The time for spring plowing has come and we are very pleased to receive the news from the Shanxi‑Chahar‑Hebei Military District. There, this year’s plan of production and self‑sufficiency in the army was announced, and this plan was published in this paper on April 22. This plan is: (1) 4 qian of oil and salt, 5 qian of meat, 1 jin of vegetables, and 3 jin of firewood per person daily, as well as 6 jin of meat for Spring Festival and holidays (each unit compensates for the inad‑ equate amount in the allocation from the government); (2) subsidies; (3) public allowances; (4) expenses for books and newspapers; (5) expenses for mules and horses; (6) 2 towels and 1 pair of cloth socks; (7) subsidies for living expenses of the wounded and ill. These seven points are provided as goals of the army’s production and self‑sufficiency. Nonetheless, it also stipulates:
Because the army inhabits different environments, some units are responsible for only some of these, such as the twelfth and thirteenth subregions and the central Hebei region. The government still provides them with public allow‑ ances; in contrast, the Hebei‑Rehe‑Liaoning region is required to improve the living standard of its troops through production.
They [the Military District] themselves also pointed out the three special char‑ acteristics of their plan. First, the most important part of the task of production is the partial self‑sufficiency in food and daily necessities, which can raise the living standards of the troops. Second, because self‑sufficiency can be achieved only through production, it will make both the army and the individual pay attention to being thrifty. Third, “this year, they will not pass their assigned responsibility to their superior but will instead set out to solve their own difficulties and set up a revolutionary household, which will encourage the notion of self‑reliance in the army and eliminate last year’s ideas of depending on the superior and attempting to hand in less or none of their assigned production.”
The whole plan is very good, and its central spirit is the third characteristic mentioned above. In the current circumstances of facing extreme material difficulties and of engaging in dispersed fighting, it is absolutely inadmissible for the leading bodies above to assume full responsibility for material provisions. Doing so would both hamper the initiative of the vast number of personnel at the lower levels and fail to satisfy their demands. We should say, “Comrades, why don’t we all go into action and overcome our difficulties?” If the higher levels would only set the tasks well and give the lower levels a free hand to achieve self-reliance, the problem would be solved, and it would be solved in a more satisfactory way. But if the higher levels do not do this and instead always shoulder loads heavier than they can really carry, dare not to give the lower levels a free hand, and do not mobilize the enthusiasm for self-reliance among the broad masses, then the result will be difficulties at both the higher and lower levels, even with the utmost efforts by the higher levels. This problem will never be solved under the existing circumstances. The experience of the past few years has amply borne this out. The principle of “unified leadership and decentralized management” has proven to be the correct one for organizing all economic life in our liberated areas under the present conditions.
The armed forces of the liberated areas already total more than 900,000 men. To defeat the Japanese aggressors, we must increase them to several times 900,000. But so far we have received no outside aid. Even if we get it in the future, we will still have to provide for our livelihood. On that score, there must be no subjectivism whatsoever. To coordinate with the Allied countries, in the near future we will have to take the necessary number of military formations from the areas where they are now engaged in dispersed fighting and concentrate them for attack on particular objectives. Such large formations for concentrated action will not only be unable to engage in production to support themselves, they will also need large amounts of supplies from the rear. Only the local troops and formations remaining behind (and they will still be considerable) will be able both to fight and to engage in production as before. With this being the case, is there any doubt that, as long as fighting and training are not impeded, all troops without exception should take advantage of the present opportunity to learn how to thoroughly resolve the task of partial production and self-provision?
Under our circumstances, the army’s production for self-provision, though backward or retrogressive in form, is progressive in substance and of great historic significance. Formally speaking, we violate the principle of division of labor. In the present world, none of the armies in civilized countries have, can have, or should have such weird things as engaging in the production of the means of liveli‑ hood for self‑provision. However, under our circumstances—a country in poverty and disunity (the result of the crimes committed by the chief ruling clique of the Guomindang) and the protracted and dispersed people’s guerrilla war—what we are doing is progressive. Look at how pale and emaciated the Guomindang soldiers are and how robust and strong the soldiers of the liberated areas are! Look at what difficulties we ourselves had before we started production for self-provision and how much more comfortable we have been since then! Let us ask two army units here, say two companies, to choose between the two methods, that is, either the higher levels supply them with all their means of livelihood or the higher levels supply them with little or nothing but let them produce for themselves all, most, half, or even less than half of what they need. Which method will yield better results? Which would they willingly accept? After a year’s serious experiment in production for self-provision, they will surely think that the latter method yields better results, and they will accept it. They will surely think that the first method yields worse results, and they will not accept it. The reason is that the second method can improve the living conditions of everyone in the army, whereas the first method can never satisfy their needs under the present conditions of material difficulties, regardless of how hard the higher try. Because we have adopted this seemingly “backward” and “retrogressive” method, our troops are able to overcome difficulties in the means of livelihood and improve their living conditions, which means that every soldier is robust and strong. As a result, we are able to ease the tax burden on the people who are also in difficulty, thus winning their support, which allows us to support the protracted war and expand our armed forces. Thus, we can extend the liberated areas, reduce the enemy-occupied areas, and attain our objective of final victory over the invaders and the liberation of the whole of China. Isn’t the historical significance of this great?
Production by the army for self-provision has not only improved the army’s living conditions and lightened the people’s burden. Because of this, it has also enabled the expansion of the army and brought many side benefits. These side benefits are as follows:
1. It improves the relations between officers and men. Officers and men work together in production and become like brothers.
2. It strengthens the labor mentality. What we now have is neither a completely2 mercenary system nor a universal conscription system but a third system, the system of mobilization. It is better than the mercenary system since it does not have3 so many loafers, but it is not as good as the universal conscription system. (Our present conditions still only allow us to adopt the mobilization system and not the conscription system.) Since they are long-term soldiers, this system will4 lessen or put an end to the members’ labor mentality. Thus, it also creates loafers and certain bad habits characteristic of the warlord armies. But since production for self-provision began, the labor mentality has returned and the loafers have been reformed.
3. It strengthens discipline. Far from weakening discipline in battle and in army life, labor discipline in production actually strengthens it.
4. It improves relations between the army and the people. Once the army began to keep house for itself, encroachments upon the property of the people have decreased or have ended entirely. As the army and the people exchange labor and help each other in production, friendship between them is strengthened.
5. It decreases the grumbling in the army about the government and improves relations between the two.
6. It serves as an impetus to the great production campaign of the people. Once the army engages in production, production in government organs becomes more necessary and more vigorous, and the general campaign of the entire people to increase production naturally becomes more necessary and energetic.
The widespread movements for rectification and for production, which began in 1942 and 1943 respectively, have been and are still playing such a great role.5 That is, if we cannot grasp these two links, our revolutionary vehicle will not move forward.6 As we all know, among the members of the organization who joined the Party before 1937, only a few thousand are left, and most of our present 1.2 million members come from the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. They have very admirable revolutionary fervor, and they are willing to accept the training of Marxism. Nonetheless, they have brought with them ideas which do not accord or do not altogether accord with Marxism in the Party. The same is true of some people who joined the Party before 1937. This constitutes an extremely serious contradiction, an enormous difficulty. In these situations, could we have advanced smoothly if we did not carry out a widespread movement of Marxist education, meaning the Rectification movement? Obviously, we could not have. But as we have solved or are in the process of solving this contradiction—the contradiction between proletarian ideology and nonproletarian ideologies (including those of the petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie, and even the landlord class, but mainly of the petty bourgeoisie) within the Party, that is, the contradiction between Marxist ideology and non-Marxist ideologies—our Party can go forward with great, firm strides in unprecedented (though not complete) ideological, political, and organizational unity. In the final stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan7 our Party can and should grow even larger. But we can handle future development even better under the guidance of the principles of Marxist ideology.
The second link is the production movement. The War of Resistance has gone on for eight years. When it began we had food and clothing. Then things got progressively more difficult until we were in great difficulty, running short of grain, cooking oil, salt, bedding, clothing, and funds. This great difficulty and this great contradiction came in the wake of the major enemy offensives and the Guomindang government’s three large-scale struggles against the people (the “high tides of anti-communism”) from 1940 to 1942.8 Could the vehicle of our anti-Japanese struggle have progressed if we had not overcome this difficulty, solved this contradiction, and grasped this link? Obviously, it could not. But we have learned and are still learning to produce, and so we are again full of vigor and vitality. In a few years, we will not fear any enemy and will overwhelm all enemies.
Thus, there is no doubt of the historical importance of the two great movements of the spirit and the material, of rectification and production.
Let us further spread these two great movements everywhere as a foundation for the fulfillment of other tasks in our struggle. If we can do so, the final defeat of the Japanese invaders and the complete liberation of the Chinese people will be assured.
Now is the season for spring plowing. I hope that the leading comrades, the working personnel, and the masses in every liberated area will take this opportunity to grasp the link of production and achieve even greater results than last year. Greater efforts must be made this year, particularly in areas that have not yet learned to produce.
Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 9, pp. 277–83, where it is reproduced from the April 27, 1945, issue of Jiefang ribao. Text in italics, below, reflects the original text, which was removed in the revised version published in Xuanji in the 1950s; for more details, see “Variants” in “Note on Sources and Conventions,” above, pp. lxi–lxvi.
1. This Is the Year When Production and Self-Sufficiency in the Entire Army Should Be Promoted—On the Historical Importance of Rectification and Production → On the Production by the Army for Its Own Support and on the Importance of the Two Great Movements for Rectification and for Production
2. Completely → Old
3. Have → Produce
4. Since they are long-term soldiers, this system will → The mobilized soldiers have to lead an army life for a long time, which may
5. Which began in 1942 and 1943 respectively, have been and are still playing such a great role → Have played and are still playing a decisive role, the one in our ideological and the other in our material life
6. If we cannot grasp these two links, our revolutionary vehicle will not move forward → Unless we grasp these two links at the right time, we will not be able to grasp the whole chain of the revolution and our struggle will not advance
7. In the final stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan → From now on
8. From 1940 to 1942 → From 1940 to 1943