Chapter Two
Current Tendencies of the Philosophy of Religion
§ 5. Troeltsch's Philosophy of Religion
The interest in the philosophy of religion is currently increasing. Even women write philosophies of religion and philosophers who wish to be taken seriously welcome them as the most important appearances in decades! One only has to compare, for example, the two essays published in the “Presentations of the Kant Society, No. 24”: 1. Radbruch, “On the Philosophy of Religion of Law” and 2. Tillich, “On the Idea of a Theology of Culture.”1 Both are influenced by Troeltsch. In what follows, we wish to characterize Troeltsch's religious-philosophical position, since he is the most significant representative of the current philosophy of religion. Otherwise, things are taking place dependently in theology. Troeltsch possesses a great knowledge of concrete religious-philosophical material and also of the historical development of the religious-philosophical problem. He is coming from theology. The presentation of his views is rendered difficult through the frequent change of his basic philosophical standpoint, throughout which, however, his religious-philosophical position is maintained quite remarkably. As a theologian from the school of Ritschl, his philosophical standpoint was initially determined by Kant, Schleiermacher, and Lotze. In terms of his philosophy of history, he is dependent upon Dilthey. In the 1890s, Troeltsch turned to Windelband-Rickertian “value-philosophy.” In more recent years, he switched finally to the Bergson-Simmelian position. He understood Hegel from Bergson and Simmel and in the end oriented his philosophy of history toward Hegel. What goals does Troeltsch posit for the philosophy of religion? His goal is the working out of a scientifically valid, essential determination of religion.
a) Psychology
Initially, a description (“positivism”) of the religious phenomena is required: immediately, free of theories, the phenomena in themselves (cf. the similar demand by Max Weber for sociology).2 Religious phenomena are to be observed naïvely, as not yet hackneyed (the prayers, cults, liturgies, in the deeds of great religious figures, preachers, reformers), and then to be characterized in their transcendental, primal conditions. Troeltsch distinguishes between central and marginal religious phenomena. The central phenomenon is the belief in the attainment of God's presence which in principle co-grants as well the ethical command. Marginal forms are the sociology and business ethic of religion—that is, its factical expression in the historical world (as Max Weber, for instance, studied them). In order to attain this goal, the philosophy of religion has to utilize the method of individual psychology and the psychology of peoples, and, further, psychopathology, prehistoric studies, ethnology, and the American method of surveys and statistics. According to Troeltsch, the best description of religious phenomena so far has been undertaken by William James.3 (Here Troeltsch is influenced by Jamesian and Diltheyian descriptive psychology.) Thus, Troeltsch took up into his own work all basic psychological tendencies
b) Epistemology
This psychological description is followed, as a second task, by the epistemology of religion and the element of validity contained in the psychic processes. (Troeltsch, “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie” [“Psychology und Epistemology”]. Lecture presented at the American Congress for the Philosophy of Religion, 1904.)4 The point is here to investigate the rational lawfulness of the religious formations of ideas. In these, specific a priori lawfulnesses are always operative, ones which are at the foundations of religious phenomena. The universal epistemology has already determined the problem of the a priori in general. (Here, Troeltsch relies upon the Windelband-Rickertian epistemology.) There is a synthetic a priori of what is religious, similar to a logical, ethical, or aesthetic a priori. This isolation of the religious a priori signifies the fixation of religious “truth” in general, of the rational element in what is religious. Particularly in his later work, Troeltsch does not mean “rational” in the sense of what is theoretically rationalistic, but rather “rational” means only what is universally valid or rationally necessary. Troeltsch determined it earlier as a rational a priori, but later he moved away from this view and claimed, without any determination of the content, that it is not a rational but an irrational a priori. He claims that it is crucial to connect the logical, ethical, and aesthetic a priori to the religious a priori and to see how the former receive their consolidation from the religious a priori. The work of the epistemology of religion is critical: it wishes to separate what is factical and psychological from what is valid a priori.
In this context, factical life experience does not fulfill the function of a domain or area in which objects exist. It has nothing to do with a monism of experience or a theory of monism; here, nothing is being “explained.” In taking up and clarifying given connections of meaning, current phenomenology does not rigorously enough question the right to validity of what is factically given. But factical life experience is what is priorly given, on the basis of which, however, nothing is to be “explained.” Phenomenology is not a preliminary science of philosophy but philosophy itself.
Current work in the philosophy of religion takes place primarily in theology, chiefly in Protestant theology; Catholic theology takes on philosophical problems with respect to the specifically Catholic understanding of Christianity. Protestant theology is essentially dependent upon the main respective philosophical trends to which it attaches itself. It is a prejudice of philosophers of religion to think that they are able to settle the problem of theology with a quick sweep of the hand. Apart from these works, we have to consider the work of the psychology of religion, about whose contribution we must decide later. Insofar as the religious-philosophical problem is tackled within philosophy, it is without doubt to be supposed that the approximation of Fichte and Hegel, which is constantly increasing at present, will lead to a renewal of religious-philosophical speculation.5 The application of these principles forces the taking up of the religious-philosophical problem in a certain direction which we will later critically reject. In any case, this speculative tendency has a special meaning for the increase in religious-philosophical work which, no doubt, will take place. That literati of today have appropriated the philosophy of religion is probably well known to all of you, but this should not concern you here.
c) Philosophy of History
Only on the basis of the separation of the psychological from the a priori can one trace the historical necessity of what is religious. The history of religion considers the realization of the religious a priori in the factical course of spiritual history—not only the mere facts but the laws according to which religion develops historically. Hegel first envisaged this goal, but his constructive method is to be rejected. To be sure, this task will not succeed without metaphysics, but only an “inductive” metaphysics can be admitted. The philosophy of the history of religion, further, has to comprehend the present and predetermine the future development of religion. It has to decide whether a universal religion of reason will come about, one which would syncretistically emerge out of the present world religions (a Protestant Catholicism, according to Söderblom), or whether in the future one of the positive religions (Christianity, Buddhism, Islam) will reign alone.
d) Metaphysics
This is a metaphysics of the idea of God on the basis of all of our experiences of the world. Critical epistemology, too (Kant, etc.), can amount to such a metaphysics. For one arrives from the teleological context of (transcendental) consciousness to one last meaning, which demands the existence of God.
Troeltsch actually steered the philosophy of religion out of theology. He focused the philosophy of religion around the problem of a unification of religious history and systematics (cf. Albrecht Ritschl 1822–89). For he attempted, in the wake of Rickert's “consciousness in general,” a reworking and rational critique of the religious-historical material. The failure of this attempt drove him to a break with theology. He wanted to ground the newer philosophy of religion in a “preliminary phenomenology,” that is, a preliminary doctrine of types of historical religions. He names this specification the psychology of religion. The central phenomenon is the belief in the experience-ability of the presence of God; peripheral are mythology, ethos, sociology of religion. Psychopathology and ethnology show that the original phenomenon of all religions is mysticism, the experiences of unity in God. Wherever religion is spiritually actualized, a priori foundations are necessary which mark even the individual psychic processes as religious. The epistemology of religion is to work out, analogically to the theoretical a priori, a religious a priori, which means a fixing of the truth-content, which constitutes the “rational moment” of religion through which religion first becomes possible (cf. Rickert). Ratio means, later in Troeltsch, an accordance with the norm not only in the logical, but also in the ethical [sense], etc. The reunification of the thus found and emphasized a priori with the psychic modes of appearance of religion belongs to religious metaphysics. For Troeltsch, the religious a priori stands opposite a higher mental world [Geisteswelt], the experience of which is the fundamental religious phenomenon. Religious metaphysics is in principle different in Troeltsch as in philosophical metaphysics, just as religious a priori differs from theoretical a priori. Therefore, there can be a historical representation on the basis of a teleological principle of development won by the history of philosophy. Thereby metaphysics becomes co-effective, but not a constructive-dialectical metaphysic such as Hegel's, but rather an inductive metaphysics of religion. Moreover, the philosophy of religion should transform the further development of religion and, for instance, solve or discuss the question of a religion of pure reason or syncretism or a privileged form of one of the great religions (cf. Söderblom), etc. The metaphysics of religion must integrate the reality of God into the context of the world. Even within an epistemological philosophy, the theological basis and the meaning of facticity of consciousness will lead to a faith in God.
We have then four religious-philosophical disciplines: (1) psychology, (2) epistemology, (3) philosophy of history—these three taken together make up the science of religion—and (4) metaphysics, which is the authentic philosophy of religion. The science of religion is a philosophical discipline like logic, ethics, aesthetics; metaphysics is founded upon these as a final region. Troeltsch himself maintained above all, alongside specific investigations (“Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen” [“Social Doctrines of Christianity”],6 etc.), the philosophy of history. In its principle foundations, he altered [his view]. Earlier, he understood history teleologically, as progressive development. Of late he affords each religious-historical epoch its own meaning; it is not merely to be viewed as a point of passage. From the provocations of life arise ever-new, no longer rationally graspable motives for the following epoch. Religions arise from rational moments and spontaneous forces of life; they have their own meaning which renders them independent; they thus become an impulse for development. A logical-dialectical connection cannot be determined; a logical schema of development is a violation (cf. Simmel and Bergson). Troeltsch poses the problem of a “historical dialectic” (cf. his essay in the Historische Zeitschrift7). With that he departs from Rickert's philosophy of history and arrives at Dilthey (cf. the latter's “Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften” [“Construction of the Historical World in the Humanities”]8). His fundamental concepts are “individual totality” and “continuity of becoming,” rather than “development” (cf. Dilthey's “effective complex” [Wirkungszusammenhang]). The modification, which follows therefrom, of his a priori conceptuality has not yet been developed by Troeltsch. Whether he now, following Rickert (cf. Simmel), holds fast to the concept of the religious a priori is doubtful. (Cf. his critique of the book of Otto, Das Heilige [The Holy] in Kantstudien 1917.)9
§ 6. Critical Observations
We do not want to criticize Troeltsch's view, but rather more precisely understand his basic position. At issue is to validly determine the essence of religion scientifically. Troeltsch has a fourfold concept of the essence of religion:
1. The psychological essence of religion; the genera of its particularity of form.
2. The epistemological essence of religion; the apriori of religious reason.
3. The historical essence of religion, understood as general typology; the actualization of (1) and (2) in history.
4. The metaphysical essence of religion; the religious as principle of everything apriori. (Position of religion in the entire complex of reason.)
Only all four of these concepts give a total picture of the philosophy of religion. We must now understand in what way this philosophy of religion refers to religion, whether it grows from out of the meaning of religion, or whether religion is not as much as grasped in the manner of an object and forced into philosophical disciplines—that is to say, integrated into material complexes that already exist in themselves before religion. There is also a psychology, epistemology, philosophy of history, metaphysics of science and of art. These religious-philosophical disciplines thus arise not from religion itself qua religion. From the outside religion is observed and integrated as an object. The philosophy of religion itself is the science of religion. The entire problematic is thus thrown back onto the view of philosophy itself. The concept of religion becomes secondary. One could just as easily think out a sociology or an aesthetics of religion.
A driving motto of Troeltsch's philosophy of religion is found in his view of the Reformation. He sees nothing new in the Reformation; rather he thinks that it progressed from within the sense-structure of the Middle Ages. What is new is thought to arrive, then, in the eighteenth century and in German Idealism. Troeltsch took up many medieval and Catholic elements in this manner in his philosophy of religion. One rightfully accuses that he, similarly to Dilthey, had no understanding of Luther. Lastly, for Troeltsch it depends on the metaphysics of religion, on the proof of God. But the proof of God is not originally Christian, but rather depends upon the connection between Christianity and Greek philosophy. This metaphysical view also determines Troeltsch's philosophy of religion.
We do not want to establish a critique on the basis of content. We want to see how religion and philosophy comport themselves, how religion becomes an object for philosophy. In Troeltsch religion is placed into four religious-philosophical disciplines in a finished material complex. Insofar as the philosophical observation of the world moves in different regions, religion is placed into these regions, and it is seen how religion expresses itself in them. The four concepts of the essence of religion arise with this. The four regions are not only methodological; [they are] rather also divided according to their material character. The psychic reality is, in its structure and in its character of being, something other than the a priori region of rational lawfulness; and this is again something else than the reality of history, in particular the universal history; and this is something other than the last metaphysical reality, in which God is thought. How the regions link together is not treated. Thus the philosophy of religion is determined here not according to religion itself, but according to a particular concept of philosophy, and indeed a scientific one. One would like to see something new here offered in Troeltsch's metaphysics, that here religion is no longer studied as an object, insofar as the primal phenomenon—faith in the existence of God—is treated. After all, the existence of God would then be gained in a non-cognitive manner. But Troeltsch says, despite this, that the “object” of faith must be studied as a real object in connection with other real objects, insofar as reason is thought as a unity. In a last universal study of objects, the entire human experience is to be brought to the level of concepts, and thus also God must be studied as a real object. Here it also becomes clear how Troeltsch could maintain his position on the philosophy of religion unchanged by altering in principle his philosophical views. Religion is for him an external object and can as such be integrated into different material complexes (as appropriate to different philosophical “systems”). As such the possibility of constant transformation in Troeltsch is the strongest sign that he posits religion as an object.
The connection between religion and science is, according to Troeltsch, not a forced one. Insofar as religion finds itself in a cultural context, it must contend with science: defensively and negatively in its apologetics; but also positively, the science of religion, through prediction of future religious development, can achieve something in the further development of religion. Science, indeed, does not make religion, yet it represents a fruitful factor in its further development. According to Troeltsch, the history of Christianity shows this; through its alliance with ancient philosophy it has achieved its strong historical position. However, presently, the possibilities of religious-philosophical products are exhausted. At issue is only an emphasis upon the right possibility.
What have we now profited, for our purposes, from this study of Troeltsch? Above all, a concrete representation of the philosophy of religion. Then four determinations one can attribute to religion: the psychological, the rational-apriori, the historical, and the metaphysical. Finally, that philosophy, in its comportment, recognizes religion as an object of cognition. Thus we have argued against our thesis of the radical difference between philosophy and science. For since philosophy has to turn religion into an object of its cognition, it cannot be understood how philosophy is to occupy itself with religion, if between philosophy and science (that is, cognition of objects) is held to exist a fundamental difference of relational sense. Will not the “phenomena” become an object of study in the “phenomenology of religion,” just as, for instance, in the phenomenology of aesthetic pleasure? Initially, after all, it is necessary to examine religion in its factuality, before one addresses to it a particular philosophical study.
1 Both essays may be found in Religionsphilosophie der Kultur. Zwei Entwürfe von Gustav Radbruch und Paul Tillich. (Philosophische Vorträge der Kant-Gesellschaft Nr. 24) Berlin, 1919.
2 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. Frühe Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1919/20. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 58, ed. Hans-Helmuth Gander, Frankfurt a. M., 1993, pp. 189–196.
3 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. New York, 1902 (in German: Die religiöse Erfahrung in ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit. Materialien und Studien zu einer Psychologie und Pathologie des religiösen Lebens. Übersetzt von Georg Wobbermin. Leipzig, 1907).
4 Cf. Ernst Troeltsch, Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft. Eine Untersuchung über die bedeutung der Kantischen Religionslehre für die heutige Religionswissenschaft. Tübingen, 1905, p. 18.
5 [Insertion in Helene Weiß's transcript: cf. Überweg IV. § 43: Following Kant, modern theology recognized the unprovability of Christian dogmas and therefore constructed its dogmatism upon the personal certainty of religious lived experience while renouncing scientific proof. In this way (similar to Schleiermacher's doctrine of faith), mere psychological self-observation of Christian faith emerges whereby, in Lotze's sense, the high value of Christianity and, in the sense of pragmatism, its “practical value of life,” are validated as the guarantee of truth.]
6 Ernst Troeltsch, Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen. Tübingen, 1912.
7 Ernst Troeltsch, “Über den Begriff einer historischen Dialektik: I./II. Windelband, Rickert, und Hegel. III. Der Marxismus,” in Historische Zeitschrift 119 and 120 (1919) and 120 (1919).
8 Wilhelm Dilthey, “Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften. Erste Hälfte,” in Abhandlungen der Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1910. Phil.-hist. Kl.
9 Ernst Troeltsch, “Zur Religionsphilosophie (aus Anlaß des Buches von R. Otto über das Heilige,” 1917), in Kantstudien 23 (1918).