Early on in the writing of this I decided to rely on the ancient writers as much as possible. But as mentioned in the introduction, what I bring to the study of Roman strategy is expertise in military affairs and strategic studies. It is therefore vital to temper what I was reading in the ancient texts with the scholarly interpretations and context of dedicated scholars of Roman history. This is particularly true with texts such as the Historia Augusta, which appears to weave a fair amount of fiction in with historical fact. Still, if one wants to comprehend Roman policies and actions as the Romans understood them, then reading the ancient sources is a must. Moreover, although modern historians have mined these sources for generations, few have employed them to shed light on Roman strategy. For those seeking to dig deeper into Roman strategic thinking, then, the ancient texts still have much to reveal. Moreover, almost all of these texts are translated into English and available online.
The crucial sources for the Empire’s first century remain Tacitus (Agricola, Germania, the Histories, and the Annals), Suetonius (The Twelve Caesars), and Dio Cassius (Roman History, much of it in fragments). From the start of the second century until the Crisis of the Third Century historians still look to the often untrustworthy Historia Augusta (multiple unknown writers), and the somewhat more accurate Herodian (Roman History) covering from the reign of Marcus Aurelius to the start of reign of Gordian III.
When examining the period between the accession of Nerva to the Battle of Adrianople, Ammianus Marcellinus (Res Gestae) remains the foundational source. Ammianus’s history is supplemented by the remaining works of Aurelius Victor, Eutropius, and Festus. Zosimus (New History) is also crucial for the period of 238 until the start of the final crisis in 410, as he employs ancient histories that are available only in fragments today, including those of Dexippus, Eunapius, and Olympiodorus.
Any study of Roman strategy should start with the first work to specifically address the topic, Edward Luttwak’s Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, followed by the works that are most employed by those taking a contrary view to Luttwak: C. R. Whittaker’s Frontiers of the Roman Empire, Benjamin Isaac’s The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East, and Susan Mattern’s Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate. These works can be immensely supplemented by Fergus Millar’s magisterial three volumes, Rome, The Greek World, and The East. It is of course impossible to understand how the Roman Empire was held together without grasping how its military power was organized and employed. The following books were instrumental in informing this work: Paul Erdkamp’s The Companion to the Roman Army; Brian Campbell’s War and Imperial Society and The Roman Army: 31 B.C.–A.D. 337; David J. Breeze’s The Frontiers of Imperial Rome; Lawrence Keppie’s The Making of the Roman Army: From the Republic to the Empire; Graham Webster and Hugh Elton’s The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries A.D.; A. D. Lee’s Warfare in the Roman World and Warfare in Late Antiquity; Adrian Goldsworthy’s Roman Warfare and The Complete Roman Army; and Hugh Elton’s Warfare in Roman Europe, AD 350–425 and Frontiers of the Roman Empire. Those looking for more information on the role of the Roman fleets can reference Michael Pitassi’s The Roman Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare, 350 BC–AD 475; William L. Rodgers’s Naval Warfare under Oars, 4th to 16th Centuries: A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design; and Chester G. Starr’s The Roman Imperial Navy, 31 B.C.–A.D. 324.
This book has made a point of emphasizing the vital importance of Rome’s economy as the foundation of its power. In recent decades there has been an outpouring of publications on various facets of ancient economies, building on the earlier works of M. Rostovtzeff, M. I. Finley, and A. H. M. Jones. Among the many books consulted for this work, readers will profit from Philip Kay’s Rome’s Economic Revolution; Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris, and Richard P. Sallers’s The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World; Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Reden’s The Ancient Economy; and J. G. Manning and Ian Morris’s excellent The Ancient Economy: Evidence and Models. Finally, see Richard Duncan-Jones’s The Economy of the Roman Empire: Quantitative Studies and Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy.
A narrative explanation of Roman strategy cannot be written without referencing the works of other historians of the period. But for anyone with an interest in the history of Rome, the Cambridge Ancient Histories (vols. 10–14) are an unsurpassed resource and should be the starting point for any serious examination of the period. In addition to the Cambridge volumes, the works that most informed this book are Ronald Syme’s The Roman Revolution; David S. Potter’s A Companion to the Roman Empire and The Roman Empire at Bay, AD 180–395; Michael Kulikowski’s The Triumph of Empire and The Tragedy of Empire; Beate Dignas and Engelbert Winter’s Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity: Neighbours and Rivals; Kyle Harper’s The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire; A. D. Lee’s From Rome to Byzantium, AD 363 to 565: The Transformation of Ancient Rome; Peter Heather’s The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians and Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe; and John F. Drinkwater’s The Alamanni and Rome, 213–496: Caracalla to Clovis.