One of the original tasks of the Interim Committee (entirely civilian in membership1), which had been appointed in April to advise the President on the problems that would be raised by the development of the atomic bomb, was to prepare the draft of a legislative bill for the domestic control of atomic energy. Along with the Secretary of War, General Marshall and everyone else who held a responsible position in the project, I was most anxious to have legislation passed promptly, for now that the MED had done the job for which it had been brought into being it was important to have a reasonably clear-cut national policy laid down for our future guidance. At first I had even hoped that the President might call a special session of Congress to consider the matter. While I always regarded this possibility as most doubtful, I felt that the administration could and should prepare appropriate legislation so that it could be considered by the proper committees prior to the opening of Congress; then with the backing of the administration, a sound law could be enacted soon after Congress convened.
However, there were a number of persons who were pushing their own pet schemes. Typical of these was the proposal that we disclose all the details of our atomic development to the world, and particularly to Russia. This idea found one strong supporter in Washington in Secretary Ickes. At the same time a few politically ambitious people decided that they could advance their careers by displaying an interest in atomic energy matters.
It was recognized that any bill that might be passed promptly would be an interim measure, since it would take some time for the administration and the nation to understand fully the implications of the new force. For this reason the original draft prepared by the Interim Committee contained a provision that the law should be revised at the end of two years. The draft legislation was sent to the White House soon after V-J Day. In accordance with usual custom, it was then circulated for comment among the various members of the Cabinet. Normally, such matters are handled rather quickly, since each Secretary merely indicates that his particular department will not be affected (if that is the case), and, therefore, he has no comments. In this instance, all replies were received quite promptly, except that from the State Department. After several months had passed, Secretary Patterson, at my urging, requested that the matter be expedited, but it seemed extremely difficult to get any action out of the State Department. There appeared to be a concerted effort there to delay consideration of the draft. From what I know of the workings of that department at that time, I am sure that this procrastination was not due in any way to Secretary Byrnes. He had been a member of the Interim Committee and had been very much in favor of rapid action. With his long experience in government, he appreciated the extreme difficulties under which we would have to operate until the necessary legislation was passed.
We had at that time an operating force in excess of fifty thousand people, and our expenditures were running to about $100 million a month. As I have mentioned earlier, many important decisions remained to be made, and had to be made in accord with an established national policy. Yet with the ending of the war there was no national policy. The only” guidance that I could obtain was that I should continue to operate the project as I thought best. Such broad powers were justified during the war, but they were not, in my opinion, justified once the war was over, and particularly after months and months passed by.
Finally, Secretary Patterson secured the President’s consent to having the draft of the legislative proposals submitted to Congress. This draft was the so-called May-Johnson Bill. Hearings on it were held before the House Military Affairs Committee. Secretary Patterson and I appeared as witnesses, along with a number of other persons. The official views of the War Department, which were also the personal views of Secretary Patterson, General Marshall, General Eisenhower and myself, were set forth very clearly at that time. The record of what was said was clear and available for all to read. It left no question concerning our official position, our personal opinions or the fact that Secretary Patterson and I, individually, both felt that the War Department’s position was sound.2
Essentially, our position could be stated as follows: First, the responsibility for the development of atomic energy should not remain in the War Department; second, it was not sound to put anything like as much power as I had had and still possessed into the hands of one man; and third, I did not subscribe to the philosophy that it was all right to have it in my hands, but not in the hands of a successor. Moreover, we both strongly felt that partisan politics must be kept out of atomic energy. Our statements had to be worded diplomatically because of our country’s recent international political ventures, and because Mr. Patterson was a Republican Cabinet officer in a Democratic administration.
In spite of the record, since the very start of the postwar period there has been a continuous stream of propaganda calculated to lead the American people and the people of the world to believe that the War Department—and General Groves in particular—was determined to retain close control of atomic energy. The effect of this propaganda has been truly remarkable, despite the fact that it was entirely false, and was known to be false by those who first originated it and by many of those who constantly repeated it. It made no difference how many times they were corrected to their faces, often quite bluntly, or in writing; they continued to put the idea forward. Even today many of them keep up the sham and appear likely to do so as long as they live. In retrospect, this seems to have been one of the most perfect brain-washing operations in modern times, and it has been particularly effective among the better-educated Americans. Those who continued to spread it even after the facts were brought to their attention were obviously doing so deliberately with the intent of gaining political advantage from propaganda that they could not help but know was absolutely without foundation.
At the initial hearing, one point was definitely cleared up for the public. During the questioning, I was asked by Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce whether there was any truth to the rumor that the bomb could have been used much sooner, but that, for some obscure reason, President Roosevelt had not wished to have it used. Her questioning was very sharp and, as one would expect, very much to the point. I answered that the bomb was dropped as soon as it was available; that the first bomb which was tested at Alamogordo on July 16 was not ready until a few days before the actual test; and that up until that time we did not have a sufficient amount of plutonium or uranium with which to hold the test.
I also emphasized that we did not have enough fissionable material for the first bomb dropped on Japan until a few days before the actual operation; that, shipping the final portion by air, the bomb could not have been assembled and dropped prior to July 30; that I had informed the President through the Secretary of War that we would not be ready until the thirty-first of July; and that the Potsdam ultimatum had been issued on that basis. Therefore, the first time that the bomb could have been used without further reference to the President was July 31.1 also testified that the bomb was dropped on the first day after the thirty-first of July that the weather permitted. To answer categorically, there had been no avoidable delay whatever in using the bomb once the fissionable material was available.
The May-Johnson Bill provided for a board of nine commissioners who would oversee the nation’s atomic energy program in a manner similar to that followed by most boards of directors in large corporations. The duties of the commissioners would not have been so arduous as to require them to devote their time exclusively to atomic affairs. The Interim Committee felt, and I am sure they were right, that this would enable the President to obtain the services of the best available people—men such as Bush and Conant and the key executives of large chemical and utilities companies who would necessarily relinquish any conflicting private interests. Under this plan, the day-to-day business of the atomic program would be conducted by the general manager, who would be selected and supervised by the commission.
The only features of the bill that in any way permitted military participation in the proposed organization lay in the proviso, which I still feel was absolutely sound, that military officers, active or retired, should not be barred from service either as members of the Commission or as its general manager. There was, however, no requirement that there be any military representation on the Commission.
Although the bill was acted upon and passed promptly by the House, the Senate did not move so quickly. This was because some political opportunists took advantage of the fact that atomic energy cut across a number of committee responsibilities and hence did not definitely belong to any one committee. It was finally agreed that there should be a special committee appointed to consider the problem, and to recommend legislation. A dispute immediately arose over who should be the chairman of this committee. If it was an investigating committee without any power to act on legislation, then, in accordance with normal custom, it would be chaired by the member of the majority party who had introduced the resolution establishing the committee. This was Senator Brien McMahon, of Connecticut. If, on the other hand, it was to pass on the advisability of actual legislation, as was the case here, it should be chaired by the senior member of the majority party on the committee. This would not have been McMahon.
I have never been able to learn who it was on the White House staff that put the idea across that the chairman in this instance should be Senator McMahon, despite his lack of seniority. I have always doubted whether President Truman was particularly interested in which course was taken, but as a former member of the Senate and a wholehearted advocate of its dignity and protector of its customs, he would have naturally been inclined to follow custom.
When the Senate committee finally met, Secretary Patterson and I again explained the views of the War Department, which were unchanged.3 I urged prompt action on the grounds that it was not fair to me to have to make decisions that would determine the future of atomic energy for many years to come, without some guidance from the Congress regarding the course I should pursue. I also emphasized the difficulties I was having in holding our organization together in the face of its very uncertain future. Yet, despite our obvious need, the Senators were in no hurry to arrive at any decision.
The only reward for my efforts here came when one of the Senators, Mr. Byrd, I believe, stated that he would prefer to have me make as many of the controlling decisions as possible, since he thought that I could probably do it better than any newly appointed group unfamiliar with the background. He went on to add that as far as he was concerned it might be better for the United States just to leave the atomic energy program in my hands for all time to come. His idea that I should run it as I thought best was not objected to by any member of the committee, so I at least had a mandate, even though by default.
The May-Johnson Bill never got out of committee in the Senate. In its place, the McMahon Bill was offered allegedly as a means of ensuring that the development of atomic energy would not rest in military hands. After many vital changes in committee the McMahon Bill eventually passed both the Senate and the House and was enacted into law on July 31, 1946, almost a year after the war ended.
To make matters worse, the Commission provided for in the Act was not appointed promptly because President Truman was unable to secure the acceptance of his preferred choices for the chairmanship. In fact, it was not until immediately before the November Congressional elections that the commissioners were named, and it was not until January 1, 1947, that they actually took over their responsibilities for atomic affairs. This period, from July 31 to the end of 1946, was a most difficult one, for everyone knew that I was in a caretaker’s position, and they had no assurance that my views would be those of the Commission. After the commissioners were finally appointed, it was quite evident that my views would not be accepted without a long-drawn-out delay.
The Atomic Energy Act, as it was finally passed, contained only a few provisions that I would have preferred to see written differently. One of its shortcomings was its failure to provide that active military officers could serve either as commissioners or as the general manager. (Of the five general managers to date, three, Major General K. D. Nichols and Brigadier General K. E. Fields of the Army and Major General A. R. Luedecke of the Air Force, have been military officers, who have had to retire from active service to accept the post for which the commissioners, of their own volition, selected them. This has removed from the active list three extremely capable, vigorous officers. Particularly with the experience gained as general managers they would have been invaluable to the military establishment.) The most vital of its defects, however, was its basic concept that the Commission act as an executive body with all commissioners holding equal powers. Although the chairman acts as the spokesman of the Commission, what he says must reflect the views of the Commission, and for some years the other commissioners were normally present at any meeting with the President. During the chairmanships of Lewis Strauss and John McCone, this was not the practice. Their terms coincided with the presidency of General Eisenhower, who always looked to the chairman rather than to the group. Even so, I have always understood that while these chairmen have expressed the views of the majority they have at the same time informed the President of any strong minority views.
As I pointed out to the Senate committee, ever since the failure of the tribunes of Rome no executive group has ever functioned well. I very much preferred—in fact, I thought it was essential—that the Commission should function as a board of directors with the general manager as the chief executive. I would not have objected if the chairman of the Commission had also been its general manager, although I thought it better to keep the two jobs separate. I said that in my opinion the only executive actions to be taken directly by the Commission, without going through the general manager, should be those which involved grants of government funds except where the grants were in payment for services rendered, and the establishment of regulations that would affect the rights of American citizens. The former would include such matters as scholarships and fellowships, and special grants to institutions for basic research where specific results were not required. The latter would include such matters as rules limiting the possession of radioactive material. These, I felt, should not be under the control of a single individual.
Of the original members of the Commission, two, Sumner Pike and William W. Waymack, had no background whatever in atomic matters. Robert F. Bacher had been connected with Los Alamos since early 1943, and was completely familiar with our work there. He was a nuclear physicist of ability and understood the scientific problems involved in the preparation processes. Lewis Strauss had come into contact with atomic theories in the early days before the war and was deeply interested in scientific matters generally. Although not a physicist, he was familiar with a great many of our problems. He had also had a wide experience in international affairs and in banking, and had served as a special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy during the war, and as such had become slightly involved in atomic matters in 1945. David E. Lilienthal had been exposed briefly to the problems of atomic energy while a member of the panel of consultants to the Acheson Committee. He had had the advantage of seeing many of our installations and of talking to many of the scientific personnel. He had also been chairman of the TVA for a number of years, and was thoroughly accustomed in the management of government operations.
When the Commission was appointed, the members asked for a meeting with the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff and me, to discuss the turnover of the Manhattan Project. They made a point of asking that they not be required to take over their responsibilities until the first of January. This was contrary to the law, and to all normal procedures. It made my own position particularly difficult, for I was no longer simply a caretaker awaiting a final decision—I was a caretaker who could make no major decisions during a period when major decisions were vital.
In view of the commissioners’ request, however, I agreed to remain in charge of the project. During the interim period, I placed at their disposal every assistance that the Manhattan District could render, and particularly urged them to make full use of Colonel Nichols. Furthermore, I told them that I would always be available to consult with or to advise them on any matters that might arise, whenever it was mutually convenient, and it would always be convenient for me. To my surprise, they took almost no advantage of this offer.
It was quite evident, and Secretary Patterson commented on it after the meeting, that some of the commissioners were definitely hostile to me, though why I did not know. This was unfortunate, but it did not deter me from giving them all the co-operation I could insofar as they would permit it. Throughout this period, I encouraged the people working in the Manhattan Project to remain with the Commission, at least for a reasonable length of time. I thought a continuity of personnel was essential to the best interests of the United States, since only these people could give the commissioners an adequate picture of the past. Moreover, they could provide invaluable assistance in the initial operations of the Commission, particularly until its members had time to gain an adequate comprehension of the problems they faced. (Many of these people are still with the Commission fifteen years and five chairmen later.)
One point on which I took a particularly strong position was the matter of security clearances. I considered this so important that I put my opinion into writing and when my original letter to the Commission appeared to be misunderstood, I reinforced it with another.
In this, I pointed out that the fact that certain people in the Manhattan Project had been cleared for employment should in no way be considered the sole basis for granting them clearance under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act.
Prior to this Act, the clearance of people on the project was subject only to my judgment of whether their employment would be in the best interests of the United States. No other criteria existed. After the passage of the Atomic Energy Act, however, this criterion went out the window, for the Act was quite specific concerning clearance limitations. I wanted to emphasize the differences in procedure both to protect the commissioners and to put the War Department’s position on record.
One very troublesome matter arose during the turnover when the Commission asked to have a formal inventory and transfer of property. I pointed out that the very magnitude of the project made this impossible, and that while I had no property responsibilities, the officers under me who did could not be expected to carry this responsibility for the months, and possibly even the years, it would take to make a complete check. As far as I was concerned, I was turning over to the Commission one Manhattan Engineer District, as is. This view was finally accepted simply because there was nothing else to do.
Shortly after the turnover to the Atomic Energy Commission, I was designated to organize the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP). This job had its genesis in a conversation I had had with Secretary Patterson following the passage of the Atomic Energy Act, when I had told him I was most anxious to be relieved of all connection with the project as soon as the Commission could take over. He said then that he was concerned about how the War Department would be able to fulfill its responsibilities resulting from the development of atomic weapons, and sirged me to remain on active duty to handle the problems this would present. He added that if he had anything to say about it, he would insist on my staying on the job until I was retired for age, and then would ask to have me recalled to active duty for as long as I was physically and mentally able to be of assistance.
Since I had already spent about half of my military service in Washington, this was not an intriguing prospect, and I asked to be assigned elsewhere. It seemed to me that this was advisable both from the Commission’s point of view and from mine. It is never sound to have a former boss sitting on the sidelines observing the operations of his successor; it is an impossible situation for both. Although Patterson refused to approve my request for another assignment, I agreed to stay on long enough to help set up an organization within the department to handle the military operations that would be involved in atomic matters, but I said that once it was firmly established I would quite probably apply for retirement. (As it turned out, I remained in command of this organization until my retirement in 1948.)
I considered that my major responsibility with the AFSWP was to carry out Mr. Patterson’s directive that it be soundly organized and capably manned. It was a combined service organization in the truest sense. No artificial requirements were established for rank or branch of service. To be sure, I had two deputies, one from the Navy and one from the Air Force, but they were both men experienced in the Manhattan Project’s operations. Throughout the rest of the organization, there was no attempt made to balance the different services. Each man was placed where he was best qualified. This sometimes resulted in entire sections being made up of people from one service.
The organization was deliberately overstaffed for its responsibilities, because it was primarily a training unit and I considered it essential to indoctrinate as many officers as possible in the various problems involved in military uses of atomic energy. We even went so far as to have a special course of lectures for all officers, given by a distinguished atomic physicist, Dr. George Gamow, from George Washington University. This was given during duty hours and attendance was compulsory.
We also organized a unit at Sandia Base near Albuquerque. Here groups of carefully selected young officers and senior noncommissioned officers were trained in the details of atomic bomb assembly and organized into teams thoroughly capable of doing the job under the kind of field conditions that had existed on Tinian. The unit was also responsible for procuring and developing the equipment the assembly teams would need in the field. Throughout, the aim was to give each man as much technical information as he could absorb. The whole purpose of the operation was to make absolutely certain that in case of war, or even the threat of war, the Defense Department would have at its instant disposal teams ready and trained to assemble atomic weapons.
1 Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, Chairman; George L. Harrison, James F. Byrnes, personal representative of the President; Ralph A. Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy; William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and president of The Carnegie Institution; Dr. Karl T. Compton, Office of Scientific Research and Development, and president of The Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, and president of Harvard University.
2 See Appendix IX, page 440.
3 See Appendix X, page 441.