3Opaque, Inconsistent, and UnfairSome Remarks on the Burden of Roman Taxation during the Principate

David B. Hollander

DOI: 10.4324/9781003041696-5

The undeniably poor reputation of Roman tax collectors might seem to suggest that Roman taxes were rather high, but recent history has shown that even relatively low taxes can generate considerable resistance and a substantial volume of complaints.1 In fact, strong arguments have been marshaled in favor of the proposition that Roman taxes were fairly low at least in the Early Imperial period,2 though, as with other critical questions concerning the ancient economy, the evidence is so poor and ambiguous as to support wildly divergent hypotheses. In what follows I will briefly review the case both for and against the proposition that Roman taxes were low, note what we can say with confidence about Roman taxation, and, finally, suggest how a different perspective can help us better assess the impact of taxation on Rome’s subjects.

Probably the most well-known case for low Roman tax levels appeared as part of Keith Hopkins’s highly influential 1980 article on “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire.” His “proposition 7” was that Roman taxes were low. That is, “the effective tax rate was significantly less than 10 per cent of gross product” (Hopkins, 1980: 119–20). Hopkins arrived at this conclusion by working from estimates of Roman GDP and the imperial budget. Assuming that the largest single expense was the military—“the anchor of our calculations”—and that this expense could be estimated, he suggested a total annual budget “probably not much larger than 800 million HS in the early first century A.D.” (Hopkins, 1980: 119). He came up with an estimate for GDP by combining population estimates with a guess about the extent to which production exceeded subsistence needs.3 Hopkins did not claim that his numbers were highly accurate. Indeed, he called his conclusions “speculative and tentative” (1980: 119). He did, however, insist on their plausibility because “if either population or gross product had been much larger than these estimates, then effective tax-rates were unbelievably low compared with declared tax-rates” (Hopkins, 1980: 120). He further argued that the great wealth of provincial elites in the early empire constituted evidence for low Roman taxes (Hopkins, 1980: 122).

Most aspects of Hopkins’s taxes-and-trade model have been the subject of lively debate in the intervening years, and Hopkins himself published several follow-ups,4 but here I will skip ahead to the much more recent arguments of Walter Scheidel (2015). Scheidel refined and expanded upon Hopkins’s arguments about Roman taxation. He estimated annual Roman state expenses of around one billion sesterces and an imperial GDP of nearly 20 billion sesterces in the mid-second century CE.5 If the Romans rarely had large surpluses, the annual budget would have to be close to annual tax revenue, suggesting net imperial tax revenue was 5 to 7 percent of Roman GDP.6 At first sight, this is a remarkable claim, but there are several qualifications that have to be kept in mind. First, Scheidel was only talking about net revenue, the “income that was actually put at the disposal of the central authorities,” not the nominal tax rates nor the gross revenue (2015: 230). Second, he was focused on the Early Imperial period in contrast to the civil wars of the late republic and the period of crisis that began in the late second century CE.7 Third, and perhaps most importantly, Scheidel was concerned only with imperial tax revenue, not local or municipal taxation, which, along with rent-taking by agents, “would have raised the share of gross revenue extraction … by a non-trivial margin” (2015: 244). So this is a narrower claim than it at first appears to be. Scheidel was looking at Roman taxation from the perspective of the imperial bureaucracy, not that of a provincial taxpayer.

Before I discuss the arguments for higher levels of Roman taxation, let me note three additional points Scheidel made in support of low taxes. First, there are signs that Augustus lowered some rates in Egypt after annexation.8 Second, he argued that emperors “lacked a strong incentive to maximize (net) revenue” in the period from 30 BCE to 160 CE since there was an “absence of intense interstate competition” (Scheidel, 2015: 230). Third and finally, Scheidel echoed Hopkins in connecting “the conspicuous flourishing of cities … to the successful retention of local surpluses” (2015: 251).

Though other scholars have made a case for oppressively high Roman taxation,9 here I will review Alan Bowman’s recent critique of Scheidel’s arguments. Bowman argues for a “higher taxation model” (2018: 30), questioning the plausibility of an imperial budget under one billion sesterces, which he calls “unrealistically low” (Bowman, 2018: 30). For starters, he contends that the estimated cost of maintaining the Roman army does not fully account for the extent to which the army levied goods and services (Bowman, 2018: 37). He also argues that the “proponents of the ‘low-tax economy’” have overlooked “several significant categories of revenue” (Bowman, 2018: 47): military requisitions/impositions and munera. Most importantly, however, Bowman points to the evidence from Egypt, which supports an “average per capita tax burden” of more than 20 percent (2018: 35).

The question of the typicality of Egypt as a Roman province—for which, of course, we have far more and better evidence than from anywhere else—is all too familiar to ancient historians.10 Scheidel argued that Egypt was rather unusual, at least with respect to taxation. He suggested that its “deeply entrenched institutions of tracking and taxing an ecologically ‘caged’ population and its assets” made it a focus of Roman collection efforts (Scheidel, 2015: 248). Bowman, however, pointed to some statements in literary sources that seem to indicate that high rates were common throughout the empire. Most notably, Hyginus, probably writing in the second century CE and seemingly quite well informed, reports (Const. 205L) that in some provinces, the landowners pay one-fifth of their produce (20 percent); but in others, they pay one-seventh (about 14 percent). Ultimately, Bowman proposed that “the overall burden on the taxpayer in the High Empire was likely to average ±20 per cent and was very unlikely to be less than 15 per cent” (2018: 47). While there is a genuine disagreement here, it is worth noting that Bowman is more concerned with the perspective of the taxpayer, while Scheidel is focused on that of the imperial bureaucracy.

Absent the discovery of major new evidence, the debate over the level of Roman taxation may never be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. There are simply too many things we don’t know.11 These include:

Aside from Egypt, most scholars would probably concede that our ignorance is vast and that this makes quantification extraordinarily difficult.22 And, whether we want to understand the fiscal capabilities of the emperor or the burdens on the average subject, conventional taxation is only one part of the equation. The Roman state took in a wide variety of revenue. In addition to its various direct and indirect taxes,23 Rome garnered revenue in some form from the following sources:

As with taxes, it is difficult to come up with estimates for these categories of revenue. Some of them must have been fairly regular, but others would have been quite inconsistent. It was obviously convenient to make the local elites perform important tasks like collecting imperial taxes on behalf of their communities, but how many denarii was that worth to the emperor? For the revenue generated by the emperor’s patrimonium, however, there is hope for greater insight and perhaps even plausible estimates in the near future.37 But there is more to economic history than quantification, and we actually have a (relatively) substantial amount of evidence for Roman taxation. References to tax collectors and discussions of taxation appear frequently in everything from Suetonius’s biographies to the Synoptic Gospels. This evidence prompts me to suggest three nonquantitative propositions about Roman taxation.

Proposition 1: The Roman Tax System Was Routinely Opaque

Most Roman subjects probably shared our ignorance of the rates and regulations governing imperial taxation. Leaving aside the issue of literacy, sometimes the information was not made publicly available. Suetonius (Cal. 41) reports that Caligula once announced a variety of taxes but did not publish the details. When he finally did publish them, they were very hard to read, having been written in tiny letters and placed in a cramped location (minutissimis litteris et angustissimo loco). When Nero undertook tax reforms, one of his measures was simply to publish the customs regulations (rAnn. 13.51). The publicani had apparently been making up additional charges.38 Peter Brunt (1990: 358) noted a statement by the jurist Paul concerning the importance of custom “in nearly all taxes” (Dig. 39.4.4.2) and speculated that “it may well be that many rules were never defined in either laws or contracts.” This, of course, would have provided tax collectors with many opportunities to take advantage of the ignorant.

Proposition 2: Roman Taxes Were Perversely Inconsistent

The evidence we possess is more than sufficient to demonstrate that variation was the norm.39 Tax rates varied from province to province, and within provinces depending on a number of factors. In Pannonia, for example, Hyginus reports (Const. 205L), that the fertility of the land determined the tax rate. In Egypt, there were several different categories of land and a variety of attested rates (Wallace, 1938: 1–10). For Roman Palestine, Keddie (2019: 150) notes that an adult’s “sum total of taxation” would vary depending on whether they were engaged in agriculture, how they were engaged in agriculture (i.e., as landowner or some type of tenant), the extent to which they engaged in commerce, their gender, and where they lived. Customs dues (portoria) also varied from place to place and depending on the nature of the goods. The Monumentum Ephesenum specifies a general 2.5 percent duty (11), but 5 percent for murex fish (20), and perhaps a flat fee for enslaved individuals (12). Some goods, however, were exempt, such as things being transported for religious purposes (58).40 Most provinces seem to have shared Asia’s 2.5 percent rate, but lower and higher rates are known, and there was a 25 percent duty on goods entering the empire in the east (De Romanis, 2020: 288–91). There were also municipal duties to worry about (France, 2017), not to mention the question of how goods were valued for tax purposes.

Proposition 3: Roman Taxes Were Flagrantly Unfair

A particularly important aspect of the variation in Roman taxes was the differential treatment of individuals and communities. Peoples and cities could be punished with additional taxes or receive preferential treatment. Dio Cassius (Hist. rom. 54.7.5) relates that in 20 BCE Augustus ordered some communities in Asia and Bithynia to pay more than their allotted tribute. The tax imposed on Jews after the First Revolt is perhaps the best-known instance of the Romans placing an additional tax burden on a particular group of subjects. By contrast, Volubilis received a ten-year exemption under Claudius.41 Nero gave the people of Ilium immunity from taxation, apparently because of their legendary connection to Rome and the Julian family (Ner. 12.58). Citizenship also conferred tax privileges. In Egypt, for example, most adult males would pay tributum capitis, but not Roman citizens or the citizens of Alexandria and their slaves, as well as some Egyptian priests (Wallace, 1938: 116ff.; Capponi, 2005: 138). Tacitus (Ann. 13.51) says that soldiers were exempt from taxes except when they were transporting commercial goods. Roman citizens were exempt from some taxes, but liable for others that provincial noncitizens did not have to pay.42

Beyond the special privileges granted to certain groups of people and communities fortunate enough to win the favor of the emperor, it is likely that, since local elites did much of the tax collection on behalf of Rome, those without power or connections paid more than their fair share.43 Scheidel is undoubtedly right to describe Roman taxation as “openly unfair” (2015: 253), but flagrantly unfair might be even better. The cruelty may have often been the point when the taxpayers were not Roman citizens.

The opaqueness of the regulations coupled with the inconsistent and unfair nature of the collection system suggest that a defining feature of Roman taxation from the perspective of the taxpayer was its unpredictability. Would the emperor raise, lower, or abolish particular taxes?44 Would he demand aurum coronarium for some reason and, if so, how would one’s community go about collecting it?45 Would arrears be canceled or used to prosecute those who had fallen behind in their payments?46 When would a census revise the tax rolls?47 Would requests for relief be granted?48 How would particular collectors go about the process of collection? How closely would the imperial bureaucracy supervise the collectors? Would the process itself change? Would Roman soldiers or magistrates pass through one’s city or territory and, if they did, how would they behave? It would be hard, at least for nonelites, to be confident about any interaction with tax collectors, or to know in advance what they might be expected to pay in money, kind, or labor. This uncertainty would have generated considerable amounts of anxiety and resentment even before we factor in the resentment of those forced to pay taxes to their foreign overlords.

For some, the payment of taxes was a mark of servitude (Tertullian, Apol. 13.6) in addition to a financial burden; however, no one liked being taxed, not even Roman citizens in Italy, who enjoyed considerable privileges and were the clearest beneficiaries of empire. In 58 CE, in response to complaints about the publicani, Nero apparently put forward the idea of ending all indirect taxation, which he thought would constitute the most beautiful gift for mortals (pulcherrimum donum generi mortalium).49 His advisors eventually talked him out of it, and he settled for a less radical set of reforms and reductions designed to limit the abuses of the tax collectors (Ann. 13.50–51). Nero and the Roman public shared the same low opinion of tax collectors that was apparently current in first-century CE Judea on the cusp of revolt. To judge by all the tax collectors associating with Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels, even some of them had misgivings about their profession.50

Conclusion

If we want to understand the role of taxation in the lives of Roman subjects, which is part of the mission of the Early Christianity and the Ancient Economy research project, the experience of taxpayers—something for which we have abundant evidence—is the most important question to investigate. We can consider some effects of the tax system without knowing precisely how much was paid. Behavioral Economics suggests that the manner in which taxes are extracted matters quite a bit.51 The process, the conduct of the people implementing that process, the meanings attached to the act of payment, the looming consequences of a failure to comply, and the perceived “return” (in terms of government services) all contribute to the psychological impact of taxation.52 The US system of payroll deductions coupled with refunds of excess payments after the filing of tax returns can transform an overpayment of taxes into an apparent bonus. The Roman system had no such feature.

Notes

  1. See most of US history.
  2. Hopkins (1980) is discussed below. Garnsey and Saller (1987: 103) qualify Hopkins’s conclusion slightly, claiming that taxes were “relatively low, at least outside Egypt.” Similarly, Rathbone and Temin (2008: 416) argue that the Romans had “a relatively low tax regime (especially for the wealthy).” Lo Cascio (2007: 622–5) argues that imperial tax revenue was well below 10 percent but cautioned against concluding that “the burden of taxation was light” because “the proportion of the imperial population as a whole which paid taxes was significantly lower than the gross total, and their tax burden must have been correspondingly heavier.”
  3. Hopkins (1980: 117–20) believed that “gross product averaged out at less than twice minimum subsistence” but refrained from offering a specific figure. His estimate for minimum gross product was HS 8,244 million. See Scheidel and Friesen (2009: 64–5) for an important critique of Hopkins’s calculations.
  4. For some discussions of the “taxes-and-trade” model see, e.g., Harris (1993: 14), Horden and Purcell (2000: 558), van Minnen (2000), Zelener (2000), and Silver (2008). Hopkins (1995/1996 and 2000: 253–4) revisit aspects of the model.
  5. Scheidel, 2015: 243, citing Scheidel and Friesen, 2009: 73–4, for the GDP estimate.
  6. Scheidel, 2015: 243–4. By way of contrast, Croatia had tax revenue of 46.1 percent of GDP in 2017.
  7. Scheidel (2015: 230) argues that “the entire period from 30 BCE to 160 CE serves as an example of the phenomenon of relaxation of fiscal demands.”
  8. Scheidel, 2015: 233–4, citing Monson, 2015: 199–200.
  9. See, e.g., MacMullen (1987) and Shaw (1988).
  10. Discussed, e.g., in Brunt (1981: 162–3), Bowman and Rathbone (1992: 108), and Haug (2021: 518).
  11. Duncan-Jones (1990: 187) noted that we have incomplete information about the details of “provincial taxation.” Brunt (1990: 356) claims, “It is impossible to insist too strongly on the paucity of documentation for the imperial fiscal system.”
  12. Brunt (1990: 386–7) declares that “we cannot even draw up a complete list of all imperial taxes.”
  13. Suetonius (Ner. 10) says that Nero lowered some taxes, but doesn’t tell us which ones.
  14. It is not clear, for example, when exactly the centesima rerum venalium was instituted (Günther, 2016: 9). Rathbone (2010: 429) says Augustus extended the poll tax to all provinces, but Scheidel (2015: 237) is less confident. On the timing of censuses, see also Keddie (2019: 123, n. 35).
  15. Suetonius (Ner. 10) says that Nero abolished some taxes. Which ones? Goodman (2004) suggests that Nerva may have canceled the Jewish tax only for Trajan to restore it.
  16. We don’t know in what year the sales tax on enslaved individuals was doubled to 4 percent (Günther, 2016: 10), nor when the eastern frontier customs duty was halved to 12.5 percent (De Romanis, 2020: 291).
  17. Hopkins (2000: 255–6) claimed that at some point in the Principate “many provinces” went from in-kind payments of taxes to cash, but Hyginus (Const. 205L) says practices varied from province to province. Duncan-Jones (1990: 31) says it is “very uncertain” how much direct taxes were paid in money during the Principate. See also Rowlandson (2001: 147).
  18. Rathbone (1997: 198).
  19. Rathbone (2010: 431); see also Scheidel (2015: 248–9) on “limited compliance” and “concealment of taxable assets.”
  20. For example, Goldsmith (1987: 54) argues that the revenue from the tax on the sale of enslaved individuals was small, but Harris (1999: 75) suggests it was more substantial. McGinn (2011: 647) argues that the tax on prostitution instituted in 40 CE by Caligula, “generated enormous revenues.”
  21. See Dignas, 2005: 208.
  22. Rathbone, 2010: 431. Bowman suggests that Egypt was the only province from which one could get “any clear ideas of tax revenues” (2018: 31), but Capponi has noted that aspects of even Egypt’s tax system “remain obscure,” especially in the early Roman period (2005: 123). Haug (2021) observes that while the Egyptian evidence is abundant, particular areas tend to dominate, and so we don’t have a representative sample from the province.
  23. Debate continues over how best to refer to certain Roman taxes. Should we classify tributum as a direct tax and vectigal as indirect? Because the Roman terminology doesn’t align precisely with modern economic usage, Günther (2016: 2) argues that “a better translation nowadays would be ‘so-called direct tax’ for tributum and ‘so-called indirect tax’ for vectigal.” See also Shaw (1988: 810), Rathbone (2008: 254), Dignas (2005: 216), and, on portoria, France (2017: 61–2).
  24. Ulpian (Dig. 50.16.131) discusses fines.
  25. For example, in Egypt, Wallace (1938: 279) notes the ἐπιστολικόν, a fee for sending “official documents to Alexandria.” Tax collectors probably often charged “fees” simply to enhance their profits.
  26. There is ample evidence for confiscation of elite property (e.g., Suetonius, Tib. 49, Cal. 41, and Claud. 25). Valuables were also confiscated from those condemned to death, and Ulpian says (Dig. 48.20.6) that governors often passed along such revenue to the imperial treasury, though they had considerable discretion with respect to its use.
  27. Dio Cassius (Hist. rom. 72) reports that Marcus Aurelius sold πάντα τὸν βασιλικὸν κόσμον to finance a war. See García Morcillo (2008: 265) on auctions of imperial goods.
  28. Through confiscation, conquest, and inheritance, Roman emperors came to hold tremendous amounts of land throughout the empire. Tacitus (Ann. 4.6.4) notes that early in the reign of Tiberius, the emperor did not possess much land in Italy and employed a limited household staff (rari per Italiam Caesaris agri, modesta servitia, intra paucos libertos domus). That would soon change dramatically (Drexhage et al., 2002: 45). On imperial estates in North Africa, see Kehoe (2021: 509ff.).
  29. For scripturae (payments for the use of public pastures), see Rathbone (1996: 315).
  30. The largest and clearest examples of imperial lending involve interest-free loans such as the hundred million sesterces distributed by Tiberius in 33 CE (Tacitus, Ann. 6.16–7; Suetonius, Tib. 48.2; and Dio Cassius, Hist. rom. 58.21.4–5). Still, loans through the emperor’s agents were likely to have been common. Public funds might also be loaned out, as an exchange between Pliny the Younger and Trajan makes clear (Ep. 10.54–5). Since moneylending was common among the Roman elite, the confiscation of property would have regularly brought outstanding loans into the hands of the emperor. Dio Cassius (Hist. rom. 52.28.3–4) has Maecenas recommend to Augustus that he sell most of the land that the state had acquired and loan the proceeds at interest.
  31. Requisitioned items might include horses, mules, and grain (Dig. 50.4.18). Billeting seems to have been a common requisition as well. The rules governing who was liable and who was exempt from what munera were complicated.
  32. Tax collection itself, on behalf of the Roman state, was a liturgy that Rome increasingly imposed on its subjects in the early empire (van Nijf, 2008: 286; Shaw, 1988: 814). In Roman Egypt, there was a five-day corvée for dike maintenance, the πενθήμερος. See discussion in Capponi (2005: 75–6). Verboven and Laes (2017: 12) doubt corvée labor was “a central institution to the Roman economy,” but note that “it was a common fiscal strategy” whose use probably extended beyond dykes to roads and other forms of infrastructure.
  33. Mines would have been especially important. See discussion in, e.g., Shaw (1988: 815), Russell (2013), and Scheidel (2015: 245–6).
  34. Aurum coronarium (“gifts” of gold for the emperor) was expected after an emperor’s accession and on occasions such as triumphs. Wallace (1938: 282) notes that “late in the second half of the second century, the theory of the crown-tax was so far forgotten that the στεφανικόν became an annual exaction” in Egypt. See also Duncan-Jones (1980: 217).
  35. Particularly, no doubt, in the form of the enslaved. Josephus (B.J. 7.132–52) indicates the variety of spoils from Jerusalem displayed in Vespasian’s triumph.
  36. For discussion, see Millar (1977: 153–5).
  37. The PATRIMONIVM project (Geography and Economy of the Imperial Properties in the Roman World) is nearing completion. Their Atlas patrimonii Caesaris should prove particularly useful: https://patrimonium.huma-num.fr/atlas/. See also Maiuro (2012).
  38. Nero’s measures also gave priority to lawsuits against the publicani.
  39. Shaw described Roman taxation as “a bewildering maze” (1988: 809), while Rathbone observed that there was “endless local variation” (2010: 429–30). Scheidel would presumably agree to some extent with this characterization since, as we have seen, he argues for the “disproportionate importance of revenue from key regions” (2015: 248). As has frequently been noted, one reason for the variation in taxation was the Roman tendency to adopt the collection practices in operation prior to conquest (Günther, 2016: 2), but there were certainly some adaptation and innovation as well.
  40. For text, translation, and commentary: Cottier et al. (2008). See also Brunt (1990: 386–7) and Rathbone (1996: 314). Duncan-Jones (2006: 4) describes the structure of Roman customs rates as “very untidy.”
  41. Inscriptions antiques du Maroc 2.448 (Euzennat and Marion, 1982: no. 448).
  42. Most famously, the inheritance tax. See de Blois (2014) for discussion of the Constitutio Antoniniana.
  43. Shaw suggested that the “unprotected peasant proprietor” paid “closer to half than to a tenth of his total production” (1988: 824). Rathbone also believed that taxation “fell disproportionately on the poor” (2010: 431). See also Keddie (2019: 112).
  44. While the details are often hazy, we frequently hear about the adjustments to taxation made by Roman emperors. Vespasian’s unexpected accession brought a number of sudden changes. He restored the taxes canceled by Galba, instituted new taxes, and increased provincial tribute amounts (Vesp. 16). On a smaller scale, note that communities sometimes suspended customs and/or sales taxes during festivals (de Ligt, 1993: 229–34).
  45. Pliny the Younger praised Trajan for declining aurum coronarium (Pan. 41.1).
  46. Augustus burned old debts to the treasury (Aug. 32.2) as did Nero (Ann. 13.23). Claudius had created a senatorial commission to help collect arrears (Dio Cassius, Hist. rom. 60.10.4). Trajan (Pan. 40.2–5 and 55.5), Hadrian (SHA Had. 7.6; Dio Cassius, Hist. rom. 69.8, epit.), and Marcus Aurelius (Dio Cassius, Hist. rom. 72.32.2) canceled some arrears. Cassius Dio says that Marcus Aurelius canceled forty-five years of arrears to both the emperor’s treasury and the public treasury.
  47. It is not clear that censuses were conducted on a regular basis (Shaw, 1988: 814).
  48. Strabo (Geogr. 10.5.3) tells the story of a fisherman who was sent to Octavian to request a reduction of tribute. His village on the island of Gyaros in the Cyclades was having trouble paying the hundred and fifty drachmas demanded of them. In 17 CE, Syria and Judea requested that their taxes be reduced (Tacitus, Ann. 2.42).
  49. Two emperors, Caligula and Galba, used coins to celebrate the abolition of a tax (Elkins, 2014).
  50. The implication of Matt 9:10–12, Mark 2:15–17, and Luke 5:29–32 would seem to be that tax collectors sought out Jesus because of their sins. See also Matt 21:31–32 and, for the parable of the penitent tax collector, Luke 18:9–14. Tax collectors approached John the Baptist, too (Luke 3:12–13). However, some tax collectors were proud enough of their profession to have it recorded in inscriptions (van Nijf, 2008: 300).
  51. See discussions of framing, loss aversion, and prospect theory in, e.g., Thaler (2015).
  52. Happiness studies offers an exciting new perspective on the ancient economy by, among other things, taking a more holistic view of taxation. See, e.g., Vandorpe (2013) and Wyns (2018).

Bibliography