Notes
1 For more remarks on Nāgārjuna’s possible dates, see Ruegg 1981, p. 4, note 11.
2 From the perspective of our ordinary thoughts and ways of relating to the world, the significance of the realities revealed at this stage is anything but “slight.” Consequently, this stage can, at first, seem misnamed. Yet as the instructions for the level of thorough analysis, explained below, demonstrate, this stage is not the final culmination of investigating appearing phenomena.
3 See Appendix III.
4 Dreyfus and McClintock 2003, p. 7.
5 The chapter of Feast for the Fortunate that examines the differences between the Consequentialists and Autonomists, as well as the debate between Bhāvaviveka and Chandrakīrti, begins on page 159. See also Appendix I (p. 579), which contains the full relevant excerpt from Chandrakīrti’s defense of Buddhapālita and refutation of Bhāvaviveka in Lucid Words.
6 Nāgārjuna’s tradition is generally thought to emphasize the profound aspect of the Mahāyāna teaching, while the tradition of Asaṅga (ca. 300) is said to emphasize the teachings on the Mahāyāna’s vast, or extensive, aspect. Also highly noteworthy for its combination of the Mahāyāna’s vast and profound elements in one text is the Entrance to the Conduct of Bodhisattvas (Bodhicharyāvatāra, Chanchub Sempe Chöpa la Jukpa/byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa) by the great Indian master Shāntideva, who is generally classified as a Consequentialist.
7 Ruegg 1981, p. 113.
8 Naktso Lotsawa Tsültrim Gyalwa/nag ‘tsho lo ts’a ba tshul khrims rgyal ba.
9 Ruegg 1981, p. 113.
10 In his Blue Annals (Debter Ngönpo/deb ther sngon po), Gö Lotsawa Shönu Pal (‘gos lo ts’a ba gzhon nu dpal, 1392-1481) lists the fours sons of Patsap as Tsangpa Sarbö (gtsang pa sar sbos), Maja Changchub Yeshe (rma bya byang chub ye shes), Dar Yönten Drak (dar yon tan grags), and Shangtang Sakpa (zhang thang sag pa).
11 See the Padmakara Translation Group’s Translators’ Introduction in Chandrakīrti and Jamgön Mipham 2002 for a discussion of qualifications to this rule within the Nyingma tradition.
12 Brunnhölzl 2004, p. 59.
13 Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche 2006, p. 182.
14 For the Karma Kagyü monastic universities, the root text for Vinaya studies is the Summary of the Vinaya (Vinayasūtra, Dulwa Do/’dul ba mdo) by Gunaprābha; Mikyö Dorje’s commentary is entitled Orb of the Sun (Nyimey Kyilkhor/nyi ma’i dkyil ’khor). The root text for the Abhidharma is the Treasury of Abhidharma (Abhidharmakosha, Chö Ngönpa Dzö/chos mngon pa mdzod) by Vasubandhu; Mikyö Dorje’s commentary is entitled Extracting the Delight of Accomplishment and Bliss (Drup De Chi Jo/grub bde dpyid ’jo). The root text for the Perfection of Supreme Knowledge is the Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Ngöntok Gyen/mngon rtogs rgyan) by Maitreya and Asaṅga; Mikyö Dorje’s commentary is entitled In Relief of the Noble Ones (Jetsün Ngalso/rje btsun ngal gso). The root text for the Middle Way is, of course, Chandrakīrti’s Entrance to the Middle Way; title information for Mikyö Dorje’s commentary is provided below. The main text for the study of Valid Cognition is the Seventh Karmapa’s Ocean of Texts on Reasoning (Rik Shung Gyamtso/rigs gzhung rgya mtsho), an exposition on multiple works by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.
15 Mikyö Dorje 1996, p. xxxx.
16 Mikyö Dorje gives his age at this time as thirty-nine, but the Tibetan system of counting one’s age often results in a total that is one year greater than in the Western custom.
17 Mikyö Dorje’s colophon only mentions the age at which he began the composition, the place at which he began it, and the place, but not the age, at which he finished it.
18 Fully titled The Chariot of the Takpo Kagyu Siddhas: The Oral Transmission of the Glorious Düsum Khyenpa—A Detailed Explanation of the Entrance to the Middle Way (Uma la Jukpe Namshe Palden Düsum Khyenpe Shal-lung Tak-gyü Drubpe Shingta/dbu ma la ‘jug pa’i rnam bshad dpal ldan dus gsum mkhyan pa’i zhal lung dvags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta).
19 Published by Nitartha international in 1996.
20 Mikyö Dorje 1996, pp. xxxx-xxxxi.
21 Ṭīkā is a Sanskrit word meaning “commentary” and often indicating the extensive variety.
22 The contents of this sentence in particular were drawn from public oral teachings on the Middle Way by the Very Venerable Khenchen Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche in Seattle, Washington.
23 Mikyö Dorje was certainly not alone among non-Gelukpa commentators who disagreed with Tsongkapa on some key issues, such as the status of the self and other phenomena on the level of relative truth and the object or target of refutation by Middle Way reasonings. However, it is perhaps easy to overlook the fact that, as a careful reading of this book will reveal, Mikyö Dorje and Tsongkapa also agreed on a number of important issues, such as whether or not the hearers and solitary realizers cognize the selflessness of phenomena (both masters hold that they do) and whether or not all instances of clinging to true existence are necessarily afflictive, as opposed to cognitive, obscurations (both masters hold that clinging to true existence is necessarily an afflictive obscuration).
24 Mikyö Dorje did compose treatises from the perspective of the other-emptiness doctrine in his earlier years, but it is believed he only did so to appease a tutor. (Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche 2006, p. 182)
25 For a translation of Shāntideva’s ninth chapter and Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary on it, as well as an excellent, thorough discussion of the Middle Way in the Kagyü tradition, see Karl Brunnhölzl’s Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2004).
26 Brunnhölzl 2004, p. 21.
27 For an example of his treatment of the Middle Way in Treasury of Knowledge, see Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy, translated by Elizabeth Callahan (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2007).
28 Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche 2006, p. 185.
29 Fully titled Feast for the Fortunate: A Commentary on the Entrance to the Middle Way That Easily Pulls Along the Chariot of the Takpo Kagyü Siddhas (Juktik Tak-gyü Drubpe Shingta Dewar Drenje Kalzang Gatön/’jug T’ik dvags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta bde bar ’dren byed skal bzang dga’ ston).
30 These two have been published in a single volume by Thrangu Dharma Kara Publications (Kathmandu, 2005). Brunnhölzl reports that Wangchuk Dorje wrote “both brief and extensive commentaries” on the five sūtra topics, but only the two mentioned here have, to our current knowledge, survived to the present day. (Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 18-19)
31 The Nitartha international Tibetan edition of Mikyö Dorje’s text is 733 pages long in a Western-style book format.
32 This verse is quoted by the Karmapa in his commentary to verse 6.119 on page 332.
33 Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche explains, however, that, in the lead-up to direct realization, fear of emptiness, born of intellectual understandings of emptiness that have begun to undermine some of the ego’s defense mechanisms, can be a positive sign that one is actually approaching realization.
34 Chandrakīrti’s tradition differs from that of Shāntideva on this point. In Shāntideva’s tradition, one may be genuinely named a bodhisattva on the basis of having given rise to relative bodhichitta, the desire, born of compassion, to attain enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings. However, for Chandrakīrti, the authentic application of the bodhisattva label must entail ultimate bodhichitta, an enlightened outlook informed by the realization of the true nature of reality. For this reason, Chandrakīrti calls his chapters on the bodhisattva grounds “bodhichitta generations,” or levels of the development of ultimate bodhichitta.
35 ALTG.
36 See, for example, Chandrakīrti and Jamgön Mipham 2002, pp. 310-314. Although Mipham allows for some level of realization of phenomenal selflessness on the part of the hearers and solitary realizers, he does not agree that the arhats fully realize phenomenal selflessness. In contrast, the Karmapa holds that the arhats’ realization of phenomenal selflessness is complete, but they do not cultivate their familiarity with this realization in a wide variety of contexts. The semantic styles of the two masters’ usage of “realization” (tokpa/rtogs pa) and “familiarization/meditation” (gompa/goms pa or bsgom pa) could well be worth further investigation.
37 See note 163.
38 See Dreyfus and McClintock 2002 for a thorough exploration of issues surrounding the history and application of these two terms.
39 As stated previously, buddhas dwell continually in meditative equipoise and have no postmeditation.
40 Also translated as “freedom from projections,” “freedom from conceptual fabrications,” “freedom from reference points,” “freedom from discursiveness,” and “simplicity.”
41 Genuine reality is not just a negation that indicates nonexistence (me-gak/med dgag).
42 Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche 2004, p. 307. The following explanation of the three consequences also follows Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche’s explanations, from the same source, pp. 307-319.
43 If there are Autonomist masters who do not accept that conventionally the phenomena of relative truth are established by virtue of their own characteristics, these masters would not be a target of Chandrakīrti’s refutation. Moreover, an examination of the Karmapa’s views on the Consequentialist-Autonomist distinction seems to reveal that the Karmapa disagrees with the notion that the Autonomists assert the valid establishment of phenomena’s characteristics on the conventional level. In fact, one of the Karmapa’s biggest objections to the explanations by the tradition of Tsongkapa is the one he makes regarding that tradition’s depiction of the Autonomists as having a different ontological view than the Consequentialists, particularly with regard to conventional phenomena being established by their own characteristics.
44 The Geluk School.
45 Gendün Chöpel 1990, pp. 291-292.
46 The Tibetan term translated as “postdisintegration” is simply the past-tense form (shikpa/zhig pa) of the intransitive verb “disintegrate” (jikpa/’jig pa), constructed as what in English would be called a noun. Consequently, some translate this term as “disintegratedness.”
47 In his Treasury of Knowledge, Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Thaye lists Tsongkapa’s eight great difficult points as four negating claims—1) there is no establishment of things by way of their own characteristics even conventionally, 2) autonomous arguments are not accepted even conventionally, 3) self-awareness is not accepted even conventionally, and 4) the all-base consciousness is not accepted even conventionally—and four affirmative claims—5) outer referents are accepted, 6) clinging to true existence is necessarily an afflictive obscuration, 7) postdisintegration is a function-performing thing, and 8) the hearers and solitary realizers realize phenomenal selflessness (Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Thaye 2002, p. 47). In his Entrance commentary the Karmapa agrees with points 3, 6, and 8 explicitly and certainly seems to favor point 4. If read as applying to the context of analysis, point 1 also seems to fit well with the Karmapa’s approach. Since Tsongkapa and the Karmapa had different understandings of what the term “autonomous arguments” means, point 2 would require more research. See Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 557-560, for alternate listings of the eight points as well as a discussion of what points the Karmapa and other masters accept or refute.
48 Available in English as Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nagarjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, translated by Ngawang Samten and Jay L. Garfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
49 Tsongkapa (n.d.), p. 53.
50 There has been much discussion about the relationships of the terms “Proponents of Mind Only” (Sem Tsampa/sems tsam pa), “Practitioners of Yogic Conduct” (Yogāchāra, Naljor Chöpa/rnal ’byor spyod pa), and “Proponents of Consciousness” (Vijñāptivādin, Namrik Mawa/rnam rig smra ba) and about whether these three terms refer to the same Indian school of thought or to different schools. This issue will not be explored here. However, Chandrakīrti seems mostly to have used the term Proponents of Consciousness in his root text and autocommentary. The Karmapa, in his commentary, sometimes uses the Tibetan-originated term Proponents of Mind Only, but without explicitly alluding to the possibility of a different school. Yet at the end of the section on the refutation of a nondual dependent nature, the Karmapa makes a curious statement: “There are many subschools, such as the Practitioners of Yogic Conduct and the Proponents of Consciousness, who hold different views about which of the three natures are substantially established and so on. One can elaborate.”
51 Acharya Lama Tenpa Gyaltsen, in his teachings at Nitartha Institute, has explored the question of whether or not the “dependent nature consciousness” refuted by Chandrakīrti is synonymous with the all-base consciousness within the Proponents of Consciousness’ eightfold collection of consciousnesses. Chandrakīrti does not seem to provide a clear answer to this question, as he never directly equates “dependent nature consciousness” with “all-base consciousness.”
52 ALTG.
53 Oral teachings by Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche.
54 These two correlate with the two types of ignorance mentioned earlier in this introduction, in the summary of the “Introduction to the Teachings on Emptiness.”
55 “Imputed” in this context is used interchangeably with “imaginary.”
56 These two schools are definite anomalies within the Buddhist tradition because of their assertions of the existence of the self of persons.
57 “Tīrthikas” most commonly is used by Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophers as a term to refer to the Hindu schools of ancient India. However, and especially in the Middle Way context, it can also refer to any philosophical school, including Buddhist schools, that mistakenly posits truly existent phenomena.
58 Oral teachings by Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche.
59 The next two lines of the quotation are: “The emptiness endowed with the supreme of all aspects/ Is not like the former emptiness.”
60 Arya-mahābherīhārakaparivarta-nāma-Mahāyāna-sūtra, Pakpa Ngawoche Chenpö Le-u Shejawa Tegpa Chenpö Do/’phags pa rnga bo che chen po’i le’u zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo.
61 Arya-mahāmegha, Pakpa Trin Chenpo/’phags pa sprin chen po.
62 Laṅkāvatārasūtra, Langkar Shekpe Do/langkar gshegs pa’i mdo.
63 Mañjushrīmūlakalpa, Jampal Tsawe Gyü/’jam dpal rtsa ba’i rgyud.
64 “Moon” (Chandra, Dawa/zla ba) is a poetic reference to Chandrakīrti (Dawa Drakpa/zla ba grags pa).
65 “Lotus in hand” is a reference to Avalokiteshvara, from whom the Karmapas are viewed as inseparable.
66 A play on the name of the Eighth Karmapa, whose name, Mikyö, is also the name of the buddha Akṣhobhya.
67 Dewar shekpa/bde bar gshegs pa: literally, “blissfully gone ones” or “those who have gone to bliss” or “those who go blissfully,” an epithet for buddhas.
68 The Entrance to the Middle Way of Chandrakīrti.
69 Here, as to the distinction drawn between dharma wheels and dharma discourses, “dharma wheels” seems to refer to groupings of teachings given by the Buddha for which there were definite and predictable topics, audiences, and locations of the teachings. “Dharma discourses,” however, is a grouping of the teachings that does not involve such definitiveness of audience and so forth, but rather is a grouping of spontaneously spoken teachings. “Dharma gates,” on the other hand, is a categorization that includes all of the teachings of the Buddha, both dharma wheels and dharma discourses. (ALTG)
70 1) The dharma wheel of the four noble truths (denpa shi/bden pa bzhi), 2) the dharma wheel of noncharacteristics (tsen-nyi mepa/mtshan nyid med pa), and 3) the dharma wheel of excellent distinction (legpar nampar chewa/legs par rnam par phye ba).
71 The twelve branches of scripture (sung-rab yenlak chunyi/gsung rab yan lag bcu gnyis) are: 1) the Sūtra Collection (Do-De/mdo sde), 2) Melodic Proclamations (Yang kyi Nyepe De/dbyangs kyis bsnyad pa’i sde), 3) Prophecies (Lungdu Tenpe De/lung du bstan pa’i sde), 4) Verses (Tsiksu Chepe De/tshigs su bcad pa’i sde), 5) Directed Statements (Chedu Jöpe De/ched du brjod pa’i sde), 6) Declarations (Lengshī De/gleng gzhi’i sde), 7) Narratives (Tokpa Jöpe De/rtogs pa brjod pa’i sde), 8) Parables (Detabu Jungwe De/de lta bu byung ba’i sde), 9) Previous Births (Kyerabpe De/skye rabs pa’i sde), 10) Extensive Sayings (Shintu Gyepe De/shin tu rgyas pa’i sde), 11) Marvels (Medu Jungwe De/rmad du byung ba’i sde), and 12) Determinations (Tenla Pabpe De/gtan la phab pa’i sde).
72 Lines one, two, and three of this quotation correspond, respectively, to the three levels of analysis: the level of no analysis, the level of slight analysis, and the level of thorough analysis. See Introduction, pp. 3–5.
73 This is an epithet of Maitreya.
74 I.e., to impermanence, suffering, selflessness, and peace as being truly existent things.
75 This quotation also follows the three stages of analysis.
76 The pleasant existences within saṃsāra.
77 The attainment of 1) mere freedom from saṃsāra or 2) the complete omniscience of buddhahood.
78 Also known as Ashvagoṣha (Tayang/rta dbyangs).
79 As to the inclusion of Shāntideva in the list of the Proponents of the Model Texts, this seems to be done here not due to chronology but rather because all major masters of the Buddhism of India and Tibet accepted Shāntideva as a Follower of the Middle Way. However, Shāntideva is usually considered a Consequentialist as opposed to being part of the group of masters whose teachings existed before the Consequentialist-Autonomist split developed.
80 Literally, “[Authors of] the Model Texts of the Middle Way.”
81 Madhyamakālaṃkāra, Uma Gyen/dbu ma rgyan, composed by Shāntarakṣhita (Shiwa Tso/zhi ba ‘tsho).
82 Madhyamakāloka, Uma Nangwa/dbu ma snang ba, composed by Kamalashīla.
83 Satyadvayavibhaṅga, Den-nyi Namje/bden gnyis rnam ’byed, composed by Jñānagharba (Yeshe Nyingpo/ye shes snying po).
84 Brunnhölzl (2004, p.462) explains that certain streams of explanation in the tradition of Maitreya/Asaṅga came to be known as False Aspectarian Middle Way. This statement by the Karmapa, therefore, seems to be a refutation of that system as a genuine expression of the Middle Way teachings.
85 Mutekpa/mu stegs pa or mutekje/mu stegs byed, “those who hold up the edges”: this term, most often used to describe non-Buddhist philosophical systems, is here used to describe any philosophical system, Buddhist or non-Buddhist, that holds to an extreme view of reality, i.e., of existence, nonexistence, and so on.
86 Another name for Atisha (ca. 980-1052)
87 The three types of supreme knowledge (sherab sum/shes rab gsum) are the supreme knowledge arising from hearing (töpa/thos pa), the supreme knowledge arising from contemplation (sampa/bsam pa), and the supreme knowledge arising from meditation (gompa/sgom pa).
88 bKa’ gdams pa is a lineage founded in Tibet by the Indian master Atisha.
89 Once again moon (Chandra) is used as a reference to Chandrakīrti. His name in full means “Famous Moon.”
90 Who himself was a direct student of Nāgārjuna.
91 The “lords of the three families” refers to Avalokiteshvara, Mañjushrī, and Vajrapaṇi. (ATW)
92 The second Shamar (zhva dmar) incarnation.
93 The first Gyaltsab (rgyal tshab) incarnation.
94 The first Sangye Nyenpa (sangs rgyas mnyan pa) incarnation. TBRC provides two sets of dates different from those given here: 1455/1457-1510/1525. Kagyü Office gives his dates as 1457-1525.
95 The fifth Shamar incarnation.
96 The greater Saraha is Saraha himself; the lesser Saraha is Shavaripa.
97 This lineage is also called “Kagyü” (bka’ brgyud) in Tibetan, but it has been translated into English here to provide distinction from the section heading entitled “The lineage of the precious Kagyü itself.”
98 Otherwise known as Dromtönpa (’brom ston pa).
99 I.e., there are two alternative lineages being described here; one passing through Gampopa to Düsum Khyenpa, the other being received by Düsum Khyenpa directly from the Kadampa masters.
100 me-gak/med dgag. This type of negation, in contrast to its counterpart, the implicative negation (mayin gak/ma yin dgag), is a total refutation of its target subject that does not leave any implication of the presence of something else in its wake. For example, the statement, “All phenomena are devoid of true existence” is a nonimplicative negation. Similarly, “The eye lacks true existence” is also a nonimplicative negation, because even though the subject of the statement (the eye) is not inclusive of other phenomena, still the eye’s lack of true existence leaves no implication that other phenomena indeed truly exist. By contrast, the statement, “These flowers were not picked during the night” would be an implicative negation: it refutes the possibility of the flowers being picked at night, but implies in its wake that they were picked during the day.
101 Patsab Lotsawa Nyima Drak (Tib.pa tshab lo ts’a ba nyi ma grags), b. 1055.
102 Könchok Yenlak and Namgyal Drakpa, as above.
103 As will be obvious, the following two paragraphs are highly cryptic and condensed references to special views and practices in the Vajrayāna. This section of the Ṭīkā contains a very long and detailed discussion of this topic, including analyses of several Tibetan masters’ views. As in many other sections of this book, the author is assuming that the reader has sufficient background knowledge to appreciate what is being said. Yet since the sūtrayāna, and not the mantrayāna, approach to the Middle Way is the main topic of this book, an attempt will not be made in the footnotes to unpack the mysteries of this brief foray into the mantrayāna. For a helpful discussion about this topic, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 61-68.
104 The first Sangye Nyenpa incarnation.
105 Another name for Shākya Chokden (sh’a kāya mchog ldan, 1428-1507).
106 Podong Chokle Namgyal (bo dong phyogs las rnam rgyal, 1376-1451).
107 Tsongkapa Lobzang Drakpa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419).
110 In his commentary to Atisha’s Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment, Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Thaye teaches that the titles of Indian treatises are stated in their original language in order to show the authenticity of the text, help students develop appreciation for the efforts of the paṇḍitas and translators, and plant a seed of familiarity with the Sanskrit language. (Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Thaye 2005, p. 6)
111 The “three obscurations” are: 1) the afflictive obscurations (nyönmong kyi dribpa/nyon mongs kyi sgrib pa), 2) the cognitive obscurations (sheje dribpa/shes bya’i sgrib pa), and 3) obscurations of absorption (nyomjuk gi dribpa/snyo ’jug gi sgrib pa). (ATW)
112 Here the term “elaboration” (tröpa/spros pa), which in Middle Way teachings usually refers in a negative way to conceptual fabrications, is used to indicate the variety and complexity of the enlightened activity of the buddhas. (ATW)
113 Mikyö Dorje says that “someone who accepts the view” of the Middle Way is someone who, through following the venerable Nāgārjuna, has developed a full understanding of the texts that speak of the lack of inherent nature of all phenomena. “Someone who has developed realization,” in the tradition of the Entrance to the Middle Way, refers to noble beings of any of the three vehicles who rest in the meditative equipoise of the true nature of phenomena. The four permutations of these two types of persons are 1) someone who accepts the view yet has no realization, 2) someone who has realization but does not accept the view, 3) someone who both accepts the view and has realization, and 4) someone who neither accepts the view nor possesses realization. The first, third, and fourth permutations are straightforward. The second (having realization but not accepting the view) is explained as follows: there are some noble beings of the Mahāyāna who have realized, but do not, at least outwardly, accept, the view of the Middle Way. They do so as a skillful means of communicating with certain types of students, namely those who practice the lower vehicles. Also, there are certain types of hearers and solitary realizers—those with dull faculties or those who gain liberation due to supreme knowledge alone (i.e., without compassion)—who have gained realization of the Middle Way but do not have the intellectual capacity to familiarize themselves with the methods and so forth that are presented in the Middle Way tradition. Consequently, these types of beings would not be capable of teaching the view of the Middle Way to others, even though they had gained realization of it in a personal way. Finally, in some cases, due to the power of the methods of the secret Vajrayāna, it is possible for even ordinary beings to gain the realization of the Middle Way in their mindstreams and yet still be incapable of perfectly explaining the view of the Middle Way to others. With respect to the third permutation, someone who has both gained realization of the Middle Way and accepts the view, Mikyö Dorje says that any instance of their accepting the view is only a display for the sake of others, as is explained in the following paragraph.
114 Mañjushrī’s name in Tibetan is Jampalyang/’jam dpal dbyangs. Jam means “gentle,” pal means “glorious,” and yang means “melodious.”
115 In Mikyö Dorje’s commentary, these two benefits are listed as 1) temporary benefit (nekab/gnas skabs) and 2) ultimate benefit (tartug/mthar thug).
116 This section explains what is commonly known in the Indo-Tibetan commentarial tradition as the “four properties, the purpose and so on” (gö sog chö shi/dgos sogs chos bzhi). They are: 1) the object of expression (jöja/brjod bya), 2) the purpose (göpa/dgos pa), 3) the essential purpose (nying-gö/nying dgos) or purpose-of-the-purpose (göpe göpa/dgos pa’i dgos pa), and 4) the connections (drelwa/’brel ba). The “connections” describes the relationships between the first three, and these four are most commonly presented in the order in which they are listed here.
117 As will be explained in the chapter on the Consequentialist-Autonomist distinction (p. 159), the Consequentialists follow Nāgārjuna’s declaration that it is self-defeating to hold any thesis about anything from one’s own point of view. For the Consequentialists, therefore, all theses and positions are only repetitions of others’ views that are voiced from the perspective of others. The Autonomists, on the other hand, contend that in some cases one must hold and express a position of one’s own in order to prove the validity of emptiness to others or in order to correct others’ wrong thoughts.
118 The five paths are the path of accumulation (tsok lam/tshogs lam), the path of juncture (jor lam/sbyor lam), the path of seeing (tong lam/mthong lam) (which corresponds to the first bodhisattva ground), the path of meditation (gom lam/bsgom lam) (which corresponds to bodhisattva grounds two through ten), and the path beyond training (mi lobpe lam/mi slob pa’i lam) (which corresponds to the ground of buddhahood).
119 The eleven grounds are the ten bodhisattva grounds and the ground of buddhahood.
120 An epithet for solitary realizers.
121 An epithet for buddhas.
122 Tathāgata is an epithet for the Buddha meaning “thus-gone one.”
123 Here the two syllables of the term nyentö/nyan thos are used to describe two activities: 1) hearing teachings from the buddhas and 2) causing others to hear them, i.e., propagating or proclaiming them to others.
124 “Inexhaustible” is a quality of the fruition of arhathood attained by hearers, also called the result of separation (draldre/bral ’bras). It refers to a state of irreversibility, the state that, once attained, will not be exhausted. (ALTG)
125 “Proponents of Things” primarily refers to the two lower Buddhist philosophical systems of the Sūtra Followers (Sautrāntika, Do Depa/mdo sde pa) and the Particularists (Vaibhāṣhika, Jedrak Mawa/bye brag smra ba), because these two schools propound truly existent things in the material world (in the form of partless particles) as well as in the realm of consciousness (in the form of indivisible moments of consciousness).
126 The first seven bodhisattva grounds are called “impure grounds” because on them some mental afflictions have not been relinquished.
127 Grounds eight through ten are called pure grounds because on them all mental afflictions have been relinquished.
128 I.e., buddhas.
129 Rendawa Shönu Lodrö (red mda’ ba gzhon nu blo gros, 1349-1412), the early Tibetan master of the Sakya lineage, in his commentary on the Entrance to the Middle Way called The Torch That Clarifies Suchness (Dekonanyi Salwe Drönme/de kho na nyid gsal ba’i sgron me) lists six ways in which the example of a water mill is congruent with the suffering of sentient beings in saṃsāra: 1) a water mill is bound by a rope, whereas sentient beings are bound tightly by the rope of karma and mental afflictions created by their fixation on self and entities connected to the self, 2) a water mill is subject to the power of its operator, whereas sentient beings are subject to the power of dualistic consciousness, 3) the water in a water mill spins about at random in the well, whereas sentient beings spin about in the great well of cyclic existence, 4) the water in a water mill naturally flows downward and is only drawn up with a great deal of effort, whereas sentient beings tend to migrate toward the lower realms of saṃsāra, and can only be released from this downward migration and drawn up to the human and god realms by applying a great deal of effort, 5) the first, middle, and final stages of the cycle of a water mill cannot be readily ascertained, whereas the stages of the sequence of the mental afflictions, karma, and birth of sentient beings are also difficult to ascertain, and 6) a water mill is progressively worn down with use every day, whereas sentient beings are battered daily by the three kinds of suffering. (Rendawa Shönu Lodrö 1983, pp. 46-47) Mikyö Dorje explains the example in a similar way in the Ṭīkā.
130 Here in his commentary Mikyö Dorje says “adults” (genpa/rgan pa) instead of “genuine beings” (dampa/dam pa).
131 These are explained in detail in the chapter on the qualities of the bodhisattva grounds (p. 505).
132 Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche explains that “power” mainly refers to the bodhisattvas’ power to purify their own obscurations and their power to help others purify obscurations. (Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche 2004, p. 58)
133 The “increase of karmic maturation” (nampar minpa pelwa/rnam par smin pa ’phel ba) refers to the stage of a bodhisattva’s progress in which the results of the bodhisattva’s earlier engagement in generosity and so forth are beginning to bear fruit. (ATW)
134 This verse was translated by Elizabeth Callahan (Nalandabodhi website). The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the Ṭīkā.
135 One hundred vigintillion equals ten to the sixty-fifth power. This number was phrased in the original text as “one hundred thousand times countless (drangme/grangs med) (ten to the fifty-ninth power) times ten.” In all instances of such complex naming of numbers throughout the text, the English (U.S.) name for the resultant figure was chosen as a substitute for a literal translation of the words in the root verses and commentary.
136 Möchö kyi sempa/mos spyod kyi sems dpa’. This term refers primarily to aspirants on the path of juncture, but it can also apply to those on the path of accumulation. Those engaging in the conduct of devoted interest have given rise to relative bodhichitta—the wish to attain perfect enlightenment for the benefit of others—but have not engendered the ultimate bodhichitta, which is born on the path of seeing, or first bodhisattva ground.
137 “Definite separation” is the first stage of fruition of the hearers, the state of “stream enterer.” This is the hearers’ equivalent of the bodhisattvas’ path of seeing. The bodhisattva engaging in the conduct of devoted interest, in not yet having attained the path of seeing of bodhisattvas, is similar to someone possessing the disposition of a hearer who has not attained the definite separation sought after by hearers. (ALTG)
138 Bhagavatī, Chomden Dema/bcom Idan ’das ma, used here as an epithet for the Prajñāpāramitā, or Perfection of Supreme Knowledge, sūtras.
139 The “three spheres” (kor sum/’khor gsum) are conceptions of true existence directed toward three axes or constituents of any given action: the performer of the action, the object to which the action is directed, and the action itself—in short, the agent, object, and action.
140 This refers to the time of taking bodhisattva vows. (ATW)
141 See more on the qualities they attain in the chapter entitled “Qualities of the Bodhisattva Grounds.”
142 For example, the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths: impermanence and so on.
143 Nyentö gangzak zung shi ya gye/nyan thos gang zag zung bzhi ya brgyad: the hearers’ results have four stages, and each of these stages has two subdivisions. The results are therefore traditionally called “the four pairs of results and the eight single results.” The four stages are 1) the arhat (drachom/dgra bcom), 2) the nonreturner (chir midogpa/phyir mi ldog pa), 3) the once-returner (chir dogpa/phyir ldog pa), and 4) the stream-enterer (gyun shug pa/rgyun zhugs pa). Each of these four stages has two subdivisions: 1) those who are entering into the given stage and 2) those who have attained the final result of the given stage. In a manner opposite to the enumeration of the bodhisattva grounds, the results of the hearers are numbered from the most advanced to the most rudimentary. (The arhat is the highest result for hearers; the stream-enterer is the starting point of the resultant stages. Just as the eighth stage of the hearers’ fruition is the starting point for hearers, the first bodhisattva ground is the starting point for the bodhisattvas’ attainment of the fruition.)
144 Both the pre-stream-enterer and the stream-enterer who has attained the result are examples of an individual who has attained the hearers’ path of seeing.
145 A scholar from the Indian Vikramalashīla Monastery who lived around the beginning of the twelfth century. (Ruegg 1981, p. 114)
146 A twelfth century Kashmiri master who authored the only extant Indian commentary to The Entrance to the Middle Way. (Ruegg 1981, p. 113)
147 All of these reasonings are directed at someone who asserts that hearers and solitary realizers do not realize the selflessness of phenomena. The reasonings show the faulty consequences of such a view. As such, they demonstrate the standard logical approach of the Consequentialists: they set forth a predicate that is either absurd or that the opponents would not want to accept; and, to prove such a predicate, they state a reason that is part of the opponents’ belief system, i.e., something they accept. In the case of each reasoning, the Karmapa is not trying to prove the predicate. He is trying to show that the reason, which the opponents accept (not the Karmapa) is illogical because of its proving an absurd predicate. These three reasonings, along with the footnotes, will be best understood by being read several times.
148 It would be undesirable for a follower of Chandrakīrti’s tradition to accept this proposition, because Chandrakīrti clearly states in verse 1.8 and its commentary that the bodhisattvas do not outshine the hearers in terms of their knowledge, or realization, until the seventh ground.
149 For the opponents this is true: the hearers and solitary realizers do not realize the selflessness of phenomena, therefore they have not fully understood how all phenomena lack inherent nature.
150 The part of the sentence from “just as” onward contains the traditional element called the concordant example (tun pe/mthun dpe). The concordant example is used to prove how the reason necessitates or entails the predicate. “Worldly freedom from attachment” refers to the fourth, or highest, meditative concentration of the form realm, which is experienced within saṃsāra. It proves that the reason entails the predicate, because people who have gained freedom from worldly attachment have not fully understood that things lack inherent nature, and for that reason they are inferior to bodhisattvas in terms of realization. (ALTG/ATW)
151 This is an undesirable proposition for the opponents, because it is universally accepted that arhats completely relinquish all mental afflictions.
152 This refers to the highest level of the formless realm, called “the peak of existence.” This is the level, according to the Buddhist presentation, attained by deities such as Īshvara. The peak of existence entails the mental afflictions of saṃsāra since it is not beyond the three realms and individuals who have achieved the peak of existence do not realize the true nature of phenomena. (ALTG)
153 Those who assert that the hearers, etc. do not realize phenomenal selflessness say that the arhats realize that the aggregates, sources, and constituents are devoid of a self of persons, but they do not realize the emptiness of the aggregates themselves. They apprehend them as being impermanent, selfless, of the nature of suffering, and so on.
154 The translations of the Precious Garland quotations were greatly assisted and informed by Hopkins 2007.
155 Clinging to the aggregates, clinging to an “I,” and the creation of karma.
156 From the Precious Garland.
157 Being distinct from each other or being merged.
158 An epithet of the Buddha.
159 From the Precious Garland.
160 In the approach to liberation of the lower vehicles, the Buddha taught karma and mental afflictions as things of which one’s mindstream must be “emptied” or “exhausted,” without placing much emphasis on the fact that the karma and mental afflictions are, from the very outset, “empty” or “exhausted” of their own inherent existence. Therefore this quotation is teaching that, though the approaches of these two vehicles are different, the exhaustion sought after by aspirants of the lower vehicle is indeed of the same quality as the emptiness that is taught in the Mahāyāna as the nonarising nature of all phenomena. The difference in approach is that in the Mahāyāna exhaustion is viewed as the nature of such phenomena as karma and mental afflictions from the very outset, as opposed to a reality that only becomes true at the time of attaining the result of individual liberation.
161 From Fundamental Wisdom.
162 From Nāgārjuna’s Praise to the Transcendent.
163 In this section of his Ṭīkā, Mikyö Dorje examines two views held by “some Tibetan masters.” The first view holds that there is a difference of extensiveness regarding what is to be proven—the selflessness of phenomena. The second view holds that this distinction applies to the means of proof—the logical reasonings that prove phenomenal selflessness. He says that the first of these views is untenable because the selflessness of phenomena is not established from its own side; therefore no distinction of brevity or extensiveness could apply to it. Furthermore, all three types of noble beings (hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas) realize the exact same phenomenal selflessness, which is nothing other than the nonexistence of phenomena’s true characteristics, which all ordinary beings mistakenly perceive as being real. Secondly, Mikyö Dorje notes that a difference in the extensiveness of reasonings cannot be the difference between the vehicle of the hearers and the Mahāyāna : if hearers realized phenomenal selflessness on the basis of a brief presentation of reasonings, followers of Mahāyāna would have no need for more extensive reasonings. The extensive proofs of selflessness in the Mahāyāna would merely be redundant. The actual difference in extensiveness between the views of the lower vehicles and the Mahāyāna lies in the extent to which the relationship between appearing phenomena (chöchen/chos can) and the true nature of phenomena (chönyi/chos nyid) is realized. Hearers and solitary realizers realize phenomenal selfless in relation to the aggregates, sources, and constituents of their own personal continua and in relation to the uncontaminated truth of the path. Bodhisattvas, on the other hand, realize the selflessness of phenomena in relation to countless appearing phenomena of the relative truth—buddha nature, infinite buddhas in infinite atoms, and more. Buddhas, moreover, cognize phenomenal selflessness in relation to all relative phenomena, including the kāyas and buddha wisdoms.
164 I.e., great compassion and the realization of emptiness.
165 The Tibetan term for “perfection” (parol tu chinpa/pha rol tu phyin pa, Skt. pāramitā) literally means “gone to the other side” or “gone to the other shore.”
166 There are seven nonvirtuous actions of body and speech: three for body (taking life, stealing, and sexual misconduct) and four for speech (harsh speech, inciting discord, lying, and idle chatter). The three virtuous actions of mind are relinquishing the three nonvirtuous mental actions (covetousness, malicious intent, and wrong view).
167 The ten virtuous actions are to refrain from the ten nonvirtuous actions or, alternatively, to practice the opposite of the ten nonvirtuous actions.
168 A corpse will float on the surface of the ocean and then be tossed to the shore.
169 Narsem kyi ngöpo gu/mnar sems kyi dngos po dgu: The following nine thoughts: 1) my enemy has harmed me, 2) my enemy is harming me, 3) my enemy will harm me, 4) my enemy has harmed my friend, 5) my enemy is harming my friend, 6) my enemy will harm my friend, 7) my enemy has assisted my other enemy, 8) my enemy is assisting my other enemy, and 9) my enemy will assist my other enemy. (GTCD)
170 Literally, “It binds one in relationships with nongenuine beings.”
171 These are four levels of concentration in the form realm. They are simply called the first concentration, the second concentration, the third concentration, and the fourth concentration.
172 The four formless absorptions are four absorption states of the formless realm: 1) limitless space, 2) limitless consciousness, 3) utter nonexistence, and 4) not existence, not nonexistence.
173 Loving-kindness (jampa/byams pa), compassion (nyingje/snying rje), joy (gawa/dga’ ba), and impartiality (tang-nyom/btang snyoms).
174 The five higher cognitions are 1) the miraculous higher cognition, 2) the divine eye, 3) the divine ear, 4) recollection of previous states, and 5) knowing the minds of others.
175 Realizing “unmoving interdependence” (tendrel powa mepa/rten ’brel pho ba med pa) refers to realizing the emptiness for the bases of the twelve links of interdependent arising and therefore being free from the forward progression (lugjung/lugs ’byung) of the twelve links. Realizing the “nondisintegration of interdependence” refers to the same insight producing the result of being free from the reverse progression (lukdog/lugs ldog) of the twelve links. (ALTG/ATW)
176 Generosity, discipline, and patience.
177 “Marked by one hundred merits” means that the forms of the buddhas, which display attributes such as the major and minor marks of enlightenment, bear the signs of having accumulated a limitless amount of merit.
178 I.e., wisdom.
179 During the explanation of verse 3.1.
180 See p. 760, note 549.
181 The devaputra māras are said to be children of the desire realm gods who, due to their jealousy, interfere with other beings’ virtuous actions.
182 Mikyö Dorje cites the example of the teaching on “the eleven truths” in The Sūtra on the Five Grounds of Bodhisattvas (Sempa Sa Ngape Do/sems dpa’ sa lnga pa’i mdo) and states that those eleven can also be placed into the categories of the two truths.
183 I.e., Nāgārjuna.
184 “Glorious” (Shrī, Pal/dpal) is a name that Nāgārjuna received upon his monastic ordination. (Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche 2004, p. 15)
185 Another way of referring to the Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Uma Tsawa Sherab/dbu ma rtsa ba shes rab).
186 The Buddhist philosophical systems of the Particularists, Sutra-Followers, and Proponents of Consciousness.
187 Rendawa Shönu Lodrö (Red mda’ ba gzhon nu blo gros, 1349-1412) was an early Tibetan master who composed a commentary to the Entrance to the Middle Way entitled A Lamp to Illuminate Suchness: An Explanation of the Entrance to the Middle Way (dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad de kho na nyidgsal baï sgron ma). This commentary is widely regarded as authoritative in the Tibetan lineages of the Middle Way.
188 The four extremes are as expressed in the above theses refuting arising from the four extremes. Alternatively, the four extremes can be listed as existence, nonexistence, both, and neither. The eight extremes are those listed by Nāgārjuna in his Fundamental Wisdom’s opening praise: cessation (gakpa/’gag pa), arising (kyewa/skye ba), nihilism (chepa/chad pa), eternalism (takpa/rtag pa), coming (ongwa/’ong ba), going (drowa/’gro ba), singularity (chik/gcig), and multiplicity (tade/tha dad).
189 I.e., the only perspective from which they say they are Consequentialists is the perspective of others, not their own perspective.
190 The four fearlessnesses of buddhas are listed and explained in the commentary to verse 6.210cd, pp. 480–481.
191 Lochen Kyapchok Palzang composed a commentary to the Entrance to the Middle Way entitled A Thorough Clarification of Suchness as Elucidated in the Ocean of Scriptures: An Extensive Explanation of the Entrance to the Middle Way (dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa gsung rab rgya mtsho’i de kho na nyid rab tu gsal ba).
192 This is challenging material. Readers may wish to read this entire section three or more times if they have difficulty understanding some sections on the first read.
193 A reference to Tsongkapa and his commentators in the Geluk tradition.
194 The valid cognition of the power of things (ngöpo topshuk kyi tsema/dngos po stob zhugs kyi tshad ma) is a system of valid cognition in which things, at least conventionally, are regarded as holding their own qualities objectively. For someone who accepts this valid cognition, fire really is hot and burning. Those properties exist in fire and nowhere else; they are testament to the objective “power” of fire. (ATW) Mikyö Dorje describes the “power of things” as the notion that things perform a function by virtue of their own, real nature, not by depending on other things. The function as well is viewed as being real. (Ṭīkā, p. 137)
195 An example of this category is the statement, “Sound, the subject, is impermanent, because it is produced,” directed at a Vedantin. The reason (or “inference”), that sound is produced, is accepted by or renowned to the Vedantins themselves.
196 An example of this category is Chandrakīrti’s use of consequences in his refutation of arising from other: if things arose from inherently different things, it would follow that darkness could arise from candle flames, because darkness is different from the candle flames. The reason is logically included in the predicate, but the predicate itself is undesirable for someone who accepts arising from other. This absurd consequence highlights the self-contradictions inherent in the view of arising from other. This reasoning is similar to reductio ad absurdum in Western philosophy.
197 Neutrality through equivalence means that the opponents’ reason is neutral, or powerless, because it equally proves the position opposite to their own. For example, someone might try to logically prove that there are no past or future lives because they cannot be perceived at present. However, their reasoning can equally be used to support the opposite position: the nonexistence of past and future lives cannot be established, because it cannot be seen at present.
198 The reason given is only a reiteration of the predicate and does nothing more to prove it. Chandrakīrti and the Karmapa highlight this fault as it applies to the Proponents of Consciousness at verse 6.68abc, p. 264.
199 This refers to the Consequentialists’ own lack of a thesis.
200 In the Ṭīkā, Karmapa Mikyö Dorje says that, firstly, the assertion that the Autonomists accept the perceptions and inferences of ordinary beings as valid cognitions is misleading. Even though they do use such presentations to communicate with ordinary beings, they do not hold such presentations as being authentic valid cognition from their own side as Followers of the Middle Way. Mikyö Dorje then uses quotations from Bhāvaviveka and Kamalashīla (both Autonomist masters) to corroborate this. He also discusses in detail how the Autonomists do not use logic in the same manner as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. See Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 341-360, for an extensive discussion of this topic based on several passages from Mikyö Dorje.
201 The main progenitor of what came to be known in Tibet as the Autonomist school.
202 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the Ṭīkā.
203 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the Ṭīkā.
204 Reading rang sde for rang cag in the Tibetan.
205 This refers to the Consequentialists’ approach of using their counterparts’ own reasoning in order to show the latter their own mistakes.
206 The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way.
207 The contention that either Buddhapālita or Bhāvaviveka was a direct disciple of Nāgārjuna seems to be at odds with most modern Western scholarship. It also does not seem to be held by many contemporary Tibetan masters.
208 Who follow the approach to logic of Bhāvaviveka.
209 Who follow the approach to logic of Buddhapālita.
210 The Consequentialist Follower of the Middle Way.
211 For the purpose of engaging with their counterparts, the Consequentialists temporarily assume that the subject and so on are established by valid cognition.
212 That subjects, predicates, and reasons are neither established by reasoning consciousnesses analyzing the ultimate truth nor are they established by the noble ones’ wisdom of meditative equipoise.
213 That “conventional valid cognition” is itself not even valid cognition.
214 This verse is found in the refutation of the Proponents of Consciousness on p. 282.
215 Presumably a reference to Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary to the Entrance to the Middle Way.
216 See Appendix I for the corresponding section of Chandrakīrti’s Lucid Words.
217 This corresponds to section I (p. 580) of the Lucid Words Appendix.
218 Chandrakīrti’s commentary to the Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way.
219 Here Chandrakīrti, in Lucid Words, is quoting Buddhapālita from the latter’s commentary to Fundamental Wisdom, conveniently entitled Buddhapālita.
220 See the corresponding footnote in Appendix I for an explanation of why “endless” appears here instead of “absurd.”
221 I.e., that being established at the time of their cause would not entail or necessitate the pointlessness of their arising.
222 They must arise again or, in other words, transform from the state of being unmanifest to the state of being manifest.
223 This corresponds to section II (p. 580) of the Lucid Words Appendix.
224 Here Chandrakīrti, in Lucid Words, is quoting Bhāvaviveka from the latter’s commentary to Fundamental Wisdom, entitled Lamp of Wisdom (Prajñāpradīpa, Sherab Drönma/shes rab sgron ma).
225 I.e., probative arguments the properties of which are established for both the defender and the challenger.
226 The “inclusion” is the capacity of the reason to prove the predicate. In this case, however, the Karmapa uses “inclusion” mainly to point to the faults that Bhāvaviveka perceives in the predicate itself, as formulated by Buddhapālita. In the following paragraph the Karmapa will paraphrase Bhāvaviveka’s criticism of the “subject-quality,” which essentially means the validity of the reason itself. In short, Bhāvaviveka says that Buddhapālita has an inclusion that is contradictory and a subject-quality that is not established.
227 The Enumerators hold that clearly manifest results—not results that exist in an unclear way at the time of their causes—arise from themselves, i.e., from their own essential nature, which exists in causes. Therefore if Buddhapālita’s statement holds the implication that Bhāvaviveka claims it does, it does nothing to disprove the Enumerators’ position. Thus it contradicts the thesis that things do not arise from themselves. According to Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita should have established this thesis through an autonomous reasoning—a formal statement of logic whose subject-quality, inclusion, and example are accepted by both parties of the debate—rather than through consequences alone.
228 This refers to Buddhapālita’s statement that, “Things that already exist by way of their own identity do not need to arise again.” If this is construed by the Enumerators as Bhāvaviveka suggests it would be, it is problematic, since, for the Enumerators, clearly manifest results do not arise again, once they are manifest. For the Enumerators, the notion of “arising from self” is the arising or “manifesting” of a result from a cause that bears the result’s “own identity” or “essential nature.”
229 See note 228.
230 The “branches of affirmation” are the subject-quality, the inclusion, and an example that upholds the inclusion.
231 And, as we saw in the quotation from Lucid Words that began this section, Bhāvaviveka also claims that Buddhapālita’s consequence implies that things arise from others. This is explained in the next paragraph.
232 This corresponds to section III (p. 580) of the Lucid Words Appendix.
233 In the case of “…because it does not employ arguments or examples,” the full reasoning would be “That [refutation] is illogical, because it does not employ arguments or examples.”
234 This corresponds to section IV (p. 581) of the Lucid Words Appendix.
235 Accepting and maintaining a position of the “nonexistence” of arising from self would, in the context of analysis of the actual state of things, be a conceptual elaboration.
236 Here the Karmapa makes a commentary on the two Nāgārjuna verses that Chandrakīrti includes in this section of Lucid Words. He ties the meaning of the verses specifically to Bhāvaviveka’s critique of Buddhapālita, with Buddhapālita, rather than Nāgārjuna, speaking in the voice of the first person.
237 This corresponds to section V (p. 581) of the Lucid Words Appendix.
238 This corresponds to section VI (p. 582) of the Lucid Words Appendix.
239 This follows Chandrakīrti’s assertion that Buddhapālita’s original consequence statement, “Things do not arise from themselves, because their arising would be pointless and their arising would be endless,” implied a five-part probative argument, as Chandrakīrti presented in Lucid Words and as the Karmapa sets forth below.
240 See footnote 653 (pp. 583–584 in the Lucid Words Appendix) for an explanation of how the traditional Indian five-membered probative argument, along with an example from traditional Indian Buddhist logic, is used here. Observe also how the Karmapa simplifies the words in comparison with Chandrakīrti’s original phrasing.
241 I.e., number two, “because they already exist by way of their own identity.”
242 The Enumerators would not criticize an argument that they themselves accept.
243 The example accepted by others is the “clearly manifest vase.” This is something that the Enumerators accept as not needing to arise again. It is the example that Buddhapālita uses to uphold the inclusion of his reason, “because they [already] exist by way of their own identity,” which in turn affirms his thesis, that all things do not arise from themselves. Just as a clearly appearing vase, since it already exists by way of its own identity, does not need to arise again, so all things—including unmanifest results such as vases when they are lumps of clay—because of existing (according to the Enumerators) by way of their own identity even at the time of their causes, do not need to arise again. Buddhapālita thus uses an argument or reason and an example that are accepted by the Enumerators to force them to accept a thesis that they had not previously accepted.
244 This corresponds to section VII (p. 585) of the Lucid Words Appendix.
245 Arising from self, arising from other, arising from both, and causeless arising.
246 Bhāvaviveka is asking about Buddhapālita’s consequence statement, “Things, the subject, do not arise from themselves, because their arising would be pointless and because their arising would be endless.” The “predicate” of the consequence refers to things “not arising from themselves.” According to Bhāvaviveka’s thinking, the standard rules of inferential valid cognition that apply to probative arguments (guidelines that come mainly from the tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) dictate that the opposite of the predicate must be true in relation to the opposite of the reason. Consider the classic Buddhist probative argument, “Sound, the subject, is impermanent, because it is produced.” In that example, that which is not produced is necessarily not impermanent. Bhāvaviveka attempts to extend this general logic principle of probative arguments to the predicate of Buddhapālita’s consequence statement. To Bhāvaviveka, a statement of not arising from self because of being produced pointlessly and endlessly would necessitate accepting arising from other because of being produced sensibly and in a limited way.
247 According to Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita implies an acceptance of arising from other. Arising from other is one of the four extreme types of arising, whereas Followers of the Middle Way wish to be free from all four extremes.
248 The reverse inclusion of Buddhapālita’s consequence would be: that which arises from itself necessarily is something whose arising is not endless. This inclusion is accepted by the Enumerators. Bhāvaviveka, in what seems a fanciful interpretation, suggests that the reversal of the predicate “not arising from self” is arising from other.
249 In other words, one does not need to prove that “things do not arise from themselves.” One need only demonstrate the absurdity of the wrong thought that “things arise from themselves.”
250 This corresponds to section VIII (p. 586) of the Lucid Words Appendix.
251 The example given by Chandrakīrti in a different section of Lucid Words (which is used by Karmapa Mikyö Dorje in the Ṭīkā) is a quotation from Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom, 13.1, from which the probative argument, “Conditioned phenomena, the subject, are delusive, because they are deceptive,” may be extracted. There, Nāgārjuna is addressing a counterpart who accepts the inclusion that whatever is deceptive is necessarily delusive and who accepts that conditioned phenomena are deceptive. Instead of relying on an absurd consequence, Nāgārjuna uses a probative argument to make the final link between conditioned phenomena and what is delusive. This approach means the same thing as a consequence that demonstrates the absurdity of a view that conditioned phenomena are free from delusion.
252 According to Mikyö Dorje, Shākya Chokden holds the view that, on the level of conduct, Consequentialists follow the Proponents of Things by stating autonomous arguments to avoid the extreme of nonexistence. However, Mikyö Dorje explains that although the Consequentialists avoid the extreme of nonexistence by using reasonings that seem similar to those of the Proponents of Things, this does not mean that they accept those reasonings from their own perspective. To think that the use of identical reasonings must entail the same assertions from one’s own perspective is, according to Mikyö Dorje, a view lacking in subtlety.
253 The example means that the sky is beyond being washed or not washed, so it is incorrect to say that there are times when it is or is not being washed, regardless of whether rain falls or not. In the same way, the Consequentialists are always free from any assertions whatsoever in terms of their own perspective, so it is incorrect to say that there are times when they have their own assertions and times when they do not, regardless of the fact that they sometimes use reasoning in a manner similar to the Proponents of Things.
254 This corresponds to section IX (p. 587 of the Lucid Words Appendix.
255 This corresponds to section X (p. 587) of the Lucid Words Appendix.
256 The Karmapa seems to abbreviate the quotation slightly here, as it appears with the following additional phrases in Lucid Words: “it is not transformed by time; it does not originate from subtle particles; it does not originate from its ‘original nature.’”
257 In this section of the Ṭīkā Karmapa Mikyö Dorje alludes to the explanations of conventional valid cognition in the tradition of Tsongkapa (a master of the “later” period), who, according to Mikyö Dorje, misreads the system of Chandrakīrti by insisting that, for Consequentialists, appearing subjects such as sprouts—the bases for Middle Way reasonings such as “beyond one and many”—are established on the relative level by conventional valid cognition.
258 “Authoritative” translates tsema/tshad ma, usually rendered as “valid cognition.” Thus the Karmapa is describing the different types of valid cognition through which Bhāvaviveka’s approach to logic is undermined.
259 This corresponds to section XI (p. 590) of the Lucid Words Appendix.
260 “Name and form” is the fourth in the twelve links of dependent arising. “The inner sense sources” is the fifth link.
261 Bhāvaviveka would say that the “relative” distinction would be contradictory for the hearers, because the hearers assert that the Buddha taught the inner sense sources and their causes as ultimate truths.
262 As was explained above, in Bhāvaviveka’s probative argument, “Ultimately, the inner sense sources do not arise from themselves, because they exist,” the existence of the sense sources is unascertainable, because, when asked to explain whether he means to say that they exist ultimately or relatively, if he says they exist ultimately, then he contradicts himself; if he says they exist relatively, his subject and reason are not established for his counterparts, the Enumerators. This criticism of Bhāvaviveka’s reasoning precisely mirrors the criticisms that he leveled against the hearers.
263 This corresponds to section XII (p. 593) of the Lucid Words Appendix.
264 The following verses seem to have been composed by Wangchuk Dorje himself, as they do not appear in the Ṭīkā.
265 A reference to Chandrakīrti (“Chandra” being the Sanskrit for “moon”).
266 A reference to the Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje.
267 Reading btsan dug for btsun dud in the fourth line of the Tibetan.
268 The example of a clearly appearing vase is used because it is a phenomenon that the Enumerators accept exists by way of its own identity and does not need to arise again. The example forces the Enumerators to accept that manifest results do not arise from “themselves”—nonmanifest results—since they accept that those nonmanifest results already exist by way of their own identity and, as such, are in no further need of arising. The reasoning used to defeat the Enumerators in this context was explained extensively beginning with the section entitled “Setting forth the system of Buddhapālita” (p. 169).
269 In other words, if you say, “We do assert that results arise from their own essential nature that exists in their cause, but that does not necessitate the consequence that you draw, which is that already-arisen seeds arise from already-arisen seeds.”
270 In other words, contrary to simply seeds producing sprouts, it would absurdly follow that seeds would produce seeds, which would produce seeds, etc.
271 This is an example of something that the Enumerators accept as not canceling itself out or causing its own disintegration.
272 This is an example of a type of seed and a type of sprout that the Enumerators accept as being of different substance due to having different attributes such as taste, color, and so forth. The implication is that plantain tree sprouts are different from plantain tree seeds, and therefore have different attributes.
273 An “excluding qualifier” is a distinction drawn for the purpose of excluding qualities or phenomena, as opposed to emphasizing what qualities the distinction might include. Its opposite is the “including qualifier” (yongchö/yongs gcod). As the section on the Consequentialist-Autonomist distinction explains, Bhāvaviveka wishes to exclude the possibility of refuting conventional arising or arising from the worldly perspective.
274 As the Karmapa has previously explained, worldly people do not analyze such notions of things “arising from themselves” or “arising from others.” Worldly people simply think, “results arise from causes,” which is different from entertaining a philosophical speculation, even conventionally, of “arising from other.”
275 Throughout the commentary, “other” (shen/gzhan) is sometimes replaced by “different” for the sake of variety. No difference in meaning is implied.
276 The six causes are 1) enabling causes (je-gyu/byed rgyu), 2) simultaneously arising causes (lhenchik jungwe gyu/lhan cig ’byung ba’i rgyu), 3) causes of a similar outcome (kalnyam gyi gyu/skal mnyam gyi rgyu), 4) congruent causes (tsungden gyi gyu/mtshungs ldan gyi rgyu), 5) omnipresent causes (kundrö gyu/kun ’gro’i rgyu), and 6) completely ripening causes (nam-min gyi gyu/rnam smin gyi rgyu).
277 The “last type of arhat” refers to the “arhat without remainder,” who passes into nirvāṇa without the five aggregates.
278 I.e., nowhere is it seen that bright flames are produced by thick darkness.
279 In this case the hearers’ probandum (what they are trying to prove) is that causes produce results and that causes and results are different from each other. The reason given to prove the probandum is “because the definitiveness is perceptible.” Here Chandrakīrti and the Karmapa charge that the reason, definitiveness being perceptible, is just a reiteration of the probandum, that causes and results are other. The hearers’ argument amounts to saying, “We are certain that causes truly produce results, because we are certain.” Mikyö Dorje’s commentary in the Ṭīkā on this point is helpful: “If you say, ‘[The definitiveness] is established, because it seen directly by the eyes,’ it is true that the eyes see rice seeds and rice sprouts. Yet they do not see a difference in substance between the seed and sprout, nor do they see [the latter] arising from [the former].”
280 These are outlined in the Ṭīkā, where in particular the view the early Tibetan master Chapa Chökyi Senge (phyva pa chos kyi seng ge, 1109-1169), who claimed that the Middle Way refutation of the hearers did not speak to the essential points of the hearers’ assertions, is examined. Also refuted is the notion that arising from other is to be accepted conventionally, whereas only the other three possibilities of arising are to be refuted in both truths.
281 In other words, the logicians of this school are suggesting that the “otherness” of causes and results is established in a context of earlier and later moments, not in a context of simultaneity.
282 The example of Maitreya and Upagupta illustrates the relationship between any two given persons: two people can be established as being different from each other in mutual dependence, but two people who exist simultaneously cannot be in a cause-result relationship.
283 Here it is being proposed that the eye consciousness is the cause, and the mind and mental events, such as feelings, that go along with it are its results.
284 The usage of the phrase “and so on” here indicates the proposed applicability of this reasoning to all other engaging consciousnesses in relation to their own specific faculties (i.e., ear, nose, tongue, etc.), observed objects, and resultant mental events.
285 Literally, “The Naked Ones.”
286 In the Ṭīkā, Mikyö Dorje explains that the Enumerators, Particularists, and some Tibetans assert that an existent result arises; that the Differentiators, the Followers of Sūtra, and the Performers of Yogic Conduct assert that a nonexistent result arises; and that the Jains assert that a result that is both existent and nonexistent arises.
287 A reference to the Gelukpa lineage and, in particular, to the views of Tsongkapa and his interpreters.
288 “Diseased vision” is a rough translation of rab-rib, an ailment of the eyes that is difficult to correlate with the terminology of modern medicine. Symptoms of rab-rib include seeing false apparitions of falling hairs.
289 For example, the horns of a rabbit may be thought of, but since they do not appear in the common worldly perspective, there is no label “horns of a rabbit” used conventionally for the purpose of adopting or rejecting.
290 This statement appears to refer to verses 6.24 through 6.26 and their autocommentary by Chandrakīrti.
291 The reason, horses and oxen created by magicians’ spells being established by the consciousness that apprehends them, does not affirm the predicate: that the Autonomists establish the relative truth as a genuine object from their own perspective.
292 In other words, not only would their reasoning not prove what they were trying to prove, it would prove the opposite. Here an anonymous interlocutor is suggesting that, because of the Autonomists’ saying that an illusion-horse exists for the consciousness perceiving it (whose faculties have been adulterated by the spells of a magician), the Autonomists affirm the existence of relative phenomena using relative valid cognition. According to the Consequentialists, however, that same reason (an illusion-horse existing for the adulterated consciousness that perceives it) would prove the opposite: it would prove that the Autonomists affirm the fact that the relative truth is incorrect or confused, because the example is one of a confused consciousness apprehending a nonexistent object. So the original reasoning proves that even the Autonomists hold that the phenomena of the relative truth are not perceptible by any valid cognition.
293 The appearance of strands of hair to someone with diseased vision is an example of the incorrect relative. Though the hairs appear real and valid to the people perceiving them, there is no benefit in according them any status of valid existence, even conventionally.
294 Mikyö Dorje’s comments at this section of the Ṭīkā are helpful: “[The same appearances] deceive naïve beings, but for noble beings they are the mere relative—illusionlike, dependent arisings.”
295 In other words, the notion that clinging to true existence necessarily constitutes an afflictive, as opposed to a cognitive, obscuration.
296 The example is illustrating the tendency to criticize that which is free of fault, spending efforts that just end up spoiling what was originally unproblematic. In the section of the Ṭīkā that corresponds to this one, Mikyö Dorje also includes Gorampa Sönam Senge with Zilungpa. Remarkably, Mikyö Dorje implicitly indicates that he and Tsongkapa agree on this issue and explicitly faults Zilungpa and Gorampa for attacking Tsongkapa. This section of the Ṭīkā thus constitutes a rare instance of Mikyö Dorje defending Tsongkapa from the criticisms of others.
297 I.e., hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas.
298 “Tanakpa” is used here as an alternative name for Gorampa Sönam Senge (go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429-1489), the great Middle Way master of the Sakya lineage. Gorampa and Mikyö Dorje agree on many points in their commentaries on the Entrance to the Middle Way, such as whether the two truths are the same or different in entity (both masters say that the two truths are beyond being the same or different due to the reason of mutually depending on each other for their own designations) and whether there is a difference between Consequentialists and Autonomists with regard to the correct and incorrect relative (both masters say that the Consequentialists and Autonomists posit these categories in the same fashion). The issue at hand here—whether there is a difference with regard to the ontological status of the relative truth and the conventional truth—brings to light a key point on which the two masters differ. The passage of Gorampa referenced here is found in his commentary to the Entrance to the Middle Way entitled Dispelling Bad Views: A Sectional Outline of the Entrance to the Middle Way and an Analysis of Each of the Text’s Difficult Points (Uma Jugpe Kyü kyi Sabchepa dang Shung Sosö Kawe Ne la Chepa Tawa Ngensel/dbu ma ’jug pa’i dkyus kyi sa bcad pa dang| gzhung so so’i dka ba’i gnas la dpyad pa lta ba ngan sel) (Gorampa Sönam Senge 1979, p. 608). Whereas Gorampa distinguishes between what is “conventional” and what is “relative,” Mikyö Dorje and Wanghcuk Dorje seem to treat the two terms as synonyms. Another point on which Mikyö Dorje and Gorampa differ is explained above in a footnote to the discussion regarding Zilungpa’s position on whether afflictive obscurations pervade clinging to true existence.
299 Gorampa seems to be classifying relative truth into the two categories of correct relative truth and false relative truth, with the latter category being composed of phenomena that would not qualify as existents. The Karmapa, however, and as explained in the text, holds the false relative as not belonging to the relative truth at all.
300 For Chandrakīrti, “valid” means “without any error,” which would refer to a consciousness free from ignorance of any kind whatever.
301 The implication is, “If the perceiving subjects of worldly people do not realize the true nature or actual status of a given object—emptiness of inherent nature—then those perceiving subjects cannot be said to be valid cognizers, because they are unaware of the object’s true nature.”
302 The anonymous interlocutor here is meant to portray Tsongkapa and his commentators in the Geluk lineage.
303 The second half of the sentences here would contain the meaning of the last three lines of verse 6.30.
304 Persons and trees are phenomena that are different from each other, but they do not, and cannot, depend on each other for production. In the same way, if boys and trees and their seeds were inherently different, it would be impossible for them to depend on their seeds for their own production.
305 This heading first appeared on p. 192.
306 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it is found in this section of the Ṭīkā. Wangchuk Dorje’s text concludes the truncated quotation by saying, “Thus, [the Buddha] taught up through wishlessness” (the first three focuses of the quotation being the components of the “three doors of liberation”).
307 Tsongkapa and his commentators in the Geluk lineage.
308 “That which has a bulbous belly, is thin at its bottom, and performs the function of carrying water” is the traditional definition for “vase” used in Tibetan debate courts. “Vase” is one of the most common examples used by the Indo-Tibetan logical tradition for a function-performing thing.
309 This heading first appeared on p. 192.
310 “Mirrors and faces” is a reference to the causes and conditions for a reflection to appear; “wood, pebbles, and spells” is a reference to the causes and conditions for an illusion to appear. Indian and Tibetan texts speak of magicians applying spells to a stone or a piece of wood in order to project the appearances of horses, oxen, etc.
311 “Emanations” (trulpa/sprul pa) here conveys a lack of solidity: “something ethereal arising from something ethereal.”
312 George Churinoff’s translation of Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary explains that Druma (Jönpa/ljon pa) is a king of a class of spirits called “kinnaras” (mi-am chi/mi’am ci) and appears frequently in the sūtras in conversations with the Buddha. (Chandrakīrti 1994, p. 108, note 95)
313 A reference to the positions of Tsongkapa that a thing called postdisintegration (shigpa/zhig pa) serves as the connection between actions and their results. “Postdisintegration” is used here as an experimental translation of zhig pa because of the emphasis placed on zhig pa as the past-tense form of jigpa/’jig pa, “to disintegrate.”
314 6.37 and 6.38ab and the commentary to those verses.
315 Minds or consciousnesses that are not tainted by faulty sense faculties.
316 Maja is considered an “Early Follower of the Middle Way” (dbu ma snga ma) and was a student of the famed early Tibetan logician, Chaba Chökyi Senge (phyva pa chos kyi seng ge, 1109-1169).
317 This is most likely a reference to Maja’s commentary on the Entrance to the Middle Way, entitled Brief Notes on the Entrance to the Middle Way (Uma la Jugpe Chenbu/dbu ma la ’jug pa’i mchan bu).
318 In brief, a nonimplicative negation refutes a given phenomenon without providing an opportunity for the positing of another phenomenon. The statement that “There is no eye,” as is found in the Heart Sutra, is an example of a nonimplicative negation. An implicative negation is a negation that allows for the possibility of positing something else. A traditional example of an implicative negation is “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.” Since he is fat it is implied that he eats. Since he does not eat during the day, the original negation implies the positive statement “Devadatta eats at night.” Maja Changchub Tsöndrü and the Karmapa use these two types of negation here by saying that, in the relative truth, the arising of mere results from mere causes is implied by the negation of the notion that causes cease or disintegrate; whereas, in the ultimate truth, the negation of the cessation of causes also negates the existence of any cause or result.
319 Though this heading represents the second subsection of the heading “Though causes and results have no nature their connection is tenable,” it does not appear in the Tibetan text of either Mikyö Dorje or Wangchuk Dorje’s commentaries beyond its initial listing. Its insertion in this location follows the choice of the editors of the 1996 Nitartha international Tibetan edition of Mikyö Dorje’s commentary. Mikyö Dorje’s commentary continues beyond these two paragraphs with an extensive analysis of the idea of “postdisintegration” as a function-performing thing.
320 6.39.
321 Gongshi (lit. “basis of intention”) is an important term in discussions of what constitutes a provisional meaning teaching. When asking what the gongshi of a particular provisional meaning teaching is, one is essentially asking, “What did [the Buddha] really have in mind when he taught about such-and-such phenomenon, which does not exist but which the Buddha provisionally stated did?” Three elements must be established for a teaching to be considered provisional meaning: purpose (as in the explanation of the previous paragraph about relating to students of certain dispositions), basis of intention, and the teaching’s vulnerability to refutation if taken literally (ngö la nöje/dngos la gnod byed).
322 “Intention” translates the same gongpa/dgongs pa that is found in gongshi/dgongs gzhi. “Special intention” here means “an intention that reflects something other than the literal meaning of the statements themselves.”
323 This is possibly a reference to one of the eighteen subsects of the hearers.
324 I.e., buddhas.
325 The next four-line verse in the Tibetan was not translated due to its unclear meaning.
326 The Tibetan for this heading, chok ngama/phyogs snga ma, could be literally rendered as “the preceding position.”
327 It is important to note here that this root verse, along with verses 6.46 and 6.47, expresses the view of the Proponents of Consciousness. It is not the position of Chandrakīrti or the Entrance to the Middle Way.
328 Also translated as “false imagination.”
329 Here the implicit three-part reasoning given by the Proponents of Consciousness is as follows: “The mistaken consciousness at the time of dreams, the subject, exists, because it is recalled after having awoken.” In saying that the reason is not included in the predicate, Chandrakīrti and the Karmapa are saying that the dream consciousness is recalled after having awoken, but this does not mean that the dream consciousness existed.
330 Here the three-part reasoning, implicitly set forth by the Followers of the Middle Way, is: “Outer objects, the subject, would also exist, because they are also recalled, just like consciousness is recalled.” If the Proponents of Consciousness say that the reason is not included in the predicate—that the reason of recollection cannot prove existence—they have undercut their own argument that consciousnesses in dreams should be considered existent phenomena.
331 Karmapa Mikyö Dorje discusses how Chandrakīrti’s refutation of the Proponents of Consciousness differs from that of Bhāvaviveka and also criticizes Tsongkapa’s views on this topic pertaining to what may be accepted as “existent” in the relative truth.
332 The Tibetan at this line literally reads, “For as long as one has not awoken.”
333 Karmapa Mikyö Dorje continues to dissect the positions of Tsongkapa.
334 This is a reference to the sixth grammatical case in Tibetan grammar, the connecting particle (dreldra/’brel sgra).
335 The possibility that “potential” is connected to a consciousness of the past or future.
336 A classic example of something that does not exist among knowable objects.
337 The commands are harbingers and causes of results to come.
338 As we saw earlier (pp. 195–197), during the general refutation of arising from other, phenomena must exist at the same time to be considered other or different. If phenomena exist at different times, such as earlier and later moments of a continuum, it is impossible for them to be other.
339 The phenomena connected to the truth of suffering and the truth of the origin of suffering.
340 The phenomena connected to the truth of cessation and the truth of the path.
341 The phrase “repetition of the thesis” here means that the Proponents of Consciousness, when making these assertions, are simply making claims that embellish or are added to their original thesis, but these claims do nothing to actually prove the original thesis—that consciousness can exist without outer objects.
342 The skeletons one is instructed to visualize do not actually exist.
343 There is no truly existent “river” there in the first place. Therefore it is unnecessary to speak of whether the river is “water” or “pus.”
344 One consciousness would have to be experienced by another consciousness, which would have to be experienced by another consciousness, and so on.
345 This sentence may be an acknowledgment of the popular position, held by other masters, that self-awareness exists conventionally and that the Entrance to the Middle Way should be understood only to refute the ultimate existence of self-awareness.
346 The text literally reads “any special [rebuttals].”
347 This example is illustrating the same principle as the “Maitreya and Upagupta” explanation above.
348 Verse 6.32 and commentary, p. 220.
349 The quotations below appear as in the Ṭīkā. These translations follow those of Thurman 2004, pp. 122-123 and p. 182.
350 It is possible to read the Tibetan of the root verse as, “If the dependent nature did not exist in the slightest,/ What would be the cause of the relative?” With his statement here, however, the Karmapa refutes that reading: this verse is to be understood as a refutation of the Proponents of Consciousness, not as a rebuttal by them.
351 A Hindu philosophical system.
352 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s Tibetan, and is only mentioned, but not quoted, in the Ṭīkā. It appears here as it is found in Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary.
353 A key doctrine of the Particularist school. The “five bases” are 1) forms, 2) primary minds, 3) mental events, 4) nonassociated formations (formations that are neither form nor mind), and 5) unconditioned phenomena.
354 A text by Bhāvaviveka for which he also composed an autocommentary
355 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears in full here.
356 Attainment (tobpa/thob pa) and nonwastage (chü mi zawa/chud me za ba) are doctrines of the lower philosophical systems; the all-base is a doctrine of the Proponents of Consciousness.
357 Blaze of Reasoning is Bhāvaviveka’s autocommentary to The Essence of the Middle Way.
358 The term tīrthika literally means “those who support the extremes.”
359 “This dharma tradition” would presumably refer to the Buddhadharma in general.
360 These verses refer to one of the Buddha’s fourteen “unanswerable questions”: questions that were put to the Buddha which the Buddha refused to answer because of the basic confusion of the questioner with regard to the phenomena that were the subjects of the question. One of these questions was, “Does the Tathāgata exist after passing into parinirvāṇa or not?” Therefore the implicit statement made by Nāgārjuna in these verses seems to be, “The buddhas do not hold any position of the Tathāgata’s existing or not existing after parinirvāṇa, because they are free from all views of the Tathāgata’s existence or nonexistence in the first place. If you wish to have an answer to your question, you should ask a philosopher who holds positions of existence or nonexistence. They might be able to be creative enough to offer you an answer based on their own confused concepts.”
361 Sang-gye (sangs rgyas) is the Tibetan word for Buddha and/or buddhahood. Its first syllable, sang, literally means “to purify” or “to be cleansed of,” and its second syllable, gye, literally means “to expand,” “to blossom,” or “to develop.”
362 The reasons why mind is foremost are explained in the section entitled “The reasons why mind only is foremost” beginning on p. 293.
363 To simplify this, when the Buddha said mind alone is the creator of the world, he did not intend his sayings about “mind only” to imply that form and other phenomena do not exist. He simply meant to refute the notion that form and other phenomena function as creators in the way mind does. The distinction between mind and form is not one of ontological status. It is one of importance with respect to karmic function.
364 This quotation is also truncated in the Ṭīkā.
365 This ancillary section refutes Tsongkapa’s contention that deadness, (shiwa/shi ba) as opposed to dying (chiwa/’chi ba), is what causes the birth of the subsequent life. Mikyö Dorje relates this assertion to Tsongkapa’s more commonly repeated position, that postdisintegration, as opposed to disintegration itself, serves as a cause for the arising of things.
366 A pure realm in Buddhist cosmology depicted as being at the summit of the universe.
367 Therefore (to explicitly conclude the sentiment of the commentary), mind is important and to be considered foremost in comparison with other phenomena in terms of its function.
368 This quotation is also truncated in the Ṭīkā.
369 “All five aggregates” is another way of saying “form and mind,” because “form” refers to the first aggregate, form, and “mind” refers to the other four aggregates: feeling, discrimination, formation, and consciousness.
370 In order for a statement of the Buddha to be considered provisional meaning, it must be shown to have three criteria: an ulterior intention (gongshi/dgongs gzhi), something else that the Buddha wished the beings to come to realize through the provisional meaning; a purpose (göpa/dgos pa), a positive result that will come about by describing something as existent even though it does not really exist; and a refutation of the literal statements (ngö la nöje/dngos la gnod byed), the susceptibility of the statement to logical refutation if it is taken literally.
371 The verb for “to quote” in Tibetan is drang/drangs. It can also mean “to lead” and is the same verb found in the first syllable of drangdön/drang don, the Tibetan term for “provisional meaning.” Thus the deeper etymology of provisional meaning, or drangdön, is that such statements by the Buddha are to be used to lead students to a deeper understanding of ultimate truth. They lead students to the ultimate truth, but are not themselves descriptions of ultimate truth.
372 “Interpreted” once again translates drang.
373 This quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the Ṭīkā.
374 This is a reference to the imaginary, or imputed, nature.
375 This seems to refer to “consciousness in the way it is described by the Proponents of Consciousness.”
376 Literally from the Tibetan, “The Naked Ones.”
377 The “nine principles of word and meaning” of the Jains, or Naked Ones, are 1) the life force, 2) the lifeless, 3) dharma, 4) nondharma, 5) the mental afflictions, 6) vows of ethics, 7) happiness, 8) suffering, and 9) karmic formations.
378 “Maitreya” is being used as a random example of a person; there is no special correlation with Buddhism’s future buddha known as Maitreya.
379 Dharma and nondharma here carry the sense of virtue and nonvirtue, i.e., what is in accordance with the genuine dharma and what is not.
380 This verse is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text.
381 The text uses “Proponents of Entity” here as an epithet for the Indian Chārvāka school. The Chārvākas’ view is different from the assertion of arising from self, because those who assert arising from self assert that the cause and result are of the same substance. Here, however, a cause is not asserted at all: phenomena arise because of their very own entity, with no need for relation to a cause whatsoever, regardless of whether that cause is of the same or different substance as the result.
382 George Churinoff, in his translation of Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary, describes “panasa” as referring to “the breadfruit or Jaka tree, Artocarpus integrifolia.” (Chandrakīrti 1994, p. 103, note 78)
383 An example of something utterly nonexistent.
384 Another reference to the Chārvākas.
385 A meaning translation was chosen over a literal translation here because of the awkwardness of this line in Tibetan, which literally reads, “Because you possess the body, an equivalent support of that view.” The commentary to this line is also rendered in a meaning translation rather than a literal translation.
386 The body is a phenomenon that, upon investigation, demonstrates the incorrectness of the Chārvākas’ view.
387 This section heading first figured into the sectional outline on p. 150.
388 This section heading first figured into the sectional outline on p. 150.
389 “Unmoving” (mi yowa/mi g.yo ba) karma is karma generated from the practice of meditation that propels one to birth in the form and formless realms.
390 I.e., beyond clinging to notions of the existence, or presence, of bewilderment (which leads to the existence, or presence, of actions or karma) and the nonexistence, or absence, of bewilderment (which leads to the nonexistence, or absence, of actions or karma).
391 An example of something utterly nonexistent
392 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the autocommentary, as it is not adduced in the Ṭīkā.
393 This section heading first figured into the sectional outline on p. 150.
394 They do not find any interdependent phenomena to exist in the first place that could be qualified by emptiness.
395 Though not specifically referenced here, this sentence seems to refer to a quotation from the sūtras that appeared earlier in Feast for the Fortunate, on pp. 328–329.
396 This is the second of the “four reliances” taught by the Buddha. The first, third, and fourth are “do not rely on the person—rely on his or her teachings,” “do not rely on provisional meaning—rely on definitive meaning,” and “do not rely on deluded consciousness—rely on enlightened wisdom.”
397 This quotation, only one line of which appears in Wangchuk Dorje’s text, is not adduced in either the Ṭīkā or the autocommentary. The translation follows an as yet unpublished translation by Karl Brunnhölzl.
398 The following three quotations are truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appear here as they appear in the Ṭīkā.
399 Tsongkapa and his followers.
400 “Self” and “entities connected to the self” also correspond to the English words “me” and “mine.”
401 Attachment, aggression, and ignorance.
402 A Buddhist school of the hearers.
403 A Buddhist school of the hearers.
404 Tsongkapa and his followers.
405 Some Saṃmitīyas assert a self that is the mere collection of the aggregates, while other Saṃmitīyas assert that the self is the mind.
406 The Tibetan text occasionally alternates between kuntak/kun brtags and its homonym, kuntak/kun btags, “imaginary” and “imputed,” respectively. I have rendered kun btags as “imaginary or imputed” in this instance to alert the reader to the interchangeability of these two terms.
407 The “three methods of analysis” are analyses of three different views of imputed self: 1) the permanent, singular, and independent self imputed by the non-Buddhists, 2) the self asserted by the Saṃmitīyas to be either mind or the collection of the aggregates, and 3) the self asserted as inexpressible by the Vātsīputrīyas.
408 These “twenty peaks” are twenty views of the self and are explained in verse 6.144, p. 377.
409 See note 377 on p. 751 for a list of the nine principles. These principles are an assertion of the Chārvākas.
410 Asserted by the Particularists and the Sūtra Followers.
411 Asserted by the Sūtra Followers.
412 Asserted by the Proponents of Consciousness.
413 Asserted by the Proponents of Consciousness and some proponents of shentong (gzhan stong), or “emptiness of other.”
414 Asserted by some proponents of shentong.
415 Asserted by Tsongkapa and his followers.
416 Asserted by Tsongkapa and his followers.
417 The following critique is aimed at Tsongkapa and his followers.
418 “Four permutations” (mu shi/mu bzhi) is a description, renowned in Tibetan logic, of a relationship between two categories of phenomena. If two categories of phenomena are described to have four permutations, there are some phenomena that are members of the first category but not the second, some that are members of the second but not the first, some that are members of both categories, and some that are members of neither. In this case, therefore, Tsongkapa is described by the Karmapa as holding the assertion that 1) there are instances of the view of the transitory collection that are not the view of a self, 2) there are instances of the view of a self that are not the view of the transitory collection, 3) there are phenomena that are both the view of a self and the view of the transitory collection, and 4) there are phenomena that are neither the view of a self nor the view of the transitory collection. “Four permutations” is one of four descriptions used in Tibetan logic to identify the possible scope of relationship between any two categories. The other three are “mutually inclusive” (dön chik/don gcig), wherein both categories are equivalent to each other (as in “thing” and “impermanent phenomenon”), “mutually exclusive” (galwa/’gal ba), wherein the two categories share no common members (as in “impermanent phenomenon” and “permanent phenomenon”), and “three permutations” (mu sum/mu gsum), wherein a larger category shares some, but not all, of its members with a smaller category, the members of which are all included in the larger category (as in “color” as a larger category and “the color red” as a smaller category).
419 Although somewhat disconcerting in English, the practice of switching between the third and second persons in the Tibetan text has been mirrored in the translation of this section in order to maintain the flow of the author’s style.
420 “It would follow that it is also not a factor to be relinquished” is the thesis joined to the reasons that follow.
421 This sentence comprises “the first reason” referenced two paragraphs below in the Karmapa’s commentary.
422 In other words, Tsongkapa and his followers try to make a distinction between the self that is the support for actions and their results and the self that is to be refuted by logic; but nowhere in the scriptures, says the Karmapa, can explanations about the latter self—explanations that would highlight a distinction between two different notions of self and thus grounds for Tsongkapa’s claim—be found.
423 This sentence comprises “the second reason” referenced below.
424 The main consequence, as stated above, is that the view of the self, asserted by Tsongkapa, etc. to be a support for actions and results is not a factor to be relinquished.
425 The Karmapa here seems to be using two examples of food categories to illustrate what he views as an excessive fondness for categorization on the part of Tsongkapa and his followers. In the example, all the names refer to types of food, which is analogous to the view of a self and the view of a transitory collection, which the Karmapa holds to be synonyms. Splitting these categories into specific instances with the hope of drawing a substantial distinction between them, he says, is pointless.
426 “Disintegrating” refers to the present moment of things, whereas “postdisintegration” refers to the state in which things have already disintegrated. “Disintegrating thing” is, in Buddhism, a synonym for “thing,” which is in general held necessarily to exist in the present moment.
427 That all things are persons that support the connection between actions and results.
428 The action would already have taken on two parts, or components, in the two types of support.
429 I.e., a consciousness apprehending the “self.”
430 If you say that the object of refutation by reasons does not exist in a substantial or imputed way, but it does not necessarily follow that that it cannot be taken as an object of mind,…
431 If you say that that which can be taken as an object of mind does not necessarily exist among knowable objects, you lose the position of knowable objects being equivalent with that which can be taken as an object of mind. This equivalency is a traditional and basic tenet of Buddhist logic.
432 That the object of refutation by reasons exists among knowable objects.
433 Literally, “from their own side.”
434 As in “Sound, the subject, is impermanent, because it is produced.”
435 In the Karmapa’s reading of the system of Tsongkapa, phenomena are empty of true existence, which is the object, or target, of refutation by reasons. Once this true existence is identified, the Karmapa says, its emptiness as well must be verified. In other words, “true existence,” in Tsongkapa’s system, would need to be verifiably shown as empty of true existence. The true existence of which it is empty would also need to be verified in a similar way. The process of verifying the emptiness of true existence of the object of refutation would thus be endless.
436 If you accept that the object of refutation must be established as emptiness in an infinite process but say that this does not mean that the object of refutation by reasons itself is not an object of refutation by reasons,…
437 Note explanations and translations related to the Enumerators’ classification schemes in this section were greatly assisted by, and often closely follow, Hopkins 1983, pp. 321-326.
438 See two paragraphs below in the Karmapa’s commentary.
439 The “sixteen” consists of five sense objects (forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangible objects), five “mental faculties” (the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin), five physical faculties (speech, arms, legs, anus, and genitalia), and the intellectual faculty (yi/yid), the nature of which is both mental and physical.
440 Readers may note that “person” here translates kyebu/skye bu or puruṣha, whereas at other points in this book “person” also translates gangzak/gang zag or pudgala. The two different origin-language terms are considered in general to be synonyms.
441 In the Enumerators’ system the person exists “alongside” the nature, with the nature creating everything that the person experiences.
442 See note 439.
443 Forms through tangible objects.
444 Earth, water, fire, wind, and space.
445 The five sense faculties and the five physical faculties outlined above.
446 Literally, “blessed.”
447 The archaic example of “another man’s wife” is drawn from old Indian culture. It refers to the shyness a married woman was said to typically feel when men who were not her husband looked at her.
448 A synonym for nature, or prakṛiti.
449 In other words, the primal matter is left with “nothing to do,” since the manifestations “do not want to” arise anymore.
450 The person becomes isolated because it no longer has any objects to enjoy.
451 These three are all qualities, or different manifestations, of the I-principle.
452 Happiness corresponds with lightness, suffering corresponds with motility, and ignorance corresponds with darkness.
453 Reading sdug bsngal gyi cha ldan rdul can dang for sdug bsngal gyi cha ldan rnam ’gyur can dang.
454 Reading skyes bu’i dbang po sogs bdag gi ba rnams for skyes bu’i dbang sogs bdag gi ba rnams.
455 Literally, “Apprehension of/fixation toward ‘I/me’” or “I-fixation.” The phenomenon referred to by this term is the everyday thought of “I” or “me” that arises in ordinary sentient beings.
456 For the Enumerators, the person is neither a nature (i.e., a cause) nor a manifestation (i.e., a result). Therefore it is not produced and does not produce anything. Thus the reasoning of nonarising is accepted by the Enumerators.
457 The view of the transitory collection apprehends the aggregates as the self, and holding the view that the self is the aggregates entails both eternalism and nihilism. Regarding the time before nirvāṇa, one clings to eternalism by believing that the aggregates are a truly existent self. Regarding the time after nirvāṇa, one clings to nihilism by believing that the self, previously truly existent, becomes nothing at all.
458 I.e., not yield a result.
459 The verse is truncated in the Tibetan and appears in full here.
460 The fourteen things left unspoken by the Buddha, listed in condensed form in the verse below, are 1) whether the world is permanent, 2) impermanent, 3) both, or 4) neither; 5) whether the world has an end, 6) does not have an end, 7) both, or 8) neither; 9) whether the Buddha exists after passing into nirvāṇa, 10) does not exist, 11) both, or 12) neither; and 13) whether the body and life force are identical or 14) different.
461 The four noble truths are traditionally taught to have sixteen aspects, four corresponding to each truth. Selflessness is the first of the four aspects related to the truth of suffering.
462 The Saṃmitīyas and the Vātsīputrīyas.
463 That “the schools from the Particularists through the Autonomists assert that the aggregates are the basis of imputation of the self and that the self is an imputed existent.”
464 That “the Consequentialists say that the aggregates are the cause of the imputation of the self, but they do not assert them to be either the basis of imputation of the self or the basis of illustration of the self.”
465 The Tibetan language has an advantage in these quotations because dak/bdag, the Tibetan word for “self,” can also be used as the first person pronoun.
466 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the Ṭīkā.
467 The text literally reads “mind” (sem/sems), but it is clear that this refers to the fifth aggregate, consciousness, because of the added phrase “…and so on, the four mental aggregates.”
468 Literally, “the four aggregates of name” (ming shiy pungpo/ming bzhi’i phung po).
469 I.e., the assembly of the aggregates.
470 Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary adds: “However, it is not to be understood that it refutes the branch of conventional truth, that which is imputed dependently.”
471 Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary is very clear at this section: “The six elements are earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness. In dependence upon them, one imputes the existence of the self. The six supports for contact are the contact of the eye meeting with the other constituents up through the contact of the mind meeting with other constituents. In dependence upon these, one imputes the existence of the self. The eighteen movements of mind are the six movements of happy mind (the happy movements of mind that depend on forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects, and mental phenomena), the six movements of the unhappy mind, and the six movements of the neutral mind. In dependence upon these, one imputes the existence of the self. Also, through apprehending the phenomena of primary mind and mental events, one imputes the existence of the self. Since the Buddha taught that one imputes the existence of the self in dependence upon these phenomena—the elements and so on—the self cannot be these phenomena. Nor is it logical for the self to be the mere collection of those phenomena. Since none of those phenomena are suitable as the self, it is illogical to engender a conception of ‘I’ in relation to those phenomena. In the same way the aggregates cannot be the object for the conception of ‘I.’ Nor can such an object be different from the aggregates. Therefore, since the object for the conception of ‘I’ does not exist, yogins fully understand that the self is unobservable. They fully understand also that entities connected to the self have no essence. These yogins clear away all conditioned phenomena and, free from the appropriated aggregates, they pass into nirvāṇa. This analysis, therefore, is very beautiful.”
472 In other words, the Saṃmitīyas, beyond simply saying that the process of refuting the two assertions is similar, take a further step and say that if you successfully refute the imputed self, you will have refuted—put a stop to completely—the notion of the connate self. If this were true, however, the mere understanding of how a permanent, singular, independent self does not exist would cause all sentient beings to gain liberation with very little effort. (ALTG)
473 In traditional Mahāyāna Buddhist cosmology, the ground of the universe is considered to be made of gold. The metaphor illustrates the formidable capability of ignorance to endure for a long time.
474 In other words, the twenty views of the transitory collection are innate views as opposed to imaginary or imputed views.
475 The appearance of “the Vātsīputrīyas” in this sentence follows the text of the Ṭīkā. Although Wangchuk Dorje’s text mentions the Saṃmitīyas at the outset of this paragraph, that mention has been removed, following Mikyö Dorje, in order to make the text more internally consistent for the reader. At his commentary to verse 6.120, for example, Wangchuk Dorje clearly identifies the Vātsīputrīyas as holding the view of a self that is inexpressible in terms of being the same as or different from the aggregates. “The Vātsīputrīyas,” therefore, appears as the subject of all sentences in the English translation of this section whose subject is implicitly the Vātsīputrīyas in the Tibetan text.
476 Vātsīputrīyas.
477 Literally, “It is not something not different from its parts.”
478 I.e., the last two components of the sevenfold analysis: 1) the mere assembly and 2) shape.
479 The first five steps of the sevenfold reasoning, which were refuted in the previous sections of the refutation of the self of persons. Specifically, these five positions are 1) a self different from the aggregates, 2) a self identical to the aggregates, 3) a self that possesses the aggregates, 4) a self that depends on the aggregates, and 5) a self on which the aggregates depend.
480 Some versions of the Tibetan text here say “…at the time when the chariot is cognized…”
481 “Formations and sprouts” are, respectively, the results of “ignorance and seeds,” ignorance being the first of the twelve links of interdependence and formations being the second.
482 The word “chariot” does not appear in the root verse, but is inserted here based on the Karmapa’s commentary and on the appearance of “chariot” in verse 6.159.
483 This triad resembles the three determinants of a provisional meaning teaching (see note 321), except it has “basis of imputation” as its first component instead of “basis of intention.”
484 This sectional outline appears in a unique way (with letters, roman numerals, and italicized text) because, strictly speaking, it is not part of the main sectional outline of Feast for the Fortunate; it is, rather, an ancillary discussion that takes place in the section entitled “The way of explaining the conventions of objects of action and performers.”
485 These are: 1) the absorption of cessation, 2) the state of nondiscrimination, 3) the absorption of nondiscrimination, 4) deep sleep, and 5) fainting.
486 This quotation, which is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the Ṭīkā, is actually an excerpt from a commentary on the text mentioned, not the root text. The commentary quoted here is that of Rongtön Sheja Kunzik (rong ston shes bya kun gzigs, 1367-1449) entitled The Great Drum of the Gods: A Well-Condensed Explanation of Distinguishing Phenomena from True Reality (chos dang chos nyid rnam par ’byed pa’i rnam bshad legs par ’doms pa lha yi rnga bo che).
487 Also called the Drikung Gongchik (’bri gung dgongs gcig), this Middle Way text of the Drikung Kagyü lineage is highly revered by scholars in many other Kagyü schools, including the Karma Kagyü. The Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje, authored a commentary to this text.
488 The other two properties are both permanence and impermanence and neither permanence nor impermanence.
489 These quotations are truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appear here as they appear in the autocommentary and the Ṭīkā.
490 This quotation proves that the self is not something stable.
491 This quotation proves that the self is not something unstable.
492 This quotation proves that the self does not arise or disintegrate.
493 This quotation proves that the self is not permanent, impermanent, both, or neither.
494 This quotation proves that the self is not the same as or different from the aggregates.
495 Literally, “Dialectic opponents who make incorrect refutations.”
496 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the Ṭīkā and in the autocommentary.
497 Due to highly challenging syntax in Mikyö Dorje’s Tibetan poetry, the lines excerpted by Wangchuk Dorje, eleven of ninety-one Tibetan lines, are the only ones that appear here. Mikyö Dorje’s main criticism in his verses centers on his reading of Tsongkapa’s presentation of the object of refutation by reasonings. Similar analyses of Tsongkapa’s object of refutation by reasonings have been preserved in Feast for the Fortunate by Wangchuk Dorje. They can be found, for example, in the commentary to verse 6.120 in the section from p. 340, line 8 to p. 348, line 26.
498 The Vajra Ḍākinī itself is a tantra of the Buddha.
499 Bhavabhaḍa goes on to refute the possibility of reflections being autonomous, function-performing things in their own right.
500 In other words, Bhāvaviveka attempts to counter the Proponents of Things’ initial complaint about Middle Way hypocrisy by giving refutations a status different from other causes, such as barley seeds that produce barley sprouts. The Proponents of Things, however, will not buy into this delineation, because for them—and, indeed, for Chandrakīrti as well—refutations function as causes every bit as much as seeds function as causes (one produces an intellectual understanding of the opposite of what was believed before, the other produces a physical sprout perceived by the eyes and other sense faculties). Chandrakīrti successfully counters his opponents’ criticisms by teaching them how although all causes—seeds and refutations alike—are devoid of their own inherent natures, they are still capable of producing results: a seed can produce a sprout. A reflection in the mirror can help one to wash one’s face. And a refutation can remove a wrong idea. The wrong idea removed here is that things inherently, or, in other words, when analyzed, arise.
501 This heading first figured into the sectional outline after the explanation of verse 6.7 on pp. 148–149.
502 This heading first figured into the sectional outline after the explanation of verse 6.7 on pp. 148–149.
503 Both quotations below are truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appear here as they appear in the Ṭīkā.
504 The Tibetan text here is phrased in a way that each of the following sixteen headings should be understood to implicitly begin with “The extensive explanation of…”
505 The translation of ter zuk tu nepa mepa/ther zug tu gnas pa med pa here follows the Karmapa’s breakdown of its Sanskrit etymology in the commentary below.
506 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the Ṭīkā.
507 Brahmachārya, tsangpar chöpa/tshangs par spyod pa, the vows of celibacy.
508 The words between brackets are from the autocommentary.
509 I.e., for bodhisattvas on the path or for buddhas.
510 This refers to the stage of analysis that corresponds to the second line of Āryadeva’s famous quotation: “In the beginning one reverses nonvirtue./ In the middle one reverses the view of a self./ In the end one reverses all views./ Those who know this way are wise.”
511 Referring to line three of Āryadeva’s quotation.
512 Despite Wangchuk Dorje’s use of the phrase “root text and commentary” below in connection with this quotation, the quotation’s source text was not readily identifiable. The quotation was not found in the editions of Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary or Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words that were available.
513 Only the first line is quoted in both Wangchuk Dorje’s text and the Ṭīkā. Three more lines were translated and appear here to give the reader context.
514 Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshen, 1292-1361) was the earliest exponent of the other-emptiness, or shentong (gzhan stong), system in Tibet. Although his views were assailed from all corners in Tibet, he is also considered to be a great scholar of the Kālachakra Tantra and treatises related to it. (See Stearns 1999)
515 The next two lines of the quotation are: “The emptiness endowed with the supreme of all aspects/ Is not like the former emptiness.”
516 This refers to a very specific type of time period in Buddhist cosmology and is equivalent to the age of degeneration (kaliyuga, nyik dü/snyigs dus). (ATW)
517 Shambhala is a pure realm associated with the Kālachakra Tantra. Dolpopa was one of the great masters of the Kālachakra’s teachings. Rigdens are said to be the kings of Shambhala.
518 This trilogy, which consists of commentaries on the Kālachakra Tantra, the Hevajra Tantra, and the Chakrasaṃvara Tantra, was among the sources Dolpopa most frequently used to support his views. (See Stearns 1999, pp.3-4 and p. 178, note 11)
519 The translation of these verses, which are truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appear here as they appear in the Ṭīkā, follows that of Cyrus Stearns. (Stearns 1999, pp. 127-128)
520 In other words, after three lesser ages, which last 5,400 years each.
521 The Karmapa seems to be stringing out a reason, for dramatic effect, that he knows would not be accepted by Dolpopa.
522 I.e., because the undeceiving quality of conventional karmic causes and results is not true in the way that it appears to the minds of ordinary beings.
523 If you say that the undeceiving quality of karmic causes and results not being true in the way that it appears to the minds of ordinary beings does not make it unnecessary for beings to correctly engage adopting and rejecting in relation to conventional karmic cause and effect…
524 The undeceiving quality of actions and results and the rabbit-horn ladder.
525 Again, the Karmapa seems to be laying out a reason he expects the hypothetical Dolpopa not to accept.
526 By not accepting the earlier reason, “he” accepted that single and multiple are not real in the way they appear to worldly beings’ minds.
527 The Tibetan words here are yöpa/yod pa for “existence” and yinpa/yin pa for “being” (in the equative sense).
528 Being refuted in the frame of reference of knowable objects does necessitate existing among knowable objects…
529 The natural implication of the two negatives is to say, for example, that a refutation of nonexistence must imply an affirmation of existence, and a refutation of existence must imply an affirmation of nonexistence.
530 You may say that the need to identify true existence as a hypothetical possibility does not necessitate the hypothetical status of its opposite, the lack of true existence…but it does.
531 This is a meaning translation of the Tibetan text, which refers to the eight grammatical particles of Tibetan grammar and how the attempted rebuttal would be beyond the scope of those eight.
532 Contradiction and connection form a classic pair of opposites in Buddhist logic.
533 The two main traditional classifications of types of connection.
534 These quotations appear as they are found in the Ṭīkā.
535 “Brahmin” in this quotation could refer to one practicing the discipline of celibacy.
536 I.e., a prophecy of Tsongkapa’s views.
537 Pak Seng/’phags seng: “The tradition of Haribhadra” refers to the lineage of explanation associated with Maitreya’s Ornament for Clear Realization.
538 The following quotation is translated as it appears in the Ṭīkā.
539 The following quotation is translated as it appears in the Ṭīkā.
540 Another name for followers of the Geluk tradition.
541 This is a reference to the Particularists’ views as described in the Treasury of Abhidharma (verse 6 is quoted at this section of the Ṭīkā) and its autocommentary by Vasubandhu. The Particularists’ description of nirvāṇa is connected to their assertion of the truth of cessation and, in particular, to their concept of “cessation through analysis” (so sor tak gok/so sor brtags ’gog). Cessation through analysis, they say, consists not of just one, but of multiple, instances that are considered to be substantial entities. Each of these substances is attained in a manner equal in number to the instances of attaining freedom or separation from the impure mental events. These instances of freedom or separation are also considered to be substantial entities. Therefore, they say, the instances of the attainment of this cessation are equal in number to the instances of separation from the impure mental events. (Vasubandhu 2005, pp. 6-7)
542 The accumulation of merit (the generosity example that follows falls in this category) and the accumulation of wisdom.
543 “Defining characteristics” (tsen-nyi/mtshan nyid) can, in cases such as this, be understood to be very close in meaning to “definition.”
544 The suffering of suffering, the suffering of change, and the all-pervasive suffering of formations.
545 The poisonous snakes example seems to illustrate that, just as grasping on to a poisonous snake will bring harm to oneself, in the same way grasping on to the constituents causes one to suffer in saṃsāra.
546 These are the four graduated levels of concentration in the form realm. They are simply called the first concentration, the second concentration, the third concentration, and the fourth concentration.
547 Loving-kindness, compassion, joy, and impartiality.
548 These are the four graduated levels of concentration, or samādhi, in the formless realm. They are limitless space (namka taye/nam mkha’ mtha’ yas), limitless consciousness (namshe taye/rnam shes mtha’ yas), utter nonexistence (chi yang mepa/ci yang med pa), and not existence, not nonexistence (yö min me min/yod min med min).
549 The thirty-seven factors of enlightenment are (1-4) the four close placements of mindfulness (drenpa nyer shak shi/dren pa nyer bzhag bzhi): the mindfulnesses of body (lü/lus), feelings (tsorwa/tshor ba), mind (sem/sems), and phenomena (chö/chos); (5-8) the four correct relinquishments (yangdak pongwa shi/yang dag spong ba bzhi): the relinquishment of nonvirtue that has arisen (mi gewa kyepe pongwa/mi dge ba skyes pa’i spong ba), the nonproduction of nonvirtue that has not arisen (mi gewa ma kyepa mi kyepa/mi dge ba ma skyes pa mi bskyed pa), the production of virtue that has not arisen (gewa ma kyepa kyepa/dge ba ma skyes pa bskyed pa), and the further propagation of virtue that has arisen (gewa kyepa pelwa/dge ba skyes pa spel ba); (9-12) the four miraculous legs (dzuntrul gyi kangpa shi/rdzu ’phrul gyi rkang pa bzhi): aspiration (dünpa/’dun pa/), exertion (tsöndrü/brtson ’grus), concentration (sempa/sems pa), and analysis (chöpa/dpyod pa); (13-17) the five pure faculties (namjang wangpo nga/rnam byang dbang po lnga): faith (depa/dad pa), exertion (tsöndrü/brtson ’grus), mindfulness (drenpa/dran pa), samādhi (ting nge dzin/ting nge ’dzin), and supreme knowledge (sherab/shes rab); (18-22) the five pure powers (namjang top nga/rnam byang stobs lnga): (same five as listed in “the five pure faculties”); (23-29) the seven branches of enlightenment (changchub yenlak dün/byang chub yan lag bdun): correct mindfulness (drenpa yangdak/dran pa yang dag), excellent differentiation of phenomena (chö rab tu nam je/chos rab tu rnam ’byed), correct exertion (tsöndrü yangdak/brtson ’grus yang dag), correct joy (gawa yangdak/dga’ ba yang dag), correct pliancy (shinjang yangdak/shin sbyangs yang dag), correct equanimity (tang-nyom yangdak/btang snyoms yang dag), and correct samādhi (ting-nge dzin yangdak/ting nge ’dzin yang dag); and (30-37) the noble eightfold path (paklam yenlak gye/’phags lam yan lag brgyad): correct view (yangdakpe tawa/yang dag pa’i lta ba), correct examination (yangdakpe tokpa/yang dag pa’i rtogs pa), correct speech (yangdakpe ngak/yang dag pa’i ngag), correct limits of action (yangdakpe le kyi ta/yang dag pa’i las kyi mtha’), correct livelihood (yangdakpe tsowa/yang dag pa’i ‘tsho ba), correct effort (yangdakpe tsolwa/yang dag pa’i rtsol ba), correct mindfulness (yangdakpe drenpa/yang dag pa’i dran pa), and correct samādhi (yangdakpe ting-nge dzin/yang dag pa’i ting nge ’dzin).
550 The three gates of liberation (nampar tarpe go sum/rnam par thar pa’i sgo gsum)—emptiness, the absence of characteristics, and wishlessness—are taught to correlate to the stages of ground, path, and result, respectively. They are also described by the Great Tibetan-Chinese Dictionary as “three samādhis that bring about the attainment of liberation.” (GTCD, p. 1569)
551 The full Tibetan here reads, “the perceptual state (kye che/skye mched) of limitless space.”
552 In the section on the qualities of buddhahood.
553 These are the correct and distinct awarenesses (soso yangdakpe rikpa/so so yang dag pa’i rig pa) of phenomena (chö/chos), meaning (dön/don), contextual etymology (ngepe tsik/nges pa’i tshig), and confidence (pobpa/spobs pa).
554 In the chapter on the ninth bodhisattva ground.
555 This fourfold grouping is also called “the four limitless ones” (tse me shi/tshad med bzhi).
556 As a note of interest, Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary at this point delves into a very extensive commentary on the eighteen unmixed qualities.
557 This heading first appeared in the sectional outline on p. 143.
558 The medicinal fruit of a tree, the embellic myrobalan (āmalakī, kyurura/skyu ru ra) or Phyllantus embellic. When fresh, this fruit is highly transparent, and has thus been used in Indo-Tibetan literature as an example of being able to see everything very clearly. (GTCD, p. 190 and Chandrakīrti and Jamgön Mipham 1992, pp. 323 and p. 382 note 236)
559 This quotation, which does not appear in the Ṭīkā (Mikyö Dorje describes its contents and says that it is to be found in the autocommentary), is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’ text and appears here as it appears in the autocommentary.
560 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the Ṭīkā.
561 Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche explains that “imputed” is an operative word here because it differentiates Asaṅga’s explanation of the absorption of cessation from that of the Particularists, who assert the absorption to be substantially existent. (Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche 2000, p. 14)
562 This term would perhaps be better rendered by “the perfect end” in this context.
563 This sentence was extracted from the Ṭīkā in order to give this paragraph more clarity.
564 I.e., the last four perfections in the enumeration of ten, which correspond to the last four bodhisattva grounds.
565 Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary provides more information: “When supreme knowledge takes on special appearances, it becomes methods, aspirations, powers, and wisdom. Supreme knowledge is only known strictly as ‘the perfection of supreme knowledge’ in a very specific presentation. This specificity does not apply in other cases.”
566 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text, is paraphrased in the Ṭīkā, and appears here as it appears in Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary.
567 “Ten sexdecillion” equals ten to the fifty-second power. The Tibetan text here literally says, “ten countless [figures],” employing the classic Indo-Tibetan numeral system in which “countless” refers to ten to the fifty-first power.
568 This quotation does not appear in the Ṭīkā. It does appear in the autocommentary, yet in an incomplete form. Wangchuk Dorje’s truncations are all that are rendered here. In terms of points conveyed, the quotation seems to be, for the most part, a more prolix rendition in prose of the verse-form quotation above.
569 The quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the Ṭīkā.
570 The word lama/bla ma, rendered contextually by “unsurpassable” here, may also be rendered as “guru”—“they become guru to the [beings in] the three realms.”
571 At this point in the Ṭīkā, Mikyö Dorje adds an interesting comment: “About the mental body, some Tibetans claim that Chandrakīrti asserts it to be a nonmaterial body that is composed of consciousness and is small and attractive. In effect these people are thinking that Chandrakīrti has chosen to follow the Proponents of Consciousness in asserting the body, faculties, and so forth to be consciousness. Yet if Chandrakīrti refutes as untenable the approach of the Proponents of Consciousness even on the nonanalytical, conventional level, think about it: does your ascription of that view to Chandrakīrti have any vision? Does it have any life?”
572 This mastery specifically relates to the bodhisattvas’ ability to take birth at any desired time. (ATW)
573 This mastery is specifically related to the location or type of birth. (ATW)
574 This refers to the ultimate teachings. (ATW)
575 This quotation appears in the Ṭīkā, as it does in the autocommentary, in an incomplete form. Wangchuk Dorje’s truncations are all that is rendered here.
576 “One octodecillion” equals ten to the fifty-seventh power. The Tibetan literally reads, “Countless (ten to the fifty-first power) times one hundred thousand times ten.”
577 This heading first appeared in the sectional outline on p. 99.
578 This epithet is a positive way of referring to our own human world, which in traditional Buddhist cosmology is called Jambudvīpa, the southern continent. In this world, one need not feel afraid or fearful with regard to practicing the dharma.
579 To summarize, the twelve sets of qualities enable bodhisattvas of the varying grounds to: 1) see a certain number of buddhas, 2) realize the blessings of those buddhas, 3) remain for a certain number of eons, 4) correctly engage in the beginnings and ends of those eons, 5) enter into and arise from a certain number of samādhis, 6) cause a certain number of worlds to quake, 7) illuminate a certain number of realms, 8) ripen a certain number of sentient beings, 9) go to a certain number of buddha realms, 10) open a certain number of gates of dharma, 11) display a certain number of bodhisattvas in their body, and 12) have those bodhisattvas in turn be surrounded by a retinue of the same number of bodhisattvas.
580 One sexillion equals ten to the twenty-first power.
581 The Tibetan text here has a long-winded way of multiplying numbers to arrive at a resultant figure. This complexity was abandoned in the translation and, instead, only the resultant numbers of the multiplications appear. The same approach is followed for the verses and commentaries that contain large numbers below.
582 One hundred vigintillion equals ten to the sixty-fifth power.
583 The Tibetan phrase here, jö du mepe yang jö du mepa/brjod du med pa’i yang brjod du med pa, could also potentially refer to the number called “inexpressible” (one hundred octodecillion or ten to the fifty-ninth power) multiplied by itself, which would yield a result of ten octotrigintillion (ten to the one hundred eighteenth power) buddha realms.
584 In this enumeration of five realms of saṃsāra, the jealous gods are taken out. Half of the jealous gods are categorized with the gods, and the other half of the jealous gods is categorized with the animals. (ATW)
585 This heading first appeared in the sectional outline on p. 99.
586 These are “five pure places only inhabited by noble ones” (pakpa shatak gi ne tsangma nga/’phags pa sha stag gi gnas gtsang ma lnga): 1) Not as Great (mi chewa/mi che ba), 2) The Untormented (mi dungwa/mi gdung ba), 3) Extensive Vision (shin tu tongwa/shin tu mthong ba), 4) The Appearance of Excellence (gyanom nangwa/gya nom snang ba), and 5) Akaniṣhṭha (ogmin/’og min). These five places exist on the fourth level of concentration in the form realm (Jamgön Mipham Rinpoche 2000, p. 94). As the Karmapa will describe beginning with the next sentence, there seems to be a paradoxical issue at hand here as to whether or not the Akaniṣhṭha in which buddhas attain enlightenment is the same Akaniṣhṭha that is a member of the fivefold list of form-realm pure lands. Both Wangchuk Dorje and Mikyö Dorje seem to refrain from offering in an explicit way a final answer as to what type of Akaniṣhṭha is being referenced by Chandrakīrti.
587 See note 191 on p. 738.
588 Alternatively, “meditates.”
589 “Suchness” and “variety” are known as the two wisdoms of the buddhas: the wisdom of suchness knows the ultimate nature of phenomena and the wisdom of variety knows phenomena individually in all their multiplicity, vastness, and extent.
590 “Purification” and “expansion” are the literal meanings of the two syllables of the Tibetan word for buddha or buddhahood, sang-gye/sangs rgyas.
591 This sentence could also be rendered as follows: “It is illogical for a perceiving subject to arise with definitiveness without having engaged its knowable object.”
592 The Tibetan ta bur/lta bur here is challenging to translate in a noncolloquial way in English. A colloquial rendering that perhaps better captures the meaning here is as follows: “In dependence upon the aspect of nonarising, wisdom is posited as realizing suchness—it’s kind of like that.”
593 “Continuum’s end” (gyun ta/rgyun mtha’) refers to the end of the tenth bodhisattva ground.
594 It seems important to use the terms “existence” and “nonexistence” in this discussion because of the parallels with all the other Middle Way reasonings; however in this context of the wisdom of the buddhas, phrases such as this one could also be rendered by “If the buddhas did not have wisdom…”
595 This is identified as “the condensed version” (düpa/sdud pa) in Wangchuk Dorje’s text. This name could refer to any of several “condensed” Perfection of Supreme Knowledge sūtras. The quotation is identified in Nitartha international’s edition of the Tibetan as being found in volume Ka of the Derge Kangyur, shes rab sna tshogs, p.5b.3.
596 This quotation is truncated in Wangchuk Dorje’s text and appears here as it appears in the Ṭīkā.
597 The quotations are truncated by Wangchuk Dorje and are presented in a different order in the Ṭīkā. The quotations appear here in the order selected by Wangchuk Dorje but with the content that appears in the Ṭīkā.
598 Those who have attained one of the four types of results for hearers (stream enterer, once-returner, nonreturner, and arhat) or those who have attained one of the eight categories created when the four main results are divided into the entrance into that result and the abiding stage of the result.
599 The Great Tibetan-Chinese Dictionary identifies these twenty as the five stream enterers, the three once-returners, the ten nonreturners, the enterers into arhathood, and the rhinoceroslike solitary realizers. (GTCD, p. 449)
600 Karl Brunnhölzl’s translation of this term as “natural outflow” has been followed here in preference to the literal “causally concordant.” These kāyas, explained later in the Karmapa’s commentary, are the natural outflow of the dharmakāya and form kāyas.
601 “Kyenpe top/mkhyen pa’i stobs” (“The power of knowledge of…”), the phrase closing out (or beginning, in English) the names of all the powers, will be deleted from the remaining Tibetan phoneticizations and transliterations for brevity.
602 The translation of this paragraph is tentative.
603 Up to now in this book, “dhātu” (kam/khams) has been rendered differently in different contexts. Sometimes dhātu refers to the eighteen sensory “constituents” (visible form and the other objects, the eye and the other faculties, and the eye consciousness and the other consciousnesses); sometimes it refers to the three “realms” (the form realm, the formless realm, and the desire realm); sometimes it refers to “elements” such as earth, space, and so on. Chandrakīrti’s autocommentary at this section, however, indicates that “dhātu” in the context of the fourth power refers to all of the above-mentioned usages and then some. Since no translation convention has been employed in this book by which one word could apply to all of these senses of “dhātu,” it has been left in its Sanskrit form for this section of the text.
604 The autocommentary here reads: “‘Nature,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘emptiness’ are synonyms.”
605 Reading mig sogs dag gi rang bzhin for mig sogs ngag gi rang bzhin.
606 These are presented by the Great Tibetan-Chinese Dictionary and the online Dharma Dictionary v.4 as the seven faculties that are supports (the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, and life force), the two faculties that are supported (the male faculty and the female faculty), the five faculties of feeling (happiness, suffering, mental comfort, mental discomfort, and neutrality), the five pure faculties (faith, diligence, mindfulness, samādhi, and supreme knowledge), and the three uncontaminated faculties (the creation of complete knowledge, complete knowledge itself, and the attainment of complete knowledge). (GTCD, p. 1933)
607 Or “vehicles to buddhahood.”
608 Also translated as “five degenerations,” “five residues,” and “five dregs.”
609 In his autocommentary, Chandrakīrti cites the following example as originating from a tale in the sūtra called The White Lotus of Genuine Dharma (Saddharmapundarika, Damchö Pema Karpo/dam chos padma dkar po).
610 In the Ṭīkā the following misconception is attributed to “some Vajrayāna practitioners of the Nyingma tradition.”
611 Literally, “the four activities including request.” These are four phases of the ritual of the ceremony for full ordination: the request to be ordained is recited once by the ordainee, and the actual verses of taking the vows are recited three times, totaling “four rituals.”
612 The text literally says, “the first verse,” but the comments here seem to apply to verse 13.1 and the first two lines of verse 13.2.
613 The text literally says, “the later verse[s],” which appears to refer to the last two lines of verse 13.2.
614 The Consequentialists.
615 This appears to refer to the Autonomists as the example of Followers of the Middle Way who make presentations of the relative in accordance with the Particularists.
616 Vasubandhu.
617 The translation of this paragraph has been slightly loosened in an attempt to accommodate a poetic relationship between the root verse and its commentary.
618 It may be noteworthy here to observe that the root verse and the commentary are constructed slightly differently from each other in terms of what it is that causes the closed pistils of Nāgārjuna’s verses to open. In the root verse it is the water, but in the commentary it is clearly “the cooling light rays of Chandrakīrti’s intelligence.” The implied connection between Chandrakīrti’s name, “famous moon,” and the night-blooming flowers, Nāgārjuna’s writings, which bloom due to cool light rays of intelligence, makes quite a beautiful image.
619 Cool, delicious, light, soft, clear, free from impurities, not harmful to the stomach, and not harmful to the throat.
620 Existence, nonexistence, both, and neither.
621 Although not reflected in the translation due to the structural difficulty which would be required, this sentence is a logical thesis, the reasons corresponding to which are the contents of this and the next two paragraphs. In other words, this paragraph and the next two prove why the Followers of the Middle Way never posit the relative truth in a context of analysis.
622 Nyam-len/nyams len is usually rendered as “practice,” but something closer to its literal meaning, “to bring into experience,” has been followed here.
623 Reading nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa’i ma rig pas for nyon mongs pa can gyi ma rig pas.
624 I.e., conceptual discrimination.
625 “In training” refers to the hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas, and “beyond training” refers to buddhas.
626 In their own system—from their own perspective—knowable objects of the relative are not observed in any way that could be expressible, including by way of interdependence. So the notion of “describing knowable objects in accord with interdependence” would not apply.
627 I.e., the inclusions of the reasons in the predicates.
628 Neyu Zurpa Yeshe Bar (sne’u zur pa ye shes ’bar, 1042-1118).
629 The Ṭīkā directs the following critique explicitly at Tsongkapa.
630 This heading first appeared in the section outline on p. 89.
631 Lhasa, Tibet.
632 These verses appear to be the composition of Wangchuk Dorje himself, with some verses strongly resembling the closing verses of Mikyö Dorje.
633 A reference to the First Karmapa, Düsum Khyenpa, “Knower of the Three Times.”
634 A reference to the Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje, “Self-Arisen Vajra.”
635 A reference to the Fourth Karmapa, Rolpe Dorje, “Playful Vajra.”
636 A reference to the Fifth Karmapa, Deshin Shekpa, “Tathāgata.”
637 A reference to the Sixth Karmapa, Tongwa Dönden, “Meaningful to See.”
638 A reference to the Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje, who was also known as Yangchen Gawa (dbyangs can dga’ ba), “Adored by Sarasvati.”
639 Some of the following verses are translated loosely.
640 Āryadeva.
641 Mikyö Dorje.
642 It is possible that “Gyamön,” “Wangpo,” and “Tsöndrü” are names of three different people.
643 Corresponding to the section “The way in which Consequentialists and Autonomists related to each other through affirmations and refutations,” p. 168.
644 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “Setting forth the system of Buddhapālita,” p. 169.
645 At this point the Tibetan in both Wangchuk Dorje’s text and ACIP actually says shin tu thal bar ’gyur ba’i phyir, “and because [their arising] would be absurd,” but that phrase has been replaced with skye ba thug pa med pa nyid du ’gyur ba’i phyir, “and because their arising would be endless.” This replacement was chosen for the sake of consistency and ease of understanding, because in the Tibetan text of Feast for the Fortunate and Lucid Words the commentary that follows Buddhapālita’s original quotation is written as if “endless,” not “absurd,” was the originally stated consequence. Discussion of “absurd” does not happen anywhere beyond the original quotation.
646 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “Stating the refutation of Bhāvaviveka,” p. 169.
647 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “Because we do not use autonomous reasonings that are established by any valid cognition of our own, there is no fault in our not stating examples or reasons,” p. 172.
648 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “Because we do not set forth consequences that contain autonomous implications of their opposite meaning, we do not contradict ourselves,” p. 173.
649 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “Because we do not state arguments and so on that are established by any valid cognition of our own, there is no need to clear away the faults involved in the theses and arguments we state to the defender,” p. 173.
650 The Enumerators believe that resultant things exist in an unmanifest way in their own causes, and that these causes are the essential nature of the result. So to say that things do not arise from their own essential nature that is the result is simply to restate the position of the Enumerators themselves.
651 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “Although we do not have assertions of our own, we do use arguments, examples, and so on for the purpose of refuting others,” p. 175.
652 A position and so on the individual components of which the Enumerators themselves would accept according to their own system
653 This follows the traditional Indian five-membered format for a probative argument. The five steps are 1) the thesis, 2) the reason, 3) the example (which upholds the reason’s inclusion in, or entailment of, the predicate of the thesis), 4) the application (which explicitly ties the subject to the reason), and 5) the summary (which restates the thesis as affirmed by the reason). The phrasing of the argument that Chandrakīrti voices on behalf of Buddhapālita is slightly more complicated than the traditional example of “sound is impermanent” cited first. In particular, at the fourth stage (i.e., of the application) Chandrakīrti departs from the general subject of “things” with which he began and introduces the more specific subject of unmanifest vases that exist by way of their own identity at the time of their causes. This strikes the heart of the Enumerators’ position, because the Enumerators wish to reserve a special place for unmanifest results by saying that the latter “arise” or “manifest” into a manifest result. The reason of “already existing by way of their own identity,” however, forces the Enumerators to accept the absurdity of their position, since something that already exists would not have any further need of arising.
654 The Enumerators accept that results already exist by way of their own identity at the time of their causes.
655 The Enumerators assert that the person is a phenomenon that does not arise—it is primordially existent.
656 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “The reversed meaning of consequences is connected to others, the Enumerators and so on, not to our position,” p. 176.
657 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “Nāgārjuna himself, when refuting others, defeated them primarily by way of consequences,” p. 177.
658 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “Stating the system of Bhāvaviveka,” p. 178.
659 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “Stating that system’s many faults,” p. 179.
660 The classical Buddhist probative argument cited as an example of traditional Buddhist logic defeating the assertions of certain Hindu schools.
661 The Vaisheṣhikas assert that sound, as opposed to being a derivative of the four major elements, is a quality of space. (Hopkins 1983, p. 506)
662 The Jains assert that sound “manifests” due to conditions, but that it exists previous to its manifestation and is therefore not a product. (Hopkins 1983, p. 507)
663 Bhāvaviveka wishes to assert the absence of arising, which is perceived by the nonmistaken consciousnesses of noble beings. But as the subject to support that assertion, he posits the inner sense sources such as the eyes, which are relative phenomena, perceived by the mistaken consciousnesses of the relative truth. It would thus require two different types of beings to perceive these two different elements of his probative argument.
664 Which suggests employing subjects that are mere generalities.
665 In the case of the reasoning proving the impermanence of sound, the Buddhist who advances the reasoning to the Hindu is a Proponent of Things, a follower of a lower vehicle philosophical system.
666 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “Bhāvaviveka has [in other contexts] acknowledged the faulty nature [of the approach he uses here],” p. 181.
667 Bhāvaviveka’s commentary to Fundamental Wisdom.
668 For the hearers, the inner sense sources exist ultimately.
669 These comments by Bhāvaviveka are made in the context of his commentary on the second chapter, the examination of coming and going, of Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom. The refutation of arising takes place in the first chapter.
670 The Enumerators hold that consciousness is not produced; thus saying it does not arise from itself would be no problem for them.
671 This section corresponds to the section in Feast for the Fortunate entitled “Showing how Chandrakīrti is free from the fault of contradiction,” p. 182.
672 Ordinary beings, those who see only the “near side” of appearances that seem to truly exist, as opposed to the “far side” of the true nature of appearances, emptiness.
673 The five great reasonings of the Middle Way.
674 Naktso Lotsawa.
675 This line is a tentative translation of bod kyi rdog btsun legs pa’i shes rab kyis.
676 The following very brief description of the basic technique of analytical meditation is based on oral teachings by Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche and Acharya Lama Tenpa Gyaltsen at Nitartha Institute.
677 Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche taught these three stages at the 2007 Nitartha Summer Institute when giving oral teachings on analytical meditation based on several texts, including Jamgön Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty (Ngeshe Drönme/nges shes sgron me).