The Army Zeppelins’ role in the campaign against Britain had been very much a subsidiary one to that of their counterparts in the Navy. While Navy airships had conducted a regular campaign in sync with the cycle of the new moon, the Army demonstrated less enthusiasm for raiding Britain, focusing more on a role supporting the troops at the Front. It was only on the night of 31 March/1 April, the same night that the Naval Airship Division lost L 15, that Army Zeppelins attempted their first raid of 1916.
Three Zeppelins set out to attack London but things did not go according to plan; LZ 81 and LZ 88 both aborted before reaching the British coast.1 The third raider, LZ 90, commanded by Oberleutnant-zur-See der Reserve Ernst Lehmann, did make it inland but even then her movements puzzled those tracking her. After crossing the Suffolk coast near Alderton, LZ 90 first headed north, then south and was reported circling over Ipswich at 1.19am. The report noted: ‘The purpose of this journey is difficult to fathom.’ They were unaware that LZ 90’s engines were causing concern, as Lehmann explained.
With only two motors functioning I could not take the LZ 90 over London, so while mechanics worked to make repairs we kept the ship hovering over a line between Colchester and Ipswich... we kept the LZ 90 at about 8,000 feet with only two engines running, and I suppose this made very little noise... because of that we were unmolested. I could not find a landmark or a light, so thoroughly had the British darkened the countryside.
When after some two hours the chief engineer reported that he could not fix one of the motors... I turned homeward. Thereupon a battery commenced firing at the ship.2
The ‘battery’ was in fact a mobile 1-pdr ‘pom-pom’ of the RNAAS Eastern Mobile Brigade on the outskirts of Ipswich, which opened fire twice between 1.30 and 1.40am.3
Engines had long been a problem for LZ 90. Although accepted by the Army at the beginning of January 1916, Lehmann noted that it was two months and a change of engines before any level of efficiency was attained.
The manufacturer, under the urgent demand, had been compelled by the authorities to release the motors prematurely. In the vernacular, he had not taken out the ‘bugs’. We had to do it ourselves.4
The engine problems he experienced over Suffolk were clearly nothing new for Lehmann.
On the night of 2/3 April, while Navy Zeppelins headed for Scotland, the Army made another attempt on London with the same three airships: LZ 81, LZ 88 and LZ 90. The first of these turned back early but both LZ 88 and LZ 90 reached England although neither threatened the primary target.
Lehmann brought LZ 90 overland at the mouth of the River Blackwater in Essex at about 10.40pm and as he headed inland her commander reflected on the experience.
The night was very dark... I tell you that one experiences a peculiar sensation riding high through the sky over enemy land, knowing that every human being down there on earth has scanned the heavens before going to bed, hoping that it will be no fit weather for Zeppelins.
Peering from the window nearest me, I could see few clouds and little haze. But straight ahead and quite close to the surface the mist was thicker and I knew it would be difficult to locate us with searchlights.5
That mist, however, was to hinder Lehmann’s navigation that night. When he began to drop his bombs he admitted that he could not see the ground below but released them ‘where the docks and eastern part of the city must have been’. Lehmann would have been extremely disappointed if he had known exactly where his bombs had fallen.
After passing south of Chelmsford, the sudden appearance of LZ 90 stung an 18-pdr of the Kirkcudbrightshire Territorial Artillery into optimistic action. They fired two rounds, causing the Zeppelin to take evasive action. A few miles on, a 1-pdr ‘pom-pom’ at Kelvedon Hatch fired 75 rounds at the sound of her engines and, although LZ 90 was unharmed, she deflected from her south-west course towards London and was now heading west towards the towns of Waltham Abbey and Enfield where there were important munitions factories. At 11.50pm, as LZ 90 passed Epping, a searchlight at Chingford pierced the clouds and found her. Other lights then picked her up and soon the Waltham Abbey area anti-aircraft guns opened fire, from Enfield Lock, Farm Hill, Monkhams Hill, Cheshunt, Hayes Hill Farm and Grange Hill. Between them they fired 159 rounds. ‘We neared a cluster of searchlights,’ Lehmann recalled, ‘and a nest of batteries, which were firing with particular fury, and then we prepared to drop our bombs.’ This sudden intensity of fire convinced him that they were over London and in particular over the docks of east London whereas he had just passed over Epping Forest, flying at a height of 8,000 to 8,500 feet. At 11.57pm, rather than the London docks, LZ 90’s first bombs fell on Woodredon Farm, two and a half miles east of Waltham Abbey.
Although many bombs were dropped in a few minutes, the only loss of life was that occasioned by the killing of four chickens in a fowl house at the rear of a cottage. Although it is now surrounded by bomb craters, the house was not hit. Every window in the building was shattered, and an unexploded bomb lies buried in the lawn a few feet from the front door... An eyewitness said the occupants of the Zeppelin appeared as if they had suddenly gone mad, and dropped bombs as if they were turning them out of a tip-cart.6
Lehmann’s bombs fell in a straight line as he headed towards Waltham Abbey, passing close to Upshire Hall. The police later accounted for 90 bombs (25 HE and 65 incendiary), the majority found buried in farmers’ fields.
Having released the last of his bombs and facing heavy anti-aircraft fire, Lehmann turned away and climbed to 12,000 feet, not realising that just over half a mile ahead lay the hugely important Waltham Abbey Gunpowder Mills. The searchlights and guns had done their job. LZ 90 passed out to sea near Clacton at about 1am. The RFC had attempted to intercept her with No.19 RAS sending up seven BE2c aircraft from airfields around London: two from Hainault Farm, two from Sutton’s Farm, two from Hounslow and one from Croydon. Only one pilot claimed a sighting but was unable to catch her and at least three were damaged when landing.
The other Army Zeppelin to come inland was Hauptmann Falck’s LZ 88, but its impact was no greater than LZ 90’s. Pushed off course by the wind, Falck crossed the Suffolk coast near Orfordness at about 11.30pm. He abandoned London and selected Harwich, an important Royal Navy port, as his secondary target.7 Progress, however, was slow and it was an hour before LZ 88 reached Rushmere Heath on the eastern outskirts of Ipswich, a distance of only 16 miles. There two mobile Maxim guns of the RNAAS and a Lewis gun of the 58th (2/1st London) Division opened fire. Falck followed an anti-clockwise course around Ipswich until he reached the River Orwell, which joined the Stour at Harwich. But close to the river at Levington Green two more mobile Maxim guns of the RNAAS opened fire at 12.45am as Falck crossed over the Orwell heading east. About four miles on LZ 88 crossed another river, the Debden, and moments later rained 73 bombs (10 HE and 63 incendiaries) on the marshy fields between the peaceful villages of Ramsholt and Anderton where they smashed windows at Peyton Hall Farm. It is difficult to reconcile what Falck believed he was bombing, but it may be that the close proximity of three rivers, the Stour, Orwell and Debden, confused him. If when he crossed the Debden and dropped his bombs he thought it was the Orwell, he may have believed he was close to Felixstowe. At 1.16am a final HE bomb dropped at Hollesley before LZ 88 went back out to sea.
After two raids in three days the Army Zeppelins did not undertake any more attacks in this current moon cycle. Strasser, however, planned three more raids on consecutive nights for the Navy Zeppelins. First up, on 3 April, were L 11 and L 17.
Setting out from the Zeppelin base at Nordholz, L 11 and L 17 headed for London but strong winds over the North Sea and a ‘considerable mist’ enveloping the east coast of Britain prevented this. Herbert Ehrlich was off the Norfolk coast in L 17 at 9.30pm but, unable to make further progress against the wind, he aborted the mission. Viktor Schütze, commanding L 11, persevered and at 1.30am observers heard engines about two miles off the north Norfolk coast. With London no longer possible, Schütze decided he would try for Norwich but the poor visibility prevented even this.
L 11 came inland near Sheringham at about 1.40am with Schütze dropping his first bomb near the village of Hanworth, about 300 yards from Hanworth Hall8 before continuing towards Norwich, but a number of directional changes indicated that navigation was a problem. About 2.30am he reached the twin villages of Buxton and Lamas on the River Bure about nine miles north of Norwich. There Schütze dropped two incendiary bombs in fields near a farm. Fifteen minutes later L 11 was six miles north-east of Norwich and dropped another incendiary near the village of Salhouse, 200 yards from the nearest dwelling.9 Unable to find Norwich, Schütze abandoned the fruitless search and returned to the coast, passing out over Caister at 3.05am. Ten minutes later he lightened his ship by dropping nine bombs at sea.
The misty conditions along the coast prevented any of the Norfolk based RNAS pilots getting airborne until Edward Pulling took off from Covehithe at 3.25am, but he saw nothing. Elsewhere Captain Arthur Thomson, a RFC pilot of No.15 RAS based at Doncaster, took off at 11pm when reports announced Zeppelins approaching the coast. No Zeppelins reached his area but when the weather deteriorated, he became lost and with fuel running low he tried to land. Unfortunately his altimeter gave an incorrect reading and he flew into a hillside near Tealby, east of Market Rasen. With great good fortune Thomson walked away from the wreckage with only minor injuries.
While L 11 and L 17 began their refits on 4 April, Strasser ordered out L 13 and L 16 from Hage as well as L 14 and L 22 from Nordholz on the next raid. Bad weather over the North Sea, however, prompted a recall and while the two Hage airships returned safely, it proved something of a problem for L 14 and L 22 as they found their Nordholz base enshrouded in fog. Orders directed L 14 to a vacant Army airship shed at Düren about 230 miles away; she returned to Nordholz on 6 April. L 22 had even further to go to find sanctuary. First directed to Hanover, a distance of about 105 miles, when she arrived fierce thunderstorms prevented a landing so she went on to Dresden, another 195 miles, where she was finally able to find shelter before returning to Nordholz.
With no let up, Strasser ordered the next raid for 5 April. With L 14 and L 22 not yet back at Nordholz he had only three Zeppelins available: L 11, L 13 and L 16.10 Not long into the mission, Heinrich Mathy, commanding L 13, had to abort again due to engine problems. ‘Once again we had to turn back...,’ Pitt Klein bemoaned, ‘We were having a run of bad luck... All the cursing and swearing was to no avail against a higher force.’11
The remaining raiders, L 11 and L 16, with the latter about an hour ahead, approached the Yorkshire coast. With land in sight at 8.15pm, L 16 turned north and, battling against strong winds, headed up the coast for about 80 miles. She only came inland at 11.30pm.12 By then L 11 had made for the tempting target of Hull where this time her commander had a fright.
Viktor Schütze brought L 11 inland at Hornsea at 9.10pm and took a direct course towards Hull. A month earlier he had made an unopposed attack on the city and this time, choosing to approach at only 4,500 feet, it would appear he anticipated another easy night. Hull’s defences, however, had improved since that raid in March and at 9.17pm searchlights at Sutton, Marfleet and Cottingham all held L 11, followed by the beginning of an anti-aircraft barrage from new gun positions in and around the city. Schütze released a single HE bomb over agricultural land at Sutton as he headed south and dropped three more three minutes later. These fell on the eastern edge of the city at East Park, within 300 yards of a searchlight, as L 11 began to climb quickly while turning away from Hull. The bombs smashed windows in Holderness Road and side streets leading from it. The day before, not far away in Barnsley Street, shock caused by a false air raid alarm had caused the death of a two-month old baby, Jessie Matthews. During the raid at least one anti-aircraft shell fell on the city causing the night’s only casualties of the raid when it damaged a house at 27 Park Avenue, injuring four of those inside. The guns had done their job, as Colonel H.R. Adair, commanding the Humber Garrison artillery, observed.
The result of the fire was that it was quickly driven off: its behaviour was erratic apparently being taken by surprise, and hardly knowing which way to turn to get out of range of both guns and lights. It finally rose to an estimated height of 10,000 feet and made off in the direction E.N.E.13
Schütze took L 11 back across the coast at 9.50pm but, as with his raid on Sunderland a few days earlier, he did not turn for home. Instead Schütze planned to wait for the waxing crescent moon to set and then try again, however, one of his engines broke down and while the crew worked feverishly to make repairs he headed north against the wind, determined to drop his bombs. But four and a half hours later a second engine failed. Other commanders might have given up at this point but not Schütze. He recognised he was close to another favourite target, the Skinningrove Ironworks. A report by the Army’s Northern Command states that L 11 circled over Skinningrove three times at about 2.30am. Although there was a 6-inch anti-aircraft gun there it had no accompanying searchlight and the gun crew were unable to locate the target. L 11 dropped 23 bombs (nine HE and 14 incendiaries) over Skinningrove, but six of the latter failed to ignite. Although Schütze claimed they wrecked the ironworks he was wrong. Bombs did smash a laboratory but the rest of the industrial site escaped harm. However, at the village of Carlin How, where many of the ironworkers lived, bombs damaged a school, a Co-operative Society shop and several homes. Estimates put the value of the damage at the ironworks and village at £5,000. Finally satisfied, Schütze took L 11 along the coast to Runswick Bay and headed out to sea at 2.50am.
In between the raids by L 11 on Hull and Skinningrove, Werner Peterson, having pushed up the coast in L 16, had made his own attack. He believed he brought L 16 inland north of Scarborough from where, heading south-west, he had dropped his bombs on an industrial area between Leeds and York. He was, however, 50 miles further north than he realised. L 16 came inland just north of Hartlepool at 11.30pm and his south-west course took him across County Durham. Having passed Bishop Auckland he approached Evenwood at about midnight from where Peterson noticed burning below – ‘fiery waste-heaps’ glowing at Railey Fell Colliery and at Randolph Colliery. In a report, Major E. Barraclough of the Tees and Hartlepool Garrison, explained that the Railey Fell Colliery had no telephone and a verbal warning to shield the fires arrived too late. The first bombs fell at 12.03am.14
With the Railey Hill Colliery on its port side, L 16 commenced dropping bombs as it passed over Low Gordon and Evenwood railway station. The sixth of these exploded in Gordon Lane where it caused significant damage to the end of a terrace of houses and injured two people. From there L 16 crossed over a railway line and dropped three more bombs between there and Oaks Bank, including the first incendiary bomb. One of the bombs exploded near Ranshaw School, wrecking a new house where a man and his wife had a narrow escape.
They had no means of escape except by a shattered window, and, calling for help, they were immediately rescued. In the next bedroom were the son and a visitor, who were precipitated into the basement kitchen and buried in the debris. The visitor was easily extricated, but it took an hour to rescue the lad.15
At Evenwood’s Randolph Colliery another brightly glowing ‘fiery waste-heap’ attracted L 16. Peterson ordered the release of eight incendiary bombs but the heaps were a distance from the colliery and the mine was never in danger. Two bombs exploded in fields north of the mine complex and two more detonated on open ground near the village of Evenwood Gate. L 16 had now dropped 23 bombs, (13 HE and 10 incendiary) seriously damaging 15 miners’ homes and inflicting lesser damage, such as broken windows, on 70 to 80 others, but although passing close to two collieries no industrial property was harmed. With only two people injured, the area had escaped lightly and it fell to the local vicar, the Reverend G.J. Collis, to summarise the community’s experience.
It is true that they did a certain amount of material damage but not much considering the immense power of the explosives used. One would hardly think it possible that such a rain of destruction could do so little harm. Great gaping holes in the land, broken windows, roofs partially unslated, doors and in some cases furniture damaged was really a small price to pay as the result of such a visitation... But the prevailing feeling is one of thankfulness.16
L 16 had been heading on a south-east course but Peterson now turned north-east and at 12.20am he reached Coronation, one of many small mining villages in the Dene Valley, about a quarter of a mile south-west of Auckland Park Colliery. The first bomb of this second attack fell close to the Eldon Lane School at Coronation, exploding just outside the boundary wall. From there L 16 passed over the Auckland Park Colliery and an area packed with coke ovens, but Peterson only resumed bombing when clear of the industrial area. At the village of Close House, Peterson dropped two bombs over Gibson Street. One failed to detonate but the other smashed into No.12, demolishing it and severely damaging those on either side. Helpers gathered to rescue a five-year-old boy buried in the wreckage.
The bomb in Gibson Street also damaged the Post Office, Friends’ Meeting House and Co-operative Society shop. Seconds later a bomb damaged Nos.50 and 52 Close House, then another narrowly missed Nos.76 and 78 in the same street, digging a great crater behind them.17 Just before he reached Eldon, Peterson ordered the release of 10 incendiary bombs. These all fell around Hall’s Row, a small terrace of miner’s dwellings. Nine of them landed in fields and gardens but one struck No.21, home to the Moyle family.
William Moyle had worked at Eldon Colliery but was now serving in the army. His wife, Hannah, was at home with their two boys, Robert (nine) and his seven-year-old brother. The incendiary bomb smashed a square-shaped hole in the roof and struck Robert as he lay asleep in bed. In the next bedroom, falling debris struck his younger brother fracturing both his legs. His mother escaped unharmed and rescuers brought out the youngest son, but for Robert there was no happy ending, as was revealed at the inquest: ‘Another witness stated that he made three attempts to get into the bedroom, but he was overcome by fumes, although he crept on the floor and tried to drag the bed to the door.’18 Robert’s body was ‘burned almost to cinders’ leading the Coroner to describe the attack as a case of ‘devilish barbarism’.19
After bombing Hall’s Row, Peterson saw more glowing fires – waste heaps at Eldon Colliery. They appeared a significant target and L 16 released 11 HE bombs. The first three landed on a football pitch. In the end house of Office Row, another terrace of miners’ homes, eight-year-old Doris Hall woke to the sound of bombs some way off. She got up and peeked through the wooden slats of a venetian blind. She saw ‘flickering lights’ off to the left – the incendiaries at Hall’s Row – before the bombs exploded on the football field. The window glass shattered and a cloud of coal dust filled the room, but the wooden blind preserved Doris from injury.20
Six bombs fell amongst the burning waste heaps at Eldon Colliery but again these were at a safe distance from the mine complex. The last two bombs straddled a locomotive shed between the colliery and a brickworks; no bombs had struck any mine buildings. Peterson took L 16 back to the coast and at 12.45am she went out to sea at the same spot as she came inland 75 minutes earlier.
Five aircraft went up to intercept L 11 and L 16. Although the sky was generally clear, fog hung about the RNAS stations on the north-east coast. One RNAS aircraft from Scarborough and two RFC pilots from Cramlington and Beverley saw nothing of the raiders but there was a tragic end for one. Returning to No.36 (Home Defence) Squadron airfield at Cramlington, Captain John Nicol, smashed into a house as he came in to land; his bombs exploded and killed him.
A damage report covering this second part of L 16’s raid listed 27 bombs (17 HE and 10 incendiary), which demolished two homes, seriously damaged 11, caused minor damage to 28 more and 18 shops. One child died and there were injuries to a woman and two children.21 But Peterson had missed four collieries even though passing over or close to them. It was, of course, not the story he told when he got back to Germany. A German press release concluded: ‘Furthermore factories at Leeds and environs and a number of railway stations in the industrial district were attacked. Very good results were observed.’22
The evening of 6 April brought a change of weather over northern Germany, heralding strong gales from the east, which ended this intense period of raiding. In fact, it proved to be the most concentrated period of Zeppelin activity throughout the war. Between 31 March and 5 April German airships set out on six consecutive days; only on one occasion did bad weather force them to abort. The statistics compiled in Britain state that those raids inflicted material damage to the value of £126,09523 with 84 people killed and 227 injured. In addition two RFC pilots died in landing accidents. Germany lost one Zeppelin (L 15) with 17 officers and men captured and one man drowned. Although many amongst the Zeppelin crews assumed this pattern of raiding would continue whenever weather permitted, it was not to be. Oberleutnant-zur-See Werner Dietsch, the executive officer (second-in-command) on L 17 during this period, wrote after the war: ‘The heady days of 1916, when we would carry out three raids in five days... would never be seen again.’24
In Britain the military took stock and expressed a general satisfaction with the gradual improvements in Home Defence evidenced by the guns and lighting arrangements.
The impunity with which the airships had hitherto generally passed over their objectives, with the possible exceptions of Dover and London, evidently received a rude shock during this week... It may be concluded that the commanders of these airships after 31st March more than once declined to face the risks attendant on the full achievements of their plan... there was also the question as to how far the reduction of lights had achieved its end... The aimless behaviour of other airships during the week under review proves that airship navigation was becoming much more difficult.25
The report concluded that the, ‘inherent fragility and weakness in face of the increasing powers of our means of defence bid fair to impose a check upon [the Zeppelins’] offensive ability’. In Germany, however, contrary to British observations there was no diminishing in the determination to continue taking the war over the North Sea to Britain.
The next time German airships appeared it formed part of a wider strategy and of necessity took place a little earlier in the moon cycle than usual. In Ireland, Republicans planned a rising against British rule over the Easter weekend and had long sought German support. Now Germany sent 20,000 rifles, ammunition and 10 machine guns. Germany also planned an airship raid on London by naval Zeppelins and hoped to create further confusion by sending out the High Seas Fleet to bombard Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth, hoping to draw out British ships, which they could pick off. HMS Bluebell intercepted the arms shipment before it could land and although the rising went ahead in Dublin on Easter Monday, 24 April, British troops crushed it five days later.
Eight Zeppelins prepared for the attack on Britain, while three older vessels, L 6, L 7 and L 9, supported the Fleet. The ships departed late on the morning of Easter Monday, followed in the afternoon by the raiding Zeppelins but both L 14 and L 20 experienced problems and turned back. The other six, L 11, L 13, L 16, L 17, L 21 and L 23, all encountered strong south-west winds that prevented them pushing on to London, leaving them to search for targets of opportunity in a blacked-out landscape, further hampered by heavy banks of cloud, fog and rain. It was another less than successful night for the raiders.
Five of the six appeared over Norfolk and Suffolk with just one, L 17, coming inland over Lincolnshire. Her commander, Herbert Ehrlich, never penetrated more than seven miles. Having crossed the coast at Chapel St Leonards he reached Anderby at about 1.20am where he released a single incendiary bomb in a field, followed ten minutes later by three HE bombs near Alford that smashed a single pane of glass. Struggling to find targets, Ehrlich aborted the raid, turned back to the coast and set course for home.
A few days earlier Kapitänleutnant der Reserve Eduard Prölss and his crew took over L 13 from Heinrich Mathy who was awaiting delivery of a new class of Zeppelin. Prölss had recently commanded L 9. In this, his first raid in L 13, things did not go well, as had often been the case for Mathy’s men, a fact unlikely to be lost on any triskaidekaphobic (extreme superstition regarding the number thirteen) members of the new crew. Coming inland near Cromer at about 10.20pm, L 13 wandered over north Norfolk until a 3-pdr mobile anti-aircraft gun at Bacton opened fire resulting in shell splinters splattering the command gondola. They failed to inflict any damage but, having been overland for no more than an hour, L 13 headed back out to sea without dropping any bombs.
Another of the raiders, L 16, came inland five minutes ahead of L 13 and headed south, passing to the west of Norwich and towards Cambridge. When he passed over the famous horse racing town of Newmarket, Werner Peterson circled back to investigate and at 12.30am came under fire from two mobile machine guns at Newmarket Heath. Stung into action, Peterson released 18 HE bombs. These fell in a line across the town from south-west to north-east, from Newmarket Heath to Warren Hill Station. Most of the damage was concentrated in Lowther Street where the bombs damaged five houses, and St Mary’s Square where 100 houses suffered lesser damage. Awoken at 12.35am by the sound of exploding bombs, an excited journalist found himself in the firing line for the first time: ‘Here it was at last. A real Zeppelin raid, and we were all under fire of the Germans, like the gallant fellows in the trenches... for the moment one seemed to be in the midst of a bombardment.’26
He timed the last bomb ten minutes later at 12.45am and then considered what to do next.
Under the circumstances it was impossible to remain in the house. In the streets there were little knots of hurrying, stopping, inquiring people, while a strident voice of command shouted through the stillness of the night: ‘Get inside your houses.’... If the voice of command had been enforced by the dropping of a bomb it might have been obeyed, but the lapse of ten minutes had restored everybody’s nerves, and curiosity got the better of caution.27
Windows and doors were broken, slates ripped from roofs and craters marked the Zeppelin’s course, but there were no casualties. ‘Nothing had been done that money would not replace,’ the journalist concluded, ‘and the cash value of restoring the property would be far less than the cost of the air raid to the enemy.’
More bombs dropped near racing stables on the open ground of The Severals as L 16 followed the line of the Bury Road leading out of the town. One killed a valuable racehorse, Coup de Main, favourite to win the Newbury Spring Cup the following week. The only human casualty occurred in a house on Bury Road near Warren Hill Station where Mr Bayliss, a London stockbroker, had committed the basic error of going to a window when he heard the bombs. As he did so, one exploded in his garden sending jagged metal fragments and glass slashing through the air.28 Mr Bayliss suffered a number of injuries, the most serious to his arm for which, a newspaper reported, ‘amputation of the limb will almost certainly have to be made’.29
As L 16 left the town Peterson released two final bombs over The Limekilns, another large open area where, unsurprisingly, they inflicted little damage. Heading back towards the coast, Peterson dropped five incendiary bombs at 1.15am as he passed between East Dereham and Norwich. They fell in fields at Honingham Hall, outside the village of Honingham, where one incinerated a large stack of straw. Peterson returned to the coast at Mundesley and set course from there back to Germany.
Kapitänleutnant Otto von Schubert was making his first raid over England when, at 11.50pm, he brought L 23 inland over Caister on the Norfolk coast. L 23 was a new airship, only in service since 16 April. Von Schubert had previously commanded L 7 but his lack of raiding experience saw him penetrate no more than four miles inland and spend less than an hour over England. He dropped three HE bombs near Caister then headed up the coast to the village of Ridlington where von Schubert released nine more. These ripped into farm buildings at Church Farm and smashed windows in the farmhouse. St Peter’s Church also had its windows broken and the bombs partly wrecked a cottage. The only casualty was a bullock killed at the farm.
Just over a mile north of Ridlington was RNAS Bacton where landing flares were burning as an aircraft had taken off at 22.55pm. L 23 attacked it with six bombs and although one physically moved a searchlight, the only other damage reported was to two houses close to the airfield where the blast smashed glass and window frames. L 23 then turned out over the coast and began the homeward journey to Germany.
Another of the raiders, Viktor Schütze’s L 11, crossed the coast near Bacton at about 12.30am. Schütze, who had already taken part in three other raids in April, set course for Norwich, about 17 miles inland, a journey he would hope to make in less than 30 minutes in normal conditions. He seemed unaware, however, of the strength of the wind he was flying into, because half an hour after heading inland he saw lights and commenced his attack, but L 11 had penetrated only five or six miles. A first batch of four HE bombs fell just north of the village of Honing in the open grounds of Honing Hall, quickly followed by 45 more bombs (19 HE and 26 incendiaries). Rather than bombarding the city of Norwich, they blasted the countryside a little to the north of the village of Dilham where the isolated Dairyhouse Farm found itself in the centre of a war zone. Fortunately no bombs hit the buildings but the blast from those nearby tore off roof tiles and smashed windows there and in four cottages. Three quarters of a mile away, at Hall Farm, the explosions gave 79-year-old widow Fanny Gaze such a shock that she died of a heart attack. Schütze now turned back, reaching the coast at Sea Palling at 1.18am. As was his way, Schütze then followed the coastline north rather than steering for Germany. After about seven miles he reached Bacton where the two 3-pdrs of the Eastern Mobile Section of the RNAAS came into action for the second time that night. The crew fired seven rounds before L 11 passed out of range but it appears that shell fragments ripped open one of her gas cells although she did return safely to Germany.30
While other commanders may have struggled with navigation, there was no such problem for Max Dietrich, commanding L 21. Accompanied by Peter Strasser, Dietrich came inland just south of Lowestoft at about 11.10pm and headed directly towards Stowmarket, about 40 miles inland, where an important munitions factory operated.31 L 21 approached Stowmarket about an hour later but the gunners defending the site were ready. Supported now by two mobile 13-pdr guns at Stowupland and Badley, the two resident 6-pdrs opened fire at 12.16am. It was an unexpected and unwelcome reception. The Zeppelin immediately released water ballast, creating a cloud of vapour, and climbed rapidly as she turned away from the town. Dietrich released nine HE bombs, which fell in ploughed fields at Ward Green, just north of the village of Old Newton, breaking a few windows. He headed back towards the coast, passing around the west side of Norwich, which lay in darkness. A single HE bomb dropped at Witton at about 1.30am before L 21 reached the coast five minutes later near Bacton. However, instead of heading back to Germany, Dietrich and Strasser rendezvoused with the German fleet as it headed towards Lowestoft to commence its bombardment of the town.
Although five RNAS aircraft and one from the RFC were searching for the raiders, only Flight sub-Lieutenant Edward Pulling caught a glimpse of one, but L 23 was about 2,000 feet above him and his slow-climbing BE2c had no chance of catching it. Pulling crashed on landing but walked away unharmed.
At 4.10am, four German battlecruisers began a ten-minute bombardment of Lowestoft before moving on to Great Yarmouth. Shells wrecked 200 houses and two gun batteries, killing three people and injuring 12. The battlecruisers subsequently cut short their bombardment of Great Yarmouth when they received news of the movements of Royal Navy ships, which resulted in them withdrawing to join the main naval force. The subsequent engagement never escalated into anything significant, but one of the casualties is worth noting. It was in this engagement that the former Grimsby trawler, King Stephen, so reviled in Germany after the loss of the crew of L 19 and now operating as a Q-ship, was captured and then sunk.
While the German fleet remained within range of the Norfolk coast an incident almost led to the destruction of one of the escorting Zeppelins. Shortly after the bombardment, at 4.38am, two BE2c aircraft from RNAS Great Yarmouth encountered Zeppelin L 9 flying at only 2,600 feet while holding a position between the battlecruisers and the main fleet. The two pilots, Flight Commander Vincent Nicholl and Flight Lieutenant Frederick Hards, both managed to get above her. However, although they were able to drop bombs and Ranken darts, L 9’s skilful manoeuvring ensured they all missed the target. What the pilots needed was a more reliable and lethal weapon. The next day there was the first hint that a solution was at hand.