Chapter 15 Science studies

Studying science as a kind of behaviour

What if the work of scientists is itself studied as just another kind of human behaviour, on a par with courtship rituals or competitive sport? Ullica Segersträle’s account of a scientific controversy of the 1970s and 1980s is just such an exercise in socio-anthropology.1 Donna Haraway likewise describes ‘science studies’ as ‘about the behavioral ecology and optimal foraging strategies of scientists and their subjects’.2
Scientists are usually baffled when their culture is studied in that way (Segersträle, Defenders, 356). The issue, however, is not to discredit scientific work by supposedly explaining one scientist's theory in terms of personal prejudices or cultural background. That would be to make the untenable claim that sociology itself is somehow the true science that trumps the others (and then, would not the behaviour of sociologists in turn be studied by their own methods…?). To use a sociological theory of human competitive behaviour to partly account for the claims of scientists does not itself discredit the scientific method, for the sociology itself rests on it.
Segersträle's focus is the fierce and sometimes nasty arguments that arose about the status of sociobiology after the publication of E. O. Wilson's Sociobiology in 1975.3 What caused the trouble was Wilson's one chapter about trying to understand human culture in evolutionary terms. Some of the stakes of this have already been outlined above. Segersträle also found, surprisingly perhaps, that ‘moral/political concerns, far from being an obstacle to be eliminated, were in fact a driving force both in generating and criticizing scientific claims in this field, and that the field was better off because of this’.4
The aim is to see scientific practice in terms broader than its own sometimes blinkered focus on strict disciplinary boundaries and ‘objective facts’. In practice, questions of value are often deeply implicated, not necessarily for the worse. What Segersträle also finds is that disputes about sociobiology often hinged on different presuppositions, not only about data but also about what science is or should be in the first place. ‘A scientific controversy is always at the same time a second-order controversy: it is a conflict about the game rules of science as well, about what counts asgood science”.’5

The Selfish Gene6

Similar to the natural history essays of Stephen Jay Gould, the books of Richard Dawkins show how powerful scientific work can be done in a mode that need not respect the distinction between a popularising text and one engaged in debate with peers. His hugely influential study The Selfish Gene (1976) arose from work on the rising theory of ‘kin selection’ as a crucial feature of evolution (‘kin selection’ meaning crudely that a creature will behave altruistically for its close relatives, behaviour that makes no sense in terms of individual self-interest but which becomes intelligible – to use the pop-science language for which Dawkins is partly responsible – because it is acting on behalf of a creature that ‘shares a large number of its own genes’).
More than the comparable popular science essays of Gould, Dawkins's book employs often forceful and virtuoso modes of pedagogy. However, its vivid but figurative title also led to misconceptions that persist to this day. The ‘selfish gene’ has now become a phrase widely used to name any sort of genetic determinism, the implausible view, explicitly attacked by Dawkins, that all animal or human behaviour can be traced fatalistically to some inexorable genetic cause. In fact, however, Dawkins's ‘gene’ was a complex invention of explanatory modelling, not a unitary substantive entity, let alone one with any motives, naming what is essentially a logical function (for its referent would actually be the working of several microbiological processes).
Segersträle writes:
Dawkins brings in vivid examples and hypothetical scenarios, he entertains, he anthropomorphizes, he stretches the reader's imagination – all in the service of explaining evolutionary theory. Dawkins wants to present the logic of the gene's eye perspective – how we may look at evolution in a new way, considering the interest of a gene in producing replicas of itself rather than working for the survival of the individual organism.
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What was in Dawkins essentially a matter of modelling, of finding the most logically simple algorithm for evolutionary processes by a focus on its minimal elements, that is, the principles of replication, soon came to circulate at second and third hands as a simplistic factual claim – that human behaviour, however objectionable, is just an inevitable consequence of evolution.
Dawkins's very success in rendering his explanatory logic concrete with an anthropomorphic term (‘selfish’) also made it liable to unjust claims that he had undermined the whole basis of human morality by promulgating the notion that all action is necessarily self-interested,7 or that he was even lending support to reactionary arguments that tried to justify xenophobia or the oppression of women by reference to the supposed facts of human nature. Out of this context and other loosely sociobiological approaches also arose that contentious but now commonplace language that narrates animal life as a process of continuous cost–benefit analysis, for which every choice of food, mate, food source or habitat becomes part of what might be called its gene survival optimisation plan. As with Darwin's partially metaphoric phrase, ‘the struggle for existence‘, Dawkins's misjudged term for an underlying model for the facts of evolution led to a reductive projection of late capitalist values into the whole biosphere.8

Donna Haraway

Donna Haraway's Primate Visions (1989)9 is widely seen as having set a standard for subsequent work in science studies. This, and her concept of ‘situated science’ (see below), have also made her perhaps the most frequent reference in ecotheory.
Primate Visions is the book that launched Haraway's reputation. In it she contrasts differing ways in which cultures and scientists have regarded and studied non-human primates such as baboons, chimpanzees and gorillas. Given that humans are themselves primates, disputes in primatology are soon inevitably laden with questions or assumptions about human nature and origins, especially gender roles. Arguing that ‘[t]he detached eye of objective science is an ideological fiction’ (13), Haraway shows in great detail how would-be ‘scientific’ accounts of primate behaviour too often draw upon modern human norms and assumptions. She studies the rhetoric and language of scientific studies with a view to foregrounding all kinds of decisive presuppositions and projections. What is really going on when a scientific observer interprets primate behaviour through the language of ‘family’, ‘courtship’, ‘home’ and so on, or modes of personhood based on competitive individualism? Haraway writes:
Nonhuman primates’ status both as surrogates and as rehabilitants rested on their semiotic residence on the borderland between western contestations of nature and culture. Many heading for laboratory colonies, some for forests, simians were literally in a busy two-way traffic between these two domains because they lived in an epistemological buffer zone.
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Let us turn now to a specific case study, Jeanne Altmann's work on baboons in the 1970s. As a result of her field studies Altmann, who is also a feminist, came to challenge the then dominant understanding of evolutionary adaptation in primate studies. This saw males as the primary source of genetic diversity in a species: that is, because one male can mate with many females, producing numerous offspring, it might seem initially that male competition for sex would be the crucial factor in genetic inheritance. Altmann, however, showed that female baboons were far more than mere prizes in rivalry between males, that they were agents and strategists in their own right, and in often decisive ways.
Altmann emphasised in interviews her view that a feminist would be discredited by directly putting ‘politics’, that is, her own gendered social identity, into ‘science’.10 To transgress in that way the fact–value distinction would be seen as contaminating the status of her work as ‘scientific’, even in the scientist's own eyes. To merely offer an explicitly feminist account against the male bias in studies of baboons would not help:
because she is simultaneously annoyed as a woman and a scientist by the primate literature's overtly sexist accounts of categories called leadership and control, the one thing she specifically should not do is substitute the mirror-image reverse account or method, except perhaps as caricature to show the sad status as science of the original masculinist version.
Primate Visions, 309–10
This is the kind of dilemma that recurs again and again in the material Haraway studies. How to show up the way in which supposedly objective studies of animal behaviour actually incorporate and project a human cultural politics, without at the same time reducing scientific work to nothing more than the play of competing human values, or to claims that ‘all is relative’, that there is no such thing as external reality and so on – to cite some familiar caricatures of science studies.
The effect of considering all these dimensions together is not to ‘relativise’ a ‘fact’ out of existence, but to demonstrate the plurality of its conditions of being accepted as a ‘fact’, to blur the boundaries between what is literal and what may be social/symbolic in the scientific papers or narratives.
Haraway's multiple literacy is illustrated by her account of modern studies of chimpanzees. After the 1960s, as with studies of baboons, primatologists came to question the earlier focus on male competition as the crucial factor for genetic inheritance in chimpanzee groups. As with Altmann and baboons, new observations of female chimps in the field led to a sense of the subtle strategies they seemed to use to maximize their own reproductive success, thus, as they say, passing on more of their own genes to the next generation. However, Haraway would not be content to stay with this new result as a newly discovered scientific fact. While such a focus on female chimps contrasts strongly with earlier attention to male aggression and competition, it still remains, in Haraway's view, necessarily as ‘situated’ as the other approaches, that is, conditioned by a whole context of changing factors, some of which may induce more questions. For instance, the new observations on female chimps were in line with the new sociobiological focus on the strategies and ruses that individual animals use to maximize their reproductive success, and this focus, Haraway argues, involves its own projections and presuppositions. It tends, for instance, to project certain unexamined, liberal assumptions about personhood, seeing each chimp itself as a kind of separate calculating individualist, seeking always to maximize individual reproductive advantage: ‘In socio-biological narrative, the female becomes the calculating, maximizing machine that males had long been.’12 However, ‘Such [assumptions are] unthinkable in naturalcultural worlds that do not think action in terms of bounded possessive individuals.’ Illustrating this point, Haraway contrasts the different situatedness of Japanese primatologists, for whom groups were the seemingly self-evident issue of any study, not the individual.13
Haraway anticipates a new kind of provocative, open science, one that would be more scrupulous and rigorous than much modern practice in that its work would always be attentive to the multiple frames and contexts whereby something is accorded, perhaps only for a time, the status of a recognised fact or an accepted observation. Dogmatic divisions between science and cultural politics would be refused, in favour of thinking through multiple, intersecting grey areas, each yet defined as precisely as possible and made explicit in its stakes. For instance, the ‘facts’ about female chimps’ reproductive strategies remain, but as part of an overall picture that must include a comprehensive account of the context that helped bestow them with the status of ‘facts’, the changing social scene (1970s feminism, for instance), the nature of the scientific institution at the time, the choice of study method in the field (e.g., the use of ‘time and motion’ and management efficiency studies originally taken from industry), and liberal assumptions about personhood. There are always more questions to ask, more contexts to unravel.
Haraway rarely uses the concept of nature unqualified. She prefers the compound term natureculture, highlighting the falsity of separating the one from the other. When the issue, however, is to affirm the natural world as an agent in its otherness from human conceptions, Haraway may use the name coyote, the wily actor or trickster spirit of some Native American cultures. Like her earlier coinage of cyborg, highlighting the way human beings in themselves transgress the natural–mechanical distinction, coyote is a kind of provisional ‘fiction’, situated in the space between the ideas we have of things and what things actually are or do. To call nature ‘coyote’ as opposed to, say, ‘mother’, is to project some expectations rather than others. ‘Tropes matter, literally’.15 ‘Coyote’, for example, is arguably preferable as a trope for a crucial agency in living processes to Dawkins's trope of the ‘selfish gene’. Dawkins defended his personification as a ‘fruitful metaphor’,16 yet it led to widespread misunderstandings he has had to clarify ever since. To call nature ‘coyote’ helpfully affirms nature's agency as that of a wily trickster with which we are learning to interact, as opposed to ‘nature’ seen solely as an object of human constructions or representations.
To acknowledge the agency of nature clearly accords already with all kinds of strategies of literary representation – mythic, magical realist, animist and fantastic. The problem for future ecocriticism may be not the plurality of ways of voicing the agencies of nature that already exist in the literatures of the world. It is in developing kinds of critical articulacy able to do justice to such agency and not, for instance, reading all figurations of the non-human and so on solely as a function, a ‘construct’ (see below), of human cultural contexts.
These issues also reflect themselves in the plurality of Haraway's own writing. Joseph Schneider observes of Primate Visions: ‘Closure, totalization, self-certainty and self-righteousness, essentialism, and claimed or desired detachment or “objectivity”, all are pointedly avoided.’18 Primate Visions ‘is replete with representations of representations, deliberately mixing genres and contexts to play with scientific and popular accounts’.19 Haraway's coined terms express the complexity of the issues and their resistance to inherited kinds of language: ‘natureculture’ and ‘subjectobject’. (The coinage ‘factvalue’ might in turn express both new freedoms and new difficulties.) The bizarre form of such expressions shows, once again, how quickly environmental and related issues collide with the demarcations between inherited concepts and disciplines.
Like science studies, environmental thought and writing places itself in the difficult, unstable but potentially radical space opened up by fissures in competing conceptions and justifications of science. Latour even argues that the importance of radical environmentalist arguments (what he calls ‘political ecology’) lies not in their own terms, those of the protection or reaffirmation of the natural, but in the way environmental issues destabilise in practice basic distinctions between science and politics, nature and culture, fact and value.20 Environmentalist debate is about competing conceptions of natureculture. Thus the natural sciences may find themselves accused of complicity in technological imperialism, while an ecocritic may attempt a stance that would defend, say, the deeper rationality of phrases such as the ‘language or message of rocks’ or the wisdom of prescientific cultures.
Environmental issues are creating the need for new types of interdisciplinarity, greater interchange between the natural and social sciences and the humanities and even a questioning of the rationale of the division between them. Ecocriticism, however falteringly, is part of the difficult emergence of new kinds of literacy.

Ninth quandary: constructivism and doing justice to non-human agency

In ‘Darwin's War-horse: Beetle-Collecting in 19th-Century England’ the naturalist Peter Marren quotes A. A. Gill's speculations on why making collections of beetles was such a common pursuit among the Victorians:
Beetles embody all the talents of the middle classes. They are not aristocratic, vain esoterics, like butterflies or moths, or communists, like ants and bees. They’re not filthy, opportunistic carpetbaggers, like flies. They are professional, with a skill. They’re built for a job, and get down to it without boastfulness or hysterics. And there is nowhere that doesn’t, sooner or later, call in a beetle to set up shop and get things done.21
Thus, humorously, the interests of innumerable amateur naturalists become seen as a kind of cultural narcissism. It is as if Gill were lampooning that powerful paradigm in cultural and literary studies according to which whenever a writer or scientist considers the universe, through a telescope or microscope, some version of race, class or gender politics is always reflected back. A first generation of green literary critics argued that the environmental crisis was not just being ignored by mainstream literary criticism, but that its dominant assumptions were complicit with that crisis. Thus beetles are assumed to hold no interest in themselves: their fascination was only, to use the current terminology, a ‘construct’ of intra-human cultural politics.
To stress the extent to which something is a ‘construct’ or a ‘social construct’ has been a widespread gesture of demystification in the modern humanities. Its target is precisely a concept of ‘nature’. It refuses the prejudice inherent, for instance, in notions of women as ‘naturally’ x or y or of any human group as ‘naturally’ inferior or superior in some sense. These conceptions are rather social ‘constructs’ whose artificiality can now be seen and dismantled. Hence the passionate controversies that can arise when some scientist claims to find natural differences between genders or ethnicities, as in the vehement disputes around sociobiology.
Although the rejection of cultural constructivism was an important gesture in earlier ecocriticism, the turn towards issues of ecojustice in the late 1990s led to a qualified use of constructivist arguments, not to assert that ‘nature’ is only a cultural construct, but to study the ways in which different cultural conceptions and notions of identity project different versions of nature. Such arguments have been productive of useful insights. They have opened again, for instance, those dominant masculinist conceptions of identity in the American pioneer tradition, of self-definition through the mastery and domestication of wilderness.
Scott Hess, for instance, contrasting three versions of nature projected in texts by William Wordsworth (see pp. 108–110 above), by Clare and by Dorothy Wordsworth relates various kinds of human self-conception to differing ‘constructs’ of nature. Dorothy, unlike William, is seen as ‘constructing a communal, relational and participatory version of the environment’.23 Such language not only uncomfortably suggests a model of the psyche as a kind of mini-industrialist, but, whatever construct of ‘nature‘ is at issue here, however participatory, reciprocal and so on, it is still being figured as passively built by a human agent. The natural world could never, within the terms of such an anthropocentric politics of ‘identity’, be acknowledged as an agent in its own right.24 By contrast, Haraway defends the use of figurative and mythic language to express the agency of the non-human in its own right (nature as ‘coyote’) as well as offering a means for articulating issues that transgress given disciplinary boundaries.