Atomic physics* is not an occult science. It is true that those who have devoted their adult lives to its study know far more about this highly specialized field than I or the average layman can ever hope to learn. Yet the same might be said of almost any other group of specialists and, just as it is possible for many laymen to understand the laws of economics that govern our markets and the laws of mechanics by which our automobiles run, so it is possible for them to have a general comprehension of the basic laws of atomic energy.
Man’s understanding of nature is usually a cumulative and gradual process. Certainly this has been the case throughout the growth of atomic physics. No single stroke of genius delivered up the finished product. Rather, its present state of development derives from the labors of many individuals from many countries, operating in many fields of endeavor, over a span of many years.
About the great milestones in this evolutionary process which led eventually to the Manhattan Project and to its end product, the atomic bomb, much has already been written, and to that story there is nothing I can add. I have recorded here only that which I am qualified to write about—my own experiences during the development of atomic energy between September 17, 1942, and December 31, 1946, the period during which I was in charge of the Manhattan Project. Insofar as practicable, my account deals with those matters with which I was personally concerned. Matters outside my direct cognizance are discussed only to the extent that some knowledge of them is essential to the reader’s understanding of our work and of the problems we faced.
Until quite recently such an undertaking would have been impossible, simply because the best interests of the United States did not allow a broad enough disclosure of the facts to permit an adequate discussion of our activities. However, the tremendous advances that American technology has made since the days of the Manhattan Project have served to remove the limits upon the dissemination of information about what is now becoming clearly a part of the past. Gradually more and more of the details of our work have been declassified and, with the issuance of an executive order in May, 1959, the curtain was drawn aside on the story of the project. Even though some of its details must continue to remain secret, enough can now be told to give the reader a good understanding of the project as a whole, and of the way in which it was conducted.
In writing this story I have tried first of all to fill in as many as possible of the gaps existing in the American public’s understanding of the project. Altogether too many of these gaps have given rise to misinformed conjecture, and as a result many Americans tend to feel embarrassed or discomfited by their country’s greatest single scientific success.
Secondly, I want to emphasize the cohesive entity that was the Manhattan Project, a factor in its success that has been largely overlooked.
Finally, I want to record the lessons that I learned while in charge of the project. Throughout that time we had few precedents to follow: the work and the problems that I and my associates faced were unique. We learned a great deal from our successes and from our failures. It is my hope that this knowledge, much of it gained the hard way, will be of value to others who must venture into uncharted fields, whether as agents of the government or as members of private organizations. While ours was the first large organization of its kind, it surely will not be the last. For this reason alone, the story of the Manhattan Project is worth telling.
Some of those who have already written about the development of atomic energy during the war years participated in the Manhattan Project in various capacities, but while in many cases their work was vitally important, their points of view were inevitably somewhat limited and their accounts of our activities focused on only one phase or part of the whole. Other writers, who had no direct connection with the project, have attempted to deal with it on a broader scale. Interesting and informative as these accounts have often been, they have suffered from their authors’ lack of access to many important facts. Since my responsibilities in the project were personal, broad and all-encompassing, my point of view is quite different, in many respects, from those of the others who have written on this subject. To the same extent my narrative differs from their accounts.
The command channels of the Manhattan Engineer District (MED) —the name given to the atomic bomb project—had no precedent. They grew up with the project and were changed as conditions changed. Yet the basic concept—that of always keeping authority and responsibility together—never changed.
Although there have been numerous stories about how obscure and devious our channels were, nobody who was directly involved ever had any doubt about what he was supposed to do. We made certain that each member of the project thoroughly understood his part in our total effort—that, and nothing more. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as an organization, were not involved in the approval of our plans or told of their purpose. The four individual Chiefs were kept informed only insofar as their specific duties required.
Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), and Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), a subdivision of OSRD, were primarily responsible for President Roosevelt’s decision to transform the atomic energy development program from a research project into a program aimed at producing a decisive military weapon. Once the military purpose of the project became governing, Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, Chief of the Army Services of Supply, and Major General W. D. Styer, his Chief of Staff, entered the picture. Within a few months they brought me in to head up the project, subject, of course, to the personal approval of General Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson, and, finally, the President. After I was brought in Bush, Conant, Styer and Rear Admiral W. R. E. Purnell were made responsible for overseeing my performance, serving to provide constant reassurance to Secretary Stimson and to the President that the project was being properly run.
At first, I was responsible only for the engineering, construction and operation of the plants to produce bomb materials. Had our work been routine and clearly defined, my responsibility probably would have ended there. However, it soon became evident to Dr. Bush and to me that if serious delays to our work were to be avoided the MED should expand its research activities, and take over control of all the atomic research projects then under the management of the OSRD, thus uniting authority with responsibility. This transfer was effected without friction during the fall and winter of 1942 by the simple device of allowing the OSRD contracts to continue in force until they expired, at which time they were replaced by new ones in which the MED was the contracting agency. The transition was so smooth, indeed, that, as I have read accounts of that period by some of the people involved, I have been struck by the fact that they did not seem to be aware of just when the transfer of authority actually took place.
Gradually, I had to take over other unforeseen responsibilities, such as security and counterintelligence. I also became responsible for military intelligence on atomic developments throughout the world, as well as for insuring that the postwar position of the United States in the field of atomic energy would not be unfavorable.
The fact that I could not operate without becoming deeply involved in future planning soon projected me into matters of extremely high-level policy, including international relations. And since my routine duties required me to have an intimate knowledge of the details of our work, which others less closely associated with the project could not hope to have, I gradually came to be more and more responsible for the initial formulation of general policy and for the translation of policy into action.
Thus I became responsible, particularly to General Marshall, Secretary Stimson and President Truman, for the over-all success of the use of the bomb against Japan. This assignment included selecting the target cities, subject to the approval of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War; preparing the orders and instructions for the bombing operations; and arranging for Army and Navy units to provide the necessary support to our overseas effort. By the time these supporting echelons were brought into the picture, the situation was too complicated and changing too quickly to permit the decentralization of authority that we habitually sought; authority and responsibility for this operation were retained in Washington.
I repeat, there was never the slightest doubt in the mind of anyone in the command channels about his own responsibilities, or about to whom he should look for direction or assistance. There was never any breakdown in these channels. That some historians do not seem to have completely grasped our command system is unquestionably due to the fact that they were unfamiliar with our methods of operation. Unfortunately, in any secret operation, it is impossible to give full information to everyone who feels that he is entitled to it, and inevitably some hurt feelings result. Our case was no exception.
Despite the passage of nearly two decades, it is still too early to write a completely objective story of the development of the first atomic bombs. I have tried, but only the passage of a much longer period of time than is allotted to me will permit a final judgment of some of the more controversial features of the project. Yet time also operates to remove from the scene those who have firsthand knowledge of the facts and who hold firsthand opinions. Gradually, the bases of their actions and their opinions will fall more and more into the realm of historians’ conjectures. So I am recording here a number of facts that I feel should be known, together with some of my opinions and my reasons for holding them. I do this in order that there can be no doubt about the ways in which I tried to carry out my responsibilities for the conduct of the project.
I have covered mainly those things which most required my personal attention. Naturally, these matters tended toward the extreme. The bulk of the project moved ahead by dint of the hard work and the feeling of urgency of everyone concerned and without requiring any personal supervision on my part.
Consideration for the reader and the limitations of space do not permit me to mention by name a great many of the people and organizations who contributed importantly to the success of the project. However, I want to emphasize as strongly as I can my gratitude to and admiration for the tens of thousands of devoted, hard-working men and women whose combined efforts made possible the greatest scientific and technical achievement of all time. The debt our country owes them is not measurable.
* Throughout this book, the terms “atomic energy” and “atomic physics” have usually been used instead of the currently accepted “nuclear energy” and “nuclear physics.” The reason for so doing is that during the period with which this narrative deals the word “atomic” was the one which was generally employed, as being more understandable in all areas outside the highly scientific.