The area north of Hatcher’s Run on October 24, 1864, drawn by John C. Babcock. Official Record.
Early’s near capture of Washington had been deeply embarrassing to Grant, but it did not deflect him from his main purpose now that he had Lee’s army pinned down in the siege of Petersburg. Neither did he let the criticism in the Northern press that labeled the 1864 Overland Campaign a failure bother him. His objective was the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia. His immediate purpose was to keep Lee’s troops pinned to the defense of Petersburg under increasing pressure that would prevent any more detachments such as to Early in the Valley or to Georgia to reinforce General Joe Johnston defending Atlanta against Sherman.
By forcing Lee to commit himself to the defense of the capital of Richmond and the railroad nexus at Petersburg, he had denied his Confederate nemesis his greatest advantage, the ability to maneuver with boldness. Instead he compelled Lee to fight a stationary battle of attrition in which all the odds were against the South. With three times the population of the South and a vastly superior industrial base, Grant rightly calculated that time was on his side. Keep the pressure up and Lee would inevitably crack. But Grant had already painfully learned that Lee would extract every advantage to be found even in this losing formula. He had discovered that he faced in Lee the greatest military engineer in the history of the United States. Lee threw the spade and shovel into the scales of battle and bought month after month of precious time. Lee was playing the bad cards well.
To break Lee in this war of attrition, Grant found the BMI’s ability to build and update a precise enemy order-of-battle invaluable. The BMI’s interrogation of prisoners and more importantly deserters was reinforced with information flowing in a steady stream from “our friends” in Richmond. “Systematic interrogations provided information on the whereabouts and movements of brigades and divisions, which were then plotted on ‘information maps’ distributed to field commanders. Captives also told of brigade consolidations and changes in command and offered insights on morale within the ranks.”1
The BMI’s order-of-battle analysts did not just keep track of the organization and location of the enemy’s units but of their strengths as well. For example, interrogations of an intelligent deserter from the 21st South Carolina revealed that when the regiment had been transferred from Charleston in May, its brigade numbered 3,700. In early September its commander was quoted by the source as stating, “Yes, if the sick and slightly wounded were with the brigade I suppose it would number 800 men.” Another example was the comparisons in Confederate cavalry regiments of the number of mounted and dismounted men due to lack of horses. In Cobb’s Legion there were 100 mounted men and 400 dismounted, while the 7th Georgia had 40 mounted and 350 dismounted. Information such as this was invaluable in discerning the weakening of the Confederate cavalry as the South exhausted its supply of horses.2 In August the BMI made the interesting observation that fewer South Carolinians deserted than men from any other state.3
Assisting the BMI were the numerous signal station observation towers set up by the Signal Corps that gave them a bird’s eye view within the Confederate lines during daylight as Lee constantly shifted regiments and brigades. Babcock matched these reports with information from interrogations to confirm his order-of-battle conclusions. The telescopes of the Signal Corps contributed more to the intelligence effort when they began to intercept Confederate signals from the Petersburg Custom House on June 21. The Signal Corps officer who was intercepting the messages quickly concluded that the Confederate code was similar to the one they had broken in 1863. By the 24th he could read the entire code and began to decipher messages that showed his Confederate counterparts could observe Union troop movements. The Signal Corps continued to read Rebel traffic throughout the rest of the siege.4
As the armies settled down to siege warfare in mid-June, Grant attempted to stretch Lee’s forces by maneuvering repeatedly south of Petersburg against the railroads feeding Petersburg and Richmond and drawing Confederate forces away from the siege lines. At the same time, Sharpe’s men were interrogating deserters who were coming over by the dozens every day, an indication of the creeping sense of despair in the Southern ranks. Three of Sharpe’s intelligence summaries for June 18 are given at length below as models of careful assessment.
Forty-two prisoners received so far this morning from Second Corps from none but the brigade properly of Beauregard. None of them know of re-enforcements from Lee. A part of Martin’s brigade was brought down from six miles out toward Richmond yesterday a.m. and sent to the enemy’s right. An apparently honest man among them says that in passing through Petersburg and out to the front no second line of works or of battle was passed, and the others, though less frank, confirm it. The prisoners do not seem willing to admit that their troops have left here. The greater part claim that they have fallen back only about one line to a position just this side of the town, but they are unable to describe any position of strength there, or any preparation to do so.5
We have received 4 officers and 36 men from the Second corps this morning, and 26 officers and 329 men from the Ninth Corps. These prisoners are all from the brigades which were under Beauregard and part of which were sent from General Lee’s army (as Hoke’s division), and represent nearly the whole of Beauregard’s force, at least nine brigades in all. None of them have seen any of the forces properly belonging to any one of the three corps of General Lee’s army. The men taken by the Ninth Corps on the enemy’s extreme right this morning, at what they term a farm-house, were told by their officers, when asked to hold the ground, that re-enforcements were coming up and they must of good courage; others understood that Ewell was close at hand, but careful examination has failed to show us that any one we have taken has seen any of these men. Even the men who were unwilling to make statements as regards the force speak generally of the force as not being heavy. The nine brigades spoken of, however, are very much stronger, all of them, than the average of brigades in General Lee’s army. We know some of them to be 3,000 to 3,500 strong. The prisoners state that in the attack last evening 500 prisoners were taken from us. (General Patrick has been informed that 275 men are reported to have been sent in to General Butler yesterday from the Eighteenth Corps.)6
In a further examination of the prisoners (42 in number, sent in by General Hancock this morning and heretofore reported) I find that a portion of Martin’s brigade, two regiments of Gracie’s (Alabama) brigade, and the whole of Evans’ (South Carolina) brigade, were withdrawn early yesterday morning from a position about four to six miles from Petersburg toward Richmond, along a little creek which they are unable to name (perhaps Swift Creek), but where they understood they were placed to prevent the advance of General Butler. These men all seem to think, at least such of them as are willing to talk, that the whole infantry force in that direction was withdrawn yesterday, leaving nothing but cavalry there. When brought here they were put on the right of the enemy’s line. The greater part of the prisoners taken this morning are such as having fallen asleep away from their commands, were picked up by our men this morning. They, consequently, cannot tell how far their forces have receded. Some of the most intelligent think that Martin’s brigade is holding a position in the rear of what was the extreme right of the enemy’s position yesterday, but that Martin’s line is not prolonged on either side.7
As it became obvious that the golden chance was gone, Sharpe put his scouts in motion. Knight remembered:
We were now in a part of Virginia where none of us had ever been, and the first thing we set about was to learn all we could about the country. About the second day after our arrival several parties started out, some going east and south, while I started with a party toward the southwest… After we crossed the Norfolk & Petersburg Railroad we kept on until we came to the Jerusalem Plank road, which led directly south from Petersburg.8
Lee could read a map better than most. It told him that the roads and railroads leading south from Petersburg were seriously vulnerable. Three railroads ran through Petersburg to Richmond, keeping the capital and arsenal of the Confederacy alive. Military supplies run through the blockade to Wilmington were sent to Richmond and Lee’s army by these routes. The three railroads were, from east to west, the Norfolk & Petersburg, the Weldon, both of which went due south, and the Southside, which paralleled the Appomattox River westward before turning south. The latter was the only one of the three that was not immediately threatened. The Norfolk & Petersburg was already overrun within a few days by Hancock’s II Corps. Lee’s eyes focused on the Weldon. He warned Secretary of War Seddon, “It will be almost impossible to preserve the connection between this place and Weldon.”9
His apprehension was well founded. As Knight stated, Sharpe’s scouts were already criss-crossing this vital line of communications preparing the way for Federal attacks. Already movement westward by Meade on the day Lee had made this statement had been rebuffed by a Confederate counterattack, but it would not be the last. Lee rode up that day to speak to Major General Mahone, who recalled that the commanding general, “expressed a desire that something should be done to arrest the progress of the Federal prolongation.” Mahone was the right man for the job. As a Confederate officer commented, “Whenever Mahone moves out, somebody is apt to be hurt.”10
At this point, part of the unsuspecting Army of the Potomac was about to benefit from the bold initiative of one of Sharpe’s scouts. Judson Knight had worked hard since watching the great opportunity slip away from the army, but the nights brought no relief, and on June 20 he “concluded to make a night trip and see if I could learn anything of importance.” Without permission or a pass that would get him through the lines he was off and crossed the Jerusalem Plank Road before dark. He thought to himself that he was acting in just the same way as a Confederate scout trying to get out through Union lines. Along the Plank Road, he came across Birney’s Division, II Corps, and spotted the men and guns of Clark’s B Battery, New Jersey Artillery, but gave them a wide berth. After traveling west beyond the army’s left flank, he turned north toward Petersburg. Approaching the enemy’s lines, he bedded down in a pine thicket for the night. In the morning he watched as a large number of men came out to work on the fortifications; he was amazed that the Confederates were using white men to do a job for which he had always seen blacks employed. He was even more amazed at how hard they worked. By 11:00 a.m. a large body of troops moved into the space in front of the working parties. Knight thought he would be treated to brigade and then division drill as the forces grew, but then the men sat down and waited.
It dawned on Knight that this was no drill but the assembly of an assault force. He knew that he would not be able to get back to headquarters in time for his report to do any good. Instead, he resolved to find the nearest unit and give the warning. Now he realized the consequences of leaving camp without permission or a pass that would authenticate his identity. He was most likely to be insulted or accused of being a Rebel spy as had often happened before, even with his identification. His penchant for making as few acquaintances as possible would mean he was unlikely to be recognized as a scout. He headed for B Battery, where he was luckily known, managed to avoid any other troops, and slipped unseen into the camp and went straight for Clark’s tent. Luckily he was known there; Captain Clark’s brother in the same battery had offered Knight a drink at one time which he had declined. The captain saw him as he entered his quarters and greeted him with the query, “What’s the news?” As soon as Knight collected on the previous offer of a drink (surely he needed one by then), he warned Clark of the impending attack. An infantry colonel who was present sneered and said that Knight was more scared than hurt by his experience. Insulted, he walked out without a word, to be pursued by Clark’s brother who said the captain wanted to know if he had been serious. “Certainly I meant it. You are sure to be attacked either this evening or early in the morning, and when it does come it will be from the west. You ought to have a strong breastwork thrown up facing that way instead of the one your guns are in now facing Petersburg.”
Clark wasted no time in telling his own officers that the bearer of the news was a scout at army headquarters known to him and put the battery to work building new breastworks to the scorn of the infantry officers nearby. He would write 20 years later to Knight stating that his warning was what saved the battery from the storm of the Confederate attack that fell on II Corps soon thereafter on June 22. Hancock’s command disintegrated from the blows of the divisions of Mahone and Wilcox and lost 650 killed or wounded and 1,742 prisoners. For a very short time Lee had saved the precious Weldon Railroad.11
If Sharpe had been caught blindside by the attack of June 22, it was because his scouts already had been given a priority mission for that same day—to support the great cavalry raid by Kautz’s and Wilson’s cavalry divisions to wreck the Southside and Richmond & Danville Railroads, the remaining routes that connected Lee’s army and Richmond with the rest of the Confederacy. Just as the Confederate attack on II Corps was kicking off, Sharpe reported to Meade that his scouts had been out looking over the Weldon Railroad, several miles to the south of the impending attack, and had been overtaken by Wilson’s cavalry and gone as far as Reams Station when they left to return to headquarters at 10:30 p.m., while the troopers stayed behind to wreck the station. One can only speculate what he would have given had he known of Knight’s findings in time.12
That night Sharpe and his men interrogated prisoners from Wilcox’s and Mahone’s attack who admitted that they had been badly cut up in front of the Union positions, Clark’s Battery B no doubt doing great slaughter behind its breastworks. They also admitted that their commands had pulled back after dark to their own lines. Early the next day Sharpe sent out as large a body of his scouts as he could, led by Cline, to confirm that the enemy had, indeed, withdrawn back. Three quarters of a mile west of the railroad all that Cline could find was a weak line of enemy pickets, and on the way back he came across men of the Union VI Corps, “engaged in destroying the railroad.” Lee’s problem was that the best he could do for a short while was to keep the enemy off only that part of the Weldon nearest his lines. The length of the railroad which ran along the Union flank made it vulnerable along a line the Confederates could never hope to defend. His attack had saved it for barely one day.13
The consequences were apparent within a week. On June 29 Sharpe reported that his scouts had found a party of four slaves on a plantation near the Weldon Railroad. They belonged to officers of the 17th North Carolina and had been given passes to take them home. “They stated that all the negroes who could possibly be spared were being sent from the army to their homes, and only such as were indispensably necessary were kept; that it was understood the want of provisions had led to the step.” One of them said that he had heard General Martin and their colonel in conversation state that if the Yankees kept the roads cut for 10 days longer, “they (the enemy) would have to dig out.” That same day Lee informed President Davis of his plans to bring in supplies:
As before stated, my greatest present anxiety is to secure regular and constant supplies. At this time I am doing well, but I must look to the future. I have started today a train of wagons, via Dinwiddie Court House to Stony Creek Station, Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, for corn to be brought there from Weldon. This, with the standing crop of clover & oats, will subsist our horses for the present.
This was just the sort of information Grant wanted. He knew that while the order-of-battle was vital, it was equally vital to know if the soldiers in those figures were well fed or on starvation rations. It would make all the difference.14
Of more immediate concern for Meade and Grant was the fate of the cavalry expedition, consisting of the cavalry divisions of August Kautz and James H. Wilson, dispatched to cut the railroads between Petersburg and Lynchburg. They had disappeared behind Confederate lines, with only rumors of disaster filtering through. The broken fragments of Kautz’s division had filtered in after a 335-mile eight-day ordeal. Despite the fact that their horses were in poor condition, the expedition had gone well until June 26, when Lee’s cavalry arrived to harry the returning and exhausted blue cavalry. Wilson’s and Kautz’s commands began to disintegrate when they found the points at which they had intended to cross back into Union lines blocked. Sharpe was interrogating every prisoner that could shed light on the fate of Wilson’s horsemen. One man from the 10th Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion laid out the disaster in painfully accurate detail:
He claims that the enemy have three divisions of cavalry concentrated against Wilson—Hampton’s, Fitz. Lee’s, and W. H. F. Lee’s divisions. He says that part of them came from Richmond; that yesterday, the enemy having destroyed a bridge over Stony Creek, and Wilson being driven back upon it, when the bridge was found to be gone large numbers of our men surrendered themselves. He thinks they had taken, up to the time he was sent back with prisoners and horses, from 600 to 800 horses, a large number of prisoners—he does not know how many—all the artillery and ambulances of General Wilson, which, however he says were not many, and his baggage wagons. He says the woods were full of our men, who had abandoned their horses, and were scattering in every direction, and that the horses taken from us were found to be very badly knocked up.15
By the next day the survivors had crossed back into Union lines and the cost was calculated. Wilson had lost 33 killed, 108 wounded, and 674 captured or missing; Kautz had lost 48, 153, and 429 respectively, for a total loss of 1,435. On the other side of the ledger, Wilson would enter the claim that “Every depot, turn-table, water-tank, and trestle-work between the Sixteen Mile Turnout on the South Side Railroad to the Roanoke bridge on the Danville road was destroyed.” The Confederate chief of railroads entered in his own debit column the fact that it took 63 days to repair over 60 miles of track Wilson and Kautz had destroyed. Lee’s optimism on the state of his commissariat in the short run had been misplaced.16
Sharpe was having his own doubts about the near collapse of Lee’s army as the month wore on.
50 odd days of fighting & marching have reduced the effective force of both armies to an incredible extent. But the enemy have their last man in the field.—It is literally true, as a Confed Col told me this week, that 100,000 men could now march anywhere on the continent, except within 10 miles of Richmond or Atlanta—I have a captured letter showing there were just 2 regiments within reach of Charleston last week. And every road leading to Richmond was cut last night. A French officer of artillery sent by Louis Napoleon told me last night he did not see how they could stand it long—I don’t either—but they stand a good deal.17
An understatement, indeed. If anything, the last year of the war would show the Army of Northern Virginia’s almost superhuman ability to “stand a good deal.” And now that Lee’s men were in the entrenchments of Petersburg, it seemed unlikely that any assault could storm through. “In front of Petersburg & fearfully hot! The enemy tried to attack our right yesterday—but altho’ he showed three lines of battle, it was utterly impossible to induce his men to advance. I know this to be so—& should we attempt to assault him, I think we would be whipped beyond a peradventure [doubt].”18
The information brought by escaped Union prisoners was providing Sharpe a new source of information. On June 25 Sharpe got a welcome surprise. Phillip Carney, one of the four BMI scouts captured in the Dahlgren raid, had escaped in June as the siege closed in on Petersburg. He and another soldier were assigned to nurse the Union wounded in Richmond’s Shockoe Hospital.19 On the 19th the guards at the prison were called away to the defenses of Richmond, their places taken by militia boys so young they could barely carry a musket. With the audacity for which Sharpe’s scouts were known, Carney and the other man put on “Confederate jackets, pretended to be clerks, took up the books as if they were such, and passed the guards.” Carney gave a good report of the roads and bridges across their route of escape and noted that his fellow scouts, Dykes and Jake Swisher, had been sent to Georgia while Hogan was still in irons. He would join the other two scouts in Georgia but would also escape. Carney said that 1,000 Union prisoners had been sent to Georgia, and that there were 1,100 remaining in Richmond, of which 900 were sick and wounded. Significantly, he noted that he had found help from a Union man in Richmond during his escape who said that there were many of such sympathies there and that it would not be difficult to find them. It would not be long before Sharpe found out for himself when he activated the Van Lew ring in Richmond.20
The next month, McEntee, who had returned from his assignment in the Valley, reported the tale of four escaped Union prisoners who had made their way through Confederate lines. What was interesting was McEntee’s reference that these four men, all from Hunter’s command in the Valley, were “all personally known to me…” Although McEntee had served with Hunter, the odds that he would have known four random escaped prisoners from that command are very low. The likelihood that they were some of Hunter’s scouts is much more possible, especially so as McEntee described one of the men as captured “while on his way to Georgia,” an unlikely destination for an ordinary enlisted man at the time. The man had escaped and then been recaptured and placed with the other three in the Confederate POW camp in Lynchburg, Virginia. The observations of the four men after their escape also read like a running intelligence collection mission and is worth recounting to give an idea of the sort of report trained scouts would turn in. While being transported by rail on the Danville Road, they jumped from the cars and escaped.
They saw two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery at the High Bridge. They were at work throwing up strong fortifications on this end of the bridge and were building one large redoubt. The west end of the bridge is fortified with breast-works. The railroad has been repaired at the junction by laying down rails that had been burnt and afterward straightened. The road was in running order from Lynchburg to Petersburg. About ten miles of the Danville road south of Meherrin Station [where they left the road] has not yet been repaired… After leaving the Dansville road they came in nearly a direct course to Blacks and Whites Station, on the South Side road. The Second Virginia Cavalry was stationed at that point. There is there a very large shop for building and repairing Government wagons, also a corral of disabled horses. From that point they marched to Dinwiddie Court-House, hence toward Reams’ Station on the road running from Dinwiddie Court-House to Reams’ Station; where the road crosses Rowanty Creek they saw two camps. They were told by negroes that there were 5,000 men there—infantry, cavalry, and artillery. While lying in the woods there on the night of the 28th [June] they heard tattoo sounded by five different bugles [indicating five regiments]. These troops had been camped at that place since Wilson’s raid. On the morning of the 29th they crossed the Weldon railroad three miles below Reams’ Station. After crossing the railroad, they secreted themselves in the bushes near the railroad, where they remained all day of the 29th. They saw one train of about ten cars pass going toward Petersburg loaded with troops. There were troops in the cars and on the top of them. The cars run very slowly, and do not blow a whistle when they stop or start.
They finally made it into Union lines, guided by the sound of fighting. McEntee notes that they also had the foresight to bring lists of captured Union soldiers in Lynchburg.21
Trained scouts such as Phil Carney were not the only escaped prisoners who could provide valuable information. In early July a servant of a Union cavalry brigade commander was captured in a raid on the Confederate supply depot at Stony Point on the Weldon Railroad. He escaped to describe both the garrison, the defenses, the number of locomotives, and the amount and type of supplies in storage there. He also described being interrogated by a general officer. Babcock reported:
He was asked a number of questions relative to the strength and movements of our army, particularly about the strength and organization of Wilson’s Cavalry. He was told by the soldiers that it was General Ewell. He describes him as being a tall, spare-built man, with heavy mustache and no beard; thinks he had a false leg, as one foot appeared larger than another.
It was indeed none other than Lt. Gen. Richard Ewell himself, now commander of the District of Richmond, famous for his wooden leg which took a number of bullets at Gettysburg, to his amusement. The encounter showed how generals on both sides actively interrogated prisoners. Lee recounted how Hill had interrogated an intelligent prisoner, “A New Yorker, sharp & shrewd, from whom but little could be gained.” But he had on his person his diary which revealed the presence of the Union IX Corps at Petersburg, filling one of his most pressing intelligence gaps. Meade, especially in this period, frequently interrogated prisoners himself, despite the presence of real experts in the BMI on his staff, a throwback to the days when commanding generals were their own intelligence officers.22
Confederate deserters were not only providing information on order-of-battle but were now an excellent source for operational information of the greatest tactical importance. July 17 was another hot, humid Virginia summer morning, and the men of the 44th Alabama and other units were sweating as they cleared the brush from a ravine. They were surprised to see their division commander, Maj. Gen. Charles Field, four brigadiers, and the colonel of the 44th Alabama pass up to the picket line. They had field glasses and were closely observing the Union lines. One of the Alabamians was close enough to overhear them speak. The colonel remarked that his regiment would be seen moving into the attack once they left the ravine in which they were to be sheltered. Field replied that there would be enough time for him to deliver his attack.
It did not take a genius to realize that the 44th was the point of a major attack by the entire I Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. The eavesdropping soldier promptly deserted.
Having seen too much glory already to look forward to another attack, he was joined by a flood of other men from I Corps who began giving themselves up to Union pickets. Their stories under interrogation were consistent down to small details. At least a corps-level attack was planned by I Corps and possibly III Corps as well. A ravine had been cleared of brush to hide the assault parties; the attack would begin late at night or early in the morning before dawn. Five to seven days’ rations had been issued. Babcock’s summaries were confirmed by field interrogations of incoming deserters conducted by the various corps.23
Meade immediately began preparations to defeat the attack and then counter-punch. Burnside and Warren were ordered to prepare to receive and counterattack the enemy, and Hancock was to hold his corps in readiness to assist. Meade was almost looking forward to it as he reported to Grant, “I most earnestly hope they will try the experiment, for I think it will relieve us greatly.”24 Dawn came and then the morning wore on, and no attack materialized.
A deserter who came over about midnight revealed more of the extraordinary plans for the attack:
He states that orders were issued to the pickets last evening to fire on any man seen going beyond the picket-line. These orders were peremptory and have never been given before; that his colonel said no attack would be made on our lines, as so many deserters came into our lines yesterday and told us all about it. They did not leave the trenches.
Reading the same report Grant commented, “so many deserters had come into our lines and exposed their plans.” Another deserter provided an additional reason for the cancelled attack. “We learn from one of them that a deserter from our army went over yesterday afternoon and gave himself up to their regiment. We cannot learn what regiment he is from. One of the informants thinks he communicated something of importance concerning the attack and our preparations for it.” Thus you see an operational merry-go-round driven by the intelligence provided by deserters from both sides.25
By the next week Grant had formulated another plan to overstretch Lee. Sharpe’s Richmond agent, Samuel Roth, had reported that the rail lines north of Richmond were critical to the feeding of the city population and part of the army. Grant proposed to send Sheridan’s cavalry north of the James to destroy the railroads while sending Hancock’s II Corps from Bermuda Hundred to cross the James at Deep Bottom ford to demonstrate against the eastern Richmond defenses. Although he did not intend Hancock to forcefully assault the city’s fortifications, he wanted his commanders to be sure to take advantage to break into the defenses by coup de main if the opportunity presented itself. Grant hoped that Lee would take the bait and rush so many troops north to defend the capital that his lines could be broken at Petersburg. Grant had full confidence that the BMI would be able to tell him just when Lee snatched at the lure. He wrote to Halleck on July 26, “Deserters come in every day, enabling us to keep track of every change the enemy makes.”26 That day he dispatched Hancock.
While these plans were underway, Meade approached Grant with a daring plan from Burnside. Burnside recommended that a mine be driven from his IX Corps front under the opposing Confederate defenses and then detonated. The obliterated Confederate works would be a highway for the IX Corps to pour through and collapse Lee’s entire position at Petersburg. Burnside’s engineers were fearful that a second line of fortifications existed that would stop the penetrating force cold. Sharpe had been reporting since the army arrived in front of Petersburg that there was no second line of fortifications, but he put Babcock to work to conclusively determine whether this second line existed or not. He reported that “there is no second line of works to the rear … between their present line and Petersburg. This is the repeated statement of all deserters.” At the same time, according to Meade’s chief of staff, “very careful examinations were made of this second line from a newly erected signal station, and it was found that the enemy had detached works, batteries probably, along the road in front of Burnside, but not a connected line.”27
For a time the issue of the mine, as it was being dug, receded into the background as Grant pinned his hopes on Sheridan and Hancock. Presented with overwhelming evidence of Grant’s major redeployment, Lee swallowed the bait hook, line, and sinker. He reinforced the Richmond defenses so strongly that neither Sheridan nor Hancock would be able to succeed. Babcock reported that Longstreet’s and Hill’s corps had left the trenches to reinforce Richmond, leaving only three divisions behind.
A deserter from the Second Florida came in about 10 o’clock last night. He brings the following additional information: That Wright’s brigade moved last evening to the right, and relieved Heth’s division, which marched to the north side of the Appomattox. This was generally understood in informant’s brigade. Does not know of any other movement. The following telegram has been received from Colonel Sharpe, at City Point:
Received last night one captain and nine men from Second Corps. They were from Kershaw’s and Bryan’s brigades, McLaws’ division. Marched from Petersburg over the James Monday evening. McGowan and Lane, of Wilcox’s division, Hill’s corps, were also there as well as the Tennessee brigade, of Beauregard’s corps… 28
By the time these reports came in on July 28, Sheridan and Hancock had already been thwarted outside of Richmond the day before by Lee’s massive reinforcement. Meade was determined to help Lee maintain his error by further deceptions. He carefully informed his remaining corps commanders the next day to feign a withdrawal by all troops that could be spared from holding the siegeworks. The columns were to march into the woods in daylight and return at night.29 Sheridan and Hancock had neither cut the railroads north of Richmond nor been able to break into the city by coup de main. Those had been secondary objectives all along. Their primary objective had been to draw Lee’s forces away from Petersburg. In that they succeeded completely. Lee had only a third of his overall command left in the defenses. Grant was quick to shift his sights to the opportunity of the mine now that Babcock’s report had assured him that only open country lay behind the Confederate works and that Lee had no reserves to throw into the breach. This was actionable intelligence of the first order.
Lee’s intelligence was also working well, though not with the specificity of Sharpe’s operation.
From mysterious paragraphs in the Northern papers, and from reports of deserters, though those last were vague and contradictory, Lee and Beauregard suspected that the enemy was mining in front of one of the three salients on Beauregard’s front, and the latter officer had in consequence directed counter-mines to be sunk from all three, meanwhile constructing gorge-lines in the rear upon which the troops might retire in case of surprise or disaster… But the countermining on the part of the Confederates was after a time discontinued, owing to the lack of proper tools, the inexperience of the troops in such work, and the arduous nature of their service in the trenches.30
Burnside had been training his new all-black division for weeks as the first wave of the assault, but Meade and Grant both forbade it for race-sensitive political reasons. It was a new and untested division, and they had no idea what conditions it would have to face. The last thing they wanted was to be exposed to the vituperations from the radical abolitionists that they had carelessly sacrificed black lives. The white divisions would lead. That took the enthusiasm right out of Burnside, who sleepwalked through the rest of the operation. In picking the lead division he drew straws which awarded the honor of first through the breach to Brig. Gen. James Ledlie, who had no combat experience and had only risen recently to division command from that of a stationary artillery regiment. His division also had a poor reputation for aggressiveness. In doing so, Burnside overlooked the solid combat records of the other two division commanders. He overlooked far worse. Bruce Catton wrote, “Ledlie was a cipher. A brigadier who served under him said that Ledlie ‘was a drunkard and an arrant coward… It was wicked to risk the lives of men in such a man’s hands.’” Major General Humphreys stated later that Ledlie was “an officer whose total unfitness for such a duty ought to have been known to General Burnside… It was not known to General Meade.”31
On July 28 the mine was finished. It ran 500 feet under the beaten zone between the siege works and then perpendicularly another 75 feet under a Confederate fort. It was packed with 320 kegs filled with 8,000 pounds of gunpowder. Two days later the order was given and the charge to set off the mine was lit. An enormous explosion obliterated the fort and a quarter-mile of Confederate fortifications. A nearby Confederate artilleryman would write:
A slight tremor of the earth for a second, then the rocking as of an earthquake, and, with a tremendous blast which rent the sleeping hills beyond, a vast column of earth and smoke shoots upward to a great height, its dark sides flashing out sparks of fire, hangs poised for a moment in mid-air, and then hurtling downward with a roaring sound showers of stones, broken timbers and blackened human limbs, subsides—the gloomy pall of darkening smoke flushing to an angry crimson as it floats away to meet the morning sun.32
Immediately 160 Union guns opened fire to sweep any approach a Confederate counterattacking force would take. Meade’s instructions to Burnside had been flawless in their design—attack through the gap in a column of divisions with the first peeling its brigades right and left to secure the edges of the penetration. In that first hour after the explosion, the Confederates were capable of little or no reaction. It was the moment the Army of the Potomac had waited years for—the killing stroke that would bring their mighty rival down into defeat. Then nothing happened.
If Meade’s plans had been excellent, Burnside’s execution was execrable. The troops had not been properly prepared to get through the shambles in front of them. Instead, they packed into the deep crater formed by the explosion in their thousands and milled there. Ledlie stayed behind in a dugout royally drunk. Burnside did not closely supervise the man either. Not one of the four brigade commanders was up with their men at this critical time as they jammed tighter and tighter into the crater. Their inaction gave the Confederates just enough time to rush to the lip of the crater and begin a slaughter of the trapped men in blue. Four thousand men were lost before Grant stopped the attack. Meade wrote bitterly to his wife:
Our attack yesterday, although made under the most advantageous circumstances was a failure. By a movement to the north bank of the James, Lee was completely deceived, and thinking it was a movement of the whole army against Richmond, he rushed over there with the greater portion of his army, leaving his works in our front held by only three out of the eight divisions of his army.
Although Meade kept a discreet silence on intelligence matters in all his private correspondence, he does reveal here that the BMI had given him not only Lee’s order-of-battle but his maneuvers on the battlefield with those forces as well.33
Grant wrote to Halleck that the attack “was the saddest affair I have witnessed in this war… Such an opportunity for carrying fortifications I have never seen and do not expect again to have.” He understood that he had been handed a victory on a silver platter by the BMI. He shouldered the blame later when testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: “I blame his [the lead division commander] seniors also for not seeing that he did his duty, all the way up to myself.”34
He could well say it. For the second time in its history, the BMI had provided the clearly actionable intelligence that would have been of decisive importance to the success of operations had they been properly executed. The first failure was Hooker’s at Chancellorsville; the second was Grant’s at the Crater. In Grant’s defense, it could be said that had a corps in the armies he commanded in the west been given this assignment, the outcome would most likely have been a success. Grant had winnowed the chaff from those superbly confident fighting formations. When he came east, he had to deal with the strange lack of alacrity and the pockets of incompetence that persisted in the Union armies in the east. Lieutenant Colonel T. S. “Joe” Bowers had come east with Grant and was to be blunt about the difference, when he commented that the troops “may yet accidentally blunder into Richmond.” His friend, Capt. George Leet, another officer brought from the western theater, echoed the theme: “If we only had some of our old Western troops, with their own generals to command them, down here just now, we could smash Lee most effectively. Joe has not much confidence in the Army of the Potomac, either soldiers or officers. He says there appears to be no vim or snap.”35
In all fairness, had the armies of the west gone through the bloodletting of the Overland Campaign, they may not have retained much vim or snap either.
Grant was not only having to deal with a different army but an army that had turned over its personnel through combat wastage several times for which he bore no little responsibility. Rear areas had been combed and combed again for garrisons, too-long used to comfort to have had any fighting spirit or skills. From these backwaters came the incompetent officers like Ledlie, whose failings had not been exposed by action. Into the army also came the sweepings of the draft, often the men bought as substitutes. Mingling with them were the large numbers of foreigners, German and Irish mostly, recruited right off the docks after landing as immigrants. Ten percent of this growing wave of male immigrants changed into Union blue in their first days ashore. Colonel Theodore Lyman, one of Meade’s staff officers, expressed the sentiment of the army’s old hands at this flood of low-quality replacements:
By the Lord! I wish these gentlemen who would overwhelm us with Germans, negroes, and the offscourings of great cities, could only see—only see—a Rebel regiment, in all their rags and squalor. If they had eyes they would know that these men are like wolf-hounds, and not to be beaten with turnspits. Look at our “Dutch” heavy artillery: we no more think of trusting them than so many babies. Send bog-trotters, if you please, for Paddy will fight—no one is braver.36
A certain amount of war-weariness had also settled in among the long-term veterans. So if Lee’s army was wasting away from irreplaceable losses, Grant’s was losing its tone and spirit.37
This meant that the troops had to be used more carefully, and this in turn meant that their objectives had to key on verifiable enemy weaknesses to ensure greater chance of success. Good intelligence was the key to maximizing the effectiveness of operations; the better the intelligence, the less requirement there would be for unnecessary sacrifice.
Through the summer and fall, Grant gave up the idea of grand assaults and concentrated on stretching Lee to the breaking point by working against his flanks, particularly to the south, which covered the Weldon Railroad that connected Lee’s army and Richmond with the port of Wilmington, North Carolina, the primary entry for blockade runners bringing irreplaceable mostly British weapons, munitions, and other supplies. Sharpe’s intelligence web grew denser and denser in support of these operations. At the center of the web were Sharpe, Babcock, and a much-needed McEntee, who finally returned from his bootless efforts in the Valley. They drew in an endless stream of information from interrogations, couriers from the Richmond espionage rings, and BMI subsidiary offices with the Army of the James and Sheridan’s Army of the Shenandoah. All this was reinforced with an equally dense web of signal station reports, including one that was 125 feet high.
Finished intelligence was shared freely throughout the Armies Operating Against Richmond, an example modern intelligence agencies still have a problem with. A level of trust had been built such that Babcock no longer had to sign Sharpe’s name but freely communicated his reports under his own name, as did McEntee with Humphreys and even Meade. Of particular interest, besides the circulars that Sharpe sent around, were Southern newspapers supplied by the espionage rings in Richmond. The army learned of Union victories at Atlanta, Savannah, Fort Fisher, and Mobile Bay faster by Southern newspapers supplied by Sharpe than they did through their own channels.38
Sharpe did not confine himself solely to all-source intelligence. He assumed the counterintelligence role as well. On August 9 at City Point, according to Grant’s aide, Col. Horace Porter, he briefed the general-in-chief, who was sitting in front of his tent, that he was convinced that Rebel spies were in the camp and that he had devised a means of capturing them. No sooner had he finished and turned away when “A terrific explosion shook the earth, accompanied by a sound which vividly recalled the Petersburg mine, still fresh in the memory of every one present.” Porter continued his account:
Then there rained down upon the party a terrific shower of shells, bullets, boards, and fragments of timber. The general was surrounded by splinters and various kinds of ammunition, but fortunately was not touched by any of the missiles. Babcock of the staff [O. E. Babcock, not John Babcock of the BMI] was slightly wounded in the right hand by a bullet, one mounted orderly and several horses were instantly killed, and three orderlies were wounded.
In the ensuing confusion, everyone on the staff ran over to the bluff overlooking the James River. Below was a vivid scene of destruction. An ammunition barge had blown up, killing 43 and wounding 126. Among the casualties in the provost guard were five dead and 17 wounded of Sharpe’s old 20th New York State Militia. Six hundred feet of warehouses and 180 linear feet of wharf were knocked down. Body parts were found a half-mile away. Grant appointed Porter to chair a commission of investigation. Blame was laid on the careless handling of ammunition, but Porter thought that Sharpe’s suspicions of enemy agents was a more likely explanation. Van Lew subsequently confirmed that the explosion had been caused by a Confederate agent. After the war, Halleck reported that the explosion had been caused “by a horological torpedo [time bomb] placed on the barge by John Maxwell and R. K. Dullard” of the Confederate Secret Service’s torpedo bureau, “under the direction of Brigadier General G. J. Rains and Captain Z. McDaniel.” During Grant’s presidency, Porter met the same John Maxwell who explained how he had infiltrated the camp to plant the time bomb that led to the explosion. He had simply handed the disguised bomb to one of the black stevedores with instructions to place it in the hold. Sharpe’s suspicions were entirely correct, but as the story shows, he was unable to capture the Confederate saboteurs.39
Grant was the only one to remain in his chair during and after the explosion, completely calm and safe amid the shower of debris and munitions. Major General Rufus Ingalls, his chief quartermaster, noted that “The lieutenant general himself seems proof against the accidents of flood and field.”40
Minor events, like exploding ammunition barges, would not deflect Grant from his relentless purpose of stretching Lee until his entire position broke down. But the lesson of Washington’s near capture had been well learned also by Grant. He would not hesitate to subordinate operations around Richmond to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, still prowling in the Valley.
For Lee, the Valley also was a priority, but of a different sort. Sheridan’s appointment to command the Army of the Shenandoah had caught his attention. Sheridan was a known favorite of Grant’s, and an indication of the Union general-in-chief’s sensitivity to that theater. He was also worried by the dispatch of two more Union cavalry brigades to Sheridan. Writing to President Davis on August 4, he said that he could only send two divisions to the Valley, which would leave him no reserves outside the trenches. “If it is their intention to endeavor to overwhelm Early I think it better to detach these troops than to hazard his destruction and that of our railroads, &c., north of Richmond.” On August 7 he ordered the acting I Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, to march to Culpeper with Kershaw’s Division, with instructions to be prepared to move into the Valley. Lee instructed Anderson, “Any enterprise that can be undertaken to injure the enemy, distract or separate his forces, embarrass his communications on the Potomac or on land is desirable.” Four days later Lee told Wade Hampton, commanding his cavalry, to take a cavalry division (Fitzhugh Lee’s) to join Anderson in Culpeper, explaining, “It is desirable that the presence of the troops in that region be felt.”41
Grant was not the only one who could bait the hook of war; Lee carefully released the disinformation that the rest of I Corps was to follow Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry. Fitzhugh Lee himself was under the impression that Anderson specifically “was selected to produce the impression, the remaining divisions of his corps were to follow, in order to induce Grant to send troops to Sheridan equivalent to the whole I Corps. In that case Lee would again re-enforce Early and transfer the principal scene of hostilities to the Potomac, just as he had drawn McClellan from the James and Hooker from the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg by similar movements.”42
On August 7 Babcock prepared for Grant a remarkably complete report of the deployment of every one of Lee’s divisions.
The following is the latest information relative to the position of the different divisions of Lee’s and Beauregard’s commands: Longstreet-Pickett’s division, in front of Major-General Butler; Kershaw’s division, in rear of Pickett’s in reserve; Field’s division, at New market, near Deep Bottom. A. P. Hill-Mahone’s division, right of (enemy’s) line, south of the Appomattox River; Heth’s division, joining the left of Mahone’s; Wilcox’s division, at Chaffin’s farm. Beauregard-Hoke’s division, on left of Heth’s; B. Johnson’s, on left of Hoke’s, and extending to the Appomattox, in front of the Eighteenth Corps. It is not thought that any force by division has been sent away from Lee’s or Beauregard’s commands, though accoutering brigades may have left, escaping our notice. The above information is corroborated from all quarters.
The only mistake was to identify Kershaw’s Division in reserve. It was an understandable error due simply to time-lag, given that Kershaw had only departed the day before.43
Lee’s deception had not had time to catch up, but catch up it did. The next morning at 3:00 a.m. a Confederate lieutenant and private crossed into the Union lines and revealed that the “Corps of Longstreet, or two divisions, Field’s and Kershaw’s, have not returned to our front, and it was understood that all or the greater part of them had been sent to reinforce Early or Hood.” As a postscript he added, “Information from a reliable source shows that a considerable force of infantry has been sent to Early and passed through Staunton, Va. (Friday, July 29), via Lynchburg; also that no trains are running on the Virginia Central Railroad from Richmond beyond Beaver Dam Station.”44
Sharpe learned on August 9 from a refugee escaping Richmond that on August 6 a considerable infantry force had boarded Virginia Central trains and departed for the Shenandoah. He judged the source to be highly reliable because he was a friend of a “Richmond man in our employ.” Grant’s headquarters sent the information to Washington with instructions that Sharpe’s detachment there should direct its attention to the Virginia Central. The next day Shape’s BMI detachment at Butler’s headquarters learned that at least a cavalry brigade had been sent to Early. On August 11 Babcock reported that Kershaw’s Division had been seen passing through Orange Court House, destined for the Valley by another deserter. The same day, Sharpe’s old agent around Culpeper, Isaac Silver, reported astounding news—that the entire I Corps had passed through on the way to the Valley.
The BMI was now scrambling to find out exactly what forces Lee had sent to the Valley. At 2:30 p.m. on the 11th, Babcock reported that deserters were saying that Kershaw’s Division had passed through Orange Court House on the way to the Valley; that camp rumor had said one of I Corps’ divisions had gone to Hood and another to the Valley. Trying to sort out the status of I Corps, Babcock then reviewed the last time each of its divisions had been confirmed in the defenses of Richmond: Field—August 8, Kershaw—August 7, and Pickett—August 7. He also noted that the location of Wilcox’s Division of Hill’s Corps was uncertain, though Butler reported it between City Point and Richmond. He noted that this needed to be confirmed.
The preponderance of information showed clearly that Kershaw’s Division had been sent toward the Valley. It had been repeatedly identified. No other piece of information identified any other particular division being dispatched with Kershaw. That fine distinction did not trouble Grant. Five hours after Babcock wrote his last summary, he informed Meade, “There is strong evidence, aside from that brought in by deserters, that the enemy are sending troops north. I think one division each from Hill’s and Longstreet’s corps have gone. Is our line now in a position to be held by two corps?”45
Since Grant had no direct communication with Sheridan, he passed the warning through Halleck in Washington. Sheridan responded that his own sources, probably the BMI detachment with his army, had also heard of the enemy’s approaching reinforcement. He suspended his own attack on Early on August 15 and withdrew back down the Valley.
In the meantime, Grant had decided to give Lee a painful reminder of the consequences of sending forces off to the Valley. Early on August 14 he transported Hancock’s II Corps by steamer up the James to land at Deep Bottom and attack the weakened Confederate defenses there. At the same time, Maj. Gen. David B. Birney’s X Corps would march north from Bermuda Hundred and cross the James on pontoon, to join the attack. Lee was aware of Union movement but confused as to its purpose. He was distracted by Butler’s pet project to cut off 4 ¾ miles of navigation in the James River by cutting a canal across a loop called Dutch Gap just to the north of the Union lines at Bermuda Hundred. Work had begun on August 10, and Lee seemed to take it as a special act of effrontery aimed at turning Pickett’s flank. One of his division commanders noted, “The general did not seem in remarkably good humor … with … this impudence of the Yankees in crawling up behind us.” Butler’s effort had nothing to do with Grant’s plans, but it drew Lee’s attention to just the area that Hancock was to attack. A deserter stated that both Butler and Grant had been seen at Dutch Gap on August 11, seeming to confirm the importance of the concentration of forces to the Union general-in-chief. It would not be the first time that Butler’s reach had exceeded his grasp and got Grant in trouble. Lee wrote his wife the same day that Hancock’s corps was steaming up the James:
I have been kept from church to-day by the enemy’s crossing to the north of the James River and the necessity of moving troops to meet him. I do not know what his intentions are. He is said to be cutting a canal across the Dutch Gap, a point in the river—but I cannot, as yet, discover it. I was up there yesterday and saw nothing to indicate it. We shall ascertain it in a day or two.46
Grant was personally on the scene as the fighting progressed that morning. He noted at 10:00 a.m. that prisoners showed that Field’s Division had not gone to the Valley. When added to the known location of other divisions, he concluded, probably with some relief, “This leaves but one division of infantry to have gone to the Valley. I am now satisfied that no more have gone.”47
That would be the sum of his satisfaction in the operation itself which bogged down after some initial success. The attack, though lacking drive, had worried Lee. He recalled Fitzhugh Lee’s Cavalry Division on its way to join Kershaw’s Division still waiting at Culpeper when a Union cavalry division began to cross the pontoons over the James on the 14th. Grant would have been happier had he known that his attack had done more than just confirm that only Kershaw had been dispatched to the Valley; it had actually pulled back part of the force Lee had concentrated at Culpeper. But it was Kershaw’s Division that continued to fix his interest.48
Grant had effectively fixed Lee’s attention in the fighting north of Petersburg. Lee had gone to Chaffin’s Bluff on August 15 to direct the operations himself. That same morning the two brigades and a cobbled-together brigade he had ordered up from the lines at Petersburg, as well as W. H. F. Lee’s Cavalry Division, also arrived to reinforce Fields.49 The BMI outdid itself that day in providing actionable intelligence to the Union commanders. That evening, based on the BMI reports, Grant warned Hancock that a division-sized reinforcement had joined Fields. But Sharpe’s efforts now concentrated on supporting Warren’s V Corps operation against Petersburg with an intensive collection and interrogation effort culminating on August 16, two days before the attack began. The location and number of Confederate units on their right was checked and checked again.
Sharpe to Babcock: Our cavalry took prisoners this a.m. from Fitz Lee’s division; Chambliss killed; his body in our hands; fight on Charles City road two miles from White’s Tavern. Prisoners taken this a.m. by Tenth Corps report Wright’s brigade, of Mahone’s division, and Lane’s brigade, of Wilcox’s division, on General Birney’s front; supposed they came over last night.50
Babcock to Sharpe: We believe the two brigades, Wright’s and Perrin’s of Mahone’s division, to have moved from the enemy’s extreme right before yesterday at 2 pm., that Heth’s division and the two divisions of Beauregard remain here as usual.51
Sharpe to Babcock: I refer to W. H. F. Lee’s [cavalry] division as having crossed to the north side of the James—the one in which Chambliss, who was killed this morning, and Barringer, were brigade commanders.52
Babcock to Sharpe: Deserters from three different brigades of Mahone’s division received this a.m. report that Wright’s and Perrin’s brigades moved to Drewry’s Bluff day before yesterday at 2 p.m. As far they know Heth’s division remained unchanged, though we only hear from Davis’ brigade, which is on the right of the division.53
All three divisions of Hill’s III Corps had been identified, but by the next day two of them, most of Mahone’s and all of Wilcox’s, were shown to be north of the James. Of Heth’s brigades, only the one on the extreme right, Davis’s Brigade, could be clearly identified. Clearly Babcock had keyed on the weakness of Heth’s Division holding the end of the Confederate right which covered the Weldon Road, and that is just the direction Warren’s attack would take. Captain Fisher, the chief signal officer, confirmed their findings on the same day from direct observation, reporting that there was a “decrease in the enemy’s camps all along the woods west of the city,” and that, “my lookouts convey the impression that the enemy has to a very great extent weakened their lines in our immediate front within the past three or four days.”54
Grant was even more pleased with the intelligence picture when Sharpe confirmed that Lee’s reinforcement of his forces fighting north of the James left only three divisions defending Petersburg—Heth’s, Hoke’s, and Johnson’s. Intelligence reports from the BMI and the signal observation stations now presented Grant with a new option. The BMI had been tracking the movement of forces from the lines at Petersburg to the fighting to the north. With Hancock and Birney diverting Lee north of the James, Grant sought to put more pressure on Lee south of Petersburg to pull Kershaw back from the Valley.
Grant reached an immediate decision. On August 17, the same day that the intelligence picture had clarified, he ordered Warren and his V Corps, “to destroy as much of the Weldon Railroad as practicable.” Grant stated, “I want, if possible, to make such demonstrations as will force Lee to withdraw a portion of his troops from the Valley, so that Sheridan can strike a blow against the balance.”55 The Weldon Railroad was the main logistics artery for Richmond and Petersburg. It fed massive amounts of foreign, particularly British, munitions and supplies from Wilmington, the last major Confederate port open to blockade runners. After the fall of Fort Fisher the next year, Grant would send Secretary of State Seward a present of British manufactures that had come through Wilmington.
With this I have the honor of forwarding to you specimens of fuses captured at Fort Fisher, N. C., together with the certificate of Lieutenant Colonel O. E. Babcock, aide-de-camp [no relation to John Babcock of the BMI] on my staff, that they were so captured, and the statement of Colonel Tal. P. Shaffner that the same were manufactured at the Woolwich Arsenal, England, an arsenal owned and run by the British Government.56
Grant sent a stream of messages to Meade, noting the enemy divisions and brigades now north of the James. He commented to Meade, “This leaves the force at Petersburg reduced to what it was when the mine was sprung.” What he had considered to be merely a glorified raid to cut the railroad suddenly had wider possibilities, as he wrote to Meade, “Warren may find an opportunity to do more than I had expected.” Meade, in turn, expanded Warren’s orders “to strike the railroad close to the enemy’s works, to extend and reconnoiter to the left, and, if he finds a weak spot, to attack.”57
Warren was now armed with an accurate picture of the enemy he would be opposing as well as the opportunities for vigorous action. He brushed aside a cavalry brigade to cut the railroad on August 18 in an attack that took the Confederates by surprise. Warren’s attack on this vital artery alarmed Beauregard, though he was not sure of the size of the attacking forces. He ordered Heth to retake the road with two brigades. He actually employed three. Beauregard was so concerned about how the Petersburg defenses had been so thinned out that he ordered Heth to return to his defensive works after the attack. Heth’s attack drove Warren back but did not retake the railroad. The Confederates were not about to let the matter rest with the Union advantage. Colonel Lyman observed, “It is touching a tiger’s cubs to get on that road!”58
The next day, the 19th, Lee lashed back with five brigades of Mahone’s and Wilcox’s Divisions brought back from north of the James, as well as W. H. F. Lee’s Cavalry Division. Determined to regain the railroad, Lee attacked again on August 21 with eight brigades. But ultimately the railroad stayed in Union hands when the fighting ended that same day. The impact was not lost on Lee, who informed Jefferson Davis the same day, “Our supply of corn is exhausted today.” He said he would do everything in his power to accumulate supplies at the Stony Point depot below the cut made by the enemy and wagon the supplies to the army. He had already sent one train out. He appealed to Davis to energize the Quartermaster Department, notorious for its lethargy.59
Grant was also unhappy, but with Warren’s performance. “It seems to me that when the enemy comes out of his works and attacks and is repulsed he ought to be followed vigorously to the last minute with every man. Holding a line is of no importance whilst troops are operating in front of it.” Much more could have been done, especially since McEntee had kept the command closely informed of the transfer of enemy brigades from north of the James. On the 21st, he listed the Confederates by unit from the enemy’s right to left. Warren had chosen to remain on the defensive after repulsing attacks when the enemy was weakest. Thereafter the enemy in his front only grew stronger. Grant thought that, in such circumstances, a corps commander should have shown a more instinctive aggressiveness and attacked. Warren had thrown away the priceless advantage of knowing exactly what forces the enemy had available.60
On August 25 Sharpe presented very welcome news:
One of our agents left Richmond about noon of day before yesterday, having arrived there on Monday afternoon about 4 o’clock. By direction he inquired from many different sources, and seemed to be entirely satisfied that no troops had been sent either to the Valley or to Atlanta, but understood, on the contrary, that it was considered necessary, and that the order had already gone forth, that one of the cavalry divisions sent to Early should return.
Sharpe also reported on Union prisoners taken in the fight and Confederate reactions supplied by couriers from his espionage rings in Richmond:
Twenty-seven hundred prisoners are claimed to have been taken in the fight on the Weldon railroad, who are now on Belle Isle, but are to be shortly sent to Georgia. It is claimed that the Weldon railroad is to be retaken at whatever cost. A very large number of wounded men were brought into Richmond from the direction of Petersburg after the railroad fight, and the agent thinks that the trains running on Monday from Petersburg to Richmond and returning were loaded with the wounded going up, and going down were conveying the troops which had been operating on the north side of the river. He could not learn of any new movements of troops, except of the return of those which had been on the north side of the James.61
A report the same day from McEntee detailed the confusion among the Confederates opposing Warren along the Weldon Railroad and even noted that Lee and Beauregard had been riding down the line with great urgency. The day was filled with flurries of intelligence reports by McEntee and Sharpe, detailing organization, movement, and intentions of the enemy to concentrate so strongly to regain the road that they had left the Petersburg trenches manned only one man deep. One deserter accurately revealed that a three-division attack was planned with the destination of Stony Creek, below Warren’s present position astride the railroad. Signal reports were confirming the movement of large numbers of troops as well. Hancock, now back south of Petersburg, and Warren were warned to expect heavy attacks, and Meade reinforced Hancock with another division. The attack came late in the afternoon of August 25 in a violent assault by eight brigades mostly of Hill’s III Corps and two of Wade Hampton’s cavalry divisions against Hancock’s II Corps. Hit front and rear, II Corps was beaten and partially driven from its entrenchments in the battle of Reams Station. Despite this, Hill’s victory had not been sufficient to recover the railroad. Hill’s men returned elated to their trenches after the attack, carrying nine of Hancock’s cannon, 12 stands of colors, and 3,100 small arms. They had inflicted 2,600 casualties and claimed to have lost only 720.62
Hancock complained bitterly about the conduct of his corps, saying that had his men behaved as they had in the past, he would have defeated the enemy. He attributed their performance to fatigue after a long campaign, the loss of many fine officers, and to the large number of recruits and substitutes. In one regiment some of the officers could not even speak English. Had not the confirming intelligence from the BMI and the Signal Corps resulted in the alert and reinforcement of II Corps, Hill’s attack might well have resulted in a complete rout and the recovery of the railroad by Lee.63
In the end, the army’s tactically inconclusive attacks throughout August had resulted in a strategic victory for Grant. As a member of Meade’s staff remarked, “The Rebels licked us, but a dozen more such lickings and there will be nothing left of the Rebel army!”64 He was more accurate than he knew. Sharpe’s informants in Richmond were reporting that the “carnage is understood to have been severe. They say that the Union men in Richmond consider it he severest repulse the Rebels have had during the year, and that it was remarked that the ‘Yankees had finally got the knack for firing low enough,’ as almost all of the wounded were struck in the legs and lower part of the body.”65
Lee had been too clever by half. He thought to stir things up by placing Kershaw at Culpeper where he could easily intervene in the Valley and thus draw Union forces away from Richmond-Petersburg. Grant had not obliged. By attacking Lee instead, he put the Virginian on the horns of a dilemma. The longer Grant attacked, the more Lee hesitated to send Kershaw to the Valley. At the same time, the prospect of reinforcing Early still seemed profitable and so he kept the division in Culpeper just in case. In the end, he did neither, and Kershaw was effectively out of the fight for a critical five weeks. The BMI played a central role in confounding Lee. Despite Lee’s deception, the BMI had been able to sort out the Confederate dispositions and provide Grant with the intelligence he required to make the decisions that kept Lee on the horns of his dilemma. For Lee his dwindling strength closed off too many options and denied him too many opportunities. He realized that Grant had outmaneuvered him. He wrote to Davis: “This was fully illustrated in the late demonstration north of the James River, which called troops from our lines here, who if present might have prevented the occupation of the Weldon Railroad. These rapid and distant movements also fatigue and exhaust our men, greatly impairing their efficiency in battle.”66
The end of August saw the departure of the legendary Sergeant Cline as the chief of scouts when his regiment, the 3rd Indiana Cavalry, was mustered out of service. Sharpe replaced him with Judson Knight, whom he had clearly been grooming for the job. Knight was to remain a primary intermediary between Sharpe and Van Lew’s spy ring in Richmond. Knight also remained in touch with his initial contact, Alexander Myers, through whom he was introduced to Henry Roach, who coincidentally was the cousin of one of Knight’s scouts, John Roach. Henry Roach was a goldmine of information about the torpedoes (mines) being manufactured in Richmond. Knight got Myers to actually bring out through the lines one of the men engaged in manufacturing the torpedoes along with an exact description. Knight had a precise drawing made and along with a description submitted it to Scientific American on September 21. It was published on October 8.67
Knight ensured that numerous copies were supplied to the fleet in the James River, and then decided to have a bit of fun with the Confederate authorities. Through Van Lew, and surely with Sharpe’s permission, he had a copy dropped into the box of Confederate Secretary of War Seddon. The work on the torpedoes came to a complete stop, and after Richmond fell, Knight was able to find many of the devices in various stages of completion where they had been left.68
Roach had also worked as an engineer and pile driver for two years and was the source of a lengthy and detailed analysis of the Confederate obstacles in the James River prepared by Sharpe. It was a priceless piece of intelligence for the 5th Division of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron supporting Grant in the James River.69
September would be mostly a quiet month, as both sides avoided major offensive operations. The Confederates continued to transship supplies by wagon from the Weldon Railroad south of where the Union army had cut the lines. The BMI monitored this activity, noting on September 11 that all the forage for the enemy cavalry was coming by that route. Babcock also passed on an informant’s opinion that “it would take only a small raiding party to capture these trains.”70
Made aware by the BMI of the importance of the Weldon Railway as a logistical lifeline for Lee’s army and Richmond, he looked beyond merely cutting as he already had. The Confederates, with some logistical effort, had largely negated his control of the railway below Petersburg. He concluded that it would be far better to cut off the source of the supplies by taking Wilmington. On September 12 Grant informed Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter of his intention of sending an expedition to seize the port. Grant had expected the expedition to get underway about October 5, but it took longer to organize the joint army-navy expedition than expected, and the start date kept moving forward.
September also saw Sharpe involved in the hunting down of a counterfeiter. Early that month the presence of counterfeited greenbacks passing through the armies around Richmond and Petersburg became apparent. Lafayette Baker was called in but failed to find the source of the bills. Sharpe relentlessly pursued the counterfeiter and his accomplices until they were rounded up. The ringleader was a Captain McDonald, 1st Pennsylvania Cavalry, an English immigrant who had enlisted a week after arriving in the United States. The Daily National Republican newspaper was quite clear about who was chiefly responsible for breaking up the ring when it wrote that “great credit is due to Gen. Patrick, Provost Marshal General, and to the indefatigable exertions of his assistant, Col. Sharp [sic].”71
Before the onset of winter weather, Grant tried once more to cut the Southern Railroad. Before the attack, Babcock was focused on refining the enemy’s order-of-battle in the area of operations, confirming that it consisted of Mahon’s and Heth’s Divisions of Hill’s III Corps, the locations of brigades, so far as noting that one brigade moved a mile and a half down the line, and the identification and location of cavalry.72 On October 27 Grant threw 17,000 men of II and V Corps toward the Boydton Plank Road and Hatcher’s Run. Hill’s Corps again stopped the attack, helped by a lack of cooperation between Hancock and Warren.
The area north of Hatcher’s Run on October 24, 1864, drawn by John C. Babcock. Official Record.
Sharpe’s old associations with the 20th New York State Militia Regiment still remained strong and allowed him to do Patrick a good turn in September. Sharpe had written the old provost marshal a note on September 7 that the men of the regiment had, as Patrick recorded in his diary, “purchased, some time ago, a very handsome sword & ‘fixings’ to be presented to me, as they are about to leave for home.” The 20th was about to be mustered out. The old puritan, in an act of self-effacement, had written back to Sharpe that he thought the presentation ought to be deferred until they all were out of service. Sharpe was disturbed because he knew how devoted the regiment was to Patrick, who considered them to be the only reliable regiment he had ever had in the provost guard and actually part of his military family. He also knew that Patrick, who was acting with the best intentions, could be a bit tone-deaf at times, and this was one of them. It was probably Sharpe who informed Grant who insisted to Patrick that he receive the heartfelt gift and that if he were “to decline it, the men would be chilled to death & would not re-enlist.” Patrick put on a good face and received the soldierly tribute—and the 20th re-enlisted to serve out the war with him. He would bring them to Richmond when he reestablished the police function of the city after Lee’s surrender.73
There was an unfortunate side to Sharpe’s relationship with the 20th. Its commander, Col. Theodore B. Gates, apparently had developed a grudge against Sharpe, and one that he carefully hid. In a diary filled with references to his cordial relationship with Sharpe, he wrote on September 26 that he “had a long talk with Gen. Patrick about G. H. S.” Patrick’s recorded diary was more descriptive of Gates’s well-chewed scrape of bile. “He [Gates] tells me that the Colonel [Sharpe] is known, at home, and by his Regt [,] as a man on whom little reliance can be placed—Tricky and full of all sorts of policy [politics] …” Well, the “Tricky and full of all sorts of policy” are characteristics of a good intelligence officer. But the reference to lack of reliance runs against the devoted nature of the men of his own 120th New York, whose interest Sharpe had always furthered. He had gone so far, Patrick commented at this time, as to write to ask that his regiment be transferred to the provost guard. Patrick noted that “I have not, yet, asked for it.” Nor would he. Sharpe had been equally solicitous of the men of the 20th NYSM; he had been the one, not Gates, to tell Patrick that his refusal to accept their presentation sword would be a mortal insult. Whether Gates’s spite had influenced him, Patrick’s diary withholds comment, but there is little else in his diary to show that he shared these sentiments except an irritated entry of September 20. Sharpe had applied for leave, which Patrick approved, then noted, “I hope he will now cease plotting—at least so far as I am concerned.” If he had had sufficient cause, a man of Patrick’s rectitude would have moved to replace Sharpe long before, yet there is nothing more in his diary to indicate that was ever contemplated. Reading between the lines, it seems that Sharpe was a serious player in headquarters politics, something his subsequent career would support but also something that Patrick and Gates would have found distasteful.74
Gates’s secret denunciation of his friend reflected more on him than Sharpe. It is difficult to explain how Gates could have held such feelings for Sharpe then accept the hospitality of the man’s home in Washington a few months later and in postwar years sit cordially with him on the dais at reunions of their regiments. Perhaps the best comment on his secret denunciation was that Patrick did not mention it again, nor did he take any action against Sharpe.75
Two months later, Patrick was interceding for Sharpe with Grant just before the general left for Washington. “I had a talk with Genl. Grant about Col. Sharpe, and have that matter all fixed right.” There is no mention of what the matter was. Whatever it was, apparently it was enough to provoke Sharpe’s resignation. Two days later, on November 18, Patrick sent up Sharpe’s resignation to Meade. Three days after that Meade replied that he declined to act until he had a chance to discuss the matter with Grant on his return from Washington. Sharpe did not in the end resign. Grant had found him simply too valuable to lose.76
Sharpe again requested leave on October 12 for 12 days, again to attend to the settlement of a large estate of which he was the co-executor. Apparently a suit had been brought against the estate, and Sharpe’s co-executor was not an “experienced business man. The time which an appeal can be taken in the suit … had nearly expired, and a decision as to the course of action … is deferred for my decision.”77
Perhaps the best reason that Grant retained Sharpe was that he had been sufficiently impressed by him to include him in the small circle of staff officers that he had come to trust. Proof is found in Grant’s use of Sharpe to help him monitor what Butler was up to. For Grant, Butler was an increasingly dangerous subordinate. He was a toxic mix of military incompetence and political ambition. Unfortunately, he was too powerful as a protégé of the Radical Republicans for Lincoln to dismiss with the election looming. He was also, in Patrick’s words, “a very troublesome man to work with. I wish he was out of the way.” He had had to intercede with Grant in late July because Butler refused to forward his prisoners to City Point. Already, Grant was trying to replace him, and Sharpe informed Patrick that “Butler’s removal is hanging again by the ears in consequence of complications at Washington.” Certainly Halleck hated Grant and relentlessly connived to remove him, something of which he was certainly not ignorant, courtesy in some degree to Sharpe. Yet, Butler’s political allies were too powerful to offend by dismissing him.
In August Sharpe informed Patrick that “Butler has gone to New York … to look out for the Convention.” Grant was coming to see Butler as a postwar rival. This was heightened just after the election, when Butler accepted Rev. Henry War Beecher’s acclamation as the next president without tactfully naming Grant as the rightful candidate. Also after the election, a possible shuffle in Lincoln’s cabinet seemed imminent. Chief Justice Taney had died the month before, and Stanton wanted the appointment. Butler’s name was seriously raised as his replacement. This so alarmed Grant that he turned to Sharpe. Patrick wrote on November 16 that Sharpe was “off to Washington …. with a view to head off Butler as Secretary of War.” What influence he did have is unknown, but by the 28th Grant was able to tell Patrick that there was no chance that Butler would be made Secretary of War. This would not be the last time that Grant would use Sharpe in a sensitive political mission.78