BEFORE THE CONVENTION, Eisenhower had warned the Republicans that if they nominated him, he would not undertake a strenuous or wide-ranging campaign. Instead, he intended to limit himself to four or five major speeches on national TV. One reason was his health; another was that unlike 1952, he had a record to run on; a third was that, as President, he simply did not have the time to devote to campaigning that he had had when he was only a candidate. One month after the nomination, on September 19, he made his first address. He gave a sober review of the world situation, stressing his Administration’s success in maintaining peace. He dismissed Stevenson’s call for a nuclear test ban as a “theatrical national gesture.”1
Eisenhower’s private view of the opposition was scathing. He told Gruenther, “Stevenson and Kefauver, as a combination, are the sorriest and weakest pair that ever aspired to the highest office in the land.” Eisenhower never had any doubts that he and Nixon would prevail, so he felt comfortable in letting Nixon do the vast majority of the campaigning. But, as in 1952, professional Republicans could imagine all sorts of things going wrong. “I notice that as election day approaches,” Eisenhower wrote Gruenther, “everybody gets the jitters. You meet a man and he is practically hysterical with the confidence of overwhelming victory, and sometimes you see that same man that evening and his face is a foot long with fright.”2
Pressed by the RNC to do more talking, Eisenhower convinced himself that it was necessary. He explained to Swede that he not only wanted to win, but to win by a substantial margin. Without a mandate, he said, he would “not want to be elected at all.” He gave two reasons. First, his work in “reforming and revamping the Republican Party” was far from complete, and his influence over the party would depend, in large measure, on the size of his victory. Second, he expected the Democrats to retain the House and Senate. Working with the Democrats, although it often came easier to Eisenhower than working with the Republicans, would depend on his margin of victory. He therefore decided to “do a bit of traveling in the campaign,” and made campaign speeches in half a dozen cities. He went partly for the fun of it—he always enjoyed traveling—and partly “to prove to the American people that I am a rather healthy individual.”3
Insofar as there was an issue that got him going, it was Stevenson’s call for a test ban. Insofar as there was a reason for his increasing contempt for Stevenson, it was the inept and confused way in which Stevenson raised and used the issue. Stevenson’s campaign was indeed a mishmash; he wanted to end the draft, end testing, but greatly accelerate spending on missiles. Eisenhower thought that testing was far too complex and dangerous a subject to be discussed in a political campaign, and he would have preferred to leave it alone. Stevenson’s advisers also told him that he was foolish to attempt to attack Eisenhower on any question concerning national defense. Stevenson nevertheless insisted on making an end to testing a central theme in his campaign.4
Eisenhower would not respond in his prepared speeches, but at a press conference on October 5, he did react to Stevenson’s proposal. One problem with a moratorium, Eisenhower said, was that it took “months and months” to prepare for a series of nuclear tests. If the U.S. stopped, the Russians could use the moratorium to make secret preparations for resumption, and thus “make tremendous advances where we would be standing still.” So the President concluded, “I think it would be foolish for us to make any such unilateral announcement.” The following day, the White House released a statement on a unilateral test ban. In it Eisenhower pointed out how vital nuclear weapons were to offset superior Communist manpower, stressed the need to continue testing to reduce fallout, insisted that inspection was necessary to supervise a moratorium, and concluded, “This specific matter is manifestly not a subject for detailed public discussion—for obvious security reasons.”5
On October 11, at the next press conference, a reporter asked Eisenhower to comment on rumors that the NSC had recommended ending the draft and stopping nuclear testing. Growing red in the face, Eisenhower refused to answer questions about national-security issues in a political campaign. “Now, I tell you frankly, I have said my last words on these subjects.”6 Four days after that, Stevenson delivered one of his major campaign speeches, on national TV. He devoted the whole of the speech to the test ban, entitling the talk “The Greatest Menace the World Has Ever Known.” He offered four reasons to stop testing. First, the United States already had bombs large enough to destroy any major city—why improve them? Second, a moratorium on testing did not require inspection, because “you can’t hide the explosion any more than you can hide an earthquake.” Third, a prohibition on testing would halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Fourth, a test ban would eliminate fallout, especially of strontium-90, which Stevenson called “the most dreadful poison in the world.”7
Eisenhower replied on October 18 in a speech in Portland, Oregon. He said that the people had to choose between “hard sense and experience versus pie-in-the-sky promises and wishful thinking.” At Los Angeles the next day, Eisenhower belittled those who “tell us that peace can be guarded—and our nation secure—by a strange new formula. It is this: Simultaneously to stop our military draft and to abandon testing of our most advanced military weapons.” There was no cheap or easy way to peace, the President said, before concluding, “I do not believe that any political campaign justifies the declaration of a moratorium on ordinary common sense.”8
Despite Eisenhower’s scorn, Stevenson’s appeal was making converts. The White House mail was running heavily in favor of a suspension of testing. Stevenson’s advisers were ready to conclude that he had been right, and they wrong, about the wisdom of taking on Ike on national defense. But then Stevenson had the worst possible luck. Bulganin wrote Eisenhower, in a letter made public by the Russians, calling for a test ban. Bulganin said such a moratorium would provide “the first step toward the solution of the problem of atomic weapons.” Then Bulganin noted with approval that “certain prominent public figures in the United States” were advocating a test ban.
The press interpreted Bulganin’s letter as blatant interference in the American presidential election. So did Eisenhower, who wrote a scathing answer to Bulganin; The New York Times called it “one of the most strongly worded diplomatic communications in recent years.” Eisenhower rejected the offer to enter into a test-ban agreement. More important, he told Bulganin that his letter “departs from accepted international practice,” as it constituted “an interference by a foreign nation in our internal affairs of a kind which, if indulged in by an ambassador, would lead to his being declared persona non grata in accordance with long-established custom.”9
Nixon, meanwhile, went after the hapless Stevenson, already made thoroughly miserable by Bulganin’s “endorsement.” Nixon described Stevenson as a “clay pigeon” for Soviet sharpshooters, compared him to Neville Chamberlain, said that his test-ban proposal was “the height of irresponsibility and absurdity” and vowed that “the Stevenson leadership would increase the chances of war.”10 But after exploiting the Bulganin letter so brilliantly, Eisenhower wanted to de-emphasize the issue, not highlight it as Nixon was doing. Eisenhower knew he had Stevenson beat anyway. When his son, John, told him, about this time, that “you’ve got to get moving. You’re going to fall behind,” Eisenhower, laughing, said, “This fellow’s licked and what’s more he knows it! Let’s go to the ball game.” With that, they were off to see the opening game of the World Series.11
Under the circumstances, Eisenhower wanted to turn the public mind away from testing and fallout. He told Dulles to issue an Administration statement on testing, and to write a document “so factual as to be uninteresting.” He wanted no personal criticism of Stevenson, and he cautioned Dulles against the use of any rigid language that could “publicly tie his [the President’s] hands so that in the future [he could] do nothing” about stopping testing.12 Eisenhower himself, after all, had written Strauss in August asking if testing could not be stopped and indicating that he did want to stop as soon as possible. An overreaction to Stevenson’s proposal would therefore reduce the chances for achieving a moratorium.
In the statement as released, Eisenhower was reassuring. Fallout from testing was not dangerous, he said, citing a National Academy of Science report as evidence. Nevertheless, the United States was dedicated to peace, and wanted a ban on testing, and disarmament, as quickly as possible after a satisfactory inspection system had been put in place. In a separate statement the same day, the White House listed the various disarmament proposals made by the United States from the Baruch plan of 1946 to Eisenhower’s offer of Open Skies in 1955, and put the blame for failure to achieve disarmament on the Russian refusal to agree to adequate inspection systems.13
• •
Through September, the British and the French had continued to mobilize on Cyprus. Nasser rejected the Users’ Association proposal and insisted on maintaining Egyptian control of the canal. Eisenhower retained his interest in wanting to promote King Saud as a rival to Nasser while attempting to restrain his NATO allies. On October 8, Herbert Hoover, Jr., the Under Secretary of State, told Eisenhower that “one of our agencies” had devised a plan that was quicker and more direct “on how to topple Nasser.” Whether or not that was a euphemism for assassination, Eisenhower rejected the premise. Goodpaster noted, “The President said that an action of this kind could not be taken when there is as much active hostility as at present. For a thing like this to be done without inflaming the Arab world, a time free from heated stress holding the world’s attention as at present would have to be chosen.”14
What then to do about Nasser, indeed about the whole crisis? Eisenhower talked to Hoover later that day on the telephone, then wrote him a letter summarizing his orders. He wanted to issue “a frank warning that the United States will not support a war or warlike moves in the Suez area.” He told Hoover to issue another statement announcing that the United States was ready to begin construction of sixty-thousand-ton supertankers. This “might have a calming effect,” because the tankers would give Britain access to North and South American oil. Eisenhower said he wanted State to come up with a plan, “any plan,” that might have some appeal to Nasser, so that “through some clandestine means we might urge Nasser to make an appropriate public offer.” He wanted Hoover to find some role for Nehru and the OAS to play in furthering negotiations, and to think about the idea of Eisenhower’s calling for a conference in Washington. Eisenhower concluded, “As you know, I am immersed [in problems] . . .” but said he wanted to give a “clear indication of my readiness to participate in any way in which I can be helpful . . .” to keep the peace.15
The British and the French, meanwhile, had gone to the United Nations, whether in a sincere search for a peaceful solution or as a cover to go to war, Eisenhower frankly did not know. He instructed Lodge to support Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, who by mid-October had managed to achieve agreement on “Six Principles” as a basis for beginning negotiations. Britain and France approved, because the principles included a Users’ Association to insure international control.16 Hammarskjold prepared to go to Cairo to begin talks with Nasser.
On October 15, Eisenhower received a new piece of information. Dulles reported that U-2 flights had revealed an Israeli mobilization, and the presence in Israel of some sixty French Mystère jets. Eisenhower was incensed, because under the terms of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were committed to maintaining a status quo in arms and borders in the Middle East. France had earlier asked for, and received, American permission to sell Mystères to Israel, but only twenty-four, not sixty. Thus Eisenhower now knew that the French were arming the Israelis in contravention of the 1950 agreement, and lying to the Americans about it. Dulles also reported that Israel was acting aggressively, sending raids into both Gaza and the West Bank of the Jordan. The Secretary said it was being taken “as a foregone conclusion” that Jordan was breaking up, and Israel was going to be “anxious to get her share of the wreckage.” Complicating this situation was the existence of a treaty between Jordan, a former British protectorate, and the United Kingdom. If Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Jordan, Britain would have to come to Jordan’s defense.
“Should this occur,” Eisenhower wrote later in a memorandum, “we would have Britain in the curious position of helping to defend one of the Arab countries, while at the same time she is engaged in a quarrel . . . with Egypt.” Eisenhower did not suspect an Israeli attack on Egypt; his attention was riveted on Jordan. He told Dulles to “make it very clear to the Israelis that they must stop these attacks against the borders of Jordan.” If they continued, the Arabs would turn to the Russians for arms, and “the ultimate effect would be to Sovietize the whole region, including Israel.”
Eisenhower told Dulles he thought “Ben-Gurion’s obviously aggressive attitude” was due to his desire to take the West Bank, coupled with his belief that Western and Egyptian preoccupation with Suez would “minimize the possibility” of war with Egypt while simultaneously impeding Britain’s capability for supporting Jordan, and finally Ben-Gurion’s belief that the political campaign in America would hamstring the Eisenhower Administration. Eisenhower told Dulles to set the Israelis straight: “Ben-Gurion should not make any grave mistake based upon his belief that winning a domestic election is as important to us as preserving and protecting the peace.” Dulles should also tell Ben-Gurion that in the long term, aggression by Israel “cannot fail to bring catastrophe and such friends as he would have left in the world, no matter how powerful, could not do anything about it.”17
How powerful Eisenhower thought the Jewish vote was in the United States he revealed in a conversation with his son. One evening in October in the White House, Eisenhower mused, “Well, it looks as if we’re in for trouble. If the Israelis keep going . . . I may have to use force to stop them . . . Then I’d lose the election. There would go New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut at least.”18 Nevertheless, he would do whatever he had to in order to prevent or turn back Israeli aggression. Thus his last words to Dulles were, “I will not under any circumstances permit the fact of the forthcoming elections to influence my judgment. If any votes are lost as a result of this attitude, that is a situation which we will have to confront, but any other attitude will not permit us to live with our conscience.”19
• •
Over the next two weeks, there was a virtual blackout on communication between the United States on the one side and the French and the British on the other. Simultaneously, American interceptors picked up heavy radio traffic between Britain and France. American code breakers were unsuccessful in unraveling the content of the messages; they could only report that the sheer volume of traffic was ominous. Eisenhower’s own expectation was that the Israelis would attack Jordan, supplied by the French and with covert British sanction, and that the British and the French would then take advantage of the confusion to occupy the canal. He was, in other words, badly misinformed, and had reached the wrong conclusions. He was about to be as completely surprised as he had been on December 7, 1941, by Pearl Harbor, or on December 16, 1944, by the Ardennes counter-offensive. The difference was that this time it was his friends who were fooling him.
How could it have happened? The United States maintained a huge, complex, and generally efficient intelligence system, of which the CIA was only one part. There were American reporters in London, Paris, and Tel Aviv, all filing daily dispatches about activities in the capitals. The State Department had flourishing embassies in all three capitals, plus a secret line of communication to send word on developments. The U-2s were overflying the eastern Mediterranean and sending back photographs that revealed major military moves. The CIA had spies at various levels scattered through the area. Most of all, Eisenhower had close personal friends in Eden’s Cabinet and in the British military, as well as in the French government and military. But there is no evidence he made any attempt to get in touch, secretly, with his friends (Macmillan, for example, or Mountbatten, both of whom opposed Eden’s adventurism) in order to find out what was going on. As a result, he was surprised.
Part of the reason was, obviously, preoccupation with the campaign, precisely the point the British, the French, and the Israelis relied upon as they did their plotting together. The more important reason for the American intelligence failure was the nature of the act itself. As a general rule, the easiest way to achieve complete strategic surprise is to commit an act that makes no sense, or is even self-destructive. In 1941 it made no sense for the Japanese to initiate a war with the United States; thus the surprise at Pearl Harbor. It made no sense for the Germans to invade Russia; thus the surprise of Operation Barbarossa. In 1944 it made no sense for Hitler to use up his armor in a hopeless counterattack, rather than reserve it for the defense of the Rhine; thus the surprise in the Battle of the Bulge. To Eisenhower in 1956, it made no sense—indeed was self-destructive—for the British and the French to attempt to seize and hold the canal, or for the Israelis to act aggressively when they were surrounded by a sea of Arabs, and it especially made no sense to him for Britain and France to attempt to act independently of the United States, much less against the expressed policy of the Eisenhower Administration.
So Eisenhower was badly surprised. He hated to be surprised, but experience had taught him—as he said so many times—that he had to expect to be surprised. The proper response was to remain cool, gather all the information he could, consider the options, and use them to take control of events. That was what he had done in December 1944, in one of his greatest moments as Supreme Commander. It was what he intended to do, and did, in October–November 1956, in one of his greatest moments as President.
• •
While Britain, France, and Israel were completing the preparations for their bizarre plot, great events were occurring in Eastern Europe. Disturbances and riots in Poland, sparked by publication of Khrushchev’s secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, swept the Soviet-dominated government out of power and brought in Wladyslaw Gomulka, a man earlier dismissed by the Soviets as a Titoist. Gomulka announced that “there is more than one road to Socialism,” and warned that the Polish people would “defend themselves with all means; they will not be pushed off the road of democratization.” On October 22, the Poles’ successful defiance of the Soviets set off demonstrations throughout Hungary, where the demand was that Imre Nagy, who had been deposed by the Soviets in 1955, be returned to power.
Although these were spontaneous events, and quite unpredictable, they nevertheless had long been expected by the Eisenhower Administration, where it was an article of faith that sooner or later the satellites would rise up against Russia. But although the United States had anticipated a revolt, and had indeed encouraged it, both through Voice of America and Radio Free Europe broadcasts and through CIA-created underground resistance cells within Eastern Europe, when the revolt actually came, the government had no plans prepared. There was a good reason for this shortcoming—there was nothing the United States could do anyway. As always in grand strategy, geography dictated the options. Hungary was surrounded by Communist states, plus neutral Austria, and had a common border with the Soviet Union. It had no ports. There was almost no trade going on between the United States and the Russians. There was no pressure, in short, save for the amorphous one of world public opinion, that Eisenhower could bring to bear on the Soviets in Hungary. He knew it, had known it all along, which made all the four years of Republican talk about “liberation” so essentially hypocritical.
On October 23, the Hungarian government installed Nagy as Premier; he promised “democratization and improved living standards.” But the riots went on, and the Soviets sent troops to Budapest to restore order. The following day, Hungarian freedom fighters began hurling homemade Molotov cocktails at Russian tanks in Budapest. Eisenhower issued a statement deploring the intervention, but he turned down frantic requests from the CIA that it be allowed to fly over Budapest and air-drop arms and supplies. The Agency was deeply disappointed; as William Colby, at the time a junior CIA officer, later director, wrote: “This [Hungary] was exactly the end for which the Agency’s paramilitary capability was designed.” But Eisenhower said no. “Whatever doubts may have existed in the Agency about Washington’s policy in matters like this vanished,” Colby wrote. “It was established, once and for all, that the United States, while firmly committed to the containment of the Soviets . . . was not going to attempt to liberate any of the areas within that sphere . . .” Liberation was a sham. Eisenhower had always known it. The Hungarians had yet to learn it.20
On October 26, Eisenhower presided over a meeting of the NSC. Allen Dulles reported on the entry of Soviet troops into Hungary, the desertion of large numbers of Hungarian Army troops, and the fighting in Budapest. Eisenhower said he wanted to proceed cautiously, that he did not want to give the Soviets any reason to think that the United States might support the Hungarian freedom fighters. Pointing to the dangers involved, he wondered if the Soviets “might not . . . be tempted to resort to extreme measures” to maintain their hold over the satellites, “even to start a world war.”
Foster Dulles then reported on the developments in the Middle East, where Egypt had joined with Jordan and Syria in the Pact of Amman, which provided for military cooperation among them, and an Egyptian commander to take charge of their armed forces in the event of war with Israel. Ben-Gurion said the pact put Israel in “direct and immediate danger,” and Dulles said he expected an Israeli attack on Jordan momentarily.21
On October 28, Eisenhower learned that Israel had ordered a general mobilization of her reserves. In addition, there was heavy radio traffic between Israel and France. Eisenhower decided to evacuate American dependents from the Middle East. He also sent a stern warning to Ben-Gurion “to do nothing which would endanger the peace.”22 U-2 flights revealed heavy military concentrations by the British and the French on Cyprus. Most disturbing was the increase in the number of troop transports and air forces. It appeared that they had concerted a plan to take advantage of the imminent Israeli attack on Jordan to occupy the canal. Whitman, monitoring a call to Dulles, recorded, “President said he just cannot believe Britain would be dragged into this.” Dulles said he had just talked to the French ambassador and the chargé. “They profess to know nothing about this at all . . . But, he [Dulles] said, their ignorance is almost a sign of a guilty conscience, in his opinion.”23
That afternoon, Eisenhower talked with Emmet Hughes, who was trying to write campaign speeches in the midst of the excitement. “I just can’t figure out what the Israelis think they’re up to,” Eisenhower confessed to Hughes. “Maybe they’re thinking they just can’t survive without more land. . . . But I don’t see how they can survive without coming to some honorable and peaceful terms with the whole Arab world that surrounds them.” Turning to intelligence reports on French activities, he said, “Damn it, the French, they’re just egging the Israelis on—hoping somehow to get out of their own North African troubles. Damn it, they sat right there in those chairs three years ago, and we tried to tell them they would repeat Indochina all over again in North Africa. And they said, ‘Oh, nol [Algeria’s] part of metropolitan France!’—and all that damn nonsense.”24
At 8 A.M. the following morning, October 28, Dulles called Eisenhower. The Israelis had not attacked Jordan, and the Russians appeared to be exercising restraint in Budapest. At least, Dulles said, “we have gained twenty-four hours.” The President wanted more substantial achievements. Whitman summarized his remarks: “The President said that they [the Russians] might be willing to talk sense now more than at any time since Administration has been in power. Said approach might be that things are not going the way any of us want, better have a meeting that recognizes these points.” Dulles replied that “undoubtedly there was a battle on in the Presidium . . . some of the people probably would want to go back to the old Stalinistic policies—but Dulles said, that was now too late. He said they [the Russians] were ‘up against a tough problem.’ ” Eisenhower agreed, and said the United States should take advantage of it: “Now is the time to talk more about reducing tensions in the world.” Dulles reminded the President, “We would have to be very careful not to do anything that would look to the satellite world as though we were selling them out.”25
Hanging up the phone, Eisenhower and Mamie left the White House for a political trip to Miami, Jacksonville, and Richmond. About midafternoon, while his plane, the Columbine, was en route between Florida and Virginia, the Israelis attacked on a broad front with everything they had. But their target was Egypt, not Jordan. And the Israelis were sweeping the Egyptians before them. Eisenhower got some of the news in Richmond. He went ahead with his speech, then flew up to Washington, arriving at 7 P.M. He met with the Dulles brothers, Hoover, Wilson, Radford, and Goodpaster. Radford thought that it would take the Israeli forces three days to overrun Sinai and get to Suez, which would be the end to the whole affair. Foster Dulles disagreed. “It is far more serious than that,” he said. The canal was likely to be closed, the oil pipelines through the Middle East broken. Then the British and the French would intervene. “They appear to be ready for it,” Dulles said, “and may even have concerted their action with the Israelis.”26
Finally, the Americans had caught on. Britain, France, and Israel had entered into a cabal, aimed against Egypt, not Jordan. The details of their plot had yet to be revealed, but that they had plotted together there could be no doubt. Dulles speculated that they must have convinced themselves that in the end the United States would have to give its grudging approval, and support. Three weeks earlier he had warned Eisenhower that the British and the French “keep on assuming that they can count on the United States to pull their chestnuts out of the fire wherever the fire occurred.”27
• •
The moment for decision had come. Eisenhower’s strategy of delay had to give way to action. His British friends, men who had fought beside him in the war, men he admired and loved without stint, had convinced themselves that they had reached a critical moment in their history, and at such a moment they expected the United States to stand beside them. They could not believe their great friend Ike would desert them. The French counted on Eisenhower’s unbreakable commitment to NATO to force Eisenhower to tilt toward them. The Israelis thought that the election, and the importance of the Jewish vote in it, would force Eisenhower to at least stay neutral, if not support them. But good as their reasoning appeared to them to be, the conspirators were as badly wrong about Eisenhower as he had been about their plans.
Eisenhower’s immediate decision, from which he never retreated one inch, was that the cabal could not be allowed to succeed. The plot reeked of nineteenth-century colonialism of the worst sort; it reeked of bad planning; it reeked of bad faith and perfidy. It also violated the 1950 Tripartite Declaration. Under the circumstances, Eisenhower said (as summarized by Goodpaster): “We cannot be bound by our traditional alliances, but must instead face the question how to make good on our pledge [in the Tripartite Declaration].” As a first step, he wanted to take a cease-fire resolution to the U.N. in the morning. “The President said, in this matter, he does not care in the slightest whether he is re-elected or not . . . He added that he did not really think the American people would throw him out in the midst of a situation like this, but if they did, so be it.” He wanted to tell the British, immediately, that the U.S. would side with Egypt, even though “we recognize that much is on their side in the dispute,” because “nothing justified double-crossing us.” Eisenhower announced that he intended to support the Tripartite Declaration, one part of which pledged the United States to support the victim of an aggression in the Middle East. The only honorable course, he said, was to carry out that pledge. He issued a White House statement to that effect.
Then Eisenhower, Dulles, and Goodpaster met (8:15 P.M.) with the British chargé, J. E. Coulson (the ambassador had flown back to London). Eisenhower told Coulson “the prestige of the United States is involved,” and that it was “incumbent” upon him to redeem America’s pledge to support any victim of aggression. He said that he had told both the Egyptians and the Israelis, earlier in the year, when he declined to sell them arms, “our word was enough” to insure their security. “If we do not now fulfill our word Russia is likely to enter the situation.” In view of the information he had received in the last few days, Eisenhower said “he could only conclude that he did not understand what the French were doing,” but he wanted them to know, too, that the President would call Congress into a special session if he had to do so “in order to redeem our pledge . . . We will stick to our undertaking.” Coulson asked if the U.S. would not first go to the Security Council. Eisenhower replied that “we plan to get there the first thing in the morning—when the doors open—before the U.S.S.R. gets there.” Then he told Coulson, for the third time, that he “would not betray the good word of the United States,” and asked him “to communicate these ideas urgently to London . . .”28
Eisenhower began the next day, October 30, by reading a message Goodpaster handed him from Ben-Gurion, saying that Israel had to strike to save herself and rejecting any thought of a cease-fire in Sinai, much less a retreat. Arthur Flemming came in to warn that Western Europe would soon be in critical need of more oil. “The President said he was inclined to think that those who began this operation should be left to work out their own oil problems—to boil in their own oil, so to speak.”29 Cabot Lodge called from New York; he had talked to the British ambassador to the U.N., Pierson Dixon, to ask him to join the Americans in calling for a cease-fire, in accordance with the 1950 Tripartite Declaration. Dixon told Lodge that the declaration “was ancient history and without current validity.”
At 10 A.M., Eisenhower went into a meeting with Dulles, Hoover, Sherman Adams, and Goodpaster. There was a wire-service report that British and French landings in Suez were “imminent.” Eisenhower said “that in his judgment the French and the British do not have an adequate cause for war . . . He wondered if the hand of Churchill might not be behind this—inasmuch as this action is in the mid-Victorian style.” He also wondered what they proposed to do to meet their oil needs; Dulles said they probably figured “we would have no choice but to take extraordinary means to get oil to them.” Eisenhower said that “he did not see much value in an unworthy and unreliable ally and that the necessity to support them might not be as great as they believed.” But that was just agitated talk; he knew Dulles was correct in saying that “the U.S. could not sit by and let them go under economically.”30
At midday, Eisenhower exchanged a series of messages with Eden, arguing about whether the Tripartite Declaration was still valid or not. In New York, the Security Council was considering the U.S. resolution asking all members of the U.N. to refrain from using force in the Middle East. When the vote came that afternoon, Britain and France vetoed it. They also used the veto to defeat a Soviet resolution calling on Israel to pull back to the starting line.
At 2:17 P.M., still October 30, Dulles called to tell the President that Britain and France “gave a twelve-hour ultimatum to Egypt that is about as crude and brutal as anything he has ever seen.” Dulles saw no point to studying it, because “of course by tomorrow they will be in.” But Eisenhower wanted Dulles to read the ultimatum to him, as he had just received a copy and had not had time to read it. The ultimatum revealed, for the first time, the scope of the plot. Britain and France told Egypt and Israel that unless both sides withdrew ten miles from the canal and permitted Anglo-French occupation of the key points along it, Britain and France would take the canal by force to keep the two sides apart. The Israelis, of course, agreed. If the plot worked, Israel would get to keep Sinai, the British and French would have the canal, Nasser would be toppled.31 To Eisenhower, such pipe dreams bordered on madness. He sent urgent cables to Eden and Mollet, at 3:30 P.M., pleading with them to withdraw the ultimatum.32
At 5 P.M., Eisenhower met with Hughes. Hughes found him “more calm (as usual) than either White House staff or State Department—all of whom are whipping themselves into an anti-British frenzy.” But calm or not, the President was clearly unhappy. “I’ve just never seen great powers make such a complete mess and botch of things . . .” Eisenhower moaned. “Of course, there’s just nobody, in a war, I’d rather have fighting alongside me than the British. . . . But—this thing! My God!”33 At 5:24, Eisenhower called Dulles to discuss Eden’s latest message, which Eisenhower said had one positive note—Eden was attempting to explain his position, so at least he “wants us to try to understand.” They talked about the possibility of issuing a statement, and rejected it. Eisenhower expressed his “concern that if we let this go along until we are completely apart, where do we get against Communism?” After another half-dozen phone calls, the President joined Mamie for dinner, did a bit of painting, went to bed—and got up at 10:30 P.M. for another call from Dulles. Eisenhower mumbled that they could deal with the matter in the morning, and went to sleep.34
At dawn, October 31, the news included the results of a vote of confidence on Eden in Commons; he had survived, 270 to 218. Israeli forces were still driving westward across Sinai. But Allen Dulles, who gave the morning briefing, had some good news. The Russians had announced they would withdraw their troops from Hungary, had apologized for past behavior toward the satellites, and had pledged “noninterference in one another’s internal affairs.” Eisenhower feared it was too good to be true. Allen Dulles said, “This utterance is one of the most significant to come out of the Soviet Union since the end of World War II.” Eisenhower replied, “Yes, if it is honest.”35
At 9:47 A.M., Senator Knowland telephoned from California to ask if Eisenhower intended to call a special session of Congress. Eisenhower said he did not. Knowland expressed his shock at British actions. Eisenhower said what amazed him was that Eden was going ahead with the thing on the basis of a 270 to 218 vote. “I could not dream of committing this nation on such a vote.” Eisenhower went on to say, “I am about to lose my British citizenship. I have done my best. I think it is the biggest error of our time, outside of losing China.” But, he concluded, “Don’t condemn the British too bitterly.”36
In New York, meanwhile, Lodge had told the General Assembly that the United States intended to introduce a resolution calling upon Israel and Egypt to cease fire, on Israel to withdraw to its original borders, and on all U.N. members to refrain from the use of force, and to participate in an embargo against Israel until it withdrew.
At 11:45 A.M., Lodge phoned Eisenhower to tell him that “never has there been such a tremendous acclaim for the President’s policy. Absolutely spectacular.” The small nations of the world could hardly believe that the United States would support a Third World country, Egypt, in a struggle with colonial powers that were America’s two staunchest allies, or that the United States would support Arabs against Israeli aggression. But it was true, and the small nations were full of admiration and delight. The introduction of the American resolution to the U.N. was, indeed, one of the great moments in U.N. history. Eisenhower’s insistence on the primacy of the U.N., of treaty obligations, and of the rights of all nations gave the United States a standing in world opinion it had never before achieved. Lodge quoted some of the remarks he had heard for the President. Hammarskjöld had given him a note: “This is one of the darkest days in postwar times. Thank God you have played the way you have. This will win you many friends.” The Colombian ambassador (“A very shrewd fellow,” Lodge said) reported that the Latin-American republics were “behind the President as never have they been before.” The Pakistan Under Secretary said that “anybody who is an American citizen can be very proud.” A “New Deal Democrat” in the U.N. Secretariat (“who always looks at me with a jaundiced eye”), told Lodge, “You make me proud to be an American.” All the Asian and African nations were overjoyed. Even the busboys, typists, elevator operators at the U.N. “have been offering their congratulations.”37
Despite this overwhelming demonstration of world public opinion (even the small nations of Europe were privately telling Lodge what a great thing this was), despite the narrow vote in the House of Commons, despite Eisenhower’s warnings, despite a thoroughly botched preparation for an invasion (the British and the French forces were in disarray even before they went into action), Eden gave the order to strike. By midday, October 31, Eisenhower learned that British planes were bombing Cairo, Port Said, and other targets. Nasser had resisted, ineffectively, but he had managed to block the canal by sinking a 320-foot ship, previously loaded with cement and rocks; in the next few days, he sent thirty-two ships to the floor of the canal, blaming all the sinkings on the British.
Eisenhower spent most of the afternoon with Hughes, preparing for a national TV broadcast at 7 P.M. For Hughes, it was a “fearfully tense” time. He was working on a Dulles’ draft which he did not like, but Eisenhower was unhappy with what Hughes was producing. Dulles joined them. Eisenhower told the two men to get it done, then went out on the lawn to hit some golf balls. At 6:15 Hughes took the latest draft to Eisenhower, who was dressing in his bedroom. Eisenhower made some changes, putting more emphasis on the importance of the alliance with Britain, and told Hughes to get a final copy typed. At 6:45 Eisenhower came down to the press room and began to go over it, page by page. At four minutes to seven, Hughes gave him the last page. “Boy,” Eisenhower said, grinning, “this is taking it right off the stove, isn’t it?” Hughes noted that the “press was edgy with expectancy, since no moment since Korea has seemed so charged with war peril. Even technicians around cameras were hushed and anxious.”38
Eisenhower began with Poland and Hungary. He said the U.S. was ready to give economic help to new and independent governments in Eastern Europe without demanding any particular form of society, and reassured the Soviets by saying the United States wanted to be friends with these new nations but did not regard them as potential allies. Turning to the Middle East, Eisenhower said the United States wished to be friends with both Arabs and Jews. He pointed out that he had not been consulted in any way about the assault on Egypt. Britain, France, and Israel had the right to make such decisions, just as the U.S. had the right to dissent. American policy was to support the U.N. in seeking peace, and to support the rule of law.39
• •
At 9 A.M. on November 1, Eisenhower presided over an NSC meeting, one of the few formal meetings of the NSC he called during the three-week crisis. Allen Dulles began with an intelligence briefing. Egypt had broken diplomatic ties with Britain and France, and Nasser had pulled most of the Egyptian Army out of Sinai to fight the British and the French in defense of the canal. In Hungary, the new Premier, Imre Nagy, told the Russians that Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact (created in 1955 as the Soviet answer to NATO), declaring its neutrality, and appealing to the U.N. for help. The developments in Hungary, Dulles said, “are a miracle. They have disproved that a popular revolt can’t occur in the face of modern weapons. Eighty percent of the Hungarian Army has defected. Except in Budapest, even the Soviet troops have shown no stomach for shooting down Hungarians.” Eisenhower thanked Dulles for his presentation, then said that “he did not wish the council to take up the situation in the Soviet satellites.” Instead, he wanted to concentrate on the Middle East.
Foster Dulles took the floor. His pessimism was as deep as his brother’s optimism was high. The Secretary of State declared that “recent events are close to marking the death knell for Great Britain and France.” They had acted contrary to the Americans’ best advice, contrary to principle, and contrary to their own self-interest. He thought “we had almost reached the point of deciding today whether we think the future lies with a policy of reasserting by force colonial control over the less-developed nations, or whether we will oppose such a course of action by every appropriate means.” Like Eisenhower, Dulles was furious with the French, British, and Israelis for plotting behind his back. Adding to the fury was the lost opportunity to exploit Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe. “It is nothing less than tragic,” Dulles said, “that at this very time, when we are on the point of winning an immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe,” that Western colonialism in Egypt was the center of the world’s attention. It was maddening that the British and the French were forcing the U.S. to choose between them (“our oldest and most trusted allies,” Dulles called them, “the allies we would most surely depend upon” in the event of war) and Egypt. Dulles concluded, “Yet this decision must be made in a mere matter of hours—before five o’clock this afternoon.” At that hour, Dulles was scheduled to address the U.N. General Assembly, at which time he had intended to formally introduce the American cease-fire resolution.
The minutes of the NSC meeting continue: “The President broke the tension which followed Secretary Dulles’ statement” by quoting a telegram he had received from Adlai Stevenson, cautioning against the hasty use of American armed forces (Stevenson had earlier urged Eisenhower to send arms to Israel). Laughing and shaking his head at “politics,” Eisenhower said, “It would be a complete mistake for this country to continue with any kind of aid to Israel, which was an aggressor.” Dulles said he had prepared a statement, announcing that the United States was withholding certain types of government aid to Israel. Eisenhower said he thought “the sanctions outlined seemed a little mild.” Dulles agreed that they were, but said more could be added later, after the General Assembly condemned Israel for aggression. Humphrey wanted to stall. He suggested that instead of introducing a resolution calling for a cease-fire, Dulles should call for an investigation by the U.N. to determine who was the aggressor. “The President replied that it seemed to him foolish for people, who know as much as we do about what is going on, to continue to give, as a government assistance to Israel.” He therefore ordered Dulles to issue the statement about sanctions against Israel, and to go ahead that afternoon in New York with the original American cease-fire resolution.
After the meeting, Eisenhower sent Dulles a memorandum outlining the policy he wanted Dulles to pursue in New York. The President said the United States must take the lead in presenting a cease-fire resolution, because a resolution from some other country might be “harshly worded” against France and Britain and thus “put us in an acutely embarrassing position.” Further, “at all costs the Soviets must be prevented from seizing a mantle of world leadership through a false but convincing exhibition of concern for smaller nations. Since Africa and Asia almost unanimously hate one of the three nations, Britain, France and Israel, the Soviets need only to propose severe and immediate punishment of these three to have the whole of two continents on their side.” Eisenhower instructed Dulles, when he made his speech to the U.N., “to avoid condemning any nation, but to put his stress on the need for a quick cease-fire.”40
Dulles did as he was told. As darkness fell on November 1, the General Assembly began its debate on the American cease-fire resolution. That evening, Eisenhower made his last campaign speech, in Philadelphia. Referring to the Middle East, he declared, “We cannot subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong; one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us. There can be only one law—or there shall be no peace.”41 Eisenhower then canceled the rallies he had been scheduled to attend in the last week of the campaign.
• •
The next day, November 2, Eisenhower dictated a letter to Gruenther, beginning, “Life gets more difficult by the minute.” He confessed that “sleep has been a little slower to come than usual. I seem to go to bed later and wake up earlier—which bores me.” But the news that morning was good—the U.N. General Assembly had adopted the U.S. cease-fire resolution by a vote of 64 to 5 (Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel opposing). Lester Pearson of Canada then proposed a U.N. police force to interject itself between the warring parties to insure the effectiveness of the cease-fire. By this time, Israeli forces had taken virtually all of Sinai and of the Gaza Strip. The Egyptian Air Force had been destroyed; the Israelis had five thousand Egyptian prisoners and large quantities of Soviet-made arms. British and French planes continued to bomb Egypt, but their troops had not yet landed (poor planning and worse execution of a joint British-French amphibious assault was repeating itself; Suez in 1956 was as badly botched as the Gallipoli landing of 1915).
Eisenhower was appalled by both British tactics and British strategy. “If one has to fight,” he told Gruenther, “then that is that. But I don’t see the point in getting into a fight to which there can be no satisfactory end, and in which the whole world believes you are playing the part of the bully and you do not even have the firm backing of your entire people.” Eisenhower said he had talked to an old British friend who was “truly bitter” about Eden’s gunboat diplomacy, and who had declared, “This is nothing except Eden trying to be bigger than he is.” Eisenhower said he “did not dismiss it that lightly. I believe that Eden and his associates have become convinced that this is the last straw and Britain simply had to react in the manner of the Victorian period.”42 To Swede, Eisenhower wrote that he was astonished Britain could commit such “a terrible mistake.” At the time the aggression began, the canal was being run more efficiently than it ever had been. Eisenhower said he had “insisted long and earnestly that you cannot resort to force in international relationships because of your fear of what might happen in the future,” but the British had acted on just such fears. The Israelis too had reacted to their fears, and attacked, thinking, no doubt, Eisenhower told Swede, that they could “take advantage” of the United States because of the election. But, the President declared, he had informed Ben-Gurion that “we would handle our affairs exactly as though we didn’t have a Jew in America.” Turning to the French, Eisenhower said they had been “perfectly cold-blooded about the matter.” Their only concern was the war in Algeria, and they had provided Israel with the arms to “get someone else fighting the Arabs.”43
• •
At the end of the day on November 2, Eisenhower told Gruenther, “I have heard many people say a fellow would go crazy doing nothing.” Then, as he had done so often during critical moments in the war, when he wrote to Mamie about his retirement fantasies, he indulged himself in a bit of wishful thinking about his retirement. At the moment, at least, he thought that a life filled with cattle raising, quail hunting, fishing, and lots of golf and bridge, with perhaps a bit of writing—“maybe such a life wouldn’t be so bad.”44
The next best thing to retirement was a weekend with the gang. Eisenhower had Whitman call the boys, and on Saturday, November 3, they arrived—George Allen, Bill Robinson, Pete Jones, and Ellis Slater. They watched Navy play Notre Dame on the television, then played nonstop bridge until dinner. At dinner, Eisenhower expressed his contempt for Stevenson, who told “outright lies.” After dinner, they played more bridge. At breakfast, they talked politics, speculating on the results of the election. Eisenhower got on the subject of the men around him. He praised Bob Anderson and Arthur Larson. Slater noted in his diary, “He rates Nixon high in many respects, particularly when it comes to summing up the various positions taken on any given subject and then arriving at a decision. He may not be the most able at innovation.”
After church, Eisenhower tried to take a nap “but got nowhere,” so he started thinking about the Gettysburg farm and called Art Nevins on the telephone to talk about his Angus herd. In the afternoon, he played bridge. At six, he watched Sherman Adams on Meet the Press, ate dinner, and played more bridge until eleven. Slater was “most impressed” by Eisenhower’s “equanimity during periods of stress. Here were so many crises of one kind or another—here were, as the President himself expressed it, the ten most frustrating days of his life, and yet there was no evidence at all of pressure, of indecision or of the frustration he mentioned.” Eisenhower took it all “in stride as part of a day’s work.”45
The news over the weekend was quite disheartening. On Saturday, Dulles had entered Walter Reed for an emergency cancer operation, which took place that day. For the immediate future, Herbert Hoover, Jr., would be the Acting Secretary. In the Middle East, the Syrians blew up oil pipelines running through their country from Iraq to the Mediterranean. In Britain, Eden rejected the U.N. call for a cease-fire, unless Egypt and Israel accepted French-British possession of Suez until a U.N. force could arrive. On Sunday morning, at 3:13 A.M., the Security Council met to consider an American resolution calling upon the Russians to withdraw from Hungary. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. That morning the Red Army launched a major assault on Hungary, following an ultimatum that Hungary rejected. Some 200,000 troops accompanied by 4,000 tanks moved on Budapest. Nagy fled to the Yugoslav Embassy, and a new Hungarian government, under Janos Kadar, took office. The Hungarian freedom fighters resisted. Eisenhower sent a message to Bulganin, reminding him of the Soviet declaration of “nonintervention” made only four days earlier, praising him for that statement, and urging him to put it into action. Meanwhile, U-2 flights revealed that the British-French armada from Cyprus was finally approaching the Egyptian coast. Eisenhower again asked Eden to turn back. Eden replied that “if we draw back now everything will go up in flames in the Middle East. . . . We cannot have a military vacuum while a U.N. force is being constituted.”46
The Hungarians, meanwhile, wanted help. They thought they had been promised it by Radio Free Europe, and by Dulles’ many references over the years to liberation. Eisenhower, however, had no intention of challenging the Russians so close to their borders. American intervention, of any type, would have appeared to the Russians as an attempt to break up the Warsaw Pact, and they would fight before they would allow that to happen. Eisenhower again refused the CIA permission to air-drop arms and supplies to the Hungarians, and he would not consider sending U.S. troops to Hungary, which he characterized as being “as inaccessible to us as Tibet.” Eisenhower knew that there were limits to his power, and Hungary was outside those limits. “So . . .” he wrote in his memoirs, “the United States did the only thing it could: We readied ourselves . . . to help the refugees fleeing from the criminal action of the Soviets, and did everything possible to condemn the aggression.”47
• •
On Monday morning, November 5, the day before the election, all hell broke loose. British and French paratroopers landed around Port Said on the Suez Canal. Amphibious landings soon followed. Bulganin sent messages to Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion, telling them that the Soviet Union was ready to use force to crush the aggressors and restore the peace. There was a thinly veiled threat to use nuclear missiles against London and Paris if the Franco-British force was not withdrawn from Suez. Bulganin also wrote Eisenhower, proposing that the U.S. and the Soviet Union join forces, march into Egypt, and put an end to the fighting. “If this war is not stopped, it is fraught with danger and can grow into a Third World War,” Bulganin warned.48
At 5 P.M., Eisenhower summoned Hoover, Adams, and Hughes to discuss a reply to Bulganin’s preposterous proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union join hands against Britain and France. To Hughes, Eisenhower seemed “poised and relaxed,” although fatigued. The discussion was somber. The conferees agreed on the word “unthinkable” in dismissing Bulganin’s suggestion. They worried about the Russians, whom they recognized were torn, by hope and fear—hope that the Suez crisis would lead to a breakup of NATO, and fear that Hungary would lead to a breakup of the Warsaw Pact. Eisenhower described their position: “Those boys are both furious and scared. Just as with Hitler, that makes for the most dangerous possible state of mind. And we better be damn sure that every intelligence point and every outpost of our armed forces is absolutely right on their toes.” Under the circumstances, Eisenhower said, “We have to be positive and clear in our every word, every step. And if those fellows start something, we may have to hit ’em—and, if necessary, with everything in the bucket.”49 Eisenhower directed Hoover to issue a statement that would include clear warnings—if the Russians tried to put troops into the Middle East, the U.S. would resist with force.
• •
November 6 was election day. At 8:37 A.M., Eisenhower met with Allen Dulles, Hoover, and Goodpaster for the latest intelligence briefing. Dulles reported that the Soviets had told the Egyptians they intended to “do something” in the Middle East. He thought it possible that they would send air forces into Syria. Eisenhower told Dulles to send U-2 flights over Syria and Israel, “avoiding, however, any flights into Russia.” If the Soviets attacked the British and the French, Eisenhower said, “we would be in war, and we would be justified in taking military action even if Congress were not in session.” If reconnaissance “discloses Soviet air forces on Syrian bases,” Eisenhower said, he thought “that there would be reason for the British and French to destroy them.” Goodpaster’s memo on the conference concluded on a chilling note: “The President asked if our forces in the Mediterranean are equipped with atomic antisubmarine weapons.”50
At 9 A.M. Eisenhower and Mamie drove to Gettysburg to vote, then took a helicopter back to Washington, arriving around noon. Goodpaster met him at the airport to report that the U-2 flights had discovered no Soviet planes on Syrian airfields, or any moving into Egypt. World War III was not about to begin. In the White House Cabinet Room, Eisenhower met with Radford. The question was, Should the U.S. mobilize? Eisenhower wanted mobilization put into effect by degrees, “in order to avoid creating a stir.” As a start, he wanted Radford to recall military personnel on leave, an action that could not be concealed and that would give the Russians pause.51
At 12:55 P.M., Eisenhower put through another call to Eden, who had just announced British willingness to accept a cease-fire. (The war had already cost the British nearly $500 million; further, the British and the French now claimed control of the canal.) Eisenhower said, “I can’t tell you how pleased we are . . . After the cease-fire it seems like the little technical things would be settled very quickly, and when Hammarskjold comes along with his people you people ought to be able to withdraw very quickly.” Eisenhower added that the U.N. peace-keeping force was “getting Canadian troops—lots of troops.” Eden wanted American troops. Would they be a part of the U.N. force? Eisenhower said he wanted none of the great nations in it. “I am afraid the Red boy is going to demand the lion’s share. I would rather make it no troops from the big five.” Eden reluctantly agreed. “If I survive here tonight [he faced a vote of confidence],” Eden concluded, “I will call you tomorrow.” Then he asked how the election was going for Eisenhower. “We have given our whole thought to Hungary and the Middle East,” Eisenhower responded. “I don’t give a damn how the election goes. I guess it will be all right.”52
Eisenhower spent the afternoon resting, to prepare for the excitement of the long night ahead. He canceled his plans to go to Augusta the next day, because of the Suez situation, a decision that he hated to make. “He’s as disappointed as a kid who had counted out all the days to Christmas,” Whitman reported. At 10 P.M. he left the White House for the Republican headquarters. As predicted, the early returns showed that he was winning by a landslide, but that the Democrats were going to retain control of Congress.
In the excitement of the contest, Eisenhower shed his supposed indifference to the outcome. He told Hughes, “There’s Michigan and Minnesota still to see. You remember that story of Nelson—dying, he looked around and asked, ‘Are there any of them still left?’ I guess that’s me. When I get in a battle, I just want to win the whole thing . . . six or seven states we can’t help. But I don’t want to lose any more. Don’t want any of them ‘left’—like Nelson. That’s the way I feel.”
By midnight, he was growing irritated at Stevenson for not conceding. “What in the name of God is the monkey waiting for?” the President demanded. “Polishing his prose?” Eisenhower loved to win, but not to gloat. In North Africa in 1943, and in Europe in 1945, he had refused to be present at the surrender ceremony. On November 6, 1956, when Stevenson finally appeared on the television screen to concede, Eisenhower stalked out of the room, saying over his shoulder that the others should stay “to receive the surrender.”
Eisenhower got the mandate he wanted from the American people, who voted 35,581,003 for him, 25,738,765 for Stevenson. That 10,000,000-vote margin was almost double the margin of 1952. Stevenson carried only seven southern states.53
• •
Eden too survived his vote of confidence. At 8:53 A.M. on November 7, he called Eisenhower to ask for an immediate—that day or the next—summit conference in Washington between himself, Eisenhower, and Mollet. Eisenhower feared that Eden was trying to back out of British acceptance of a cease-fire and a U.N. force taking control in Suez, but Eden said that what he wanted to discuss was what happened next. Well, Eisenhower replied, “If we are going to talk about the future and about the Bear—okay.”54
Eisenhower next met with Adams and Goodpaster. They both told him the proposed conference was a terrible idea. Goodpaster emphasized that such a meeting would give the appearance “that we were now concerting action in the Middle East independently of the U.N. action.” Hoover joined them. He agreed with Goodpaster and said he had just talked to Dulles, who also opposed the meeting. Hoover also said he had a report from Allen Dulles stating that the Soviets had offered Egypt 250,000 volunteers and that preparations for their departure were under way. Eisenhower asked Goodpaster to check on that report. While he did so, Eisenhower called Eden to inform him that the meeting would have to be postponed. Goodpaster returned to report that there was nothing solid in the intelligence data, but certainly the Soviets did not have 250,000 troops on the move.55
That morning, Ben-Gurion issued a statement saying Israel rejected the U.N. order to withdraw Israeli forces from Sinai and Gaza and to permit U.N. forces to enter. Eisenhower sent him a strong protest. Then the President received a message from Bulganin: “I feel urged to state that the problem of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary . . . comes completely and entirely under the competence of the Hungarian and Soviet governments.”56 The fighting in Budapest, meanwhile, had passed its peak. Hungarian refugees were fleeing to Austria at the rate of three to four thousand a day; there were forty thousand dead freedom fighters. As had happened so many times before, and would again, the United States found itself unable to influence in any significant way events in Eastern Europe. The Russians violated their pledge of safe-conduct to Nagy, seized him, held a secret trial, and executed him. All that Eisenhower could do was announce that the U.S. was ready to accept 21,000 of the 150,000 Hungarian refugees, and that he would ask for emergency legislation to let more Hungarians enter the U.S.
• •
On the morning of November 9, Eisenhower met with the NSC to begin planning for picking up the pieces in the Middle East. He wanted American oil companies organized for a major effort in providing France and Britain with oil, saying—with a smile—that “despite my stiff-necked Attorney General” he could give the industry members a certificate that they were acting in the national interest, thus removing the threat of antitrust suits. And if the heads of the oil companies nevertheless landed in jail, he laughed, he would pardon them. Eisenhower said he would not actually send any oil, however, until the British and the French had completely withdrawn and the U.N. force was in place. In the meantime, he did not want to aggravate the situation any further. “The way of the peacemaker is proverbially hard,” he sighed.57
It was indeed. At 8:45 A.M., the newly appointed British ambassador, Sir Harold Caccia, arrived to present his credentials. After an exchange of pleasantries, Eisenhower told Caccia that it baffled him “that the Russians, as cruel and brutal as they are, can get away with murder . . . However, if we breach the smallest courtesy, the whole world is aflame.” In the Far East, he complained, where anti-British sentiment was white-hot, no one paid any attention to the Russian actions in Hungary. To the people of Asia, Eisenhower said, “colonialism is not colonialism unless it is a matter of white domination over colored people.” The Asians just shrugged off the murders committed in Hungary—that was a case of whites killing whites, of no concern to them. But anything Britain did in the Middle East was of concern.58
At 4:48 P.M., Lodge called from New York. Another resolution condemning the Russians in Hungary was under discussion. Lodge told Eisenhower that “there is the feeling at the U.N. that for ten years we have been exciting the Hungarians through our Radio Free Europe, and now that they are in trouble, we turn our backs on them.” Eisenhower protested strongly. He insisted that was wrong—“we have never excited anybody to rebel.”59 The President put through a call to Dulles, still in Walter Reed recovering from his surgery. He repeated Lodge’s statement about telling the Hungarians to revolt and then “turning our backs to them when they are in a jam.” Dulles assured Eisenhower that “we always said we are against violent rebellion.” Eisenhower agreed that that was so, and expressed his “amazement” that Lodge was in ignorance of that fact. In addition, Eisenhower said, the Europeans at the U.N. were “asking why we are so fretful about France and Britain with a few troops in Egypt, while we don’t show as much concern about Hungary.” Eisenhower was concerned about “putting ourselves in the wrong” by urging the French, British, and Israelis to pull back, while not putting more pressure on the Russians.
But the President could put no meaningful pressure on Bulganin. The Russians did not need Arab oil, or American arms or money, and they had complete military preponderance in Eastern Europe. As Eisenhower later told C. D. Jackson, who was frantic about the lack of action in Hungary by the United States, the only option available to him was to use atomic weapons. “But to annihilate Hungary . . . is in no way to help her.”60 Britain and France, on the other hand, desperately needed American oil and money; Israel needed American money and good will. They could be pressured. Eisenhower applied it.
Eisenhower called his ambassador to the Court of St. James’s, Winthrop Aldrich, to tell Aldrich to talk to Rab Butler and Harold Macmillan, the most likely successors to Eden when he resigned (talk of his resignation filled the air), and tell them that “as soon as things happen that we anticipate, we can furnish a lot of fig leaves.” He wondered, “Will that be enough to get the boys moving?” Aldrich thought so.61
But having invested so much, the British were reluctant to pull out. Eisenhower kept the pressure on by withholding American oil and financial assistance. The British tried a bit of counterpressure. Lord Ismay wrote Eisenhower, accusing him of deserting his friends “in their hour of trial, and now won’t even help them out with oil and gas, etc.” The accusation pained Eisenhower. He told Dulles, who had gone to Key West to recuperate, that he and Ismay “have been the best of friends over the years.” But he would not release the oil until the British were well on their way out.62 Churchill also wrote the President a long letter suggesting that they leave it to the historians to sort out the arguments and themselves look to the future. The danger was that the Soviets would succeed in their attempt to convince the Arabs that it was their threats, not Eisenhower’s actions, that had saved the day for Egypt. Eisenhower replied that he was fully aware that “the Soviets are the real enemy of the Western world, implacably hostile and seeking our destruction.” But he could not resist giving Churchill a four-page summary of events of the past few weeks, with the emphasis on how many times he had warned Eden against using force. He also pointed out that “even by the doctrine of expediency the invasion could not be judged as soundly conceived and skillfully executed.” Eisenhower did resist any temptation to point out that the last time the British engaged in an amphibious assault, it was in June of 1944; he had been in command and everything had gone successfully. Instead, he concluded with the hope that the Suez crisis would be “washed off the slate as soon as possible,” because “nothing saddens me more than the thought that I and my old friends of years have met a problem concerning which we do not see eye to eye. I shall never be happy until our old-time closeness has been restored.”63
Others among Eisenhower’s British wartime friends wrote him letters of protest. To Lord Tedder, Eisenhower replied, “I do not conceive it to be the function of a friend to encourage action that he believes in his heart to be unwise and even inexpedient.” He insisted that in trying to prevent Eden from taking action, and now forcing him to withdraw, he was acting “as a true friend.”64 He repeated those statements in a letter to Freddie de Guingand.65
By the end of November, the U.N. force was moving into place, and the British and the French were almost out. Eisenhower lifted the embargo on oil sales to Britain, and the United States soon was shipping 200,000 barrels a day. The Americans loaned money to the British to tide them over. By Christmastime the French and the British troops were gone and the Egyptians had started to clear the canal.
At a meeting with Republican leaders on New Year’s Eve, Eisenhower was asked about British and French attitudes toward the U.S. “Underneath,” the President replied, “the governments are thankful we did what we did. But publicly, we have to be the whipping boy.” Anyway, “The whole darn thing is straightening out very rapidly.” A recent NATO meeting had gone “very well.” The alliance had survived the crisis.66
• •
After all the nuclear saber rattling that had gone on, relations with the Russians were still tense. Three days after the election, Eisenhower had proposed to Hoover that the United States take advantage of the worldwide fright, a fright that Bulganin presumably shared, to make some progress on disarmament. Eisenhower was willing to make a dramatic offer, such as pulling NATO forces behind the Rhine and withdrawing American ground troops in Germany. Hoover doubted that Dulles would agree. Eisenhower said he just wanted the Secretary to have the thought, because “as long as we are before the world, just calling each other names, being horrified all the time by their brutality, then we get nowhere.” But nothing came of the President’s idea.67
One reason was Soviet reaction to continued U-2 overflights. During the crisis, Eisenhower had to know what military moves the Soviets were making, and after the election he authorized additional flights. The Soviets protested, privately but strongly. On November 15, Eisenhower met with Hoover, Radford, and Allan Dulles to discuss the flights. Eisenhower thought that they were beginning to “cost more than we gain in form of solid information.” Hoover pointed out that “if we lost a plane at this stage, it would be almost catastrophic.” Eisenhower agreed, and pointed out that “everyone in the world says that in the last six weeks, the U.S. has gained a place it hasn’t held since World War II.” The country had to “preserve a place that is correct and moral.” Still, he worried about those Russians and what they might do with the Red Army, so he approved flights over Eastern Europe, “but not the deep one.” The pilot should “stay as close to border as possible.”68
The Russians continued to protest. One month later, on December 18, Eisenhower talked to Foster Dulles about the overflights of Eastern Europe. Eisenhower said he was “going to order complete stoppage of the entire business.” As to the Russian protests, Dulles said, “I think we will have to admit this was done and say we are sorry. We cannot deny it.” Eisenhower said he would call Charlie Wilson “and have him stop it.” Dulles reminded the President that “our relations with Russia are pretty tense at the moment.” Eisenhower agreed that this was no time to be provocative.69
• •
The problem of the Hungarian refugees remained. On November 26, Eisenhower gave a warm and heartfelt greeting to the first arrivals, who came to the White House to see the President. He expressed his shock and horror at Russian actions and assured the Hungarians that they were most welcome in the U.S.70
On the day after Christmas, Eisenhower held an 11 A.M. meeting with Nixon, who had just returned from a trip to Vienna to get an overview on the refugee situation. Nixon remarked on the high caliber of the refugees. They were mostly young, well-educated, leadership types who had to flee because they had participated in the rebellion. Eisenhower recalled a remark that Zhukov had made to him in the summer of 1945: “If you get rid of the leaders of a country, you can do anything you want to.” But the only thing the Americans could do for poor Hungary was accept refugees—yet the law prevented that. Nixon said there were still seventy thousand in Vienna. Eisenhower remarked that the Hungarians were productive people, and that it would be “a tremendous thing” if some of the Middle East countries would take in refugees. The Latin Americans also ought to try to take some—God knew they could “use the skills the Hungarians have.” Meanwhile, he wanted the State Department to continue to process applications, even if the quota had been used up, because if the processing stopped, “the pick of the refugees will go to other countries.”71 The best of Hungary’s young people but not freedom for Hungary—that was what the United States got for four years of agitation about liberation.