Although we believed that because of the splendid co-operation of Edgar Sengier of Union Miniere we controlled enough uranium ore for our war needs, the Military Policy Committee realized that we must increase our supplies if we wanted to be certain that at the end of the war we would not find ourselves in the embarrassing position of having the plants, the knowledge and the skills, but no raw materials to work with. Information available at the time indicated that the Belgian Congo was, by far, the best source for us. However, the Belgian Government-in-Exile was in London, and it was possible that the British might gain a monopoly over the Belgian Congo raw materials. The United States would then find itself in a most disadvantageous position.
The best solution to this rather delicate situation, it seemed to us, would be to obtain a long-term commitment from the Belgians through the medium of a governmental agreement between Belgium on the one hand and the United States and the United Kingdom on the other. Accordingly the matter was brought before the Combined Policy Committee, and it was agreed that a tripartite agreement should be negotiated in London with the Belgian Government-in-Exile.
Shortly thereafter we began work on establishing a joint Anglo-American-Canadian agency which could enter into and administer the commercial contracts that we hoped to make with the Belgians following the tripartite agreement. In these contract negotiations, carried on in London, the United States was represented by Ambassador Winant, and Great Britain by Sir John Anderson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
In order that Mr. Winant would have the necessary background information and also so that I would be kept fully informed, I sent over Major H. S. Traynor from Oak Ridge to assist him. As in all other diplomatic matters dealing with atomic energy, the instructions to Winant were issued in the name of Secretary of War Stimson rather than that of the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. When I asked him once whether he found this arrangement embarrassing, he replied: “Not at all—I am the representative in London of the President, not of the State Department.”
The conduct of negotiations in London can perhaps best be described by excerpts from a recent account written by Traynor at my request.
On a day in early March 1944 a telephone call to Oak Ridge informed me that General Groves requested that I report to him the next day in Washington.
General Groves told me that it had become necessary to make immediate and personal contact with British and Belgian government officials and mine owners in London to insure availability of critically needed uranium ores in the Belgian Congo and that I was to proceed to England as quickly as possible, enlist the assistance of U.S. Ambassador John G. Winant and proceed to take whatever steps appeared to be appropriate. He said that a letter of introduction from the President would be provided as would known information on the amount and availability of ore, and legal opinions on possible courses of action with respect to intergovernmental and commercial arrangements. Ambassador Winant, General Groves added, was to be given information on the Manhattan Project —or the S-1 Project, as it was then sometimes called—to the extent necessary for him to appreciate and understand the implications of the assistance he was being asked to give.
Two objectives were clear: first, the establishment of some type of organization to effect intergovernment long-term exclusive rights to Congo ores and second, the development of a commercial arrangement that would insure prompt and uninterrupted ore shipments to the United States. All arrangements had to be equitable and legally supportable in all countries concerned and should take advantage of negotiations that were already under way between Belgian mining interests and U.S. military authorities.
On March 18, I arrived in London and I was able to see the Ambassador within the hour. I gave him a brief account of the S-1 Project, laying particular emphasis on the necessity for the prompt and complete availability of uranium ores which had already been mined in the Belgian Congo, the necessity for extracting additional quantities of ore from this source at the earliest practicable moment, and the strict security which surrounded the entire project and which would have to be observed in all negotiations.
Ambassador Winant quickly grasped the importance and urgency of the work. He mentioned that he had learned that the Germans had been engaged in a similar sort of project and had wondered what steps the U.S. had been taking in this regard. I was requested to see him again the following day—a Sunday.
The Sunday meeting with the Ambassador was arranged for one hour shortly after lunch. However, as the S-1 Project was described to him in more detail, as its importance to the U.S. war effort was explained, and as the need for swift action in the Congo was emphasized, Mr. Winant’s interest became so complete that the meeting continued into the early evening hours. He mentioned that in his younger days he had had some mining experience which he believed helped him in appreciating the complexities and difficulties of the matters at hand.
One could not talk with Mr. Winant without being deeply impressed by his quick perception, his intensity of interest, and his quick grasp of implications. Courteous, considerate, mild in manner, soft and plain-spoken, he treated all people alike regardless of rank or station. Yet he seemed to exert a remarkable influence on those with whom he came in contact—both foreigner and American alike. I was told that many persons—both British and American—sought his advice on personal problems as well as matters of state. Several times he expressed great concern as to whether humanity would be able to progress socially and morally as fast as it was progressing technically and thus be able to control, for the common good, the new power from the atom. . . .
On the following Wednesday, Ambassador Winant met with Sir John Anderson. Mr. Winant stated that he had received instructions from the President to collaborate with the British Government with a view to obtaining long-term exclusive rights to uranium deposits in the Congo jointly by the U.S. and the U.K. It was agreed that it would be necessary to inform Belgian Government representatives in strict confidence that certain experimental work with uranium being carried out by the U.S. and the U.K. had reached the stage at which, while no results had been achieved which made it possible to say on the basis of tests what the ultimate developments would be, it was clear that there were possibilities of the greatest significance and that if these possibilities materialized, it would be of profound importance for the future not only of the United States, but of the whole world, that uranium should not fall into the wrong hands, that the U.S. and U.K. governments felt it their duty to do their best to obtain an option on as much as possible of the world’s supply of uranium and to assume the task of seeing that it was not misused, at least until other arrangements were made after conclusion of the war. The exact nature of an agreement was left open pending further legal consideration, but a request for an option on all Belgian Congo uranium ore for a term of years was considered. It was agreed that Sir John Anderson would make the initial approach to the Belgian Government, which he did the evening of the same day.
The Chancellor reported that he talked with an official of the Belgian Government along the agreed lines. He said that he also gave assurance that nothing was contemplated that would in any way derogate from national Belgian sovereignty. He mentioned the possibility of an option on the entire output of uranium on terms to be discussed, pointing out, however, that the importance of the matter transcended commercial considerations. The Belgian official gave assurance that his government would co-operate.
A need quickly developed for legal guidance and consideration. Consequently, at Ambassador Winant’s request, Brigadier General E. C. Betts, Judge Advocate General of the European Theater of Operations, was assigned by General Eisenhower to Mr. Winant for “advice on matters of interest to the War Department outside the European Theater of Operations.” On the British side Sir Thomas Barnes, the Treasury Solicitor, was assigned a similar role. These were fortunate appointments as both men were highly regarded for their integrity and professional competence. Both had successfully worked together on legal problems arising from the presence of U.S. armed forces in the United Kingdom.
On March 27, a joint meeting was held between Ambassador Winant, the U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer and senior officials of the Belgian Government stationed in London. Assurance of Belgian co-operation was again given and the Belgians stated that it would be necessary for representatives of Congo commercial mining interests to be brought into the negotiations.
Two days later General Betts and Sir Thomas Barnes proceeded to the problem of an intergovernmental body and developed a draft “Declaration of Trust.”1 This was completed within several days, and was dispatched to Washington on April 5 for the President’s formal approval. At the same time, arrangements were made to put the draft before the British Prime Minister. . . .
After some exchange of views between London and Washington, and modifications including provisions for thorium procurement, the Declaration of Trust was signed by the President and the Prime Minister in mid-June, 1944.
One feature of the Declaration which, I think, made it unique among all such secret executive agreements, was its last clause, which was included at my instance, because of my strong feeling that all international agreements should receive the approval of the Senate, as set forth in the Constitution. It said:
The signatories of the Agreement and Declaration of Trust will, as soon as practicable after the conclusion of hostilities, recommend to their respective Governments the extension and revision of this war-time emergency agreement to cover post war conditions and its formalization by treaty or other proper method. This Agreement and Declaration of Trust shall continue in full force and effect until such extension or revision.
This provision was never carried out as far as I know.
The Trust Agreement established in Washington an agency known as the Combined Development Trust,2 which, under the direction and guidance of the Combined Policy Committee, was to supervise the acquisition of raw materials outside of American and British territory. Their allocation was the responsibility of the Combined Policy Committee.
The Trust functioned to good advantage. Besides providing the impetus which led to several international agreements dealing with the control of raw materials, it increased the scope of the exploratory surveys that had been initiated by the Manhattan District, and it encouraged valuable research activities in the field of enrichment of low-grade ores.
At the same time that the Trust was being set up, negotiations were continuing with the Belgian Government officials. In mid-April the Belgian Minister of Colonies had sent an urgent summons to Edgar Sengier to come to London at once, as a matter of “national duty.” The Belgian Government was completely unaware of Sengier’s previous top secret contracts with the Manhattan Project and wanted his advice before signing an agreement with the British and Americans. We for our part were delighted, since his presence during the negotiations would be an insurance against delay and unfortunate questions.
The British Supply Council in Washington made the arrangements for his trip, though the situation was complicated by a recent regulation closing all British borders to diplomatic travel.
In spite of the care we had taken, Sengier’s trip was not without its awkward moments. All boat departures were kept very secret, and so that he would not have to stay on board any longer than necessary, he was picked up just before sailing time. He had already been provided with the necessary travel papers. As he told me afterward, “At six o’clock in the evening two officials in civilian clothes appeared at my hotel apartment. They prevented me from even saying good-by to my wife, who had the impression that I was being taken off to Sing Sing prison.” They delivered him on board without his having to observe any of the usual formalities.
Sengier was the lone civilian traveler among nine thousand military passengers, but nevertheless on the first day he became involved in the usual disciplinary and physical exercises. Among other things, he claims he was kept standing for two hours in the rain, with discipline as the objective. Fortunately, this difficulty was cleared up promptly and his voyage thereafter was as comfortable as conditions permitted.
On his arrival at Liverpool there was trouble again: first, a serious objection to his disembarking at all, and then a suggestion that he be put into quarantine. This embarrassment ended quickly when a British colonel in civilian clothes, who had been waiting for him, intervened and took him and his baggage to London in a jeep.
On May 8 Sengier, the Belgian Cabinet members, Winant and Anderson held a meeting at which, to continue with Traynor’s report:
The Belgians reiterated their readiness to co-operate in seeing that the Congo uranium did not fall into the wrong hands and that as much as possible of it was made available for experimental work dealing with military possibilities. In addition, they stated that if experimental work produced results capable of commercial and industrial exploitation, the Belgian Government would expect to share in the benefits.
Negotiations continued for several days, and on May 12 Ambassador Winant reported to Washington that their discussions had resulted in an understanding that an agreement would be negotiated and signed under which the Belgian Government would undertake to grant to the U.S. and U.K. governments, on terms to be agreed upon, first refusal to purchase all Belgian Congo uranium.
Implementation of the undertaking was provided for in three parts:
The Belgian agreement became effective in late September, 1944, with an exchange of letters among Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak, Sir John Anderson and Ambassador Winant.
With the signing of the purchase agreement with the Union Miniere the American trustees were confronted with a serious problem. The contract was for so long a term that appropriated funds could not be counted on from War Department sources. The Constitution would prevent it.
Any such long-term commitment, if made from other funds, would require prior authorization from the Congress and, even so, would be subject to a change of heart on the part of Congress. Under the terms of the contract the trustees would be personally responsible for the payments and none of us had the necessary number of millions to take care of the obligation.
Our dilemma was solved by arranging for me to be paid by the United States $37,500,000, a sum sufficient to cover the expected obligations. I then deposited this money in a personal account at the U.S. Treasury. From this I made withdrawals as necessary and deposited the money with the Bankers Trust Company of New York.
Payments for ore were made from this account. To avoid arousing undue curiosity, knowledge of the account was limited to Mr. Sloan Colt, the president of the bank, and two other officials, who handled all transactions, including deposits and the delivery of statements.
Some time after the account was opened, I was startled by an observation by Major Consodine. He pointed out that in the event of my death, and probably of either of the other two American trustees empowered to sign checks (for two signatures were required), there could be some serious complications. The state of New York might claim inheritance tax on the balance in the bank and might resist the settlement of the individual’s estate besides. When I talked to George Harrison about it, he became quite concerned. We immediately prepared a letter to the bank stating that the funds were not ours and that if any of us died or were disabled, the Secretary of War would designate the person to whom the money would be paid.
The MED’s associations with Sengier continued to be as pleasant as they had been from the day of Nichols’ first visit to his office. Despite the large sums of money involved, agreements were reached expeditiously and without any quibbling over legal language, usually in an hour or so. Each of us would have a scratch pad on which we wrote down the various points as agreement was reached. These heads of agreement seldom covered more than a legal-sized sheet. Then one of us would read his notes aloud for the other to check, so that the two papers would be alike. After this the notes were turned over to our assistants, who would draw up a contract in accord with the listed points. After the Trust came into being, Sir Charles Hambro normally participated with me in the negotiations.
It was difficult to arrive at a proper price. By this time it was certain that the material was of immense value to the United States, provided the bomb worked. To the seller it was of great potential value if atomic energy should prove to have either military or peacetime value. Otherwise, it was worth only the value of its radium content. And if our reactor theories were sound, the radium would lose most of its value since radioactive cobalt could largely replace it.
It did have one definite value and that was what it cost to produce. Yet even this was difficult to establish fairly, for the unit production cost was much less at Shinkolobwe than in Canada or on the Colorado Plateau. Its value had never been determined in the open market and now there was only one purchaser and one seller.
As a Belgian, Sengier appreciated fully the absolute necessity of an Allied victory. It was his broad, statesman-like attitude that made it possible for us to reach an agreement satisfactory to all.
It was a distinct pleasure for me after the war to recommend the award of the Medal of Merit, the highest civilian award made by our government, to Edgar Sengier for his great services to the United States, to Belgium and the free world in making available to us adequate supplies of Belgian Congo uranium. It was also my pleasure to present this award at a ceremony in my office in Washington. Security restrictions had not yet been lifted on this phase of the MED operations and the ceremony was private and unpublicized. It has always been a source of regret to me that Sengier’s services, and particularly his foresight, could not receive full public recognition at the time.
Union Miniere was not our only supplier of ore. Prior to the formation of the MED all ores had been obtained from the Eldorado Mining Company, which had a uranium mine at Great Bear Lake, not far from the Arctic Circle. Eldorado also operated a refinery at Port Hope on Lake Ontario, where uranium oxide, as well as radium, was extracted from uranium ore, and through which we eventually funneled all the Belgian Congo ore.
Later, when we found it imperative to decrease the breadth of the responsibilities originally assigned to Stone and Webster, we placed a soundly trained geologist, Captain Phillip L. Merritt, in charge of all raw ore procurement and processing through the refining stage. Under his immediate direction, and under the general guidance of Nichols, the ore situation rapidly improved.
A systematic search of the Colorado Plateau disclosed uranium-bearing wastes in the dumps at the vanadium mills of Union Carbon and Carbide and of the Vanadium Corporation of America. Contracts were let for the uranium content of these dumps, which was of considerable quantity, and for its extraction.
In the fall of 1943, Merritt went to the Belgian Congo, to make certain that there were no other known easily exploitable ores in that area. As expected, there were none. He also checked to determine whether there were not some tailing dumps that contained a substantial amount of ore; that there might be seemed most probable in the light of the richness of the ores we had previously received. Merritt’s inquiry was successful and as a result we had immediately available another large amount of ore. It was not so rich as that which we had previously obtained from the Congo, but the Congo’s poorest was much better than the best from Canada or the Colorado Plateau. These dumps had been built up during the years as a result of hand-sorting the richer ores. Their uranium content varied widely from 3 per cent to 20 per cent.
A typical example of the difficulties that we so often encountered in operating during the war came up when the shipping arrangements were made. There were no suitable bags to be found in the Congo, or, apparently, anywhere else. We finally found some new ones in India, and some used ones in Texas City. The latter were tin ore bags and were marked “Product of Bolivia.” When they were reused, no one thought to re-mark them. Consequently their delivery was held up, for the United States Customs officials knew that the “sand” which they contained came from West Africa, not Bolivia. This matter was cleared up in short order. As a matter of fact, we never had much trouble with government regulations and so-called “red tape,” probably because whenever we encountered potential difficulties, we did not resort to letter-writing through channels. Instead, a competent officer was always sent immediately to the trouble spot with orders and authority to resolve the problems.
Early in 1943, we decided that we ought to learn as much as possible about the various deposits of uranium and thorium throughout the world. It was obvious to me that we had a responsibility to see to it that in the future the United States would not lack the essential raw materials known to be, or likely to be found, suitable for the production of atomic energy. Uranium, we were certain, would be all-important and we thought that thorium might prove to be of almost equal value.
To collect the necessary knowledge we decided to use the services of some existing organization rather than attempt to organize an agency of our own for the work. We also decided that we should use a private organization rather than one within the government. The principal reason for this was the need for security, since extensive field investigations by a government agency would be apt to attract too much attention.
Union Carbide and Carbon agreed to undertake the assignment. It was a large company with adequate manpower resources; moreover, it was already engaged in the Manhattan Project as the operator-to-be of the gas diffusion plant at Clinton, as the supplier of the extremely pure graphite needed for the plutonium process reactors and as a refiner and supplier of uranium-bearing ores.
Among other things, it was to make a study of all the existing literature on the world’s geology. This would require competent geologists who were also competent linguists—a requirement that proved extremely difficult to meet, particularly in the Russian language area. Somehow Union Carbide succeeded in finding good people for the job.
We had no suitable officer available in the MED to serve as the Army representative on this study. Mining experts had estimated that the work might take a number of years to complete; some estimates running as high as fifteen or twenty years. To avoid any unnecessary stretch-out of our study, I wanted a man who was experienced in the oil industry, feeling that he would be used to making quick, conclusive decisions, based, if necessary, on very limited information. I did not want anyone who would always insist on 100 per cent proof before making a move.
The records of all officers on file in the Adjutant General’s office were reviewed as we searched for individuals possessing the desired qualifications. Out of the million or more cards examined came only a dozen names and most of these men were already overseas. Fortunately, the man who seemed best qualified, Major Paul L. Guarin, Corps of Engineers, was then stationed in Dallas, Texas, in the office of the Division Engineer. He had had many years of experience with the Shell Oil Company and was thoroughly accustomed to crash programs.
Before he took charge, I talked with him for twenty or thirty minutes. I went over our objectives and emphasized my views somewhat along the following lines: “When the war is over, there will be diplomatic exchanges between the victorious nations, possibly even another Versailles Conference. It seems clear that President Wilson and his staff, as well as the other participants at that conference, were not supplied with all the pertinent data they should have had. I am determined that any American negotiators after the present war will have available to them all possible information concerning the sources of fissionable materials. I estimate that we must be ready with the bulk of this information within two or three years. We are after a good sound report—not a perfect one.”
We would help him all we could, I told him, but like everyone else in the MED, he had to carry his own responsibilities and make his own decisions when he could not, for any reason, obtain guidance promptly from either the District Engineer or me. I assured him he would not be subjected to second guessing so long as his decisions were reasonable.
In carrying out his responsibilities, Guarin was aided by a small group of assistants, chief among whom were Dr. George W. Bain, a Professor of Geology at Amherst College, and Dr. George Selfridge, a geologist from the University of Utah.
As the reports from Union Carbide’s task force began to come through, Bain developed certain generalizations concerning the pattern of conditions under which uranium ore of sufficient richness was likely to be found and, equally important to our goal, where it was unlikely to be found.
Out of all this came several extremely important technological breakthroughs. Until this time it had never been thought that extract-able amounts of uranium would be found in any hydrocarbon-bearing material, such as petroleum or coal. From his pattern studies, Bain concluded that they should be; and was proved to be right.
He had a remarkably thorough knowledge of geological formations throughout the world and recalled that, in the course of a trip he had made in 1941, he had found uranium in amounts that might be of interest to us in the gold mines of the Rand, in South Africa. A further investigation confirmed the presence of uranium, but not of sufficient richness for our needs. These findings were at considerable variance with Bain’s estimate of what they should have shown.
After reviewing the entire situation with Guarin, Bain went home to Amherst from New York on a Sunday. While he was there, he took from his private collection a sample of the Rand gold-bearing rock, placed it on a photographic plate, and was delighted to find from the exposure very definite proof that the ore did emit beta rays of an intensity that indicated uranium content far beyond anything that had previously been suspected.
This made us feel certain that we had uncovered great possibilities. But we had a great deal of trouble convincing others, who insisted that it was impossible that uranium could have been overlooked in the Rand ore for so many years. I discussed the matter with Sir Charles Hambro and Sir James Chadwick and they agreed with me that we could pursue our investigation of the Rand vigorously.
A new assay confirmed Bain’s opinion of the ore’s richness, and proved that the Rand was probably a major potential source of uranium. It also led directly to the adoption of Bain’s views that all placer deposits should be carefully considered; thus many other areas throughout the world came to be regarded as possible sources of uranium.
The uranium-bearing rock in the Rand mines occurs with the gold in a thin stratum. Under the normal extractive procedures, the uranium was completely mixed with the other nongold-bearing rock and deposited on the waste piles. It appeared difficult and expensive to recover, and many thought it would be completely impracticable even to attempt it. Nevertheless, with the wholehearted approval of General Smuts, the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, we organized a special group, headed by Dr. A. M. Gaudin of MIT, to try to devise a method by which it could be done. Gaudin had previously worked for the MED in developing concentration methods for low-grade Congo ores in his MIT laboratories. Within a comparatively short period of time, he came up with a most ingenious and satisfactory solution to our problem. Later the South Africans were able to improve Gaudin’s process so that the Rand ores could be processed in mass.
The economic effect of these discoveries on the Union of South Africa has been tremendous. In 1959, well over $150 million worth of uranium was exported. It has made possible the working of many gold mines which, without this valuable by-product, would not have been able to operate. It is difficult to estimate how much the $700 million worth of gold produced during that same year would have been reduced, but it would have been by a substantial amount if uranium had not been recovered from what previously had been discarded as waste.
Another of Bain’s technological breakthroughs involved his belief that uranium should normally be present in the monazite sands which are the principal source of thorium. To prove this theory, an agent was sent to the Lindsay plant in Chicago. This company, a refiner and dealer in the rare-earth class of chemicals for many years, had some old bins which contained unprocessed samples of monazite sands from one of the major sources of this material—the state of Travancore on the western coast of India.
Analyses of these samples proved the soundness of Bain’s reasoning. This discovery emphasized the importance of gaining all possible knowledge of the world’s monazite resources, in which we were already interested because of their being the principal source of thorium.
Although we were not sure of the value of thorium to our work, we had become convinced at an early stage of the desirability of arranging for long-term rights for thorium from the world’s principal deposits of monazite, located in Brazil, the Netherlands East Indies and the Indian state of Travancore. Since Travancore fell outside the territory under the jurisdiction of the Combined Development Trust, negotiations with that state were conducted by the British.
Other agreements covering the sale of monazite sands were signed with Brazil and the Netherlands. During the time I was connected with the project, the Netherlands agreement remained inoperative. The Brazil agreement was finally abrogated by the Brazilian Government because of our failure to make use of its provisions, owing to the unexpectedly large production of uranium and consequent lack of interest in thorium.
Incidentally, it was at the start of negotiations with Brazil that the State Department was brought into the atomic energy picture for the first time. In a conference with President Roosevelt before his departure for Yalta, I suggested that it would be desirable to have Secretary Stettinius himself handle the initial talks with President Vargas, and that I would like to give him enough information about the project to enable him to do so. The President agreed and informed Stettinius almost immediately. Later I talked with him and arranged to have an officer accompany him to Brazil.
It was at this same conference that Mr. Roosevelt informed me that if the European war was not over before we had our first bombs he wanted us to be ready to drop them on Germany.
I should add that we also attempted to obtain first refusal rights on Sweden’s uranium ores, and were completely unsuccessful. As far as I could see, this was largely because of the Swedish Government’s concern about the possible reaction of the Russians. The Swedish negotiators also claimed that on constitutional grounds alone their government could not make any secret agreement without informing their Riksdag or at least their Foreign Ministry.
1 The basis for this was a brief which had been previously prepared in my office by Lieutenant Colonel John Lansdale, Jr., and Major W. A. Consodine.
2 Originally appointed as trustees were Mr. C. K. Leith, a distinguished mining engineer; Mr. George L. Harrison, a special assistant to Secretary Stimson, who was becoming more and more involved in atomic affairs; and Major General Leslie R. Groves for the United States; Sir Charles Hambro and Mr. Frank G. Lee for the United Kingdom; and Mr. George C. Bateman for Canada.