◆ FOUR ◆

Economic Espionage Cases

During the Cold War, the Soviet KGB’s Directorate T and its Line X officers were noted foes of Western export controls and high-tech industries. Every year (with particularly notable success in 1980), they acquired thousands of technology samples, finished products, and other materials from the United States and its allies. These were clandestine transactions unlikely to have been approved for sale to the Soviet Union.¹

In comparison to Russia’s classic centrally controlled system for acquiring foreign technology, China’s effort has some parallels but is unsurprisingly unique, including an element of post-Mao, Deng Xiaoping–inspired entrepreneurialism.

Beijing operates a centrally directed system that pursues technology through both open and clandestine means. Acquisition, control, and distribution efforts meet the science and technology development targets of the moment, both military and civilian—many are openly stated in the goals of the current PRC Five-Year Plan and in the now-famous Made in China 2025 program. At the same time Beijing allows other PRC organizations to pursue their own technology acquisition operations, all intended to help China catch up with and even surpass the West. It is an ambition with echoes from the past: the Self-Strengthening movement of the late Qing and the Great Leap Forward under Mao Zedong. However, Made in China 2025 is blessed with more rational and detailed planning.

A substantial part of today’s catch-up effort is focused on open-source material that is publicly available in scientific journals and other publications. But the economic espionage cases outlined below were clandestine until discovered by law enforcement—a mix of operations run by CCP intelligence organs and those conducted independently by state-owned enterprises and overseas organizations, and even more independently by students and entrepreneurs.² However, we argue that evidence does not point to a “grains of sand” approach enlisting tens of thousands of ordinary Chinese in a worldwide effort. Rather, PRC technology acquisition is a hybrid phenomenon that is mostly secret and not made semipublic by calling upon all ethnic Chinese to pitch in. It includes both professional intelligence officers in clandestine operations (see Chung Dongfan below and Mak Chi in chapter 6) and Chinese state-owned enterprises running their own operations.

Beijing Dabeinong Technology Group
(大北农集团/北京大北农生物技术有限公司)

The Beijing Dabeinong Technology Group (DBN Group) and its subsidiary Kings Nower Seed Company were implicated in the theft of several strands of inbred seed lines from Monsanto, Pioneer, and LG Seeds. At least some of the indicted individuals were investigated under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), suggesting the FBI presented evidence to the FISA court that linked the DBN Group directly to the Chinese state. A Chinese government investment fund owned a 1.08 percent stake in the publicly listed company, according to an affidavit authored by a scholar at the University of Iowa, and the company also has the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committee as part of its governance structure. In 2012 the DBN Group received a government grant to support research into a cornfocused genetic engineering project.³ The company’s website claims it has more than 18,000 employees and 67 subsidiaries; it is headquartered in the Haidian district of Beijing at Number 2 Yuanmingyuan West Road.⁴

Cai Bo (arrested 2013, pleaded guilty 2014) and Cai Wentong (arrested 2014, pleaded guilty 2014)

Cai Bo was a Chinese national working at an unnamed PRC-based technology company. He and his cousin Cai Wentong, a Chinese national doing graduate studies at Iowa State University, attempted to export a controlled sensor with military applications from the United States to China. The angular rate sensors that the Cai cousins tried to acquire are used for line-of-sight stabilization and precision motion control systems. Cai Bo wanted to acquire the sensors on behalf of a Chinese client and contacted his cousin Cai Wentong to make inquiries. This put him in contact with an undercover federal agent who arranged for a December 2013 meeting in New Mexico with both of the cousins. In addition to the transfer of a sensor into the Cais’ hands, the meeting was used to plot how to smuggle the sensors to China and was used as the basis for the charges against the Cais.⁵ Cai Bo was sentenced to two years in prison and deportation following his release.⁶

Capener, Janice Kuang
(arrested 2012, pleaded guilty 2014)

Janice Kuang Capener was a Chinese national and employee at the Ningbo, Zhejiang, facility of a Utah-based irrigation company who stole trade secrets from her firm for Chinese competitors. Capener worked for Orbit Irrigation Products between 2003 and 2009—including as chief of operations for the company’s manufacturing plant in China—and stole sales and pricing information to help her own company, Sunhills International LLC, and Zhejiang Hongchen Irrigation Equipment Company. They intended to undermine Orbit’s market position based on the illegally gained knowledge of the company’s pricing structures. Initially, a second Chinese national, Luo Jun, faced charges, but they were dismissed in 2012 shortly after the indictment was unsealed. In 2014, Capener was sentenced to 90 days in prison, 2 years of supervised release, and a $3,000 fine.⁷

Chan Kwan-chun “Jenny”
(arrested 2004, pleaded guilty 2005)

Chan Kwan-chun was a naturalized U.S. citizen and the controller of Manten Electronics, a New Jersey company that shipped approximately $400,000 worth of military-grade electronics to China without the required export license between 2003 and 2004. She is the wife of Chen Haoli (also known as Ali Chan). The electronic components shipped to Chinese research institutes played important roles within a variety of defense systems ranging from electronic warfare to missiles. Chan was sentenced to six months of home confinement as part of a two-year probation. Manten also forfeited the revenue from the illegal sales.⁸

Chang Huanling “Alice” (pleaded guilty 2014)

Chang Huanling was a Taiwanese national who attempted to export crystal methamphetamine from Taiwan to the United States and subsequently asked undercover FBI agents about the possibility of acquiring sensitive defense technology on behalf of a Chinese intelligence service. Chang’s partner in this endeavor was Shen Huisheng. In a series of conversations beginning in 2012, Shen and Chang sought to acquire information on the E-2 Hawkeye reconnaissance aircraft, the stealth technology used in the F-22, missile engine technology, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The two sent the undercover agents a codebook to protect their communications and set up a Hong Kong bank account to handle related transactions.⁹ In 2015 Chang was sentenced to time served and a $200 special assessment.¹⁰

Chang York-Yuan
(arrested 2010, suspended sentence 2010)

Chang York-Yuan (also known as David Zhang) was a naturalized U.S. citizen and businessman who attempted to transfer restricted defense technology to a research institute affiliated with the giant Chinese state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC). Chang and his wife, Huang Leping, were co-owners of General Technology Systems Integration, Inc. (GTSI), based in Ontario, California. In 2009 GTSI entered into contracts with the Sichuan Institute of Solid-State Circuits—also known as the CETC Twenty-fourth Research Institute—to design and export two kinds of high-performance analog-to-digital converters. Under Chang and Huang’s direction, GTSI hired two engineers to work on this project. Huang and Chang both separately lied to federal agents, telling them that this project had been cancelled after the two engineers were contacted by federal authorities in relation to the legality of the project, which would have required valid export licenses because the converters had national security applications.¹¹ Chang was sentenced to five years of probation.¹²

Chao Tah-wei (arrested 2008, pleaded guilty 2009)

Chao Tah-wei was a Chinese national and Beijing resident who attempted to export thermal-imaging cameras illegally to China. Chao and his coconspirator Guo Zhiyong were arrested at Los Angeles International Airport with a total of ten export-controlled, thermal-imaging cameras, manufactured by FLIR Systems, hidden in their luggage. Chao also shipped three similar cameras to Guo in October 2007 for which he earned a $900 commission. The ultimate consignees were the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the People’s Armed Police. Chao pleaded guilty and was sentenced to twenty months’ imprisonment.¹³

Chao Tze (indicted 2012, pleaded guilty 2012)

Chao Tze, a scientist at DuPont from 1966 to 2002, provided his former company’s proprietary information as part of his consulting work for the Chinese firm Pangang Group. Chao began consulting for Pangang Group in 2003. Also, see Walter Liew.

Chen Haoli (arrested 2004, pleaded guilty 2005)

Chen Haoli (also known as Ali Chan), the husband of Chan Kwan-chun, was implicated in Manten Electronics’ export control violations. Chen was sentenced to thirty months in prison followed by two years of supervised release.¹⁴ Also, see Chan Kwan-chun “Jenny.”

Chen Xiuling “Linda” (arrested 2004, pleaded guilty 2005)

Chen, a naturalized U.S. citizen and the spouse of Xu Weibo, was the purchasing agent of Manten Electronics. For conspiracy to violate U.S. export control laws, Chen was sentenced to eighteen months in prison followed by two years of supervised release.¹⁵ Also, see Chan Kwan-chun “Jenny.”

Cheng, George K. (arrested 1998, convicted 1999)

George Cheng was a Taiwanese national and U.S. permanent resident who shipped military equipment illegally to China in the 1990s. Cheng operated Telecomp Materials Recycling, a scrap metal company in New York. Prior to his arrest in 1998, U.S. authorities warned him several times as early as 1991 about possible export control violations. The military equipment he was charged with attempting to export without a license included navigational systems for the F-117 stealth fighter, thirty-five components for the navigational system of the F-111 fighter/bomber, tubes for the Navy’s electronic warfare jamming devices, and hundreds of spare parts for M-16 and M-41 combat tanks.¹⁶ In 1999 a federal court sentenced Cheng to two years in prison.

Cheng, Philip (indicted 2004, pleaded guilty 2006)

Philip Cheng, in collaboration with Martin Shih, attempted to circumvent export controls on night vision equipment for military use by establishing a company, SPCTEK, to hide their activities. The pair tried to manufacture the night vision equipment made by Shih’s company, Night Vision Technology, in China. An informant tipped off U.S. authorities that Cheng and Shih would submit false end user documents claiming Taiwan as the destination while diverting the night vision cameras to China. Shih died of cancer before trial. Cheng was sentenced to two years in jail with a $50,000 fine.¹⁷ Also see Shih, Martin.

Cheng Yongqing (arrested 2001, pleaded guilty 2005)

Cheng Yongqing, a naturalized U.S. citizen and vice president of Village Networks, conspired with Lin Hai and Xu Kai to steal proprietary software from Lucent Technologies. Specifically, Cheng and his coconspirators attempted to acquire switching software associated with Lucent’s PathStar Access Server. The three men were starting their own company, ComTriad Technologies, in partnership with Datang Telecommunication Technology Industry Group, and they received between $500,000 and $1.2 million in startup capital from their Chinese partner. Cheng, Lin, and Xu originally sought venture capital financing in the United States but approached Datang after their U.S. interlocutors asked to see the product specifications based on the stolen Lucent software. In April 2001 the three electronically transferred their modifications on the Lucent PathStar software to China, presumably to Datang.¹⁸ Cheng and Xu Kai avoided prison time as part of their plea agreement in 2005, but ComTriad paid a $250,000 fine.¹⁹

China Association for International Exchange of Personnel
(中国国际人才交流协会)

See the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs (SAFEA).

China Electronics Technology Group Corporation
(中国电子科技集团公司)

The China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) is one of China’s leading defense industrial groups, overseeing a vast network of 150,000 employees, 18 state key laboratories, and 14 provincial- or ministerial-level key laboratories distributed across 18 provinces. CETC was formed in 2002 out of the research laboratories and enterprises administered by the now-defunct Ministry of Information Industries.²⁰ Three of CETC’s research institutes—but not the organization as a whole—are on the U.S. Entity List for organizations that require additional licensing procedures to trade in specified items in the United States or with U.S. companies: the Fifty-fourth Research Institute in Shijiazhuang (also known as the Communication, Telemetry, and Telecontrol Research Institute), the Twenty-ninth Research Institute in Chengdu (also known as the Southwest Research Institute of Electronics Technology), and the Eleventh Research Institute in Beijing (also known as the North China Research Institute of Electro-Optics). All three research institutes and their subsidiaries have “presumption of denial” listed as their policy review guidance.²¹

China General Nuclear Power Group
(中国广核集团)

The China General Nuclear Power Group (CGNPG), formerly known as the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Company (CGNPC), is one of China’s two major nuclear power companies. As a state-owned enterprise, CGNPG is administered by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. In addition to the company’s nuclear energy business, CGNPG also operates wind, hydro, and solar power facilities. In 2016, the company and Allen Ho, an American nuclear engineer, were charged in U.S. courts for “conspiracy to unlawfully engage and participate in the production and development of special nuclear material outside the United States, without the required authorization from the U.S. Department of Energy.” Conviction occurred in 2017.²²

China International Talent Exchange Foundation
(中国国际人才交流基金会)

See the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs (SAFEA).

Chung, Dongfan “Greg” (arrested 2008, convicted 2009)

Dongfan “Greg” Chung, an aerospace engineer at Rockwell International (1973–96) and Boeing (1996–2006), was convicted of passing trade secrets related to the space shuttle, the C-17 military transport aircraft, and the Delta IV rocket. The indictment against him alleged Chung may have passed information related to the B-1 bomber. He held a secret clearance at the time of his arrest. Chung’s motivation largely was to assist his home country, and he started receiving letters from officials in the Chinese aviation industry as early as 1979.²³ Chung was convicted in 2009 and sentenced to fifteen years in prison for passing trade secrets to assist the Chinese aviation industry. The investigative lead developed out of the Chi Mak case (see Mak, Chi, chapter 6), because an official from the Chinese Ministry of Aviation requested Chung pass his communications and materials through Mak’s wife in the late 1980s. Chung’s name was found on documents found in the Mak family residence.²⁴

Datang Telecommunication Technology Industry Group
(大唐电信科技产业集团)

Datang Telecommunication is one of China’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturers alongside such companies as Huawei and ZTE. Datang is most known for its development of TD-SCDMA, an alternative Chinese standard for 3G mobile phones used by China Mobile, and TD-LTE, an alternative 4G standard. Datang benefitted from stolen switching software from Lucent Technology in 2000, but no evidence appeared in the legal proceedings against Cheng Yongqing, Lin Hai, and Xu Kai to suggest Datang knew it was receiving stolen software.²⁵

Ding Zhengxing (arrested 2008, sentenced 2009)

Ding Zhengxing attempted to purchase and illegally export amplifiers that are export-controlled for military purposes (for digital radios and wireless area networks). Ding and his colleague Yang Su were arrested in Saipan, where they planned to take possession of the purchased amplifiers. A third person, Peter Zhu of Shanghai Meuro Electronics Company, was not caught. Ding was sentenced to forty-six months in prison after pleading guilty.²⁶

Dorfman, Michael (pleaded guilty 2006)

Michael Dorfman was the son of Yale Dorfman and an employee of State Metal Industries. For his role in helping his father sell U.S. military components to China, he pleaded guilty to making false statements to the Department of Defense.²⁷ Also, see Yale Dorfman.

Dorfman, Yale (pleaded guilty 2006)

Yale Dorfman, the co-owner of State Metal Industries, attempted to export missile components that his company acquired through a contract with the U.S. Department of Defense. State Metal Industries had a contract from April 2003 with the Defense Department to smelt down surplus military equipment, including components of the AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missile. Dorfman hid AIM-7 components, including the radar guidance system, among other metal scrap in a cargo container bound for China.²⁸

Du Shanshan (indicted 2010, convicted 2012)

Du Shanshan was an engineer at General Motors (GM) from 2000 to 2005 who stole company documents related to hybrid vehicles. GM later valued at roughly $40 million the thousands of pages of stolen documents that Du had emailed herself or backed up on a hard drive. She relayed the information to the company, Millennium Technology International, that she owned with her husband, Qin Yu. Qin then approached China’s Chery Automobile to sell GM’s research and engineering work on hybrid vehicles, and they pitched Chery on a joint venture to build hybrid cars.²⁹ Du was convicted for unauthorized possession of trade secrets and conspiracy and sentenced to one year in prison.³⁰

Frank, Desmond Dinesh (arrested 2007, pleaded guilty 2008)

Desmond Dinesh Frank was a Malaysian freight forwarder based in Penang, Malaysia, who attempted to export controlled technologies (training equipment for the C-130 military transport aircraft) through his company, Asian Sky Support. He was also involved in money laundering and export violations related to Iran.³¹ Frank was sentenced to twenty-three months in prison after pleading guilty in 2008.³²

Ge Yuefei (arrested 2006, acquitted 2009)

Ge, a Chinese national, was an engineer at NetLogic Microsystems who stole proprietary chip technology to establish a business in China with Lee Lan. The pair stole circuit designs from NetLogic and Taiwan’s Semiconductor Manufacturing Company to start a business backed by Beijing Electronic Development Company, which had links to the Chinese military.³³ Ge and Lee also reportedly planned to acquire funding dispersed through the 863 Program.³⁴ The federal jury deadlocked on the charges that the two stole trade secrets from NetLogic and acquitted them in 2009 on charges of stealing from Semiconductor Manufacturing Company.³⁵ Also, see Lee Lan.

Gormley, Timothy (pleaded guilty 2012)

Timothy Gormley was an export control manager at AR Worldwide who altered invoices and shipping documents to conceal the classification of microwave amplifiers manufactured and sold by his company. Gormley also listed false license numbers and lied to colleagues about the existence and status of export licenses. His behavior allowed more than fifty microwave amplifiers to be shipped to consignees in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Russia, and other locations between 2006 and 2011. The consignees and end users remain unnamed. Microwave amplifiers can be used in weapons guidance systems and electronic warfare systems, including radar jammers. Gormley claimed to be “too busy” to apply for and properly manage export control licenses. In 2013 he was sentenced to forty-two months in prison.³⁶

Gowadia, Noshir (arrested 2005, convicted 2010)

Noshir Gowadia, an Indian American and former Northrup Grumman engineer from 1967 to 1986, sold information about low observable (LO) technologies to China. Specifically, Gowadia helped design and create testing systems for a low signature, infrared-suppressing exhaust system for cruise missiles, based on the knowledge he developed working on the propulsion of the B-2 stealth bomber. At the time of his arrest, he had received roughly $80,000 of the $400,000 he expected for his services to the Chinese government, and he told the FBI that “at that time I knew it was wrong and I did it for the money.”³⁷ From 2003 to 2005 Gowadia made six trips to China to consult on his infrared-suppressing exhaust system and to design test software to evaluate the cruise missile’s performance against U.S. equipment. The State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs arranged the visits and introduced Gowadia to the Chinese weapons engineers with whom he developed the missile.³⁸ A jury found him guilty in 2010 on charges relating to providing classified information to a foreign government, export control violations, and filing false tax returns. In January 2011 the court sentenced Gowadia to thirty-two years in prison.³⁹

Gu Chunhui (indicted 2014)

Gu Chunhui (顾春晖) is one of five members of the Chinese signals intelligence unit (Unit 61398) indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice in May 2014. Gu managed domain accounts used to enable computer network operations and tested spear-phishing emails that would be used in targeting U.S. and other foreign companies.⁴⁰ Also see Huang Zhenyu, Sun

Kailiang, Wang Dong, and Wen Xinyu.
Guo Zhiyong (arrested 2008, convicted 2009)

Guo Zhiyong, an engineer and a managing director at an unnamed Beijing electronics firm, attempted to acquire thermal-imaging cameras for his company’s clients. Guo and his coconspirator Chao Tah-wei were arrested at Los Angeles International Airport with a total of ten export-controlled, thermal-imaging cameras, manufactured by FLIR Systems, hidden in their luggage. The cameras were intended for clients of Guo’s technology firm, namely the MPS and the People’s Armed Police.⁴¹ Guo was convicted in a trial and was sentenced to five years in prison.⁴²

Hanson, Harold Dewitt, and Yaming Nina Qi Hanson
(arrested 2009, pleaded guilty 2009)

Yaming Nina Qi Hanson was a naturalized U.S. citizen who transported UAV autopilots to a Chinese aerospace firm. Although she lived in the United States and at overseas U.S. facilities where her husband was employed, Mrs. Hanson owned two properties in China and maintained close connections to family and former classmates there.⁴³ In 2008 the Hansons collaborated to import UAV autopilot devices from a Canadian company, MicroPilot, to the United States. As part of the import process, the Hansons signed an agreement with MicroPilot that they would only export the autopilots if they received approved U.S. government export licenses. Mr. Hanson reported the shipment missing in July 2008, but MicroPilot received a request in August for technical support on the autopilots from a Chinese company, presumably Xi’an Xiangyu Aviation Technical Group (西安翔宇航空科技股份有限公司), part of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (中国航空工业集团公司) family of companies. MicroPilot alerted Canadian and U.S. authorities in October to a possible export control violation, because Mr. Hanson told MicroPilot that the autopilots were intended incongruously for a civilian model airplane club.⁴⁴ The devices had not gone missing; Mrs. Hanson had hand-delivered the autopilots in China without an export license. She told federal law enforcement that several former classmates provided $75,000 to purchase the MicroPilot parts; however, Yu Fang, president of Xi’an Xiangyu Aviation Technical Group, provided at least that amount toward the total purchase of approximately $90,000.⁴⁵ In November 2009 Mrs. Hanson pleaded guilty to making false statements, and the court sentenced her to time served. In November 2009, Mr. Hanson pleaded guilty to making false statements, and in February 2010 the court sentenced him to two years in prison.⁴⁶

He, Philip Chaohui (indicted 2011, pleaded guilty 2013)

Philip Chaohui He, a Chinese national and former California Department of Transportation engineer, attempted to export radiation-hardened integrated circuits. He was caught at the port in Long Beach, California, with two hundred space-qualified and radiation-hardened circuits used in satellite communications systems concealed inside plastic infant formula containers. He arranged the purchase of the circuits through his company Sierra Electronic Instruments, and an unnamed Chinese coconspirator wired him roughly $490,000 toward the $549,654 total purchase. He presented the circuit manufacturer, Aeroflex, with false end user certificates that indicated the circuits would remain inside the United States. He also contacted Aeroflex under the alias “Philip Hope.” A prior shipment of 112 circuits did go overseas to China, but the ultimate end user was unknown.⁴⁷ He was sentenced to three years in prison followed by three years of supervised release.⁴⁸

Ho Szu-hsiung “Allen” (arrested 2016, sentenced 2017)

Ho Szu-hsiung, a naturalized U.S. citizen and nuclear engineer, was accused of helping a state-owned Chinese nuclear company develop and produce special nuclear material. Dr. Ho came to the United States in 1973 to attend the University of California, Berkeley, and earned a PhD in nuclear engineering from the University of Illinois in 1980. The indictment claimed that Ho provided illegal assistance to China General Nuclear Power Company (CGNPC) from 1997 to 2016 and enlisted half a dozen U.S.-based scientists to do the same.⁴⁹ Ho paid these scientists, including a senior executive at the Tennessee Valley Authority, to provide assistance to CGNPC, and he communicated the need for surreptitiousness to those he recruited. As a senior advisor to CGNPC and an owner of his own consulting firm, Energy Technology International, Ho told these still unnamed scientists that he had been tasked to gather U.S. nuclear expertise for CGNPC’s programs. Specifically, he assisted the Chinese company’s small modular reactor program (which are used primarily on submarines), advanced fuel assembly program, and fixed in-core detector system, and helped with verification and validation of nuclear reactor–related computer codes.⁵⁰ Ho was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison for violating the Atomic Energy Act in 2017.

Hou Shengdong (arrest warrant issued 2012)

Hou Shengdong was the vice director of the chloride-route titanium dioxide (TiO2) project department for the Pangang subsidiary Pangang Group Titanium Industry Company Ltd. Hou specifically requested Walter Liew and his company, USA Performance Technology Inc., provide proprietary DuPont blueprints for a TiO2 processing facility as a condition of working with the Pangang Group. An arrest warrant was issued in 2012 for the Chinese national, and Hou remains at large in China.⁵¹ Also, see Walter Liew.

Hsu, You-Tsai “Eugene” (arrested 2001, sentenced 2002)

Naturalized U.S. citizen You-Tsai “Eugene” Hsu attempted to purchase sophisticated encryption devices used by the U.S. government and export them to China. He contacted Mykotronx, the manufacturer of encryption devices used to secure phone and fax transmissions, to inquire about the price of each unit. The Mykotronx device, KIV-7HS, was on the U.S. Munitions List and required approval from the National Security Agency for export.⁵² The Columbia, Maryland–based company contacted federal law enforcement, which provided an undercover agent as an intermediary for Hsu. When the agent informed Hsu that the encryption devices were export controlled, Hsu proposed repackaging and disguising them for unlicensed export. His partner, David Tzu-Wei Yang, owned a freight forwarding business in California, and Hsu arranged for Yang to take possession and ship them via a Singaporean cutout to China.⁵³ Hsu received two concurrent forty-one-month prison sentences for his role in the conspiracy.⁵⁴

Hsy, Howard (arrested 2003, pleaded guilty 2005)

Howard Hsy was a dual U.S.-Taiwanese citizen and former Boeing engineer who exported night vision equipment to China via an intermediary in Taiwan. Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau arrested Hsy in 2003 and kept him under house arrest until his extradition to the United States for his connection to an espionage case involving Yeh Yu-chen and Chen Shih-liang.⁵⁵ Hsy came to the attention of U.S. authorities in 2003 for his illegal export of plastic optical filters suitable for night vision lighting, night vision goggles with helmet mounts for fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, and liquid crystal displays that can be integrated into avionics.⁵⁶ Hsy and Donald Shull used forged documents to purchase night vision equipment that was shipped to an Auburn, Washington–based company that one of them owned before being transferred to China via Taiwan. The two men may have believed that the Taiwan connection was the end user.⁵⁷ In March 2006 Hsy was sentenced to two years of probation and fined $15,000.⁵⁸

Hu Qiang (arrested 2012, pleaded guilty 2013)

Hu Qiang is a Chinese national and Shanghai resident who conspired to export dual-use pressure transducers from the United States to China. Hu, sometimes known as Johnson Hu, was the Shanghai sales manager for a subsidiary of MKS Instruments, an Andover, Massachusetts, company that manufactured the pressure transducers. The devices are controlled for export because they can be used in centrifuge cascades. Hu and his coconspirators allegedly obtained export licenses for thousands of transducers, worth $6.5 million, to unauthorized end users in China by obtaining fraudulent end use certificates for existing MKS customers. They also used front companies to hide ultimate destinations and end use. In 2014

Hu was sentenced to thirty-four months in prison.⁵⁹

Huang Jili (arrested 2012, pleaded guilty 2013) Huang Jili was the chief executive officer of Ningbo Oriental Crafts Ltd. who conspired with one of his employees, Qi Xiaoguang, to steal cellular glass insulation. Huang and Qi attempted to purchase the formulas and manufacturing processes for FoamGlas from an employee at Pittsburg Corning for $100,000. The court ruled that the intended loss to Pittsburg Corning was more than $7 million, including the research, development, and protection of the proprietary information related to FoamGlas. The person whom Huang and Qi attempted to pay to break in to Pittsburg Corning’s engineering department and steal this information was cooperating with federal authorities. After an agreement was reached and the three met for a second time to exchange money and documents, the FBI arrested Huang and Qi. Huang was sentenced to 18 months in prison without parole and fined $250,000.⁶⁰ Also see Qi Xiaoguang.

Huang Kexue (pleaded guilty 2011)

Huang Kexue, a naturalized U.S. citizen who was a research scientist at a Dow Chemical lab in Indiana, stole company secrets in an effort to start his own company in China.⁶¹ Prior to being fired in 2008, Huang had started sharing Dow Chemical intellectual property with Chinese researchers, and he obtained research grants to further his research at Hunan Normal University. Huang intended to develop and produce pesticides to compete with Dow Chemical inside China. After his dismissal from Dow Chemical, Huang worked at Cargill where he also stole details about enzymes used to make food products. Prosecutors estimated the intellectual property loss between $7 million and $20 million.⁶² Huang pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eighty-seven months in prison and three years of supervised release.⁶³

Huang Leping “Nicole”
(arrested 2010, suspended sentence 2010)

Huang Leping, a Chinese national and a businesswoman, attempted to transfer restricted defense technology to a research institute affiliated with a Chinese state-owned firm, the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC). Huang and her husband, Chang York-Yuan, were co-owners of General Technology Systems Integration, Inc. (GTSI), based in Ontario, California. In 2009 GTSI entered into contracts with the Sichuan Institute of Solid-State Circuits—also known as the CETC Twenty-fourth Research Institute—to design and export two kinds of high-performance analog-to-digital converters. Under Huang and Chang’s direction, GTSI hired two engineers to work on this project. Huang and Chang both separately lied to federal agents, telling them that this project had been cancelled after the two engineers were contacted by federal authorities in relation to the legality of the project, which would have required valid export licenses because the converters have national security applications.⁶⁴ According to U.S. Commerce Department documents, Huang also advised the hired engineers and other GTSI employees on ways to communicate discreetly about the project, such as using personal rather than work email addresses as well as code words for the converters and the client.⁶⁵ Also, see Chang York-Yuan.

Huang Zhenyu (indicted 2014)

Huang Zhenyu (黄振宇) is one of the five members of the Chinese signals intelligence unit (Unit 61398) indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice in May 2014. Huang registered and managed domain accounts that other officers of Unit 61398 used to hack into U.S. companies. The unit also assigned him to create a database for intelligence on the iron and steel industries, including information taken from U.S. companies.⁶⁶ Also see Gu Chunhui, Sun Kailiang, Wang Dong, and Wen Xinyu.

Jiang, Qingchang “Frank” (arrested 2003, convicted 2005)

Qingchang “Frank” Jiang was president of EHI Group USA Inc./Araj Electronics and attempted to export microwave amplifiers to the Fiftyfourth Research Institute, also known as the Communication, Telemetry, and Telecontrol Research Institute.⁶⁷ This institute is affiliated with the China Electronics Technology Group (中国电子科技集团公司) and is involved primarily with missile-, signals intelligence–, and telecommunicationsrelated technologies, according to the institute’s website.⁶⁸ In spring 2002 Jiang purchased nine microwave amplifiers and shipped four to the Hebei Far-East Harris Company, which shared an address with the Fifty-fourth Research Institute. In 2005 Jiang was acquitted of export control violations—the government could not prove he knowingly circumvented export regulations—but was convicted on making false statements.⁶⁹

Jin Hanjuan (arrested 2007, convicted 2012)

Jin Hanjuan was a naturalized U.S. citizen and software engineer at Motorola who attempted to start her own company in China with stolen company intellectual property. Jin was arrested at Chicago O’Hare International Airport in February 2007 with a one-way ticket to China, $31,000 in cash, and hundreds of Motorola documents stored electronically. Jin had worked at Motorola for nine years. Before her planned departure from the United States, she had been working for the Chinese telecommunications firm Sun Kaisens, which develops some products for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).⁷⁰ In 2006 and 2007 Jin was on prolonged medical leave from Motorola and spent a great of time in China, where she started working with Sun Kaisens on projects for the PLA.⁷¹ Also in Jin’s possession was a set of PLA documents describing requirements for future telecommunications projects.⁷² She was sentenced to four years in prison, and the sentence was upheld on appeal.⁷³

Karabasevic, Dejan (arrested 2011, convicted 2011)

Dejan Karabasevic was an engineer at the American Superconductor Corporation (AMSC) who helped the company’s Chinese customer, Sinovel, steal its software for operating wind turbines. Two Sinovel employees, Su Liying and Zhao Haichun, recruited Karabasevic in spring 2011 to provide AMSC’s proprietary software in exchange for a six-year, $1.7 million contract and promises of “all the human contact” he could want.⁷⁴ The theft of AMSC’s software was discovered when its employees working on malfunctioning Sinovel wind turbines discovered they were running on outdated and pirated AMSC software.⁷⁵ In 2011 Karabasevic was sentenced to one year in jail and two years’ probation.

Kuok Chi-Tong (arrested 2009, convicted 2010)

Kuok Chi-Tong of Macau is a businessman who attempted to acquire global positioning system (GPS) devices used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S. military as well as military communications–related equipment. Kuok told investigators, according to Wired, that he had been “acting at the direction of officials for the People’s Republic of China.”⁷⁶ Beginning in 2006 Kuok started contacting individuals in and around U.S. defense industries, and a tip from a British company raised Kuok’s profile with U.S. law enforcement.⁷⁷ The items Kuok sought ranged from GPS devices with anti-spoofing features to software used to secure satellite communications from military aircraft to encryption technology developed under contract to the U.S. National Security Agency. He also specifically sought encryption devices that enable communications with the U.S. Department of Defense’s classified networks, such as the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network.⁷⁸ Kuok was arrested at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta in 2009 while transiting to a supposed meeting in Panama with undercover agents. He was convicted in 2010 in a jury trial, but two of the four counts on which he was convicted were overturned in 2012 by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which accepted Kuok’s defense that he committed these export violations under duress.⁷⁹ After starting a company in 2000, Kuok met and assisted a Chinese cultural official, “Zheng Kung-Pen,” in acquiring items from abroad that could not normally be purchased in China. The opinion recorded Kuok’s counsel stating that “what started out as a friendly relationship turned serious at one business dinner, when Zheng—after encouraging Kuok to drink to excess—pressured Kuok into signing a note promising to locate and purchase certain items that could not be obtained in China.” Kuok later tried to back out, but Zheng implied threats against Kuok’s family and regularly provided Kuok with surveillance photos of Kuok with his family. In 2002 Zheng explained that others were being asked to do what Kuok was doing and told him that his family would be thrown in a “black jail”—an off-the-books detention facility—if he stopped cooperating. In 2005 Kuok asked Zheng to let him off after he learned he could be violating U.S. export laws, and in 2007 Kuok asked again because he developed a tumor. Each time Zheng refused, keeping the pressure on Kuok to acquire technology overseas illegally.⁸⁰

Lau Hing-Shing “Victor”
(indicted 2009, pleaded guilty 2012)

Lau Hing-Shing is a Hong Kong resident who attempted to ship exportcontrolled thermal-imaging devices from the United States to Hong Kong. Specifically, Lau tried to purchase twelve infrared thermal-imaging devices for export to China and Hong Kong and transferred nearly $40,000 to the United States in partial payment. These thermal imagers had a variety of potential military uses, such as unmanned vehicle payloads, weapon sights, and security and surveillance products. Lau was arrested at Toronto International Airport in 2009 when he traveled to take possession of the imagers and was later extradited to the United States. He was sentenced to ten months in prison followed by two years of supervised release.⁸¹

Lee, Charles Yu-Hsu (arrested 2008, pleaded guilty 2010)

Charles Yu-Hsu Lee was a naturalized U.S. citizen from Taiwan who shipped ten thermal-imaging cameras illegally to Shanghai between 2002 and 2007. Charles Lee purchased the $9,500 cameras and provided them to his uncle, Sam Ching-Sheng Lee, for shipment to China. Lee was informed at the time of purchase that these thermal-imaging cameras could not be exported without a license. In 2010 Charles Lee was sentenced to six days in prison and fined $3,000.⁸²

Lee Lan (arrested 2006, acquitted 2009)

Lee Lan (also known as Li Lan) was a U.S. citizen and engineer at NetLogic Microsystems who stole proprietary chip technology to set up a business in China with Ge Yuefei. The two stole chip designs from NetLogic and Taiwan’s Semiconductor Manufacturing Company to start a business backed by a firm, Beijing Electronic Development Company, with links to the Chinese military.⁸³ Lee and Ge also reportedly planned to acquire funding dispersed through the 863 Program.⁸⁴ The federal jury deadlocked on the charges that the two stole trade secrets from NetLogic and acquitted them on charges of stealing from Semiconductor Manufacturing Company in 2009.⁸⁵ Also, see Ge Yuefei.

Lee, Peter (arrested 1997, pleaded guilty 1997)

Peter Lee was a naturalized Taiwanese and U.S. citizen who revealed classified information about nuclear weapon design to Chinese scientists in 1985 and about submarine detection in 1997 while on trips to China. During the 1980s and 1990s, Dr. Lee first worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and then at defense contractor TRW. He first came to the FBI’s attention in 1982, and the Los Angeles Field Office opened a second case on him in 1991.⁸⁶ In 1985 Lee met with a Chinese scientist in his Beijing hotel room and answered questions about a diagram related to nuclear weapon design. The next day, Lee was taken to a conference where for at least two hours he spoke and responded to questions related to similar diagrams and his own design work. In 1997 Dr. Lee traveled to China at the invitation and expense of the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, one of China’s leading defense labs. He delivered two presentations for Chinese scientists on his classified U.S. Navy work related to submarine detection. Because of his work for TRW and his top secret clearance, he was required to file a travel report and fill out a post-travel questionnaire. During follow-up interviews with the FBI in August 1997, Lee admitted that he provided classified information to Chinese scientists in 1985 and lied on his travel forms about his Chinese contacts, his activities in China, and who paid for the trip. A federal court sentenced Lee to 1 year in a halfway house, 3 years of probation, 3,000 hours of community service, and a $20,000 fine after he pleaded guilty.⁸⁷

Lee, Sam Ching-Sheng
(arrested 2008, pleaded guilty 2010)

Sam Ching-Sheng Lee was a naturalized U.S. citizen who shipped ten thermal-imaging cameras illegally to Shanghai between 2002 and 2007. He was part owner and chief operations manager of Multimillion Business Associate Corporation, through which the cameras were shipped abroad. Lee was assisted by his nephew Charles Lee. While his nephew purchased the $9,500 cameras, Sam Lee found customers in Shanghai and arranged the shipments. At least one alleged Chinese customer had plans to bring their own thermal-imaging and night vision equipment to market, suggesting the customer intended to reverse engineer the camera that the Lees provided. In 2011 Sam Lee was sentenced to twelve months in prison and fined $10,000.⁸⁸

Li Li “Lea” (arrested 2010, pleaded guilty 2011)

Li Li, the vice president of Beijing Starcreates Space Science and Technology Development Company Limited, attempted to export computer chips that were classified as defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List. Under the U.S. arms embargo placed on China in 1990, such articles cannot be exported to China. Li and her boss, Xian Hongwei, were arrested in Hungary in 2010 and extradited to the United States in spring 2011. The two attempted to acquire radiation-hardened programmable read-only memory microchips (PROMs), which store the initial start-up program for a computer system and are built to withstand the conditions present in outer space. Li and Xian intended to order thousands of these PROMs, suggesting production-level quantities, and planned to break up the purchases into smaller shipments to multiple countries to disguise the conspiracy. The intended end user was the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, a state-owned company that develops and produces a range of missile-related technologies, launch vehicles, and spacecraft among other industrial products. Li was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison and spent seven months jailed in Hungary awaiting extradition.⁸⁹

Li Qing (charged 2007, pleaded guilty 2008)

Li Qing was a Chinese national and U.S. permanent resident who attempted to acquire piezoresistive accelerometers for “a special agency, a scientific research institute in China.”⁹⁰ Along with an unidentified coconspirator in China, Li attempted to purchase thirty 7270A-200K accelerometers from Endevco. These devices measure massive shocks, such as those caused by nuclear and chemical explosions, and have many military applications, including precision-guidance systems for bombs and missiles.⁹¹ Li contacted Endevco about purchasing the accelerometers, but company representatives demurred. Suspicious that Li might attempt to export the devices, Endevco contacted federal law enforcement, and they launched a sting operation to draw out Li and her coconspirator. The coconspirator promised that if the first thirty accelerometers worked out, the undercover agents should expect more and larger orders.⁹² Li pleaded guilty in 2008 and was sentenced to one year and one day in prison, three years of supervised release, and a fine of $7,500.⁹³

Li Shaoming (stopped 2012)

Li Shaoming was the chief operating officer or the chief executive officer of the Kings Nower Seed Company, a subsidiary of Beijing Dabeinong Technology Group.⁹⁴ Li was stopped and searched alongside his colleague and coconspirator Ye Jian in 2012, and U.S. authorities seized dozens of corn seed packets hidden in microwave popcorn packets. Neither man was arrested to preserve the continuing investigation into corn seed theft and Hailong “Robert” Mo.

Li, Terry Teng Fang (arrested 2004, pleaded guilty 2006)

Terry Teng Fang Li, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Taiwan and the president of Universal Technologies, Inc., sold electronic components to Chinese arms manufacturers.⁹⁵ Li was sentenced to one year of probation, and the court ordered Universal Technologies to cease its operations.⁹⁶

Li Yuan (pleaded guilty 2012)

Li Yuan was a Chinese national working as a research chemist in the U.S. headquarters of the French pharmaceutical company Sanofi-Aventis who stole data on compounds for the benefit of a Chinese company. Li stole Sanofi-Aventis trade secrets, including research data that had not yet been patented, to sell on the website of Abby Pharmatech, a U.S.-based unit of Xiamen KAK Science and Technology Company. She had a 50 percent share in Abby Pharmatech. Li was sentenced to eighteen months in prison and ordered to pay $131,000 in restitution.⁹⁷

Liang, Jason Jian (indicted 2010, pleaded guilty 2011)

Jason Jian Liang, a naturalized U.S. citizen and the owner of Sanwave International Corporation, exported more than sixty thermal-imaging cameras to China and Hong Kong. At least seven of the cameras were exported illegally, because low-light vision devices are considered defense articles and are banned for export to China. The cameras Liang exported illegally were manufactured by L-3 Communications Infrared Products. He was sentenced to forty-six months in prison and three years of supervised release in 2011.⁹⁸

Liang Xiuwen “Jennifer” (arrested 2003, pleaded guilty 2003)

Liang Xiuwen, a co-owner of Maytone International, conspired with the help of her husband Zhuang Jinghua to export components for U.S. military aircraft and missiles. Specifically, Liang and Zhuang attempted to export F-14 Tomcat parts as well as components for the HAWK surface-to-air missile, TOW anti-tank missile, and AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile. At least one of the Chinese purchasers was believed to be in Shenyang.⁹⁹ The two were caught in 2003 as part of lengthy undercover investigation into U.S. companies that offer defense articles over the Internet to foreign buyers. In 2005 Liang was sentenced to thirty months in prison and fined $6,000.¹⁰⁰

Liew, Christina (indicted 2011)

Christina Liew (also known as Qiao Hong) and her husband Walter Liew were co-owners of USA Performance Technology Inc. She actively participated in her husband’s attempt to sell DuPont trade secrets related to processing chloride-route titanium dioxide to the Chinese state-owned enterprise Pangang Group.¹⁰¹ Also see Liew, Walter.

Liew, Walter (indicted 2011, convicted 2014)

Walter Liew (also known as Liu Xuanxuan) was the co-owner and president of USA Performance Technology Inc. who stole DuPont trade secrets for the Chinese state-owned enterprise Pangang Group and its subsidiaries. Liew and his coconspirators—his wife Christina Liew, Robert Maegerle, and Hou Shengdong, as well as Chao Tze—succeeded in part in transferring DuPont’s proprietary information on processing chloride-route titanium dioxide (TiO2), which is widely used as a white pigment. Mr. Liew discovered Beijing’s interest in TiO2 during meetings with government officials in China during the early 1990s. He subsequently began assembling a group of former DuPont employees to acquire and eventually sell TiO2-related trade secrets to Chinese firms. A federal jury found Lieu guilty of violations of the Economic Espionage Act, tax evasion, bankruptcy fraud, and obstruction of justice in 2014, and he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, forfeiture of $27.8 million in profits, and $511,667.82 in fines.¹⁰²

Lin Hai (arrested 2001, fled abroad 2004)

Lin Hai was a Chinese national and U.S. permanent resident who conspired with Xu Kai and Cheng Yongqing to steal proprietary software from his employer, Lucent Technologies. Specifically, Cheng and his coconspirators attempted to acquire switching software associated with Lucent’s PathStar Access Server. The three men were starting their own company, ComTriad Technologies, in partnership with Datang Telecommunication Technology Industry Group, and they received between $500,000 and $1.2 million in startup capital from their Chinese partner. Cheng, Lin, and Xu originally sought venture capital financing in the United States but approached Datang after their U.S. interlocutors asked to see the product specifications based on the stolen Lucent software. In April 2001 the three transferred their modifications on the Lucent PathStar software to China electronically, presumably to Datang.¹⁰³ Sometime in 2004 while free on bail, Lin Hai fled the United States to avoid facing charges or prison time but lost out on the plea deal as a result.¹⁰⁴

Lin Yong (indicted 2013)

Lin Yong was a Chinese national and a researcher for the Kings Nower Seed Company, a subsidiary of Beijing Dabeinong Technology Group. The FBI recorded a conversation with coconspirator Ye Jian in which both made statements that demonstrated they understood the theft of seeds was illegal and that they intended to smuggle the seeds past U.S. customs.¹⁰⁵ Also see Mo, Hailong “Robert.”

Liu Sixing “Steve” (convicted 2012)

Liu Sixing was a Chinese national working at L-3 Communications, Space, and Navigation Division in New Jersey. Liu stole thousands of files from his employer that detailed the performance and design of guidance systems for missiles, rockets, target locators, and unmanned aerial vehicles. He intended to position himself for future employment in China, and he traveled there to deliver presentations at several universities, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and government-organized conferences. L-3 trained Liu about U.S. export control laws and indicated that most company products were covered by those laws. Federal agents searched Liu’s personal computer upon his return from a November 2010 trip to China and found the stolen files. In a follow-up interview, he lied to federal authorities about the nature of his defense work. A jury convicted Liu on arms control and economic espionage violations as well as lying to federal agents, and he was sentenced to seventy months in jail and three years of supervised release.¹⁰⁶

Liu Wenchyu (arrested 2006, convicted 2011)

Liu Wenchyu (also known as David Liou) was a retired Dow Chemical Company research scientist who attempted to sell the company’s trade secrets in China. Following Liu’s retirement from Dow Chemical in 1992 after twenty-five years, he founded his own chemical company to manufacture and sell products similar to those of Dow. For example, Liu worked on the development and manufacture of elastomers, including Dow’s widely used Tyrin chlorinated polyethylene (CPE), and he attempted to build the capacity to produce Tyrin CPE and other proprietary Dow compounds within his own company. To do so, he paid a Dow employee $50,000 for the company’s production manual and other information about CPE manufacture. Dow’s CPE compounds are used in automotive and industrial hoses, vinyl siding, and electrical cable jackets.¹⁰⁷ Liu recruited at least three other current and former Dow employees to assist him with acquiring proprietary CPE information, including relating to the establishment of a CPE manufacturing facility in China. He was sentenced to five years in prison, two years of supervised released, the forfeiture of $600,000, and a fine of $25,000 for perjuring himself in depositions and conspiracy to commit trade theft.¹⁰⁸

Long Yu (arrested 2014, sentenced 2017)

Long Yu, a Chinese national with U.S. permanent residency and a senior engineer at the United Technologies Research Center, attempted to take the company’s proprietary documents related to advanced titanium used in U.S. military aircraft. Long worked at the defense contractor from 2008 to May 2014, when he was let go because of a federal investigation into his activities. After he left United Technologies, Long went to China. On his return from China in August 2014, federal authorities searched his luggage at John F. Kennedy International Airport. They found registration documents for a new corporation in China and a mostly completed application for a job at a state-controlled aerospace research center.¹⁰⁹ The application form highlighted Long’s experience with the F119 and F135 engines used in the F-22 and F-35, respectively. United Technologies is the parent company of Pratt and Whitney, which manufactures the F119 and F135 engines. When Long attempted to make a subsequent trip to China in November, his luggage contained the proprietary documents related to United Technologies’ titanium processes. The documents bore warning markings that indicated they were proprietary and export controlled.¹¹⁰ Yu was sentenced to two and a half years in prison after pleading guilty.

Lu Fu-Tain (arrested 2010, pleaded guilty 2011)

Lu Fu-Tain, the owner of Fushine Technology in Cupertino, California, sold microwave amplifiers to a Chinese company without proper export licenses. When Lu sold a microwave amplifier to Everjet Science and Technology Corporation in 2004, Fushine maintained a sales representative relationship with Miteq Components, which manufactures microwave and satellite communications components and subsystems. Later, Lu agreed to forfeit thirty-six additional microwave amplifiers that may have been intended for China. Company emails indicated that Lu and his subordinates knowingly obfuscated the recipients of these products and the need for an export license. In 2012 Lu was sentenced to fifteen months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine.¹¹¹

Maegerle, Robert (arrested 2012, convicted 2014)

Robert Maegerle worked as an engineer at DuPont from 1956 to 1991 and participated in Walter Liew’s conspiracy to sell DuPont trade secrets related to processing chloride-route titanium dioxide (TiO2) to the Chinese stateowned enterprise Pangang Group.¹¹² He possessed detailed knowledge of TiO2-related technologies and setting up production lines, which he provided the Pangang Group alongside specific information about DuPont’s TiO2 facility in Taiwan.¹¹³ Also see Walter Liew.

Man, Wenxia “Wency” (arrested 2015, convicted 2016)

Wenxia “Wency” Man was a naturalized U.S. citizen and vice president of California-based AFM Microelectronics Corporation who attempted to acquire and export fighter jet engines and other defense articles. AFM Microelectronics had a Shenzhen office and reportedly had links to Xifei Aviation Components Company, an independent company that provided support to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) General Staff Department and General Armaments Department and the PLA Air Force.¹¹⁴ Man conspired with Zhang Xinsheng, whom she described as a “technology spy” for the PLA who acquired foreign defense technology for domestic Chinese production. According to the U.S. Justice Department, Man and Zhang attempted to acquire and export the following defense articles and related technical data: Pratt and Whitney F135-PW-100 engines used in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter; Pratt and Whitney F119-PW-100 turbofan engines used in the F-22 Raptor fighter jet; General Electric F110-GE-132 engines designed for the F-16 fighter jet; and the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B unmanned aerial vehicle.¹¹⁵ The two thought to use either South Korea, Israel, or Hong Kong as the channel through which to disguise China as the ultimate end user.¹¹⁶ In 2016 Man was sentenced to roughly four years in prison.¹¹⁷ Also see Zhang Xinsheng.

Meng Hong (indicted 2009, pleaded guilty 2010)

Meng Hong was a Chinese national with U.S. permanent residency and former DuPont research scientist who attempted to steal the company’s proprietary data to commercialize several projects with Beijing University (北京大学). Specifically, Meng stole files relating to organic light emitting diode (OLED) research, to which he had extensive access during his employment at DuPont beginning in 2002. Meng requested some of the files through official channels when offered his resignation in 2009. He told DuPont that he intended to take a job with DuPont China and that he needed the OLED files for background. The company denied him access. In a search of Meng’s company-issued laptop, DuPont found that he copied roughly six hundred files onto an external storage device. The company also discovered that Meng had accepted a position with Beijing University’s college of engineering without informing DuPont as he was obligated to do.¹¹⁸ A federal court sentenced Meng to fourteen months in prison after he pleaded guilty in 2010.

Meng, Xiaodong “Sheldon” (charged 2006, pleaded guilty 2007)

Xiaodong “Sheldon” Meng was a software engineer at Quantum3D who stole sensitive motion simulation software to sell to the Chinese military as well as the Malaysian and Thai militaries. He was a naturalized Canadian citizen working for Quantum3D until spring 2003. The most important program, Mantis, simulated real-world motion, such as flight, for military training purposes, and Quantum3D executives described the program as the “crown jewel” of their company. This program and others stolen by Meng allow precision night training for fighter pilots.¹¹⁹ Without authorization, Meng installed demo software at a PLA Navy research center. Meng was the first to be prosecuted under the Economic Espionage Act for providing assistance to a foreign government.¹²⁰

Mo, Hailong “Robert” (arrested 2014, pleaded guilty 2016)

Hailong “Robert” Mo was a Chinese national with U.S. permanent residency who, alongside five associates, dug up corn seeds from an Iowa farm to send back to China. Mo, Wang Lei, and four other associates visited test plots owned by Pioneer, Monsanto, and LG Seeds across Illinois and Iowa to steal seeds. All but one of the men worked for Beijing Dabeinong Technology Group (or its subsidiaries), where Mo worked as director of international business. Mo and Wang were caught collecting seeds in Iowa in May 2011 by a Pioneer security guard and came to the attention of law enforcement.¹²¹ Mo was arrested later at his home in Boca Raton, Florida.¹²² In 2016 Mo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to steal agricultural trade secrets for breaching the intellectual property rights of Monsanto and DuPont.¹²³ He was sentenced to three years in prison and three years of supervised release and was ordered to forfeit some of his property. Also see Li Shaoming, Wang Lei, and Ye Jian.

Mo Yun (arrested 2014, charges dropped)

Mo Yun is the sister of Hailong “Robert” Mo and the spouse of Shao Genhuo, chief executive officer of the Beijing Dabeinong Technology Group. She was arrested in July 2014 and held with her brother under de facto house arrest in Des Moines, Iowa.¹²⁴ In 2007–8 Mo led a research division at Dabeinong, and her text messages around this time brought her into the conspiracy, but charges were ultimately dropped when the judge disallowed her text messages to be used as evidence.¹²⁵

Moo, Ko-Suen “Bill” (arrested 2005, pleaded guilty 2006)

Ko-Suen “Bill” Moo was a South Korean–born Taiwanese businessman who attempted to smuggle a variety of military, primarily aerospace, equipment to China along with Frenchman Maurice Serge Voros. They had attempted to acquire UH-60 Blackhawk engines, the AGM-129 cruise missile, the AIM-120 air-to-air missile, and the F110-GE-129 afterburning turbofan engine for the F-16.

Park, Kwonhwan “Howard” (arrested 2004)

Kwonhwan “Howard” Park was a South Korean who attempted to sell military hardware to China. Specifically, Park along with Sung-Ryul “Roger” Chun sought to purchase two helicopter engines from an unnamed Connecticut company and helmet-mounted night vision equipment. The latter was found in Park’s luggage as he prepared to fly to China. He also attempted to falsify the end user certificates to suggest the Malaysian military was the purchaser, but the company from which he purchased the engines discovered no record of a transaction and alerted federal authorities.¹²⁶

Piquet, Joseph (indicted 2008, sentenced 2009)

Joseph Piquet, the owner and president of AlphaTronX, attempted to purchase and illegally ship military electronic components to Hong Kong and China. AlphaTronX was a Florida-based company that produced electronic components, and it was initially named in the indictment before a court dismissed the charges against the company. Piquet conspired to purchase electronics, including power amplifiers used in early warning radar and missile target acquisition systems, from Northrop Grumman Corporation and export them to unknown Chinese end users. One customer or middleman was Thompson Tam, a director of the China-based Ontime Electronics Technology, who also was indicted. Piquet was convicted of seven export violations and sentenced to five years in prison followed by two years of supervised release.¹²⁷ Also see Tam, Thompson.

Qi Xiaoguang (arrested 2012, pleaded guilty 2013)

Qi Xiaoguang was an employee at Ningbo Oriental Crafts Ltd. who conspired with his boss, Huang Jili, to steal cellular glass insulation. Qi and Huang attempted to purchase the formulas and manufacturing processes for FoamGlas from an employee at Pittsburg Corning for $100,000. The court ruled that the potential loss to Pittsburg Corning was more than $7 million, including the research, development, and protection of the proprietary information related to FoamGlas. The person whom Qi and Huang attempted to pay to break in to Pittsburg Corning’s engineering department and steal this information was cooperating with federal authorities. After an agreement was reached and the three met for a second time to exchange money and documents, the FBI arrested Qi and Huang. Qi was sentenced to time served and was fined $20,000.¹²⁸ Also see Huang Jili.

Qin Yu (indicted 2010, convicted 2012)

Qin Yu and his wife Du Shanshan were co-owners of Millennium Technology International, and they attempted to sell proprietary General Motors (GM) information to China-based Chery Automobile. Between 2003 and 2006, Du removed roughly $40 million worth of GM documentation on hybrid vehicles. Qin then approached Chery to sell GM’s hybrid vehicle research and designs, and they pitched Chery on a joint venture to build hybrid cars.¹²⁹ Like his wife, Qin was convicted on unauthorized possession of trade secrets and conspiracy for the same. The court also convicted him on wire fraud and obstruction of justice, resulting in a three-year prison sentence.¹³⁰ Also see Du Shanshan.

Roth, John Reece (charged 2008, convicted 2008)

Dr. John Reece Roth was a professor emeritus at the University of Tennessee who illegally exported technologies and data related to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In addition to selling technical data relating to UAVrelated plasma technology, Roth took controlled U.S. military data with him to China and emailed other related files to an individual in China. He also exported similar data to Iran. In 2009 a federal court sentenced Roth to four years in prison, two years of supervised release, and a $1,700 fine.¹³¹

Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation
(中芯国际集成电路制造有限公司)

The Shanghai-based Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) is one of the leading semiconductor foundries in the world, and the company is listed on both the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges. In the 2000s Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TMSC) twice took SMIC to court in the United States for the theft of trade secrets. In 2004 TMSC filed a lawsuit in a California state court alleging SMIC stole trade secrets. The lawsuit alleged that “by January 2003, SMIC had hired away more than 100 TSMC employees who collectively had knowledge of virtually all of TSMC’s proprietary technology and business trade secrets.”¹³² SMIC settled the lawsuit in January 2005 for $175 million payable over six years and a cross-licensing agreement through 2010 on SMIC and TSMC patents.¹³³ SMIC also settled a second lawsuit for theft of trade secrets and nonpayment of the previous settlement with TSMC in 2009. SMIC moved to settle the case after a California court found the company guilty of stealing trade secrets but before the court established damages. The settlement meant SMIC would pay $200 million and offer TSMC stock and warrants worth approximately $90 million.¹³⁴

Shan Yanming (arrested 2002, convicted 2004)

Shan Yanming was an employee of Daqing Oil Field, a division of PetroChina, who attempted to steal software from 3DGEO Development Inc. The Mountain View, California–based company writes seismic imaging software for the oil and natural gas industries. The FBI arrested Shan at San Francisco International Airport in October 2002 as he prepared to leave the country.¹³⁵ On his laptop, Shan had a password cracking program that he had used on the 3DGEO’s networks to help him access parts of the network from which he was kept. The company maintained a close eye on Shan because another PetroChina employee had attempted to access the network to steal software two years prior.¹³⁶ He was convicted in 2004 for illegally accessing 3DGEO’s computer network and copying the company’s proprietary source code.¹³⁷ A federal court sentenced Shan to two years in prison.¹³⁸

Shen Huisheng “Charlie” (pleaded guilty 2014)

Shen Huisheng was a Taiwanese national who attempted to export crystal methamphetamine from Taiwan to the United States and subsequently asked undercover FBI agents about the possibility of acquiring sensitive defense technology on behalf of a Chinese intelligence service. Shen’s partner in this endeavor was Chang Huanling. In a series of conversations beginning in 2012, Shen and Chang sought to acquire information on the E-2 Hawkeye reconnaissance aircraft, the stealth technology used in the F-22, missile engine technology, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The two sent the undercover agents a code book to protect their communications and set up a Hong Kong bank account to handle these transactions. In 2015 Shen was sentenced to forty-nine months in prison and a $200 special assessment.¹³⁹ Also see Chang Huanling.

Shih, Martin (indicted 2004, deceased before trial)

Martin Shih was owner of Night Vision Technology based in Cupertino, California. The company manufactured thermal-imaging and infrared devices for use in military-grade night vision equipment. In 2001 and 2002 Shih and Philip Cheng attempted to export the equipment illegally to China via a separate company, SPCTEK, that Cheng established to hide their activities.¹⁴⁰ Cheng also intended the company to begin manufacturing night vision technology equipment in China. An informant tipped off U.S. authorities and reported Cheng and Shih would use false end user documents claiming Taiwan as the destination while night vision cameras would be diverted to China. The two were indicted in 2004, but Shih died of cancer before trial, and Cheng received two years of jail time and a $50,000 fine.¹⁴¹ Also see Philip Cheng.

Shu Quansheng (arrested 2008, pleaded guilty 2008)

Shu Quansheng was a naturalized U.S. citizen and the president, secretary, and treasurer of AMAC International, Inc., who provided defense-related assistance to the Chinese military and the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALVT, 中国运载火箭技术研究院). Specifically, Shu assisted in the design and development of a cryogenic fueling system for heavy payload launch vehicles and provided controlled U.S. military technical data on liquid hydrogen tanks and various cryogenic pumps, valves, filters, and instruments. He also attempted to bribe three Chinese officials by offering percentages on approved contracts. Shu also consulted for other firms and represented them in contract negotiations with Chinese entities, such as CALVT. He arranged for delegations of Chinese officials and scientists to tour European space launch facilities.¹⁴² His company, AMAC, was based in Newport News, Virginia, with offices in Beijing, and at least part of the company’s research was funded through grants by the Small Business Research Program run by the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Dr. Shu was sentenced to fifty-one months in prison and forfeited at least $386,740 to the federal government.¹⁴³

Shull, Donald (arrested 2005, pleaded guilty 2005)

Donald Shull was a U.S. citizen who assisted Howard Hsy in exporting night vision equipment to China via an intermediary in Taiwan.¹⁴⁴ Specifically, they exported plastic optical filters suitable for night vision lighting; night vision goggles with helmet mounts for fixed-wing and rotary aircraft; and liquid crystal displays that can be integrated into avionics.¹⁴⁵ Shull and Hsy used forged documents to purchase night vision equipment that was shipped to an Auburn, Washington–based company that one of them owned before being transferred to China via Taiwan. The two men may have believed that the Taiwan connection was the end user.¹⁴⁶ In February 2006 Shull was sentenced to two years of probation and fined $10,000.¹⁴⁷

Song Jiang (indicted 2011, fled to China)

Song Jiang was a Chinese national and associate of Yuan Wanli who assisted in the latter’s effort to acquire controlled programmable logic devices while impersonating a U.S. company. Song Jiang used the alias Jason Jiang and, according to the indictment, Song also occasionally pretended to be Yuan in English-language meetings and discussions.¹⁴⁸ Also see Yuan Wanli.

State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs
(国家外国专家局)

The State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs’s (SAFEA’s) mission, according to a statement no longer on its website, is “to facilitate the ‘introduction of advanced technology and make Chinese more competitive internationally’ by managing the recruitment of skilled persons from abroad and sending [Chinese] overseas for training.”¹⁴⁹ The SAFEA’s recruitment of foreign experts includes any area of endeavor that Beijing designates as a strategic interest. In recent years, the SAFEA and its subordinate talent-spotting organizations have attempted to draw foreign expertise to support the following research areas: social stability risk assessment; domestic surveillance and intelligence-led policing systems;¹⁵⁰ public administration; agriculture and animal husbandry;¹⁵¹ as well as software and integrated circuits.¹⁵² The administration runs a broad range of local and national programs to attract foreign talent, such as working with provincial and municipal governments to create recruitment programs to support local initiatives and organizing the annual Conference on International Exchange of Professions, an international and state-level talent exchange fair.¹⁵³ In 2011 SAFEA introduced a national recruitment drive, known as the 1,000 Talent Program, for five hundred to one thousand foreign experts in key industries. Those experts would commit to three years in China, and Beijing would provide them with a 1 million RMB (roughly $148,000) annual salary and, for those doing scientific research, an addition 3 to 5 million RMB (roughly $440,000–740,000) for research.¹⁵⁴ Although its work is largely public, SAFEA has been involved in the illegal acquisition of technology, such as the Noshir Gowadia case, and knowledgeable observers believe SAFEA also provides talent spotting for other actors to secretly approach foreign experts.¹⁵⁵ In addition to its provincial- and local-level offices, SAFEA also oversees the related work by the China Association for International Exchange of Personnel (中国国际人才交流协会) and China International Talent Exchange Foundation (中国国际人才交流基金会). These two organizations’ leadership largely overlaps with SAFEA, suggesting they provide a nongovernmental fig leaf in cases where Beijing’s direct role in SAFEA would be a hindrance.

Su Liying (indicted 2013)

Su Liying was the deputy director of Sinovel’s research and development department who was indicted for his role in recruiting American Semiconductor Corporation (AMSC) engineer Dejan Karabasevic to steal trade secrets for Sinovel.¹⁵⁶ Su and Zhao Haichun recruited Karabasevic to steal AMSC source code for operating wind turbines so that Sinovel could produce and retrofit wind turbines without paying AMSC roughly $800 million for previously delivered goods and services. Also see Karabasevic, Dejan.

Sun Kailiang (indicted 2014)

Sun Kailiang (孙凯亮) is one of the five members of the Chinese signals intelligence unit (Unit 61398) indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice in May 2014. Specifically, Sun allegedly hacked into the networks of Westinghouse, U.S. Steel, and Alcoa on behalf of Chinese state-owned enterprises. In the case of Westinghouse, he took proprietary technical and design specifications related to the AP1000 nuclear plant as well as proprietary, nonpublic emails belonging to company executives responsible for managing the relationship and negotiations with the Chinese firm. In the case of U.S. Steel, Sun and Wang Dong used a spear-phishing attack to gain access to U.S. Steel employees’ emails involved in litigation with a Chinese company. In the case of Alcoa, Sun stole thousands of emails related to the company’s relationship with a Chinese state-owned enterprise in 2008.¹⁵⁷ Also see Gu Chunhui, Huang Zhenyu, Wang Dong, and Wen Xinyu.

Tam, Thompson (indicted 2008)

Thompson Tam, a director of the China-based Ontime Electronics Technology, was indicted for his involvement in Joseph Piquet’s efforts to export controlled electronic components to Hong Kong and China. Among the components sought by Piquet and Tam were power amplifiers used in early warning radar and missile target acquisition systems and low noise amplifiers that have both commercial and military applications. As of 2016, Tam remained at large.¹⁵⁸ Also see Piquet, Joseph.

Tsu Chi-Wai “William” (indicted 2009, pleaded guilty 2009)

Tsu Chi-Wai was a resident of Beijing and vice president of Cheerway Trading, based in Hacienda Heights, California, who illegally shipped four hundred integrated circuits to China. These circuits have a variety of applications including military communications and sensors. Prosecutors alleged Cheerway served as a front for Tsu to hide the shipment of integrated circuits and possibly other defense-related articles to his Beijingbased firm Dimagit Science and Technology Company Ltd. Dimagit is a Chinese defense company and includes among its clients the 704 Research Institute (also known as the Aerospace Long March Rocket Technology Company)—a subsidiary of state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). Tsu was arrested in January 2009 and pleaded guilty in March of that year; he was sentenced to forty months in prison.¹⁵⁹

Universal Technologies, Inc.

Universal Technologies, Inc., of Mount Laurel, New Jersey, was a company run by Terry Teng Fang Li, who established it, according to court filings, “for the purpose of acquiring national security-controlled technology for the People’s Republic of China and its military factories.”¹⁶⁰ A federal court ordered the company to cease operations after Li pleaded guilty to export violations in 2006.¹⁶¹

Wang Dong (indicted 2014)

Wang Dong (王东) is one of the five members of the Chinese signals intelligence unit (Unit 61398) indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice in May 2014. Wang and Sun Kailiang used a spear-phishing attack to gain access to U.S. Steel employees’ emails involved in litigation with a Chinese company.¹⁶² Also see Gu Chunhui, Huang Zhenyu, Sun Kailiang, and Wen Xinyu.

Wang Hongwei (stopped 2012, indicted 2013)

Wang Hongwei was one of the alleged coconspirators in the effort to steal corn seed from Pioneer, Monsanto, and LG Seeds centered around Hailong “Robert” Mo. According to the indictment, the FBI believes Wang to be a dual Chinese and Canadian citizen but did not link him to Beijing Dabeinong Technology Group or its subsidiary, Kings Nower Seed Company. Wang was stopped in 2012 on the same day as Li Shaoming and Ye Jian at the U.S.-Canadian border in Vermont, and U.S. authorities seized forty-four bags of seed in his vehicle and luggage.¹⁶³ Also see Mo, Hailong “Robert.”

Wang Lei

Wang Lei was one of Hailong “Robert” Mo’s coconspirators in stealing corn seeds from Pioneer, Monsanto, and LG Seeds.¹⁶⁴ Wang is a Chinese national and vice chairman of the Kings Nower Seed Company, a subsidiary of Beijing Dabeinong Technology Group.¹⁶⁵ Also see Mo, Hailong “Robert.”

WaveLab, Inc. (charged 2008, pleaded guilty 2008)

WaveLab, Inc., based in Reston, Virginia, purchased hundreds of microcircuit power amplifiers in 2006 and exported them to an unnamed entity in China. Wavelab assured the manufacturing company, TriQuint Semiconductor, that the power amplifiers were for domestic sale. Power amplifiers like the ones WaveLab purchased have a variety of military applications in communications and electronic warfare. When confronted by federal authorities, WaveLab chief executive officer Walter Zheng arranged a plea agreement that penalized the company but exempted him from criminal charges personally.¹⁶⁶ In 2008 WaveLab was sentenced to one year of supervised probation, a fine of $15,000, forfeiture of $85,000, and a loss of export privileges for five years.¹⁶⁷

Wei Yufeng “Annie” (convicted 2010)

Wei Yufeng (sometimes known as Annie Wei) ran the Waltham, Massachusetts, office of Chitron Electronics Company Limited (Chitron-U.S.) and channeled the company’s purchases of U.S. export-controlled technology through Chitron’s Hong Kong office to China without obtaining proper export licenses. Wei is the ex-wife of Chitron founder Wu Zhenzhou. Chitron-U.S. first would purchase controlled electronics components and have them shipped to Waltham. Wu explicitly instructed his employees and Wei to never mention to U.S. companies that these parts would be shipped overseas. Chitron-U.S. would then ship the components, without having obtained export licenses, to Hong Kong, where freight forwarders would move the products to the Shenzhen office. Chitron sold electronic components to a wide variety of military-related customers—including factories, research institutes, and subsidiary units of the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation—that worked on electronic warfare, military radar, fire control, military guidance and control equipment, missile systems, and satellite communications. In addition to the export control violations, Wei was convicted on immigration fraud for having knowingly provided false information on her application for U.S. permanent residency status. Wei was sentenced to twenty-three months in prison and two years of supervised release; she also was subject to deportation.¹⁶⁸ Also see Wu Zhenzhou “Alex.”

Wen Xinyu (indicted 2014)

Wen Xinyu (文新宇) is one of the five members of the Chinese signals intelligence unit (Unit 61398) indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice in May 2014. Specifically, Wen allegedly hacked into the networks of SolarWorld AG, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW), and Allegheny Technologies Inc. (ATI). In the case of SolarWorld, Wen and an unidentified fellow officer stole information related to, among other things, the company’s cash flow, manufacturing metrics, production line, and privileged communications related to ongoing litigation. In the case of USW, Wen stole emails from senior union employees containing nonpublic information about USW strategies related to pending trade disputes over Chinese trade practices in at least two industries. Finally, in the case of ATI, Wen stole the network credentials for almost every ATI employee after the company became embroiled in a trade dispute with a Chinese state-owned enterprise.¹⁶⁹ Also see Gu Chunhui, Huang Zhenyu, Sun Kailiang, and Wang Dong.

Wu Zhenzhou “Alex” (charged 2009, convicted 2010)

Wu Zhenzhou (sometimes known as Alex Wu) founded and controlled Chitron Electronics Company Limited, a Shenzhen-based company with subsidiaries in Hong Kong and Waltham, Massachusetts, and sold U.S. export-controlled technology to Chinese defense companies without obtaining proper export licenses. Wu received assistance from his now ex-wife Wei Yufeng, who also ran the Waltham office (Chitron-U.S.). Chitron-U.S. first would purchase controlled electronics components and have them shipped to Waltham. Wu explicitly instructed his employees and Wei to never mention to U.S. companies that these parts would be shipped overseas. Chitron-U.S. would then ship the components, without having obtained export licenses, to Hong Kong, where freight forwarders would move the products to the Shenzhen office. Chitron sold electronic components to a wide variety of military-related customers—including factories, research institutes, and subsidiary units of the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation—that worked on electronic warfare, military radar, fire control, military guidance and control equipment, missile systems, and satellite communications. A federal court sentenced Wu to seven years in prison, fined him $15,000, and made him subject to deportation; the sentence was upheld on appeal.¹⁷⁰ Also see Wei Yufeng “Annie.”

Xian Hongwei (arrested 2010, pleaded guilty 2011)

Xian Hongwei, also known as Harry Zan, was the president of Beijing Starcreates Space Science and Technology Development Company Limited who attempted to export computer chips that were classified as defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List. Under the U.S. arms embargo placed on China in 1990, such articles cannot be exported to China. Xian along his coconspirator, Li Li, were arrested in Hungary in 2010 and extradited to the United States in spring 2011. The two attempted to acquire radiationhardened programmable read-only memory microchips (PROMs), which store the initial start-up program for a computer system and are built to withstand the conditions present in outer space. Xian and Li intended to order thousands of these PROMs, suggesting production-level quantities, and planned to break up the purchases into smaller shipments to multiple countries to disguise the conspiracy. The intended end user was the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, which is a state-owned company that develops and produces a wide range of missile-related technologies, launch vehicles, and spacecraft, among other industrial products. Xian was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison and spent seven months jailed in Hungary awaiting extradition.¹⁷¹ Also see Li “Lea.”

Xu Bing (charged 2007, pleaded guilty 2009)

Xu Bing was a Chinese national and a manager at Everbright Science and Technology Ltd. who attempted to acquire night vision equipment for export to China. The F-1600 night vision technology that Xu attempted to acquire included image intensifiers that are on the U.S. Munitions List and require export licenses. In meeting with an undercover law enforcement agent, Xu asked the agent to remove the serial numbers and other identifiable information from night vision equipment.¹⁷² Everbright applied for export licenses prior to the illegal effort but was denied because of the U.S. government ban on exporting defense articles to China. Xu was sentenced to twenty-two months in prison and two years of supervised release in 2009.¹⁷³

Xu Kai (arrested 2001, pleaded guilty 2005)

Xu Kai was a Chinese national and U.S. permanent resident who conspired with Lin Hai and Cheng Yongqing to steal proprietary software from his employer, Lucent Technologies. Specifically, Cheng and his coconspirators attempted to acquire switching software associated with Lucent’s PathStar Access Server. The three men were starting their own company, ComTriad Technologies, in partnership with Datang Telecommunication Technology Industry Group, and they received between $500,000 and $1.2 million in startup capital from their Chinese partner. Cheng, Lin, and Xu originally sought venture capital financing in the United States but approached Datang after their U.S. interlocutors asked to see the product specifications based on the stolen Lucent software. In April 2001 the three transferred their modifications on the Lucent PathStar software to China electronically, presumably to Datang.¹⁷⁴ Xu and Cheng Yongqing avoided prison time as part of their plea agreement in 2005, but ComTriad paid a $250,000 fine.¹⁷⁵ Also see Cheng Yongqing and Lin Hai.

Xu Weibo “Kevin” (arrested 2004, pleaded guilty 2005)

Xu Weibo was a naturalized U.S. citizen and the president of Manten Electronics, a New Jersey company that shipped approximately $400,000 in export-controlled equipment to banned Chinese end users between 2003 and 2004. He is also the husband of Chen Xiuling. The electronic components shipped to Chinese research institutes played important roles within a wide variety of defense systems, ranging from electronic warfare to missiles. In addition to falsifying end user certificates and using Hong Kong as a transshipment point, Xu also created at least one shell company, GMC, that was identified as the end user for some exports to China. GMC probably was created with the complicity of Manten vice president Chen Haoli and his wife Chan Kwan-chun, because the shell company was registered at their home address.¹⁷⁶ Xu was sentenced to forty-four months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. Manten also forfeited the revenue from the illegal sales.¹⁷⁷ Also see Chen Xiuling.

Yan Wengui (arrested 2014)

Yan Wengui was a naturalized U.S. citizen and Arkansas-based research geneticist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture who was accused of stealing seed strains for the China Academy of Agricultural Science and the Crop Research Institute. Yan along with Zhang Weiqiang hosted a delegation from the Chinese institutes to Ventria and U.S. Department of Agriculture facilities in 2012 following a trip to China to discuss cooperation. Investigators found proprietary seed strains in the luggage of the delegation as they were departing the United States and in the homes of Zhang and Yan.¹⁷⁸ The motivations of Zhang and his coconspirator are unclear. Also see Zhang Weiqiang.

Yang Bin (arrested 2012, pleaded guilty 2013)

Yang Bin, a Chinese national and businessman with the Changsha Harsay Industry Company, attempted to illegally export accelerometers to China. The Endevco 7270–200K accelerometers Yang attempted to acquire can be used for, among other things, “smart” munitions, bunker-busting bombs, military aircraft, and measuring nuclear and chemical explosions. In 2010 he posted a request on an Internet business forum that he was looking to acquire accelerometers made by Honeywell. An undercover U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent responded positively, and they arranged for a meeting in Bulgaria where the agent could deliver two accelerometers in person. Bulgarian authorities arrested Yang at Washington’s request, and he was extradited to the United States in May 2012. In 2013 Yang was sentenced to twenty-seven months in prison and three years of supervised release.¹⁷⁹

Yang Chunlai (arrested 2011, pleaded guilty 2012)

Yang Chunlai was a naturalized U.S. citizen and senior software engineer at the CME Group who downloaded company source code to start his own business in China. Yang along with two unnamed business associates planned to use the CME Group’s global trading platform and related software to establish a China-based mercantile exchange. They also intended to sell their software derived from CME Group’s products to speed up the Zhangjiagang chemical electronic trading market. He pleaded guilty to two counts of trade secret theft for stealing more than 10,000 files that CME estimated were worth $50 million.¹⁸⁰ Yang avoided jail time, receiving four years of probation.¹⁸¹

Yang Feng (arrested 2007, pleaded guilty 2007)

Yang Feng (also known as Yang Fung) was the president of Excellence Engineering Electronics, Inc., who exported controlled electronics to China. Specifically, Yang sold microwave integrated circuits to unknown end users.¹⁸²

Yang Fung (charged 2007, pleaded guilty 2007)

Yang, the president of Excellence Engineering Electronics, Inc., pleaded guilty to charges of illegally exporting controlled microwave integrated circuits to China without Department of Commerce authorization.

Yang Lian (arrested 2010, pleaded guilty 2011)

Yang Lian was a former software engineer at Microsoft who attempted to buy computer chips classified as defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List for an unnamed partner in China. He attempted to export three hundred radiation-hardened programmable semiconductors that are primarily used in satellites or other aerospace products. According to the FBI, Yang also considered creating a company to conceal the fact that the intended end user was in China as well as planning to falsify purchase orders to suggest the parts could be legally exported. One of the people Yang contacted to pursue the acquisition of these semiconductors cooperated with the FBI and helped engineer the bureau’s sting operation. Yang wired $60,000 to an FBI account and was prepared to make another payment of $20,000 as part of the $700,000 total for the semiconductors. Yang’s motive presumably was financial, and he described his interlocutors in China as “old school friends.”¹⁸³ He was sentenced to eighteen months in prison in 2011.¹⁸⁴

Yang Su (arrested 2008)

Yang Su attempted to purchase and illegally export amplifiers that are export-controlled for military purposes. The amplifiers in this case are used for digital radios and wireless area networks. Yang and his colleague Ding Zhengxing were arrested in Saipan, where they planned to take possession of the purchased amplifiers. A third person, Peter Zhu of Shanghai Meuro Electronics Company, was not caught. As of October 2016 no further information was available on the disposition of this case.¹⁸⁵

Yang, Tzu-Wei “David” (arrested 2001 sentenced 2002)

Tzu-Wei “David” Yang was a Taiwanese national with U.S. permanent residency who ran a freight forwarding company to be used in a plot to smuggle encryption devices to China. Yang along with You-Tsai “Eugene” Hsu planned to purchase and ship the KIV-7HS encryption device made by Mykotronx to China via an intermediary in Singapore. Hsu was the one who contacted Mykotronx and made the arrangements.¹⁸⁶ Yang received two concurrent thirty-month prison sentences for his role in the conspiracy.¹⁸⁷ Also see Hu, You-Tsai “Eugene.”

Ye Fei (arrested 2001, pleaded guilty 2006)

Ye Fei is a naturalized U.S. citizen and engineer at Transmeta who was arrested with Zhong Ming at San Francisco International Airport attempting to leave the country with proprietary information from Sun Microsystems, NEC Electronics Corporation, and Transmeta, among others. Ye previously worked at Sun.¹⁸⁸ At the time of his arrest, Ye had the proprietary documents in his possession. The two individuals were the first two prosecuted successfully under the Economic Espionage Act passed in 1996. Zhong and Ye intended to establish their company in China manufacturing integrated circuits, and they sought 863 Program funding and assistance from the Hangzhou municipal government to support their new endeavor.¹⁸⁹ According to the prosecuting attorney, the two engineers appear motivated by greed rather than any desire to assist the Chinese government.¹⁹⁰ Also see Zhong Ming.

Ye Jian (stopped 2012)

Ye Jian was the research manager of the Kings Nower Seed Company, a subsidiary of Beijing Dabeinong Technology Group.¹⁹¹ Ye was stopped and searched alongside his colleague and coconspirator Li Shaoming, and U.S. authorities seized dozens of corn seed packets hidden in microwave popcorn packets. Neither man was arrested to preserve the continuing investigation into corn seed theft and Hailong “Robert” Mo.

Yu Xiangdong “Mike” (arrested 2009)

Yu Xiangdong of Beijing was a product engineer at Ford Motor Company from 1997 to 2007 who attempted to carry four thousand sensitive company documents, including designs, to China in 2009. When U.S. authorities arrested Yu at Chicago O’Hare International Airport, he was carrying an external hard drive with the company documents. In 2005 he began talks with Shenzhen-based Foxconn PCE Industry Inc. about future employment and may have begun providing Ford designs in those meetings.

Yuan Wanli (indicted 2011, fled to China)

Yuan Wanli was a Chinese national and businessman who attempted to acquire controlled programmable logic devices while impersonating an employee of an unnamed U.S. company. He worked for the China Wingwish Group, which procured dual-use electronics for sale in China, and was assisted by Song Jiang. Yuan falsely claimed to be Nicholas Bush and an employee of the impersonated U.S. company. As part of the deception, Yuan created a fake website and email addresses for the U.S. company and misrepresented the address of a freight forwarder as being associated with this company.¹⁹² Yuan and Song attempted to purchase programmable logic devices manufactured by the Lattice Semiconductor Corporation. The devices were designed to operate at extreme temperatures and were of sufficient quality for military applications, such as in missiles or radar systems. The U.S. government seized $414,000 transferred into U.S. banks as a part of the down payment for the programmable logic devices.¹⁹³ Also see Song Jiang.

Zhang Bo (arrested 2012, pleaded guilty 2013)

Zhang Bo was a contractor doing computer programming for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York who stole software code that cost the U.S. Treasury Department $9.8 million to develop. He copied the code onto an external hard drive and told fellow employees that he had lost the hard drive. Investigators started looking into Zhang after a coworker complained to a supervisor that he had lost that hard drive. Although Zhang told authorities that he stole the code for private use in case he lost his job, there was never any clear motive for the theft. The software code he stole related to the Government-wide Accounting and Reporting Program, which tracks U.S. government expenditures and provides government agencies with their operating balance. Zhang was charged with stealing government property rather than trade secret theft, which carries a much more serious penalty. The court sentenced Zhang to six months of house arrest.¹⁹⁴

Zhang, Michael Ming
(indicted January 2009, pleaded guilty 2009)

Michael Ming Zhang was the owner and president of J. J. Electronics, based in Rancho Cucamonga, California, who exported controlled dual-use electronic components to China and imported counterfeit computer chips. Among the dual-use components were electronic systems used in U.S. tanks made by Vetronix Research Corporation. Zhang shipped these parts abroad through both the Shenzhen office of J. J. Electronics and Fangyuan Electronics Limited, a transshipment point company in China and Hong Kong.¹⁹⁵ Zhang also trafficked roughly 4,300 counterfeit Cisco chips in 25 separate transactions with an estimated value of $3.3 million. In 2010 a court sentenced Zhang to eighteen months in prison and three years of supervised release and forced him to pay the companies whose parts had been counterfeited.¹⁹⁶

Zhang Mingsuan (arrested 2012, pleaded guilty 2013)

Zhang Mingsuan was a Chinese national who attempted to acquire military-grade carbon fiber. Although Zhang claimed to be acquiring the material for sports equipment, he stated to an undercover U.S. Department of Commerce investigator that he needed the carbon fiber in connection with upcoming flight tests of a Chinese fighter plane.¹⁹⁷ At the time, the specific carbon fiber, Toray-type M60JB-3000-50B, cost roughly $1,000 per pound, and prosecutors alleged Zhang was prepared to spend $4 million and was looking for a steady supply.¹⁹⁸ One report claimed Zhang was acting on behalf of China North Industries Corporation. He pleaded guilty to violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and was sentenced to nearly five years in prison.¹⁹⁹

Zhang Weiqiang (arrested 2014)

Zhang Weiqiang, a rice breeder at Ventria Bioscience in Manhattan, Kansas, was accused of stealing seed strains for the China Academy of Agricultural Science and the Crop Research Institute. Zhang, a U.S. permanent resident, along with Yan Wengui hosted a delegation from the Chinese institutes to Ventria and U.S. Department of Agriculture facilities in 2012 following a trip to China to discuss cooperation. Investigators found proprietary seed strains in the luggage of the delegation as they were departing the United States and in the homes of Zhang and Yan.²⁰⁰ The motivations of Zhang and his coconspirator are unclear. Also see Yan Wengui.

Zhang Xinsheng (indicted 2015)

Zhang Xinsheng is a Chinese national who was indicted in connection with Wenxia “Wency” Man’s efforts to acquire U.S. fighter jet engines. Man described Zhang’s position as a “technology spy” who worked on behalf of the PLA to acquire or copy foreign defense technology for domestic production.²⁰¹ According to the U.S. Justice Department, Man and Zhang attempted to acquire and export the following defense articles and related technical data: Pratt and Whitney F135-PW-100 engines used in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter; Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100 turbofan engines used in the F-22 Raptor fighter jet; General Electric F110-GE-132 engines designed for the F-16 fighter jet; and the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B unmanned aerial vehicle.²⁰² The two thought to use either South Korea, Israel, or Hong Kong as the channel through which to disguise China as the ultimate end user.²⁰³ Also see Man, Wenxia “Wency.”

Zhang, Zhaowei “Kevin” (arrested 2012)

Zhaowei “Kevin” Zhang was a naturalized Canadian citizen who conspired to export defense articles without a license. Specifically, Zhang attempted to acquire gyroscopes used in unmanned aerial vehicles and missile guidance systems. He sought U.S. intermediaries who could ship the equipment to his Calgary home, where he would then repackage the gyroscopes for shipping to China. Neither the ultimate end user nor Zhang’s compensation were named in the court documents.²⁰⁴

Zhao Haichun (indicted 2013)

Zhao Haichun was a technology manager at Sinovel who was indicted for his role in recruiting American Semiconductor Corporation (AMSC) engineer Dejan Karabasevic to steal trade secrets for Sinovel.²⁰⁵ Zhao and Su Liying recruited Karabasevic to steal AMSC source code for operating wind turbines, so that Sinovel could produce and retrofit wind turbines without paying AMSC roughly $800 million for previously delivered goods and services. Also see Dejan Karabasevic.

Zhao Huajun (arrested 2013)

Zhao Huajun, a researcher at the Medical College of Wisconsin, stole samples of a possible cancer-fighting compound that he intended to pass to Zhejiang University. He was captured on security footage entering and leaving the laboratory at the time the sample vials went missing.²⁰⁶

Zhejiang Hongchen Irrigation Equipment Company
(indicted 2012, pleaded guilty 2014)

Zhejiang Hongchen Irrigation Equipment Company, with the aid of Janice Kuang Capener, stole trade secrets from the Utah-based Orbit Irrigation Products. Capener, who worked at Orbit’s China manufacturing facility, stole sales and pricing information from that company, and she provided that information to Zhejiang Hongchen as a part of a coordinated effort to undermine Orbit’s market position. Zhejiang Hongchen pleaded guilty to stealing trade secrets and related crimes. The company was sentenced to three years of probation, fined $100,000, and forced to pay $300,000 in restitution to Orbit Irrigation Products.²⁰⁷

Zhong Ming (arrested 2001, pleaded guilty 2006)

Zhong Ming is a Chinese citizen with U.S. permanent residency and an engineer at Transmeta who was arrested with Ye Fei at San Francisco International Airport attempting to leave the country with proprietary information from Sun Microsystems, NEC Electronics Corporation, and Transmeta, among others. The two individuals were the first two prosecuted successfully under the Economic Espionage Act passed in 1996. As part of the plea agreement, Zhong assisted in the investigation of Lee Lan and Ge Yuefei.²⁰⁸ Zhong and Ye intended to establish their company in China manufacturing integrated circuits, and they sought 863 Program funding and assistance from the Hangzhou municipal government to support their new endeavor.²⁰⁹ Also see Ye Fei.

Zhu, Peter (indicted 2007)

Peter Zhu of Shanghai Meuro Electronics Company was a third defendant in Ding Zhengxing and Yang Su’s plot to purchase and illegally export amplifiers that are export-controlled for military purposes. The indictment was unsealed in December 2007, and no further information could be found about Zhu’s identity.²¹⁰ Also see Ding Zhengxing and Yang Su.

Zhu Zhaoxin (pleaded guilty 2004)

Zhu Zhaoxin was a Chinese national who attempted to purchase controlled satellite and radar technologies for export to China. In his effort to acquire the equipment, he came in contact with federal law enforcement who controlled the attempted transaction and lured Zhu to a U.S. jurisdiction. Zhu was sentenced to two years in prison and three years of supervised release.²¹¹

Zhuang Jinghua (arrested 2003, pleaded guilty 2003)

Zhuang Jinghua was a co-owner of Maytone International who conspired with his wife, Liang Xiuwen, to export components for U.S. military aircraft and missiles. Zhuang previously had been an international sales manager for Harris Corporation, a Fortune 500 company specializing in communications equipment. Specifically, Zhuang and Liang attempted to export F-14 Tomcat parts as well as components for the HAWK surface-to-air missile, TOW anti-tank missile, and AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile. At least one of the Chinese purchasers was believed to be in Shenyang. The two were caught in 2003 as part of lengthy undercover investigation into U.S. companies that offer defense articles over the Internet to foreign buyers. In 2003 Zhuang was sentenced to thirty months in prison and fined $6,000.²¹² Also see Liang Xiuwen “Jennifer.”