29. DESTINATION TO BE CONFIRMED

On 28 April at 5 a.m., just before light dawned, the driver and stoker worked up steam in the locomotive before heading west in the direction of Ekaterinburg – quite the opposite to the plan that Yakovlev had indicated to Avdeev.1 Russia’s trains were slow in comparison with those on many networks in central and northern Europe, and even on main lines it was rare for a Russian train to average more than twenty-five miles an hour. (On branch lines, the usual scheduled speed was lower still.)2 The trip to the Urals would take most of the day. At least, this was the impression that Yakovlev gave everyone who was standing on the platform in Tyumen. He had already instructed his driver that the real intention was to stop the train at the first little junction, turn the engine round and make for Omsk. Although this would involve passing back through Tyumen, Yakovlev calculated that he would complete the manoeuvre before anyone in the town guessed what he was up to. He was aiming to out-trick those whom he thought were working against him, and in Omsk, he felt sure, he would have the chance to decide exactly what to do next without feeling under threat.3

Loginov and Gusyatski in Tyumen, however, duly witnessed what was happening and cabled the Urals Regional Soviet Executive Committee about the train’s redirection to Omsk. Their telegram reached Ekaterinburg at 10 a.m. and when it was brought to Beloborodov, he immediately called a meeting of the Soviet Regional Executive Committee to condemn Yakovlev as a traitor to the revolution.4 Nobody in Ekaterinburg as yet knew that Yakovlev had conferred with Sverdlov and secured his approval. The sole thing that mattered for the Urals leaders was that Yakovlev was deliberately transporting the Romanovs out of their reach. All of Zaslavski’s warnings about him seemed to have been confirmed. The Executive Committee also reflected on how respectfully he had talked to Nicholas and arranged life for the family in Tobolsk. Yakovlev’s lack of consultation with Ekaterinburg about the changed itinerary gave grounds for deep suspicion, and the Urals leadership felt alarm about the possibility that Yakovlev had no intention of halting in Omsk. Beloborodov and his comrades speculated that Sverdlov’s favoured commissar was none other than a secret monarchist who planned to press on to Vladivostok, where he would release Nicholas into foreign exile.

Such a plot would have been anathema to Nicholas since it would mean leaving his son and two of his daughters in grave peril in distant Tobolsk. But the Urals leadership had come to believe the worst of Yakovlev, and some of them supported the idea of killing Nicholas without further ado. These included the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries Khotimski and Polyakov as well as Bolsheviks Boris Didkovski, Georgi Safarov, Ivan Tuntul and Pëtr Voikov. Safarov spoke for them when he complained about the whole transport process since Tobolsk: ‘Let the military commissar, comrade Goloshchëkin, tell us,’ he demanded, ‘how it came about that Tsar Nicholas galloped off to Omsk!’ Voikov shouted: ‘Scoundrel!’5 Goloshchëkin, pale and agitated, did his best to explain what had happened but was unable to dispel the growing feeling that he, a known confidant of Yakovlev, had concealed important information from the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee decided to liaise with Moscow at the same time as it wired an alert to every railway station on the line to Omsk: Yakovlev must not be allowed to proceed with his plan to bypass Ekaterinburg. About that, at least, everyone could agree.6

Beloborodov angrily informed Sverdlov by telegram that ‘his’ commissar Yakovlev had tricked everyone by heading against orders to Omsk. Nobody, he stated, knew the train’s ultimate destination and Yakovlev’s behaviour was treasonous. He revealed that the Urals Regional Soviet had ordered his arrest and transfer along with Nicholas to Ekaterinburg.7

In his telegram to railway stations on the Tyumen–Omsk line, Beloborodov accused Yakovlev of disregarding Moscow’s orders. The Urals Soviet Regional Executive Committee had concluded that Yakovlev had engaged in a ‘betrayal of the revolution’ and had placed himself ‘outside the ranks of the revolutionaries’. Beloborodov called for Yakovlev to be arrested and, if he showed any resistance, shot on the spot. Yakovlev’s entire detachment was also to be taken into custody. Beloborodov expected there to be violence and indicated that the other passengers too could be killed – this would necessarily have included the Romanovs. He asked that nobody should be influenced by any documents that Yakovlev might proffer in self-justification. The Urals regional leaderships of Bolsheviks, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and far-left Maximalists were in agreement on bringing the ‘criminal scheme’ to an end.8 The Urals Regional Soviet ordered a train of its own to travel at full steam to intercept Yakovlev and his party. The hunt for the Romanovs was on.9

Yakovlev let the Romanov party off the train to get some air shortly before Ishim, nearly 200 miles to the south-east of Tyumen.10 He allowed a telegram to be sent to Tobolsk that contained the following message: ‘The trip is going well. Christ be with you. How is the little one’s health? Yakovlev.’11 Almost certainly the wording was composed by Nicholas or Alexandra and passed to Yakovlev for approval. Yakovlev wanted the Romanovs to feel comfortable on the way to Omsk. He himself focused on the trip ahead. Despite the many pressures on him and his uncertainty about what the Urals leadership might be doing, he kept calm even though Alexandra was behaving with her usual hauteur. She simply could not help herself. She hated passing people in the corridor on the way to the washroom. Since she could not get rid of Yakovlev’s guards and the railway personnel, she took to rising from her bed at four or five in the morning when no one was likely to be around, and if she saw someone, she turned about-face and went back to her compartment.12

The Romanovs had felt properly rested when they awoke on their first morning on the train. Looking out at the names of the stations they passed, they could tell that they were moving towards Omsk. But Yakovlev still refused to say where he was taking them, and Nicholas, like Beloborodov, pondered whether it might even be Vladivostok. If this was really true, the only credible plan would be to spirit the imperial couple into foreign exile. Another possibility was that Yakovlev intended to take a sharp turn at the junction with the southern loop of the Trans-Siberian rail line and take them westward to Moscow. They ate a pleasant lunch at Vagai at eleven o’clock, where Yakovlev ordered a halt. Nicholas conceded the querying duties to Maria, who went down to the four riflemen on guard duty at the far end of the carriage. She was unable to elicit any information and possibly they too were in the dark. The Romanovs distracted themselves by peering out of the windows to catch sight of people celebrating Palm Sunday. They went to their beds early after a dinner of cold dishes; they were none the wiser about Yakovlev’s intentions.13

Avdeev, despite travelling under duress from Yakovlev, continued to discuss his plans with him. Yakovlev told of his commitment to taking the Romanovs through to Moscow – he now made no mention of Ekaterinburg; he reminded Avdeev of their instructions to safeguard the Romanovs and repeated his fear that Zaslavski was lurking somewhere with lethal intent. Appreciating the volatility of the situation, he halted the train again at Lyubino and, leaving the party with strict instructions, commandeered a car to Omsk to find out what was going on.14 He was hoping for the best. Viktor Kosarev in the West Siberian Regional Soviet Executive Committee was an old party comrade of his. They had attended the Capri party school together and Yakovlev had hopes of securing his help against Ekaterinburg’s pretensions.15

Kosarev had concerns of his own about Yakovlev’s behaviour and had dispatched armed units to the little station at Kulomzino a few miles to the west of Omsk on the Ekaterinburg–Chelyabinsk line. He did this after receiving the telegram from the Urals leaders. He also sent out nearly 2,000 armed men with machine guns and artillery to arrest Yakovlev and the Romanovs. On arriving at Omsk station, which was two miles outside the city, Yakovlev immediately understood that he had to talk on the direct line to Sverdlov. Only Moscow could save him and his imperial captives from disaster.16 Sverdlov yet again sided with him and telegrammed a message to Kosarev to the effect that Yakovlev deserved ‘complete confidence’ and was acting entirely according to instructions.17 Yakovlev meanwhile discovered that Zaslavski, the enemy of all his plans, was somewhere in Omsk. Soon afterwards, it was reported that Zaslavski had disappeared after claiming that he had to return to Ekaterinburg on business. Yakovlev suspected that this was part of an assassination plot. He got on the line to Goloshchëkin and asked whether the Urals leadership had recalled Zaslavski. Goloshchëkin denied that any such order had been given. Yakovlev now knew that dirty work remained afoot and that Zaslavski was behind it.18

Sverdlov sent a cable to the Urals Regional Soviet Executive Committee defending Yakovlev against the charge of treachery and stressing that he was obeying Sverdlov’s instructions. He warned Beloborodov against undertaking any initiative without Moscow’s agreement: ‘I repeat: no interference.’19 The Executive Committee was not best pleased to learn that Sverdlov had engaged in secret consultations with Yakovlev. Sverdlov’s behaviour discomfited the Urals leaders, who claimed that it was too late to ‘annul’ their instruction to Omsk and other cities on the railway line to arrest Yakovlev. This was apparently a bargaining ploy designed to ensure that Yakovlev should be ordered to make immediately for Ekaterinburg. They informed Sverdlov that the entire matter was under discussion at the Bolshevik Regional Party Conference.20 They complained generally about Sverdlov’s failure to keep them abreast of the change in ‘Sovnarkom’s objectives’. When no answer came from Sverdlov, they contacted Lenin by telegram and asked: ‘What do you say to that?’ They demanded a ‘direct and clear reply’. They repeated that Yakovlev had perpetrated ‘a colossal stupidity, with your approval, in driving the “baggage” towards Omsk’. But they ended by offering guarantees of physical safety for the Romanovs ‘on condition that this whole business will now be conducted through the Regional Soviet’.21

Beloborodov cabled Kosarev to invalidate the content of telegram no. 3507 about how to treat Yakovlev. At the same time he indicated that he had secured the agreement of Lenin and Sverdlov to turn the train with the Romanovs westward along the Omsk–Tyumen line towards Ekaterinburg. He indicated that Moscow was about to inform Yakovlev about the plan.22 Beloborodov also had to warn off Zaslavski and order him to do nothing to prevent the delivery of the Romanovs alive to Ekaterinburg. He reproduced the text of Sverdlov’s respectful enquiry as to whether the Urals leaders would be content with an instruction from Moscow for Yakovlev to proceed to Tyumen and hand over ‘the entire baggage’ to the Urals Regional Soviet. He appended the expression of consent by Didkovski, Safarov, Khotimski and Preobrazhenski. Beloborodov wanted to leave no doubt in Zaslavski’s mind about the fact that a settled policy had been reached between Moscow and Ekaterinburg; he instructed Zaslavski to go instantly to Tyumen. In an attempt to assuage any resentment that Zaslavski might be harbouring, Beloborodov told him to meet up with Yakovlev at the railway station and present his mandate and instructions to escort the three Romanovs, together with Yakovlev, unharmed to the Urals capital.23 Zaslavski had hitherto acted like an assassin in the shadows; he was now to come into the open and take charge of the so-called baggage. Yakovlev’s status was in steep decline.

When Yakovlev next talked on the Hughes apparatus, Sverdlov disappointed him by ordering that he abandon any idea of bringing the Romanovs to Omsk: ‘We have agreed things with the Uralites. They have taken measures – they have given guarantees on the basis of the personal responsibility of the regional leaders. Transfer the entire baggage in Tyumen to the representative of the Urals Regional Committee. This is necessary. Go with them yourself, provide assistance to the representative.’24 Yakovlev himself was to stay on the train until Ekaterinburg and hand over ‘the entire baggage’ to whoever came to meet him. Sverdlov thanked him for his work: ‘You have accomplished the most important thing.’25 He added that Yakovlev should borrow military reinforcements from Kosarev in Omsk before rejoining the Romanovs. This was an implicit admission that things could still go wrong. The Urals leaders were a recalcitrant bunch, and it could not be excluded that they still had some violent subterfuge in mind.26

Shortly after midnight, early on 29 April 1918, Kosarev conferred by the Hughes apparatus with Urals Regional Soviet Executive Committee Presidium member Georgi Safarov. Yakovlev had not yet started back to Lyubino, where he had left the Romanovs; indeed, he too was liaising with Moscow on another such apparatus. Kosarev received Safarov’s assurance that the Urals leadership had settled the misunderstandings with Sverdlov and that Yakovlev, like it or not, had to bring ‘the baggage’ to Ekaterinburg. Safarov wanted to know whether Yakovlev’s arrival in Omsk had led to any violence – he obviously had an interest in assembling a charge sheet against him. It was an odd situation; for this exchange happened at the same time as the Ekaterinburg Bolsheviks were depending on Yakovlev to do as Sverdlov had bidden him. Kosarev refused to join in any denigration of Yakovlev. Instead he repeated Sverdlov’s demand that the Urals leaders should steer clear of doing anything in contradiction of Moscow’s purposes.27 Kosarev sent a telegram annulling Beloborodov’s telegram no. 3507 of the previous day. Emphasizing that Yakovlev had come to Omsk exclusively with the approval of Sverdlov himself, he sought to get all Bolsheviks working well together.28

Yakovlev made one last attempt to persuade Sverdlov that the River Sim mining district remained a safer option than Ekaterinburg. This, he argued, would enable the central authorities in due course to bring ‘the baggage’ to Moscow. He was sceptical about whether this would ever be possible once Nicholas had been handed over to the Urals leadership. He claimed that Guzakov and Avdeev were agreed about the persistent dangers. When Sverdlov refused to change the plan, Yakovlev promised to obey Moscow’s instructions, but he stressed that he could no longer take moral responsibility for whatever happened next. He complained about the chaotic conditions of the telegraph and asked that People’s Commissar V. I. Nevski should order his people to accept no telegrams with messages that deviated from the plan that Sverdlov had provided. With that, he promised again to take ‘the baggage’ to Ekaterinburg.29

By then the Urals leadership had sent their own detachment to Kulomzino and were blocking access to the southern loop of the Trans-Siberian Railway that could have taken Yakovlev and the Romanovs back to Chelyabinsk. Yakovlev was politically and geographically cornered. With a heavy heart he took his leave of Kosarev and travelled back to Lyubino, where he gave the order to return to Tyumen. To keep the Romanovs in the dark, he told them that he had been forced to change the plan because a bridge on the line to Omsk had been destroyed.30

He also overrode one particular point of his agreement with Sverdlov. Rather than meeting up with Zaslavski, he moved straight through Tyumen at dead of night. Yakovlev’s Ekaterinburg adversary Gusyatski, who had stayed in Tyumen, set off in pursuit after learning about this. Nobody could be sure about where Yakovlev was heading, and there arose a concern that he planned to take the branch line to Shadrinsk and disappear with the Romanovs. Gusyatski soon discovered to his relief that Yakovlev was yielding to Goloshchëkin and travelling to Ekaterinburg. When Nicholas himself heard of this, his mood sank. He knew about the severity of the Urals revolutionaries even though he had no clue about the intricacies of their Marxist ideas. He approached Pavel Matveev in the carriage corridor and asked: ‘Tell me, has it been definitely decided that we’ll be staying in Ekaterinburg?’ When Matveev confirmed the news, Nicholas let out a sigh and said: ‘I’d rather go anywhere but the Urals.’ Matveev tried to reassure him that it made no difference which place was chosen in the zone of Soviet power. Nicholas gloomily remarked that if the local press was to be believed, the Urals workers were fiercely hostile to him.31

Yakovlev took his time. After the train moved westward, he twice ordered a halt and allowed the Romanovs to stretch their legs. On the first occasion he insisted that they stayed close to the rail line. On the next he allowed them to walk into the nearby field in his company. Everybody’s spirits were lifted.32 But the halts were only delaying the inevitable for Yakovlev and Romanovs alike. At 8.40 a.m. on 30 April 1918 the train pulled into no. 1 station in Ekaterinburg – Nicholas kept a careful note of this.33 A crowd had gathered, and Yakovlev held the train short of the platform while he assessed the situation. He lined his men on both sides of the train, threatening to order the machine-gunners to open fire unless people dispersed. Nobody took the slightest notice. Someone yelled: ‘Show us that bloodsucker!’ They had come to see Nicholas – and perhaps to do him harm.34 Yakovlev had told Sverdlov that the Ekaterinburg option was fraught with risks. Sverdlov had overruled him, and it appeared that Yakovlev’s presentiments were about to be realized.