ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

Critique of Judgement

Preface

Introduction

    I. The division of philosophy

   II. The realm of philosophy in general

  III. The critique of judgement as a means of connecting the two parts of philosophy in a whole

  IV. Judgement as a faculty by which laws are prescribed a priori

   V. The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle of judgement

  VI. The association of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of the purposiveness of nature

 VII. The aesthetic representation of the purposiveness of nature

VIII. The logical representation of the purposiveness of nature

  IX. The connecting of the legislations of understanding and reason by means of judgement

    PART I. CRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

FIRST SECTION Analytic of aesthetic judgement

First book. Analytic of the beautiful

First moment of the judgement of taste: moment of quality

§ 1. The judgement of taste is aesthetic

§ 2. The delight which determines the judgement of taste is independent of all interest

§ 3. Delight in the agreeable is coupled with interest

§ 4. Delight in the good is coupled with interest

§ 5. Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of delight

Second moment of the judgement of taste: moment of quantity

§ 6. The beautiful is that which, apart from concepts, is represented as the object of a universal delight

§ 7. Comparison of the beautiful with the agreeable and the good by means of the above characteristic

§ 8. In a judgement of taste the universality of delight is only represented as subjective

§ 9. Investigation of the question whether in a judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging of the object or the latter precedes the former

Third moment of judgements of taste: moment of the relation of the ends brought under review in such judgements

§ 10. Purposiveness in general

§ 11. The sole foundation of the judgement of taste is the form of purposiveness of an object (or mode of representing it)

§ 12. The judgement of taste rests upon a priori grounds

§ 13. The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion

§ 14. Elucidation by means of examples

§ 15. The judgement of taste is entirely independent of the concept of perfection

§ 16. A judgement of taste by which an object is described as beautiful under the condition of a determinate concept is not pure

§ 17. The ideal of beauty

Fourth moment of the judgement of taste: moment of the modality of the delight in the object

§ 18. Character of the modality in a judgement of taste

§ 19. The subjective necessity attributed to a judgement of taste is conditioned

§ 20. The condition of the necessity advanced by a judgement of taste is the idea of a common sense

§ 21. Have we any ground for presupposing a common sense?

§ 22. The necessity of the universal assent that is thought in a judgement of taste, is a subjective necessity which, under the presupposition of a common sense, is represented as objective

General remark on the first section of the analytic

Second book. Analytic of the sublime

§ 23. Transition from the faculty of judging the beautiful to that of judging the sublime

§ 24. On the division of an investigation of the feeling of the sublime

A. The mathematically sublime

§ 25. Definition of the term ‘sublime’

§ 26. The estimation of the magnitude of natural things requisite for the idea of the sublime

§ 27. Quality of the delight in the judging of the sublime

B. The dynamically sublime in nature

§ 28. Nature as might

§ 29. Modality of the judgement on the sublime in nature

General remark upon the exposition of aesthetic reflective judgements 96

Deduction of pure aesthetic judgements

§ 30. The deduction of aesthetic judgements upon objects of nature must not be directed to what we call sublime in nature, but only to the beautiful

§ 31. Of the method of the deduction of judgements of taste

§ 32. First peculiarity of the judgement of taste

§ 33. Second peculiarity of the judgement of taste

§ 34. An objective principle of taste is not possible

§ 35. The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the general power of judgement

§ 36. The problem of a deduction of judgements of taste

§ 37. What exactly it is, that is asserted a priori of an object in a judgement of taste

§ 38. Deduction of judgements of taste

Remark

§ 39. The communicability of a sensation

§ 40. Taste as a kind of sensus communis

§ 41. The empirical interest in the beautiful

§ 42. The intellectual interest in the beautiful

§ 43. Art in general

§ 44. Fine art

§ 45. Fine art is an art, so far as it has at the same time the appearance of being nature

§ 46. Fine art is the art of genius

§ 47. Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of genius

§ 48. The relation of genius to taste

§ 49. The faculties of the mind which constitute genius

§ 50. The combination of taste and genius in products of fine art

§ 51. The division of the fine arts

§ 52. The combination of the fine arts in one and the same product

§ 53. Comparison of the aesthetic worth of the fine arts

§ 54. Remark

SECOND SECTION Dialectic of aesthetic judgement

§ 55.

§ 56. Representation of the antinomy of taste

§ 57. Solution of the antinomy of taste

Remark 1

Remark 2

§ 58. The idealism of the purposiveness of both nature and art, as the unique principle of aesthetic judgement

§ 59. Beauty as the symbol of morality

§ 60. Appendix. The methodology of taste

PART II. CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGEMENT

§ 61. The objective purposiveness of nature

FIRST DIVISION Analytic of teleological judgement

§ 62. Purely formal, as distinguished from material, objective purposiveness

§ 63. The relative, as distinguished from the intrinsic, purposiveness of nature

§ 64. The distinctive character of things considered as natural ends

§ 65. Things considered as natural ends are organisms

§ 66. The principle on which the intrinsic purposiveness in organisms is judged

§ 67. The principle on which nature in general is judged teleologically as a system of ends

§ 68. The principle of teleology considered as an inherent principle of natural science

SECOND DIVISION Dialectic of teleological judgement

§ 69. What is an antinomy of judgement?

§ 70. Exposition of this antinomy

§ 71. Introduction to the solution of the above antinomy

§ 72. The various kinds of systems dealing with the purposiveness of nature

§ 73. None of the above systems does what it professes to do

§ 74. The impossibility of treating the concept of a technic of nature dogmatically springs from the inexplicability of a natural end

§ 75. The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical principle of reason for the use of reflective judgement

§ 76. Remark

§ 77. The peculiarity of human understanding that makes the concept of a natural end possible for us

§ 78. The union of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter with the teleological principle in the technic of nature

APPENDIX Theory of the method of teleological judgement

§ 79. Whether teleology must be treated as a branch of natural science

§ 80. The necessary subordination of the principle of mechanism to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing regarded as a natural end

§ 81. The association of mechanism with the teleological principle which we apply to the explanation of a natural end considered as a product of nature

§ 82. The teleological system in the extrinsic relations of organisms

§ 83. The ultimate end of nature as a teleological system

§ 84. The final end of the existence of the world, that is, of creation itself

§ 85. Physico-theology

§ 86. Ethico-theology

Remark

§ 87. The moral proof of the existence of God

§ 88. Limitation of the validity of the moral proof

Remark

§ 89. The use of the moral argument

§ 90. The type of assurance in a teleological proof of the existence of God

§ 91. The type of assurance produced by a practical faith

General remark on teleology

APPENDIX. THE ‘FIRST INTRODUCTION’ TO THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT

    I. Philosophy as a system

   II. The system of the higher cognitive faculties which lies at the basis of philosophy

  III. The system of all the faculties of the human mind

  IV. Experience as a system for the power of judgement

   V. The reflective power of judgement

  VI. The purposiveness of natural forms as so many particular systems

 VII. The technic of the power of judgement as the ground of the idea of a technic of nature

VIII. The aesthetic of the faculty of judging

  IX. Teleological judging

   X. The search for a principle of the technical power of judgement

  XI. The encyclopedic introduction of the critique of judgement into the system of the critique of pure reason

 XII. The division of the critique of judgement