September 17, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS
Subject: Release of Colonel L. R. Groves, C.E., for Special Assignment
Brehon Somervell
Lieutenant General
Commanding
Some of these instructions were never carried out because, as the work progressed, they no longer seemed appropriate. No working committee was ever established; and it proved impracticable to transfer all activities to the Tennessee site. Also, the information then available did not permit us to draw up bills of materials any more than we could arrive at realistic before-the-fact plans for the organization, construction, operation or security of the project. These were developed and put into effect as the work progressed, and while their more important phases were often discussed with the Military Policy Committee, they were never submitted to anyone for formal approval.
* The then code name for the atomic energy project.
The Metallurgical Project also had a number of activities at other sites. It was responsible in a very general way for overseeing certain metallurgical support we received from the Battelle Institute and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; for chemistry support from the University of California; for the very important metal work done by Dr. F. H. Spedding at the State University at Ames, Iowa, and later, but above all, for the operation of the Clinton laboratory at Oak Ridge and for the work of a special group later established at Hanford to provide scientific advice and counsel on the ground to du Pont.
Among the principal contributors to our efforts from the Metallurgical Project were Drs. Enrico Fermi, Eugene Wigner, James Franck, Glenn Seaborg, Samuel Allison and Joyce Stearns in Chicago; Martin D. Whitaker and R. L. Doan at Clinton; Frank H. Spedding at Ames; John Chipman at MIT; and Norman Hilberry at Hanford, who was the chief representative at that point.
By order of the President all government patent rights arising from any invention involving war developments were to be put in the custody of the Director of the OSRD. When I became responsible for the MED, Dr. Bush already had a patent section in his office under the direction of Captain R. A. Lavender, USN, Retired.*
It seemed best to me and it was agreeable to Bush to continue to have Lavender handle all of the MED patent work, under Bush’s general administration. At the same time, I was vitally concerned with the general patent policies, with security, and with the numerous patent field offices in the MED.
This resulted in Lavender’s having to report to and to satisfy both Bush and myself. As far as I ever knew, there was never the slightest conflict in this operation, because of Lavender’s capacity as an administrator and as a patent lawyer and because there was always complete agreement between Bush and me on patent policy, which remained essentially the same as that inherited from the previous OSRD operation.
The mission of the Patent Division was to make certain that the government’s interests were properly protected in inventions made as a result of research and development paid for by government funds. It also sought to secure the maximum control of patents vital to the use of atomic energy in the years to come, whether for peace or for war purposes.
The problem was complicated by the extreme security requirements and by the brand-new scientific theories involved. Lavender was faced with an almost complete lack of precedents for our type of invention in patent law. There was also the necessity for dealing with large companies, all of whom had developed quite rigid patent policies over the years.
In this brand-new field, there were no trained, qualified patent attorneys and there were also no precedents for any patent organization handling such a large number of inventions from so many different, highly technical sources.
The compartmentalization of activities within the MED added to the difficulties of the Patent Department, as did the attitude thoroughly ingrained in all personnel in the Manhattan Project that our primary purpose was to complete the development as quickly as possible. Compromises from the patent standpoint had to be made constantly.
One of the basic problems was the necessity for secrecy in the United States Patent Office. This was arranged by the Commissioner of Patents and worked satisfactorily throughout.
In all contracts the patent provisions were written with Lavender’s advice and approval. We also looked to him for interpretation after the contracts were in effect. Every contract, whether it was made with a university or an industrial organization, contained one of several standard patent clauses. Each required that any inventions made under the work called for under the contract be reported to the government. The government would then elect whether or not it would file applications for patents thereon.
Our patent problems fell into three general categories, and a different contract paragraph was used for each. These comprised: (A) Where the nature of the contract was such that any invention might be related directly to, or concern some phase of, the basic research and development of the project. Here the government retained exclusive rights. (B) Where the work related only indirectly to the project, but was related to a field of activity within the normal business of the contractor. Here, while the government retained full rights, the contractor retained a nonexclusive, royalty-free license. (C) Where the work was a mere refinement of work already completed by the contractor. Here the government retained the right for its own uses on all of the patents, but the contractor had a license and the sole right to grant sublicenses.
Usually a great deal of information was furnished by the government to the contractor and normally all rights in any inventions became the property of the government.
Because of the fact that a number of British and Canadian scientists and engineers visited various project sites and exchanged certain technical information with the American scientists and engineers, procedures were established to avoid any conflict and to protect the interest of the individual government concerned.
Some time after the Quebec Conference of 1943 it was determined that the exchange of invention information on the project would not come under the provisions of the patent interchange rules which were already in effect. The riling for patent protection in foreign countries was a serious problem. This was handled very carefully in order that we would not at some later date find ourselves severely handicapped by reason of patents filed by persons not under our control.
The magnitude of the patent problem is indicated by the fact that some 8,500 project technical reports had to be reviewed, over 6,000 notebooks examined and something like 5,600 inventions looked into.
Probably no man had a greater insight into the technical details of the entire project than Lavender and his chief deputy, Roland A. Anderson, for they examined all the detailed inventions made.
* As a Lieutenant Commander, Lavender was the radio operator on the NC-3, one of the three Navy seaplanes which attempted the first Atlantic crossing.
To define and evaluate the physical dangers that many of the people working in the project might be risking, and to find methods of prevention and treatment, we vastly expanded the program of medical research that had been going on ever since the United States became interested in atomic energy.*
The MED’s Medical Section was headed and organized by Colonel Stafford Warren, with Captain H. L. Friedel as his executive officer. Its duties were spelled out in a memorandum from Nichols to Warren, dated August 10, 1943. At that time Nichols made the Medical Section responsible for performing, contracting for, supervising and maintaining liaison with all medical research necessary to the project. In carrying out these responsibilities, the Medical Section was to utilize to the full the facilities of existing research agencies; care was to be taken to avoid unnecessary duplication of work.
The most urgent problem was to determine the toxicity of the materials we were using: primarily, uranium and plutonium compounds; the related heavy elements, such as radium, polonium and thorium; and certain accessory process materials, such as fluorine and beryllium. This required the study of the manner in which the materials might be introduced into the body, whether by ingestion, inhalation, skin absorption or in other ways.
There had to be a careful analysis of the nature of the biological changes that produced physiological, histopathological or biochemical evidences of damage. The nature of radiation injuries and the mechanisms by which they were produced had to be studied, since this provided the information upon which to base protective measures before and therapeutic treatment after exposure. The effectiveness of various ways to remove hazardous dust and reduce skin contact and to prevent ingestion and inhalation had to be measured. The effectiveness of ointments, chemicals and other protective measures had to be assessed. Treatments for acute and chronic poisoning had to be tested.
As we got more and more into the operating phases of the project, we came upon many additional and wholly unexpected dangers. In the electromagnetic and diffusion processes, for example, hazards were created by the concentration of the uranium and by the accessory materials. The reactors held even greater dangers from alpha, beta and gamma rays; from neutrons; from plutonium metal and its compounds; and from the various radioactive fissionable products resulting from the operation of the pile.
To provide adequate safeguards required intensive study of plant processes. Such measures included the clinical survey of all exposed personnel, the monitoring of hazards by special instruments and the analysis and investigation of graphite piles and other production equipment. Protective measures had to be taken to minimize the effects of any catastrophe that might occur; investigative and decontaminating equipment and techniques had to be developed; provisions had to be made for the treatment of possible casualties, and we could not overlook the possible contamination of supply systems, populated areas, or even agricultural land, both within our reservations and without.
The problems with which the Medical Section was confronted were considerably aggravated by the need for their resolution before work on many of our research programs could be undertaken. At its inception, the Industrial Medical Division had to deal not only with laboratories and plants which were wholly without precedent, but also with materials whose degrees of toxicity were virtually unknown.
Ionizing radiation in almost all instances produces no immediately observable biological effects. It was necessary, therefore, to take every precaution to avoid overexposure. These precautions had to be determined largely by careful assessment of the known effects of X-rays, radium and other radioactive elements employed in clinical treatment; and by some meager animal experiments. Later these were augmented by extensive animal experimentation performed under very careful controls. Once the tolerance was determined for each species tested, it was extrapolated to arrive at estimated permissible values for man. A large factor of safety was applied to the estimates before they were established for the employees on the project.
In the same way, permissible limits were established for each of the other possible hazards, always minimizing the risks by setting them on the side of safety. Some idea of the scope of the Medical Section’s work in this area can be gained from a realization that there were fifteen different contractors performing hazardous work in connection with the experimentation, development of processes, and actual operations of one phase of metal-shaping alone.
At Hanford the fumes and gases emitted by the pile and by the separation process exhausts were examined carefully to prevent any danger to the plant and its surrounding areas. A number of specially designed instruments placed in strategic locations in the vicinity of the installation were used to make continuous checks on the amount of radioactive gases in the air. Similar measures were taken at our other facilities. No concentrations above the permissible levels were ever detected during the period of MED’s operations.
The pile process contained a number of potential hazards, among which radiation was by far the greatest. A number of protective measures were taken, such as the use of special table coverings to guard against the contamination of work benches, the use of protective clothing and equipment, and the rotation of employees through places where high radiation levels might be encountered. The methods which we employed provided highly effective protection to those who worked on the pile processes.
Similar precautions were taken at the Clinton laboratory, as well as at various other operating plants throughout the District. In the gaseous diffusion process, all operating employees who could possibly become exposed were required to have special medical examinations in addition to the regular routine ones. These were to determine the physical condition of the worker before and after his employment, to make certain that he had not been adversely affected. And most important, they were to enable us to take prompt corrective measures at the first indication of trouble.
At the same time, we had to meet the rapidly growing demands for the more conventional medical and public health services. At Oak Ridge, for instance, we had to build a hospital because those in the surrounding communities could not possibly handle the load that we would impose on them. Starting out with a hospital of fifty beds, we wound up in the spring of 1945 with 310, plus a complete out-patient dispensary. Even at that, toward the end, we were overloaded and frequently had to put patients in the corridors. In addition, we had to provide dormitories and other facilities for the nurses and hospital workers.
For security reasons, the hospital was run on a closed staff basis under the leadership of a very able surgeon, Major Charles E. Rea. Only doctors regularly assigned to the hospital were permitted to care for patients. Industrial physicians employed by the various contractors at Oak Ridge were accorded courtesy privileges and occasionally acted as consultants.
We used civilian doctors at first to provide medical service at Oak Ridge, but in November and December of 1943, the entire medical staff, with the exception of one man who was not eligible, was commissioned in the Army Medical Corps. The advantage of this was that it made available to us all of the services of the Surgeon General of the Army, including the procurement of personnel and material. It also enabled us to use Medical Corps funds, as was proper in providing treatment for military personnel who were assigned to the project, made it easier to handle security problems and made it possible for us to retain those doctors who displayed exceptional professional ability. On the other hand, we never submitted any of the usually required reports that might in any way reveal the nature, scope or military importance of our work. All such reports were retained in the files of the MED Medical Section.
The number of doctors assigned to Oak Ridge rose to a high of fifty-two in July, 1946, when the number of nurses reached almost 150. The nurses were all civilian employees.
A dental program was instituted along with the medical program and was continually adjusted to meet the needs of the community. Here, civilians were used, since dentists were not too hard to find and since they would have no contact with classified material. The number of dentists at Oak Ridge increased from two at the start to twenty-nine by March, 1945, decreasing subsequently to twenty-five.
The local medical societies adjacent to Oak Ridge and to Hanford were most co-operative in every respect. They were always consulted whenever we instituted medical and dental services. By this means, we avoided many potential difficulties regarding the services offered and the fee schedules.
Our policies concerning medical fees, personnel and services had to be revised from time to time in the light of our experience and the evergrowing demand for them. At first only first-aid and emergency treatment was provided, but as the facilities grew, our medical services expanded with them. At Oak Ridge, a prepayment plan for medical care was instituted. The charge for a family membership was four dollars per month, which covered hospital, diagnostic and physician services.
Medical service at Hanford was tailored to meet the needs of the two distinct phases of the work at that site: construction and operations. During the construction phase, medical service was provided to meet the needs for a temporary community. This was in accordance with the normal du Pont policies, which were quite adequate for our purposes. Initially, only first-aid and emergency medical service was furnished, but it soon grew into a hospital with clinical service and an industrial medical section. At Richland, the requirements were somewhat different, involving as they did the needs of a permanent community.
To complete the medical services furnished at Oak Ridge, several civilian psychiatrists were employed. These gave such consultation and advice as were needed.
* This research was conducted at the Universities of Chicago, Rochester, Columbia, and also at the University of Washington, where the effects upon fish of acute and chronic exposure to radiation were investigated. Special projects were carried out at the Clinton laboratories in conjunction with the Monsanto Chemical Company’s work there, at Los Alamos and at Western Reserve.
Oak Ridge, or the Clinton Engineer Works, was located in Anderson and Roane counties in Tennessee. It consisted of industrial plants, their supporting facilities and the town of Oak Ridge. The installation occupied a rectangular-shaped Government Reservation, ninety-three square miles in area. Its workers were concentrated chiefly in Oak Ridge, which attained a peak population of about 75,000 during the summer of 1945. A maximum employment of 82,000 was reached in May, 1945. Thereafter both population and employment declined steadily until, by the end of 1946, they were down to 42,000 and 28,000 respectively.
In the course of our work, Oak Ridge grew to be Tennessee’s fifth city by population, and the Clinton Engineer Works became the second largest consumer of TVA power. The area’s motor transportation system was the largest in the Southeastern United States. Because it was a closed military area, we had to provide all the normal community, municipal and other government services.
The town’s architectural planning was handled entirely by Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, except for its utility systems, which were designed by Stone and Webster. Construction at the site began in February, 1943. Throughout the entire period, we had to limit our activities to meeting only essential requirements. The first phase of our planning program called for the construction of more than three thousand family quarters, several apartment buildings and dormitories and numerous trailer parks, along with all the community facilities. The second and third phases were carried out along similar lines, but on a far greater scale. Aside from keeping all design as simple as possible, the factors bearing most heavily on our planning were minimizing construction costs, and using noncritical materials and noncritical labor. We were always guided by the realization that the construction of the town was secondary to the construction of the plants. For this reason, the construction of the town was stretched out until April, 1944.
The first housing became ready in the summer of 1943. Initially the town was operated by government personnel. This was not satisfactory for a number of reasons, but particularly because it was certain to result in Nichols’ having to devote a great deal of personal attention to this operation, which, after all, was a side issue. It would also require the attention of many of his most competent people.
After considerable discussion and study, Nichols and I decided to bring in an outside managing operator and asked the Turner Construction Company to take over the job.
The scope of its responsibilities included the operation of the laundry and cafeterias; the transportation, water, sewage, electrical and heating systems; the nonmedical features of the hospitals; the schools; the public safety forces; and the housing, both of individual family types and dormitories. As I fully expected, the entire operation was well handled.
Naturally, there was never enough family housing, so assignments were based on quotas assigned to the major operating groups. House rentals and service rates were based on fair charges for utilities, service, maintenance and amortization. For the trailers, dormitories and hutments, the charges were based on fair rentals, giving due consideration to the interests of the project in obtaining desirable personnel. In general, commercial facilities at Oak Ridge were limited to those required to provide the daily necessities of the residents, without very much in the way of luxury items. They were grouped in neighborhood shopping centers and commercial areas.
The school system was based on a policy that the community should be provided with educational standards of high quality. The schools became a part of the Anderson County school system, but in order to maintain the standards we wanted, we supported the county in obtaining federal funds. Additional physical school facilities were provided from MED supplementary funds. By the end of 1946, when the population had decreased considerably, the school system included over 7,000 pupils, 285 teachers and the usual administrative assistants.
We also had to provide for the recreation and welfare of the inhabitants of Oak Ridge. These activities were generally handled through the Oak Ridge welfare organization, which was set up to be self-supporting. We provided motion picture theaters, soda fountains, snack bars, athletic fields and even a weekly newspaper. Religious activities were conducted in two Army-type chapels. Later, other buildings were made available for that purpose. Eventually, Oak Ridge possessed every service that might be found in any typical American community.*
To avoid too much monotony in the external appearance of the housing and to make it as acceptable as possible to its occupants, we originally employed nine different designs, all of which provided more or less equivalent units. Each of these provided for single-family units, except one which put four in the same building. They ranged in size from one to three bedrooms. Later, multifamily houses were built, and finally we went to prefabricated houses. These were all of different capacities. The prefabricated models ranged from one-bedroom through two- and three-bedroom units.
The hutment camp units housed five men each. They had been used elsewhere on other construction projects both in the United States and abroad and were generally considered quite successful. Two such camps were built, one for white and one for colored workers. A utility building for every group of twelve huts and each camp had its own cafeteria, recreation building, barbershop and other facilities.
There was also a trailer camp that accommodated nearly four thousand government-owned trailers, which had been transferred from other agencies, and 269 privately owned trailers. In addition to these, there were camps which were operated as part of the general facilities, as well as a number of camps established in the diffusion area for workers there.
In determining the type of roads to be used, we decided that adequate roads and streets had to be provided as a matter of prime necessity, but adequate should mean no more than usable. Eventually, these roads were improved, but only after considerable use had shown that their improvement was absolutely essential. Considering the amount of heavy construction traffic and heavy equipment on the roads and streets, it was not feasible to surface the crushed-stone roads and streets with a bituminous-wearing surface during the main part of the construction program. As time went on, we found it desirable to hard-surface wherever it was not too expensive. The same treatment was given to the walks, curbs and gutters.
During the spring and summer of 1945, after the completion of much of the construction, it became feasible to institute a large-scale paving program. All of the important area roads and Oak Ridge streets were surfaced with hot-laid asphaltic concrete paving or with an asphaltic surface treatment, depending upon traffic conditions. Our most serious road problems were in connection with the access roads, for the area was practically devoid of anything approaching adequate ones. It was not possible for various reasons to make any real improvement in that direction until 1944.
* Those responsible for planning Oak Ridge’s construction and operation were Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Blair, director of planning from August, 1942, to July, 1943; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas T. Crenshaw from July, 1943, to May, 1944; and Colonel John S. Hodgson, May, 1944, to January, 1946. Lieutenant Colonel Warren George made the initial preparations for constructing the central facilities in November, 1942, as Area Engineer, and later then served as chief of the Construction Division until the fall of 1943.
The entire electromagnetic plant was designed and constructed by Stone and Webster, who also co-operated in getting it into operation. Their personnel for development and construction were under the management of R. T. Branch, President; T. C. Williams and T. R. Thornberg, Project Managers; and F. C. Creedon, Resident Manager during the critical period from January 6, 1944, to January 31, 1945.
Tennessee Eastman was the operating contractor. Their key civilian personnel on the site included Dr. Frederick R. Conklin, Works Manager; Dr. James G. McNally, Assistant Works Manager in Charge of Production from April, 1943, to September, 1945; and Mr. James Ellis, Assistant Works Manager in Charge of Engineering from March 1, 1943, until February 1, 1945, by which time his work was finished and he was transferred to other duties in the Tennessee Eastman Corporation in Kings-port. Off site there were two key men, without whom the work could not have been accomplished, Dr. A. K. Chapman, Executive Vice President of the Eastman Kodak Co. and Mr. James C. White, the President of Tennessee Eastman.
Many other organizations contributed to the success of this plant. The Tennessee Valley Authority, besides supplying power for the project, gave much time and effort in aiding in the selection of the site and later in the solution of various electrical supply and transmission problems. The U.S. Employment Service was of great assistance in the recruitment of personnel for the plant. The U. S. Office of Education helped organize the training classes. The U.S. Bureau of Mines helped to solve gas and ceramic problems. The U.S. Bureau of Standards co-operated on analytical problems. The Selective Service co-operated with the District at all times to keep trained personnel available.
For the gaseous diffusion plant, research, development, design, engineering, procurement and over-all job progress direction was provided by the Kellex Corporation, a special subsidiary of the M. W. Kellogg Company. Kellex was headed by P. C. Keith; A. L. Baker was Project Manager and J. H. Arnold was Director of Research and Development. The J. A. Jones Construction Company, Inc., with its own forces and some sixty-four subcontractors, did all the construction required by the facilities in the process area. Here the key man was Edwin L. Jones. The major subcontractors were the Midwest Piping and Supply Company, the Poe Piping and Heating Company, the L. K. Comstock Electric Company and the Bryant Electric Company. In co-operation with William A. Pope Company, the A. S. Schulman Electric Company and the Combustion Engineering Company, Jones also built the power plant, the main feature of which was the unusual requirement of a number of different frequencies.
Union Carbide was the operating contractor. Its key personnel on the site included G. T. Felbeck, in general charge both on and off site, C. E. Center, the superintendent, and H. D. Kinsey, the plant manager. Off-site, there were three key men without whom we could not have been successful: James A. Rafferty, a vice president of Carbide, Lyman A. Bliss, a vice president of a subsidiary, and L. M. Currie, who directed the SAM laboratory for Carbide.
The H. K. Ferguson Company was responsible for the design, engineering, construction, procurement and operation for the thermal diffusion plant.
Written in April, 1943, to Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer:
DEAR ROBERT: This letter will serve to put in the record some of the things which we have discussed during the past week which have led to my decision not to accept a permanent connection with the Los Alamos project and to return to the Westinghouse Research Laboratories at East Pittsburgh.
First let me apologize for failure to emphasize the tentativeness of the situation in which I have been during the past month. This came about because I initially felt quite sure that I would decide to stay, and secondly because I thought that if the tentativeness were too much stressed it would interfere with my settling down and trying to be useful at once.
In trying to be clear about the reasons for the decision I suppose it boils down to this: With additional knowledge of detailed needs of the project I was unable to get a strong conviction that I am decidedly more useful to the war here than at Westinghouse. Since the change would entail considerable personal sacrifice, I do not feel justified in making it. I do not see how such a view could have been reached without my coming here to see the problem at first hand.
I am happy that you are generous enough to feel that I was of a little help during the first month. It will always be my hope to be able to help from a distance in any way that I can. There are many ways in which the technical resources with which Westinghouse could aid this project are as yet unexplored. Naturally, however, I will not take any initiative on this at home as being inconsistent with security policy. But if your people or others in related projects approach me with special needs I am sure that I will be in a better position to help because of the background I now possess.
There may be some point in making some general observations based on my brief experience. My own decision of course was weighted pretty heavily with personal factors which are not of general interest so I will skip them except insofar as they seem likely to be things that would also concern other people.
The thing which upsets me most is the extraordinarily close security policy. I do not feel qualified to question the wisdom of this since I am totally unaware of the extent of enemy espionage and sabotage activities. I only want to say that in my case I found that the extreme concern with security was morbidly depressing—especially the discussion about censoring mail and telephone calls, the possible militarization and complete isolation of the personnel from the outside world. I know that before long all such concerns would make me be so depressed as to be of little if any value. I think a great many of the other people are apt to be this way, otherwise I wouldn’t mention it.
An aspect of this policy for which I am completely at a loss to find justification is the tendency to isolate this group intellectually from the key members of the other units of the whole project. While I had heard that there were to be some restrictions, I can say that I was so shocked that I could hardly believe my ears when General Groves undertook to reprove us, though he did so with exquisite tact and courtesy, for a discussion which you had concerning an important technical question with A. H. Compton. To me the absence from the conference of such men as A. H. Compton, E. O. Lawrence, and H. C. Urey was an unfortunate thing but up to that time in your office last Monday I had put it down simply to their being too busy with other matters.
I feel so strongly that this policy puts you in the position of trying to do an extremely difficult job with three hands tied behind your back that I cannot accept the view that such internal compartmentalization of the larger project is proper. My disturbance was complicated with the feeling that I might sooner or later unintentionally violate such rules through failure to comprehend them fully. On my way through Chicago coming out here I had a friendly chat with A. H. Compton about the project at his nome which probably would be considered improper though if so I would say the scientific position of the project is hopeless.
To speak of something more on the positive side, I feel that the laboratory is extremely well-staffed on the basic physics side. You have several first-rate young experimentalists in Williams, Manley, and Wilson, who will do a splendid job in setting up the equipment and getting useful results from it. If to these can be added a couple of maturer experimentalists like Allison, and Bacher, in addition to McMillan, the success of this side of the project is assured. In the auxiliary fields like chemistry, with Kennedy and Segre, and metallurgy, with Cyril Smith, I do not think that you could have done better. The theoretical group is, of course, extremely brilliant. As you know the ordnance side is the weak spot and the one which will require some first-rate specialized mechanical engineering. This is one of the points at which I feel that Westinghouse might be of effective help on special problems.
The way the presence of such an excellent staff reacted on me was something like this: I found myself in a role analogous to that of a military man who would suddenly shift from the Air Force to submarines in the middle of a war. I saw that I would face a great task of learning a job while surrounded with people who understood it much better than I. At the same time, administratively, I would have to make decisions affecting their technical activities. Of course there are many minor matters that I could have handled as a stuffed shirt but I hope that that is not the best use of my abilities.
Now to get back again to less agreeable matters. I am worried about a situation which is not fully clear to me and perhaps is not as bad as my impression of it. I feel that an attempt is being made both by the Manhattan District and by the University of California to put too many restrictions on the activities of Dr. D. P. Mitchell. We have roomed together since he came up to the site and I know that he feels baffled and perplexed by some of the things confronting him. He is working with a high expenditure of nervous energy and I think that he should get more backing, otherwise an irreplaceable man may be lost. (Please let it be clear that these things are my own observations, put forth on my own responsibility, that he has in no way suggested that I take this up, that in fact, I am taking it up more as a laboratory problem than as Mitchell’s personal problem.)
In the first place Dana Mitchell is an absolutely unique individual in America. He is a good physicist. In addition he has been buying equipment and supplies for experimental research projects for some 15 years, including recent experience in setting up such service for several war research projects. Situated as we are in remote isolation the supply problem is unusually difficult. It is moreover extraordinarily difficult owing to war shortages. A man in Mitchell’s position needs to have complete authority, freedom of action, and responsibility within his field. A man of Mitchell’s experience and competence should be given it unhesitatingly. The only criticism of Mitchell I have ever heard is that it is said that he oversimplified his records and accounting procedures. I do not know whether this is true, in any case it is the kind of matter on which there is bound to be strong difference of opinion.
What I would strongly recommend in this connection is that Mitchell be given complete control over all procurement, that it be absolutely definite that the Los Angeles office is under him, that he have full authority and responsibility in procurement matters, that the contractor do no more than set up accountants who record what tie does, but that no person except yourself be in a position to question what he does.
Finally there is the matter of the working relations with the local military people. On the whole they have done remarkably well in getting the post started. But I feel that there is much room for improvement although some of the present fault lies on me for I did not carry on effectively a lot of detail which I would have done if not so preoccupied with my personal decision. The worst trouble seems to be a lack of close communications. I fully expect that this will remedy itself when Colonel Harman and his staff take up residence here and an effective town council is organized.
But there is also an unnecessary vagueness about many features of the town life with which the technical people are vitally concerned. The school situation is the most urgent. Many of the mothers are extremely anxious to know what is being done and how the schools are to be handled. These people come from good neighborhoods where there are good public schools. Many of them are more worried about the school here than anything else affecting their lives out of working hours. This matter gave me a great deal of personal concern and I know it is a factor that weighs heavily in Rabi’s mind in his probable decision not to come. This situation was not helped with me by the way in which General Groves replied to my questions with a short plea for no “frills” when none had been asked for, together with what I felt were rather vague assurances that everything “necessary” would be provided. There is an awful lot of room for disagreement about the interpretation of the two words in quotes.
As I have said, I am afraid that I have been at fault in not better organizing our relations with Colonel Harman’s staff. In consequence, his people have been pestered with many conflicting requests from different individuals of our group some of whom they did not know. On their side I believe they have not been entirely in the right since so many of his people have shown a tendency to be taciturn and uncommunicative so that our people find it difficult to learn what procedures they need to follow.
But these minor things are all of a kind that will work out in the next few months as people get acquainted. The school matter is much more critical. It will take decisive action very soon if a good school system is to be ready in the fall.
I hope this long tirade is of some help to you and that my association with the project adds up to something more positive than negative. With all best wishes for a complete and timely success in the solution of the primary problem of the project, and with the hope that I may be of some future help to you in it.
Sincerely,
(Signed) Ed Condon
(From testimony of Dr. Edward U. Condon before the Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives)
(July 18, 1945)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Subject: The Test
“The scene inside the shelter was dramatic beyond words. In and around the shelter were some twenty-odd people concerned with last-minute arrangements prior to firing the shot. Included were: Dr. Oppenheimer, the Director, who had borne the great scientific burden of developing the weapon from the raw materials made in Tennessee and Washington, and a dozen of his key assistants—Dr. Kistiakowsky, who had developed the highly special explosives; Dr. Bainbridge, who supervised all the detailed arrangements for the test; Dr. Hubbard, the weather expert, and several others. Besides these, there were a handful of soldiers, two or three Army officers and one Naval officer. The shelter was cluttered with a great variety of instruments and radios.
“For some hectic two hours preceding the blast, General Groves stayed with the Director, walking with him and steadying his tense excitement. Every time the Director would be about to explode because of some untoward happening, General Groves would take him off and walk with him in the rain, counseling with him and reassuring him that everything would be all right. At twenty minutes before zero hour, General Groves left for his station at the base camp, first, because it provided a better observation point, and second, because of our rule that he and I must not be together in situations where there is an element of danger, which existed at both points.
“Just after General Groves left, announcements began to be broadcast of the interval remaining before the blast. They were sent by radio to the other groups participating in and observing the test. As the time intervals grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The scientists felt that their figuring must be right and that the bomb had to go off but there was in everyone’s mind a strong measure of doubt. The feeling of many could be expressed by ‘Lord, I believe; help Thou mine unbelief.’ We were reaching into the unknown and we did not know what might come of it. It can be safely said that most of those present—Christian, Jew and atheist—were praying and praying harder than they had ever prayed before. If the shot were successful, it would be a justification of the several years of intensive effort of tens of thousands of people —statesmen, scientists, engineers, manufacturers, soldiers and many others in every walk of life.
“In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition. Dr. Oppenheimer, on whom had rested a very heavy burden, grew tenser as the last seconds ticked off. He scarcely breathed. He held on to a post to steady himself. For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and then when the announcer shouted ‘Now!’ and there came this tremendous burst of light followed shortly thereafter by the deep growling roar of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief. Several of the observers standing back of the shelter to watch the lighting effects were knocked flat by the blast.
“The tension in the room let up and all started congratulating each other. Everyone sensed, This is it!’ No matter what might happen now, all knew that the impossible scientific job had been done. Atomic fission would no longer be hidden in the cloisters of the theoretical physicists’ dreams. It was almost full grown at birth. It was a new force to be used for good or for evil. There was a feeling in that shelter that those concerned with its nativity should dedicate their lives to the mission that it would always be used for good and never for evil.
“Dr. Kistiakowsky, the impulsive Russian [interpolation by Groves at this point: ‘an American and Harvard professor for many years’], threw his arms around Dr. Oppenheimer and embraced him with shouts of glee. Others were equally enthusiastic. All the pent-up emotions were released in those few minutes and all seemed to sense immediately that the explosion had far exceeded the most optimistic expectations and wildest hopes of the scientists. All seemed to feel that they had been present at the birth of a new age—The Age of Atomic Energy—and felt their profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history.
“As to the present war, there was a feeling that no matter what else might happen, we now had the means to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives. As to the future, there had been brought into being something big and something new that would prove to be immeasurably more important than the discovery of electricity or any of the other great discoveries which have so affected our existence.
’The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explosion came, first, the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty. Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized.”
(End of General Farrell’s account)
After about an hour’s sleep I got up at 0100 and from that time on until about five I was with Dr. Oppenheimer constantly. Naturally he was very nervous, although his mind was working at its usual extraordinary efficiency. I devoted my entire attention to shielding him from the excited and generally faulty advice of his assistants, who were more than disturbed by their excitement and the uncertain weather conditions. By 0330 we decided that we could probably fire at 0530. By 0400 the rain had stopped but the sky was heavily overcast. Our decision became firmer as time went on. During most of these hours the two of us journeyed from the control house out into the darkness to look at the stars and to assure each other that the one or two visible stars were becoming brighter. At 0510 I left Dr. Oppenheimer and returned to the main observation point which was 17,000 yards from the point of explosion. In accordance with our orders, I found all personnel not otherwise occupied massed on a bit of high ground.
At about two minutes of the scheduled firing time all persons lay face down with their feet pointing toward the explosion. As the remaining time was called from the loudspeaker from the 10,000-yard control station there was complete silence. Dr. Conant said he had never imagined seconds could be so long. Most of the individuals in accordance with orders shielded their eyes in one way or another. There was then this burst of light of a brilliance beyond any comparison. We all rolled over and looked through dark glasses at the ball of fire. About forty seconds later came the shock wave followed by the sound, neither of which seemed startling after our complete astonishment at the extraordinary lighting intensity. Dr. Conant reached over and we shook hands in mutual congratulations. Dr. Bush, who was on the other side of me, did likewise. The. feeling of the entire assembly was similar to that described by General Farrell, with even the uninitiated feeling profound awe. Drs. Conant and Bush and myself were struck by an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying-on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niagara Falls on his tightrope, only to me this tightrope had lasted for almost three years, and of my repeated, confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we would do it.
“There was a blinding flash of light that lighted the entire northwestern sky. In the center of the flash, there appeared to be a huge billow of smoke. The original flash lasted approximately ten to fifteen seconds. As the first died down, there arose in the approximate center of where the original flash had occurred an enormous ball of what appeared to be fire and closely resembled a rising sun that was three-fourths above a mountain. The ball of fire lasted approximately fifteen seconds, then died down and the sky resumed an almost normal appearance.
“Almost immediately, a third, but much smaller, flash and billow of smoke of a whitish-orange color appeared in the sky, again lighting the sky for approximately four seconds. At the time of the original flash, the field was lighted well enough so that a newspaper could easily have been read. The second and third flashes were of much lesser intensity.
“We were in a glass-enclosed control tower some seventy feet above the ground and felt no concussion or air compression. There was no noticeable earth tremor although reports overheard at the Field during the following twenty-four hours indicated that some believed that they had both heard the explosion and felt some earth tremor.”
L. R. Groves
Two pertinent paragraphs from the opening statement by Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, on October 9, 1945:
The War Department has taken the initiative in proposing that it be divested of the great authority that goes with the control of atomic energy, because it recognizes that the problems we now face go far beyond the purely military sphere.
The atomic bomb is the most devastating weapon we know, but the means of releasing atomic energy which it employs may prove to be the greatest boon to mankind in the world’s history. The wisest minds in our Nation will be required to administer this discovery for the benefit of all of us.
Opening paragraphs in statement by Major General Leslie R. Groves to the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, on October 9, 1945:
In coming before your committee today we are appealing for an opportunity to give you our existing powers. In the interest of the war effort, there was delivered into our care the responsibility for directing all activities relating to the release and use of atomic energy.
We have discharged that responsibility to the best of our ability. Thanks to the brilliant and selfless efforts of the thousands of scientists, engineers, industrialists, workers and Army and Navy officers associated with the project, and to the wise counsel of Secretary Stimson and his advisers and the members of the Military Policy Committee, our work achieved its purpose. It helped to shorten the war and to save the lives of American and Allied righting men.
But the individual responsibility that was desirable in wartime should not be continued today. The hopes and fears of all mankind are so inextricably bound up with the future development of atomic energy, and the problems requiring immediate solution are so fundamental that control should be vested in the most representative and able body our democratic society is capable of organizing.
The bill you are considering today is intended to create such a body.
It would establish a commission of nine distinguished citizens, with a revolving membership to guard against political domination or the development within the commission of frozen attitudes that would act as a brake on experimentation and new ideas.
Within the limits of general policy, as defined by Congress, and of appropriations, as authorized by Congress, the commission would have broad power to conduct or supervise all research and manufacturing activities relating to the use of atomic energy for military or civilian purposes; to control the raw materials from which atomic energy may be derived and to provide for the security of information and property connected with the release of atomic energy. It is also the aim of this legislation that the commission capitalize on the initiative and ingenuity of American science and American industry by giving as much freedom and encouragement to private research and private enterprise in this field as it is possible to give consistent with the requirement of American security.
The success of the Manhattan District Project would have been impossible without the support it received from colleges and universities, from large and small industrial corporations, and from the skill of American labor.
Opening statement of Major General Leslie R. Groves to the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, United States Senate, on November 28, 1945:
It is essential, in the highest national interest, that further development in the field of atomic energy be pursued under controls which will preclude the utilization of atomic energy in a way which would imperil the national safety or endanger world peace. Future activity in this field is so important to the national welfare, and potentially to the enrichment of our living, that control should be exercised by a special commission independent of any existing Government agency with the sole duty of supervising and controlling the development of atomic energy. The commission should have complete authority over all activities in the field, subject only to the approval of Congress and the President. The commission should be composed of persons of recognized ability whose actions would be unquestionably in the public interest. Broad discretionary powers and adequate funds are essential to its success.
The War Department will always have a vital interest in the use of atomic energy for military purposes. In the field of practical administration and operation, the Army can furnish invaluable assistance. Civilian and military personnel who have acquired knowledge and experience on the project should continue to serve to the extent that their services are useful. The commission should be in complete control of policy and should exercise general direction and supervision of all activities.
Because of the current uncertainty, we are daily losing key people whose services should be retained. Until that uncertainty is resolved by the establishment of a national policy, we are not in a position to offer acceptable commitments to these key people. Prolonged delay will result in appreciable loss of the present efficiency of the vast combination of plants, scientific talent, and engineering skill.
We must recognize the clear distinction between domestic control and international control. The two can and should logically be separated. Domestic control is necessary no matter what international policy may be eventually worked out for the United States and the world. It is necessary to protect America’s tremendous investment in atomic research and development and to insure that this development will go steadily forward.
Extracts from the statement by Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to the Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy, February 14, 1946:
Long before the bombs were dropped it was realized that there were unmeasured possibilities in the development of atomic energy for industrial and other peacetime purposes as well as for use as a war weapon. In May 1945 Secretary Stimson, with the approval of the President, formed a committee to consider the subject and to recommend legislation for the control and development of atomic energy. The committee consisted of Secretary Stimson; James F. Byrnes (prior to his appointment as Secretary of State); Will Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State; Ralph Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy; George Harrison, president of the New York Life Insurance Co. and special assistant to the Secretary of War; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the Office of Scientific Research and Development; Dr. Karl Compton, president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Dr. James Conant, president of Harvard University.
I know of no committee appointed during wartime or thereafter that had higher talent than that committee. The committee had the assistance of a scientific panel composed of four of the leading scientists in the project, Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, Dr. E. O. Lawrence, Dr. A. H. Compton, and Dr. Enrico Fermi. Legislation was drafted under direction of this committee and with the cooperation of the State Department, Interior Department, and Department of Justice, the bill being later introduced as the May-Johnson bill.
Senator AUSTIN. These names given in this paragraph of your statement really represent the authors of the May-Johnson bill?
Secretary Patterson. Yes, sir. The draftsmanship was done under their direction. I think the actual draftsmen were Captain Davis, who is sitting here, who had a hand in it, and Mr. Marbury, a Baltimore lawyer who was then in the employ of the War Department, and Under Secretary Royall, who was then a brigadier general.
I will not at this time go into the details of the May-Johnson bill. The objectives, fully stated in the bill, are to promote the national welfare, to secure the national defense, to safeguard world peace, and to foster the acquisition of further knowledge concerning atomic energy. Responsibility was transferred from the War Department to a new civilian agency, to be known as the Atomic Energy Commission, to take over and manage all source materials of atomic energy, all stock piles of materials, and all plants and property connected with development and use of atomic energy. Full ownership and control are vested in the United States. It is provided that the Commission interfere as little as possible with private research, and employ other governmental agencies, educational and research institutions, and private enterprise to the maximum extent. The Commission is given power to adopt the necessary security regulations to control the collection, publication, and transmission of information on release of atomic energy, as required by considerations of national defense or military security.
The House Military Affairs Committee held hearings on the bill. It was freely criticized as a measure drafted by the military and intended to perpetuate military control of atomic energy, although the true facts are that it was drafted by the committee of civilians named above, or under their supervision, and that it provides for transfer of responsibility from the War Department to a civilian agency. The House committee, after adding several amendments including those further emphasizing freedom of research and investigation, reported the bill favorably.
I should add that the President, since introduction of the May-Johnson bill, has indicated that he is of the opinion that a number of changes should be made in it. The War Department will, of course, advocate such changes in discussion of any detailed legislation.