Food-insecure and vulnerable: the politics of African rural livelihoods
With little time left to make significant progress before 2015, it is unlikely that the first Millennium Development Goal, to eradicate hunger and poverty, will be achieved in Africa. In the longer term this will be achieved only with a more robust global strategy to create sustainable livelihoods, which not only ensure the ‘right to food’, but also create systems of food production that can feed growing and increasingly urbanized populations in the context of climate change and diminishing oil reserves. On a regional level, the previous chapter has emphasized the problematic and unsustained nature of economic development on the continent. This chapter develops from that starting point and argues that the political and economic marginalization of rural livelihoods and agriculture has been a theme in both colonial and post-colonial regimes.
Africa is still predominantly rural (although rapidly urbanizing), but development strategies have suffered from a decidedly ‘urban’ bias. The necessary investments in rural infrastructure, education and health, which would be inherently pro-poor and pro-growth, have been lacking, being deemed politically unimportant. This has undoubtedly contributed to the slow reduction in poverty in most African economies. Even some of the recent and much-trumpeted economic growth in some countries has often been based on sectors such as tourism and mining that have a minimal impact on the reduction of poverty. This chapter therefore attempts to present a comprehensive and political engagement with rural livelihoods and, specifically, the role and development of agriculture. However, agriculture should not be viewed in isolation; it is not only a significant productive activity in rural Africa, but is a crucial component of most rural and many urban livelihoods that combine on-farm and off-farm activities. It is likely and desirable that fewer people will rely on agriculture as productivity increases, as they become better educated and are able to take up other opportunities for employment and enterprise. Subsistence and small-scale agriculture is unstable and highly vulnerable, yet it is a key contributor to the livelihoods of the majority of Africa’s population. Without significant investment in appropriate education, infrastructure and technology, this is the situation in which most Africans will remain.
Levels of hunger and poverty in Africa would almost certainly decline through improved local and regional agricultural production. The majority of the population of sub-Saharan Africa remains dependent on agriculture as a key component of their livelihoods. Therefore, increasing the productivity and sustainability of agriculture is a fundamental challenge. However, the challenge of agriculture in Africa is by no means a new one. Colonial and post-colonial administrations sought to revolutionize and control peasant agriculture through the creation of large plantations and settlement of lands. There was a general belief that agriculture would be modernized, commercialized and export-led as the newly independent states progressively industrialized. However, in much of the world, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, fully modernized agriculture remained an elusive small-scale goal and family farmers have continued to feed the bulk of the population (Ponte 1999; Wiggins 2009). Aid funding and government spending on agriculture declined from the 1980s onwards, with many agricultural research and extension institutions and subsidized input schemes scaled back. The state was no longer to be the agent of modernization in agriculture, but the market would drive commercialization and productivity gains.
Global agriculture now faces a double challenge: climate change and increasing energy costs. Climate change is predicted to have severe impacts on agriculture in Africa and, while we cannot predict exactly the scale and substance of such impacts, it is likely that increasingly erratic weather patterns will disrupt the livelihoods of farmers dependent on rain-fed agriculture. This will have major social impacts that can already be seen in increasing conflicts over land and natural resources (Toulmin 2009).
At the same time, energy costs are rising and global food production systems are responsible for a significant proportion of carbon emissions. Predictions suggest that, in the coming decades, oil reserves will decline and will push the cost of energy ever higher, as the consumption habits of an expanding global population increase demand. Current global food systems are energy intensive in the form of inputs (agrochemicals and fertilizers) and in fuel for transportation. In 2008, oil prices reached their peak and food prices also increased, resulting in riots in a number of countries. Inflation in the price of basic food commodities had a significant impact on poor consumers, who spend large proportions of their income on food.
There is now a general recognition that the future of food and agriculture requires radical rethinking (Rao 2009; Woodhouse 2009). In sub-Saharan Africa, donors and governments have begun to reconsider agriculture as a significant component of poverty reduction. The role and persistence of small-scale farmers were formally recognized by the World Bank in the 2008 World Development Report. However, there is significant debate in relation to the strategy that sub-Saharan Africa should adopt for the improvement of food production systems.
Some see the answer in technology in a new green revolution that enhances agricultural productivity through genetically modified (GM) crops and agricultural modernization (Collier et al. 2008; Gowing and Palmer 2008). However, there is fierce opposition to this perspective, which argues that GM crops will further reinforce the marginalization of small farmers and threaten biodiversity. A growing movement seeks a more radical transformation through heavily localized food production systems with increased use of organic and low-input agriculture.
This chapter, therefore, seeks to highlight a number of key areas in this debate. It begins by charting investment and support for agriculture in Africa and considers the prospects for current initiatives. It then considers access to land and access to inputs, both of which are crucial in developing small-scale agriculture. Sub-Saharan Africa is currently the focus of significant levels of land grab, as wealthier countries seek to ensure their own food supplies. The issue of whether or not to subsidize agricultural inputs is also a focal area of debate. We explore the case of Malawi, which is seen to provide important lessons for the continent and indeed challenged the assumptions of donors and the international financial institutions. The chapter then goes on to explore issues around increasing the resilience of small-scale farmers and considers the role of agriculture in productive and sustainable livelihood systems, with the consequent implications for the roles of internal and external actors. It is mistaken to assume that all of these questions are technical; the history of agriculture in Africa and the issues outlined above are deeply political in relation to the just and effective allocation of resources and to the possibility of a less vulnerable future for the majority of Africans.
The state of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa
Agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remains dominated by smallholder farmers. It is estimated that 56 per cent depend on agriculture for their livelihoods in total with 69 per cent living in rural areas, and 86 per cent of these depend on agriculture, but also supply the urban areas (Hazell et al. 2007; Jazairy et al. 1992; Rockström 2003; World Bank 2009). It is important to qualify this with the recognition that agricultural and food production activities cannot easily be divided between individuals who might be labelled as ‘farmers’ and ‘non-farmers’. Agricultural activities are often combined with off-farm activities as part of a diversified livelihood, which enables households to reduce their vulnerability to external shocks and stresses such as droughts or floods (Ellis 2000). Not only is SSA heavily reliant on agriculture, it is also the only region in the world where poverty and undernourishment have been increasing over the past twenty years and where those living on less than US$1 per day have become poorer (Staatz and Dembélé 2007).
This poverty remains a strongly rural phenomenon. SSA also has the largest proportion of ultra-poor people who live on less than $0.50 per day (International Food Policy Research Institute 2009).
The majority of the sub-Saharan African population depends to some extent on small-scale agriculture for food and livelihood. However, the significance of agriculture does not necessarily reveal itself in economic indicators, as most producers operate at the margins of the formal economy and commercial markets. Estimates vary substantially as to the contribution of agriculture to gross domestic product (GDP). One report (Integrated Regional Information Networks 2009) suggests that 40 per cent of GDP in SSA relates to agriculture. However, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) suggest that agriculture contributes 15.6 per cent to GDP in all Africa and 16.4 per cent in SSA. There is also a substantial range in the contribution from 54 per cent in Central African Republic, to 1.6 per cent in Botswana. Further, it is estimated that agriculture employs about 80 per cent of the total workforce (Integrated Regional Information Networks 2009). However, levels of food insecurity have remained roughly constant as a proportion in recent decades with around 32–35 per cent of the sub-Saharan African population classified as undernourished (ibid.).
As populations have continued to increase in real terms, in 2005 the number of undernourished people was estimated to be 200 million, an increase from 131 million in the early 1990s (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2008).
The reasons for the lack of adequate food for individuals and communities alike are multiple and are certainly not determined solely by production of agricultural products. Social and political entitlements to land, water and inputs also shape access to agriculture and, similarly, to consumption of the products. However, in SSA, where the majority of the population depends to some degree on agriculture, productivity gains are likely to have a significant impact on food consumption. It is argued that the failure of African agriculture can be attributed to declining donor and governmental investment in agriculture. For example, it is estimated that global financial assistance for agriculture declined from $6.2 billion to $2.3 billion between 1980 and 2000, to the advantage of other sectors (Mkandawire and Albright 2006). Consequently, agricultural production in the sub-region has declined owing to farmers’ inability to purchase the necessary agricultural inputs. For example, in Zambia, farmers have shifted from production of maize and other nutritious and income-generating crops to cassava and millet, which require less fertilizer (Leavy and White 2006). Table 3.1 shows the slow rate of progress of agriculture in SSA over a forty-year period and illustrates the low level of inputs considered key to increasing productivity. In the same period, fertilizer use and productivity in China has increased dramatically. In one study it was shown to reach 588 kilograms per hectare as opposed to 7 kilograms in Kenya, with China’s use considered excessive and Kenya’s inadequate (Stanford University 2009).
TABLE 3.1 Development of sub-Saharan African agriculture
| 1962 | 2002 | |
| Irrigation (%) | 2.47 | 3.95 |
| Modern seed (%) | 0 | 24 |
| Fertilizer per hectare (kg) | 2.9 | 13.1 |
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2009: 51)
According to the Africa in Our Hands report (Africa Monitor 2009) food security and hunger tops the concerns of the poor, for it is agriculture on which they depend for daily survival. Yet productivity in agriculture in SSA has been stagnant for three decades and is the lowest in the world. The report takes testimonies from Kenya, South Africa, Chad and the Gambia, which show that the most significant challenges to productivity are climatic factors, lack of access to agricultural inputs and access to land. Farmers themselves blame the liberalization of the sector and removal of subsidies, plus high demand, which has pushed the prices of inputs to high levels.
External factors and global food prices
An argument often made in relation to African agriculture is that production subsidies in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries unfairly block exports from Africa, and certainly imports from such countries have disrupted local markets by flooding them with cheap produce (Holt-Giménez and Patel 2009). However, according to the FAO, African exports are only 2.4 per cent of production, and it therefore makes more sense for Africa to look to the development of regional markets to support substantial growth in the agricultural sector. Wider external challenges to the global food system such as increasing energy prices may also limit the potential and desirability of export-led growth (United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization 2009; Holt-Giménez and Patel 2009). In addition, Africa is currently disproportionately dependent on food aid with 17.1 per cent imported in 2009 (United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization 2009). Stronger productivity and regional markets in Africa could reduce this dependency.
With a rapidly increasing urban population, rising food prices are significant. Global food prices doubled between 2005 and 2007 and continued to rise to mid-2008 (see Figure 3.1).
The reasons for the price spike included droughts in key regions, low stocks of cereal/oil seeds and feedstock being used in biofuel production, alongside increasing oil prices and the decline of the dollar (ibid.). All of these factors are likely to recur in the future as a result of increasing climate change and increasing energy prices. It might also be argued that increasing food prices are also an opportunity for African farmers to get better returns from their products, but again, at present, this is limited by the chronic problems in agricultural productivity and lack of robust marketing institutions and mechanisms. The FAO uses the example of Uganda, which showed no production response to price rises. Farmers are not able to respond to the market in this way, as land is in small parcels and they have little access to credit inputs. Government invests only 1.5 per cent of national expenditure in agriculture and there are few farmers’ organizations to enhance bargaining (ibid.).
FIGURE 3.1 Increase in food prices 2006–08 (source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2009)
It is broadly agreed that African governments have, in recent decades, failed to make the necessary commitment to agriculture. In 2003, signatories to the Maputo Declaration from the African Union endorsed the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and promised to allocate 10 per cent of government expenditure to agriculture. The data from 2007 suggested that only six countries spent 10 per cent or more (Ethiopia, Senegal, Mali, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso), with the mean spend being around 5.5 per cent, and seventeen countries spent less than 5 per cent (see Figure 3.2). According to the CAADP website, some progress, albeit slow, is being made, and in 2010 some eleven countries committed to spending 10 per cent (Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 2010). Billed as an ‘African-owned’ initiative, CAADP is built around four pillars: land and water management, market access, food supply and hunger, and agricultural research. Emphasis is placed on improving the availability of agricultural inputs and addressing rural infrastructure shortages, promoting sustainable land management and improving access to appropriate technology, as well as building an African common market for agricultural products.
FIGURE 3.2 Agricultural spending by selected African countries in 2008: percentage of total government expenditure (source: Africa Monitor 2009: 38)
The CAADP sets some ambitious targets – for instance, the commitment to ensure food security by 2015 – and yet in 2009, 30 per cent of children remained underweight on the continent (Africa Monitor 2009).
The Development Support Monitor, which takes a broad and longitudinal view of agriculture, suggests that some countries are performing well in improving smallholder agriculture, such as Nigeria, Malawi, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. However, many other countries are yet to make significant progress in either increasing productivity or in ensuring access to food. One country that stands out in terms of both approach and results is Malawi, a country that has increased agricultural productivity, particularly for small-scale farmers, through strong leadership by government-targeted financial disbursements, a pro-poor agricultural policy and improved technology. We will return to the case of Malawi later in the chapter.
In addition to direct investment in agriculture, there are also a range of consumption, producer and trade-oriented interventions that African governments are currently implementing both to stimulate productivity and ensure access to food. For example, Egypt, Senegal, Ethiopia and Lesotho have introduced food subsidies, Cameroon and Senegal are implementing price controls, Ghana and Rwanda are offering producer support, and Benin, Burkina Faso, Liberia and Malawi have export controls and reduced import subsidies (United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization 2009). None of these measures is particularly radical and all have been used in the past, particularly in the immediate post-colonial period, but under liberalization they were discouraged (Griffiths 2003).
We have noted above that African governments have been criticized for failure to support agriculture, and the same argument is also directed at international donors. The last decades also saw large declines in aid to agriculture, with aid flowing into other sectors. Figure 3.3 shows that at the close of the 1970s, 20 per cent of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) was directed towards agriculture, but by 2003 this had fallen to below 5 per cent (around $2.3 billion). However, donors have promised to reverse the decline of ODA to agriculture, and by 2007 spending on agriculture had risen to $4.2 billion (ibid.). The European Union (EU) pledged to support CAADP in 2007, and now a range of donors have committed to support a CAADP multi-donor harmonization fund under the control of NEPAD (Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 2010).
FIGURE 3.3 Share of ODA for agriculture (source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organizaton 2009: 12)
It would be a mistake to think that donors and the wide range of external actors with an interest in African agriculture are in agreement concerning the fundamental challenges that it faces. While it can be argued that the World Bank’s recognition of the importance of small-scale farmers is positive, critics argue that actually the World Development Report offers little in terms of how the change will be achieved beyond that the World Bank will retain a market- and private-sector-led growth strategy and will seek to support farmers in diversifying their livelihoods and finding exits from agriculture (Rao 2009; Woodhouse 2009). Aid remains largely focused on the macro level, while there is a growing consensus among large donors that more effective aid should have an emphasis on food production, food security, agricultural and rural development. The emphasis on food production is a welcome evolution, but the expectation that markets and private-sector-led growth will lead the transformation seems to ignore decades of evidence to the contrary. For example, the FAO highlights the case of Uganda above, which dismantled many of its publicly funded agricultural support mechanisms such as extension services under the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA) with the expectation that the private sector would fill the gap. It did to some degree, but served only the needs and interests of wealthier commercial farmers (Muhumuza 2002; Woodhouse 2009).
Partnerships with the private sector do have a potentially important role to play, but cannot replace public intervention, particularly for small-scale farmers, and a range of partnerships are now evolving (with parallels to those now targeted at HIV/AIDS). In 2007, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) put $7.7 million into the West African Seed Alliance with inputs from global seed giant Monsanto and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
There are increasing calls for an African green revolution starting from the better use of natural resources, but also incorporating the use of modern technologies such as GM seeds. New and influential donors such as the Gates Foundation see answers to the chronic productivity problem in technology (Gates Foundation 2009). USAID also favours genetic engineering, but the FAO, the OECD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) caution that this should be appropriate and targeted at needs of the poor population (UK Food Group 2008: 26).
An increasingly vocal and growing global movement urges a more fundamental resistance to such technologies, arguing that they will damage biodiversity and place too much control over production in the hands of a few large companies (Holt-Giménez and Patel 2009). Research and agricultural support has tended in the past to neglect subsistence agriculture, and it is argued that technological ‘quick fixes’ ignore the complexity and social aspects of agricultural livelihoods. The UN’s International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), published in 2008, which took four years to produce and included the inputs of more than four hundred consultations, found GM had contributed little to eradicating hunger and argued for a more agro-ecological approach. This conclusion has proved unpalatable to the green revolution lobby, and these conclusions have largely been ignored by influential actors such as the World Bank (ibid.).
Hunger and food security in Africa are far more than an issue of increasing productivity, and an agro-ecological approach can indeed be very helpful in enabling an improved understanding of the challenge.
Hine et al. (2008), in their report on the potential contribution of organic and low-input agriculture in East Africa, argue that the main factors contributing to food insecurity in Africa are:
•Availability of food – incorporating lack of access to and rights to food.
•Natural capital – degraded natural resources and mono-cropping (often adopted from colonial and modernization projects).
•Social capital – poor collective action and public institutions.
•Human capital – lack of education, poor health and labour, gender issues.
•Physical capital – poor infrastructure and lack of access to technology.
•Financial capital – poverty and lack of access to markets and investment capital.
•Other external factors – land tenure, political issues.
A substantial set of challenges is contained in this list and solving them is not simply a matter of technological inputs (although they are also important). Hine et al. argue that global evidence on more sustainable and less input-dependent agricultural systems shows that such methods can be more productive than commercial mono-cropping systems. Such systems are knowledge intensive rather than resource intensive, and therefore would require far higher investment in agricultural extension and education.
Who owns the land?
Competition for land is growing, with expanding demand to feed expanding urban populations and to grow biofuels, leading to rapid increases in land prices and a pressing need for governments in Africa to clarify and regulate issues of land title in a way that will benefit longer-term food security and resilience to climate change (Toulmin 2009). Devereux et al. (2008: 70) noted that ‘the links between land ownership, poverty and hunger among rural people are clear and undeniable and action on improving land access for the poor families lies at the heart of fighting hunger’.
Land is also a political problem. The colonial settlement of lands was an injustice to local populations who, generations later, still suffer the consequences of this marginalization, and is a source of conflict in a number of countries – for example, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Kenya.
Systems of access to land and land ownership vary dramatically across the continent and often involve a complex intertwining of traditional and customary rights to land use with legal and individualistic conceptions of ownership. The issue of gender and access to land is a particular illustration of this. Chapter 4 discusses in more detail how the burden of small-scale agricultural production falls disproportionately on women, as illustrated by Figure 3.4.
FIGURE 3.4 Rural workload by gender (source: Brown and Haddad 1995 in Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004: 9)
In some countries, women work nearly double the hours of their male counterparts. This is supported by Bryceson (1995) and Gladwin (1991, in Wanyeki 2003: 71), who discuss the fact that women work longer hours as they have ‘triple responsibilities’, working on their own fields, as unremunerated family labour and undertaking domestic labour. However, barely 2 per cent of land in SSA is legally ‘owned’ by women (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2009). Even if many state laws declare that women can own land, customary practice around inheritance may deny women legal title (World Bank 2005; Ellis 2007; Green 2008; Toulmin and Quan 2000; Devereux et al. 2008; Wanyeki 2003; Agarwal 2001; Izumi 1999, Doss 2001; Carr 2008; Peters 2009; Place 2009; Razavi 2007). In many areas of Africa, the idea of a woman having land of her own is an alien concept and one that meets with much resistance. ‘Women exist only as the wives of household heads; their actions are considered secondary or unimportant to the changes that landholding systems undergo’ (Yngstrom 2002: 92).
When a woman is a widow, single or divorced, if she wishes to acquire land, then more often than not she will be restricted to asking a male member of her family to help her with her attempts to make a claim (Razavi 2007; Place 2009; Carr 2008; Toulmin 2009).
However, to focus simply on a dichotomy between individual title and customary ownership is overly simplistic. Systems of land access are diverse and households may access land using different mechanisms. Woodhouse (2003) argues that increasingly the default mode in Africa has been moving away from customary and collective systems towards individualized and market-based ownership. This has been supported by actors such as the World Bank, which views the ambiguity of customary access to be a barrier to investment and increasing productivity (World Bank 2008). This approach would argue that land ownership also stimulates rural credit markets through giving more marginalized groups collateral to underpin lending for investment.
It is a mistake to see individual land title as a solution to the food security problem; and alternative systems, such as the formation of cooperatives or long-term leasing, might also offer possibilities. In itself, title will not necessarily reduce food insecurity and poverty in SSA, if the size of landholding that is accessed is so small that it prohibits sufficient production. For example, in Ethiopia a large number of plots of land are referred to as ‘starvation plots’ owing to their size (Staatz and Dembélé 2007). Land title may also be counterproductive; as Davison (1987, in Doss 2001) notes, in matrilineal areas of Kenya, many men will refuse to work on the land of their wives owing to the fact that the land will remain in the wife’s lineage and not the husband’s. In this instance it could be argued that food insecurity could be exacerbated if husbands are not prepared to contribute to the farm.
Collective ownership and farming certainly has few friends in Africa, the vilification of ‘villagization’ in Nyerere’s Tanzania being a case in point (Scott 1999), with collective farms being blamed for increasing hunger and famines in some areas. In this case, neoliberal myopia and outrage may not be helpful. Socialist Tanzania looked to China for inspiration for the villagization programme. China went on to vastly increase the productivity of small-scale agriculture through an evolution from collective farms through individual access to small plots to state production quotas (Ravillion 2009). Agricultural production in Tanzania stagnated during the same period.
The issue of redistribution of land (often following colonial settlement, but also conflict and political occupation) has been evident in many countries in SSA, most notably in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The overall objective of both countries is to empower the rural poor. However, the manner in which this has been implemented from the perspective of the respective governments is quite different. In South Africa, access to, and redistribution of, land has taken the form of ‘willing seller, willing buyer’, whereas land policy in Zimbabwe has been ‘fast-tracked’ to incorporate land invasions and the confiscation of land owned by white farmers. The popular perception is that this has resulted in near economic disaster, devastating agricultural production and increasing hunger. Broekhuis and Huisman (2001), Kinsey (2004), Waeterloos (2004) and Zimmerman (2000) discuss the fact that even with the facilitation of land access for the poor, in South Africa they are ill equipped to endure stresses and shocks and their skills base is limited with respect to agricultural practices. However, more recent evidence from Zimbabwe suggests that this is a myth. Agriculture has to some extent been refocused from large-scale commercial production to a more smallholder-dominated model that has, in a number of areas, shown increases in productivity and sustained investment, albeit under difficult economic circumstances (Scoones 2009; Cousins and Scoones 2009). Controversially, Zimbabwe may actually offer some lessons to the continent in terms of supporting small-scale agriculture. This is not to deny that the confiscation of lands has increased racial tensions and has in part been used as political patronage.
One of the most pressing current political issues in relation to land in Africa is the contentious practice of ‘land grab’, which may represent an increasing threat to food security for the poorest in SSA. Concerns over the leasing of, or selling of, large areas of land to transnational corporations (TNCs) and external governments by national governments are growing. It is estimated that 2.4 million hectares in Africa have already been appropriated in this way. With arable land and water already in short supply, if land is leased to large-scale farmers and foreign investors, the consequences to local farmers may be negative (Cotula et al. 2009). The effects of land grab have already been felt in Ethiopia, where Rice (2010) notes that many farmers are having their access to water limited owing to the expansion of foreign-owned farms, and their holdings are decreasing. While the risks of this new global acquisition are recognized by the World Bank and IFPRI, it can be argued that their proposed voluntary ‘code of conduct’ to regulate such deals alongside a fundamental belief in the privatization of land may ultimately increase the dangers of further dispossession and marginalization of the poorest and that more radical and redistributive solutions will be required (Borras and Franco 2010).
Securing inputs for agriculture
Securing access to land is only a part of the food security puzzle; access to inputs to ensure productivity is also crucial. This section will examine the case for subsidies for conventional inputs using the case of Malawi.
Agriculture in developed countries is heavily subsidized, with spending of around $300 billion annually (Lingard 2002; Maene 2000), without which an estimated 40 per cent of EU farmers and their farms would technically go bankrupt (Royal Agricultural Society of England 2000). Such support cannot, however, be found in SSA despite the obvious benefits to resource-poor farmers.
Agricultural subsidies, which were popular in SSA during the 1960s and 1970s, were a casualty of liberalization as donors considered them ineffective and inefficient in transforming African economies (Dorward et al. 2008). Consequently, subsidies have either been eliminated or substantially reduced following the adoption of structural adjustment programmes (Townsend 1999).
Accordingly, fertilizer consumption has declined, resulting in low soil fertility and agricultural productivity (ibid.). Decline in soil fertility is blamed for SSA’s slow growth in food production (Sanchez et al. 1997) and deepening food insecurity and poverty. This is because farmers are unable to cultivate high-yielding crop varieties that are also nutrient-demanding. Growth in agricultural production has therefore come from area expansion rather than increase in yields.
However, agricultural subsidy is not without controversy (World Bank 2007; Agricultural Research Institute 2007; Bowers and Cheshire 1983). Sceptics of agricultural subsidies contend that they can distort markets, crowd out the private agricultural inputs market, discourage agricultural diversification and breed corruption (Agricultural Research Institute 2007). Conversely, advocates believe subsidies provide a ‘public good’ and have social protection benefits for resource-poor farmers, particularly in developing countries (ActionAid 2002). As a social safety net, subsidies play an essential role in resource distribution to disadvantaged groups, poverty alleviation and promotion of long-term growth (Conning and Kevane 2002). Additionally, agricultural subsidies impact directly and indirectly on upstream and downstream industries (Mayrand et al. 2003), thereby generating multiplier effects. It is estimated that the average farm yields in SSA remain at about 1 tonne per hectare (tonne/ha), while maize yield in farm demonstrations is reported to be about 5.2 tonnes/ha (World Bank 2007) leaving an exploitable yield gap of more than 4 tonnes. With most small-scale and subsistence farmers unable to make the required investments in inputs to attain this level of production, the role of inputs support subsidy and investment in rural infrastructure is crucial. It is also crucial to consider evidence that agricultural subsidization of local food production is cheaper, more efficient and effective than food aid (Clay 2006; Sachs 2005).
Malawi, a country of nearly thirteen million, has implemented several Agricultural Input Subsidies Programmes (AISPs) within the last three decades to improve smallholder agricultural productivity, reduce vulnerability to food insecurity and hunger, and stimulate economic growth and development. Some 2.8 million households depend on smallholder farming (Agricultural Research Institute 2007) and agriculture contributes 38.9 per cent of GDP (United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization 2008), 90 per cent of export earnings and over 5 per cent of total employment (Mwangwela 2001), with small-scale farmers contributing 85 per cent of total agricultural production (Nagayets 2005). However, years of neglect and dwindling budgetary support for the Agricultural Ministry and particularly for small-scale farmers has undermined agricultural production, with only 20.68 per cent of the 2,450,000 hectares of total arable land in use and just 3 per cent of it under irrigation (Agricultural Research Institute 2007). Consequently, the country became import dependent, with 30 per cent of the population food insecure (Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee 2005) and 34 per cent undernourished (Agricultural Research Institute 2007), with disastrous health and life consequences. Agricultural input prices were high, resulting in 30 per cent fertilizer use at a rate of 4 kilograms/ha (Langyintuo 2005), leading to low soil fertility and poor maize yields of 1 tonne/ha with good rains, relative to the potential of 3 tonnes/ha on healthy soils (Sachs 2005). To address agriculture and food security problems in the country, several policies have been implemented over the years with interesting outcomes. Among them are input subsidies for maize production, despite the country’s $113 million national debt (Chinsinga 2008). Support for maize is explained by the fact that the crop is a major staple food of the people (Langyintuo 2005) contributing 58 per cent of the national food basket (Masina 2007); 42 per cent of the total arable land is under maize production nationwide and it is regarded by both the poor and the rich as ‘life’ (Peters 2006: 328).
The Malawian government has attempted a number of periods of subsidization of inputs for maize production, including the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Programme between 1988 and 1994, which emphasized providing targeted subsidies and improving food crop productivity. This resulted in 16 per cent smallholder agriculture growth and bumper harvests of maize (Harrigan 2003). However, this programme was later abandoned owing to pressure from donors (Chinsinga 2005).
The subsequent implementation of Starter Pack (SP) and Targeted Input (TI) programmes that distributed fertilizers and hybrid maize to rural farming households in the late 1990s, and then following severe drought in 2002 (Peters 2006; Chinsinga 2005), achieved tremendous yield and food security impacts (Agricultural Research Institute 2007; Peters 2006; Blackie 2006), though it is argued that the gains would have been much higher if delays in input distribution and errors had been avoided (Peters 2006). Timely agro-inputs distribution is important to enable farmers to take advantage of available rainfall. Late planting during a particular cropping season can result in the critical growth period of the crop coinciding with the dry spell, which can lead to total crop failure or abysmal yields.
The AISPs have resulted in over a million tonnes of grain surplus above the country’s requirement (Integrated Regional Information Networks 2009; Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2009) and lower maize and staple food prices (Integrated Regional Information Networks 2008), thereby benefiting the poor, who spend a great part of their income on maize. A significant increase in casual labour wage rates has thereby impacted livelihoods positively (Chinsinga 2008). The maize surpluses Malawi has achieved from the subsidies have increased food security, with the majority of households now dependent on own production (Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2009). They have improved economic well-being by 8 per cent, and reduced the incidence of household vulnerability from 79 per cent in May/June 2004 to 20 per cent in May/June 2007 (Dorward et al. 2008). For example, according to Famine Early Warning Systems Network’s (FEWS NET) December 2008/January 2009 food security update in southern Africa, the population in need of food assistance from January to April 2009 increased by over 24 per cent in Mozambique and 50 per cent in Zambia. However, in Malawi the figure significantly reduced from 1.5 million to 674,000 given a maize stock of 98,377 tonnes to cater for emergencies (Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2009). The food insecurity situation in southern Africa is attributed to high input prices that have limited the land area cultivated by farmers (ibid.). The different situation in Malawi might therefore be evidence of the beneficial impacts of the subsidies targeting resource-poor small-scale farmers. Malawi also benefited from foreign exchange earnings as it was able to sell excess production to neighbouring countries.
Impacts of the AISPs in Malawi suggest that successful implementation of subsidy programmes is possible without donor support even in poor countries if there is political will. This is also the approach being pursued under the Millennium Villages Project, which subsidizes inputs of fertilizers and seed, with beneficiaries expected to contribute a proportion of their production in return (Udahemuka 2009). Therefore there is a clear case for further exploration of the use of subsidy and targeted supplies of inputs as a means of social protection for resource-poor farmers (United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization 2008).
A new vision for agriculture in Africa
Major challenges facing farmers in SSA include erratic climatic conditions, low soil fertility, low crop yields, high post-harvest losses and difficulties in accessing credit and agro-inputs. The soil fertility problems can be attributed to the abandoning of traditional shifting cultivation and land rotation systems for continuous cultivation without soil fertility replenishment (Rockström 2003). This, however, is due to population increases, which render those systems no longer feasible, and lack of income to purchase fertilizers, as discussed above. Recent estimates suggest that 70 per cent of farming activity globally is undertaken by smallholder farmers working in resource-poor and rain-fed agriculture (ibid.), and further, that around two billion people in developing countries derive some or all of their livelihoods from farming (Hazell et al. 2007). It is certainly easy to argue that a growing global population with changing consumption habits might be fed only by large-scale industrial agriculture. However, it is being increasingly argued that, in terms of global food security, the view that smallholder agriculture is a backward and unproductive way of life that must be ‘modernized’ is to miss an opportunity. Certainly, with rising demand for food and increasing oil prices, significant attention is being redirected to the role of small-scale agriculture for the triple goals of reducing economic poverty, building stronger communities and working in balance with ecological systems (Wilkinson 2008).
The concepts of social and environmental/ecological resilience are increasingly important for making the link between the general well-being of the human population and the ever-changing ecological system. Resilience captures the idea that all livelihoods need to be able to adapt to complex and continual change (Rockström 2003; King 2008). King (2008) argues that low-input and holistic agriculture systems such as some form of organic agriculture, bio-dynamics, community-supported agriculture, permaculture and community gardening are all attempts to evolve adaptive systems. It is an important aspect of such systems that they are not purely focused on farming in harmony with nature, but also equally value the creation of enhanced well-being in human societies. While such systems and philosophies have coalesced as a range of small-scale popular movements in western Europe, the United States, Japan and Australia, the concept of the ecologically and socially resilient livelihood applies equally to the broader sweep of small-scale agriculture (Pretty et al. 2003).
Seasonality is a fundamental challenge for small-scale and subsistence farmers. Their knowledge of the seasons, their choice of crop varieties, access to land and land husbandry practices are all important components of the extent to which they are able to sustain and build a livelihood. Rain-fed agriculture has always been a risky and precarious undertaking, and in order to mitigate the unpredictability of the seasons, and particularly the timing and quantity of rainfall, farmers have adopted a range of adaptive practices. For example, they may diversify the range of crops or non-farm income generation activities. However, pressures on farmers to adopt commercial crops and mono-cropping practices combined with the loss of indigenous knowledge may have left them even more vulnerable to seasonal changes (Rockström 2003).
It is also likely that human-induced climate change will exacerbate the vulnerability of these same farmers and so may increase their poverty. While predicting the exact pattern of climate change is difficult and fraught with uncertainty, it is agreed that the next decades will see an increase in vulnerability to extreme weather events such as meteorological drought and floods. Further, it is likely that the timings of monsoons and rainfall will become less predictable (United Nations Development Programme 2007). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change prediction is that in many water-scarce regions, water availability will be reduced through increased evaporation and changes to run-off and rainfall patterns.
Vulnerable livelihoods that are dependent on rain-fed agriculture can be devastated by a lack of resilience in coping with seasonal access to water. Resilience as defined by the Resilience Alliance is the ability of integrated systems of people and nature to adapt to change and to absorb shocks and stresses to the system. The success of rain-fed agriculture is crucially dependent on the knowledge and resources of farmers in coping with the unpredictability of rainfall. Seasonality has always been part of agriculture. Larger farmers try to manage this by constructing dams and choosing varieties of crops to suit their location; therefore investment in appropriate agricultural infrastructure is vital.
Research shows that the poorest households are dependent on rain-fed agriculture. In drought years, production can be non-existent and households may have to depend on food aid. However, some argue that we must distinguish between agricultural drought and meteorological drought. Meteorological drought is defined as occurring when the amount of rainfall falls below the minimum required to produce a functional harvest of food, whereas agricultural drought is the poor availability and uptake of water by the plants themselves. Rockström (2003) argues that meteorological drought is much rarer than we believe, but when it does occur, farmers will require social protection. Agricultural drought can occur when farmers, through lack of knowledge, resources or support, are unable to implement measures to ensure their increased resilience to the seasonality and unpredictability of rainfall. A particular example here is in the collection, storage and usage of rainfall (ibid.). More resilient farmers can diversify income sources, grow a wider range of crops, change their land use practices or add non-farm enterprises to their activities. In SSA, economic growth rates tend to be closely tied to rain, and this reflects the fact that a large proportion of such economies is dependent on the agricultural sector (United Nations Development Programme 2007).
Predictions for the future are dire: the 2007/08 Human Development Report predicts that in northern Sudan temperatures will rise by 1.5°C between 2030 and 2060 while rainfall will drop by 5 per cent, giving a 70 per cent decline in production of sorghum. However, 2030 is still relatively far away and rain-fed agriculture is still the backbone of food supply for the majority of the world’s poor. Much can be done now to increase the resilience of livelihoods, but the focus in agricultural policy needs to be on how to support resource-poor farmers in coping with the increasing unpredictability of the seasons.
While agriculture has been ignored in development policy for the last decade in favour of the good governance and MDG agenda, significant attention is now turning back to the crucial role of local food production rather than export-led commercial production. It is argued that investment in the sector will improve the productivity of staple food crops that are consumed and traded locally by the poor and, thus, can stimulate local economic development (Department for International Development 2004). Agricultural activities are a foundation in building a sustainable livelihood for most families in SSA, as is shown by research in Tanzania, and therefore supporting and improving small-scale agriculture offers potential gains in well-being (Toner 2008).
On the other hand, commercial farming requires consolidation of small lands. This has proved to be socially and economically disruptive owing to appropriation of common lands and the taking back of land previously rented to smallholders. Small-scale farmers consequently become wage labourers and/or migrate to non-farm enterprises, resulting in depeasantization and reduction in production of local commodities (Bryceson 2000). Although large farms may be preferred for their low transaction costs in accessing goods and services (Hazell et al. 2007), they are not necessarily more productive and efficient. Pretty et al. (2003) have shown that low-input and environmentally sensitive agriculture can demonstrate significant productivity gains for small farmers. Moreover, the extensive use of machinery, clearing of vegetation and continuous mono-cropping associated with large farms tend to reduce soil fertility and increase pest problems, which necessitates the extensive application of inorganic chemicals, leading to pollution, destruction of biodiversity and high production costs.
Irz et al. (2001) argue that supporting small-scale agriculture will lead to increased farmer incomes, on-farm and non-farm employment, better nutrition and health, reduced food prices, social capital development, generation of local tax revenues and demand for better infrastructure.
The degree and form of these linkages are likely to be affected by factors such as the amount of rural infrastructure, rural population density, the need for immediate and local processing of farm produce and the nature of technical change in farming, and the tradability of both farm output and the goods and services demanded by farming communities. (Ibid.: 454)
Small-scale agriculture plays a significant role in supplying food. Nagayets (2005) estimates that Malawian small-scale farmers’ contribution is 85 per cent of total agricultural production and that Ethiopian dairy smallholders contribute 97 per cent of national milk production. Production of food at the local levels minimizes food miles, reducing fossil fuel consumption and distribution costs, and thereby reducing food prices and making food affordable for low-income food-insecure households.
There is also a need to consider the role of agriculture and gardening in the city environment as a key component of sustainable development. The role of urban agriculture in contributing to global food supply is starting to be recognized, given the need identified above to localize food production in light of the possible reduction in reliance on fossil fuels.
Cuba is the one country in the world that has already attempted a transition in agriculture from large-scale fossil-fuel-based production to low-input, environmentally sensitive production, and it holds many lessons for African agriculture. The background to the transition was a sudden crisis in accessing food, oil and agricultural inputs following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Cuban government’s favourable agricultural policies, reform and support for small-scale agriculture during the 1990s in the midst of the United States’ economic embargo on Cuba helped the country to combat its looming food crisis. Conversion of state farms to small farms and use of indigenous farming technologies and new biopesticides and biofuels propelled Cuba from food shortage to food sufficiency (Rosset and Bourque 2005). The transition was achieved through small farms and backyard production. Similarly, use of vacant plots and backyards in the cities for food and animal production increased fresh produce availability throughout urban centres at lower than farmers’ market prices and ensured food security in Cuban families. The result was improved health and better performance in the World Bank Development Indicator rating in 2001 (Murphy 1999).
Cubans became involved in food production in Havana through the state-supported infrastructure for urban agriculture. In 2005, it was estimated that Cuba produced 4.1 million tonnes of urban-area harvest of vegetables, herbs and spices, in urban farms, intensive gardens, plots of land and family gardens, employing 354,000 people. These efforts led to improved food security, and urban agriculture has played a significant role in achieving food security and food production through Cuba’s firm commitment to the idea, despite tough economic and environmental conditions (Rosset and Bourque 2005). Cuba is not alone in seeing the potential of agriculture in urban areas. Initiatives from the United Kingdom to Malawi to Argentina see this as a force for reconnecting people with nature and growing nutritious food close to people’s homes in a way that encourages social cooperation. When described in this way, the intersection of environment, society and economy is obvious (Mkwambisi 2009).
While the Human Development Report 2007/2008 contains a gloomy prediction that the developing world will become more dependent on the rich world for food exports, this may not be true. It cites the case of Malawi as proof of how drought undermines coping cycles and undermines the resilience and sustainability of livelihoods. Yet the reasons for severe declines in food security in Malawi were not all drought related, but rather related to the lack of support given to the Malawian agricultural sector. For example, in Malawi a 15–22 per cent increase in maize production was achieved during 2006, resulting from subsidy to small farmers, and the increase has continued (Future Agricultures 2008). While it may be argued that subsidy creates dependency, the programmes in Malawi prove that there can be a short-term productivity gain. However, in the longer term investment in research, water harvesting and marketing will be required. The Human Development Report talks about social resilience in terms of safety nets, but fails to provide an adequate consideration of ecological/environmental resilience.
Therefore, policy should focus on measures to increase the resilience of small-scale farmers in coping with seasonality and unpredictability. This may be through appropriate rainwater harvesting and distribution and better access to inputs of seeds, fertilizers and knowledge of how to increase productivity. However, there is a wider challenge that will require greater support for the development of strong national and regional food markets in Africa. Farmers will need to be supported to diversify their activities and to develop appropriate collective institutions. Attention should also be paid to linked processing activities that add value to agricultural products, creating stronger employment opportunities in off-farm activities and therefore decreasing the vulnerability of rural livelihoods.
Greater understanding is required of how farmers adapt to climate change, but also how farming systems can be made more resilient to fluctuations in rainfall. It is likely that the knowledge and technology already exist, but that the political will required to transform rain-fed agriculture is still lacking
Conclusion
This chapter began from a starting point that recognized the significance not only of agricultural activity in African economies but also as a sector that plays a significant or dominant role in the lives of most Africans. Hopes that a natural evolution towards an industrialized and ‘modern’ future as farms commercialized and peasants left the lands have not been fulfilled, nor did the neoliberal era and structural adjustment lead to a great transformation. We have charted how an understanding of agricultural livelihoods in Africa must be based on an appreciation of both colonial and post-colonial attempts to distribute, settle and control land-based production. The aftershocks are still visible in the vulnerability of African populations that rely on the land for their livelihoods. When production fails, the state or external actors must step in or starvation awaits. Resilient and sustainable agriculture is the key to food security in Africa, but how this is achieved remains controversial. It will require an equitable and effective distribution of land and access to agricultural inputs and extension services. Such investment both by governments and external actors has been lacking in the last thirty years. However, a new set of rights may also be required, as conceptualized by the food sovereignty movement, encompassing rights to the means of food production.
We have to accept that seasonality and unpredictability are inherent features of humanity’s relationship with the natural world. However, if we are serious about tackling rural poverty and the food insecurity that characterizes chronic poverty, then rain-fed agriculture requires urgent attention. Simply wishing away such agriculture by pointing to future hopes of modernization is to ignore the evidence of the last fifty years. So-called modern agriculture is itself looking vulnerable to declining fertility from intensive production and from the challenges of climate change. A new form of agriculture that is both ecologically and socially resilient is a challenge for us all.