Whosoever Will

On the clear autumn morning of September 11, 2001, I was straightening up my office (having moved in only a few days earlier) when a news bulletin caught my attention. My small desk TV was tuned to the Today Show when a news flash announced that a plane had just crashed into one of the World Trade Towers. Troubling as that was, it seemed that the immediate danger or threat was limited to those in the immediate vicinity of the event. Soon, however, it became clear that this crash was not a small-scale accident but a premeditated act of terror involving much more than the World Trade Towers. It would be hours later before the magnitude of the destruction and the cost of human life bound up in this epoch-making event etched its reality upon the fleshy memory banks of America citizens as well as the watching world. On that day thousands of lives were lost, and many thousands more would never be the same. Where was God? Or was there a God at all, at least the Christian God?

The unthinkable had happened. Staring in the face of a nation was the reality that evil exists in a concrete way. Diplomacy and technology had not banished it to faraway places. The event startled the hearts of millions with a renewed sense of human finiteness and impotency (if only for a time) resulting in an intuitive reaction to call out to God. Instinctively, people prayed and talked of God. This reality once again raised the age-old dilemma: If God is all-powerful and all-good, how could such horrific evil ¹ be permitted in this world created and maintained by this God? On the one hand, there is the instinctive need for God in such times; yet, on the other hand, if God is all-powerful and all-good, how did He allow something like 9/11 to happen? That is, if God is all Christians claim He is, why does evil exist in a world created and maintained by this sovereign God? Furthermore, this event underscores the need of the human heart to have real answers regarding the question of the relation of God to evil. However the question of evil’s existence is answered, this response must consistently offer an answer concerning suffering (evil) caused by moral agents (such as rape), suffering caused by natural disasters (such as tsunamis), and physical suffering (such as cancer). Any answer that fails to take into account these three areas has not yet faced the scope of the question and will be found wanting. If Christianity’s claim as a superior worldview is to have any intellectual currency in the marketplace of ideas, it cannot ignore the question of evil. Of course, many have attempted to answer the question of evil, and their answers have only raised other questions.

It is not that Christians have not offered answers over the past, for they have. This set of answers is often referred to as a theodicy.² In clarification, not everybody who deals with the question of evil would subscribe to the concept of theodicy. This essay, however, does not develop or defend a theodicy.³ In particular, this essay examines answers given by those in the theological tradition called Calvinism.⁴ The moment the word Calvinism surfaces, it may produce an instinctive reaction in some persons to prepare for a fight. That reaction, at least not here, is not so. This critique hopefully will be evenhanded and fair-minded, conducted not as warfare but thoughtfully. Intellectual honesty presses me to disclose that I do not consider myself a Calvinist or an Arminian, but my theological position beyond that is irrelevant to what is going on here.

Clarification on several points hopefully will eliminate misunderstandings that can be all too common to a discussion of this nature. First, not all Calvinists ⁵ are in view here, as I am sure there are exceptions to the rule in any theological position. Second, I do not use the term Calvinist in a pejorative sense; it is simply a matter of using a traditional classification regarding a theological position. Third, it is readily acknowledged that the difference between theological positions must not be portrayed as a distinction between those who love God and want to glorify Him and those who do not. Each position must stand or fall on the merits or strengths of the particular arguments supporting the position. Unfortunately, too often important discussions of this nature degenerate into unhelpful rhetoric which unnecessarily creates division between Christian brothers and sisters. The principle of charity is important at this point. It would be silly to think that a person claims a belief he knows is biblically wrong simply because it comes with the theological system he has adopted or because he wants to be different. While theological systems play an important role in doing theology, at the end of the day, one’s commitment must be to come to the truth, not simply defend a system.

Lastly, to my knowledge, no one propositional statement in the Bible sets forth an unambiguous full-orbed answer to this question of evil. Therefore, constructing an answer involves drawing inferences from what the Bible states clearly, a procedure not foreign to the Church. In drawing these inferences, the theological inference must neither deny what God affirms nor affirm what God clearly denies; it must strive for internal consistency. Any answer to the question of evil will touch many different doctrines, but however the answer is framed, it must reflect (1) consistency within one’s theological system, (2) avoidance of logical fallacies or inconsistencies, and (3) a balanced application of all the acknowledged attributes of God. Method, or what is known as hermeneutics, is, therefore, important, as are all prior theological assumptions with which one comes to the discussion.

Although this essay begins with the event of 9/11, other events beg for an answer as well and possibly even more so. Hundreds of evil events causing great suffering occur every day around the world; however, they often receive far less publicity because they involve much smaller numbers. Many of these events are cases of horrific evil and suffering that rip families apart and wound human beings in the innermost part of their being because the principal sufferer is a child. Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov wrestles with this matter, as does Voltaire’s Candide. In a natural or intuitive sense, the suffering of small children offends people’s moral sensibilities no matter who they are or what their religious beliefs are. Not only are children seen as defenseless, but the Christian perspective introduces another existential difficulty. What sense is to be made of the abusive cruelty directed toward children when Jesus says they are special in God’s sight?

The Gospel of Matthew records the words of Jesus regarding God’s view of children: “Assuredly I say to you, unless you are converted and become as little children, you will by no means enter the kingdom of heaven. . . . Whoever receives one little child like this in My name receives Me” (Matt 18:3,5).⁶ Later Jesus said concerning the little children: “Take heed that you do not despise one of these little ones, for I say to you that in heaven their angels always see the face of My Father who is in heaven” (Matt 18:10). Jesus rebuked the disciples when they attempted to prevent the little children from coming to him: “But Jesus said, ‘Let the little children come to Me, and do not forbid them; for of such is the kingdom of heaven’ ” (Matt 19:14). At the least these texts indicate that children are special in God’s sight. Jesus, who was God, says so. Such texts do not give an answer for why children suffer; they only acknowledge that mistreating children is an offense to God. The suffering of children not only offends God; it offends the moral sensibilities of humanity almost universally. This suffering must be understood as set against the words of Jesus. Therefore, however one answers the question of evil, it must not only address the scope of evil in general but the suffering of children in particular.

Consider the situation of the little girl Jessica in Florida a couple of years ago, whom a convicted sex offender abducted, raped, and then buried alive in his yard. She was nine years old when taken from her bedroom. She is chosen here not for any particular reason but merely as a representative of hundreds of little children, many younger than Jessica, who are subjected to horrible torture every year. Not only did Jessica suffer such inhumane torture, but those related to or associated with her have and will suffer for years to come. Most think that if there is a God, surely He would intervene on behalf of little children, that is, if He were to intervene for any, especially in light of what Jesus says. If God is the God of the universe, why would He allow such things to happen to the innocent ones?⁷ Of course, this example does not, on the face of it, serve as a sure defeater of the claim that God exists. Nonetheless, the suffering of children does present a serious challenge to those attempting to provide an answer to the question of evil. Where is God in all of this?

While this discussion has mentioned the matter of children and their innocence, Calvinists such as John Piper claim that no one is innocent. Commenting on US Airways flight 1549, which on January 15, 2009 experienced an exceptional landing on the Hudson River, Piper makes this comment: “God can take down a plane any time he pleases—and if he does, he wrongs no one. Apart from Christ, none of us deserves anything from God but judgment. We have belittled him so consistently that he would be perfectly just to take any of us any time in any way he chooses.”⁸ This viewpoint means that when Jessica was tortured and buried alive, God had injured no one. After all, as it is argued, Jessica is a sinner and deserving of the wrath of God, so God owed Jessica nothing. Of course, it is true that God owes human beings nothing and only in Christ is there security from the penalty of sin. Christ died for the sins of the world (1 John 2:1–2), and only those in Christ are delivered from the second death. However, Piper seems to confuse suffering in time with suffering in eternity. If Christ has died for the sins of the world, then the Father has been satisfied on that account. So why claim that because Jessica is a sinner, God can justifiably ordain her torture? In addition, if He ordained her death the way things turned out, then in reality it is the only way it could turn out if sovereignty means anything. It is not that it just happens this way; it is ordained to be this way because God is sovereign—or at least that is how sovereignty is applied to the situation. It means more than simply saying God allowed it to happen.

According to Calvinists such as Piper, God is not blameworthy even though He ordained it. God ordains the evil He commands humans to refrain from doing. Either God orders the world under moral principles different from those He gives mankind, or there is a contradiction in the nature of God. What logically follows if one accepts the idea that God ordained Jessica’s horrible end even though the rapist bears the responsibility? Since God ordained the particular act, God also must have ordained the pedophile to act (although according to this view, the pedophile bears the full responsibility for acting the way he does). Understand the logical force of this view: there is no way for Jessica to be raped except for someone to rape her. If the rape is ordained, then so is the rapist ordained to act.

Jessica, however, is not alone in all of this suffering; many others suffer as well. The parents, grandparents, and other relatives must live with the knowledge of the torture as well as with the loss of a dear daughter. One can now only conclude that God also ordained this grief. But Jesus does not seem to reflect an indifferent attitude toward suffering and loss, even though Jesus revealed the Father to humanity (John 1:18). What about the widow of Nain? It appears that Jesus had compassion on the widow when He came across the funeral procession taking her only son to be buried. On that occasion no one begs Him to do something, and no one prays. According to the text, “He had compassion on her” (Luke 7:13). Jesus simply reaches down, touches the coffin, and says, “Young man, I say to you, arise” (Luke 7:14). The boy’s life comes into him again. The Calvinists’ view of the same God ordaining the torture and hideous death of a child like Jessica and dispassionately watching her parents grieve seems curious in light of this passage. Furthermore, according to Luke, Jesus proclaims humanity is living in “the acceptable year of the LORD” (4:19) because “God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, not imputing their trespasses to them, and has committed to us the word of reconciliation” (2 Cor 5:19). Surely, this passage has something to say to us regarding the way God is now interacting with the world, which seems at odds with the Calvinist’s view. One must agree that God, in one sense (apart from His grace), can do as He pleases with any human being. Still, it must not be ignored He has laid something on Himself for these days, namely to be “longsuffering toward us, not willing that any should perish” (2 Pet 3:9). While it is right to affirm God can, in one sense, do as He pleases, His commitments (promises) to His creation constrain Him, and this constraint in no way detracts from His sovereignty. In addition, Christians are commanded to do good to all people, especially those of the household of faith (Gal 6:10). Should God do less—especially the sovereign God?

The doctrine of divine sovereignty looms large in this discussion and rightly so. If Christians did not claim that God governed as the omnipotent sovereign One over His creation, the question of God and evil would assume a considerably different shape. The doctrine of God’s divine sovereignty stands at the center of the Calvinist position on evil. However, that others may apply divine sovereignty somewhat differently is not the problem but rather how Calvinists understand sovereignty in relationship to the question of evil in the larger context of God’s sovereign control.

The other side of the argument focuses on free will. The term free will is an unfortunate one since it does not precisely mean what is suggested by the term, for man is not free to will just anything he wishes. Libertarian freedom is a much preferred term.⁹ Many of those who affirm libertarian freedom also affirm a high view of divine sovereignty. That both human free will, which is roughly interchangeable with libertarian freedom, and divine sovereignty have support in the Scriptures, explains why many Christians hold to both. The controversy develops over how to understand the relationship between sovereignty and free will. How one understands the relationship goes to the heart of how the question of God and evil is answered.

With that said, the subject at hand—how Calvinists typically answer the question of evil—can move forward. Generally, many Calvinists¹⁰ (as well as any who reject the notion of free will), in explaining evil in this world, appeal to some form of a greater good, which finds its beginnings in Augustine of Hippo. This approach argues that God allows into this world only that evil from which He can either bring about a greater good or prevent a worse evil. Whereas there is no way to know if a worse evil was preempted or not, part of the explanation can probably be dropped. Regarding Augustine’s position, Richard Middleton notes: “whereas Augustine’s explicit position in De Libero Arbitrio is that the world is no worse for all the evil in it, due to God’s providence (technically, that all evil is ‘counterbalanced’ by good), by the time we get to his later Enchiridion Augustine boldly claims that ‘God judged it better to bring good out of evil than not to permit any evil to exist.’”¹¹ For Augustine, it was better for persons to have free will than not, even though free will made evil possible (not necessary) in God’s creation. Augustine argued that it was God’s goodness that led Him to create persons with free will, for he said it is better to be a moral being than a nonmoral being: “Such is the generosity of God’s goodness that He has not refrained from creating even that creature which He foreknew would not only sin but remain in the will to sin. As a runaway horse is better than a stone which does not run away because it lacks self-movement and sense perception, so the creature is more excellent which sins by free will than that which does not sin only because it has no free will.”¹²

Augustine affirmed that sin came by human free will and that God in no way ordained or forced humans to do evil. In fact, evil was not necessary even though God knew about it. Augustine wrote:

Your [God’s] foreknowledge would not be the cause of his [man’s] sin, though undoubtedly he [man] would sin; otherwise you would not foreknow that this would happen. Therefore, these two are not contradictory, your foreknowledge and someone else’s free act. So too God compels no one to sin, though He foresees those who will sin by their own will.¹³

For Augustine the will is free, and, therefore, persons are truly morally responsible for their acts. Furthermore, Augustine maintained that the will is culpable for its own turning or that it is its own cause. He noted that the will’s turn from good to evil “belongs only to the soul, and is voluntary and therefore culpable.”¹⁴ However, he believes that God in His providence, brings good out of the evil He allowed, thus justifying the evil being allowed. Augustine has a robust view of God’s providence, which understands God’s work in history to bring good out of all evil; in fact, that evil is the only evil God would allow into the world. Today, many within the Calvinistic tradition argue that the greater good is the glory of God (Augustine argued for particular goods in this life) and deny the idea of free will. Furthermore, there is a subtle shift from God allows to God has a purpose in the evil.

Some claim that God has a purpose in all evil that He allows, but they give some room for human free will. Others, such as Piper, maintain that God has a purpose and actually ordains or wills the evil for this purpose. In the latter case the purpose of evil is to glorify God and is solidly constructed on God’s sovereignty. In other words, either God controls all things in the strong sense, or He controls nothing. To be truly sovereign means that whatever happens on earth, if it is for His good purposes, is willed by God; otherwise, there could be no assurance that His purpose would be accomplished. Two questions surface from this view: (1) Does divine sovereignty require this strong view in order to maintain a biblical view of sovereignty? (2) If God ordains or wills all things, in what way do persons, not God, stand morally responsible for their acts? Greater-good approaches differ, for in the case of Augustine, God’s providence allows evil, whereas in more recent Calvinistic views, God actually ordains or wills the evil. In the case of Jessica, then, according to one view, God allowed her to be tortured to death for no reason other than pure wickedness on the part of the perpetrator, and God would bring some good from it. I do not mean to say that this view does not raise other questions as well, but I am only pointing out the difference. According to the other view, God ordained it for the greater glory for Christ, which is His good purpose.

Those who take what might be considered a moderate Calvinism (often referred to as compatibilism) rest their answer to evil on Rom 8:28: “And we know that all things work together for good to those who love God, to those who are the called according to His purpose.” This text, however, only affirms that God works “together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to His purpose.” A casual reading of the text reveals that this working together applies only to those who “love God,” which excludes the majority of earth’s population and says nothing about natural disasters. This verse, while it provides comfort for the believer, does not provide a foundational position from which to answer the question of evil. Asserting that God allows evil because He will bring about some good from it finds no support in this verse. A cursory examination of the greater-good explanation for all evil reveals serious weaknesses.¹⁵ Because this explanation plays a part in so many Christian responses to evil, considering briefly some of those weaknesses will be helpful. The critique will also show how these weaknesses apply to the Calvinist position under consideration in this essay.

First, it seems rather obvious (at least to me) that something happens in this world either because God has allowed it or ordained it. I envision no objection on that point except maybe from those who hold to an open theism. The point of concern arises over why He allows it. That He allows it because His sovereign hand will bring some good (particular good things or the good of God’s glory) from the evil, faces some serious challenges. This challenge does not say that God cannot bring good from evil. The challenge is whether the good that obtains morally justifies God in allowing evil. For the moment set aside that Rom 8:28 does not explain much of the suffering in this world; it actually says nothing about why God allows suffering. It affirms that God will bring some good from certain kinds of suffering. These are two different matters—why He allows suffering and what He might do in the suffering. To suggest that one can move from what God might do with suffering to why He allowed the suffering makes one a consequentialist, in which the end justifies the means. That is, justifying the cause by looking at the effect is tantamount to allowing the end to excuse or justify the means. The text says nothing about why God allows the suffering.

Still, if God ordains or allows evil, a couple of practical matters come to light. If God allows or ordains evil to bring about good (regardless of what the good is), what does that say about the Christian’s responsibility to uphold social justice? If God allows or ordains evil in order to bring good, then it would seem that Christians should not be engaged in standing against social injustice (that which the Bible calls evil). Should they stop it, they would keep the good from obtaining—a good necessary to God’s plan. If God is really sovereign and He ordains the evil, it would be impossible for mere humans to stop it, so standing against social injustice would be an exercise in futility. Apply this to the matter of abortion, an act that can be properly put in the category of evil (taking of life). Since abortion presently occurs, then God either allowed or ordained it for some good. Therefore, logically, to attempt to eliminate abortion would, in fact, be frustrating (or at least attempting to frustrate) God’s plan to bring some good. In addition, if God allowed evil, the good must be necessary, which in turn makes evil necessary.

The second concern pertains to the relationship between good and evil within the plan of God. The good (whether the good be some particular good or the glory of God) must in some way accomplish God’s purposes; therefore, the good must be necessary to His purposes. If the good can only come from the evil, then the evil also must be necessary to God’s plan. Avoiding this conclusion seems difficult:

God cannot bring about certain goods without particular evils, for if any evil will do, God should pick the least of the sufferings. Also, if God can bring about the good without the evil, then He should for if He can and He does not, then He is not the good God being defended. One could argue that if God needs particular evils to bring about certain goods, then God is not omnipotent. In this case, the all-good, all-powerful God is unable to bring about a good without the help of evil. Immediately one can see how theologically convoluted this becomes. It diminishes God and makes evil a necessary part of His plan.¹⁶

If evil is necessary to God’s plan, then since it is God’s plan, God is the one responsible for evil, which John seems to contradict clearly by claiming that “God is light and in Him is no darkness at all” (1 John 1:5b). In the case of Jessica, her torture then was necessary to some good in the overall purposes of God regardless of whether He allowed it or ordained it.

Once the move has been made making evil part of God’s design within His larger plan, the direct line to God as the cause of evil becomes straighter and stronger. If the sovereign God is in control of all things, then what happens on this earth must fulfill the particular purposes of God. Furthermore, either all things have a purpose, or all things are chaotic or left to chance. Since chaos and chance are incompatible with God’s sovereignty, it supposedly follows that all things must have a purpose, and the guarantee of this purpose is God’s will. There seems to be, however, a mistake of logic at this point. The suggestion cannot be sustained that if all things in life are not part of God’s purpose, then all things are left to chance. This argument fails because it does not distinguish between reason and purpose.

Undoubtedly, or so it seems to me, if God is truly sovereign, then for everything that happens (at least on earth), there is a reason but not necessarily a purpose. Often the Bible provides the record of God’s reason for something happening but not necessarily His purpose. Consider God’s relationship with Israel as expressed in Deuteronomy 28. God is not giving His purpose in what He says but rather expressing the reason the outcomes in Israel’s life will differ depending on her choices. Giving that explanation is not, however, the same thing as saying that everything that happens must have a purpose. An illustration will display the difference. If, when you ask me why I did not pay my electric bill, I say because I did not have the money, then what I have given you is a reason. Should I, however, reply that I did not pay my electric bill because I am protesting the recent hike in the price of electricity, then I have given you the purpose for which I did not pay my electric bill. As the examples illustrate, the reason and the purpose for an action differ. Therefore, it is perfectly consistent to affirm that because God is sovereign, nothing happens on this earth by chance as there is always a reason. That God has purposes regarding history cannot be denied. Many things happen because God has a purpose, such as sending His Son to be the Savior of the world (John 3:16), but that explanation does not account for all things.

In a larger sense, it is the difference between contrivance and order. One can contrive certain things to indicate purpose. Other things, however, happen by order within the universe, which supplies the reason these things occurred. If people fall off a high building, it is not a matter of chance that they hurt themselves since that would be predicted because of the way the world is structured. That example illustrates a reason flowing from natural order. If on the other hand people jump off the building in order to take their own life, they are depending on natural order to accomplish their purposes. The two events differ not in that one is chaotic and the other not since both are predictable. Both have a reason, but a purpose is involved only in the latter case. God surely has sufficient reasons for allowing things to happen on this planet within the established natural order of creation, but that does not require claiming that He has a purpose in all things. Sometimes things happen because of the ordering of the universe: “Whatever a man sows, that he will also reap” (Gal 6:7). Furthermore, sometimes God purposes something, but because of the human agent’s disobedience, it does not reach fruition (Isa 5:4). Israel’s disobedience gives the reason things turned out as they did. God’s purpose is to produce fruit. When that does not happen, He judges His vineyard (Isa 5:5-7) that Israel might repent. That explains the purpose of the judgment. Israel suffered, but that was not God’s purpose in planting the vineyard. In the end God’s purpose for Israel and the world will come to pass in spite of disobedience because of His providential hand in history. He is the sovereign One who works through His providence to bring history to its final appointed place. In light of this, it is possible to maintain a robust view of sovereignty and order in this world while maintaining that evil in this world is not necessarily the work of God’s purposes.

The writings of John Piper display the view of strong sovereignty. Piper, an evangelical leader, has brought much spiritual encouragement to the community of faith. Therefore, the following interaction is only to see how, as a Calvinist, he answers the question of God and evil in light of a strong sovereignty. In a recent Internet posting by Piper, he refers to the event others dubbed the “Miracle on the Hudson” as a parable on our nation. The event unfolded on January 15, 2009, when US Airways flight 1549, shortly after takeoff, encountered a flock of birds (geese), some of which were sucked into the plane’s engines and shut down both. Captain Sullenberger, an experienced pilot, chose to land the plane on the Hudson River rather than attempt a landing at an airport several miles away. By all accounts, it was one of those events where training, outstanding judgment, and right circumstances came together, resulting in all passengers surviving. The nation rightfully celebrated Captain Sullenberger as a hero. Piper, however, had a little different take on the event. He writes: “Two laser-guided missiles would not have been as amazingly effective as were those geese. It is incredible, statistically speaking. If God governs nature down to the fall (and the flight) of every bird, as Jesus says (Matt 10:29), then the crash of flight 1549 was designed by God.”¹⁸ He goes on to say, “If God guides geese so precisely, he also guides the captain’s hand.”¹⁹ In other words, God in His sovereignty is even responsible for the movement of the pilot’s hands. Furthermore, according to Piper, this entire event was “designed” by God. This assertion can only mean that God in His sovereignty designed it before the world began to fit His purposes. If that is so, God does not merely allow this; God designs and executes it. In His omnipotence He executes the plan by, among other things, guiding the flight of the geese and the hands of the pilot to bring about an event that will, as Piper says, give a parable of His power to the nation. There is no way for things to turn out differently. Who is responsible for this event? According to this view of things, God is, right down to guiding the geese into the engine and guiding the hands of the pilot. God is responsible but not morally culpable. The logic of this view means He also designed all events that preceded that event. This view includes making sure those precise geese were there at that particular moment as well as ordaining everything in Sullenberger’s life so he would be on that plane on that day. Notice God did not providentially intervene at the moment in response to some prayer or by His own mercy. According to this view, God designed it in order to serve His purposes, purportedly to show His power to a new president and to a nation.

Only a few days after “Miracle on the Hudson” happened, another airplane mishap occurred, but this time 50 people died. According to reports, “Continental Connection Flight 3407 from Newark, New Jersey, came in squarely through the roof of the house, its tail section visible through flames shooting at least 50 feet high.”²⁰ As the Continental commuter plane was coming in for a landing, it slammed into a house in suburban Buffalo, sparking a fiery explosion that killed all 49 people aboard and a person in the home. Although the investigation is unfinished, the preliminary investigation concluded that “pilot commands—not a buildup of ice on the wings and tail—likely initiated the fatal dive of the twin-engine Bombardier Q400 into a neighborhood six miles short of the Buffalo, New York, airport, according to people familiar with the situation.”²¹

Applying Piper’s theological explanation of the Hudson episode, it logically follows that in this case God guided the pilot of flight 3407 to misjudgment in order that God “would bring the plane down” killing 50 people. It might be argued that He only guided the hand where safety resulted and that flight 3407 was just an accident. Yet, if Piper maintains that all evil occurs to give glory to Christ, then one can reasonably conclude that in both situations God was involved in bringing His design to pass, which includes this evil. Furthermore, whereas God owes no one anything, He has not harmed the 50 people killed. In his book Spectacular Sins, Piper writes in the section titled “All Things for Jesus–Even Evil”:

This book is also meant to show that everything that exists—including evil—is ordained by an infinitely holy and all-wise God to make the glory of Christ shine more brightly. The word ordained is peculiar, I know. But I want to be clear what I mean by it. There is no attempt to obscure what I am saying about God’s relation to evil. But there is an attempt to say carefully what the Bible says. By ordain I mean that God either caused something directly or permitted it for wise purposes. This permitting is a kind of indirect causing, since God knows all the factors involved and what effects they will have and he could prevent any outcome.²²

Later Piper claims:

So when I say that everything that exists—including evil—is ordained by an infinitely holy and all-wise God to make the glory of Christ shine more brightly, I mean that, one way or the other, God sees to it that all things serve to glorify his Son. Whether he causes or permits, he does so with purpose. For an infinitely wise and all-knowing God, both causing and permitting are purposeful. They are part of the big picture of what God plans to bring to pass.²³

Notice the words “purpose” and “purposeful.” It may be simply a poor choice of words, but it seems that it is not. Piper carefully uses his words to say that in all the evil on this earth, God has a purpose: to make the glory of Christ shine more brightly. If it is for the purposes of God and purpose reflects the will of God, then the will of God is not perfect if any evil fails to materialize. Jessica’s torturous death is part of this will. This position not only makes evil necessary to the purposes of God; it makes God the one morally responsible for the evil.

Addressing this matter, Piper agrees that God seems blameworthy, but he claims that He is not. In fact, Piper argues that in all of this, God is not blameworthy; we just do not understand how it is this way, but it is. Piper explains his claim regarding the “sovereignty of God over sin” by adding a footnote to demonstrate how he squares that view with Jas 1:13–15. He writes:

Thus it seems to me that James is saying that God never experiences this kind of “being dragged away” or “being lured.” And he does not directly (see Chapter Four, note 1) produce that “dragging” and that “luring” toward evil in humans. In some way (that we may not be able to fully comprehend), God is able without blameworthy “tempting” to see to it that a person does what God ordains for him to do even if it involves evil.²⁴

In the end Piper concludes that though people may not understand it, God ordains evil but at the same time is not blameworthy for the evil. What does this say about the torture of Jessica and her abductor and all the events surrounding that horrible day? Could Christ’s glory not shine brighter with a lot less trauma to Jessica and her friends and family? So, God does not just love the glory of Christ more than Jessica; He is actually willing to ordain the evil that befalls her that Christ’s glory might shine brighter.

It is not that the glory of the Lord is unimportant, because it is (1 Cor 10:31), but to say that God ordains evil in order to magnify the glory of Christ seems to confuse the difference between good and evil. That is, God ordained Jessica’s suffering for the purpose of making the glory of Christ shine brighter. Yet if a righteous life glorifies God (1 Cor 6:20), how does evil also glorify God? How do the contraries, one commanded and the other forbidden, both glorify God? That Christ will be glorified is not debated. It is not whether Christ will receive glory, because it seems that in the eschaton He will. As Paul says, “Therefore God also has highly exalted Him [Christ] and given Him the name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those in heaven, and of those on earth, . . . and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of the Father” (Phil 2:9–11). But Paul’s statement is an affirmation of a different sort. It only tells what the end will be and is silent on the issue of necessity or causality. The statement says only that in spite of the evil, God has the last word and glory will come to Christ even though at one point He was rejected. To say that all of this particular evil was necessary to Christ’s glory says something quite different.

With little doubt, the idea of God’s glory in history fills the pages of Scripture. The point of concern is whether the triumph over sin makes Christ’s glory shine brighter. The night of Christ’s betrayal (just before going to the cross), He prays, “And now, O Father, glorify Me together with Yourself, with the glory which I had with You before the world was” (John 17:5). The glory for which Jesus prays is the glory He had with the Father before the world was. Jesus is not referring to a glory that comes because He is about to defeat evil on the cross but rather the glory that was before creation. Undoubtedly, Christ’s work on the cross demonstrates the redemption by the incarnate Son crucified for the sins of the world; that, however, does not seem to be the argument. The argument is that God ordains all individual events of evil as part of His plan so that Christ’s glory might shine brighter. In the end, when the words used are understood in the common usage, sin is made a part of the plan of God. It is, as Piper says, “part of the big picture of what God plans to bring to pass.” For the sovereign God, He has only one big picture.

To be clear at this point, the question is not whether God will bring glory to Himself in the end. He will. The concern is that in Calvinist theology God ordains the evil along the way in order for the glory of Christ to shine brighter. But how many acts of evil does it take to show that Christ has power over them? Does each act of evil result in the glory of Christ shining brighter? If this is the case, then it seems that people need the ugly in order to appreciate beauty. That would mean that the beauty and glory of God could not be fully appreciated until there was the ugly—evil. So Adam in the garden could not appreciate the beauty and glory of God. Does that not necessitate the fall in the garden? The necessity of the fall, which has resulted in horrible evils of human torture, to say nothing of thousands going to hell, is now justified on the grounds it was needed for Christ’s glory to shine brighter. The logic of this argument says that the more evil there is, the brighter Christ’s glory will shine. The Bible, though, does not command people to order their lives in such a way; in fact, it commands just the opposite: “What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? Certainly not!” (Rom 6:1–2). Therefore, that God would order His creation this way seems curious. At the end of the day, that sure looks as though in the Calvinist system God not only ordained evil but actually needs evil if Christ is to get the greater glory. In fact, it makes the fall in the garden necessary, which in the end means Adam had no choice. So why is God not the one morally responsible even if for a good cause—the glory of Christ?

Gordon H. Clark, arguing for what he calls the Calvinist position on God and evil, writes, “As God cannot sin, so in the next place, God is not responsible for sin, even though he decrees it.”²⁵ In fact, in responding to an Arminian position, he writes, “I wish very frankly and pointedly to assert that if a man gets drunk and shoots his family, it was the will of God that he should do so. . . . In Ephesians 1:11 Paul tells us that God works all things, not some things only, after the counsel of his own will.”²⁶ Notice here, Clark says it is God’s will and earlier says it is decreed by God and yet maintains that God is not the cause of sin or evil. Piper says evil is ordained by God, but God is not blameworthy. The verse Clark quotes only says what God does with all things; it does not say that God wills all things. It says that God works all things in light of the counsel of His will. This verse seems to say only that the providential work of God in human history keeps the plan of God for humanity on course. Notice this verse is saying something quite different from what Clark says.

In the midst of all of this discussion lies the question of moral responsibility. Those of a Calvinistic position often disavow God’s moral responsibility for evil.²⁷ Both Clark and Piper maintain that their deterministic explanations for evil do not shift the moral responsibility to God. Instead, both claim that God is not blameworthy and man is responsible. Still, apart from assigning moral responsibility, according to the Calvinist’s position, the evil in this world would not be here if God had not ordained or willed it. In other words, in the final analysis, Jessica (and the hundreds like her) suffered her end because of God. The Holocaust, the millions slain by Stalin, Pol Pot’s killing in Cambodia, every baby beaten to death, and every cancer could not be here if it were not for God willing it or ordaining it. At the end of the day, it seems hard to escape the conclusion that God is morally responsible, although arguments are offered to deny this conclusion.

Gordon Clark presents one way of responding to the charge that the Calvinist position leaves God morally responsible for evil even though He ordained it. Clark seeks to smooth out the contradiction by crafting the notion of God’s secret will and His revealed will. In the context of Genesis 22, Clark writes:

One may speak of the secret will of God, and one may speak of the revealed will of God. Those who saw self-contradiction in the previous case would no doubt argue similarly on this point too. The Arminian would say that God’s will cannot contradict itself, and that therefore his secret will cannot contradict his revealed will. Now, the Calvinist would say the same thing; but he has a clearer notion of what contradiction is, and what the Scriptures say. It was God’s secret will that Abraham should not sacrifice his son Isaac; but it was his revealed (for a time), his command, that he should do so. Superficially this seems like a contradiction. But it is not. The statement, or command, “Abraham, sacrifice Isaac,” does not contradict the statement, at the moment known only to God, “I have decreed that Abraham shall not sacrifice his son.” If Arminians had a keener sense of logic they would not be Arminians.²⁸

For the moment, the Calvinist-Arminian debate will be put aside in order to consider Clark’s argument on its own merit. The logic of all of his argument may not be as clear as he affirms. He claims the contradiction is removed by affirming God’s secret will is that Abraham must not sacrifice his son, while the revealed will is that he should sacrifice his son. Suggesting that God knows which will prevail hardly resolves the contradiction. That is, it is difficult to see how appealing to God’s knowledge solves the problem. In fact, appealing to God’s knowledge seems to strengthen the problem. The conclusion is that God has two apparently incoherent wills since He knows two contraries simultaneously. If God is sovereign, how does He have two wills (secret and revealed) regarding the same event, especially when the wills affirm contraries? Clark admits that there is an apparent contradiction in the text, but he thinks he has solved it. However, I think his solution fails on logical grounds. Of course, undoubtedly there is a solution to this apparent contradiction, but I suggest it is not Clark’s solution.

Clark’s explanation of Abraham’s situation as involving God’s secret will and the revealed will must also be applied to the drunk who kills his family. It was God’s secret will that he not shoot his family, but it was God’s revealed will that he should shoot his family. Yet it is the revealed will that is actually accomplished in time and space. So what happens in this case is just the opposite of what happens in the case of Abraham. The secret will in the case of the drunk is that he should not murder (Exod 20:13), yet when he murders, Clark says it is God’s will. Is this the secret will or the revealed will? Surely Clark cannot be saying that murder is the secret will of God. The killing of the family, since Clark affirms it is God’s will, then, must be the revealed will of God. Still, this argument puts the revealed will and the secret will of the sovereign God in conflict, so that apparently one is a sovereign will and the other is not. The command “do not murder” appears to be the sovereign will of God. Therefore, when Clark affirms the murder of the family as God’s will, it cannot be the sovereign will, which is the affirmation he seeks to argue. Accordingly, in the case of Jessica, both her torture and her nontorture were God’s will. At the end of the day, this view can only be called incoherent. God is presented as willing what He does not will, and yet He is not guilty of contradiction, nor is He found to be blameworthy in the murder.

If God is not blameworthy, who is? Only one other agent is involved, namely man. According to Calvinism, man does not have free will, so how can he be morally responsible? Both Piper and Clark agree that God ultimately is the cause of evil—either directly or indirectly. Piper uses the term “ordained” (either direct or indirect causation), and Clark affirms that God wills the evil. If God wills or ordains the evil but is not blameworthy and persons do not have free will, then who is morally responsible? Both Piper and Clark maintain that the individual bears the moral responsibility for his evil even though he do not have free will. Clark attempts an answer to this question:

Perhaps the matter can be made clearer by stating in other words precisely what the question is. The question is, Is the will free? The question is not, Is there a will? Calvinism most assuredly holds that Judas acted voluntarily. He chose to betray Christ. He did so willingly. No question is raised as to whether or not he had a will. What the Calvinist asks is whether that will was free. Are there factors or powers that determine a person’s choice, or is the choice causeless? Could Judas have chosen otherwise? Not, could he have done otherwise, had he chosen; but, could he have chosen in opposition to God’s foreordination? Acts 4:28 indicates he could not.²⁹

Clark’s point is that one cannot choose other than he did although he could have done differently but only if God had willed differently.

Clark separates the idea of “free” from the idea of will. Of course, the will is never free in the absolute sense, but for Clark it is not free in any sense. According to Clark, the human will cannot choose in any sense. The will becomes merely the channel through which what God has willed is actualized. In the case of the man who raped Jessica, he could only have chosen otherwise if God had willed otherwise. Still the rapist is responsible. Clark affirms man has a will because of its association with a human action, not because it functions as a will in the normal sense of the word (that which chooses between one thing and its contrary).

For many, including Augustine, the will meant it had the freedom to move itself. Augustine notes:

So what need is there to ask the source of that movement by which the will turns from the unchangeable good to the changeable good? We agree that it belongs only to the soul, and is voluntary and therefore culpable; and the whole value of teaching in this matter consists in its power to make us censure and check this movement, and turn our wills away from temporal things below us to enjoyment of the everlasting good.³⁰

Therefore, Augustine maintains that the will is at least culpable for its own turning prior to the fall (and for some time he also believed it was true after the fall). In fact, Richard Swinburne claims that this view persisted in the church for the first four centuries. He writes,

My assessment of the Christian theological tradition is that all Christian theologians of the first four centuries believed in human free will in the libertarian sense, as did all subsequent Eastern Orthodox theologians, and most Western Catholic theologians from Duns Scotus (in the fourteenth century) onwards.³¹

Most often theologians believed that libertarian freedom was the only way humans could be morally responsible for their actions, just as the Bible affirms clearly. Actually, the notion of will carries with it the idea of the ability to choose between this and that—between contraries even. To say the will is not free is to render what is called a will to be something other than a will, at least in any common understanding of the word.

Clark anticipates another question, namely, how can something be called a choice if it is a necessity? That is, if God wills something (actually all things), in what sense could a person be said to have a choice? Clark answers that by saying:

Choice and necessity are therefore not incompatible. Instead of prejudging the question by confusing choice with free choice, one should give an explicit definition of choice. The adjective could be justified only afterward, if at all. Choice may be defined, at least sufficiently for the present purpose, as a mental act that consciously initiates and determines a further choice. The ability to have chosen otherwise is an irrelevant matter and has no place in the definition.³²

He is emphasizing that the will is only something that initiates and determines a further choice. The will is not a kind of self-determiner as Augustine and many of the church fathers taught, but rather the will only initiates what God has willed. It is how the will of God gets into history. Of course, one is not sure which will, the secret will or the revealed will. Clark seems to be saying that man has the ability to choose but not the freedom to choose. It is curious how this comports with the idea of moral responsibility. It sounds something like, persons can have any color car they want as long as they want black. It is true they can choose to have a car or not have a car, but they cannot in any legitimate sense say that they have a choice regarding color. In the end the will in Clark’s terms is no will at all.

The logical end of the Calvinist position on the question of sovereignty leads to a strong form of determinism, which is not the necessary outcome of biblical sovereignty. In addition, moral responsibility for sin must find its final causal agent to be God. The protest against drawing this conclusion involves an argument that commits the fallacy of equivocation (particularly with the word “will”) and the fallacy of explaining by naming—just saying it is so makes it so. Yet the Bible seems to say something different. In the Scriptures humans can choose between contraries such as life and death (Deut 30:15–19; Josh 24:15; Isa 56:4). The Old Testament is a story of God’s responding to the checkered history of Israel in which at one time she is acting faithfully and the next minute she is playing the part of the harlot. The book of Judges is a sad story revealing a pattern where Israel freely chooses unfaithfulness against God’s command, and how God intervenes. Consider the review of God’s curses and blessings in Deuteronomy 28. There, if Israel obeyed, blessing followed (v. 1); but if Israel disobeyed, the curses would come upon Israel (v. 15). Either this account is real history, or God makes it look as though the people have real free choices when, in fact, they do not, if the Calvinists are right. If it was not a free choice, then moral responsibility cannot be imputed. Whereas definite, different outcomes resulted, depending on whether the people of Israel obeyed or disobeyed, the common sense understanding is that they freely chose between the contraries. Otherwise, the whole episode is meaningless. In the end their choices may be worse than meaningless—more likely illusionary and deceptive as far as the record goes. To say they chose but were not free is to void the meaning of “to choose,” and then language means nothing. Not only that, but it destroys the entire notion of justice. The man who raped Jessica and buried her alive could not have chosen to do differently. In the plain sense of language, that choice means he should not be held accountable. On the other hand, to affirm that God ordains but is not morally responsible cannot be solved by simply appealing to mystery.

While Calvinists such as John Piper can be respected for their desire to honor the Lord, in this issue, they are simply wrong and their position incoherent. Unfortunately, being wrong in this area has some serious implications for areas of theology beyond the question of evil. At the end of the day, if they wish to hold to their view of sovereignty, they should be willing to accept the logical conclusion of their position and acknowledge that God is morally responsible for evil. Then they can attempt to build a case for why that does not directly conflict with the clear teaching of Scripture. If my critique has any legitimacy, at the end of the day, this position logically affirms that God is both causally and morally responsible for 9/11, the drunk murdering his family, and the rape and torturous death of Jessica. As I write this concluding paragraph, I have just received a news item on my computer reporting that a man fatally stabbed his 17-year-old sister and decapitated his five-year–old sister during her birthday party before police shot him. These acts were also ordained by God if Piper and others are right.³³ Is that what the Bible teaches?

NOTES

1. The word evil is used in a broad sense in this discussion. Its use includes moral evil, which is evil caused by a moral human agent, as well as natural evil and physical evil. Its use here assumes a connection between evil and suffering. I would argue that not all suffering is evil (for example, that which comes from God when He disciplines His children as in Heb 12:6–11). Nonetheless, all suffering has its roots in evil.

2. The word “theodicy” (theos dike) signifies the justification of God and enables one to argue for the existence of God in the light of evil.

3. This topic receives treatment elsewhere: B. A. Little, A Creation–Order Theodicy: God and Gratuitous Evil (Lanham: University Press of America, 2005).

4. Other books look at this issue from different Calvinistic perspectives: J. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil (rev. and exp. ed.; Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2004); U. Middelmann, The Innocence of God (Colorado Springs: Paternoster, 2007).

5. Some within the Reformed tradition take sovereignty to a different level than others. See, for example, R. C. Sproul Jr. in his book Almighty over All: Understanding the Sovereignty of God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1999).

6. All Scripture references come from the New King James Version unless otherwise stated.

7. When I speak of children being innocent, I am not suggesting they are not corrupted from birth. I am not using the word in its theological sense, but rather in a sense of personal moral culpability for personal actions.

8. J. Piper, “The President, the Passengers, and the Patience of God,” http://www.desiringgod.org/ResourceLibrary/TasteAndSee/ByDate/2009/3520/; accessed March 21, 2009.

9. There are some slight nuances in definition among those who affirm libertarian freedom, however. Thomas Flint offers the following general definition: “A theory of agent causation, according to which the ultimate cause of a free action is not some set of prior conditions, but the agent herself who performs the action” (Divine Providence [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995], 32.). I would add that antecedent events/conditions may incline or influence a person in making the choice, but they neither determine nor cause the choice.