AN EXERCISE IN CYNICISM: “DEMOCRACY” AND “SECURITY” IN THE ANDES
Canadian democracy promotion and security policy offer two very important modes of intervention in the Andes geared at actively undermining democratic projects and movements of resistance. Given how under-analyzed these foreign policy strategies are, especially relative to their importance to Canadian foreign policy, we offer an extended examination of their dynamics in this chapter. While formally distinct strategies, in reality they are flip sides of the same interventionist coin: one funds “civil society” organizations in the nominal spirit of promoting political dialogue and greater civic engagement in the targeted country; the other offers back up, should the former fail, by building ties with and financially supporting trusted security apparatuses in the region. The growth of both security and democracy promotion in the Canadian arsenal of foreign policy tactics in Latin America clearly correspond to, on the one hand, the expansion of Canadian capital, and, on the other, the increasing electoral and social movement strength of the region’s left-wing forces over the last fifteen years. Canadian imperialism is both a cause of, and response to, movements of resistance: exploitation of Andean resources engenders resistance, which in turn necessitates political intervention to undermine that resistance.
In the 1980s, democracy promotion became a key strategic axis in American foreign policy strategy in Latin America, as the U.S. began to slowly shift its support away from murderous military dictatorships, towards forces seen as better able to secure stability for international capital. Funding for democracy promotion, emanating from the National Endowment for Democracy, and channeled through organizations such as the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, offered financial support and training to political parties, business organizations, human rights groups, and journalists that were sympathetic to neoliberalism. Market liberalization, together with an extremely narrow conception of democracy—what the sociologist William I. Robinson refers to as polyarchy—were pursued to support the consolidation of the new world order.1077
It was not until the 2000s that Canada began to actively engage in this form of democracy promotion, following the expansion of Canadian capital throughout Latin America from the 1990s onwards, and the growing influence of left-wing forces there, especially in the Andes.1078 Between 2009 and 2012, Foreign Affairs spent nearly C$5 million on democracy promotion initiatives in South America in general, most of it for the Andean region, on top of spending on specific countries such as Ecuador and Venezuela (not including money spent on Rights and Democracy, which increasingly focused its attention on Latin America before the government shut it down).1079 Projects financed by Foreign Affairs include a report on supposed threats to democracy in the region by the conservative World Movement for Democracy, political party assistance seminars, training in the use of new technologies, projects working against efforts to limit foreign financing of Andean NGOs (a concern in Venezuela and Ecuador given the extensive funding of opposition NGOs by the U.S.), and the building of a network for political monitoring in the Andes. Many of these projects involve direct, coordinated support for oppositional groups in the region, such as the network la Red Latinoamericana y del Caribe para la Democracia (Latin American and Caribbean Network for Democracy), which was created through a 2008 meeting organized by the Canadian embassy in Panama together with the American National Endowment for Democracy (NED), for leaders of the opposition from Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Cuba.1080
Most of these Canadian-funded projects are based on the idea that democracy is under threat in parts of the Andes, by which Foreign Affairs officials and democracy promotion NGOs really mean that social movements and/or governments are challenging the sanctity of the narrowly defined parameters of liberal institutional politics: democracy is reduced to an election once every several years, and the spectrum of debate never should transcend policy prescriptions for enhancing market liberalization. As one Canadian project proposal remarks, “popular support for democracy has dropped across the region, largely in response to unrealistic expectations of what democracy can deliver.” But support for democracy has not dropped in the Andes; demands for greater popular participation have in fact increased. What has declined is faith in traditional liberal institutions such as legislatures that discourage more active political participation, which the project proposal acknowledges when it refers to the “increasingly divisive” debate “between proponents of direct democracy and representative democracy.” In the face of this reality, this project calls for “practical programming activities to enhance the involvement of citizens in the law-making and oversight functions of legislatures”—that is, in those institutions that growing numbers of people increasingly see as having limited capacity to reflect their interests.1081 For Canadian democracy promotion policy, democracy is defined in the narrowest of terms, and anything more inclusive or participatory is cited as a threat.
In a 2009 speech, Peter Kent captured his government’s priorities in the region and how democracy and human rights fit into these. High rates of inequality in Latin America, he observes, “may fuel opposition to the free market and democracy,” so Canada’s response is a “commitment to promoting freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”—with no mention of economic issues.1082 The problem, then, is not in fact inequality for Canada’s foreign policy makers. Nor, therefore, is it possible to imagine that alternatives to neoliberal economics, and narrowly conceived liberal democracy, might provide solutions to the region’s longstanding problem of inequality. It is not even conceivable in the minds of Canada’s political leaders, serving the interests of capital, that any such alternatives could be democratic.
The problem, instead, is the potential threat to the free market in a narrowly circumscribed liberal democracy posed by forces challenging inequality. As political scientist Neil Burron argues, “Canadian democracy promotion is increasingly being used as a political device to promote free markets and to criticize governments that have strayed from the Washington Consensus.”1083 While he was head of the now defunct government-funded Rights and Democracy, Gérard Latulippe offered a similar, and somewhat confused, attempt to justify Canada’s focus on Latin America for democracy promotion: “you can see the emergence of a new model of democracy, where in fact it’s trying to make an alternative to democracy by saying people can have a better life even if there’s no democracy.”1084
It is noteworthy that while Canada likes to pontificate about its support for democracy and human rights in the Americas, it has not even signed the American Convention on Human Rights, and is therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission or Court (the Inter American Commission and Court are the monitoring bodies of the Convention) beyond their advisory functions. Yet Canada has been, in recent years, the second largest individual funder of the Commission, spending US$2.4 million—11 percent of the Commission’s budget financed by states and international organizations—between 2008 and 2012. The U.S. and Canada have the most financial influence over one of the Convention’s monitoring bodies, although neither of them are signatories of the Convention.1085
Venezuela
The biggest target of Canada’s democracy and human rights promotion activities in the region is Venezuela. It became a common assertion by Foreign Affairs and International Trade (FAIT) and the Conservative and Liberal parties, though never backed up by serious argument, that the Chávez government was an authoritarian regime. Venezuela has also been identified as a country with a poor democratic and human rights record by Conservative members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.1086
The mandate letter issued to the Ambassador to Venezuela, Perry Calwood, on his appointment in 2007 by the Deputy Ministers of FAIT was clear on what the embassy’s attention should be focused on: “human rights, democracy and the rule of law.”1087 This directive is in turn reflected in the Country Strategy reports, which are written by embassies for Ottawa. The embassy reports from Venezuela to Ottawa note, for example, that “Venezuelan human rights organizations such as [redacted] are in a critical financial situation,”1088 and that its objective is to “nurture all civil society,” though, quite clearly, civil society for the embassy is synonymous with the opposition to Chávez.1089
During a rare trip to Venezuela by a cabinet minister in January 2010, Peter Kent met with “representatives of civil society,” business leaders, and politicians.1090 The names of those with whom he met, however, are not disclosed by the Canadian government on the grounds that their security would be threatened should their names be made public. In a speech to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States in November 2010—several months after his trip to Venezuela—Kent spent much of his time highlighting the importance of democracy promotion to Canadian foreign policy in the Americas; in thinly veiled criticisms of Venezuela, Kent proclaimed Canada’s commitment to “vigorously defend” human rights and democratic institutions “in the face of efforts to weaken and discredit” them.1091 Direct contact by Canadian political leaders in Venezuela did not extend beyond Kent’s visit, given the chilly relationship Canada’s meddling created. As noted above, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird did plan to visit Venezuela in early 2013 while Chávez was fighting cancer in Cuba—in a proactive attempt to test the waters of a soon-to-be post-Chávez Venezuela—but had to abruptly cancel when the president returned home unexpectedly.
In December 2010, the Venezuelan National Assembly passed a law that prohibits foreign funding of NGOs and political parties. The law was a response to the role of these foreign-funded NGOs in efforts to build the anti-Chávez right-wing and support for the failed 2002 coup against the President. In response to this, Ottawa directed several Latin American-based Canadian embassies in early 2011 to meet with “like-minded” governments in the region in an effort to mobilize opposition and publicly censure the Venezuelan government. At this time, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs travelled to Venezuela and, along with embassy officials, held several meetings with Venezuelan NGOs, academics, and “grassroots” organizations to discuss opposition to the law and its potential impact on foreign support for these organizations.1092 While the opposition presented this to international observers as a crackdown on dissent, for the Chávez government it was a defense of Venezuelan sovereignty, given the role that foreign funding has played in efforts to destabilize the country.1093 The embassy read this move by the Chávez government as targeted first and foremost at the Americans, and therefore as an important reason for Canada to step up its own democracy promotion support—to pick up the American slack.1094
The stepped up attacks on Chávez’s “authoritarian” proclivities translated into a growing budget for democracy promotion and human rights in Venezuela. This started under the Liberals, in fact, but intensified after the Harper Conservatives took power in 2006. CIDA’s Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), which is actually distributed through embassies, has been an important conduit for Canadian financing of democracy promotion and human rights support in Venezuela. Until 2003–2004, little CFLI money went to democracy and human rights. After that, democracy promotion and human rights becomes a CFLI focus, and by 2007–2008 CFLI in Venezuela was dedicated to these strategic areas alone. Between 2005 and 2006, CFLI spending included support for well-known supporters of the 2002 coup and active anti-government organizations. The best known of these organizations was Súmate. In 2005, the Liberal government brought the head of Súmate, Maria Corina Machado, to Ottawa to speak to members of parliament.
As Anthony Fenton notes, Machado supported the attempted 2002 coup and was later “charged with conspiracy to commit treason for allegedly using NED funds to campaign against Chávez in the recall referendum organized by the opposition.” The chair of the FAIT-funded (now defunct) right-wing Latin American policy organization, FOCAL, John Graham, participated in high-level meetings in Washington with Machado and key U.S. political figures such as Condoleeza Rice and Roger Noriega in 2005 to discuss “strengthening democracy in the region.”1095 FOCAL itself subsequently received funding from NED for democracy promotion work in Venezuela and the Andes. Canada also funded coup-supporting Fundacion Justicia de Pas Monagas.1096 Starting in 2007–2008, CIDA and the embassy refused to disclose publicly the organizations they were supporting on the grounds of the alleged security risk involved in releasing such information. While the security risk is surely extremely overblown, the rationale implies they are funding opposition organizations.
In 2007–2008, CFLI money for democracy and human rights projects in Venezuela shot up to over C$227,000, declining the following year to less than C$100,000 and rising above C$100,000 in 2009–2010 to nearly C$200,000 in 2010–2011 and over C$175,000 in 2011–2012. Over the same periods, non-democracy promotion and human rights bilateral aid was a significantly smaller component to Canadian spending, and in fact non-existent in 2011–2012.1097 Of the FAIT spending that has been publicly disclosed, between 2008 and 2012, over C$715,000 was earmarked for democracy promotion specifically targeting Venezuela. This figure would be higher still if it included funding for regional initiatives that also targeted Venezuela.
In 2010, as part of Canada’s expanding democracy promotion agenda against Venezuela, the now defunct, federally-funded Rights and Democracy—then headed by former employee of the National Democratic Institute (the international democracy promotion wing of the U.S. Democracy Party) Gérard Latulippe—awarded its John Humphrey prize to Chávez critic PROVEA (El Programa Venezolano de Educacion-Accion en Derechos Humanos). The award included a C$30,000 grant.1098 A 2010 report, Assessing Democracy Support in Venezuela, by Spanish think-tank the FRIDE Institute, which was funded in part by the World Movement for Democracy—which itself has received hundreds of thousands of dollars from Canada, and whose steering committee chair at the time was former Canadian Conservative Prime Minister Kim Campbell—identified Canada as the third largest supporter of democracy promotion programs in Venezuela after the U.S. and Spain. The report describes Venezuela as “semi-authoritarian,” and, in the face of the electoral successes of Chávez, it states that, in fact, “elections are the main link between democracy and dictatorship,” and calls for more financing for the opposition.1099 Without irony, in its Country Strategy reports the Caracas embassy stresses that Venezuela is wracked by political polarization and instability, which it uses as part of the justification for democracy promotion spending. But given that Canada has become a significant spender in this area, trying to systematically bolster the opposition, such claims about political polarization and instability become self-fulfilling prophecies: Canada intervenes to embolden the opposition, which creates polarization, and on that basis Canada justifies intervention to support democracy or human rights. Canadian spending is not a response to polarization or instability, but part of the cause.
Canada’s democracy promotion human rights position on Venezuela was reiterated by the government in its response in the fall of 2012 to the Conservative-dominated Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development’s report on human rights in Venezuela. The committee called on the government to continue its democracy promotion and human rights work, including the funding of Venezuelan “human rights defenders.” The government responded by assuring the committee of its ongoing commitment.1100
Ecuador
As an important destination for Canadian investment in the late 1990s and 2000s, the site of a significant number of powerful social movements, and the locale for the election of a left-of-centre president, Ecuador has also drawn the attention of Canada’s democracy and human rights promotion efforts. Allan Culham, Canada’s representative to the OAS, has flagged Canada’s concern for an ostensible closing of “democratic space” in Ecuador. Culham was speaking about Ecuador following what has been referred to by the Correa government as a failed coup attempt on September 30, 2010.1101 On that day, police officers mounted road blockades in Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca and, together with a small sector of the armed forces, seized several barracks and briefly shut down the national airport by occupying the airstrip. The National Assembly was also occupied. The actions were an expression of opposition to cuts to public sector funding, including new austerity measures that hit the police and armed forces alike. After Correa addressed a hostile crowd of police at one of the seized barracks that morning he was shot at with a tear gas canister as he attempted to leave the scene with his security guards—he was walking with a cane at the time due to a recent knee operation.
Although the canister did not hit him, he did suffer from gas inhalation and was immediately taken to the hospital. Police then surrounded the hospital and Correa was unable to leave the premises for several hours, ultimately being freed by loyal soldiers who engaged in a firefight with the protesting police, leading to several deaths outside the hospital. In hindsight, the loyalty of the bulk of the armed forces to the constitutionally elected government seems never to have been seriously in doubt.1102 However, in the immediate context of the events this was hardly self-evident, and the presidents of numerous Latin American countries, as well as the Secretary General of the OAS, José Miguel Insulza, deemed it necessary to immediately denounce the actions of the insurrectionary police and a sector of the armed forces, and to publicly declare their support for the continuity of Correa’s constitutional government.1103
Canada played down the significance of the police threat. As in Honduras, Canada refused to single out the police and right-wing opposition as responsible for the violence and instead suggested that the government and its supporters were equally responsible. Kent, as Minister of State for the Americas, called “on all parties to refrain from violence and any other actions that could imperil the rule of law and the country’s democratic institutions.”1104 This position is repeated by Allan Culham during a special meeting about the attempted coup at the OAS Permanent Council. While Canada supported a resolution criticizing the threat to the rule of law, and Culham expressed support for the “elected government,” he added “I would…like to take this opportunity to remind us all of what I think is an important element of government that we should not forget, and that is the need to create democratic spaces which are respectful of dialogue and respectful of all sectors of society to be sure they have the opportunities to express views.”1105 The implication Culham was making is that the police rebellion and insubordination of a sector of the armed forces were a response to the narrowing of democratic space in Correa’s Ecuador.
In follow-up reports to Ottawa the embassy puts the blame for the conflagration on Correa, but opportunistically sees an opening to put more pressure on Correa to perhaps bring him more securely into the imperial fold. For example, Ambassador Shisko refers in a Situation Report to Ottawa on the attempted coup to the “vulnerability of Ecuadorian institutions” that “has further been exacerbated,” not by rebellious police and the Right, but “by a steady concentration of power at the hands of the president,” and notes the possibility that Correa might exploit the opportunity of the events of September 30, “to follow Chávez’s example and radicalize his position with no negotiations, no dialogue and further concentration of power.”1106 In a follow-up communication Shisko assures Ottawa that “we are very much looking forward to exploring creative ideas and entry points for Canada in support of democratic governance in the country.”1107 Shisko’s expression of imperial opportunism came while discussing the potential danger of Correa’s centralizing power, and the deepening of his putative leftist political agenda. Shisko’s “evidence” was the fact that Correa’s party, Alianza Patria Altiva y Soberana, or simply Alianza País (Proud and Sovereign Homeland Alliance, AP), enjoys a majority in congress, and can therefore pass laws without consulting the opposition.
Several months later, Canada provided C$120,000 to Corporacion Participación Ciudadana (Citizen Participation Corporation), which, according to Foreign Affairs, is meant to “empower citizens to more effectively engage in the political process through civil society capacity-building and strengthening the civil society network in Ecuador.”1108 Citizen Participation Corporation, identified by Shisko as “an active critic of certain government practices,”1109 and thus deemed suitable for Canadian funding, highlights in its proposal the “obvious weakening of civil society…due to a lack of action by civil society organizations.” The project’s aim will be to “create space…for the public discussion of issues of prime importance to the country,” as well as “capacity building in leadership, political watchdogs, and communication strategies.”1110 Again, the implicit premise for Canadian support here is a distrust of Correa and the idea that the Ecuadorian Right, and those sympathetic to Canadian investors, should have a stronger voice, greater opportunity to be heard, and, ultimately, be more politically effective and have greater decision-making influence—all themes that are raised in discussions surrounding the project proposal. It is also worth noting that the Andean Unit for Democratic Governance, the centrepiece of Canadian democracy promotion in the Andes, which is headquartered in Peru, has had staff based in Quito since November 2010.
When Canada expresses concern about threats to democracy in Ecuador, what it fears is not some form of dictatorship or slide toward authoritarianism, for which there is no evidence, but rather the independent actions of Correa and his government when it seeks to set—rather modest—limits on the power of Canadian capital. Also seen as an obstacle to democracy in Ecuador are the country’s social movements, particularly those pushing for more participatory and collective forms of decision making—often unsupported by Correa himself—on issues of land and environment, which are in form and substance far more extensive examples of democracy than the neoliberalism preached by Canada. The desire for alternatives to the neoliberal free market model promoted by Canada—whether in the form of Correa’s Left populism, or the more radical push for participatory and inclusive democracy by some of the more powerful social movements in the country—could not be ignored by Canadian policymakers. The embassy, writing to Ottawa, recognized after Correa’s victory that “Ecuadorians support him and…they wish to see institutional change.”1111 While much of the social movement Left are less supportive of Correa than when he was first elected, there certainly is a desire for “institutional change.”
Neither of these alternatives is acceptable to Canada. They represent a push beyond the bounds of so-called “good governance,” and thus pose ostensible challenges to democracy; Canadian intervention is therefore required. The free market and the rights of foreign capital are, in this view, inviolable, and so Ecuador, like Venezuela, becomes a target of democracy and human rights promotion. Between 2008—a short period into Correa’s first term in power—and 2011, Canada spent roughly C$1 million on democracy and human rights promotion in Ecuador. Foreign Affairs provided C$400,000 for a U.S. NED-coordinated project starting in 2008 for Latin America, including Ecuador. The premise of the project was to offer organizational, financial, and educational support to civil society organizations operating in “in countries where civil society faces immediate threats to their freedom of association, such as in Venezuela or Ecuador.”1112 The sheer absurdity of this assessment should give the reader pause.
In 2009, FAIT committed C$336,500 to the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), even though Ecuador has a multiparty democracy, to “encourage dialogue on Ecuador’s constitution” (dialogue which already existed), and another C$302,000 in 2011 to encourage greater political participation from youth, “with the objective of strengthening the country’s democratic culture and institutions.”1113 The 2009 proposal from the NIMD justifies support for the project noting that, “the Latin American political landscape has proven to be a turbulent, rapidly changing environment in which constant evaluation and reassessment is necessary,” including of “the emergence of new political parties, leaders and social movements, especially in the Andean region.”1114
What the Canadian-funded project is stating, in reality, is that the Left has been ascendant in Ecuador in both the mode of social movements and the form of political parties, challenging foreign capital directly and gaining institutional political power, and in some cases rethinking those institutions and norms—a process that clearly does not benefit Canadian investors, or Canada’s longer-term geopolitical strategy in the region. In the process, political organizations and parties of the Right that held power in the recent past in countries like Ecuador (or Venezuela), have been weakened or marginalized due to their association with the legacy of neoliberalism, and have consequently been incapable of shaping contemporary political debate. Canadian policymakers, in response, criticize this outcome as an example of a lack of political dialogue, and a decline in democratic practices. Canada rarely broached such criticism before the re-emergence of the Ecuadorian or Andean Left in the late 1990s.
Clearly the Canadian strategists supporting these democracy and human rights promotion projects are not motivated by the concerns of indigenous communities and environmental activists opposed to Correa’s mining policy, given that Canada pushed heavily for a more favourable mining regime against the demands of such groups. The NIMD proposal itself identifies explicitly with the experiences of the “opposition parties,” which were not represented in the elected Constituent Assembly, and the interests of which were “not being taken into account by the governmental majority.” Even though the constitution was “approved by the population with an overwhelming majority,” according to the NIMD’s proposal it reflects a democratic shortcoming, as the “opposition”—that is the right-wing parties—did not exercise sufficient influence.1115 Ultimately, the meagre support for right-wing forces in Ecuador is not raised by Canadian supporters of these projects, who focus on an alleged absence of “open and broad debate”; the power of the Left—ranging from Correa to the social movements with whom he has clashed—and weakness of the Right is simply depicted by Canadian officials as a failure of Ecuadorian democracy.
In addition to the internal inconsistencies in Canada’s logic of democracy promotion in Ecuador, there is also considerable hypocrisy surrounding Ottawa’s agenda in this area. Before Correa’s election, the Canadian state was hardly concerned with promoting dialogue or “open and honest debate” between all sides in Ecuador. There were no demands for more meaningful inclusivity, despite violence being meted out against opponents of mining by state and private security forces. It is only when Correa gains control of the country’s electoral institutions that Canada discerns the need for such a focus. In Correa’s Ecuador, Canadian funds are targeted to “strengthen the role of citizens as part of the current constitutional process”—this after the elected Constituent Assembly completed its work with a considerable degree of popular input, and certainly a great deal more than Canada could ever claim for its own constitutional process in the 1980s. Canadian money was also used to issue bulletins explaining the content of the new constitution to the right-wing national newspaper El Comercio, and the organization of workshops to create “better informed citizens about their rights and obligations.”1116
The purpose of the youth democracy project led by the NIMD was to study youth electoral participation with the aim to “expand the inclusiveness and representativeness of the political system,” even though voter turnout in the election held previous to this Canadian-supported project was over 75 percent—higher than the last six Ecuadorian presidential elections, and considerably higher than the turnout in any recent federal Canadian election.1117 In expressing his support for the project in an email to Foreign Affairs in Ottawa, Ambassador Shisko notes that the new constitution permits sixteen-year-olds to vote, even though they are not “prepared to participate in a responsible way.” He adds that “Ecuador does currently lack of [sic] political leaders and political parties are not strong in training new generations.” But democracy programs such as those funded by Canada “could help address, in the longer term, the weaknesses of a [sic] party practices in the current political system overall.”1118
Canada’s hypocrisy can be seen more clearly if we look at its democracy and human rights promotion agenda from a regional perspective. Canada has not sought to promote “honest debate” in allied countries, such as Colombia, despite that country’s terrible human rights record, and the regular targeting of dissidents and opponents of natural resource development by state and non-state security forces. Governed by right-wing administrations, Peru has also not received the same attention from Canada’s democracy and human rights promotion initiatives under the Harper government, despite ongoing violence against indigenous communities. Peru, according to Foreign Affairs, is a “like-minded partner on issues of democracy, human rights and prosperity.”1119 Foreign Affairs did spend C$167,400 to help political parties’ “platform-development capacities,” with particular focus on getting parties to engage Peruvians outside of Lima—where the resistance to mining is strongest—more effectively.1120 Lima is, however, the headquarters for Canada’s Andean Unit for Democratic Governance (AUDG), which was established in 2009 to develop and coordinate democracy promotion work in the region. A FAIT report on the opening of the Centre, in discussing its chosen location, remarked that “Canada considers Peru to be an important partner in the hemisphere to build strong, effective and accountable democracies.”1121 The same year Canada opened the Unit in Lima, President Alan García’s security forces killed over thirty indigenous protesters in its ongoing assault on the opposition to natural resource development. But because the Peruvian government is an ally, it is democratic.
The diplomatic and political interference described above is accompanied by a more sinister approach to shaping political and economic outcomes in the region. The opposition to Canadian interests in the Andes is viewed by Canadian political leaders as a security threat. We need to understand that security concerns for imperialist countries are not simply reducible to physical threats against them; and, indeed, in this case no credible claim could be made that any country in Latin America, including in the Andes, poses such a threat to Canada. The threat is to the security of Canadian capital and its ability to make profit in the region. The interests of Canadian capital are, after all, what drives Canada’s engagement with the region in the first place. Whereas in Central America this challenge has for the most part remained at the level of social movement organizing, in the Andes it includes governments, which raises the security stakes for Canada. What we are witnessing is the securitization of Canadian foreign policy in the Americas, involving alliance with particular countries as a front against popular movements and governments that are not sufficiently compliant with imperialism.
Venezuela
Certainly the U.S. has taken the lead on the practical and ideological sides of the security question in the Andes. The U.S., Eva Golinger has demonstrated, was working behind the scenes in support of the failed 2002 coup against Chávez. It maintains a series of military bases throughout the region. Meanwhile, the American Right has tried to link Venezuela to Islamic terrorism, of course without any demonstrable proof. The U.S. Congressional Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence actually held hearings on support for Hezbollah in Latin America. Witnesses, such as neocon Roger Noriega, sought to make links between Venezuela and terrorism, based in part on Chávez’s expedient alliance with Iran. The point is that, for the American political establishment, Venezuela, and left-wing populism more generally, are security threats.1122
The Canadian government, as we have noted, claimed Chávez was an authoritarian ruler, contrary to the facts. From the claims that Chávez is a dangerous authoritarian—based on the active imagination of Canadian policymakers—and the fear of his growing regional influence, it was only a short step to the conclusion that Venezuela was a security threat that needed to be contained. In the internal FAIT discussions on Venezuela, the potential dangers of the Venezuelan military are a regular thematic focus. Canada, one report notes, “is [redacted] observing Venezuela’s rearmament and growing weapon’s purchases.”1123 An increase in military spending by Venezuela is identified as part of the dangerous regional anti-neoliberal agenda of Chávez, rather than an-under-the-circumstances reasonable response to real external threats. Venezuela has faced foreign meddling by imperialist powers, including an attempted coup, and the violation of its sovereignty by the Colombian military, while in 2009 the U.S. reached a deal with Colombia for use of seven military bases. It is actually acknowledged by observers in FAIT that Venezuelan military spending as a percentage of GDP is lower than most countries in South America, including Canadian ally and chronic human rights offender, Colombia.1124 It is worth considering, too, that Venezuelan defense spending is not projected to match the significant increases in Canadian defense spending in the next decade, nor is Venezuelan military spending used to project power in North America. But Canada’s military spending (consistently in the top fifteen nations in the world), increased security cooperation with Colombia, support for security forces in Honduras and Guatemala, and establishment of a new military base in Jamaica are of course no threat to stability or security in the region.
Colombia
As the government most aggressively sympathetic to the interests of foreign capital in the region, and with a war-hardened security apparatus well positioned to play a frontline role in the defense of imperialism, Colombia has become the anchor of Canada’s Andean security posture. Since the late 2000s, Colombia has been receiving Canadian training and funding through Foreign Affairs’ Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program, and since 2011 that support has been provided through DND’s Military Training and Cooperation Program.
The geopolitical side of Canada’s Colombian posture is summed up well in the Bogotá embassy’s 2006–2007 Country Strategy report, which acknowledges the terrible human rights situation in the country but reflects that nevertheless “it is, in important ways for Canada, a bastion of stability in its region despite the internal conflict.”1125 It is not that the Canadian embassy values stability for Colombian workers, indigenous peoples, Afro-Colombians, peasants, or anyone else who falls on the wrong side of state and paramilitary terror; rather Canadian diplomacy values the stability of the Colombian state only insofar as it helps to secure the geopolitical and economic interests of Canada, in a region where other governments are not as readily compliant to Canadian interests. The condition of workers, Afro-Colombians, indigenous peoples, peasants and so on is beside the point from the Canadian state’s perspective. In a political context like the Andes, there is a premium on having an ally such as the Colombian state.
Speaking to the Wall Street Journal in 2009, Harper was unambiguous in stressing the geopolitical importance of Colombia to Canada. Colombia, he reflected, is an important “ally” in a region “with serious enemies and opponents.”1126 This view is held by key Liberals in Ottawa as well—it is worth remembering that the Chretien Liberals laid the groundwork for the deepening of political ties with the Colombian regime in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Harper government subsequently built upon and extended the existing diplomatic infrastructure. Scott Brison, a former Tory who led the Liberals’ support for the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA), put his defence of the ostensibly economic treaty in realist geopolitical terms (with the usual dose of hyperbole): “If we isolate Colombia in the Andean region and leave Colombia exposed and vulnerable to the ideological attacks of Chávez’s Venezuela, we will be allowing evil to flourish.”1127
The two countries’ militaries discussed closer cooperation at least as early as 2009 during a visit to Colombia by several Canadian military leaders. That meeting followed a visit by Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff that same year, and a meeting between Stephen Harper’s National Security Advisor, Marie-Lucie Morin, and President Uribe (all government documents for Morin’s trip are completely redacted).1128 A background report written within National Defence observes that Colombia has “a professional, joint, military that is looking to expand its role outside its borders” and that, in line with the geopolitical thinking of Canadian policymakers discussed above, there is a “strategic importance of Colombia to Canada.”1129 In fact, Colombia had already expanded its role outside its borders in 2008, a year before the 2009 discussions of greater military cooperation with Canada noted above, when it caused a diplomatic crisis in the region after violating Ecuadorian sovereignty in an attack on a FARC encampment. While Colombia’s action was condemned by most countries in the region, a U.S. embassy communiqué refers to comments made by FAIT’s Director General for the Caribbean, James Lambert, to the U.S. embassy in Ottawa expressing Canada’s support for Colombia, though wanting to be cautious in how that support is publicly expressed so as not to unnecessarily alienate the region.1130 The Uribe regime was also notable for its constant military sabre rattling with neighbouring Venezuela.1131
Relations were deepened with the March 2014 signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for defense cooperation between Canada and Colombia. The memorandum indicates that this is to be part of “a strategic framework for increasing [military] relations” between the two countries. Defence Minister Peter MacKay remarked that he was “very satisfied by the signing of this memorandum of understanding with Minister Pinzón. With the growing emphasis of Canada in Latin America, and given the importance of Colombia in the continent, there are increasing opportunities for Canada and Colombia to learn from one another.”1132
Not only is the increase in security cooperation connected to the role Colombia plays in the region, but it also obviously comes at a time when Canadian investment is increasing in the country following the FTA. The Canadian government and capital are cognizant that while great strides have been made in improving investment conditions in mining and oil and gas, that process is not complete: guerrilla forces are still active—a reminder of which came in 2013 when a Canadian mining executive was held hostage by the ELN for seven months—and communities of resistance are still standing in the way of resource development on their land. During Harper’s visit to Colombia in August 2011, he announced increased security support for Colombia, ultimately laying the foundations for the MOU. Harper and President Santos discussed security for Canadian companies investing in Colombia. The Canadian Prime Minister noted that while improvements have been made there are still concerns that need to be addressed.1133
Canada has also sought to bolster the Colombian security apparatus by expanding arms sales. In fact, the Liberal government permitted the sale of dozens of helicopters that can be used as gunships to the Colombian military in the 1990s.1134 In 2012, the Harper government added Colombia to the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (it also added Peru). This means that Colombia is now one of a few dozen countries to which Canada can export automatic assault weapons—guns that are banned in Canada. The Canadian government rather coldly notes that the addition of Colombia to the list “opens new market opportunities” for Canadian weapons exporters, but the flipside of this business opportunity is arming a military whose role in Colombia and the region is important to the pursuit of Canadian interests beyond the profits of the arms industry.1135 Just weeks after Colombia was added to the Firearms Control List, General Dynamics Land Systems Canada, supported by the Canadian Commercial Corporation, won a C$65.3 million contract to sell twenty-four light armoured vehicles to the Colombian Ministry of National Defence.1136 In 2013, Canada also provided C$550,000 in equipment to the Colombian national police for detection of and protection against chemical, biological, and nuclear explosives.1137
Exporting the Colombian Model
As we noted in our earlier discussion of Central America, Canada is also helping to extend the military reach of Colombia into the isthmus—thus adding to that region’s militarization—through its partnership with the Andean country’s security forces in Honduras. In effect, Canada’s support for the Colombian military is contributing to an increasingly militarized form of democracy throughout large parts of Latin America, where electoralism and the nominal existence of liberal rights intersect with powerful state and non-state security apparatuses and the routinization of violent assaults against political opposition.
Canada has also fostered stronger security ties with Peru, which it counts on as an ally in the uncertain Andean region.1138 Several trips in the 2010s to Peru by Canadian cabinet ministers to advance Canadian investment also witnessed the establishment of security cooperation agreements (one involving the Canadian Commercial Corporation) and commitments by Peru to purchase Canadian security technologies. Canada, the Prime Minister’s Office reported upon concluding one of the MOUs, “aims to deepen defence and security relations between the two countries, and to facilitate and improve cooperation for the purchase of services or military and defence equipment by Canadian companies to the Peruvian Ministry of defense.”1139 One of the Canada-Peru MOUs led to the creation of the Instituto Técnico de las Fuerzas Armadas (Armed Forces Technical Institute) in 2012.1140 In 2013, Canada sold Twin Otter aircraft to Peru, which have dual-purpose capacity for military use.1141 The Peruvian air force, as noted above, has trained with the Canadian Air Force in Canada.
Finally, the securitization of Canadian foreign policy also led the Harper Conservatives to establish a military base in Jamaica. While references are made to terror threats and counternarcotics work by military spokespeople and political leaders—and indeed the Canadian Navy has conducted interdictions in the Caribbean Sea, as well as illegally in Jamaican territorial waters, on ships suspected of drug trafficking—it would be shortsighted to see the establishment of a military base on those grounds alone given Canada’s expanding economic interests and their vulnerability. The base is rather about the desire to project Canadian power and rapidly react to situations of “instability” in a region in which Canadian capital is one of the most powerful economic forces, with extensive interests that require protection.
Canada has been laying the groundwork for deeper security ties throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Democracy and human rights promotion has thus far had limited pay off in Ecuador and Venezuela, though such investments, while they may be inspired by short-term ambitions, are also viewed as long-term projects. If openings do present themselves at some point, Canada or Canadian-funded and -trained organizations, are positioned to insert themselves and exploit the opportunities. Strong security links offer an alternative approach to the same goal: instability for progressive forces, stability for Canadian capital. Whatever Canada may claim publicly about these policies, the tell is simple enough to read. The most violent and authoritarian governments in the region, one of which—Colombia—has a track record of violating the sovereignty of its neighbours, are held up as beacons of democracy, while their security forces are targeted for deeper relations with Canada. Meanwhile, social movements and governments that pose a threat to the smooth reproduction of neoliberalism in the region are portrayed as imminent threats to Latin America’s security and democracy.