The section of Chandrakīrti’s Lucid Words referred to in the Karmapa’s analysis of the Consequentialist-Autonomist distinction in Feast for the Fortunate643
Translator’s note: This section of Chandrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, or Lucid Words (ACIP TD3860, 05B-11B), is part of Chandrakīrti’s commentary to Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom, verse 1.1, which says, “Not from themselves and not from others, / Not from both nor causelessly— / In things, of whatever type they may be, / Arising never exists.” This entire section relates to the meaning of “not from themselves.” The commentary examines the issue of how to appropriately refute the Enumerators, a non-Buddhist Indian philosophical school that asserts that 1) phenomena arise from themselves, i.e., from their own essential nature, and that 2) that essential nature is present in an unclear or unmanifest way at the time of phenomena’s causes. In particular, Chandrakīrti compares the approaches of Buddhapālita and of Bhāvaviveka regarding how the Enumerators are to be refuted by Followers of the Middle Way. He defends Buddhapālita’s approach of highlighting the absurd consequences of the Enumerators’ position and refutes Bhāvaviveka’s approach of using structured logic statements to affirmatively prove the nonexistence of arising from self Roman numeral section headings have been inserted by the translator and are accompanied by footnotes indicating the section of Feast for the Fortunate to which they correspond. This is challenging material. Readers may wish to read this appendix three times if they do not understand some sections on the first read. Material in square brackets, which appear much more frequently than in the body of Feast for the Fortunate due to Chandrakīrti often not explicitly stating the subjects of sentences and his using the passive voice, has been inserted by the translator.
I644
The master Buddhapālita said, “Things do not arise from themselves, because their arising would be pointless and because their arising would be endless.645 Things that already exist by way of their own identity do not need to arise again. If they arose even though they [already] existed, there would never be a time at which they were not arising.”
II646
Some, [namely Bhāvaviveka], criticized that [statement of consequences] by saying, “That [refutation] is not logical, because it does not employ arguments or examples and because it does not dispel the countercriticisms of others. Since [Buddhapālita’s] words are consequential, the opposite meanings of his probandum and of his reason are clearly implied. Thus [Buddhapālita unwittingly] implies that things arise from others, that arising has meaning, and that arising has an end. In this way he contradicts the tenets [of his own position].”
III647
However, we see that such criticisms are themselves illogical. Firstly, the claim that [Buddhapālita is at fault] when he “does not employ arguments or examples” is incorrect. [Buddhapālita] is probing his counterpart [in a debate], [in this case] someone who asserts that [things] arise from themselves, by saying, “When you say ‘things arise from themselves,’ you are saying that an existent, the cause, gives rise to precisely itself. However, one cannot see any need for an existent to arise again. One can, [however], see that [such a process] would be endless. You do not accept that something that has already arisen arises again, nor do you accept that arising is endless. Therefore, your logic is untenable and contradicts your own assertions.”
[Buddhapālita] debates in a way that has [the same desired] effect [of forcing the proponent of arising from self to acknowledge his or her own internal contradictions] as using arguments and examples would. [Moreover, his approach is free from the undesirable effect of having to hold to a position of his own in the process of doing so]. Why would [Buddhapālita’s] counterparts, [the Enumerators], not accept [that their position is erroneous]?
If a debate method that revealed the internal contradictions of counterparts did not cause the counterparts to relinquish their previously held view, [we can only conclude that] they are shameless [and immune to logical discourse]. Arguments and examples will certainly do no more [to help them] relinquish [their wrong view]. We do not debate with the insane.
Therefore, when the master [Bhāvaviveka] inappropriately uses [autonomous] inferences, he is merely showing his own affection for inferences, nothing more.
IV648
It is unacceptable for a Follower of the Middle Way to use autonomous inferences, because [Followers of the Middle Way] do not accept any positions that are alternatives [to the counterparts’ position]. As Āryadeva said:
Against someone who does not hold any position
Of existence, nonexistence, or both existence and nonexistence,
One cannot [prevail] in argument,
Even if [one tries] for a long time.
And, from Nāgārjuna’s Dispelling Objections:
If I had a thesis,
I would have a fault.
Since I have no thesis,
I am strictly faultless.
If direct perception or any other form of valid cognition
Were to observe some [truly existent] objects,
It would be possible to engage in affirmation and refutation [on the basis of those].
Since that is not the case, I cannot be criticized.
V 649
Since Followers of the Middle Way do not state autonomous inferences, why would they use an autonomous thesis such as “Things do not arise from themselves”? To such a thesis the Enumerators would respond, “What is the meaning of your thesis, ‘…do not arise from themselves’? Does ‘from themselves’ mean ‘from their own essential nature that is their result,’ or does it mean ‘from their own essential nature that is their cause’? If it refers to their result, you simply affirm what is already established for us.650 If it refers to their cause, your meaning will [merely] contradict [our assertion without proving its illogicality]: for us, everything that arises exists in the essential nature of its cause, and it is [from this essential nature] that [results] arise.”
Thus, such an autonomous reasoning would, when spoken to an Enumerator, either affirm [for the Enumerators] what is already established for them or contradict [the Enumerators without doing anything further to refute them]. Therefore, why would we employ an argument such as “because they exist [already]” that would subject us to the efforts of removing such faults? Since [Buddhapālita’s consequences] do not entail the faults [described above] that would be adduced as countercriticisms by [the Enumerators], it is not necessary for the master Buddhapālita to respond to such countercriticisms.
VI651
[After hearing the above defenses of Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka might respond by saying], “Suppose I grant that Followers of the Middle Way should refrain from stating autonomous inferences because no position, argument, or example is established for them. [And suppose I grant] that therefore [Followers of the Middle Way] do not prove any thesis that refutes arising from self nor do they dispel the thesis [of arising from self] held by others, [the Enumerators], using an inference that is established for both parties [in the debate].
“It would still be necessary to state the contradictions inherent in the others’ thesis using inferences [that are established] for [the persons who hold the thesis] themselves. Therefore one must possess, from one’s own perspective, a position, argument, and example that are free of the faults [that could be drawn by the Enumerators].652 Since [Buddhapālita] did not state those, and since he did not clear away the countercriticisms [the Enumerators would voice when confronted with the thesis “Things do not arise from themselves,”] [Buddhapālita] is definitely at fault.”
That is not the case. On the contrary, [after a Follower of the Middle Way sets forth absurd consequences of “arising from self,”] the onus is on the Enumerators to generate in their counterparts—[us, the Followers of the Middle Way]—a certainty in the [Enumerator] thesis that mirrors the certainty that they themselves have. Whatever methods they use to understand that their position is sensible, they must explain those methods to us. This is the custom in debate: [the Enumerators], as counterparts [to the Followers of the Middle Way, who have presented them with absurd consequences of their thesis], must justify the thesis they hold.
[Yet the Enumerators] do not have arguments [that prove their thesis]. Since they have no [valid] arguments or examples, the proofs that they employ to prove their thesis are nothing more than a repetition of the thesis itself. Since they hold to an untenable position, they are not fooling anyone but themselves [when they put forth reasons to prove their position]. [Their reasons] are incapable of generating certainty in others.
It is clear that this very incapacity of [the Enumerators’] affirmations to [prove] their thesis is [the best] means of undermining [the Enumerators’ position in a debate]. What sense would there be in trying to do so through stating inferences in order to refute them?
[At this point, Bhāvaviveka might respond], “It is still necessary to state the contradictions [inherent in the Enumerators’ system] using inferences [that are accepted by] the Enumerators themselves.” [We would respond by saying that] the master Buddhapālita has [already] stated those very [inferences], [as will be explained below].
[Buddhapālita] said, “Things do not arise from themselves, because their arising would be pointless…” The term “their” [in his reason] bears [the meaning] “[things] that already exist by way of their own identity.” That is so because “Things that already exist by way of their own identity do not need to arise again” is a commentary on the [previous] brief statement [“Things do not arise from themselves, because their arising would be pointless.”] The [commentarial] statement also, [implicitly], bears a concordant example—[a clearly manifest vase]— that is accepted by [the Enumerators] and that has the properties of the probandum, [that things do not arise from themselves], and the means of affirmation, [existing by way of identity]. “Already existing by way of their own identity” is connected to the argument or reason. “Because their arising would be pointless” is connected to the meaning of the predicate to be proven.
Consider the following, well-known example of a five-part [probative argument]:
1) Sound is impermanent,
2) because that which is produced is impermanent.
3) That which is produced is seen as impermanent,
4) as in the case, for example, of a vase.
5) Therefore, since it is produced, [sound] is impermanent.
“Being produced” is the argument or reason employed in that example.
Here, too, [Buddhapālita implies a five-part logic statement]:
1) Things do not arise from themselves,
2) because it would be pointless for things that already existed by way of their own identity to arise again.
3) It is seen that that which [already] exists by way of its own identity, such as vases and so on that clearly appear in front of [someone], do not depend on [their own] rearising.
4) In the same way, if [you] think that vases and so on exist by way of their own identity [even] at the stage of [their production when they are] lumps of clay and so on, then,
5) [since they already] exist by way of their own identity even at times such as those, they are devoid of arising.653
In that [logic statement], “already existing by way of their own identity” is used as the argument [or reason] and [also] clarifies the application [of the reason]. It is unmistaken with respect to refuting the rearising [of things that already exist by way of their own identity]. It is an inference held by the Enumerators themselves654 and is used [by Buddhapālita] to highlight contradictions in the Enumerators’ own position.
Therefore, how can Bhāvaviveka say that [Buddhapālita’s reasoning] “is not logical, because it does not employ arguments or examples”? Not only did [Buddhapālita] not fail to state reasons and examples, he also did not fail to counter the criticisms of others. For the Enumerators do not assert that a vase, clearly manifest before them, becomes clearly manifest again. Thus he correctly chooses [the vase] as his example.
Furthermore, [Buddhapālita] makes a clear distinction regarding what he is refuting with his reasoning: his probandum refutes the arising of things that have the potential to arise but have not yet clearly arisen. Therefore on what grounds does [Bhāvaviveka] accuse [Buddhapālita] of the faults of affirming what is already established [for the Enumerators] and of having a [merely] contradictory argument or reason?
In summary, when Buddhapālita uses the inferences of [the Enumerators] to highlight the contradictions of their system, [the Enumerators] would not respond with the criticisms that Bhāvaviveka says they would. Therefore it is not the case that Buddhapālita did not counter the criticisms of others. Bhāvaviveka’s criticisms of Buddhapālita are unfounded.
The phrase “and so on” in the “vases and so on” [of the probative argument above] signifies all things that are asserted [by the Enumerators] to arise. Thus [the example] does not [have the fault of] being unascertainable in the sense of not including woolen cloths, etc.
There is another way to set forth a probative argument [by drawing on the implications of Buddhapālita’s original consequence statement], “[Considering] referent objects with the exception of the person655—all objects that [you Enumerators] describe as arising from themselves: they do not arise from themselves, because they [already] exist by way of their own identity, just as in the example of the person.”
[If the Enumerators respond], “Refuting ‘arising’ does nothing to invalidate our assertion of ‘manifesting,’” they will also be undermined: “arising again” applies [directly] to manifesting, since [manifesting and rearising] are identical terms that refer to the lack of observation previously and the presence of observation subsequently. Thus arising expresses nothing other than manifesting, and the refutation of arising is also a refutation of manifesting.
One may think, “Since Buddhapālita did not state [the above probative arguments directly], how did you arrive at this analysis [and ascribe it to Buddhapālita]?” The words of [Buddhapālita] carry great meaning. In an abbreviated manner, they bear the meaning of all that has been stated above. Explaining [the original brief statements naturally] leads to all of the meanings [that I have explicitly described here]. There is nothing [in what I have said] that is not indicated [in Buddhapālita’s original statements].
VII656
The reversed meaning of consequences is connected solely to our counterparts, not to us, because we do not have any thesis. Therefore, how would we contradict our own tenets? For it is only in accordance with our wishes when our counterparts’ [assertions] are befallen by many [logical] flaws through the reversed meaning of the consequences we state. How could it be the case that the master Buddhapālita, a follower of the unerring way of Nāgārjuna, made statements that afforded opportunities for others [to refute him]?
When someone who speaks of the absence of an inherent nature sets forth [absurd] consequences to someone who speaks of the existence of an inherent nature, how would the reversed meaning of their consequences [fall back on themselves in an undesirable way]?
Words do not disarm their speakers as if they were [bandits] armed with sticks and nooses. Rather, the speaker makes the words—if the words have the potential to do so—follow after his or her intention.
The use of consequences yields no other result than refuting the thesis of the counterpart. The reversed meaning of the consequences does not follow.
VIII657
Further, the master Nāgārjuna said (Fundamental Wisdom):
Before the defining characteristics of space,
Not even the slightest space existed.
If [space] existed before its characteristics,
It would absurdly follow that it had no characteristics. (5.1)
And, in the same vein (Fundamental Wisdom):
If form existed without its causes,
It would absurdly follow that form was causeless.
But no object [of perception] whatsoever Is causeless. (4.2)
Also (Fundamental Wisdom):
Nirvāṇa is not a thing.
[If it were], it would absurdly follow that it bears the characteristics of aging and death.
There is no existent thing
That does not have aging and death.
As indicated above and elsewhere, [the master Nāgārjuna] mostly used consequences as the means to dismantle the positions of others. So, why does [Bhāvaviveka] see the master [Nāgārjuna’s] statements, [even though they are only consequences explicitly], as being the cause [for inferring] several probative arguments because of being “endowed with great meaning,” while [at the same time] withholding that consideration regarding the [consequence] statements of the master Buddhapālita?
He might reply, “[The difference is that] the extensive statement of probative arguments [by extracting them from brief consequence statements] is the tradition [and responsibility] of the authors of commentaries [to root texts],” but that as well is not [correct]. For even the master Nāgārjuna himself, when authoring the commentary to Dispelling Objections, did not use probative arguments.
IX658
Furthermore, this logician, wishing merely to show that he is very learned in the treatises of logic, accepts the view of the Followers of the Middle Way, but at the same time states autonomous probative arguments. [His approach] can be seen as a wellspring of many serious faults. To [explain] why, I will first provide his own probative argument: “Ultimately, the inner sense sources can be ascertained to not arise from themselves, because they exist—just as in the case, for example, of an existent consciousness.”
X659
Why did he apply the distinction “ultimately”? He may reply, “Because, on the worldly, relative level, the assertion of arising should not be refuted. Furthermore, even if one refuted arising [on the level of the relative], the refutation would be invalidated because of one’s own acceptance [of relative arising].”
That is illogical. Arising from self is not to be accepted [in any context, including] the relative. The sūtras say:
When a sprout arises from its cause, a seed, it does not create itself; it is not created by others; it is not created by both; it is not created by Īshvara; it is not transformed by time; it does not originate from subtle particles; it does not originate from its “original nature”; it does not arise causelessly.
Similarly (The Sūtra of Vast Play, Lalitavistarasūtra, Gyacher Rolpey Do/rgya cher rol pa’i mdo):
If a seed exists, so it is for the sprout.
The sprout is not what the seed is.
It is not the same nor is it other.
Its true reality is beyond permanence and extinction.
And, from this very text (Fundamental Wisdom):
When something arises in dependence upon something else,
The one is not the other,
Nor is it different from the other.
Thus permanence and extinction are transcended. (28.10)
He may claim, “I applied the distinction, [‘ultimately’], in dependence upon the systems of others, [the Enumerators],” but that as well is wrong, because [we Followers of the Middle Way] do not accept [the Enumerators’] presentations, even in the relative. It should be seen as advantageous [rather than problematic] when the tīrthikas, who fall from a correct perception of [both of] the two truths, are refuted in regard to both truths. Thus it is unreasonable to apply this distinction in dependence upon the systems of others.
It would be effective [in some instances] to apply this distinction when [communicating with] worldly people, but worldly people do not conceive of arising from self, [which is what is being refuted here]. Worldly people, without analyzing anything such as [arising] “from self” or “from other,” simply think, “Results arise from causes.” The master [Nāgārjuna] also made his presentations in accordance with [the world]. So, in all respects, this distinction [“ultimately”] should be ascertained as meaningless.
If [Bhāvaviveka] applied this distinction wishing to refute arising on the relative level, he would incur the faults of having a subject that was not established for him and an argument that was not established for him, because he does not accept the eyes and so on, the inner sense sources, as [existing] on the ultimate level. He may reply, “Since the eyes and so on exist [on the relative level], there is no fault,” but then what does “ultimately” qualify?
If he applied the distinction as a way to refute the ultimate arising of relative [phenomena] such as eyes, he should have said, “Relative phenomena, such as the eyes, do not ultimately arise…,” but he did not say that. Even if he did, [his phrasing] would still be illogical, because his counterparts, [the Enumerators], assert [phenomena] such as the eyes to be substantial existents and deny that they are only imputed existents. He would incur the fault of having a subject that was not established for his counterpart.
Still he may retort, “In the case of ‘sound is impermanent [because it is produced],’660 both the subject and the predicate are construed as generalities. [Their status in terms of relative or ultimate] is not specified, because if it was, there would be no [opportunity] to employ the conventions of inference and what is to be inferred. [For example], if you [specified the subject] by saying, ‘sound arisen from the four major elements…,’ that [subject] would not be established for the counterpart, [a Vaisheṣhika].661 If you said, ‘[sound that is] the quality of space,’ that would not be established for oneself, a Buddhist.
“Similarly, when the Vaisheṣhikas hold the thesis of sound being impermanent, if they stated [the subject to be] ‘produced sound,’ that [subject] would not be established for their counterparts, [the Jains].662 If they used ‘clearly manifest [sound],’ [the subject] would not be established for themselves. Continuing in the same vein, if a Buddhist [employed a subject] whose disintegration involved causes [other than that subject’s own arising], [the subject] would not be established for the Buddhist. If the subject’s disintegration did not depend on any cause [other than that subject’s own arising], the subject would not be established for other, [non-Buddhist] parties.
“For the same reasons that apply [to the examples above], in which the subject and predicate are set forth as mere generalities, we may employ the subject [in the probative argument directed at the Enumerators that refutes arising from self] free of specifications [such as relative or ultimate].”
That again is wrong. Here the predicate that [Bhāvaviveka] wishes to affirm is the refutation of arising. Yet [Bhāvaviveka] himself accepts that mere erroneous [consciousnesses] will fail to discover a subject that was a thing that [could serve as] the support for [such a predicate]. Mistakenness and nonmistakenness are different.663 It is just as in the case of a person with an eye disease seeing falling hairs: due to their mistaken [consciousness], they perceive something to exist, even though it does not. But how could even the slightest [truly] existent object be observed? When people whose eyes are healthy [perceive objects], they do not superimpose falsities such as falling hairs. In the same way, when nonmistaken [consciousnesses] do not superimpose falsities, how could they observe even the slightest of objects, [the phenomena of] the relative [truth], which do not exist? Echoing this [logic], the master [Nāgārjuna] himself said (Dispelling Objections):
If direct perception or any other form of valid cognition
Were to observe some [truly existent] objects,
It would be possible to engage in affirmation and refutation [on the basis of those].
Since that is not the case, I cannot be criticized.
Since mistakenness and nonmistakenness are different, what exists for a mistaken [consciousness] does not exist in the context of nonmistakenness. What need to even mention [Bhāvaviveka’s] subject, the relative eyes? Because he fails to avoid the faults of having [both] a subject and a reason the bases of which are not established [for both parties], his response664 falls short.
There is also no similarity between his example, [the probative argument of sound and impermanence, and your thesis]. In the example, the generality of sound and the generality of impermanence, without any specifications, exist for both parties [of the debate].665 Here, the generality of the eyes [and so on, the inner sense sources], is not accepted [in the same way] even on the relative level by those who speak of emptiness and those who speak of nonemptiness. Since the same is true with respect to the ultimate [truth], his example is not relevant.
The fault of having a baseless position also applies to his reason “…because they exist.” It also has a basis that is not established.
XI666
As to why this is the case, the logician [Bhāvaviveka] himself accepts [that his logic is erroneous]! This will be explained as follows.
[Consider Bhāvaviveka’s treatment of this probative argument] set forth by others. [The hearers say], “The producers, or causes, of the inner sense sources exist, because the Tathāgata said so. Whatever is said to be so by the Tathāgata is just so, such as the statement, ‘Nirvāṇa is peace.’”
To that reasoning of [the hearers], Bhāvaviveka responded [in his Lamp of Knowledge667] with the following:
What do you assert to be the meaning of your reason? Do you mean to say, “because he said so on the relative level,” or do you mean, “because he said so on the ultimate level”? If you intended the relative, the reason would not be established for you.668 If you intended the ultimate, it is as [Nāgārjuna] said (Fundamental Wisdom):
No phenomenon is established as existing,
Not existing, or both existing and not existing. (1.7ab)
This [quotation] dispels [the notion] that conditions could produce any result that was either existent, nonexistent, or both. [Nāgārjuna continues (Fundamental Wisdom)]:
Thus how could a “producing cause” [exist]?
It would be illogical. (1.7cd)
The meaning of that [quotation] is that [the phenomena that produce the inner sense sources] are not [actual] producing causes. Therefore, since on the ultimate level that which is produced and the producer are not established, [your reasoning] is either not established [from the ultimate perspective] or contradictory [from the relative perspective].
The above criticisms are the words of [Bhāvaviveka] himself. Since he himself acknowledged that a reason is not established in just the way [he described to the hearers], whatever inferences he sets forth that involve arguments [referring to existent] things will not be established for himself in regard to the reason and so on. Therefore all of his means of affirmation will be lost. The [nonestablishment that Bhāvaviveka identifies for the hearers] applies to [his own refutations as well].
When he says, “Ultimately, the inner sense sources do not arise from conditions that are different from themselves, because they are different [from those conditions], just as in the case of a vase,” or, when he says, “It can be ascertained that the producers of the inner sense sources, such as the eyes, which are asserted by others to be ultimate [phenomena], are not conditions, because they are different [from the inner sense sources], just as in the case of cotton and so on,” the “difference” [that he speaks of] and the other [components of his reason] are not established for himself!
[Again, examine how he treats this reasoning of the hearers]: “The inner sense sources definitely arise because special conventional terms are used with respect to that which possesses [appearances of] their objects.” To this, wishing to show the nonestablishment of the reason, [Bhāvaviveka] replies, “Well then, when a yogin rests in ultimate equipoise, if his or her eyes of supreme knowledge seeing the authentic suchness of things were to affirm the existence of arising, going, and so on, then [your reason would be established. But since the eyes of supreme knowledge of yogins resting in ultimate equipoise do not affirm the existence of arising and so on], your reason—‘because special conventional terms are used with respect to that which possesses [appearances of] their objects’—is not established. [Furthermore], ‘going’ has [already] been refuted by the refutation of arising.”669
The same faults can be ascribed to his own arguments, such as “Ultimately, there is no motion on the path not yet traversed, because [the latter] is a path, just as in the case of the path already traversed.” The reason [in that probative argument] is not established for [Bhāvaviveka] himself. The meaning of this can be drawn from [Bhāvaviveka’s own criticisms above]. It is the same with the following: “Ultimately, the eyes along with their supports do not view forms, because they constitute the eye faculty, just as in the case of [an inoperative eye faculty, such as the eye faculty during sleep].” [Bhāvaviveka] also said, “The eyes do not view forms, because they are derived from the elements, just as in the case of forms,” and “Earth is not of a hard nature, because it is an element, just as in the case of wind.” In the case of all these [probative arguments], the reason and so on are not established for [Bhāvaviveka], thus [Bhāvaviveka’s own criticisms above of the hearers] apply [to himself as well].
[Furthermore], [Bhāvaviveka’s] counterparts, [the Enumerators], upon hearing his reason, “…because they exist,” might wonder, “Is it the case that the inner sense sources do not arise from themselves, due to the reason of existing, in the same manner as the existence of consciousness?670 Or do they arise from themselves in the same manner as vases and so forth?” In this way, [his reason] is unascertainable [for them]. He may object, “I affirmed vases and so on [as not arising from themselves] in an equal manner,” but [actually] he did not, because he never mentioned vases and so on.
XII671
To all of these criticisms, one may reply, “The faults that you ascribe to the inferences of others will equally apply to your own inferences. Do you not also incur the faults of subjects and reasons that are not established? You should not criticize the faulty components of only [Bhāvaviveka’s] approach if they equally apply to yours. All of your criticisms [of Bhāvaviveka] are therefore unfounded.”
[Not so]. Those who state autonomous inferences will incur the faults [described above], but we do not use autonomous inferences. The inferences [that we use] merely refute the theses of others. Thus when others, [the hearers], think [such thoughts as], “The eyes see [things],” they assert the eye to be a phenomenon that does not view itself. They also accept that [the eyes] do not arise unless there is a phenomenon viewing other [phenomena].
[The hearers can be refuted in the following way]: “Whatever does not observe itself also does not observe others, just as in the example of a vase. Therefore the eyes, existing as something that does not observe itself, also do not observe other [phenomena]. In contradiction with [your claim that eyes] do not observe themselves, they do observe [other objects] such as blue. This contradicts an inference that you yourselves accept.” In this way, [the hearers’ misconceptions] are cleared away using inferences that are established for them.
Since we state inferences in just this way, in what way could our position incur the same faults that we ascribe to [Bhāvaviveka]?
You may inquire, “Is it [actually] possible to use an inference that is established for [only] one [party in the debate] to invalidate [their position]?” Yes, it is. [In fact, the dispelling of misconceptions] can only take place through [the counterpart’s accepting] a reason that is established for him or herself. [They cannot be persuaded] by [arguments that are] accepted only by someone else.
This is, indeed, the way things proceed in the world. In the world, sometimes victory or defeat is determined by the pronouncement of a witness who both parties—[for example], the challenger and the defender—hold in authority. At other times, [defeat is admitted] by one’s own words alone. Defeat and victory are, however, never decided merely by the proclamations of someone else. As it is in the world, so it should be in logic, for only the conventions of the world can apply in the treatises of logic.
Some say that inferences accepted by others cannot invalidate the others’ positions, because what is desired [in logical debate] is the refutation of precisely what is accepted by others. Still others say that affirmations and refutations can only be accomplished by that which can be stated definitively by both [parties in a debate], and that no [affirmation or refutation] is possible [in situations where the argument] is established for only one [party] or when there is doubt [about the argument in the mind of either party]. But those [people] need to understand the description given here of how inferences must be set forth in dependence upon the presentation of conventions in the world.
In terms [of the possibilities of] refutation via scripture, a refutation does not necessarily depend on a scripture established for both parties. It may also take place by using a scripture that is accepted only by [the person being refuted]. In all instances of inferences for oneself, what is established for oneself is [of course] most conclusive, and never is establishment by two parties [required]. Therefore, [in order to clear away misconceptions of others], it is senseless to state the definitions [relied on by] logicians. The buddhas help ignorant beings to be tamed simply by using whatever makes sense to those beings. Enough of this extensive elaboration!