Sketch of part of the front line at Petersburg, November 6, 1864, drawn by John C. Babcock. Courtesy Huntington Library. p. 5
If events around Petersburg and Richmond remained largely quiet after the battles of late August, Grant had plenty to occupy his attention in supporting Sheridan with intelligence in support of his operations in the Valley. On September 6 he informed Sheridan, perhaps a little too eagerly, “From reports of deserters coming in at different times, and on different parts of our lines, we learn that Kershaw’s division arrived in Petersburg last night. I think there is no doubt but some troops home arrived from the Valley.” Sharpe was able to dismiss that conclusion the next day with information from a spy in Richmond. McEntee confirmed this by unraveling the source of the earlier error. From interrogations he learned that several deserters had seen I Corps brigades moving through Petersburg at the time which “gave rise to the rumor” of Kershaw’s return from the Valley. Sheridan’s capture of prisoners also confirmed this assessment, as he wrote on September 8, “I am to say positively that no troops have left.”1
Early and the issue of his strength were clearly frustrating Sheridan’s attempts to lay waste the Valley and deprive Lee of his main food supply, the mission given him by Grant. The Valley’s farms and mills were the granary of the Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond. Early’s presence in the Valley was to protect the granary. The Confederate general dodged Sheridan’s attempts to bring him to battle in a series of maneuvers through the lower Valley. Yet Sheridan approached Early with caution; he had concluded erroneously that both sides were equivalent in strength at 40,000 men each, when Early had barely 14,000 men. Sheridan had another even more pressing concern. He would write later, “The Presidential campaign in the north was fairly opened … under no circumstances, could we afford to risk defeat.” He would wait until Early returned a sizeable part of his force to Lee. Early, looking at the same situation, arrived at a completely different conclusion—that Sheridan “possessed an excessive caution which amounted to timidity.” At the same time, Early was aware of Lee’s desperate need for more men. On September 15 he felt secure enough to put Kershaw on the road back to Lee. Three days later, Kershaw was in Culpeper. On the same day, Sharpe was reporting, “Nothing is known in Richmond outside of official circles of the position of Early.” And Sheridan was anxiously asking Captain Leet, “Have you any information from your scouts from Culpeper or other points south? Please answer.”2
Sheridan’s own scouts now enter the picture. He had been impressed by the reputation of the “Jesse Scouts” serving with cavalry general Averell in West Virginia. The term “Jesse Scouts” had originated in the west in the command of John C. Fremont and were named in honor of his wife. Jesse Scouts not only gathered information in Confederate uniform but would gather in larger numbers to carry out raids. They were a forerunner of special operations. Over time they came to mean any Union scout operating in Confederate uniform. The effectiveness of the scouts in Sharpe’s organization of the Army of the Potomac could not have been lost on him in his service with them in the Overland Campaign. When Sheridan took command in the Valley in early August, he concluded that “… I felt the need of an efficient body of scouts to collect information regarding the enemy, for the defective intelligence-establishment with which I started out from Harper’s Ferry early in August had not proved satisfactory.” This was evidence of Sigel’s obstinate refusal to cooperate with McEntee to establish a BMI-type operation in his command. Sheridan now ordered Averell to send him his oldest scouts. These six men and one from the Army of the Potomac he put under the supervision of his provost marshal.3
Sheridan’s new scouts quickly proved their worth. He had been frustrated by the conflicting information about Early’s reinforcements. Two of his new scouts found Tom Laws, an elderly former slave and produce vendor, who had a pass that allowed him to enter Winchester three days a week. The scouts had sounded out this man, and, “finding him both loyal and shrewd, suggested he might be made useful to us within the enemy’s lines.” The next step was to find a reliable contact in Winchester; he called on General Crook, who responded that he had met such a person in a young lady he had met in the town—the 26-year-old Quaker school teacher and Unionist, Rebecca Wright. Sheridan then ordered Laws brought to his headquarters, where he interviewed the man himself. “I was soon convinced of the negro’s fidelity.” Sheridan discovered that not only did Laws know Wright but that he would gladly carry a message. Sheridan wrote the message himself:
I learn from Major-General Crook that you are a loyal lady and still love the old flag. Can you inform me of the position of Early’s forces, the number of divisions in his army, and the strength of any or all of them, and his probable or reported intentions? Have any more troops arrived from Richmond, or are any more coming, or reported to be coming?
I am respectfully, your most obedient servant,
P. H. Sheridan, Major-General Commanding. You can trust the bearer.4
On September 16 Laws drove his vegetable cart into Winchester with the message wrapped in tinfoil and hidden in his mouth. He delivered it to Wright, saying that he would wait for an answer. She nervously hesitated but steeled herself and replied that she had no communication with the Rebels but would tell what she knew. And here luck fell on the Union side. The night before she had been speaking with a convalescing Confederate officer who told her, “The division of General Kershaw, and Cutshaw’s artillery, twelve guns and men, General Anderson commanding, have been sent away, and no more are expected, as they cannot be spared from Richmond.” Laws put the reply in Sheridan’s hand the same day. The general made immediate plans to move against Early.
Early on September 17 Sharpe reported in a summary to Meade that there was no sign of Kershaw’s return: “Nothing is known in Richmond of the return of any part of Early’s forces from the Valley.” But earlier that same day, Babcock reported to Sharpe, “A large force of infantry, at least four or five brigades, from some point north of the Appomattox, passed through Petersburg on Wednesday eve and Thursday morning last.” Sharpe’s summary explained, “The infantry seen passing through Petersburg day before yesterday by deserters may have been Pickett’s division, as it was stated it came from the north side of the Appomattox.”5 At 2:30 p.m. Meade, acting as his own chief intelligence officer, apparently drew his own differing conclusions and telegraphed them to Grant at Harper’s Ferry on his way to confer with Sheridan:
Yesterday I informed you signal officers north of the Appomattox reported the movement into Petersburg of troops on the Richmond road, and a deserter stated he had about the same time seen troops marching through Petersburg, said to be part of Early’s forces, who, it was stated, had sent back 6,000 troops. There may be nothing in all this, but so many reports from different sources would lead to the conclusion that some movement is on foot—whether it be offensive, or whether it is, that seeing in our journals the reports of large accessions daily received by the army, Lee is merely preparing for an anticipated extension of our lines, I am unable to say; but the existence of those reports and the movements known to have combined to produce caution on my part during your absence.6
Combined with Sheridan’s own reports, this message determined both Sheridan and Grant to go for the kill. However, the Union intelligence was only half right. Meade, taking counsel of his fears, had been wrong to suppose Kershaw was back in Richmond. Sharpe was right all along that there was no proof that Kershaw had returned, but he offered no evidence of where that division was. Meade’s error, however, was benign. In a way, he was right for the wrong reason. What was important was that Kershaw was no longer with Early but had been withdrawn to an intermediate position at Orange Court House between Winchester and Richmond on September 14 as reported by Rebecca Wright. The critical information, though, was that his division no longer was available to Early. On September 17, the same day that Meade had told Grant that Kershaw was in Richmond, Lee wrote Early confirming that Kershaw was not in Richmond:
I have been very anxious to recall General Anderson with Kershaw’s Division to me. But a victory at this time over Sheridan would be greatly advantageous to us, and I feared that your corps would be insufficient for the purpose. General Anderson is more necessary here than in the Valley, and I have written to him to return with his staff if circumstances permit, and to direct General Kershaw with his division to report to you for the present.
Nevertheless, Lee throughout the message refers again and again to his desire to return Kershaw to Richmond so that he could take the offensive. He was clearly wanting it both ways—for Kershaw to be able to reinforce Early to beat Sheridan and for Kershaw to return to Richmond to take part in offensive action there.7
Sheridan was faster off the mark. Before Kershaw could rejoin the Army of the Valley as per Lee’s letter, Sheridan attacked and defeated Early at Winchester on September 19, inflicting 3,921 casualties on Early’s much smaller force for 4,018 of his own. Three days later Grant noted that Sharpe’s friends in Richmond reported there was no news of Early’s disaster at Winchester. That same day Sheridan beat Early again at Fisher’s Hill. Sheridan wired Grant the next day, “Do not think that there ever was an army so badly routed. The Valley soldiers are hiding away and going to their homes.” Grant responded enthusiastically, “I have just received the news of your second great victory and ordered 100 guns in honor of it. Keep on, and your work will cause the fall of Richmond.” The whole lower Valley was now in Union hands as Sheridan proceeded to waste it, burning crops, barns, and mills. Not only was the Valley denied to Lee’s quartermaster, but Grant could take immense relief that there would be no future threats from that quarter. He thought he had laid to rest the ghost of Early’s near capture of Washington. The trigger of Sheridan’s twin victories was the knowledge obtained by his scouts and Rebecca Wright that Kershaw was no longer with the Army of the Valley, reinforced by Meade’s happy error confirming that that division was absent.8
Upon receipt of the news of Fisher’s Hill on September 23, Lee telegraphed Anderson at Orange Court House. “Early has met with a reverse, falling back to New Market. Send Kershaw’s Division with a battalion of artillery through Swift gap to report to him at once. You will report there in person with your staff …” Kershaw’s trains were stopped near Gordonville and turned around. As he dictated the telegram, Lee may even have heard the ripple of Grant’s hundred-gun salute. The irony was that had Lee committed Kershaw to Early in August, Winchester and Fisher’s Hill could easily have swung against Sheridan. Joseph Kershaw was a formidable fighting man, and his presence on a battlefield was a combat multiplier. He would have the chance to prove his reputation.9
This time the BMI simply lost track of Kershaw’s Division. The odds were going to look a lot better for Early. Lee could not have picked more favorable circumstances for his redeployment of Kershaw. Sharpe believed the division was on the way back to Richmond if it had not already arrived. None of his sources were able to pick up anything definite on its arrival or location. The same day Lee turned Kershaw’s Division around at Gordonsville, Sharpe’s friends in Richmond reported a rumor “that Early was eighteen miles this side of Gordonville.” That was a garbled reflection of Kershaw’s men on their way to Richmond. The only other news he received from his friends was that none of Early’s wounded had arrived in Richmond. The next day, his friends reported that the news of Fisher’s Hill was known in the city. On the 25th, Babcock concluded that they, “Are not aware of any re-enforcements arriving, or any troops sent away.” That same day Sharpe reported that only the day before had the second of Early’s defeats become known in Richmond. Two days later Grant wired Halleck that “No troops have passed through Richmond to re-enforce Early.” The same day Babcock reported the Confederates, “have sent Early no re-enforcements,” and that a camp rumor suggested one regiment from each brigade in Hill’s Corps would be sent to Early. On the 28th a deserter stated that Field’s and Hoke’s Divisions had gone to Early. Another report suggested it would be Johnson’s Division. Finally, he received an accurate piece of information that a Mississippi brigade went to Early five days before on the 23rd. Babcock concluded this was Humphreys’s Brigade of Kershaw’s Division, which had been left behind when the division had originally been sent west. That was a key to why they had seen no reinforcements going to Early. They had been looking at Richmond as the source for reinforcements. Kershaw’s Division was not considered because it was on its way back to Richmond. There were scattered reports that it had actually returned. Being “in transit” put it out of mind. The only Richmond source for the information would have been Lee’s telegram to Anderson and that simply did not leak.10
President Lincoln’s instincts were better. With the election coming up, he was loath to risk a defeat and became worried that Sheridan’s all-out pursuit of Early might lead to a reverse. As Grant would later summarize the situation, “The President was afraid that Sheridan was getting so far away [from communication with Washington [and Grant] that reinforcements would be sent out from Richmond to enable Early to beat him. I replied to the President that I had taken steps to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, by attacking the former [Lee] where he was.”
Grant was working on the premise that with Early so badly beaten, he could withdraw Sheridan’s VI Corps and return it to the Army of the Potomac. At this time Sheridan was wasting the Valley and trying to come to grips with Early’s remnant. Grant and Sheridan both thought his remaining XIX Corps would be sufficient.11
The certain steps that Grant “had taken to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early” would be a major two-pronged attack, “to retain Lee in his position.” On the 27th Babcock produced a detailed sketch of the enemy forces from the Appomattox River on the east to the Weldon Railroad on the west. The sketch showed, in Babcock’s fine architect’s hand, the location of every division and brigade, to include those in the entrenchments and those in reserve. The latter were Hoke’s and Field’s Divisions and two of Heth’s brigades. A 21st-century order-of-battle map would find it hard to improve upon it. In addition to the detailed tactical array, Babcock’s sketch showed that six of the Confederate divisions were defending Petersburg—Heth, Mahone, Wilcox (all III Corps), Field (I Corps), Johnson, and Hoke (Beauregard’s command). That only left Pickett’s Division (I Corps), a few stray brigades, and Hampton’s cavalry north of the James defending Richmond. Grant did not have to be Alexander the Great to figure out that by striking here he would draw Lee’s reserves like a magnet.12
It was interesting that deserters at this time were identifying Field’s and Hoke’s Divisions in reserve as having been sent to reinforce Early. Babcock began to have doubts about the two reserve divisions he had shown on his sketch map. He reported to Humphreys based on the information from one deserter, “From the fact that Hoke’s division was to have relieved Johnson’s yesterday at 5 o’clock and did not, it seems probable it may have gone to Early. Field’s division has been lying in reserve on the right—enemy’s right.” He then notified Sharpe that a deserter from another regiment had stated Field’s and Hoke’s Divisions had gone to Early. “We have indications going to substantiate that.” Sharpe, in turn, ordered Davenport to check on Babcock’s report with his operation.” By the morning of September 30, it had all been sorted out and Babcock reported these reserve divisions operating with Lee north of the James. On October 1, Sharpe was closing the loop with Davenport. “We think that Hoke and Field have gone up in front of you; that Bushrod Johnson and Mahone hold the line from the Appomattox to the lead-works, and that Heth and Wilcox are on the enemy’s right. Can you give us anything to prove or disprove, or can you locate any part of the enemy’s force?”13
Sketch of part of the front line at Petersburg, November 6, 1864, drawn by John C. Babcock. Courtesy Huntington Library. p. 5
The importance of this contretemps was not to show that Babcock could make mistakes. Even the finest intelligence analysts make mistakes. It offered an insight into the professional workings of the BMI as it collected, sifted, analyzed, checked, and confirmed information. It also showed Sharpe’s central role in coordinating and cross-checking the reports of his subordinates. Most importantly, it showed the self-correcting process vital to any first-class intelligence analysis operation.
On September 29 Grant suddenly attacked Lee north of the James. Union troops of Major General E. O. C. Ord’s XVIII Corps of the Army of the James stormed Fort Harrison, an important point in Richmond’s defenses. The contest at Fort Harrison was considered so vital that both Lee and Grant were there personally directing operations. Lee recalled Hoke’s and Field’s reserve divisions for an attempt to recover the fort, and the next day threw them into an attack that failed with great loss.
The defenses of Petersburg were now largely denuded of reserves except for Heth’s two brigades on the western end of the line. Lee had even ordered Wilcox’s three brigades in the lines at Petersburg to be, “packed up and rationed, and under march orders,” so desperate was the fighting around Fort Harrison. As Lee’s attacks on the 30th crested in bloody waves on the fort, Meade lunged westward with 16,000 men of the V and IX Corps to cut the Southern Railroad running along the Appomattox River, one of the last major lines leading out of the city. The march orders to Wilcox’s brigades were countermanded. Hill counterattacked with his two reserve brigades of Heth’s Division and Wilcox’s brigades in the battle of Pebbles Farm and saved the Southern Railroad, though he had to withdraw back into his entrenchments as the fighting ended on October 2. But Meade had inched his left wing closer to the artery and extended his lines 3 miles, forcing the Confederates to do the same. With shrinking manpower, every foot of new entrenchments the Confederates had to man was increasing the strain on the Army of Northern Virginia. Once again, Sharpe’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), to use a modern term, had prepared the way for Grant’s one-two punch.14
In addition to order-of-battle analysis, the BMI was also keeping up with its biographical intelligence. As the second day of the fighting began, Babcock reported that Beauregard had been reassigned to Georgia. Beauregard’s sense of grievance had been growing ever since Lee had given command of the Valley to Early and not him. Serving under the shadow of the great Lee had not been good for his ego or his reputation. Aware of his dissatisfaction, Davis arranged a transfer. Douglas Southall Freeman put his finger on the problem when he wrote, “Every soldier is on the wane from the moment he begins to think more of reputation than of opportunity.” Now Grant would have to face Lee, in undisputed command of the entire Confederate force, as Beauregard’s two divisions were incorporated into a new IV Corps for the Army of Northern Virginia.15
The intelligence log jam about Early’s reinforcements started to break up on September 30, the day after Grant’s offensive had begun. That day Babcock learned that Rosser’s Cavalry Brigade had been sent to Early a few days before. Then, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler reported, undoubtedly on Lieutenant Davenport’s findings, that a Confederate officer who had taken the loyalty oath to the Union identified the location of every one of Lee’s divisions, placing Kershaw with Early.16
Early the next month Sharpe’s scouts, working out of Northern Virginia, reported that Longstreet had joined Early with 5,000 men, besides Pickett’s Division and Rosser’s Cavalry Brigade. The figure of 5,000 was an exaggeration; Early would later state that Kershaw’s Division arrived with only 2,700 effectives. The only other error was the identification of Pickett’s Division. Halleck immediately notified Grant, who replied with a highly accurate review of enemy forces. Sharpe’s BMI had made a good start in sorting out the muddle. Grant summarized the intelligence situation in an October 5 message to Halleck:
Longstreet has been reported as having gone to the Valley, but took no troops. Kershaw’s Division of his corps started back to Richmond before Sheridan’s first fight, but was turned back from about Gordonsville. Rosser’s brigade of cavalry has gone, but no other troops of any kind. We have had prisoners and deserters, I believe, from every brigade of Lee’s army within the last few days, and know the location of every division at this time.17
With the exception of Longstreet’s presence, which apparently was a deception, every other piece of information was accurate. In fact, Rosser’s Brigade joined Early the day Grant sent the message. The Longstreet deception was to take on a new life. Lee had sent Early a strong encouragement to go on the offensive. “I have weakened myself very much to strengthen you. It was done with the expectation of enabling you to gain such success that you could return the troops if not rejoin me yourself.”18 Three days later, knowing that the enemy could read Confederate signals, Early borrowed Longstreet’s reputation to intimidate Sheridan with the following deception.
Lieutenant-General EARLY:
Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you and we will crush Sheridan.
LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General.19
Sheridan left his army at Cedar Creek for Washington on October 15 for a meeting with Grant. He left Major General H. G. Wright, commanding VI Corps, in command. The next morning a courier sent by Wright rode up to where he had spent the night to give him the message about the signal intercept. He was skeptical and rightly considered the message to be a “ruse,” but to be on the safe side he ordered the cavalry division he had detached for a raid to return to the army. He opined that if the presence of Longstreet was true, Old Pete would be working on the premise that Sheridan’s cavalry was still detached.
[S]o I abandoned the cavalry raid toward Charlottesville, in order to give General Wright the entire strength of the army, for it did not seem wise to reduce this number while reinforcement for the enemy might be near, and especially when such pregnant messages were reaching Early from one of the ablest Confederate generals.
In response to Sheridan’s transmission of the “Longstreet” message to Washington, Halleck responded by relaying Grant’s summary but added somewhat snidely, “I have very little confidence in the information collected at his headquarters.” Nevertheless, Sheridan left with a great sense of uneasiness but concluded that Longstreet would not be able to join Early before he returned to the army.20
On his return, Sheridan stopped at Winchester for the night of October 18–19. The next morning he could hear cannon fire coming from the direction of his army at Cedar Creek. The sound quickly reached the thundering rumble of a battle, and Sheridan was off to rejoin his army in a famous ride on his horse Rienzi. As he approached, “there burst upon our view the appalling spectacle of a panic-stricken army—hundreds of slightly wounded men, throngs of other unhurt but utterly demoralized, and baggage-wagons by the score, all pressing to the rear in hopeless confusion, telling only too plainly that a disaster had occurred at the front.” Early had attacked his unsuspecting army that morning in its camp just as the men had started to wake. Homer’s “panic, brother to blood-stained rout,” unraveled the army and set it streaming to the rear. Early’s men had overrun Sheridan’s own headquarters with the purpose of capturing Sheridan himself.21
Sheridan galloped forward. His presence alone turned men in their tracks to march back toward the battle and rejoin their units. Sheridan found that substantial portions of both corps were still in good order and turned them around to face the enemy. The line held and beat off attacks growing stronger as men thronged back to their units. Sheridan needed this time to ascertain whether the formidable Longstreet was actually on the field. Lee’s Old Warhorse had been responsible for too many Union routs from Second Bull Run to Chickamauga for him not to be concerned that he faced a far more able opponent than Early. So far, Longstreet’s reputation was still serving Early well.
Table 12.1. Military Use Infrastructure and Supplies Captured or Destroyed by The Army of the Shenandoah, August 10–November 16, 1864
Sheridan was only waiting until his ranks swelled enough to call Early’s bluff. He ordered his cavalry to attack an exposed enemy artillery battery expressly to take prisoners. This was speedily done, and the prisoner interrogations revealed that only Kershaw of Longstreet’s Corps was on the field and not the great man himself. With that, he attacked. Early’s line fell apart. Now it was the Confederate turn to experience rout, as Sheridan’s exultant force pursued them into the night.22
With Early’s army crippled, demoralized, and deserting away, it became a military cipher. Sheridan could now resume unimpeded the wasting the Valley with a thoroughness that would echo down the years and be known to the inhabitants as “the burning.” The cost to Lee was enormous, as shown by Sheridan’s report of the damage done to the resources of the Valley. Between August 10 and November 16, Sheridan’s army destroyed or captured the following economic resources that Lee’s hungry men would never see:23
The loss of military equipment and supplies also left a deep wound in the Army of Northern Virginia.
Cedar Creek had had another consequence. Sheridan’s scouts had been critical to his victory at Winchester, but he felt they had not properly warned him of the impending attack at Cedar Creek the following month. He felt he needed a larger and more tightly organized unit. Sheridan decided to raise a special battalion which he announced would number 500 men, a form of psychological operations designed to magnify the Confederates’ already healthy respect for the so-called “Jesse Scouts” and to throw off the Confederate spies Sheridan believed had penetrated his camp. He chose Maj. Henry Harrison Young of the 2nd Rhode Island Infantry to command and gave him the cover title of “Asst. Aide-de-Camp.” Young’s battalion never grew to more than 60 men, but he mixed scouting with a liberal amount of special operations. On their first mission, they joined a Confederate cavalry column, and when the unit had settled into a dozing ride, Young and his men galloped up the length of the column, firing into it with pistols and shotguns. Young also relentlessly hunted down enemy partisan leaders on Sheridan’s orders. So effective was their scouting that Sheridan would comment that there was little he did not know about the enemy within a 50-mile radius of his base.
Table 12.2. Military Equipment and Supplies Captured or Destroyed by The Army of the Shenandoah, August 10–November 16, 1864 Medical wagons
