Chapter 7

Vimy, Arras and Messines 1917

1917 saw the culmination of British mining potential and the establishment of a partial supremacy by British miners on some fronts. In the set piece and limited British victories of April and June mining played a role, although at Vimy and Arras a very limited one. At the Battle of Arras and the assault on Vimy Ridge, launched on 9 April 1917, the British could have placed a large number of mines beneath or near the German lines, but chose not to do so. The Vimy Ridge and Arras positions were taken over by the British from the French in March 1916. Extremely heavy fighting had taken place between the French and Germans during 1915. Following the capture of Carency the French had pushed the Germans to the crest of the ridge but, as at Vauquois, the Germans still retained observation over the Allied rear areas.

The British took over a mining situation similar to that in the active area of the Somme the previous summer, with the Germans dominant and in many places beneath their front lines. Five British Tunnelling Companies were deployed along the ridge and seventy mines were fired in the first two months of the British occupation, mostly by the Germans. The Germans also used trench mortar fire on the shaft heads and this was the cause of high casualties amongst the tunnellers at Vimy. A German overland attack in May 1916, which forced the British back 700yds, was aimed at neutralising British mining activity by capturing the shaft entrances above ground. From June 1916, however, the Germans withdrew many miners to work on the preparation for the new defence system known collectively as the Hindenburg Line, and also, subsequently, for work in the mining industry at home. German activity tailed off and in the second half of 1916 the British established strong defensive underground positions incorporating transversal galleries. From August the British tunnelling companies were able to develop schemes for laying mines to support an attack on the Ridge proposed for autumn 1916, although this was subsequently postponed. The Canadian Corps was posted to the northern part of the Ridge in October 1916 and preparations for an attack were revived in February 1917.

The commander of 182 Company, Mulqueen, described an encounter with General Currie, commanding the 1st Canadian Division, which took over the Carency and Berthonval sectors. Mulqueen explained that his men had obtained supremacy, but still needed to engage in offensive mining in places.

General Currie was very interested in the offensive mines which had been, and were being built. He asked many questions regarding their depth, the weight of explosive in them, or intended, the size of the craters which would result, etc., etc. Nothing further was said and I was asked to keep in close touch with his G.S.O. 1, Colonel Radcliffe.¹

Mulqueen was a frequent visitor to the Divisional headquarters, but only later did Currie fully explain to him his views on mines for the offensive. Commanders in the Canadian Corps were very likely to have been influenced by the Canadians’ experience at St Eloi in April 1916, where the mines that Mulqueen had pioneered had so altered and damaged the landscape as to render occupation of the craters by the infantry all but impossible. Mulqueen’s 182 Company, however, and the other tunnellers on Vimy Ridge, were looking forward to playing their part in the coming attack:

Above ground there were persistent rumours of a British attack on the ‘Ridge’ and underground we drove eagerly forward with our offensive mines, all the while congratulating ourselves on our unquestioned superiority of position. We lived and dreamed mines and the effect which they would have on the Hun. All of this was reported to the G.S.O.1, and he accepted it with patient reserve. When and by whom the meeting was called I have forgotten. All I can remember is the shock which I received at it. The purpose of the meeting was to consider preliminary arrangements for the assault on the ‘Ridge’. The meeting was not a large one, but it is probable a representative of the Corps was on hand. I was with Colonel Williams [1st Army Controller of Mines], but I do not remember representatives of any of the other Tunnelling Companies and it may be it was purely a First Division affair. General Currie spoke and stated that he had come to the conclusion that the large mines which were charged would be more of a hindrance than a help and, that they were not to be fired. He was so definite and his reasons were so sound that even had I had the authority to do so, I had no grounds on which to advance counter arguments. He pointed out that should a line of craters be thrown up under the German lines, they would undoubtedly disrupt the German front line position, but they would also hinder the advancing troops and force them to move forward over extremely difficult terrain. The chasms would be at least fifty feet deep and the attackers would be forced to move around their rims and would be sitting targets for enemy machine guns stationed in his support trenches. He considered these alone were sufficient reasons to drop the offensive mining operations, but he advanced the further argument that the Tunnelling Companies would be much better employed building subways. At that time we had several mines charged with some 120,000 pounds of explosive. Our plans called for charging several more, but these were all dropped. The mines which were charged were left undisturbed and while we rounded out one or two headings which were then well advanced, we did not embark on any new offensive operations.²

Officers from the Canadian Corps studied the problems of advancing across heavily mine cratered ground and visited La Boisselle and Fricourt on the old Somme battlefield for this purpose. They were impressed by the fact that the decision not to assault across the crater areas had left troops on either side heavily exposed to fire from these areas, but concluded that the craters only rarely caused an obstacle. Parties could infiltrate around the lips of the craters with machine guns (the lighter Lewis gun was by then far more plentiful than in July 1916):

The general conclusion arrived at is that, with the exception of the big ones of recent formation, such as Montreal and Patricia, the Craters do not present an insurmountable obstacle. This opinion is confirmed by the experience of several raids which have been carried out. They must be negotiated by small parties who can take advantage of the causeways formed by the lips, skirting the actual bottoms, which are likely to be wet and holding [sic]. The advance of these parties will be covered by a barrage of Stokes Mortars and Rifle Grenades.

Special means of ingress into the Craters will be prepared by a trench or Russian Sap, each individual crater being treated differently.³

Despite this report, offensive mines were removed from the entire central portion of the Canadian Corps attack opposite Hill 145, which was the highest part of the ridge and amongst the hardest fought over. Further mines were vetoed following the blowing by the Germans on 23 March of nine craters, named the Longfellow group, along no man’s land. These craters effectively closed a gap between a large crater to the north, Broadmarsh, and others to the south, leaving just 100yds of no man’s land clear. It is probable that the Germans were aiming to restrict the passage of attackers to predictable points as well as blowing craters as tank obstacles. It was therefore decided that three mines laid by 172 Company should not be blown, although the largest was designed to prevent the Germans firing across the Broadmarsh crater. These mines were left in place after the assault and only removed in the 1990s. Of a large number of British mines under preparation on Vimy Ridge, probably eleven were charged in preparation for the attack, but on the day just three were blown, including those forming a northern defensive flank.⁴ The 1st Army Controller of Mines, Lieutenant Colonel G.C. Williams, strongly implied after the attack that the Broadmarsh crater was too powerful a position to have been left intact:

The position of Broadmarsh Crater is very commanding, and situated as it is at the commencement of a re-entrant in the enemy lines, it completely enfiladed our position behind the main group of craters to the south. It is a question whether the abandonment of this mine was wise, for our troops suffered heavily in traversing the gap. An inspection of Broadmarsh Crater has shown that the enemy dug-outs at the bottom were practically untouched by the bombardment. There is every reason to believe that the enemy machine gunners accommodated in them were ready on the lip when the assault came over.⁵

In the north of the attack on Vimy Ridge a mine was prepared by 176 Tunnelling Company against the strongpoint position known as the Pimple, which was not completed in time for the attack. This was notable for the use that it made of the geological formation of that part of the ridge, where sand and clay lay over the chalk. The gallery was pushed silently through the clay, but by 9 April was still 70ft short of its target. The Pimple was not captured until 12 April but, despite this delay, the mine would not have reached under the strongpoint.⁶

Owing to the German withdrawal from their front line south-east of Arras, the only mine that was used on the Arras front on 9 April was to the north-east, at Blagny. This was apparently a 2,200lb charge and was blown at zero, 5.30am, and, according to Lieutenant J.C. Neill of the New Zealand Tunnelling Company, destroyed two dugouts, 50yds of trench and a concrete pillbox. However, it also stunned and apparently buried some members of the 13th Royal Scots and checked their assault temporarily.⁷