II
AMNESIA, PERSONAL IDENTITY, AND THE MANY LIVES OF WOLVERINE
Jason Southworth
In Hulk #180-182, Wolverine makes his first appearance as little more than a feral man in a colorful costume with no memories of his past or seemingly of anything (in fact, in Giant-Size X-Men #1, he has no memory of the Hulk appearance). The Weapon X stories in Marvel Comics Presents show us some of the things the character has done as an agent of the Canadian government, and Origin gives us a glimpse of the character prior to his time at Weapon X, when he was more at peace with the world.
Over the years, Professor Xavier and Wolverine had very little success in reversing the amnesia until House of M, when Wolverine finally recovered all of his memories. But rather than answer questions about his identity, the sudden emergence of these memories has raised more questions for Wolverine about who he really is.
What Is Personal Identity?
The issue of personal identity is actually a set of issues that are entangled and, at times, may be conflated. The questions philosophers try to answer when they discuss personal identity are: What constitutes personhood? Who am I? And what does it mean for a person to persist over time?
When establishing what constitutes personhood, philosophers are trying to figure out what makes a person a person (rather than, say, a comic book). What properties must that entity have to count as a person? Many nonphilosophers may not think this is an interesting or difficult question to answer, as our common use of the term person is synonymous with human. The case of the mutants in the X-books shows why this is an unsatisfactory answer, as they are not humans—they are Homo superiors, not Homo sapiens. If mutants are persons, then being a human is not a necessary condition (it is not required) for being a person. As you might imagine, philosophers do not spend a lot of time talking about Homo superiors, but we do spend quite a lot of time talking about other animals and artificial intelligence. You might consider whether Kitty Pryde’s pet dragon, Lockheed, and the Scarlet Witch’s robot husband, the Vision, are persons.
When we consider the question of “Who am I?” we are trying to establish the characteristics that make you the person that you are, as opposed to some other person. Again, this question appears deceptively easy to answer. You might think that you can just rattle off a description of your character traits, but the answer is going to have to be more complicated than that, because we can often be described in a variety of ways, some of which might be in tension. The question of who counts as a person and why is one of the recurring tropes of Wolverine’s storyline. We see this when the Ol’ Canucklehead goes on one of his tears, complaining that he is not the animal that some people think that he is.
Personhood and persistence over time also feature prominently in X-Men. Consider the classic story “Days of Future Past” (which appeared in
Uncanny X-Men #141 and 142), in which we encounter characters who seem to be many of the X-Men we know (including Wolverine), but in the future. How do we know that they are the same characters? They
look the same. This is the standard, unreflective first response people often give to the question of personal identity: people persist over time if they occupy the same bodies. Same claws and pointy hair? Well, it
must be Wolverine. That’s just common sense—which, as we’ll see, isn’t always as common or sensical as we might initially think.
1 Still, you might say, who cares?
Well, the main reason we should care about personal identity concerns moral culpability. All moral frameworks involve the attribution of blame and praise, and many call for punishment. In order to attribute praise and blame for an act, we have to be certain that the people to whom we are giving the praise and the blame are the ones who deserve it, based on their actions. If, for example, it turns out that the man called Logan is not the same person who committed atrocities for the Canadian government under the code name Weapon X, then he should not be punished for the behavior of that person. Likewise, if the current Wolverine is not the same person that he was in the past, Sabretooth and Lady Deathstrike would be wrong in their attempts to punish him.
Cassandra Nova, Charles Xavier, and John Locke
The philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) argued against the commonsense view that the body is the source of personal identity, using a modified example from the pop culture of his own time. Locke told a story that was essentially
The Prince and the Pauper, except the individuals exchanged minds, rather than simply roles. If Locke were around today, he might instead have talked about Charles Xavier and Cassandra Nova. In Grant Morrison’s run on
New X-Men (if you haven’t read it, you should be ashamed of yourself), we learn that Cassandra Nova placed her mind in Charles Xavier’s body and placed Xavier’s mind in her body. The Xavier body with Nova’s mind forced Beak (if you don’t know who Beak is, you should be doubly ashamed of yourself) to beat the Beast so badly, he had to be hospitalized, and started a war between the Shi’ar Empire and the X-Men.
2 When the body of Xavier manipulated Beak, it referred to itself as Cassandra. Likewise, later in the story, when Jean Grey communicates with the mind in Cassandra Nova’s body, it reports to be Xavier. Prior to discovering the switch, the X-Men naturally believed the actions of Xavier’s body to be those of Xavier. After finding out about this switch, however, they do not hold Xavier accountable for the actions taken by his body. Instead, they condemn Cassandra Nova for them and discuss how to defeat her. So, it seems personal identity is not a matter of body but of mind.
Having rejected the body theory in favor of something mental, Locke tries to determine the nature of the mental thing. What mental properties or characteristics could indicate persistence over time? Locke quickly rejects any type of character or personality traits because such traits are constantly in flux. We’re always trying to become better people, and, as a result, our morality, tastes, and preferences tend to change often. Yet we remain in essence the same people.
By process of elimination, we come to memories as the source of personal identity. Locke does not mean that we need to have all and only the memories that a previous individual in time has had. You have “sameness of memories” even if you have additional memories that come after the memories that you have in common with yourself at an earlier time. So, we would say that Wolverine is still the same person he was the day he joined the New Avengers as he was the day after, since he has the same memories he had the day before.
Of course, we don’t remember everything that happens to us—and some of us are more forgetful than others. Locke isn’t forgetful on this account, though: he complicates things by introducing the concept of connected memories. One memory can be connected to another as follows: I remember a time when I had a memory I no longer have. As long as I can remember such a time, then those earlier memories still count as
mine.3 So, even if Wolverine no longer has memories of the first time he performed the Fast Ball Special with Colossus (in
Uncanny X-Men #100. I didn’t even have to look that up. I am a walking
OHotMU), as long as he remembers a time when he
did remember that day, then he is still the same person as he was
on that day. Likewise, since on the day he joined the X-Men, Wolverine did not have memories of his encounter with the Hulk in
Hulk #180-182, nor does he have memories of a time when he had memories of this, there are no connected memories, and he is, as a result, not the same person who encountered the Hulk on that day.
Bringing It All Back to Wolverine
If sameness of memory gives us sameness of person, then it seems several different people have inhabited the body we recognize as Wolverine’s. Let’s go through the history of Wolverine as it has been revealed to us so far and yell out, “New Wolverine!” every time we spot one.
The known history of Wolverine begins in
Origin (2002). In this story, we learn that he was born in the nineteenth century on a plantation in Canada under the name James Howlett. Howlett left the plantation and adopted the name “Logan,” the last name of the groundskeeper on the plantation. He had several adventures after leaving the plantation, first living with a pack of wolves, then with Blackfoot Indians (marrying one of them known as Silver Fox), joining the Canadian military, living in Japan under the name “Patch,” and fighting in World War II with Captain America.
4 After returning to Canada, Logan is recruited by Team X, and as a part of the program, Wolverine has his memory erased and replaced with memories of a life that no one ever lived.
5
New Wolverine!
The man involved with Team X has no memory of the life prior to being a part of the team, so we are on the second life of Wolverine.
While a member of Team X, Logan was abducted by the people at the Weapon X program. As a part of the Weapon X program, he was given the name Mutate #9601 and once again had his mind erased.
New Wolverine!
And thus ended the short life of the second Wolverine.
Not all of the life of Mutate #9601 has been documented, but we have seen some of his nasty and brutish life in Barry Windsor-Smith’s feature “Weapon X” that appeared in
Marvel Comics Presents #72-84 (every comic fan should own a copy of this, as there is little better than Windsor-Smith art). Eventually, the Winter Soldier (a brainwashed Bucky) frees him, and the creature referred to as Weapon X goes feral in the woods of Canada and has his famous fight with the Hulk.
6 After some time, he is discovered by James and Heather Hudson (of Alpha Flight fame), with no memory of what he was doing in the woods, the fight with the Hulk, or the Weapon X project, and in time is civilized.
7
New Wolverine!
At this point, the Wolverine we all know and love is born.
I will spare you a complete rundown of the rest of Wolverine’s history (as I am sure you know it all), except to point to two other important events. When Apocalypse captures Wolverine to make him serve as his horseman Death, in Wolverine Vol. 2 #145, he was once again brainwashed.
New Wolver—okay, that’s probably enough of that.
With the conclusion of House of M, we discover that after Wolverine’s body heals from the Scarlet Witch’s messing with his mind, he finally has all of his memories restored, giving us one final new person, in Locke’s view. Wolverine now has memories or connected memories to every person who inhabited that familiar body. At this point it seems that if Locke is right, the inhabitant of the Wolverine body will in one moment go from not being responsible for any of the things done by the other inhabitants of that body to being responsible for all of them.
Jamie Madrox and Derek Parfit
The contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit (b. 1942) has famously objected to the memory account of personal identity with a thought experiment about a brain being divided into two parts and placed in two separate bodies. Had Parfit been an X-Men fan, he could have used the example of Jamie Madrox, the Multipleman. For those who don’t know, Madrox has the ability to create up to ninety-nine duplicates of himself at a time. To form a duplicate, a force must be applied to Madrox from outside himself, or he must apply the force to an outside object—in other words, he has to be hit by or hit something. At any time, two adjacent Madroxes can recombine by an act of mutual will.
When the Madroxes combine, all memories each of them had separately are joined into the new entity. Likewise, whenever a duplicate is formed, it has all of the memories of the Madrox from which it came. So, as we learn in the miniseries Madrox (2005), if one of the duplicates studies Russian or anatomy, then all other duplicates that are made after it has been reabsorbed will have this knowledge as well. From the moment it is created, each duplicate begins to have unique memories and experiences that no other Madrox has. So, Madrox is an even more complicated case than Parfit was concerned with, as there can be up to one hundred individuals that exist at the same time, with the same memories.
Parfit thinks that it would be wrong to say of the one hundred Madroxes that they are the same person. If they’re the same, we get big problems: if one multiple were to go to the refrigerator and get a sandwich, but all of the other ones did not, it would follow that Madrox both did and did not get a sandwich. This certainly looks like a contradiction. Considering each of the Madroxes to be a different person who is unique until reabsorbed, at which time that particular Madrox is destroyed, seems like an obvious way to avoid this contradiction.
X-Factor #70-90, written by Peter David, features conflicts between the different duplicates. Some of the duplicates refuse to allow themselves to be reabsorbed, as they claim it would end their existence. In fact, one of the duplicates professes to hate the original Madrox. In addition, in the Madrox miniseries, it turns out that a duplicate ends up being the villain of the story, while the original Madrox and some other duplicates were the heroes fighting against him. Was Madrox getting into arguments with himself? Fighting himself? It doesn’t seem like it. We thus have reason to conclude that sameness of memories is not a sufficient condition for sameness of identity.
This kind of thought experiment leads Parfit to conclude that there must be something physical involved in personal identity. Because the brain houses the mind, Parfit concludes that “sameness of brain” means sameness of identity over time. This is more complicated than it sounds, however, because the human brain changes over time. All cells in the human body, including neurons (a very special type of cell found only in the brain), break down and are replaced with new versions. It takes about seven years for all of the matter in the human brain to get completely broken down and changed. Due to this, Parfit concluded that personhood can persist for only, at most, seven years.
8
Bringing It All Back to Wolverine (Again)
Wolverine’s case is special. Wolvie is the head-trauma king. Every time he is severely injured in his brain, there is brain damage. And every time the old healing factor kicks in and repairs it, we are looking at a new Wolverine. In cases where there is only light brain damage (so the whole brain isn’t affected), the healing factor still manages to reorganize his brain so quickly that the length of time to a new Wolverine is much shorter than seven years.
When you start thinking of all of your favorite instances of Wolverine brain damage, you realize there are so many that we will not be able to count all of the new selves in this short chapter. Just for fun, though, some of my favorites are: the Punisher running over Wolverine with a steamroller, leaving it parked on his head in Punisher Vol. 3 #16; when the Wrecker hits him with his magic crowbar in New Avengers #7; and when Sabretooth thinks he has drowned him and walks away, only for the Ol’ Canuklehead to get up again.
Be Slow to Judge
Now that you know Wolverine is in fact many individuals, you should see him in a new light. And if Parfit is right, it should make you think twice about how quickly you judge all of the characters in the X-Verse (and the real world). People who commit terrible acts of violence may need to be given the benefit of the doubt until it can be established that they are in fact the same person. In the X-Verse we should be less dubious of Emma Frost working with the X-Men; the less catlike Beast should question whether, even if the secondary mutation were reversed, he would be the character they miss; and the next time Jean Grey comes back from the dead, we should all stop complaining that she seems different from before.
NOTES
1 This is known as the bodily theory of personal identity.
3 John Locke (1690),
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1994).
4 Wolverine: Origins #16.
8 See Derek Parfit’s “Personal Identity,”
Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27.