It is by now commonplace in the field of immigration to note that periods of high migration inevitably trigger a nativist reaction in the form of restrictionist policies, xenophobic pamphlets, and generalized anti-immigrant rhetoric. The current situation is no exception, with the qualification that the anti-migrant and, specifically, anti-Hispanic rhetoric is reaching unexpectedly shrill levels. A reason for this is that migration, primarily from Mexico and largely unauthorized, seems unstoppable: it continues at high levels year after year despite massive investments in deterrent technology and in the Border Patrol; the much touted border fence is still to show any capacity to stem the flow.
In this book, David Coates and Peter Siavelis have assembled a collection of contributions addressing the complexity of contemporary U.S.-bound immigration, with an emphasis on Mexico. With admirable balance, they have included chapters representing different political and ideological positions—from those that decry the stigmatization and victimization of migrant workers to those that decry the presence of migrants in the country and call for their prompt removal. This commendable eclecticism seeks to bridge the “dialogue of the deaf” that debates on American immigration policy have become and cast new light on those features of the situation that really make a difference.
In these introductory lines, I seek to contribute to the enterprise by highlighting four such features. In my view, each must be taken into account if the present impasse on what to do about immigration is to be overcome. Unlike much of the recent literature on the topic, these four points are not prescriptive—that is, focused on “oughts,” “musts,” and “must nots”—but analytic, with an emphasis on what the research literature tells us are the facts on the ground:
1. The current immigration situation is largely the country’s own doing. American policies toward major sending countries in the past have set the stage for the present inflows.
2. Attempts to suppress those inflows by force backfire, leading to consequences that are commonly the opposite of those intended.
3. Mass Mexican migration to the United States will end.
4. The present foreign-born population poses no threat to the nation’s linguistic and territorial integrity, but the present nativist offensive can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies.
In the course of a brief introductory essay, it is impossible to document each of these points in detail. I will limit the exposition to a synthesis of results buttressing each fact and refer the reader to the pertinent literature. It is well established by now that migration decisions do not occur as isolated cost-benefit calculations, but rather in the context of preexisting relations between sending and receiving nations. Obviously, the greater the cultural and economic influence of the stronger nation on the weaker, the more likely migrant outflows will direct themselves toward the place from where those influences emanate. This is the reason migration from former colonies directs itself overwhelmingly to the old colonial powers.1
The United States has long exercised an overwhelming cultural and economic hegemony over its immediate periphery in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin. Unsurprisingly, these areas are the major sources of low-skill labor for American farms and industries.2 The signing of free trade agreements, in particular the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico, has compounded this influence in recent years. NAFTA has been rather good for American businesses, granting them access to a sizable new market and ample sources of low-wage labor. As a number of analysts have noted, its effect on Mexican workers has been much less desirable, as open markets eviscerated formerly protected domestic industries and as small and medium Mexican farmers found themselves suddenly unable to compete with subsidized U.S. agricultural goods. With a still young population, Mexico produces close to 1 million new entrants per year to its labor force, and NAFTA has made it increasingly difficult to employ these potential workers. Unsurprisingly, young Mexicans of both sexes have seen their only option in moving north to fulfill life aspirations that have become impossible to attain in their own country. NAFTA helped diffuse modern consumption goals among the Mexican population but did not provide the means to fulfill them. What goes around, comes around.3
It is a regular feature of American policy debates to be largely oblivious to the historical forces shaping contemporary events. This is certainly the case of current immigration discussions, where the surge of Mexican migrant labor in recent years is debated without regard to the historical sequence that led to it. While it may be too late to erase NAFTA’s effects, clear awareness of its role in shaping what is now taking place at the border would be a healthy antidote to one-sided interpretations and emotion-laden policy blueprints.
The same kind of historical amnesia underlies attempts to suppress the outflows produced in countries of origin by past American hegemony with force at the border. A number of studies have shown that repression does not work and that it actually backfires: instead of stemming the unauthorized movement across the U.S. southern border, heightened repression has succeeded in keeping the unauthorized population bottled up on the American side. Instead of returning to Mexico after a stint of labor in U.S. agriculture or industry, as most migrants used to do, they now remain here to avoid the increasing costs and difficulty of new crossings. Put differently, the fence does not “secure” the border, it simply disrupts the previous circular labor flow that worked for the benefit of both countries.4
As a corollary of this situation, formerly temporary and now permanent unauthorized migrants tend to move out of agriculture and into new locations in search of better employment. This is the reason behind the movement of this labor force out of the West and Southwest, where crops now rot in the field while growers increasingly claim that they cannot find enough workers to do harvest work.5 There would be enough workers to harvest those crops if a viable temporary labor migration program were put in place. However, even such a program would not prevent the eventual end of the current Mexican labor flow. The principal reasons are demographic: First, past migration has depopulated many places of origin to the point that up to half of Mexican municipalities are reported to have lost population during the last intercensal period.6 Many able-bodied workers in such places have already moved north, drastically reducing future labor supplies. Second, Mexico is already undergoing a demographic transition and fertility rates are declining fast. This will inexorably lower the number of new entrants into the labor force and, hence, the supply of new migrants.7
In a more optimistic vein, it is possible that, notwithstanding NAFTA, Mexico will find a path toward sustained economic development in the future. The experience of southern European countries during the 1970s and 1980s indicates that a few years of rapid growth plus good prospects for the future suffice to bring migrants home and to remove most incentives for others to start the journey. With some luck, Mexico will follow the same path, but even if this outcome were not to materialize, demographic forces already in place will be enough to end mass migration by 2030 at the latest. Detractors of the present labor flow from south of the border may reconsider what they wish for. With this conveniently near source coming to an end, it will be interesting to see how and where labor-intensive sectors of the American economy—such as agriculture, construction, and services—manage to secure their vital labor supplies in the future.
Last, the country should consider itself lucky about the outlooks of the various components of its foreign-born population. Despite the fears and accusations of nativists, the fact is that the overwhelming majority of this population shows every sign of wishing to assimilate to American society and that they evince far more acceptance than criticism of American institutions. In contrast with Europe, where some foreign residents routinely challenge the West’s “decadent” ways and seek to keep their children from assimilating or intermarrying, no such thing happens in the United States. Because of the pervasive American influence in their country, Mexican immigrants are presocialized on what to expect on this side of the border. Once here, they seek to integrate socially and economically as best they can and, especially, to further the upward mobility of their children.8
Studies on linguistic assimilation indicate that, while many first-generation immigrants have difficulty with English, most seek to learn it. By the second generation, fluency in English is almost universal and preference for the language overwhelming. By the third generation, knowledge of the immigrants’ language almost entirely disappears.9 The question of language assimilation and retention can be seen from another perspective, however. Unless one makes knowledge of English, and English only, the litmus test of Americanization, the preservation of fluency in other languages in addition to English seems a skill worth preserving. Spanish, in particular, is a world language used in many countries with which the United States maintains political and economic relations. Seen from that perspective, the language spoken by Latin migrants and its preservation by their offspring should be seen as an asset and an enrichment rather than a threat to the future of American society.
This generally positive scenario is presently endangered. Just as the campaign to enforce the border ended up doing more harm than good by bringing about the very situation it sought to prevent, current efforts to countermand the cultural “threat” posed by immigrants in general and Hispanics in particular may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. No such threat exists at present. The disposition of the vast majority of immigrants to seek integration into American society represents a valuable asset that repeated attacks against their language and culture may reduce or even eliminate. If shrill enough and widespread enough, nativist attacks will inevitably trigger a defensive reaction and, with it, the prospect of ethnic mobilization and militance.10
Today, it is relatively costless to attack immigrants in general and Hispanics in particular because, in their quest for integration and acceptance, this population has been loath to support ethnic confrontations. However, this scenario can change if, seeing themselves repeatedly portrayed as culturally inferior and as a threat to the nation, these groups see no option but to coalesce into a militantly political block. The recent history of immigration to America is strewn with policies and campaigns that have backfired. One can only hope that the rise of migrant and Hispanic political militance where none existed before does not become the latest episode of this unenviable saga.
The collection of essays so ably assembled by Coates and Siavelis provides a comprehensive overview of the range of positions on the subject of immigration reform. Some of the authors in this collection will likely disagree with the arguments advanced here. However, facts cannot be easily brushed aside. The four points summarized in these lines represent, in my view, preconditions for any sound immigration policy in the future. Otherwise, the “oughts,” “musts,” and assorted moralizing that populate the debate in this field are likely to lead to the opposite-from-expected consequences and self-fulfilling prophecies so often registered in the past. For immigrants and natives caught in the middle, this will surely be an outcome worth preventing.