Meade smarted from his failure to crush Lee when the Virginian was trapped at Williamsport with his back to the rain-swollen Potomac. Now he pushed his own army across the receding river quickly toward the gaps in the Blue Ridge, but his army was worn out. Sharpe observed to his Uncle Jansen in a letter of July 18, “We must stop soon, as horses & mules are dropping dead every day—& the men are nearly exhausted.”1
Sharpe had made the same observation Homer did 2,600 years before—“Past his strength no man can go.” Courage in battle is a factor of energy, and energy is an accumulated resource. The exertions of the forced march to Gettysburg, the exertions and trauma of battle, and the pursuit had seriously drained the army of that moral and bodily energy upon which success in battle is based. If the men in the ranks were exhausted, so too were their officers, line and staff. Meade himself had almost no sleep in the three days after he assumed command and little more in the three days of dreadful battle. That applied to most staff officers and Sharpe himself. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery may have said as a subaltern in 1915, “If bread is the staff of life, what is the life of the staff? One big loaf.” On the contrary, the staff on active campaign works early and late into the night after the soldier, his duties at bay, slumbers. Sharpe had had the advantage of being an energetic and active man, but even that by this point had its limits after a month of continuous effort.2
That limit had just been reached by an intimate friend of Sharpe’s. Just before the headquarters crossed the Potomac, Sharpe and Patrick were presented with a family problem of sorts. Colonel Gates of the 20th NYSM passed his resignation to Patrick on July 17 as he boarded a train with 727 Confederate prisoners destined for Washington and with most of the survivors of his regiment as guard. Apparently, his regiment’s heavy losses had been too much for him. On his return to the army four days later, he found that his resignation had been refused. That night he had dinner with both Patrick and Sharpe. He pressed his “personal application” for his resignation. As friends, Patrick and Sharpe must have struggled with a decision. It is significant that Sharpe played such a role in this matter when it was Patrick’s decision. Gates evidently relied on Sharpe as a friend and fellow veteran of the old 20th NYSM for advice. Sharpe recommended a rest to clear his mind of too many ghosts. A week later Sharpe wrote Gates a letter, which Gates described in his diary as stating that “he [Sharpe] & Gen. Patrick had concluded that my resignation had better not be pressed at present but that I had better go home on the conscript detail.” Patrick arranged for this detail and that of two officers and six enlisted men to train conscripts on Riker’s Island in New York Harbor.3
It would be light duty for Gates, who took frequent leave to visit his family in Kingston. He was ordered back to his regiment and arrived on December 18 to “cheers and pleased faces.” The next day he called on Patrick and Sharpe, who must have been pleased to see that he was his old self again. On Christmas Day Sharpe and the other officers of the 120th New York arrived at Gate’s tent with the regimental band to serenade an old friend. They stayed to party until one in the morning and “had quite a jolly time.”4
This story reveals Sharpe as a concerned brother officer and friend. He realized how much the trauma of Gettysburg had affected Gates. He also realized that allowing Gates’s resignation to be approved would both lose a good officer and forever destroy the man’s self-esteem. By his action he saved Gates, and on Christmas Day welcomed him back in a handsome style that told Gates all was well; he was back among friends.5
No sooner had the broken Gates been sent home to recover than another personal tragedy hit the provost marshal’s official family. Fred Manning’s father had recently visited his son at the army’s camp at Germantown and then had gone on to visit another son, who had lost a leg at Chancellorsville, at the Mount Pleasant Hospital in Washington. Upon leaving, the elder Manning died suddenly of a stroke. Lieutenant Manning asked for 15 days’ leave. Sharpe approved it immediately and authorized Manning’s use of the army telegram service to expedite his leave. Patrick was equally supportive, noting that Manning’s father had lived near Patrick’s own family in New York.6
This is another example of the band of brothers attitude that Sharpe consistently demonstrated toward subordinates, whether in the 120th New York or the BMI. Those that worked for him knew he would be sensitive to their concerns, loyal to them as comrades, and would do his utmost to be fair. It would be reciprocated with devotion and an intelligent and aggressive initiative to excel that broke down the many barriers that crop up in armies at war. The reciprocal bonds of affection that Sharpe induced in his subordinates produced a determination never to let “the old man” down.
The opposition to the draft that summer, particularly the riots that engulfed New York City, July 11–16, had stirred up strong feelings in the army. Sharpe’s Uncle Jansen apparently had written him that his name had been associated with a strong opinion on the draft and that he would be bringing his regiment home to enforce the draft. Aghast, Sharpe had replied on July 28 that he had not written a word to anyone on the subject of the draft or his regiment’s use to enforce it. He commented that reticence was due to larger considerations. “I have uniformly tried to be very prudent in what I said in my letters—I know of no one more so—& I have to be—for my position is a very confidential one—& I am informed of all the movements of both armies.” Sharpe was a natural-born politician, but he also possessed a good lawyer’s ability to keep his client’s affairs entirely opaque.
Trying to unravel the story, he said that a local Kingston dignitary, Dr. Dawes, had suggested to him that if he brought his regiment home to recruit, it “could be filled up by volunteers.” Dawes had stated that “he and other gentlemen of standing were authorized to guarantee it.” Sharpe had given the matter much thought and concluded that “it could be done—because the friends of each Company—raised as my Companies were, in distinct localities, would have done it… I should like to see the draft averted from our County.” Volunteers would fill the counties’ draft quota.
He then formally requested of Meade that his regiment be sent home for recruitment. Meade replied that “not a man could be spared from this Army.” Sharpe was disappointed because he believed that an important opportunity had been lost. The best he could do now was to repair his reputation on the matter and perhaps effect an end run around Meade. “I shall write to [Congressman] Steele immediately on the subject of your letter—to get him to set me straight in certain quarters. Perhaps a strong paper from leading citizens of our district—backed by Steele might get our 2 regts sent home to recruit & save the dft in the district—It can only be done from Wash.”7
But the pressure on Meade to fill up his depleted regiments was too great. The historian of the 120th wrote, “The ranks of the regiment had grown greatly depleted through losses of the Gettysburg campaign, and its one crying need now, was a fresh supply of men. This need, indeed, it shared with nearly all the army.” Companies that a year before had numbered 100 men now could only muster 20; at one brigade parade the regiment could only put out 83 men. “Accordingly, efforts were at once put forth to supply this demand. A detail of officers and men was sent North to obtain what was so urgently required. The several rendezvous of drafted men were resorted to, to secure the necessary supply, it being found that voluntary enlistments were insufficient…”8
“The Regiment is under the command of Capt. Abram Lockwood. Major Tappen has gone to New York, with a detail of men from the Regiment to aid in enforcing the draft, and to bring on the conscripts—three hundred and fifty-five of whom will be placed in the 120th.”9
What Sharpe had feared had come to pass. The draft had fallen on Ulster County. Sending details from the regiment to bring back drafted men seemed the worst solution. Had Sharpe been able to bring the entire regiment home to actively recruit among communities, his enthusiasm, his reputation, and his ability as a public speaker probably would have filled up the ranks without resort to the draft.
The draft issue would continue to bother Sharpe but from a different angle. Enforcement of the draft was in the hands of the provost marshal general of the U.S. Army, Col. John B. Fry. Unfortunately, civilians in Sharpe’s county associated him with the effort because he was the deputy provost marshal general of the Army of the Potomac. As he was at pains to explain on occasion, “I do not wonder that there is some misunderstanding regarding the particular work assigned to Provost Marshals of whom so many have been created since the war. Our pro Mar Genl Department is a purely military organization forming part of the army in the field—and having nothing to do with Drafted men…” Nevertheless, he would always do what he could for someone with an appeal, either by directing them to Fry’s office or researching the matter as far as he could.10
Irony of ironies but Meade, the very man whose reputation rested on his timely receipt and use of intelligence, now ordered Sharpe to deal only with the sources under his own direction—espionage, scouting, document exploitation, and interrogation. Meade was enough of a traditionalist and a scholar to think he could coordinate the remaining sources himself. At a stroke, he undid the all-source miracle. Sharpe ceased to use any name for his organization, now using only “Office of the Provost Marshal General.” The coordination that Sharpe had conducted directly with the signals and cavalry now had to go “through channels.” The chief signal officer of the army, Capt. Benjamin F. Fisher, went so far as to suggest that his reports be shared with the “secret service.”
His new chief of staff was the recently promoted Maj. Gen. Andrew Humphreys, who had stood behind Sharpe’s old regiment on the second day at Gettysburg when only it held the line against the Confederate tide. He was also the same topographical engineer whose maps had been so outclassed by Babcock’s efforts in the Peninsular Campaign. Sharpe had to make Babcock scarce for quite a while and even have subordinates prepare the order-of-battle reports that had normally been in Babcock’s hand. Nor was it possible for Babcock to sign Sharpe’s name. It was Humphreys who would now collect all the information from all the non-BMI collection sources, Sharpe’s former task.11
Meade was far more directly involved in the analysis of information than he should have been, even of those areas of responsibility retained by Sharpe. Captured newspapers were brought to him first before Sharpe and his staff could analyze them. Sharpe had to beg for them back. “The papers brought by our men—Richmond dates of the day previous—are included—We would like to examine them carefully, when the General himself have done with them.” Again in December Manning, signing for Sharpe, had to plead to Meade in a way that indicated this was a constant problem, “Much information can be gleaned from them for our records should you see fit to return them.”12
It also appears that Meade was taking a lot of the reports from deserters and prisoners far too literally, without Sharpe’s analytical filter. He was also known to personally interrogate them. This would have consequences later on.13
At the same time, Meade’s constant ill-temper was alienating everyone around him. Grant’s characterization was again on the mark when he wrote that Meade “was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most offensive manner… This made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with information.” Meade’s tongue was just as sharp with his own general and personal staff.14 We shall see later that Sharpe on at least one occasion became the quiet spokesman to Patrick of the army staff ’s unhappiness.
Meade’s scholarship did make a significant contribution to the art of intelligence by resurrecting the meaning of the word “intelligence” to mean processed information about the enemy, in which sense it had been used by George Washington. Meade deserves the credit for returning its meaning to Washington’s original sense of the word.15
After Meade clipped Sharpe’s wings, he reserved the right unto himself to answer the ultimate question of military intelligence, “What does all this mean?” He had gone from being not only the primary consumer of intelligence but the ultimate military intelligence analyst. As Sharpe was confined to rely on only the four lanes that were left to him (and we have seen with the latter it was only contingent, and at times Meade conducted his own interrogations), he could not incorporate the equally valuable information received from the Signal Corps and the cavalry. Whatever intelligence Sharpe was providing was no longer fully all-source.
Despite Meade’s disruption of the all-source effort, Sharpe made the most of the assets that remained to him, and his continuing control of interrogations allowed him to state in late 1863, “We are entirely familiar with the organization of the rebel forces in Virginia and North Carolina.” The BMI had become familiar “with each regiment, brigade, and division, with the changes therein, and [with] their officers and locations.” With the coming of the new year, he could state confidently, “the state of our information has been such as to form a standard of credibility by which these men were gauged, while each was adding to the general sum.” Babcock would also note that after Gettysburg, “Much was done in perfecting Lee’s organization, selecting guides for country to be operated in, location of enemy on map. Etc.”16
Despite his problems with Meade, Sharpe was having some success in creating the concept among the various staffs and commands within the army that everyone had a part to play in the development of intelligence. The two other traditional collection arms were the Signal Corps and the cavalry. It is evident that Sharpe and the signal officer had a close working relationship. Doubtless the signal officer was providing his reports under the table to Sharpe. It was a natural relationship.
It was the cavalry that had to break old habits and ideas that it was the primary collection means of the army. Sharpe in the last two campaigns had shown he was the new game in town, and the cavalry resented his treading on their traditional mission. An example of the attempt to play it alone was Brig. Gen. George A. Custer, commanding a brigade in Kilpatrick’s 3rd Cavalry Division. He bypassed Kilpatrick and sent a letter dated August 13 directly to the corps commander, Pleasonton, in which he at some length went over his collection and analysis efforts. He referred to a Richmond newspaper which he enclosed and to the contents of an Army of Northern Virginia mailbag he had captured. He did not forward the letters, and it appears that army headquarters learned nothing of them.17
On the morning of the 17th it appears that Kilpatrick’s command captured another mailbag but forwarded only two letters and a newspaper to Pleasonton who, in turn, sent them on to Meade’s headquarters the next day. It took another 10 days for the matter of the various mailbags to come to Meade’s attention, an indication of the confusion attendant in the headquarters, with Meade and Humphreys trying to substitute themselves, already burdened with heavy workloads, for the single-mission dedicated BMI. In his response, it is not clear whether Meade was referring to the mailbag captured on the 13th, if he ever learned of that one, or to the one captured on the 17th. He sent a preemptory order that “hereafter ... anything of that kind that is captured be forwarded at once.”18
The BMI was no threat to the cavalry; rather, it complemented it, although there was some natural overlap in the use of scouts. Cavalry patrols and scouts largely functioned at the tactical level to warn of enemy movements and threats against the army, and to answer the questions of what and when. Although cavalry and BMI scouts went out in small numbers or singly, Sharpe’s men were frequently in civilian clothes or Confederate uniforms that allowed them to pass unobtrusively among the enemy, and here is an important difference—to interact with Confederate soldiers and civilians. For example, in the episode described above, scout Skinker posing as a Confederate civilian was able to elicit important information from an influential man who assumed he was also a rebel. They also worked with a network of Union agents in the enemy countryside and regularly brought back written reports. Isaac Silver was only the most important of Sharpe’s agents. The most telling limitation of the cavalry is its inability to answer “why.” That was Sharpe’s forte even with the limitations forced on him by Meade.
In Meade’s defense, there is no evidence that he discouraged the collection of information from any source. If anything, he gave collection his complete support. That meant not only the cavalry but the major corps commands as well. The corps now knew that it was just not enough to forward prisoners and deserters to the provost marshal general but to conduct initial interrogations to be able to alert the BMI to promising sources. Deserters, in particular, usually had something to offer and were up front about it. Sharpe would have been the one to coordinate with corps staffs and commanders. He was very much a hands-on staff officer who would brief pickets on what information to worm out of their counterparts. He would have worked closely at lower levels essentially to train the staff and line, and to gain the goodwill of the corps commanders to smooth the way for his message. Since he was regularly providing the corps commanders with Lee’s order-of-battle down to regiment, he ensured himself a positive reception. Slowly but surely the army was learning that everyone had a role in the creation of intelligence.
On August 11 Patrick suddenly took leave for 15 days; he had angered some powerful authorities in the War Department and saw his removal as imminent. The only thing that seemed to be staying their hand was finding a qualified successor. In the meantime, both Meade and Patrick thought it advisable for him to take leave as things sorted themselves out. Sharpe had already had his own leave approved for what he had called “this period of inaction,” and wrote his uncle that Patrick suddenly had to take leave because of a severe illness in his family. The illness was either an amazingly timely coincidence or a public face on why Patrick had to leave, one that Sharpe does not appear to have known.19
Shortly after Patrick took leave, the threat of his relief seems to have blown over. Reports in the press indicated that rumors of his replacement were unfounded, and “although should the exigencies of the service require him to take command of a division, the ability and experience of Col. Sharpe would point to him as the next Provost Marshal General.” The correspondent was evidently picking up the high regard in which Sharpe was held at headquarters.20
Patrick’s sudden departure on leave meant that Sharpe had to immediately step into the provost marshal general’s demanding job while continuing to do his own, even as it began to pick up again. One of the first issues he had to deal with was the policy on allowing sutlers to bring liquors into the army, a matter of no little concern given the hard-drinking attitudes of the period and the effects on good order and discipline of uncontrolled access to such. He instructed Captain Beckwith on the provost marshal general’s staff to produce a summary of the current policy, and based upon that, he recommended, “It is quite important that the system of bringing goods to the Army should be fixed, and that it should harmonize not only with rules established here, but also with such as Major General Martindale [military governor of Washington] feels called upon to make…” In other words, he had arrived at a common sense solution that would prevent the ongoing friction between the army and its rear.21
A good part of his time was taken up in dealing with the Virginia civilians in the army’s area of operations. There were constant appeals for redress of grievance over animals seized by the army. Each case was the subject of inquiry and adjudication. Another critical issue was the overall treatment of civilians. Sharpe wrote out a memorandum stating that citizens who refused to take the oath of loyalty had only to expect the protection of their lives and property and not expect to be given passes into Washington or Alexandria, travel on the roads, come within the army’s lines, or be allowed any favors or indulgences. Sharpe concluded, “Each case should rest upon its individual merits but the Oath of Allegiance should always be a prerequisite.”22
A normal responsibility of the provost operation was dealing with criminal matters within the army, which entailed numerous investigations, even down to claims of stolen horses. Of far more importance was the problem of desertion, which plagued both Union and Confederate armies, particularly among drafted men. In one case Sharpe requested lists of names and descriptions of deserters from the 15th Massachusetts Volunteers to aid in their apprehension. Sharpe lamented, “Conscript deserters are being brought in every day and are using every device possible to escape identification.” Eventually, Patrick and Sharpe would hit upon a foolproof method of forcing a confession from such deserters.23
There was also a lot of humdrum and detail in the provost duties Sharpe had to deal with. One of them was in confiscating the significant amount of pornographic material being sent to the army through the mail. A serious sex scandal in the army may have provided some dramatic if not comic relief. A teenage prostitute, Anne (Annie) E. Jones, had joined the army as “a daughter of the regiment,” a term for a female mascot, and gone on to ensnare a number of general officers, including cavalry Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick, who put her up in his tent and flaunted her about his command. Jealous that she boasted also of bedding Brig. Gen. George A. Custer, of the flowing blonde locks, he accused her of being a spy.24 She brazenly applied to remain with the army. Sharpe was the one who, in accordance with Meade’s orders, denied her application, ordered her to headquarters to expel her from the army, and sent her to Washington. She would eventually spend three months in prison as a suspected spy, but would be pardoned and released.25
Patrick returned on August 26 and immediately approved Sharpe’s leave. Upon Sharpe’s return, Patrick surprised him with some news:
Genl Patrick asked me on my return what I would like best in case of his soon leaving. I replied that I would rather do something for my regiment than myself & he said he could apply for it to be ordered on duty with me at H. Q. immediately—he has since told me that Meade has consented—but the order is not out as yet. I hope it may come.
At last, it seemed that Sharpe would succeed in having the 120th transferred to the provost guard—or so it seemed. Nothing came of it in the end.
At least the middle of August found the 120th with comparatively easy duty. One of the soldiers wrote home, “At present our Regiment is doing picket duty along the Rappahannock, between Beverly and Freeman’s Ford.—I assure you we enjoy ourselves along this beautiful stream, and in the cool shade. It is just the placs [sic] for our wearied soldiers, after long marches over dusty roads, and through the hot sun.” He also took the opportunity to vent: “Great indignation is felt by the members of the Brigade at the dastardly conduct of the Copperheads in our native State. We have some respect for the rebel soldiers who will stand up, face the bullets and fight like men; but words cannot express the contempt with which we regard those home traitors, who seek to stab in the dark and fire in the rear.” It was a sentiment actively held by Sharpe and one he would not fail to express after the war.26
A detailed insight into the workings of the BMI at this time is found in what can only be described as John Babcock’s daily journal of intelligence operations. It covers the period from August 24 to December 6, 1863 and is a day-by-day account of interrogations and scouting activities. That it was meant to be a journal of only those issues on which Babcock concentrated is evidenced by the absence of Sharpe’s dealings with spies and counterintelligence and interaction with other agencies such as McPhail’s provost marshal general’s office in Baltimore.
The journal reflects the rhythm of the BMI’s order-of-battle and scouting operations for that period. Throughout the interrogation reports are brigade-level orders-of-battle, and here and there are elegant hand-drawn maps in color. Given the precision and order of this journal, which clearly reflected Babcock’s approach to his duties, it is a reasonable assumption that this is the only surviving volume of a series that covered the entire history of the BMI. The disappearance of the other volumes remains a great loss to the study of military intelligence in the Civil War.
In the 75 days covered by the journal, Babcock shows that he interrogated 80 POWs/deserters, 20 civilian refugees, and 20 contraband slaves. These were among the subjects that Babcock thought worth interrogating. Given that the army headquarters moved 13 times in this period during which interrogations were not conducted, Babcock was conducting about two interrogations a day. Separating this wheat from the chaff required a careful sorting process that included almost all POWs and deserters. Because of his selectivity in choosing his subjects, reports generated by them were often lengthy. Great care was especially given to determining how genuine were the motives of deserters in seeking to be sent North.
Babcock also reports that there were 19 scouting expeditions composed of at least two and often more scouts which often lasted three or more days. That amounted to a constant scouting effort against the enemy. Babcock mentions the names of the most stalwart of the scouts: Cline, Brown, Anson B. Carney, Hogan, McGee, Plew, McCord, Dodd, and Hunnicutt.27
Pasted at the end of the journal are a number of newspaper clippings from Northern and Southern newspapers, the latter showing how much important order-of-battle information was available “open source,” as the term is used today. For example, there was Lee’s official report of the Gettysburg Campaign as published in the Richmond papers; a Richmond Enquirer account of Pickett’s Charge and its losses; a list of Confederate general officers who had been killed, wounded, or resigned; and a list of senior officers confirmed by the Confederate senate. All of these, processed and analyzed, ended up in the growing files of the BMI. Of the Northern papers, the New York Herald printed in early September a complete order-of-battle of the Army of Northern Virginia down to regiment that it claimed originated from the office of the Confederate adjutant general. It was hugely inaccurate and bears little resemblance to the actual return of the Army of Northern Virginia for the end of August, except such publicly known information as the corps and divisions and their commanders. For example, the article shows a strength of 112,000, whereas Lee’s returns for that time show only 61,202 officers and men present for duty. It has all the earmarks of a deception operation—just enough accuracy to be believable, and the inaccuracies cleverly woven to seriously mislead and alarm the enemy. That it appeared in the Herald, a newspaper despised by Sharpe for its antiwar positions, indicates that the newspaper may have been carefully chosen as a platform for the deception. It must have caused Babcock to shake his head at what nonsense got into the Northern press. It would not be the last time the BMI and the Provost Marshal Department would protest such consistent cupidity and error.28
The Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia would fight no more major battles until the spring of 1864. Essentially the armies left each other alone for August and September in order to recover from the bloodletting at Gettysburg. The relatively calm situation was ideal for scouts, and Sharpe had his “constantly on the move. One group ranged as far eastward as the Potomac, its members posing alternately as Confederate soldiers and as local civilians, and repeatedly encountering enemy picket lines.” Communications were reestablished with Isaac Silver, who had been waiting to hear from Sharpe’s men. He had a report ready on Lee’s right wing.
On August 4 Sharpe reported on “a most important expedition, conducted by Cline, attended by the highest results. Cline in another bravura performance had slipped into Spotsylvania County and through his own observations and information from agents such as Silver had reported on the severe problems affecting Lee’s army. The country he traveled through was swarming with cavalry patrols searching for deserters. Desertion had become so rampant in the Army of Northern Virginia as to cause a crisis in morale. Lee reported to Davis that “Great dissatisfaction is reported among the good men in the Army at the apparent impunity of the deserters.” He issued general orders to implement Davis’s August 1 proclamation of amnesty to any deserter who would return to the ranks within 20 days. It backfired, and as Lee explained, “many presumed on it and absented themselves from their commands choosing to place on it a wrong interpretation.” Lee was forced to institute a system of furloughs. Cline’s report was dead on, an amazing insight into the crucial morale of the enemy.29
Cline also reported on the attempted resignation of Robert E. Lee in response to the barrage of criticism over the failure of the Gettysburg Campaign. Sharpe wrote:
An extraordinary state of excitement is pervading all classes of Southern society in regard to the late retreat of General Lee. A disagreement has sprung up between himself and the Confederate cabinet, and General Lee has tendered his resignation. He desires to retire to the line of the James River, and Mr. Davis urgently insists upon his defending the line of the Rappahannock. Much recrimination exists in regard to the immense loss occasioned by the advance into and retirement from Pennsylvania. All agree that the line of the Rapidan will only be defended for the purpose of retarding our movements.30
In fact, Cline’s information had anticipated Lee’s resignation, which was not made until August 8. But the crisis in the Southern command was as genuine as Lee’s heartfelt attempt to resign.
The general remedy for the want of success in a military commander is his removal… I therefore, in all sincerity, request Your Excellency to take measures to supply my place. I do this with the more earnestness because no one is more aware than myself of my inability for the duties of my position. I cannot even accomplish what I myself desire. How can I fulfill the expectations of others? In addition, I sensibly feel the growing failure of my bodily strength. I have not yet recovered from the attack I experienced last spring. I am becoming more and more incapable of exertion, and am thus prevented from making the personal supervision of the operations in the field which I feel to be necessary. I am so dull that in making use of the eyes of others I am frequently misled.31
Sharpe apparently had already personally briefed Meade on these issue, but added in his official report that this information had been “obtained from such sources as to make it entirely reliable—the details hereof being personally communicated to the Commanding General.” Sharpe had delivered a remarkably accurate report of the political-military state of the enemy at this time, a state of shock and demoralization after the ruinous failure of the Gettysburg Campaign. It was strategic political-military assessment that today might be the subject of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).32
In addition to reporting accurately on the enemy’s morale and command crises, Sharpe had another morsel of operational importance. However garbled the reason, he had identified the importance of the Rapidan to Lee. When Meade finally took up a position on the Rappahannock, Lee settled down along the Rapidan. And settle down he could, recovering his health, and resting his army and restoring its morale for the rest of August and September, largely undisturbed by his opponents. Meade was doing essentially the same thing. There was an alarm, however, on August 15 that most of Lee’s army was on the march from Culpeper Court House along the Fredericksburg road with the intent to cross the Rappahannock at U.S. Ford. The press attributed the alarm to the story of Curtis Merritt, a black drummer boy who had deserted and come into Union lines that day. Humphreys informed the I Corps commander of the movement, citing the evidence of “scouts and other sources.” There are no BMI supporting documents of this event to include an interrogation of the drummer boy, but the files are incomplete. Nevertheless, the story has the ring of authenticity. Charlie Wright before Gettysburg is the most noteworthy example, but there were many more, a rich and often reliable source of excellent information. Humphreys was clearly alluding to Sharpe’s reporting. It is hard to explain, then, Meade’s comment in a letter to his wife of August 19 that “it is very difficult to obtain any minute or reliable intelligence of his [Lee’s] movements.” Sharpe had done just that with the reports of his scouts and possibly the interrogation of the drummer boy. In the end, Lee’s movement was seen to be a demonstration to warn Meade off any offensive action by threatening his left flank.33
If ever there was a time to strike when the iron was hot, this was it. However, neither Meade nor Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck saw that the combination of rampant desertion, drop in morale, and crisis in confidence in the highest levels of command was a reason for offensive operations. They were to be similarly unresponsive to an even greater opportunity. One wonders what Lincoln, who haunted the War Department’s telegraph office reading everything that came through, would have thought of this had Meade forwarded it to Halleck. Surely the content would have resonated politically in showing an especially vulnerable enemy and prompted a prodding inquiry to Meade. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that he saw or responded to Sharpe’s report in either the Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress or the Official Records.
Sharpe was looking deep into the battlefield beyond his own immediate responsibilities. He understood that the ability of Lee’s army to sustain itself was as vital as its order-of-battle; he had passed the threshold out of parochial concerns—the old saw about tactics are for amateurs, logistics for professionals. Grist for his mill came also from McPhail on August 17, whose man in Richmond provided insight into Lee’s very ability to sustain his army with this report on the Tredegar Works in Richmond, the largest single source of ordnance for the Confederate armies:
I have been able to obtain in relation to the Tredegar works Situated between the canal & River on the west side of Richmond. They are now in full operation, employing about 600. men, making all kinds of shot & shell and cannon from six to fifteen inches, and are making arrangements for Rifling larger sizes, the workmen form a battalion of five hundred as infantry and artillery having two batteries. The works turn out from nine to ten field pieces and from three to four large guns per week, a number of shops attached to the works, making smaller work. Lester’s factory for making small arms employ at least 200—hands. Iron and coal are scarce. Thousands of pounds of shot, shell & old scrap iron are at the works which cannot be used for want of proper fuel… The convicts in the penitentiary are making gun carriages, and nearly all the shops in the city are on Govt work. Three ironclads are nearly finished have a larger ordnance than the Merrimack had, three guns on the side, if one bow & one stern.34
The report also described how the employees of the works had been formed into reserve militia formations to supplement the defenses of Richmond.
Richmond included not only the Tredegar Works but enough other war industries to make the city along with Atlanta the largest sources of war materials for the Confederacy. Sharpe eagerly collected on Richmond’s war industries to supplement what he obtained from McPhail. On August 23 he reported the information provided by James Edgeworth, a conscript deserter, formerly an employee of the Tredegar Works. Edgeworth stated that the works were frequently disrupted and shut down while the employees were called up to man the defenses of Richmond. He also related how munitions works had been transferred from the works to Manchester and Belle Island to accommodate the female employees. Both Union and Confederate munitions makers found it more efficient to employ women and children, whose smaller hands and finer motor control were an advantage with sensitive explosives.35
Another feature of Sharpe’s reporting, supporting Cline’s report of the 4th, was on the increasing numbers of deserters who wished to take the oath of allegiance and be transported north. Twenty-five men from Benning’s Brigade deserted in one night. Most spoke of “hard treatment” and constant deprivation of food and clothing. Sharpe was “quite certain that almost all the men who originally enlisted from Western Va are secretly going to their homes within our lines.” There were almost no replacements, and the only men arriving were convalescents. Sharpe was identifying the phenomenon of men deserting once their homes fell beyond Union lines. Deserters were frequently being found in their own homes, now under Union control, such as the four men from the 49th Virginia taken at their homes in Rappahannock County and who had deserted the previous December.36
Perhaps most revealing was the statement of an officer deserter, Lieutenant Clair Mayfair, whom Sharpe judged intelligent and truthful:
The feeling among the troops differs a good deal. The men are very anxious for the war to close. Many of our men are sorry they did not desert in Maryland. The Tennessean and N. Carolinians desert in droves. Most of them go home but would come here if they knew how they would be received and treated.
I think that an order from General Meade similar to that issued by General Rosencrans [sic] would do Lee’s Army more damage than any battle that could be fought. This I know to be so. For I have talked with many of the men, who would desert if they had not heard that they would be badly treated here.37
Certainly this supported Sharpe’s advocacy of the psychological warfare effort to encourage desertions, an advocacy that would be transformed later into a very effective policy.
Mayfair also pointed out another problem that Lee was facing that was not reflected in the deserters that the BMI interrogated. Large numbers of Confederate soldiers were deserting in the opposite direction—homewards within the Confederacy, just the painful point President Davis was making in his amnesty proclamation of the month before.
Sharpe’s greatest achievement in these fallow months was to learn that Longstreet had departed to reinforce Lt. Gen. Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee, which was being outmaneuvered by the Union’s Army of the Cumberland under Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans. Lee was spending an extended period in Richmond and had left Longstreet in command in his absence with the instructions to take offensive action if the opportunity arose. Longstreet replied that the offensive action would only have utility if it could be made north of the Potomac, but that the army did not have the strength to ensure a decisive outcome. Instead he added:
I know little of the condition of our affairs in the West, but am inclined to the opinion that our best opportunity for great results is in Tennessee. A few could hold the defensive here with two corps and send the other to operate in Tennessee with that army, I think that we could accomplish more than by an advance from here.
Longstreet had not crassly recommended his own corps, but the suggestion clearly hung in the air. Davis approved the plan on September 9.38
The plan was already being talked about openly because two deserters from Hood’s Division had come into the Union lines on the 8th and reported the rumors of a move to Tennessee. Babcock had noted in his journal for the 9th, “Can’t locate Pickett’s or McLaws’s Divisions,” and that “Hood’s Divn is reported to be moving south!”39 In the same entry he underlined this information as important in his interrogation report of two Georgian deserters that went to Meade the same day Davis approved Longstreet’s plan.
It was the opinion of many, that a corps of Lee’s army would go west as soon as the Yankee army advanced in Tennessee. Hood’s Division had marching orders to leave yesterday at 3 a.m.
This was before informants left but they say they heard drums beating about that time. Think they are going to Richmond. Do not know however. Orders to cook three days rations.40
Two days later, on the 11th, Babcock noted in his journal that scouts Carny and Hogan had reported that farmers and slaves were all stating that there were large troop movements heading south.41
On September 14, Babcock reported that prisoners had revealed, “That Longstreet’s Corps had gone to Tennessee, and left the position in and about Fredericksburg in the following order: McLaws’ Division first, Hood’s next and Pickett last. They have all passed through Richmond and are taking the Richmond and Knoxville R. R.” That same day two more sources reported. An Italian refugee and resident of Richmond came into the lines on the 14th and reported the next day that he had witnessed Longstreet’s entire corps passing by rail through Richmond. Scouts McGee and Plew, who had been operating near Chancellorsville, came in the same day as the refugee and reported the departure from their own observations and from news from “reliable sources,” probably meaning Silver and the other Unionist agents in the area. Their only mistake was to report that all three of Longstreet’s divisions had departed for Tennessee. All three had gone to Richmond, the departure point for the long roundabout train journey to Tennessee, but Pickett’s Division had been retained there, not having recovered from its bloodletting at Gettysburg. Deserters from Virginia regiments suggested another reason. Pickett’s Division was entirely composed of Virginia regiments; they had simply refused to leave their home state. “The Virginians say if General Lee evacuates Virginia, they will not go with him. The Virginians in Longstreet’s Corps were on the point of refusing to go to the west. Think many of them will desert.” McGee and Plew’s report was the final confirmation of Lee’s strategic reinforcement of Bragg.42
Meade properly forwarded the intelligence to Halleck at 10:30 that morning and followed it up with a 10:30 p.m. letter reinforcing his opinion. “My judgment, formed on the variety of meager and conflicting testimony, is, that Lee’s army has been reduced by Longstreet’s corps.” Meade’s sour phrase, “meager and conflicting testimony” was unwarranted. Sharpe had provided his analysis based on multiple scout reports, the interrogation of a refugee, and the information gathered by Silver.43
For his part, Halleck immediately forwarded Meade’s warning to Rosecrans, where it arrived on the 16th. His chief of staff, Brig. James Garfield, reported, “A dispatch from General Halleck this morning confirms our reports that Longstreet has joined Bragg, or is on the way to do so, with three divisions.” Although it was only two divisions. Longstreet’s divisions had to travel by rail through North Carolina and Atlanta before moving north to join Bragg, arriving in increments over three days, 17–19 September. On the 18th Sharpe was almost boastful as he related to his Uncle Jansen, “General Lee has tried to cheat us as to his movements—but failed. He has sent offone corps, Longstreet’s, south and west.” Sharpe would not have felt so smug had he known that the mighty I Corps under its great commander was at that moment coiling to strike Rosecrans’s flank.44 However, Sharpe, by alerting Rosecrans four days before the battle, had done as much for him as military intelligence could do.
Knowing Longstreet would most likely be in the enemy’s array in the next battle in itself was not decisive. What Rosecrans did with that information was. It allowed him to fight a better battle. He fought Bragg to a standstill on the 19th and was doing well even when Longstreet’s forces entered the battle the next day. In the end, it was just plain bad luck. Longstreet found an unexpected hole in Rosecrans’s left flank and charged through it, to put half of the Army of the Cumberland to flight.
With his army beaten, Rosecrans fled back to Chattanooga. Bragg followed slowly and put Chattanooga under siege. Halleck was now roused to send the XI and XII Corps from Meade’s army to help break Rosecrans out of his trap. Joe Hooker was given command of the relief force and brought Butterfield with him as chief of staff. Butterfield requested that Meade’s aide, Captain Oliver, who had recovered from wounds at Gettysburg, accompany him. They sang such praises of George Sharpe to the desperate Rosecrans that he requested from Meade any intelligence that might apply to his theater, writing on October 18, “Please ask Colonel Sharpe to advise me of rebel movements affecting us here.” Edwin Fishel observed, “In a Hooker regime, Sharpe himself would have sent it himself or written it into a telegram for Butterfield’s signature, but he may not even have been informed of Rosecrans’ request.”45
The continuous refinement of the enemy’s order-of-battle and deployments by the BMI allowed Sharpe to present to Meade on October 1 with as good an estimate of the enemy situation as possible. He stated, “That two corps, Ewell’s and A. P. Hill’s comprise all the force now in our front…” and then laid out the deployment of each of the subordinate divisions and identified the whereabouts of the detached elements of the army. “That no reinforcements have been received, or any of Longstreet’s Corps returned since they went away. That Pickett’s is at Shaffer’s Bluff just below Richmond on the James River and two divisions at Chattanooga. No information as to what force is at Gordonsville but think there are none there.”
He ended the report with the general comment on the enemy’s intent: “Informants all agree that Lee’s present position is one of great strength, and has been fortified with a great deal of consideration. Also that they are anxious for us to make an attack, and exhibit much impatience at our inactivity. They state that deserters have put our army at 78,000 strong (infantry).”
Lee had indeed heavily fortified his positions and would have liked nothing more than for Meade to impale himself on them. That Confederate deserters had attributed a strength of 78,000 infantry to the Army of the Potomac may reflect indirectly the reason why Lee had entrenched so heavily. He had perhaps learned a painful lesson at Gettysburg on the power of the defensive. The enemy might have felt more confident had they known that Meade’s present for duty infantry strength was about 55,000.46
In early October another controversy arose over the question of whether A. P. Hill’s Corps and Ewell’s Corps had also been sent to Tennessee. It was an issue that would provoke Lincoln himself to weigh in with his own opinion. On October 4, a summary report written by Babcock and signed by Sharpe related the assertion of a deserter that Anderson’s Division of Hill’s Corps had been transferred to Tennessee and been replaced by Pickett’s Division from near Richmond. The report stated that this was “very probable.”47 The same day McPhail forwarded information obtained by an agent in Richmond to Sharpe that “Lee advancing with fifty-five thousands (55,000) men. Hill and Longstreet cannot return.”48
The story began to gather its own momentum when Meade wired Halleck on the 7th that two deserters repeated the camp rumor that a division of Hill’s Corps had been sent to Tennessee and that he had sent out scouts to confirm this. Two hours later Halleck wired back an inquiry from Secretary of War Stanton, “if a part of A. P. Hill’s Corps has gone west, a portion of your army cannot be spared…” One can see an edifice being built on camp rumors. The next day Sharpe, as part of ongoing analysis, expressed doubt on the issue and informed Meade of another camp rumor from three deserters that Mississippi brigade was breaking camp for transfer to Tennessee, but Sharpe comments that they were recent conscripts who knew little of their army’s organization. That same day he sent over a summary of the results of interrogations of a large number of deserters from both Ewell’s and Hill’s Corps who uniformly said that there had been no transfers of parts of Hill’s Corps from the Army of Northern Virginia.49
On the 10th Sharpe presented another report to Meade based on the observations of his scouts and in coordination with an agent who had freely traveled to Richmond. He stated categorically, “There is not the slightest evidence that any reinforcements whatever have been received by General Lee nor that any troops have left his army since Longstreet’s movement but all the evidence is to the contrary.” And that the “main body of the enemy was lying between Orange Court House and Rapidan Station,” in an inactive state. Later that day, Meade wires Halleck, “From a deserter and prisoners I learn that A. P. Hill’s whole corps and part of Ewell’s are turning my right flank, moving from Madison Court-House to Sperryville.”50 Enough prisoners and deserters acquired during the Bristoe Campaign (October 13–19) confirmed beyond doubt that A. P. Hill’s Corps was present with Lee’s army. Seemingly the issue of transfers to Tennessee had been laid to rest. However, now rumor mills would be fed by the story that it was Ewell’s Corps that was being sent west.
At this same time, Sharpe received a stream of telegrams from Michael Graham, formerly a spy for Maj. Gen. Robert Milroy. He was a Virginian and former railroad builder based in Martinsburg, West Virginia. Apparently he had been retained in some official capacity in both collecting information and conducting counterintelligence. The fact that Graham ran his own scouts and acted in the provost marshal capacity indicates he may have been leading a subordinate activity created by Sharpe for the Shenandoah Valley. Sharpe quite clearly had no problems giving him orders in both his capacity as chief of intelligence and as deputy provost marshal. Martin again and again warned of a new invasion of the North by Lee in dramatic terms.
All my scouts who came in and reported to me say that General Lee has a large army, and if he cannot capture Washington, Baltimore, and redeem Maryland, that he will fortify South Mountain, and will winter in Washington County, Md., and draw his supplies from the richest parts of Maryland and Pennsylvania. I am satisfied that they are coming. They have had the Union force weighed and counted, and found them wanting. Prepare for the storm.51
There is no evidence that Sharpe ever took these claims seriously. Graham’s estimates of Lee’s strength were too far out of line with what his own order-of-battle analysis told him. Graham’s order-of-battle estimates were so wide off the mark that Sharpe had to admonish him, “What regiments & brigades are the prisoners from who tell you the stories of last night? If you see the prisoners at all, you can ask them from what regiments & brigades they are; and I don’t want what they say, without knowing who they are—answer immediately.”52 Sharpe was instructing Graham on an essential element of collection—ascertaining the knowledgeability of the source.
Graham also kept Sharpe up to date on the activities of Imboden’s Cavalry Brigade of Lee’s army operating independently in the Valley. Martin appears to have at some point around the 20th stated that Imboden was in retreat down the Valley to Harrisonburg. Though this particular message cannot be identified, it will be referenced by Lincoln.
McEntee reported on October 21 that two refugees arrested near Warrenton had reported seeing 2 miles from Culpeper Court House long columns of troops heading south and were told they were Ewell’s Corps going to Tennessee. Two days later Meade immediately forwarded to Halleck Sharpe’s report based on what his scouts had brought to him.
Our men returned this morning. The old man [Isaac Silver] says that Ewell’s corps went to Tennessee last Monday. He did not have time to go to the army himself, but yesterday he saw a man from Fredericksburg who had gone up to Culpeper on Monday as claimant to get certificates for damages done to his property and that of citizens around Fredericksburg. These certificates were to come from officers in Ewell’s corps. The claimant returned to Fredericksburg on Tuesday, and said that he was unable to complete his business, because Ewell’s corps had left for Tennessee on Monday. This is the authority, and the old man thinks it straight.
This was the first time Silver had based his report on secondhand information. The scouts on their return had come across an Irish refugee from Richmond who asserted that Ewell’s Corps had not passed through the city and that the governor had appealed to the citizens of the capital to volunteer to defend the salt works. Notably Sharpe did not confirm Silver’s assessment from other sources. In fact he included the contradictory statement of the Irish refugee. This was the type of single-source report that an intelligence analyst will let sit for a while until it gets company that confirms or disproves it, or offers a third explanation. But in this case, there had not been time because Meade wanted it sent immediately, even though he said in his endorsement that he had ordered confirmation. It was amateurish to alarm Washington with such unfinished intelligence. Given his established methodology, Sharpe undoubtedly would have waited to let the issue ripen as more information came in, But Meade was acting as his own chief intelligence officer and made the judgment that it was accurate. It was he who decided to forward Sharpe’s unconfirmed report to Washington.53
Lincoln, who often haunted the War Department telegraph office next to the White House, had been following the issue and focused on this last report which had been sent at 6:30 p.m. The next day he shot back his own analysis of the enemy situation to Halleck who must have forwarded it to Meade by 11:00 a.m.