japanese which became perceptibly stiffer, even if it remained cautious, was one of political and economic consolidation. Politically they placed their advisers at the Korean court and tried to build up a nucleus of proJapanese Korean politicians. But a permanent improvement in Japan's standing depended on economic penetration. Although it was difficult to procure supplies of suitable emigrants, the number of Japanese who went to settle in south-east Korea grew rapidly in 1903 to 30,000. Moreover, despite a shortage of Japanese capital for use overseas, Japan gradually assumed control of mines, posts and telegraphs. The Japanesecontrolled Daiichi Bank was beginning to secure financial control as great as that of a central bank, issuing the only currency notes available and making loans to the Korean court. Steps were also taken to raise funds for the construction of the railway between Fusan and Seoul for which a lease had been granted in 1898 but on which work had been held up. Clearly, if the Korean peninsula was to be opened up to Japanese commerce, this rail artery was indispensable. A foreign loan for the purpose was raised in London in 1902, while the Japanese cabinet decided to vote almost two million yen towards specified projects in Korea in 1903, of which the building of the Seoul—Fusan railway had the top priority. Thus, Japanese enterprise in Korea was becoming notably more dynamic; and the government was becoming increasingly drawn in.20
This activity was motivated by hostility to Russia's entrenched position; and public opinion in Japan was intensely anti-Russian. But in other areas 1902 was not a bad year for Russo-Japanese relations. Thus the arrangement for fisheries around Sakhalin was renewed. Baron Matsukata on a round-the-world trip received a warm welcome in St Petersburg. In Tokyo a Russo-Japanese society was founded under Itō and Inoue in order to improve relations and foster good-neighbourly links. It attracted many adherents and held its inaugural meeting at the end of the year under prestigious auspices. So Izvolskii had not been inactive.21
The Korean court in the autumn reverted to the proposal made two years earlier for an international guarantee for Korea. This was a device for ensuring that the present emperor and his family stayed in power and that the state was not submerged by the two competing giants, Japan and Russia. Not surprisingly the Koreans were supported in their endeavours — or, some would say, were fed with the idea — by some Russians. Most notable of these was Pavlov, who had been charge at Seoul since 1898. In September he went on leave and was replaced by Weber who returned to his place of former glory to attend the fortieth anniversary celebrations of the Korean emperor's accession to his throne (which was in any case postponed). In Tokyo Pavlov paid calls on Izvolskii and rumours grew that he was active also in Paris when he took up the issue with Cassini on his way to Washington as Russian ambassador. For a proposal of this kind to succeed, American support was important because the most practical outcome was for Korea to be neutralized under the guarantee of the powers most involved, in this case, the United States, Russia and Japan. Rumours of Pavlov's activities were carried in the Tokyo newspapers. Japan, therefore, made it clear that it would be impossible for her to 'accede to any arrangement which might impair the actual position of Japan in Korea.' Since Japan was by this time in a dominant position, though not necessarily an unchallenged one, she saw the proposal as one hostile to herself. John Hay under the guidance of Minister Horace Allen appears to have been non-committal. When, therefore, the Japanese minister enquired about Washington's reactions, Hay could honestly say that no proposal had been put to the United States government. Within a matter of months this particular proposal had been overshadowed by events in Manchuria. The Koreans, as we shall see, revived it in August 1903, as the prospect of war grew stronger. But Japan persisted in discarding the concept of international guarantee. For her 'the powers' were never disinterested. She wanted the peninsula for herself.22
Even if Japan offered a united front on this matter, there was in fact dissension just below the surface. Hayashi Gonsuke told the British minister in Seoul that Itō was not disinclined to the idea of Korean neutralization, presumably on the grounds that it would contribute to a peaceful solution for a troublesome area. Foreign Minister Komura, he said, would not hear of such a thing. Hayashi himself appears to have thought that Japan might be 'disposed to entertain the proposal if Russia carried out a bona fide evacuation of Manchuria but the mere concentration of Russian forces along the railway line would not satisfy Japan'.23 In other words, some Japanese were prepared to treat Korean neutralization as a quid pro quo. But the reins were in the hands of Komura who would not entertain encroachments on Japan's power in the peninsula and was thoroughly suspicious of all formulae put forward by the Koreans. He saw the latter as acting as puppets for sinister Russian intentions. He was successful in steering the suggestion away from the meeting-table where it could be advocated by Itō. As the French minister remarked with some prescience, 'whenever the question of Korea is brought up in conversation, Japanese statesmen slip away and become silent'.24
1. Hiratsuka Atsushi, Shishaku Kurino Shinichirō den.
2. DDF, 1st series, vol. 16 (1900), no. 198.
3. Japanese Weekly Times, 23 Nov. 1901.
4. Kurino to Itō, 20 Jan. 1902, Itō Hiroku, no. 71.
5. DDF, 2nd series, vol. 2 (1902), no. 84.
6. A. L. Galperin, Anglo-Iaponskii Soiuz, pp. 160, 177.
7. I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 202-3.
8. ltd Hiroku, no. 48.
9. Lansdowne to Edward VII, 18 Apr. 1904, [British] Royal Archives R/42; Newton, Lord Lansdowne: A Biography, London 1929, and Magnus, King Edward VII, London 1964, pp. 308-9, use 'condition' instead of 'coalition', I believe mistakenly.
10. DDF, 2nd series, vol. 2 (1902), no. 84.
11. Lamsdorf also proposed that the Dreibund of 1895 should be reconstituted with Russia and Germany and France; but Berlin did not respond. B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, pp. 249-50.
12. T. H. Sanderson to Scott, 26 Mar. 1902, Scott Papers 52, 299.
13. Japan, Foreign Ministry, Komura Gaikōshi, vol. 1, pp. 297-300.
14. Ibid., p. 298.
15. A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p. 202.
16. Komura Gaikōshi, vol. 1, p. 300; Nichi-Ro Kōshōshi, Tokyo 1944.
17. d'Anethan Dispatches, pp. 154-5.
18. The Memoirs of Alexander Iswolski, London 1920 p. 21; Scott to T. H. Sanderson, 6 Aug. 1903, Scott Papers 52,304: 'Izvolsky is, I am told, under a cloud at present at the Foreign Office — he tried to air his views of the Far East at Lamsdorf's dinner and was pulled up roughly by Witte each time and so mercilessly snubbed by him that he finally shut up. When he talked of China's future, Witte asked him how he could possibly know anything about the future.'
19. Rosen, Forty Years, vol. 1, pp. 205-7, 208-9.
20. The Seoul-Suwon sector was opened in Oct. 1903.
21. The Society was founded by Nakata Keigi in July 1902 and the name of the politician Hara Kei was associated with it.
22. Kajima Morinosuke, Nihon Gaikōshi, vol. 6, pp. 187-204.
23. Jordan to Francis Bertie, 8 Nov. 1902 in Jordan Papers 3.
24. NGB 36/1, nos. 694-700; DDF, 2nd series, vol. 2 (1902), no. 409.