Vannevar Bush carried innumerable important responsibilities during the war years, but perhaps his most valuable service to the nation was his handling of the Manhattan Project’s relations with the White House. He had established a close working relationship with Mr. Roosevelt long before the Army entered the atomic picture, and after the MED was formed he handled all our business with the President, directly with him or with Harry Hopkins. He was the man to whom the President looked for advice and information on the project, and no one connected with its management ever had the least desire to change this arrangement. It was a tremendous aid, not only to me but to Secretary Stimson as well, relieving us of a considerable burden.
He also, and with equal effectiveness, acted in our behalf in many other ways; and was always punctilious in keeping the other members of the Military Policy Committee and me informed about the course he was pursuing and the results he obtained. For all of this I shall be everlastingly grateful to him.
Nor shall I ever forget the masterful way in which he conducted the ticklish discussions with the British regarding the interchange of atomic information.
Before the summer of 1942, the relative amounts of work being done on the development of atomic energy in the United States and Britain were not greatly unbalanced, and it was on this basis that the interchange of information between the two countries had been instituted. Soon after I came into the project, Bush and Conant and I reviewed the situation and reached the conclusion that in the future the British effort would probably be limited to the work of a very small number of scientists without any significant support from either the British Government or industry; and that inevitably a large amount of information would pass from the United States to the United Kingdom, while practically none beyond preliminary laboratory data would pass from the British to us. In order that everyone would have a better understanding of the background of our relations with the British, I brought up the subject at the General Policy Group’s meeting of September 23, 1942.
Discussions between representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom on the development of atomic energy had begun informally as far back as early 1940, while the American effort was still under the control of the original Advisory Committee on Uranium. The first attempt to put the exchanges on a formal basis grew out of an aide-mémoire, dated July 8, 1940, in which the British Ambassador, the Marquess of Lothian, proposed to the President that there be an immediate and general interchange of secret technical information. This paper made no mention of nuclear energy; it dealt primarily with radio and radar developments. However, the door was left open when the Ambassador said that, although the British did not want to bargain for secrets and would consequently make any or all of theirs available to the United States, “they would hope you would reciprocate by discussing certain secret information of a technical nature which they are anxious to have.”
This aide-mémoire was discussed in a Cabinet meeting a few days later, and was approved by the President, with the Secretaries of War and Navy concurring. The State Department thereupon informed the British that the United States was prepared to enter into conversations with them on the interchange of technical information, and implied that we were in agreement with the proposal, so long as it did not interfere with our own war procurement programs. In the light of later developments, it is significant that neither the original British proposal nor our reply placed any restriction upon the type of information to be exchanged which would limit it to that having military applications only.
That fall, a British technical mission under Sir Henry Tizard, which had been empowered to disclose secret information concerning weapons, arrived in the United States to discuss the research activities of both countries. With the knowledge and consent of both the Army and Navy, the British mission had a number of conferences with the members of the NDRC, in the course of which Sir Henry proposed a full exchange of information concerning research and plans for weapons development. The desirability of such an arrangement was confirmed by an exchange of letters between Bush, for the NDRC, and the Secretaries of War and Navy, acting jointly.
In February, 1941, having received an invitation from the British, NDRC sent over a mission headed by Conant to exchange technical information. Agreements were reached there that set the pattern for liaison throughout the war. They provided that the NDRC would exchange war research information directly with the appropriate British ministries; that the British would concern themselves with research having as its immediate objectives the defense of Britain, while long-range development would, in general, be undertaken by the United States.
However, there was no official interchange of information on atomic energy until after the establishment of OSRD on June 28, 1941. The Executive Order that created it designated OSRD as the agency to “initiate and support such scientific and medical research as may be requested by the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States . . . and serve as liaison office for the conduct of such scientific and medical research for such countries.” This directive, together with the Lothian aide-mémoire, formed the basis for a complete interchange of information between the United States and the United Kingdom during the early phases of atomic development.
During the summer of 1941, both countries exchanged reports on the subject, and several months later two American scientists, Harold Urey and George Pegram, visited England to become familiar at firsthand with British work in this field. British efforts up to that time had been concerned primarily with certain theoretical aspects of the separation of U-235 by gaseous diffusion. While they had done a little theoretical work on the heavy-water pile, they had done almost nothing on the graphite pile or the electromagnetic process—two of the three major production methods which we later employed. Recently, I was told, the British had requested and been refused representation on the OSRD S-1 Executive Committee.
This then was the general pattern of relationship between the British and American scientific groups when I brought up at the General Policy Group meeting in September, 1942, the matter of exchange of information on the scope of the work under way in the laboratories of each country and on plans for the future. Not until later, so far as I know, was there any formal agreement dealing specifically with the exchange of information on the production of atomic energy. After some discussion, it was decided to let things stand as they were until Secretary Stimson could discuss the subject with the President.
At the close of the Cabinet meeting on October 29, Mr. Stimson put the question to President Roosevelt. He told him of our accelerating progress and of his feeling that we were already doing nine-tenths of the work, and asked what foreign commitments the President had made in this field. In his diary, Mr. Stimson says of that meeting:
He said he talked with no one but Churchill and that his talk was of a very general nature. I asked him if it wasn’t better for us to go along for the present without sharing anything more than we could help. He said yes, but he suggested that sometime in the near future he and Churchill and I should have a conference over this matter. He and I discussed some of the enormous possibilities and the ways of meeting the ticklish situation after the war with a view to prevent it being used to conquer the world. He, himself, was alarmed by the thought that possibly a bomb might fail to go off over enemy territory and give the thing away.
About this time, the British Government sent Mr. W. A. Akers to this country. Before the war, Akers had been a senior official of the Imperial Chemicals, Ltd., and, at the time of his visit, was acting as the head of all British work on atomic energy. While in the United States, he had several meetings with Bush and with Conant and me. He presented a number of arguments in favor of a freer flow of information about manufacturing processes, but I explained to him that, under the existing agreements, I had no authority to extend the established rules of collaboration. Bush, Conant and I met frequently during this time, as did the Military Policy Committee, to discuss Akers’ proposals, and we were generally agreed that: (1) Akers might well be influenced by an undue regard for possible postwar commercial advantages for the British when speaking of interchange of information; and (2) the United States should make available only such information as would assist in winning the war. All of us felt strongly that we should not consider any change in United States policy until we had official instructions from the President.
It became apparent from our discussions with the British during this period that they would not be in a position to embark on any large-scale atomic development or production programs during the war. Disturbed because they were getting less and less information from us—for I insisted that anything we gave them must be essential to our common war effort—they put increasingly strong pressure on both Bush and me. They had always understood, they insisted, that there would be complete collaboration even beyond what was necessary for war purposes.
But they themselves had provided us with numerous precedents for rejecting their argument, for, as Conant pointed out, they had not told us of a secret bomb disposal method, or of several other of their developments in which we were interested, because, they said, this knowledge would not assist our military effort. Consequently, we felt no pangs of conscience when we decided that information on the Manhattan Project would not assist British military participation in the current war. Akers and his colleagues were greatly discomfited by this interpretation of policy.
With matters in this regard pretty much at a standstill, the Military Policy Committee, in December, 1942, submitted a report to the President, reviewing progress on the atomic energy project as a whole. The report emphasized the need for clear instructions on future relations with the British and the Canadians. Three alternatives were offered:
(A) Cessation of all interchange.
(B) Complete interchange not only in the research field, but in development and production, including free interchange of personnel.
(C) Restricted interchange of information only to the extent that it can be used now by the recipient.
Alternative (C) was strongly recommended, and the President’s approval of it established the pattern for our collaboration with the British from then on.
At about the same time, Akers wrote to Conant setting forth once more the views he had previously given to Bush and me. He expressed grave concern over the restrictions that had been imposed on the interchange of information, saying: “It has always been the intention of the British group that the closest possible liaison should be maintained, not only in research work, but also in production.”
If the British, particularly Akers, had not displayed such an interest in, and had not insisted on obtaining, material of value solely for postwar industrial possibilities, the existing interchange of information might not have been affected. Negotiations broke down not because of American policy, but because the British refused to accept our view that collaboration should be for the purpose of winning the war—not for postwar purposes. I decided that, in the absence of any official agreement, the Manhattan Project would not be justified in continuing to supply information to the British beyond that permitted by the President’s approval of the Military Policy Committee’s recommendations. Needless to say, the British were far from satisfied with this state of affairs and undertook to have it changed.
It was not long before Mr. Churchill raised the question of interchange directly with President Roosevelt. On May 25, 1943, in an attempt to reach a meeting of the minds, a conference was held at the White House, attended by Harry Hopkins, Dr. Bush, and Lord Cherwell, who, throughout most of the war, was Mr. Churchill’s scientific adviser. Lord Cherwell made it very clear during this discussion that the principal reason the British wanted information on our project at this time was for postwar military purposes. He denied that they had postwar commercial ambitions in this field. He went on to point out that unless military information for postwar use were furnished to the British, they might find it necessary to divert some of their war effort to developing the necessary information for themselves.
Mr. Churchill’s efforts to remove completely all restrictions were almost crowned with success when, on July 20, the President wrote to Bush saying: “While I am mindful of the vital necessity for security in regard to this, I feel that our understanding with the British encompasses the complete exchange of all information.” This new position of the President constituted a complete reversal of his approval of the recommendations of the Military Policy Committee scarcely six months before.
Dr. Bush did not receive Mr. Roosevelt’s note at once, for he had gone to London on other business. While there, he was asked by Mr. Churchill to confer on the subject of exchanging information. Bush replied that both Secretary Stimson and Mr. Bundy were also in England and that he felt they should take part in any such discussion. The meeting was held at Number 10 Downing Street on July 22.
At the time of this meeting, Bush had no knowledge of the President’s willingness to enter into a complete and free interchange with the British. Mr. Roosevelt’s note of July 20 had been received by Dr. Conant, acting then as the head of the OSRD, who transmitted its contents to Bush, but the cable was so garbled in transmission that the American representatives in London did not have a correct understanding of the President’s instructions. Before the meeting Conant went on record, saying: “A complete interchange with the British on the S-1 project is a mistake. The proposition put up officially by the American Government, I firmly believe, was in the best interests of the war effort, the United States and the eventual peace of the world. I can only express the hope that the President did not revise his decision on a matter which may have such important bearings on the future of the United States without proper understanding of the potential possibilities of the weapon we are now engaged in developing, nor the difficulties of our enterprise. . . . In my opinion, the reopening of the exchange with the British without reservation (as contrasted to our restricted offer of some months ago) cannot in any way assist the war effort and will greatly diminish our security provisions here in the United States. Whatever time and energy those concerned with the S-1 project devote to British interchange (outside of the areas we have already offered to open) will be a pure waste of time as far as the job of winning this war is concerned.” I completely shared his opinion.
The British were represented at the July 22 meeting by Prime Minister Churchill, Sir John Anderson (the British Cabinet officer handling atomic energy matters) and Lord Cherwell. The United States representatives were Secretary Stimson, Bush and Harvey Bundy. Mr. Churchill opened with a plea for a complete re-examination of the interchange problem. He emphasized the fact that Britain was not interested in the commercial aspects of atomic energy, but instead was vitally concerned with being able to maintain her future independence in the face of the international blackmail that the Russians might eventually be able to employ. After considerable discussion Churchill modified his position to agree to an interchange of only that information which would support the war effort, finally removing all British objections to our position.
He suggested an agreement between himself and the President that would contain the following provisions:
I have never been able to find any justification for the notion advanced from time to time that the fourth provision held some hidden meanings. The fifth provision was the result of an effort by the British Government to remove any shadow that might have been cast upon their good faith by the vigorous representations of Akers.
After further discussion in the conference, Secretary Stimson agreed to present the Prime Minister’s proposals to the President.
Shortly afterward, Mr. Churchill wrote to Mr. Stimson to tell him that he had received a message from the President, and suggested that the British send a representative to Washington “to discuss arrangements for the resumption of collaboration.” For this purpose, the Prime Minister had designated Sir John Anderson, who would bring with him a draft of the heads of agreement which Mr. Churchill had proposed at the July 22 meeting. I do not know when Mr. Stimson told the President of his conversations in London, but probably not before his return to the United States on July 31, so once again (through his close personal relationship with the Prime Minister) Mr. Roosevelt had been precipitated into a matter on which he was not fully informed.
When Sir John arrived, he sent to Bush for review an expanded version of the draft heads of agreement governing future collaboration. The principal area in which Mr. Churchill’s proposal had been expanded lay in the fifth point, where Sir John had attempted to prescribe in some detail the machinery for achieving American-British collaboration in research and development. Sir John’s fifth point provided that:
Bush replied that the first four points in the draft were concerned with matters of international understanding which lay far beyond the problems of interchange and should thus be for the consideration of the President and the Prime Minister. He therefore limited his comments to the fifth point, indicating that the General Policy Group was in agreement that the proposed procedure was practicable. He reiterated our understanding of interchange of information as meaning that it would be pursued wherever the receipt of such information would definitely advance the project as a war measure.
Sir John replied immediately, confirming Bush’s interpretation that, while provision “b” was intended merely to authorize the British to discuss with their immediate scientific advisors such information as they might have, provision “d” would really govern the interchange. He went on to state that “it will not be for the Combined Policy Committee to interfere with the control of the American programme by the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army. My thought is that the members of the Combined Policy Committee should have such information as may be necessary to enable all of us to be satisfied that we are making the greatest possible contribution towards bringing the project to fruition at the earliest possible moment.”
On August 7, Bush notified the President that a basis for interchange with the British had been reached. Although he referred to Mr. Roosevelt’s letter of July 20, which directed full interchange, he forwarded to the President the draft of the British proposals which placed interchange on a much more equitable basis.
Throughout his negotiations with Sir John, Bush had been most meticulous in consulting with all members of the General Policy Group and the Military Policy Committee. However, after August 7, when the matter was referred to the White House, until the nineteenth, when the Quebec Agreement was signed, we were all pretty much in the dark. The Military Policy Committee was not consulted by the President during this time, nor, so far as I know, were any of its members. Most of us were extremely concerned lest the President enter into an undesirable arrangement. At General Marshall’s request, Bundy asked Secretary Stimson to tell the President that Bush and Conant felt strongly that the “agreement should stand on a reasonable basis of quid pro quo, and exchange should be limited to the exchanges of information which will help expedite the S-1 development” in order to “avoid at all costs the President’s being accused of dealing with hundreds of millions of taxpayers’ money improvidently or acting for purposes beyond the winning of the war.”
I was not informed of Churchill’s presence in this country just prior to the Quebec Conference in August, 1943, nor did I learn of the conference itself until it was about to get under way. When I finally did hear of it, I knew that atomic energy matters were bound to be discussed between President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister. While their discussion would probably be centered on the interchange of atomic information, there was no way to be certain that it would be confined to this area.
Bush had been keeping the President informed of our efforts verbally. Our only written report to him had been delivered early in the previous December. The need for a new report was obvious. I started to prepare one personally, and with Nichols’ assistance, on the project. On the thirteenth of August, the Military Police Committee agreed that this report should be sent to the President at once.
In order that further information would be immediately available, I had Nichols take the report to Quebec on the War Department’s courier plane. When he delivered it to General Marshall, he was told that it was probably too late, as an agreement had already been signed, but that if anything else came up, it would be useful.
I do not know whether President Roosevelt consulted any Americans at Quebec on atomic energy. I doubt very much that he did.
All we were able to learn of the proceedings there was that, on August 17, the President signed the Quebec Agreement, which matched almost word for word the version that had been presented by Sir John Anderson to Dr. Bush in Washington a few weeks earlier. In that, I feel, we were very fortunate—fortunate that the British were not aware of the President’s instructions of July 20, fortunate that the President’s directions to Bush were garbled in transmission, and fortunate that Bush had possessed sufficient initiative and courage and skill in negotiating, after he did learn of them, to modify them to the extent necessary to protect our national interest.
The Quebec Agreement established the official basis for the relationship of the United States to the United Kingdom throughout most of our wartime nuclear energy programs.
Under the Agreement, a Combined Policy Committee was set up which was to meet in Washington and to supervise the joint efforts of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada.1 Its operations went smoothly at all times and there were never any serious differences of opinion among its members over the conduct of its business during the war. I attribute this largely to the outstanding membership and to the awareness on the part of the British delegates of the magnitude of the American contribution in comparison to theirs. The decisions of the Combined Policy Committee did not at any time interfere with the United States program. On the contrary, it supported our efforts to the fullest extent that could be desired.
Carrying out the policies governing the interchange of information, we arranged for selected British scientists to work in certain of our laboratories; we also supplied certain information, personnel, equipment and materials to the heavy-water pile at Chalk River, in Canada. In December, working closely with Colonel John Llewellin and Dr. James Chadwick, the recently appointed Chief of the British Scientific Group assigned to the Manhattan Project, I drew up the rules regulating the operations of British scientists attached to our project, and I assigned some twenty-eight British scientists to the work that was under my control. The Combined Policy Committee approved this action and appointed a subcommittee consisting of Dr. James Chadwick (U.K.), Mr. C. J. Mackenzie (Canada) and me to establish rules for the interchange of information between the group of scientists working on Canadian projects and their colleagues in the United States. The regulations which we established at this time provided the basis for all interchange until the passage of the Atomic Energy Act in 1946.
1 The committee, as it was originally designated in the Agreement, consisted of: Secretary Stimson (U.S.), Dr. Bush (U.S.), Dr. Conant (U.S.), Field Marshal Dill (U.K.), Colonel Llewellin (U.K.), and Mr. Howe (Canada). Colonel Llewellin was in the British Ministry of Supply and was stationed in Washington. Mr. Howe was the Canadian Minister of Munitions.