Chapter 6

The Somme 1916

The Somme, and not Haig’s Flanders operation, became the major British operation of 1916. The BEF took over the northern Somme sector from the French in July and August 1915. Although the front of fourteen miles was largely quiet, there were parts which had seen very fierce but local fighting in the winter of 1914 and the spring of 1915. In a number of places mine warfare had broken out, in particular at Carnoy, Bois Français, Fricourt and La Boisselle. General Fowke moved 174 and 183 Tunnelling Companies south, but the British did not have enough miners to take over the large number of French shafts and they agreed to leave their engineers at work for several weeks. To provide the tunnellers needed the British formed 178 and 179 Companies in August, followed by 185 and 252 Companies in October. These units were created partly by recruiting men from units in the sectors and partly from enlistment at home. Good recruits were still found from units such as the 51st Highland Division, which included many Territorials who were professional coal miners from the Fife coalfields. Those miners coming from home were increasingly unfit and many were sent home soon after arrival in France, or within a few weeks, especially during the winter of 1915-16.

The British found shafts of 20–30ft depth, mainly sunk from the front line or close behind. The Germans had the advantage in all of the sectors and in many places were very close to or actually below the front line taken over by the British. During the autumn and winter these companies fought a hard battle. They had first to secure the British lines, in places having to abandon the front line and beginning a new series of shafts further back. The British tunnellers regarded their French counterparts as unproductive, using tunnels which were too cramped for effective working and with excessive timbering, which further slowed their progress. Close below the surface was chalk and inclined entrances were largely used, as the chalk would support them and they facilitated the removal of spoil by tramming. As they sank deeper the chalk became extremely hard and both sides used blasting, especially when closer to their own lines, but it was a method which alerted the other side to activity. The Germans did not feel much threatened until the early months of 1916, by which time the British had created defensive systems at around 40ft depth, including transversals to protect their front lines and deep attack tunnels just above the water level, which they encountered at about 100ft. As the British were achieving this, however, they also relieved more of the French front, at Arras and Vimy Ridge, which contained active mining areas, and in February 184 and 185 Companies were withdrawn from the Somme and sent north. At the beginning of March 1916, Haig formed the 4th Army, which took over the Somme front in order to carry out the Franco-British attack due to begin in June. He placed General Rawlinson in command and Rawlinson obtained Preedy, whose 170 Company had just carried out the Hohenzollern mining attack, as his Controller of Mines. The five remaining Tunnelling companies on the Somme front were to play a major part in the Somme offensive, especially the first day of the infantry attack.

The Somme was to be characterized by yet larger mines, laid deep in the chalk and often overcharged to throw up high lips for screening and to give advantage to the attackers when, or if, they captured them. The tunnellers were to make two major contributions to the opening attack. Firstly they placed a number of mines beneath or close to the German front lines. Secondly they prepared a series of shallow Russian saps from the British front line into no man’s land (see Chapter 9). Rawlinson’s original attack plan was for a limited advance such as he had evolved during spring and summer 1915, concentrating on taking the first line of German trenches in a tactic that he called ‘bite and hold’. This was a safer method of proceeding, but was extremely slow and politically unacceptable, as the Government believed that the BEF now had both the manpower and munitions to beat the Germans. Haig therefore required Rawlinson to redraw his plan to capture all of the German in-depth defences in his initial attack, to allow a general advance. Rawlinson acquiesced, even though he knew that his artillery was insufficient to destroy either the defences or the defenders to such a depth. Haig likewise complied with the desire of the British government for a quick victory, despite reservations that he had about the ability of his forces to fight effectively. The infantry attack was preceded by a six-day bombardment, prolonged so that the British artillery could shell all of the German defences.

The northernmost corps carrying out the main attack (there was also a diversion further north at Gommecourt) was VIII Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Hunter-Weston, a Sapper whose recent experience of mine warfare was at Helles. Controversially and disastrously, a mine beneath the Hawthorn Redoubt was to be mishandled by VIII Corps. This particularly powerful position, on the crest of a hill dominating the valley in front of the village of Beaumont Hamel, was selected for mine attack. A gallery (H3) to destroy the Redoubt was started at 80ft depth by 252 Company, commanded by Captain Rex Trower, on about 4 April and at the end of the month he reported good progress:

This Company has every record for the Army beaten by the driving in the Hawthorne Mine. In this we made 35 feet in 24 hrs 200 feet in one week of 7 days – 322 feet in fourteen days, and 565 feet in 26 days. This is one tunnel with one face only and the length to destroy the enemy trench will be 1055 feet.¹

As they neared the German lines, however, work slowed: the air was bad at the end of the long tunnel and it was extremely difficult to work without alerting the Germans:

Extraordinary difficulty is being encountered with mine H3. The length is now 900ft and work is being carried on silently by wetting the face and working the chalk out with bayonets. This face is now entirely flint and progress is very slow.²

On 22 June, however, a charge of 40,600lbs of ammonal was in place beneath the Hawthorn Redoubt. On 25th Trower was informed that the infantry attack was to begin at 7.30am on 29 June, but the following day the date was postponed to 1 July. He was also told that he was to detonate the mine at 7.20am, ten minutes before zero. This contradicted the recent experience of St Eloi, where only a few seconds were regarded as necessary for debris to fall. The 29th Division plan required the 2nd Royal Fusiliers to rush the crater before the main attack at 7.30. Therefore, the heavy artillery was ordered to ‘lift’ onto the next target from the front trenches at 7.20am instead of lifting at zero hour (7.30am). However, it was ordered to lift not only from the Hawthorn Redoubt and the surrounding trenches, but also from the whole of the German front line on the 8th Corps front.³