1. See, for example, R. Hastie and R. M. Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World: The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2010), pp. 17-19; K. M. Galotti, Making Decisions That Matter: How People Face Important Life Choices (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2002), pp. 3-4; and S. Williams, Making Better Business Decisions (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), 5-15.
2. See H. A. Simon, “Rationality in Psychology and Economics,” Journal of Business, October 1986, pp. 209-24; G. Harman, “Rationality,” in D. N. Osherson (ed.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science: Thinking, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 175-211; and F. Eisenfuhr, M. Weber, and T. Langer, Rational Decision Making (New York: Springer, 2010).
3. See E. F. Harrison, The Managerial Decision-Making Process, 5th ed. (Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning, 1999), pp. 2-7.
1. “Statistics Show You Are NOT Going to Be Killed by Terrorism,” washingtonsblog.com; April 28, 2013. See also D. Gardner, Risk: The Science and Politics of Fear (London: Virgin Books, 2009).
2. E. Shafir and R. A. LeBoeuf, “Rationality,” in S. T. Fiske, D. L. Schacter, and C. Zahn-Waxler (eds.), Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 53 (Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, 2002), pp. 491-517.
3. J. G. March, A Primer on Decision Making (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 2-7; and D. Hardman and C. Harries, “How Rational Are We?” Psychologist, February 2002, pp. 76-79.
4. This section is based on R. J. Meyer and J. Wesley Hutchinson, “Bumbling Geniuses: The Power of Everyday Reasoning in Multistage Decision Making,” in S. J. Hoch and H. C. Kunreuther (eds.), Wharton on Making Decisions (New York: Wiley, 2001), pp. 50-51; and H. A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1976).
1. This instrument is adapted, with permission, from S. G. Scott and R. A. Bruce, “Decision-Making Style: The Development and Assessment of a New Measure,” Educational and Psychological Measurement, October 1995, pp. 818-31. For additional support, see R. Loo, “A Psychometric Evaluation of the General Decision-Making Style Inventory,” Personality and Individual Differences, November 2000, pp. 895-905.
2. For a discussion of various decision-style questionnaires, see Y. Leykin and R. J. DeRubeis, “Decision-Making Styles and Depressive Symptomatology: Development of the Decision Styles Questionnaire,” Judgment and Decision Making, December 2010, pp. 506-15.
3. See, for instance, J. C. Henderson and P. C. Nutt, “The Influence of Decision Style on Decision Making Behavior,” Management Science, April 1980, pp. 371-86; and D. Keirsey, Please Understand Me II (Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1998).
1. Adapted, with permission, from N. Kogan and M. A. Wallach, Risk Taking: A Study in Cognition and Personality (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 256-61.
1. This instrument was created exclusively for this book by Stephen P. Robbins.
2. A. M. Parker, W. B. Bruin, and B. Fischhoff, “Maximizers Versus Satisficers: Decision-Making Styles, Competence, and Outcomes,” Judgment and Decision Making, December 2007, pp. 342-50; and A. Roets, B. Schwartz, and Y. Guan, “The Tyanny of Choice: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Maximizing-Satisficing Effects on Well-Being,” Judgment and Decision Making, November 2012, pp. 689-704.
1. This instrument was created exclusively for this book by Stephen P. Robbins.
2. J. B. Rotter, “Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement,” Psychological Monographs, 80, no. 609 (1966); T. W. H. Ng, K. L. Sorensen, and L. T. Eby, “Locus of Control at Work: A Meta-Analysis,” Journal of Organizational Behavior, December 2006, pp. 1057-87.
1. This instrument was created exclusively for this book by Stephen P. Robbins.
2. N. Milgram and R. Tenne, “Personality Correlates of Decisional and Task Avoidant Procrastination,” European Journal of Personality, March-April 2000, p. 141.
3. See, for instance, A. H. C. Chu and J. N. Choi, “Rethinking Procrastination: Positive Effects of ‘Active’ Procrastination Behavior on Attitudes and Performance,” The Journal of Social Psychology, June 2005, pp. 245-64.
1. Based on E. S. Barratt, “Impulsiveness Subtraits: Arousal and Information Processing,” in J. T. Spence and C. E. Izard (eds.), Motivation, Emotion, and Personality (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1985), pp. 137-46; and J. H. Patton, M. S. Stanford, and E. S. Barratt, “Factor Structure of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale,” Journal of Clinical Psychology, November 1995, pp. 768-74. Reprinted with permission.
2. J. H. Patton, M. S. Stanford, and E. S. Barratt, “Factor Structure of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale.”
3. Ibid.
1. Based on M. Watson and S. Greer, “Development of a Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Control,” Journal of Psychosomatic Research, vol. 27, no. 4, 1983, pp. 299-305. Reprinted with permission.
1. Adapted from J. E. Russo and P. J. H. Schoemaker, Winning Decisions: Getting It Right the First Time (New York: Doubleday, 2002), p. 80. Reprinted with permission.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 78.
1. S. Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw Hill, 1993), p. 217.
2. S. Highhouse, “Judgment and Decision-Making Research: Relevance to Industrial and Organizational Psychology,” in N. Anderson, et al. (eds.), Handbook of Industrial, Work & Organizational Psychology, vol. 2 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001), p. 320.
3. S. Lichtenstein and B. Fischhoff, “Do Those Who Know More Also Know More About How Much They Know?” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, December 1977, pp. 159-83.
4. B. Fischhoff, P. Slovic, and S. Lichtenstein, “Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, November 1977, pp. 552-64.
5. Cited in College Board Student Descriptive Questionnaire, 1976-77. Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service.
6. R. J. Burke, “Why Performance Appraisal Systems Fail,” Personnel Administration, June 1972, pp. 32-40.
7. See, for instance, N. D. Weinstein, “Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, November 1980, pp. 806-20; and “Economic Predictions: Personal Future Seems Brightest,” Psychology Today, October 1989, p. 16.
8. K. Agrawal, “A Conceptual Framework of Behavioral Biases in Finance,” IUP Journal of Behavioral Finance, March 2012, pp. 7-18.
9. M. H. Bazerman, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making, 5th ed. (New York: Wiley, 2002), p. 100.
10. S. Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, p. 230.
11. J. Kruger and D. Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, November 1999, pp. 1121-34.
12. B. Fischhoff, P. Slovic, and S. Lichtenstein, “Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence.”
13. These conclusions were based on J. E. Russo and P. J. H. Schoemaker, “Managing Overconfidence,” Sloan Management Review, Winter 1992, pp. 11-12; and D. M. Messick and M. H. Bazerman, “Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision Making,” Sloan Management Review, Winter 1996, pp. 17-19.
14. A. Koriat, S. Lichtenstein, and B. Fischhoff, “Reasons for Confidence,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, March 1980, pp. 107-18; and J. E. Russo and P. J. H. Schoemaker, “Managing Overconfidence,” pp. 12-14.
15. “Zero-Defect Decision Making,” INC., March 2002, p. 117.
16. A. Caputo, “A Literature Review of Cognitive Biases in Negotiation Processes,” International Journal of Conflict Management, vol. 24, no. 4, 2013, pp. 374-98.
1. N. Milgram and R. Tenne, “Personality Correlates of Decisional and Task Avoidant Procrastination,” European Journal of Personality, March-April 2000, p. 141.
2. D. Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), p. 5.
3. J. R. Ferrari, J. J. Johnson, and W. C. McCown, Procrastination and Task Avoidance: Theory, Research, and Treatment (New York: Plenum, 1995), p. 220.
4. See, for instance, G. Beswick, E. D. Rothblum, and L. Mann, “Psychological Antecedents of Student Procrastination,” Australian Psychologist, July 1988, pp. 207-17; and J. R. Ferrari and J. F. Dovidio, “Examining Behavioral Processes in Indecision: Decisional Procrastination and Decision-Making Style,” Journal of Research in Personality, March 2000, pp. 127-37.
5. See I. L. Janis and L. Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977); and A. Tversky and E. Shafir, “Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decision,” Psychological Science, November 1992, pp. 358-61.
6. A. Tversky and E. Shafir, “Choice Under Conflict,” p. 358.
7. Ibid.
8. See O. E. Tykocinski, T. S. Pittman, and E. E. Tuttle, “Inaction Inertia: Foregoing Future Benefits as a Result of an Initial Failure to Act,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, May 1995, p. 794.
9. N. Milgram and R. Tenne, “Personality Correlates of Decisional and Task Avoidant Procrastination,” p. 142.
10. D. Ariely and K. Wertenbroch, “Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment,” Psychological Science, May 2002, pp. 219-24.
11. B. O’Neill, “Overcoming Inertia: Do Automated Saving and Investing Strategies Work?” Journal of Family and Economic Issues, June 2007, pp. 321-35.
1. D. P. Ray and Y. Ghahremani, “Credit Card Statistics, Industry Facts, Debt Statistics,” creditcards.com; January 2014.
2. Ibid.
3. See, for instance, T. O’Donoghue and M. Rabin, “The Economics of Immediate Gratification,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, April/June 2000, pp. 233-50.
4. D. Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (New York: Bantam, 1995).
5. See, for instance, W. Mischel, E. B. Ebbesen, and A. R. Zeiss, “Cognitive and Attentional Mechanisms in Delay of Gratification,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, February 1972, pp. 204-18.
1. See, for instance, A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science, September 1974, pp. 1124-31.
2. J. S. Hammond, R. L. Keeney, and H. Raiffa, Smart Choices (Boston: HBS Press, 1999), p. 191.
3. R. Hastie, D. A. Schkade, and J. W. Payne, “Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests and Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damage Awards,” Law and Human Behavior, August 1999, pp. 445-70.
4. G. B. Northcraft and M. A. Neale, “Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, February 1987, pp. 84-97.
5. T. Mussweiler and F. Strack, “Considering the Impossible: Explaining the Effects of Implausible Anchors,” Social Cognition, April 2001, pp. 145-60.
6. S. Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (New York: McGraw, 1993), p. 152.
7. Ibid.
8. J. S. Hammond, R. L. Keeney, and H. Raiffa, Smart Choices, pp. 191-93.
1. D. C. Dearborn and H. A. Simon, “Selective Perception: A Note on the Departmental Identification of Executives,” Sociometry, June 1958, pp. 140-44.
2. R. P. Vallone, L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper, “The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, September 1985, pp. 577-85.
3. C. G. Lord, L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper, “Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, November 1979, pp. 2098-2109.
1. P. C. Wason, “On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, August 1960, pp. 129-40; R. S. Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,” Review of General Psychology, June 1998, pp. 175-220; and E. Jonas, S. Schulz-Hardt, D. Frey, and N. Thelen, “Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information Search After Preliminary Decisions,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, April 2001, pp. 557-71.
2. M. Bazerman, R. Beekun, and F. Schoorman, “Performance Evaluation in a Dynamic Context: A Laboratory Study of the Impact of Prior Commitment to the Ratee,” Journal of Applied Psychology, December 1982, pp. 873-76.
3. J. E. Russo and P. J. H. Schoemaker, Winning Decisions (New York: Doubleday, 2002), p. 84.
4. M. Lewicka, “Confirmation Bias: Cognitive Error or Adaptive Strategy of Action Control?” in M. Kofta, et al. (eds.), Personal Control in Action: Cognitive and Motivational Mechanisms (New York: Plenum Press, 1998), pp. 233-58.
5. See, for instance, C. R. Mynatt, M. E. Doherty, and R. D. Tweney, “Consequences of Confirmation and Disconfirmation in a Simulated Research Environment,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, August 1978, pp. 395-406.
6. J. S. Hammond, R. L. Keeney, and H. Raiffa, Smart Choices (Boston: HBS Press, 1999), p. 200.
1. I found this story retold in a number of places. For instance, see J. S. Hammond, R. L. Keeney, and H. Raiffa, Smart Choices (Boston: HBS Press, 1999), p. 200; and J. E. Russo and P. J. H. Schoemaker, Winning Decisions (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 39. The actual source is unknown.
2. See, for example, A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science, January 1981, pp. 453-58; D. Frisch, “Reasons for Framing Effects,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, April 1993, pp. 399-429; and R. M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication, Autumn 1993, pp. 51-58.
3. J. E. Russo and P. J. H. Schoemaker, Winning Decisions (New York: Doubleday, 2002), p. 28.
4. Ibid., p. 37.
5. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica, March 1979, pp. 263-91.
6. D. K. Wilson, R. M. Kaplan, and L. J. Schneiderman, “Framing of Decisions and Selection of Alternatives in Health Care,” Social Behaviour, March 1987, pp. 51-59.
1. See, for instance, “Three Missing Women Rescued from Cleveland Home,” washingtonpost.com; May 7, 2013.
2. D. Finkelhor, “Five Myths About Missing Children,” washingtonpost.com; May 10, 2013.
3. See A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability,” in D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1982), pp. 163-78.
1. Cited in J. Simons, “Improbable Dreams,” U.S. News & World Report, March 24, 1997, p. 46.
2. See D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “On the Psychology of Prediction,” Psychological Review, July 1973, pp. 251-73; and A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Sciences, September 1974, pp. 1124-31.
3. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Belief in the Law of Small Numbers,” Psychological Bulletin, August 1971, pp. 105-10.
4. M. B. O’Higgins, Beating the Dow (New York: HarperBusiness, 2000).
5. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty,” p. 1127.
1. See, for instance, E. F. Fama, “Random Walks in Stock Market Prices,” Financial Analysts Journal, September-October 1965, pp. 55-60.
2. B. Fischhoff and P. Slovic, “A Little Learning...: Confidence in Multicue Judgment Tasks,” in R. Nicherson (ed.), Attention and Performance, vol. 8 (New Jersey: Erlbaum, 1980).
3. See, for example, N. Friedland, “Games of Luck and Games of Chance: The Effects of Luck-Versus-Chance-Orientation on Gambling Decisions,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, September 1998, pp. 161-79; and M. H. Guindon and F. J. Hanna, “Coincidence, Happenstance, Serendipity, Fate, or the Hand of God: Case Studies in Synchronicity,” Career Development Quarterly, December 2001, pp. 195-208.
4. See, for instance, A. James and A. Wells, “Death Beliefs, Superstitious Beliefs and Health Anxiety,” British Journal of Clinical Psychology, March 2002, pp. 43-53.
5. J. L. Bleak and C. M. Frederick, “Superstitious Behavior in Sport: Levels of Effectiveness and Determinants of Use in Three Collegiate Sports,” Journal of Sport Behavior, March 1998, pp. 1-15.
1. Cited in C. Lake, “‘Invest in What You Know’—Always a Good Idea?” InvestorPlace.com, October 9, 2013.
2. “Stock Superstar Who Beat the Street,” Wharton Alumni Magazine, Spring 2007.
3. See H. Foad, “Familiarity Bias,” in H. K. Baker and J. R. Nofsinger (eds.), Behavioral Finance: Investors, Corporations, and Markets (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010), pp. 277-94.
4. J. Nofsinger, “Mind on My Money,” Psychology Today, July 25, 2008.
5. H. H. Cao, B. Han, D. Hirshleifer, and H. H. Zhang, “Fear of the Unknown: Familiarity and Economic Decisions,” Review of Finance, January 2011, pp. 173-206.
6. H. Foad, “Familiarity Bias,” p. 277.
7. C. Duhigg, “Psst, You in Aisle 5,” The New York Times Magazine, March 2, 2012; pp. 30-37.
8. M. Koren, “Study Predicts Political Beliefs with 83 Percent Accuracy,” Smithsonian.com; February 14, 2013.
9. K. N. Cytryn, Lay Reasoning and Decision-Making Related to Health and Illness (Montreal: McGill University, 2001).
1. See, for instance, H. Arkes and C. Blumer, “The Psychology of Sunk Costs,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, February 1985, pp. 124-40; and R. L. Leahy, “Sunk Costs and Resistance to Change,” Journal of Cognitive Psychology, Winter 2000, pp. 355-71.
2. H. Arkes and C. Blumer, “The Psychology of Sunk Costs.”
3. B. M. Staw and H. Hoang, “Sunk Costs in the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing Time and Survival in Professional Basketball,” Administrative Science Quarterly, September 1995, pp. 474-94.
4. See, for instance, R. Hastie and R. M. Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001), pp. 36-45.
5. H-T. Tan and J. F. Yates, “Sunk Cost Effects: The Influences of Instruction and Future Return Estimates,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, September 1995, pp. 311-20.
6. K. Kroll, “Rising Above Sunk Costs,” Industry Week, September 4, 2000, pp. 19-21.
1. See, for instance, H. A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1976); M. A. Goodrich, W. C. Stirling, and E. R. Boer, “Satisficing Revisited,” Minds & Machines, February 2000, pp. 79-110; and D. E. Agosto, “Bounded Rationality and Satisficing in Young People’s Web-Based Decision Making,” Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, January 2002, pp. 16-27.
2. J. Forester, “Bounded Rationality and the Politics of Muddling Through,” Public Administration Review, January-February 1984, pp. 23-31; and G. Gigerenzer (ed.), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
3. L. R. Beach, Image Theory: Decision Making in Personal and Organizational Contexts (Chichester, England: Wiley, 1990); C. Seidl and S. Traub, “A New Test of Image Theory,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, August 1998, pp. 93-116; L. R. Beach, ed., Image Theory: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1998); and L. D. Ordonez, L. Benson III, and L. R. Beach, “Testing the Compatibility Test: How Instructions, Accountability, and Anticipated Regret Affect Prechoice Screening of Options,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, April 1999, pp. 63-80.
1. See, for instance, R. Plutchik, The Psychology and Biology of Emotion (New York: HarperCollins, 1994).
2. K. Fiedler, “Emotional Mood, Cognitive Style, and Behavioral Regulation,” in K. Fiedler and J. Forgas (eds.), Affect, Cognition, and Social Behavior (Toronto: Hogrefe Int., 1988), pp. 100-19; and T. Gilovich and V. H. Medvec, “The Experience of Regret: What, Why, and When,” Psychological Review, April 1995, pp. 379-95.
3. D. Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010), pp. 257-79.
4. G. Loewenstein, “Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, March 1996, pp. 272-92; and M. F. Luce, J. R. Bettman, and J. W. Payne, “Choice Processing in Emotionally Difficult Decisions,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, March 1997, pp. 384-405.
5. M. der Hovanesian, “Master Your Market Mood Swings,” Business Week, September 30, 2002, pp. 108-09.
1. J. M. Schlesinger and B. Gruley, “A Tale of a Broker and His Clients and an Era’s End,” Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2002, p. A1.
2. D. T. Miller and M. Ross, “Self-Serving Biases in the Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction?” Psychological Bulletin, March 1975, pp. 213-25; B. Mullen and C. A. Riordan, “Self-Serving Attributions for Performance in Naturalistic Settings: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, January 1988, pp. 3-22; and N. Epley and D. Dunning, “Feeling ‘Holier Than Thou’: Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, December 2000, pp. 861-75.
3. H. Seneviratne and B. Saunders, “An Investigation of Alcohol Dependent Respondents’ Attributions for Their Own and ‘Others’ Relapses,” Addiction Research, October 2000, pp. 439-53.
1. See, for instance, S. Frederick and G. Lowenstein, “Hedonic Adaptation,” in D. Kahneman, E. Diener, and N. Schwarz (eds.), Wellbeing: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), pp. 302-29.
2. S. Adams, “Why Winning Powerball Won’t Make You Happy,” forbes.com; November 28, 2012.
3. P. Brickman, D. Coates, and R. Janoff-Bulman, “Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, August 1978, pp. 917-27.
4. See, for example, “How the Lives of 10 Lottery Millionaires Went Disastrously Wrong,” money.co.uk; December 3, 2008; J. Doll, “A Treasury of Terribly Sad Stories of Lotto Winners,” thewire.com; March 30, 2012; and “Powerball Winner Says He Regrets Winning Lottery,” king5.com; September 26, 2013.
5. D. Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010), pp. 185-88.
6. L. D. Nelson and T. Meyvis, “Interrupted Consumption: Disrupting Adaptation to Hedonic Experiences,” Journal of Marketing Research, December 2008, pp. 654-64.
1. B. Fischhoff and R. Beyth, “‘I Knew It Would Happen’: Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, February 1975, pp. 1-16; S. A. Hawkins and R. Hastie, “Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known,” Psychological Bulletin, May 1990, pp. 311-27; J. J. J. Christensen-Szalanski, “The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, February 1991, pp. 147-68; R. L. Guilbault, F. B. Bryant, J. H. Brockway, and E. J. Posavac, “A Meta-Analysis of Research on Hindsight Bias,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology, vol. 26, no. 2-3, 2004, pp. 103-17; and H. Blank, H. J. Musch, and R. F. Pohl, “Hindsight Bias: On Being Wise After the Event,” Social Cognition, February 2007, pp. 1-9.
2. J. M. Bonds-Raacke, L. S. Fryer, S. D. Nicks, and R. T. Durr, “Hindsight Bias Demonstrated in the Prediction of a Sporting Event,” Journal of Social Psychology, June 2001, pp. 349-52.
3. See, for instance, E. Erdfelder and A. Buckner, “Decomposing the Hindsight Bias: A Multinomial Processing Tree Model for Separating Recollection and Reconstruction in Hindsight,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, March 1998, pp. 387-414.
4. F. B. Bryant and R. L. Guilbault, “‘I Knew It All Along’ Eventually: The Development of Hindsight Bias in Reaction to the Clinton Impeachment Verdict,” Basic & Applied Social Psychology, March 2002, pp. 27-41.
5. B. Fischhoff, “Perceived Informativeness of Facts,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, May 1977, pp. 349-58.
6. P. Slovic and B. Fischhoff, “On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, November 1977, pp. 544-51.
1. R. J. Meyer and J. W. Hutchinson, “Bumbling Geniuses: The Power of Everyday Reasoning in Multistage Decision Making,” in S. J. Hoch and H. C. Kunreuther (eds.), Wharton on Making Decisions (New York: Wiley, 2001), p. 44.
2. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
3. A. Tversky and E. Shafir, “Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decision,” Psychological Science, November 1992, p. 358.
1. C. J. Anderson, “The Psychology of Doing Nothing: Forms of Decision Avoidance Result from Reason and Emotion,” Psychological Bulletin, January 2003, p. 140.
2. See, for instance, W. Samuelson and R. Zeckhauser, “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, March 1988, pp. 7-59; and S. K. Wolcott, “Getting Out of a Decision-Making Rut,” Beyond Numbers, May 2009, pp. 8-10.
3. This assessment of time-shares is based on A. Roth, “Don’t Buy It,” AARP The Magazine, April/May 2014, pp. 20-22.
1. O. E. Tykocinski, T. S. Pittman, and E. E. Tuttle, “Inaction Inertia: Foregoing Future Benefits as a Result of an Initial Failure to Act,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, May 1995, pp. 793-803; and M. van Putten, M. Zeelenberg, and E. van Dijk, “Decoupling the Past From the Present Attenuates Inaction Inertia,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, January 2007, pp. 65-79.
2. T. Gilovich and V. H. Medvec, “The Experience of Regret: What, Why, and When,” Psychological Review, April 1995, pp. 379-95.
1. G. A. Miller, “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information,” Psychological Review, March 1956, pp. 81-97. See also, J. Schweickert and B. Boruff, “Short-Term Memory Capacity: Magic Number or Magic Spell?” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, July 1986, pp. 419-25; and J. N. MacGregor, “Short-Term Memory Capacity: Limitation or Optimization?” Psychological Review, January 1987, pp. 107-108.
2. A. Bastardi and E. Shafir, “Nonconsequential Reasoning and Its Consequences,” Current Directions in Psychological Science, December 2000, pp. 216-19.
1. S. S. Iyengar and M. R. Lepper, “When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, December, 2000, pp. 995-1006.
2. B. Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less (New York: Harper Perennial, 2004).
3. See, for instance, I. Simonson and A. Tversky, “Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion,” Journal of Marketing Research, August 1992, pp. 281-95; E. Shafir, I. Simonson, and A. Tversky, “Reason-Based Choice,” Cognition, October-November 1993, pp. 11-36; and R. Dhar, “Consumer Preference for a No-Choice Option,” Journal of Consumer Research, September 1997, pp. 215-31.
4. B. Schwartz, “Self Determination: The Tyranny of Freedom,” American Psychologist, January 2000, pp. 79-88.
5. B. Schwartz, A. Ward, J. Monterosso, S. Lyubomirsky, K. White, and D.R. Lehman, “Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, November 2002, pp. 1178-97; A. M. Parker, W. B. Bruin, and B. Fischhoff, “Maximizers Versus Satisficers: Decision-Making Styles, Competence, and Outcomes,” Judgment and Decision Making, December 2007, pp. 342-50; and A. Roets, B. Schwartz, and Y. Guan, “The Tyranny of Choice: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Maximizing-Satisficing Effects on Well-Being,” Judgment and Decision Making, November 2012, pp. 689-704.
1. O. E. Tykocinski and T. S. Pittman, “The Consequences of Doing Nothing: Inaction Inertia as Avoidance of Anticipated Counterfactual Regret,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, September 1998, pp. 607-16.
2. See, for instance, M. Zeelenberg, W. W. van Dijk, A. S. R. Manstead, and J. van der Pligt, “On Bad Decisions and Disconfirmed Expectancies: The Psychology of Regret and Disappointment,” Cognition and Emotion, July 2000, pp. 521-41; and M. Zeelenberg, K. van den Bos, E. van Dijk, and R. Pieters, “The Inaction Effect in the Psychology of Regret,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, March 2002, pp. 314-27.
3. M. Zeelenberg, “Anticipated Regret, Expected Feedback and Behavioral Decision Making,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, June 1999, pp. 93-106.
4. M. Spranca, E. Minsk, and J. Baron, “Omission and Commission in Judgment and Choice,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, January 1991, pp. 76-105.
5. V. H. Medvec, S. F. Madey, and T. Gilovich, “When Less Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction Among Olympic Medalists,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, October 1995, pp. 603-10.
6. M. Zeelenberg, “Anticipated Regret, Expected Feedback and Behavioral Decision Making,” pp. 102-03.
1. R. N. Taylor and M. D. Dunnette, “Influence of Dogmatism, Risk-Taking Propensity, and Intelligence on Decision-Making Strategies for a Sample of Industrial Managers,” Journal of Applied Psychology, August 1974, pp. 420-23.
2. V. H. Vroom and B. Pahl, “Relationship Between Age and Risk Taking Among Managers,” Journal of Applied Psychology, October 1971, pp. 399-405.
3. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica, March 1979, pp. 263-91; and C. H. Coombs and P. E. Lehner, “Conjoint Design and Analysis of the Bilinear Model: An Application of Judgments of Risk,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, March 1984, pp. 1-42.
4. H. Shefrin and M. Statman, “The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Finance, July 1985, pp. 777-91.
5. D. A. Moore, T. R. Kurtzberg, C. R. Fox, and M. H. Bazerman, “Positive Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, August 1999, pp. 95-114.
1. Some famous “failures” cited in businessinsider.com, March 7, 2014.
2. B. F. Skinner, The Behavior of Organisms: An Experimental Analysis (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938); and F. K. McSweeny and E. S. Murphy, The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of Operant and Classical Conditioning (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014).
3. A. Ellis, “The Role of Irrational Beliefs in Perfectionism,” in G. L. Gordon and P. L. Hewitt (eds.), Perfectionism: Theory, Research, and Treatment (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2002), pp. 217-29; and I. Kopylov, “Perfectionism and Choice,” Econometrica, September 2012, pp. 1819-44.
4. R. O. Frost, P. Marten, C. Lahart, and R. Rosenblate, “The Dimensions of Perfectionism,” Cognitive Therapy and Research, October 1990, pp. 449-68.
5. K. R. Blankstein, G. L. Flett, P. L. Hewitt, and A. Eng, “Dimensions of Perfectionism and Irrational Fears: An Examination with the Fear Survey Schedule,” Personality and Individual Differences, September 1993, pp. 323-28.
6. R. O. Frost, P. Martin, C. Lahart, and R. Rosenblate, “The Dimensions of Perfectionism.”
1. Based on B. Breen, “What’s Your Intuition?” Fast Company, September 2000, pp. 290-300.
2. See, for instance, R. N. Taylor, “Age and Experience as Determinants of Managerial Information Processing and Decision Making Performance,” Academy of Management Journal, March 1975, pp. 74-81; M. A. Neale and G. B. Northcraft, “Experience, Expertise, and Decision Bias in Negotiation: The Role of Strategic Conceptualization,” in B. Sheppard, M. Bazerman, and R. Lewicki (eds.), Research on Negotiations in Organizations, vol. 2 (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1989); and M. A. Quinones, J. K. Ford, and M. S. Teachout, “The Relationship between Work Experience and Job Performance: A Conceptual and Meta-Analytic Review, Personnel Psychology, Winter 1995, pp. 887-910.
3. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,” in D. E. Bell and H. Raiffa (eds.), Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 167-92.
4. J. E. Russo and P. J. H. Schoemaker, Winning Decisions (New York: Doubleday, 2002), p. 198.
5. See, for instance, S. J. Hoch, “Combining Models with Intuition to Improve Decisions,” in S. J. Hoch and H. C. Kunreuther (eds.), Wharton on Decision Making (New York: Wiley, 2001), p. 97.
6. P. Slovic, B. Fischhoff, and S. Lichtenstein, “Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk,” in D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 467.
7. See, for instance, W. McKelvey, Outside the Box (Ship Bottom, NJ: Eclipse Publishing, 1998); and C. Niessen, C. Swarowsky, and M. Leiz, “Age and Adaptation to Changes in the Workplace,” Journal of Managerial Psychology, vol. 25, no. 4, 2010, pp. 356-83.
1. Some of these insights on Saudi culture came from R. T. Moran, N. R. Abramson, and S. V. Moran, Managing Cultural Differences, 9th ed. (London: Routledge, 2014).
2. See, for instance, F. Kluckhohn and F. L. Strodtbeck, Variations in Value Orientations (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1961); G. Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work Related Values (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980); and R. J. House, P. J. Hanges, M. Javidan, P. W. Dorfman, and V. Gupta (eds.), Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004).
3. C. K. Hsee and E. U. Weber, “Cross-National Differences in Risk Preference and Lay Predictions,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, June 1999, pp. 165-79.