Comrade Hu Fu:1
1. I received your telegram of June 9 some time ago, and all the comrades in the Secretariat have read it. Because I have been thinking about it, I am rather late in replying.
2. We would like very much for you to come to Yan’an to participate in the Seventh Party Congress, but since the road is not safe, you should not risk it. Better to remain in the enemy’s rear and rely on our troops.
3. As for your activities, you should give first priority to your safety and then to your work. These should be the criteria by which you decide whether to stay in Shandong or to return to army headquarters.
4. There is, however, one point on which we need to consult with you. This is the question of the importance of Shandong. The situation both at home and abroad is very advantageous. There is hope that the anti-Hitler struggle will triumph in the winter of this year or the spring of next year. If this should happen, then there is real hope that Japan will be defeated in the fall or the winter of next year. The Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States have united very well, and this cannot hurt the relationship between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, which will not be very bad either. Our policy is to do our utmost to unite with the Guomindang, to find a way to improve relations between the two parties, and to emphasize that after the war is over we will still need to cooperate in national reconstruction. When the war is entirely over, the international situation will still be in the phase of democratic republics, in which various democratic forces will collaborate in a united front, so China will need all the more to go through the stage of a democratic republic before entering socialism. Under such overall international conditions, it is still possible that after the end of the war the Guomindang will cooperate with our Party. Although there is the other possibility of civil war, we should work to bring about the realization of the first possibility. Therefore, we need to take into consideration the possibility that after the defeat of Japan and the withdrawal of its forces from China, we may only be able to secure the conditions for continued cooperation between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party by concentrating the New Fourth Army and other forces from south of the Yellow River in North China, and even by concentrating the whole of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in the three provinces in the eastern provinces [Manchuria] (no need to tell anyone else this point at present). If this is the case, then Shandong will be the pivot for redeployment. At the same time, we need to take into consideration the possibility that the Guomindang may then take advantage of the situation to eliminate the New Fourth Army. If Chiang [Kaishek] moves heavy troops out of Shandong to sever the route of the New Fourth Army’s northward advance, then the New Fourth Army would be in a very dangerous situation. Hence, it is really necessary to plan ahead and to take control over Shandong and all the forces in Shandong (the 115th Division, the Mountain Column, and the Yang-Su Column) so as to create secure conditions for the northward redeployment of the New Fourth Army.
5. We request that you assume responsibility for the task of securing control over Shandong as mentioned above. As for the execution of this task, it would be most convenient for you to operate out of Shandong. However, if north Jiangsu is safer, you may also work from there. Or you may operate in Shandong for a while, then return to north Jiangsu, and finally move back to Shandong. Please make a decision on this after evaluating the situation. After you have finalized your plans, the Central Committee will notify the Central China, Shandong, and Northern bureaus to entrust you with the power to command overall affairs in Shandong and Central China.
6. The Japanese bandits are now actively preparing to launch an offensive against Jiangsu. One report puts the timing for this at the end of this month. You need to prepare to deal with this situation.
7. One of the policies of the Japanese bandits in their offensive against us is to seek out our main commanding organs for attack. The sudden attack on the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and the death of Zuo Quan are a serious lesson.2 This spring, the division headquarters of the 115th Division also encountered similar dangers. Please give this serious attention. All main leading organs and main leaders should give first priority to safety.
8. The study of the twenty-two documents in Yan’an has been very effective (10,000 cadres in Yan’an have participated in this study). In the process of study, various erroneous ideas have been discovered and corrected. The overwhelming majority of cadres say that these two months of study have been more effective than the three years of study undertaken in the past. Please pay attention to guiding this kind of study in accordance with the characteristics of life behind enemy lines. Grasping ideological leadership is the most important step in grasping leadership over everything.
Mao Zedong
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 434–36, which is based on a handwritten manuscript.
1. That is, Liu Shaoqi.
2. Japanese forces destroyed the Eighth Route Army Headquarters and killed Vice Chief of Staff Zuo Quan in an attack on the Taihang base area in May 1942.