Major General Leland Hobbs and the 14,000 soldiers of the 30th Infantry Division, “Old Hickory,” came ashore on the beaches of Normandy, France on June 11, 1944 as an untested unit. They joined British, Canadian, and American units in an effort to break out of the Normandy beachhead and defeat the German Army Group B. Over the next two months, the United States First Army Staff would change the higher headquarters of this division seven times, almost weekly, as senior leaders shifted their few combat effective divisions in an effort to penetrate the German defense line and break into the French countryside. Upon landing, the 30th Infantry Division received orders to report to XIX Corps and took its placed holding a defense line. On July 7, XIX Corps directed the division to conduct a critical canal crossing, and then halt a major German counterattack on July 11. Four days later, Major General Omar Bradley, Commander of First United States Army, began to shift his forces in preparation for Operation Cobra. July 15 would be a busy day for 30th Infantry Division. At 0540, it attacked to secure the intended line of departure for the entire operation, an offensive that continued throughout the day. That night XIX Corps sent an order transferring the division to VII Corps effective at 2400 hours. Completing the change during the night, Hobbs resumed the offensive at 1000 the following morning under his new corps leadership.{1} The division participated as one of the lead divisions in Cobra, which included the infamous short dropping of bombs that resulted in sixty-four killed and three hundred and seventy-four wounded in two days.{2} Despite this loss, Hobbs and his troops achieved all of their assigned objectives. As the successful breakout became exploitation, the 30th Infantry Division changed back to XIX Corps control on July 28. Six days later, it joined V Corps control and the next day subsequently to VII Corps as the army level adjusted forces in an attempt to encircle German army. By August 13, the division returned to XIX Corps control, where it replaced 1st Infantry Division around St. Barthelmy, France and repulse the German counterattack aimed at Avranches at Mortain.{3}
During this entire period, the 30th Infantry Division was constantly in contact, conducting offensive missions, defending against enemy counter-attacks, or clearing areas of remaining enemy soldiers. Despite his ever-changing corps headquarters, Hobbs never required an operational pause to integrate with his new command. This division performed extraordinarily well, especially considering the conditions. Colonel S.L.A. Marshall, the European Theater Command Historian, wrote a letter to Hobbs in 1946, stating he and thirty other command historians studying the European Theater campaigns recommended that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, recognize the 30th Infantry Division as the top ranked division based upon its flawless combat record.{4} However, it was far from the only division to undergo multiple task organization changes while in combat. In the period between June and October 1944, there were nine changes of corps alignment under United States armies and no less than sixty-five changes of division alignment under corps.{5} The American way of war in World War II relied upon this organizational flexibility.
Changing task organization was, and is, not an easy mission. The linkage between a unit and its higher headquarters entails a significant shift in the mechanics that run modern mechanized armies. A commander must understand the capabilities and limitations of the units he directs, and this understanding does not come from briefing charts on manpower numbers, combat power, or operational readiness rates. History is replete with examples where the human element has played a large role determining victory or defeat. The morale of the unit, personality of the senior leaders, and capability of junior leaders often have a decisive effect upon a battle—all of which require time for a commander to gain appreciation for new units working for him.{6}
For the staffs, changes in task organization could be even more disruptive. Staffs must share common procedures in order to transmit orders, receive reports, collect and disseminate intelligence, and coordinate fire support. From the simple problems of format and suspenses for reports, to the more important tasks of linking requirements to capabilities, smooth staff interoperability is integral for the functioning of modern armies. The exchange of liaison officers plays a huge role in coordination between units. In times of limited communications and fast moving battles, these liaison officers represented their commanders in decision-making, planning, and tracking of the battle. Sustaining modern armies requires a substantial supply system, especially when further complicated by keeping up with fast moving and changing chains of command. Logistics is typically the most critical factor in determining operational reach and preventing culmination. Establishing and maintaining communications systems among all of these units was also a major challenge. The technology available in 1944 relied primarily upon wire based communications, especially at the division and above levels. Each change of relationship required rerouting circuits and establishing new lines, which takes time and effort. Without these communications, staffs would be unable to coordinate the complex command, control, and support requirements of the modern battlefield. Despite the complicated nature of task organization changes, army and corps commanders in the European Theater of Operations still directed changes on a regular basis without losing combat effectiveness. This paper seeks to explain how they made this possible.{7}
The United States’ entry into World War II presented the nation’s military leadership with a number of significant challenges, and their solutions would be in line with the perception of an American way of war. The experiences of the previous war affected every senior leader, whether they had served or not. The First World War led American officers to believe French and British methods were incompatible with their vision of modern warfare. The problems faced with fire support, logistics, tactics, and command and control of large unit operations in Aisne-Marne and Meuse-Argonne drove the development of United States Army doctrine and education during the interwar years in a distinctly American way of warfare.{8} The shadow of the First World War and tribulations of the interwar years steered senior leader decision making when preparing for the next war. Starting in 1940, they transformed an army of 120,000 regular soldiers with no practical experience operating in units above the regimental level into a combat effective force of nearly eight million in army groups operating across the globe. The War Department created new large unit organizations, trained thousands of citizens to serve as commanders and staff officers, and developed strategic and operational plans for defeating the Axis forces in every imaginable environment. They faced enemy forces that had years of combat experience and had already defeated nearly every other army in battle with superior tactics and equipment. One of the major factors that contributed to the success of the American army was organizational flexibility. This flexibility enabled commanders to exploit opportunities by shifting units where needed. The infantry division was the basic combined arms unit in the army’s concept for large unit employment. The division was self-sustaining and capable of fighting independently.{9} A decision to limit the total army to ninety divisions in order to preserve the nation’s industrial capacity resulted in the limited availability of combat ready divisions for planning and executing operations throughout the war.{10} The decision to land in Normandy, France, added more operational limitations driven by terrain and ports available. Once the Allies broke out of the bocage of Normandy, the front expanded eastward without a natural break creating a widening and contiguous battlefield unlike experienced in any other theater. Western Europe geography forced commanders to deal with the problems of massing combat power on this expanding front with limited experienced divisions and regular introduction of untested new divisions from the limited ports in the rear. The solution, more often than not, required shifting division and corps task organization to ensure overwhelming combat power at decisive points. Commanders at the army group, army, and corps levels moved units around frequently, particularly in preparation for an operation. Many divisions changed corps assignments four times in the three-month period. Even corps moved between armies, with VIII Corps reporting to three different army headquarters in October 1944 alone.{11} Senior leaders must have believed the benefits of making these changes outweighed the inherent risks.
Remarkably, neither participants nor historians have emphasized, studied, or analyzed how they achieved this flexibility in task organization. Many historians have studied the transformation from a peacetime army into a dominant mechanized combat force. The distinguished historian, Russell Weigley in Eisenhower’s Lieutenants set the standard for many historians by analyzing the application of American military thought during the interwar period through what he terms as the “American army’s greatest campaign.”{12} Peter Schifferle explores the role the Fort Leavenworth military education system had in preparing the future leaders of the army for positions as division, corps, army, and army group leaders in his book America’s School for War. Michael R. Matheny expands that study to include the entire military school system, focusing on the role of the service war colleges in developing operational artists in his book Carrying the War to the Enemy. Carlo D’Este in Decision in Normandy, Peter R. Mansoor in The GI Offensive in Europe, David W. Hogan Jr. in A Command Post at War, Michael D. Doubler in Closing with the Enemy, James Jay Carafano in After D-Day, and Edward G. Miller in Nothing Less than Full Victory all have variations on this general theme of transformation from frontier or third rate army into the ruling world power on the plains of Europe. {13} All of these historians note the task organization changes, often crediting them with providing the decisive combat power at the right moment. However, none comments on how they were able to accomplish this feat.
The biographies and autobiographies of many of the American leaders confirm the view that the transformation was both remarkable and successful. General Omar N. Bradley, General George S. Patton III, General J. Lawton Collins, and Lieutenant General Troy H. Middleton all credit the interwar period for influencing their ability to lead large units, and specifically the Army school system for influencing their personal development and success. Each of them felt a great deal of pride in the performance of the United States Army in Europe and the effectiveness of the American way of war. They often mention task organization changes, sometimes in reference to a conference or decision, but like the historians, they do not address the complexity or impact of making the changes. {14}Although these historians and participants approach and examine the American experience in Europe from different perspectives, they agree that the United States Army had succeeded in building a capable force by the fall of 1944. They all address the task organization changes in a similar fashion; mentioning the changes briefly in passing, usually while linking the arrival of a new unit with the success in a particular battle. They seem to accept that the units were able to execute quickly and without significant effort, ignoring the inherent complexity of the task. While both historians and participants recognize flexibility was critical to massing combat power, none examined what was necessary to support that flexibility.
The United States Army built a citizen-based army in less than three years and executed complicated task organization changes on a routine basis in combat. What factors enabled the US Army to execute rapid task organization changes during combat at the corps and division levels during World War II? This level of flexibility could have come from a standing professional army well versed in large unit operations, but the army that landed on the beaches of Normandy was heavily reliant upon citizens turned soldiers. Another method could have been a rigid command and control system that expected every unit to operate like part of a machine—interchangeable and lockstep in following orders. This does not describe the United States’ philosophy of mission command and initiative that was clearly in place. Determining the factors that enabled this success can guide current and future force development.
If our nation calls on our army to execute combined arms maneuver operations today, the current operational concept relies upon brigade combat teams to demonstrate the same flexibility in task organization. Today’s brigade combat teams operate under different divisions as our predecessors did in World War II with divisions under corps. With similar limitations on force structure, it will be critical that these units be able to integrate with new division headquarters on the move and maintain the initiative. This flexibility will enable commanders to maintain the initiative and exploit operational opportunities as they present themselves. Much like the army of the inter-war period, there will be little opportunity for brigade combat teams and divisions to practice this kind of organizational flexibility in field exercises. Thus, we must turn to history to identify the factors that enabled previous success.
The United States Army was successful in making rapid task organization changes during World War II in the European Theater of Operations because of a combination of three factors. First, during the interwar period Regular Army officers established a common doctrinal foundation built through professional education and stable doctrine. The professional officers who served as trainers and cadre for the expanding army were able to draw upon both their experience and published manuals to train the new units. Second, only the best officers commanded divisions, corps, and armies. General George C. Marshall, United States Army Chief of Staff throughout the war, personally led the process that ensured the selection of high quality commanders and primary staff at the corps and division level. Finally, the army built an organizational structure designed to support rapid task organization. Reflecting upon their experience in the First World War and interwar years, returning leaders carefully planned the design of large units that would support operational employment concepts of fire and maneuver. When units were able to combine common doctrine, great leadership, and effective organizational structure, commanders gained the flexibility to respond to battlefield changes and exploit opportunities.