Task organization changes at the division and corps level was a common factor of the battlefield of Europe in 1944. The ability to shift forces allowed commanders a great deal of flexibility in application of combat power that contributed to the Allied success against the German Army. This monograph proposes that this flexibility was intentionally built into the American way of war and imbedded in the doctrine and training of high quality leaders who led organizations designed to facilitate the rapid reorganization in combat. Without this flexibility, the American forces would not have been able to conduct the breakout from Normandy, the pursuit across France, or set the conditions that ultimately led to the defeat of Nazi Germany.
The American Army operated off a common doctrinal understanding that allowed interoperability between commanders and staffs. The Army built the doctrine upon the lessons of the First World War and it remained relatively stable during the decades between wars. The doctrine stressed the importance of fire and maneuver with combined arms formations. It also promoted the concept of mission type orders. Instead of detailing the movements of subordinate leaders and establishing elaborate controls to make decisions at the highest level, the American system enforced pushing initiative down the chain of command by focusing on subordinates being told what needed to be done and not how to accomplish the mission. With a demanding and progressive school system, the entire officer corps learned and put the doctrine to use in practical exercises designed to push their limits. This school system became a major part of the officer management system, separating those with potential for high command from those without.
In this type of system, the role of officers, especially senior leaders, was critical. The peacetime cadre army had to expand quickly, and choosing the right people for command was a major task. The Regular Army officers became the base upon which the rest of the army was built. Highly sought after, they would fill the vast majority of senior level commands, nearly all critical staff positions above the regimental level, and were responsible for training the influx of National Guard and volunteer officers. General Marshall also sought and received the power to promote and separate officers, allowing him to shape the officer corps toward his mold of combat focused leaders. He personally led the effort to select division and above commanders, reflecting his belief that quality commanders were necessary to maintain the discipline and drive necessary to beat the highly professional German Army. These senior commanders, nearly all who knew each other from the peacetime army, were able to quickly integrate themselves into new formations because of their tactical competence, leadership ability, and existing personal relationships. This focus on quality of commanders does not however negate the importance of the staff, particularly the liaison officers and dual hatted staff officers who were critical in integrating units as they moved between headquarters.
The final factor that this monograph studied was the organization of the Army itself. The division was a self-contained unit and the primary unit for tactical operations. The corps served as a tactical headquarters, designed to accept attachments of divisions and support units based upon the mission parameters for each operation. Without any administrative responsibilities, the corps became the key fighting organization on the battlefield fully engaged with managing the combined arms fight. The success of task organization lay in the ability of the corps to integrate new divisions rapidly and effectively. Picking up the responsibility for managing the sustainment and allocation of divisions based upon the strategic maneuver plan was the army. Army commanders managed huge systems, concentrated on maintaining momentum and tempo while leaving the tactical fight to the corps commanders. Innovations developed in the interwar years allowed the artillery community to mass fires and allocate firing units in support of the army commander’s priorities. Removing administrative responsibility from the corps headquarters simplified the process of moving divisions between units, as the divisions drew from army and theater level support directly. Finally, the ability of the Signal Corps to maintain the wire communications networks between headquarters was a critical enabler of the entire system.
The conclusions of this monograph are based upon a very specific study of American divisions and corps during the first few months of operation on the continent of Europe during World War II. It is possible that the study of different echelons, time periods, or theaters would bring additional factors to light. It was also biased by the sources available at the Eisenhower Presidential Library and the Combined Army Research Library. However, the period studied does offer some unique factors that argue that it may be the best time and location to study. The geography of western France and the introduction of new divisions into the fight on a regular basis presented the American Army with a situation in which they had to be flexible in their task organization. The other option would have been to stand up new corps with untested divisions and then conduct passage of lines as units culminated or spread out from the narrow breakout point—not a good option for many reasons. While not a complete study, this monograph may serve as the basis for further investigation.
The breakout from France was also one of the most challenging operational problems of the war. How to allocate forces and weight the main effort is a major component of operational art, and this monograph presents the implication that in order for a commander to have options, the institution must build that flexibility into its education, personnel, and organizational plans. Doctrine is only good if those who will implement it understand and can apply it. Constantly changing terms and concepts defeat any efforts to indoctrinate the officer corps. The Army school system must also be the intellectual center of gravity for the institution. Every level of schooling is an opportunity to not only build the skills of the student, but also should serve to identify future leaders. Especially during interwar periods, the schools must be rigorous and competitive. Finally, the Army must design the roles and systems to support rapid task organization, as flexibility in combat is constrained to a great deal by how units are designed.
The Army is currently facing major changes. The past ten years have challenged many traditional beliefs, radically altering our doctrinal foundation, and undergoing a massive transformation in our organization. Some of these changes are very good. The brigade combat team is now a self-contained combined arms team along the lines of the World War II division. The effort to add a third maneuver battalion and additional engineer support will only strengthen this role. There is a clear parallel in doctrine between the flexibility of the World War II corps headquarters and the current divisions. Division headquarters are designed to integrate brigade combat teams allocated for specific missions much like the corps did for divisions and other enablers. The division also lacks the ability to provide direct logistics support—a factor that many today lament, but this study suggests is a positive attribute. The emphasis on mission command philosophy directly reflects the intent behind mission type orders, one of the key factors driving flexible task organization. However, there are also trends that the Army should seriously examine as we reset. The lack of stability in doctrine threatens the ability of the officer corps to operate with a common understanding. As Combined Arms Center Commander, Lieutenant General David Perkins acknowledged this challenge, and there is an effort with the Army Doctrine 2015 to stabilize the big concepts and get a big information push out to the force.{210} Ensuring the quality of the officer corps is also a big concern. The decision to return to selective Command and General Staff Course is a good first step, but it must be matched with an effort to raise the standards in that school to in order to challenge the students and identify the most capable. Changing the culture of the Army to encourage high quality active duty instructors will be very difficult. Our current organization also fails to allocate sufficient personnel to serve as liaison officers, requiring units to support the job out of hide, typically from whoever is available instead of making a conscious decision on who would be best suited. Another concept worth revisiting is the dual-hatting of staff officers with command responsibility for technical branches.
With the elimination of signal, military intelligence, and military police units at the brigade and division level, this dual-hatting system may offer a solution to the challenges of training and administration of these small specialty units. Assigning both staff and command responsibility to intelligence and signal corps officers may provide the training, readiness, and oversight currently lacking. Our current organization also relies heavily upon the concept of pooling critical resources, a concept that had mixed results in World War II and deserves its own in depth analysis to identify ways to improve our current system. Reducing the capabilities, particularly of engineer, anti-armor, and communications assets at the brigade combat team and division is likely to have negative effects on the next battlefield. The challenges of the Field Artillery community to provide mass fires is a major topic, with many monographs and articles discussing that problem, yet consensus of the solution eludes us. Finally, the rigidity of our current communications networks does not facilitate the rapid movement and task organization flexibility that is necessary. Designed to support large static headquarters, the Warfighter Information Network—Tactical must undergo significant changes to become the mobile and flexible network needed. In a time of decreasing funding, the research and equipment to make this happen is unlikely. However, just as the Signal Corps overcame the constraints of the wired network, our current Signal Corps soldiers can overcome the technical limitations of their equipment if given the opportunity and incentive to train for the mission. The effect of providing each unit with their own communications assets has greatly improved their capability, but the responsibility of establishing communications links from higher to lower, which remains in doctrine, is in need of reinvigoration. Attacking these challenges should be a major focus of the United States Army in the coming years. Regaining the flexibility that proved dominate in World War II is critical—not only does our doctrine still rely upon it, it is fundamentally what makes our Army more capable than any other force in the world.