Dong-Choon Kim
Following the collapse of military regimes in 1987, Korean society witnessed the popularization of the concept of “civil society,” and the vocabularies of “civic movements” or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have since gained familiarity. In addition, civil society, during the time, found itself to sprout alongside capitalist industrialization, the formation of urban middle class, and growth of media in Korea. However, it is widely recognized that it was democratization that caused the flowering of civil society in Korea, not vice versa.
The collapse of the military regimes activated the Gramscian concept of “political society,” the arena of political parties or political activity, and further consolidated civil society. During this time, labor unions were organized, many kinds of civic organizations were established, alternative media emerged, and diverse forms of interest groups were also founded. In particular, during the mid-1990s, civic organizations related to women, the environment, and human rights got off to a start, and many grassroots organizations formed alongside the launch of local self-governing systems.
According to the Hanguk min-gan danche chongnam (Directory of Korean NGOs, 2000), the number of NGOs almost doubled within the three years of 1996 to 1999. By specific field, the majority fell under the category of “civil society,” which far exceeded the number of groups categorized under the title of “social service” and “cultur- related” groups (Hankyor,, October 20, 2000). It can be determined from this that the increase in the number of national and local civic groups was the main contributor to the numerical increase of NGOs. Interest groups and labor unions can be excluded, though some of them can be included in the broader term of NGOs. Hereby NGOs can be broadly divided into two categories: one is “groups for social service,” the other “citizens’ movement organizations.” This chapter is primarily concerned with the latter type. For types of NGO, see Cho (2000, 129). Even more noteworthy than this quantitative growth is the increase in the influence of civic groups or citizens’ movements. It is widely accepted that civic groups are no less important than government or businesses in contemporary society. In Korea, in particular, these civic organizations have exerted great influence on various matters, including the formation of public opinion, policy planning, elections, and social reforms. A survey conducted in 2001 found that citizens’ groups were ranked as the fourth most influential group (Sisa Press, October 25, 2001), and one survey (2004) reported that citizens’ groups were the most influential in Korea, surpassing the popular sway of political parties. According to the survey, the rate of respondents who thought civil groups to be the most influential was 28.9 percent, which was followed by the ruling Uri Party 23.7 percent, and the press, 18.1 percent.
However, over recent several years, Korea’s citizens’ movement suffered various internal hardships. The globalization of capitalist accumulation as well as neoliberal economic policy in Korea since 1997’s economic crisis, have required repositioning on the substance, objectives, strategy, and method of the citizens’ movement. In addition, external factors – political parties, government, and businesses – that influence the substance and scope of the citizens’ movement have changed greatly. Thus, it can be said that the Korean citizens’ movement has entered the stage of repositioning its societal role, while already passing the rapid expansion found in its early stage. Activists have felt that the current situation is one of crisis.
With this in mind, this chapter examines general characteristics of the Korean citizens’ movement that was active following the 1990s, along with the movement’s contribution to democratization of Korean society. The chapter then investigates the current status of the citizens’ movement and the challenges it faces.
The Korean citizens’ movement became a full-fledged one with the appearance of several citizens’ movement organizations, including the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) on July 8, 1989. The Korean citizens’ movement has played a distinct role, a parallel for which cannot be found in other countries. In order to clearly understand the characteristics of the citizens’ movement, it is necessary to trace the following elements: the historical trajectory of Korean society, the politico-social structure of Korea after the demise of the military regime, and the changes to social movements at the global level following the end of the Cold War and globalization.
As far as the “Korean citizens’ movement” is concerned, the term of “citizen” in the Korean case is not only related to the “subjects” who are engaged in the movement as the main actors, but epitomizes its “objectives or orientation.” The term “citizen” has, above all, been used in contrast to the minjung, a concept appropriated by Korean social movement activists since the 1970s. “Citizen” thus articulates the ideological orientation and objectives of the movement, which differs not only from those of the revolutionary political movement but also from radical political activism in the 1980s of South Korea. The “citizen” also marks an attempt to consolidate the democracy movements by institutional reforms, and to expand democracy to the social and economic realms. It can be found in the CCEJ’s inaugural declaration:
Under our organization, not only the isolated and the oppressed gather together. Those who bear good will can also be important actors in our movement. If they have good intentions, whether they be businessmen or belong to the middle class, they can be members of the movement.
Some scholars point out that the citizens’ movement in Korea shares an affinity with middle-class interests – instead of advocating for the interests of socially underprivileged groups.
But it is also true that it has grown within a global context, in which similar NGOs in other regions, including the West, have been found to fill the gap made by the retreat of the state. From the historical perspective of Korean democratization, the Korean citizens’ movement began to take its full shape when Korean political democratization had already progressed somewhat; when South Korea secured the advantage in “regime competition” with North Korea (due to the North–South economic exchange and South Korean enterprise’s active role in that exchange); when the need was felt to expand democracy to other sectors of society, including parliament, court, administration, and enterprises. Although they represent a broad ideological spectrum, it can still be said that the citizens’ movement shared a starting point with each other. Insofar as the activists who engaged in the democracy movement of the 1970s and 1980s played a leading role in the citizens’ movement, which, they thought, would be an extension of the past democracy movement on the changed political context.
But while distancing themselves from the previous radical activism, the leaders of citizens’ movement inherited the style or viewpoint that had existed during the military dictatorship, focusing on the Seoul-based central politics. From the 1990s, although the main organized citizens’ groups used the liberal rhetoric, their main interest was in changing the socio-politi cal system at a macro-level like the old democracy movements. As such, the Korean citizens’ movement reflects the history and ongoing state of Korean civil society. Historically, students and intellectuals were the main agents in the Korean democracy. It was rare to see grassroots people who were directly engaged in national politics and the local community, which greatly defined the nature and line of Korean citizens’ movement, which have been primarily managed by a few notable personalities. Accordingly, these groups suffered difficulties in terms of financial and human resources. The Third Sector Institute at Hanyang University conducted a survey as to the current status of financial and human resources for citizens’ groups. According to the survey, citizen participation ranked only 1.3 points out of 3 points, citizens’ and resources were more vulnerable at 1.1 points. Nonetheless, the policy influence of the groups was rated as high, at 2.5 points (Dong-a Ilbo, June 17, 2005). The Korean citizens’ movement has yet to succeed in taking root on the grassroots level because civil society continues to be deeply conditioned by central politics on the one hand and people’s lack of public participation (JoongAng Ilbo, February 2, 200) on the other. The participation rate for adult citizens was 10–20 percent, far lower than that of the British and American cases (50–69 percent).
From this, it can be deduced that the most important variable influencing the nature and direction of the Korean citizens’ movement are historical and political conditions.
Among Korean the citizens’ movement, however, while some groups bear a strong continuity with the past democracy movements, political or “general” (jonghap) citizens’ movement, others are similar to those of the new social movements (NSMs) in terms of their objectives and philosophy.
These “general” citizens’ movement organizations implicitly set as their goal macro-structural changes in Korean society, believing that their mission was the criticism of Seoul-based centralized politics. Given that party politics was corrupt and incompetent, and failed several times to reflect the needs and demands of citizens through party integration among conservatives, it is likely that the citizens’ movement played the role of representative bodies, which the institutional political parties failed to do. Two examples of this are the CCEJ and People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD). The Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Election, which was led by these general citizens’ movement groups including the PSPD, was originally initiated by the campaign for the National Assembly watch in the PSPD. Although the CCEJ and PSPD have habitually stressed the importance of ordinary citizens’ participation in governmental decision-making processes and local politics, they actually set policy-making as their primary goal, which distances themselves from the grassroots movement.
Unlike the previous movement that pursued regime change, these “general” citizens’ movement organizations have adopted as their strategies the filing of lawsuits, petitioning for legislation, presenting policy alternatives, and dealing with various civil affairs. They do not strive to reorganize state power or government anymore. They recognize the existence of political circles and the government, but criticize their arbitrary, illegal operations. These organizations have played a role in monitoring and checking the power monopoly found in the branches of parliament, court, and administration. However, they also clearly demonstrate a liberal stance in that they emphasize the restoration of individual rights and filing lawsuits. Judiciary reform, a National Assembly watch, and an anti-corruption and minority rights campaign are all enlarged parts of this politically oriented movement.
The NSM prioritizes the penetration of democracy into everyday life, rather than securing state power, and pursues the values of post-materialism by employing an identity-based mobilization strategy – that is, rather than catering to the interests of the masses, the movement emphasizes voluntary participation and networks rather than a centralized, concentrated organization (Offe 1985, 52–54). Green Korea United (GKU) and Korea Women’s Associations United (KWAU) may be seen as typical organizations that formed their basis on these values and strategies (www.greenkorea.org/www.women21.or.kr).
However, other leading citizens’ movements bear a stronger similarity to old democratization movements than to Western-type NSM, as they are heavily preoccupied with national politics.
The second current of the citizens’ groups includes these Korean variants of NSMs, a grassroots groups, and a community movement besides the abovementioned environmental movement and women’s organization. Korean society has seen these kinds of new social movements and local residents’ participatory movements become active since the mid-1990s. The latter presented new concepts of politics and rights in the field of everyday life and sexuality. The most prominent cases to appear during the 1990s were the women’s and environmental groups. These two movements paved the way for creating new discursive spaces and opened new horizon for democracy and social development. These movements tried to some degree to distance themselves from the intellectual-led, centralized politics movements. While transcending the strategies of putting pressure on the state and governmental bodies, they showed a deep interest in resolving problems through the mobilization of grassroots civil society.
In short, the Korean citizens’ movement, which has been often represented by several “general” citizens’ movement organizations, has very diverse goals, orientations, and methods that also reveal some traits in common with other movements. Contrary to the citizens’ movements of other advanced countries, especially those of Japan, the Korean citizens’ movement has tended to put heavier emphasis on political transformation than transforming the everyday life of the people. The Korean citizens’ movement began to appear at the same historical time that class politics and interest group politics became full-fledged in the Korean context. There are some scholars who identify the Korean citizens’ movement with the new social movement. For this, see D. Cho (1996).
Korea has been often referred to as one of the countries that succeeded in democratization among the countries that implemented nation-building and industrialization following World War II. This success was made possible mainly due to the perseverance of anti-dictatorship struggles waged by students and intellectuals, but it cannot be denied that the citizens’ movement since 1987 also greatly contributed to the consolidating political democracy. To reiterate what has been mentioned above, the citizens’ movement played a large role in gradually reforming the state and consolidating democracy following the era of military dictatorships and the anti-dictatorship democratization movement.
It was only before the 1990s that the Korean democratization movement was able to make progress in the pro-democracy struggle by changing ruling elites while relying on the former type. However, the civic groups since 1987 tried to call for state reform and took control of the political arena and government while utilizing policy planning, filing lawsuits, and petitioning for the passage of legislation, rather than relying on resistance methods alone. Exploiting the underdevelopment of party politics and representative democracy, the citizens’ movement has engaged in many activities, including the administration watches, election watches, anti-corruption campaign, and legislative petitions. It went further to pursue its agendas in local politics and a grassroots citizens’ movement on a local basis, the goal of which was to democratize “the politics of everyday life.” The Korean citizens’ movement has contributed to the reinforcement and deepening of democracy with succeeding the previous democracy movement.
The reason the Korean citizens’ movement stressed the strengthening and deepening of democracy by that means was not only because they thought the old power elites still stood intransigently against resigning, but because the parliamentary system and political parties were not consolidated yet. Also, the leaders of the movement saw the fairness in legal procedures was not guaranteed, and the administration was failing to serve the needs of the citizenry. In particular, citizens’ sufferings after experiencing the economic crisis of 1997 were aggravated by the lack of democracy and equalized tax distribution under the IMF bailout system and neoliberal economic policy. In other words, the market system forced upon Korea by the IMF in exchange for a bailout package could not automatically weaken state power, bureaucratism, and political corruption; corruption did not end with the close of the military regimes and the weakening of oppressive state apparatus. The organizers of the Korean citizens’ movement believed that local politics, grassroots democracy, and economic and social democracy could be guaranteed simply with the realization of parliamentary, judicial, and administrative democratization.
Civil society during the post-democratization period can be dubbed as one framed by the struggle of “civil society vs. civil society,” as postulated by Professor Choi Jang Jip (Choi 2005a). The key issue here is how civic groups can check the power of capitalists that has gained tremendous power, and how to act in favor of grassroots campaigns in a time marked by capital liberalization, and the emergence of an influential press.
The citizens’ movement has been often referred to generically as a “third sector,” independent of political power and capital. In Korea, while it was assumed to be a politically oppressed sector under military dictatorship, after the advent of civilian government, it has been considered capable of curbing the power of capital. Under the IMF regime and the Kim Dae-jung administration, large conglomerates and the jaebeol grew more powerful. Large conglomerates became so influential that the Roh Moo-hyun administration has been conceived of as underpinning the jaebeol-state alliance (Choi, 2005b). It is in such ways that the power of private businesses has overwhelmed the public sector in all fields. The Samsung Economic Research Institute, for example, exerts a significant influence on the governmental policy agenda-setting process. According to a survey conducted by the JoongAng Ilbo, Samsung ranked first among 23 power groups in the categories of influence and credibility, with the PSPD being ranked twelfth and eight, respectively (May 25, 2005).
In this regard, economic democratization and business watch campaigns can be interpreted as efforts to enable the state and civil society to take control of capital accumulation, and to level the playing field for economic agents. These efforts included CCEJ’s “real name system” and the idea of “public land,” as well as PSPD’s minority shareholder campaign. As labor’s involvement in management has also not been officially allowed, the minority shareholders’ campaign that aims for democratization of the corporate governance is in an initial stage. Although the minority shareholders’ campaign was limited by its dependence on the interest of the shareholders, it promoted public awareness and contributed to enhancing businesses’ management transparency by showing that even the jaebeols’ governance, which had been thereto considered sanctified, could also be placed under the scrutiny of shareholders.
The Korean citizens’ movement, therefore, should also strive to be independent from not only political but business power. Whether the movement can obtain its independence from business became a key issue that is closely connected to the question of whether the movement can survive after the development of market capitalism in Korea.
Civilian governments such as both the Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung administrations provided favorable conditions for the citizens’ movement but also, in some respect, made it difficult for it to criticize them openly. The two administrations assumed themselves to be successors to democratization while believing they deserved the support of all reform-minded forces, including citizens’ movement activists, and further tried to appoint activists to governmental posts. As part of showing a positive response, some activists actually joined the governments. Here, some of the groups were engaged in political parties, and other specialists who had been engaged in the citizens’ movement participated in various committees under the Kim Dae-jung administration. At the local level, some heads of local government tried to share policy responsibility with civic organizations.
In the process, the neutrality and independence pursued by the citizens’ movement came to be threatened when the capability of the movement and its performances were institutionalized and the movement’s leaders began to play an advisory or directing role in governmental policy-making. Thus, debate over the independence or “moral purity” of the movement appeared, fuelled by criticism that viewed the citizens’ movement as one partner of the government or as organizations that supported the government. This debate offered a space for conservatives to launch a total attack on the citizens’ movement. Some point to the low rate of participation of citizens’ movement activists in governmental posts. In 2001, for example, 474 committees were operating under 40 governmental ministries, and among former activists, those who participated in the committees totaled only six.
Though keeping “purity” for civic groups would be detrimental in sustaining the social legitimacy and integrity of citizens’ movement, the argument that it should not involve itself in real politics might be regarded as a kind of myth raised by conservatives who viewed the citizens’ movement negatively in the Korean context. The discourse of “purity” of the agency of social movements has had a very peculiar meaning in the Korean context, where “purity” was equal to being disinterested in politics or material gain. Thus praising the “purity” of the protestors may reflect the oppressive ruling system that does not permit the people (workers, peasants, and other interest groups) to intervene in politics. This is why the argument has come out from the conservatives as an ill-intentioned criticism against the citizens’ movement. Many former activists who had occupied governmental posts or entered the political arena could not evade the criticism that they had owned the achievement of the movement rather than systematically conveying their original ideas or vision into the policy-making process in the government and political parties in emphasizing its rationale. Consequently, they could only partly succeed in institutionalizing its original slogans or demands, and allowed the citizens’ movement activists to be blamed for their individual behaviors. In short, the former activists’ participation in governmental bodies and politics operated as a burden on the citizens’ movement, thereby causing the foundation upon which the movement stood to shrink.
In order to realize the needs or demands of citizens, it is natural for the movement to align itself with institutional politics. However, based on the Korean experience, if the leaders couldn’t endure the enticement of politicization or institutionalization, the movement would face a backlash. In particular, financially vulnerable groups tend to rely heavily on governmental funding, and activists find themselves becoming project planners and rapporteurs instead. Since 1999, the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs and local governments subsidized NGOs on project base. The conservatives and mainstream media, then, blamed the policy as a kind of collusion between government and the citizens’ movement. Small, financially weak NGOs have no choice but to depend on the subsidy.
Some people criticized that the main actors in the movement, elites, and specialists, made it difficult for ordinary citizens to facilitate their participation. Many academics have theorized that these problems were due to the Korean citizens’ movement’s deep preoccupation in national macro-politic s, which was the most serious problem felt by activists working in local areas (Simin-ui sinmun, January 3, 2005).
Recently, some rightists criticized the citizens’ movement groups in Seoul by calling them a new power group that is exerting a negative impact on local citizens’ participation and the expansion of grassroots democracy. Leftists also criticize the citizens’ movement for acting in partnership with liberal market capitalism and neoliberalism, which contributes to the exclusion of working people and deprives them of their rights (Jeong 2000).
Such criticism from both the left and right carry their own validity, and therefore remain problems that the citizens’ movement organizations need to resolve.
Globalization, corporate restructuring, large-scale lay-offs, and aggravated economic disparities threaten the existence of the middle class. The growth-oriented policy and developmentalism are being more widely accepted as priorities, making it difficult for the citizens’ movement to pursue social solidarity. Neoliberal polarization is weakening the public foundation on which the citizens’ movement stands, as it has increasingly failed to offer an expectation and concrete alternatives to the middle class. As has been widely recognized, market fundamentalism tends to eliminate the raison d’être behind the citizens’ movement or civil society. Thus, the citizens’ movement, which prioritizes the improvement of the corporate governance system, is likely to de-emphasize welfare, human rights, and the environment in favor of the theory that equates businesses’ competitiveness with national competitiveness.
An expanded civil society and a neoliberal economic order fueled the vitality of interest groups, some of which were more influential than the citizens’ movement or voluntary associations. Interest groups displayed their influence most vividly when hospitals and pharmacies were planned for separation in 2000. Civic organizations were calling for this change, and the government tried to accept the proposal. Medical doctors’ groups, however, feared this development and exerted their power to block the separation. In response, they were met with intense confrontation by the citizens’ movement. Even before this time, interest groups such as the Federation of Korean Industries, the Korea Employers Federation, and the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry made their demands via lobbying. When a mass agenda, such as political democratization, prevails nationwide, interest groups tend to be influenced by these political and economic trends. However, with the decreased influence of a singular agenda, the specific agendas of interest groups that are more difficult to consolidate are brought to the fore. Having taken this into consideration, the leaders of the citizens’ movement felt they could not merely be satisfied with their moral superiority and presented concrete policy alternatives for the issues over which many interest groups were entangled.
One of the most difficult problems facing Korean society may be the social instability caused by social dissolution and isolation, both factors that have been believed to stem from neoliberal economic policy. Job insecurity and concern about the future make it difficult for citizens to voluntarily participate in social issues. It cannot be denied that destruction of social solidarity is tragic but, even so, one cannot rely on the traditional community to restore solidarity. As citizens do not have a keen awareness of their social obligations as much as they eagerly want to gain political rights, it is all the more important that Korean civil society restores social trust by overcoming insincerity and moral hazards to others (Jeong 2000).
Since the period of modernization, Korean people have increasingly found themselves to be socially unstable, and Korean society has become witness to the loss of a social trust system and the resultant collapse of social stability. As there has been a deep-rooted tradition of the state addressing all issues in Korea, citizens do not think they can solve social problems by themselves, and distrust of people in power runs very high. Thus, more than anything else, it is important for citizens to participate in social issues with integrity and maintain social integration.
The Korean citizens’ movement, in such a period of market fundamentalism, is facing the tasks of correcting market failures and maintaining moral integration in Korean society. Therefore, it is increasingly important for citizens’ organizations to make efforts to curb market fundamentalism, such as through business watches, consumer campaigns, the eradication of poverty, establishment of a regional welfare system, and protection of non-standard workers.
As the role of nation- states become limited with the advent of globalization, the question of whether the state or the market can meet human needs and desires has often been raised. Against this background, some people have taken an interest in the communitarian movement. Communitarian activists carefully present the building of new local communities as an alternative to the current situation, where there is a great disinterest in political parties, labor unions, elections, and the press, as well as a low rate of social participation.
Since the economic crisis of the late 1990s, the context of the citizens’ movement has undergone many changes: a shrinkage of the middle class that was facilitated by social polarization, interest groups’ active engagement in decision-making regarding many political and social issues, the consequent weakened intervening power of the citizens’ movement, emergence of the progressive DLP that is capable of easily politicizing the citizens’ movement agenda, and the reduction of the resource pool of citizen activists due to the depoliticization of young people in their 20s. Of course, the identity confusion that the citizens’ movement has undergone, stemming from the ideological diversification of the movement activists, cannot be denied either. Besides, it can also not be ignored that the limited potential pool of activists or so-called “crisis of reproducing citizens’ movement activists” was brought about when the more notable activists began to participate in the institutionalized political arena and government. This difficulty, however, was mainly produced when centralized and state-centered issues began to disappear (Yoon 2005, 67).
As mentioned above, the political and social impact of the citizens’ movement on Korean society has shrunk, coupled with the entry of the minjung movement activists into the institutionalized political arena and the increased role played by interest groups.
The most significant issue that the Korean citizens’ movement should resolve is that of fostering itself as an independent social force that distances itself from the state and market. Rather than expanding its political impact via institutionalized politics, it is most desirable for the movement to fuel societal change from within institutions by expanding their influence outside them. The citizens’ movement should try to represent the voice of citizens who are against political groups or a government that caters to pro-capitalist forces. The citizens’ movement should go beyond a role of merely being independent from the state or market to one of pioneering the pursuit of an alternative order or community.
In particular, the Korean citizens’ movement should overcome its Seoul-centrism and reinforce its combination of localization, specialization, and transnationality. The largest advantage that the Korean citizens’ movement can have is its influence on “central politics.” In the long term, however, the advantage can hamper the development of the citizens’ movement since it might lack practicality. In other words, the citizens’ movement will be able to maintain its vitality only when the movement combines itself with everyday politics, a foundation of grassroot people.
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