2
OPERATIONAL PLANNING:
AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 1915
On 6 September 1915 General Sir Douglas Haig gave the main pre-battle conference at the Chateau of Hinges, First Army’s headquarters.1 All the senior First Army officers were present at this gathering, at which Haig expressed his thoughts on the coming attack and repeated the reason why the British and French must launch a new offensive: to take some pressure off Russia. First Army would, therefore, support the French to the ‘full extent’ of its power. But this was not to be the limited artillery action mooted in early August. Haig was now confident of not only securing the line Loos–Hulluch, but also of taking Hill 70 and then pushing onto the Haute Deule canal, over five miles from the British front line. Anticipating a ‘rapid’ advance, Haig told the officers that ‘it is not enough to gain a tactical success. The direction of our advance’, he believed, ‘must be such as will bring us upon the enemy’s rear so that we will cut his communications and force him to retreat.’
Haig’s apologists have tended to see Loos as a tragic example of what happens when politicians go against the professional opinions of soldiers and – to some extent it was – but the tactical arrangements for the battle, as John Terraine has explained, were ‘Haig’s responsibility’.2 In contrast to his earlier concerns about an attack between the La Bassée canal and Loos, the commander of First Army had now, seemingly, changed his mind. Withan army that, as he fully recognised, was short of guns, shells and trained officers and men – literally everything that modern war required – Haig was planning not merely a limited subsidiary operation, but a high-risk breakthrough aimed at securing a strategic victory over the German Sixth Army. How Haig came to anticipate this rapid and decisive advance, when all previous experience of First Army during 1915 had been of limited, sometimes non-existent, gains with correspondingly heavy casualties, must be understood if one is to appreciate how the Battle of Loos was planned and fought.
This striking development, from the earlier pessimism to the ambitious and far-reaching plan subsequently adopted, is perhaps the greatest question concerning the planning of the Battle of Loos. Traditional interpretations have tended to stress that this was simply because the orders Sir John French received from Lord Kitchener called for a major ‘all-out’ attack to be pressed to support Britain’s allies. On closer inspection it can be seen that this ‘all-out’ attack emerged, not so much from Kitchener’s orders – which allowed considerable operational scope – but out of the conflicting opinions (and subsequent confusion) between French and Haig as to how the battle would be fought. This stemmed from a number of factors, including Sir John’s waning interest in the battle and his recurrent ill health, which did much to hamper GHQ’s control of operations. There is also the role of Sir Douglas Haig to reassess, especially in the development of the ‘all-out’ attack, his thoughts on the theoretical nature of warfare and his attitude to technology, particularly gas.
On the afternoon of 5 August 1915 – the anniversary of British mobilisation the previous year – the sleepy village of Hinges, set amongst open fields two miles north of Béthune, became the base for the headquarters of First Army. After spending most of the summer at the chateau of Aire, Haig had transferred to Hinges to be closer to the front for the coming, decisive battle. From the quiet grounds of his headquarters, Haig commanded an army that consisted of over 260,000 men, supported by around 70,000 horses and mules, and split more or less evenly into four corps. Ever since its inception on 26 December 1914, First Army had held the southern sector of the British line. By September 1915 this was twenty-one miles in length. It stretched from the town of Armentières in the north, where it joined General Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second Army, to Lens in the south, where the left flank of the French Tenth Army was deployed.3
A stocky, dour Presbyterian Scot, Haig was 54-years old, and a waxing power within the British Army.4 Although they had worked closely together for many years, and held similar views on the continued relevance and importance of cavalry, the cold, inarticulate Haig could not have been less like the emotional Sir John French. While the latter was at his happiest when galloping across the veldt, Haig was more accustomed to working behind the scenes as a staff officer. He was more of an ‘educated soldier’ than Sir John and had been the author of several military manuals, including Cavalry Training (1907) and Field Service Regulations (1909). But there were flaws in Haig’s character. He may have been a quiet, urbane officer of determination, focus and strict professionalism, but in some respects, he was curiously backward looking; a traditionalist who found it difficult to make the mental leap necessary to understand the warfare that would develop on the Western Front. He was also an incurable optimist, whose glass was always half full. And when this was buttressed by his powerful sense of religious destiny, it was to prove a formidable combination.
While Haig’s ability as a commander has been endlessly debated, in order to understand the operations First Army conducted in this period, it is necessary to examine those subordinate officers who were tasked with turning Haig’s initial ideas into a workable plan. Corps was the key level of command. First Army consisted of four corps, each containing around 60,000 men.5 By the summer of 1915 they were deployed as follows. On the extreme left was III Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney. Ill Corps was deployed from Armentières to a point opposite the Aubers Ridge. Here it linked up with Indian Corps north of the village of Neuve Chapelle, the scene of much bitter fighting earlier in the year.6 At the village of Givenchy, just north of the La Bassée canal, Indian Corps met Lieutenant-General Hubert Gough’s I Corps. Gough’s sector crossed the canal, eventually drawing up on the left of IV Corps on the Vermelles–Hulluch road. IV Corps was commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson and completed First Army’s lines.
It was in the days after Sir John French had first proposed his limited ‘artillery plan’ that Haig began seriously to consider offensive operations in the La Bassée–Loos area. Although only required to neutralise enemy artillery batteries on its front, if the French made major gains south of Lens, First Army would be required to advance and complete the defeat of the enemy. This operation would be made by I and IV Corps, deployed on the southern half of First Army’s front. At a meeting with his corps commanders on 13 August, Haig asked Gough to draft plans for the capture of a massive German earthwork (known as the Hohenzollern Redoubt), while Rawlinson was to take the village of Loos and possibly look to an advance towards Hill 70.7 From the plans the two commanders subsequently drafted it is possible to see a divergence in approach. This seems to have stemmed largely from their differing characters and ideas about war. While Gough’s plan was relatively simple – a division would ‘rush’ the German positions at dawn, following a preliminary bombardment and a gas discharge – Rawlinson’s was much more cautious. He was sceptical about the use of gas and offered a three-step operation, using heavy bombardments while slowly sapping forward; a task that he admitted could take up to a week. Haig’s reaction to these plans would determine, to a great extent, how First Army would fight the Battle of Loos.
Hailing from an illustrious military family from Ireland – his father, uncle and brother had all received the Victoria Cross – Hubert de la Poer Gough (GOC I Corps) was, by 1915, one of the ‘bright young things’ of the British Army.8 A cavalry officer, renowned for his drive and aggression, although somewhat prone to arrogance, Gough was primarily famous before the war for his role in the Curragh ‘mutiny’ of March 1914, where as GOC 3 Cavalry Brigade, he (supported by his officers) refused to be part of any move to coerce Ulster into accepting Irish Home Rule. Although the resulting political scandal forced the resignation of the then CIGS, Sir John French, Gough survived and went to war with 3 Cavalry Brigade in August 1914. Once at the front Gough was successively promoted, eventually becoming GOC I Corps at age of forty-five in July 1915; something that he admitted brought with it ‘special difficulties’.9 As well as arousing an understandable jealousy among some on account of his meteoric rise, Gough did not shirk controversy and gained a reputation as a ruthless ‘thruster’ with a habit of sacking subordinates who were less offensively minded than he felt desirable.10 Gough was also one of Haig’s protégés, sharing the latter’s views on the continued importance and relevance of cavalry and providing the commander of First Army with a ‘spirited, direct and witty’ confidant, particularly after the death of his brother ‘Johnnie’ Gough (MGGS First Army) in February 1915.11
At fifty-one years of age, Sir Henry Rawlins on (GOC IV Corps) could not compete with either Gough’s youth or his closeness to Haig, but he was an infantryman of great experience and competence. Although not involved in the BEF from August 1914, Rawlinson took part in the abortive operations around Antwerp with IV Corps, before finally arriving on the Western Front in time for the First Battle of Ypres in mid-October. Rawlinson, the subject of arguably the most important biography of a senior British commander in Command on the Western Front (1992), seems to have been a curiously frustrating general.12 Although by as early as March 1915 he had correctly perceived that the key to success on the Western Front was the density of artillery fire and the application of small ‘bite and hold’ attacks, he was sometimes incapable (or unwilling) of acting upon this knowledge. Throughout 1915 and 1916, Rawlinson was torn between his personal belief in the necessity for limited, artillery-heavy operations aimed at conquering local points of tactical importance and the calls for wider and deeper breakthrough operations that came from more optimistic officers, particularly Haig. But Rawlinson could also not fail to realise how fragile his position would become if he incurred the wrath of his army commander. Indeed, Rawlinson had barely survived a collision with one of his subordinates following the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915. In the days following the closure of operations, Rawlinson had wanted to send home Major-General F.J. Davies (GOC 8th Division) for apparently ‘dissipating’ his reserves around the battlefield. In fact, on further investigation, it was revealed that Davies was innocent and Rawlinson had been at fault.13 The Commander of IV Corps had only survived because of Haig’s personal intervention.
Within nine days both corps commanders had drafted plans for the capture of the relevant enemy positions. After making a reconnaissance and visiting Haig to discuss the extent of his attack, Gough completed his plan.14 With the village of Hulluch as his final objective, Gough proposed initially to secure and consolidate the cluttered mining area around Fosse 8 and the Hohenzollern Redoubt. This would form the left flank for a further assault on the German front line between the Redoubt and the Vermelles–Hulluch road, with a subsequent advance being made in the direction of the Quarries if events proved favourable. So bad were the ground conditions further north that Gough did not consider an attack in this sector practicable. Even if attacks were successful in taking the German front line, they would only then ‘run into the labyrinth of houses of Auchy and Haisnes’ and so were to be avoided.
While admitting that ‘it is impossible to put forward very definitive proposals’, Gough felt that the main attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt should be conducted by 9th (Scottish) Division.15 While the right brigade would push on towards Fosse 8 and the miners’ houses of Corons de Maroc and Corons de Pekin, the left brigade would secure its flank by taking and holding the German front line up to the Vermelles railway. The attack would take place at dawn – 4a.m. in mid-September – when the light was ‘poor’, thus allowing the whole of the day for consolidation. If the attack was a success, Gough proposed that 7th Division, then deployed on the right of 9th Division, would move forward to take advantage of the favourable situation. Once it had taken the German front line, 7th Division would push on through the Quarries towards Cite St Elie. But this, Gough warned, would be difficult, and ‘owing to the great distance that any assault by 7th Division against the line must cover’, the attack would be conducted the following night. The ground was ‘open, free from obstacles and favourable to a night attack’. As regards the use of asphyxiating gas, Gough believed that it would not alter his plans, but it ‘should be used before or at dawn, when [the] enemy [was] tired and panicky’.
Like Gough, Rawlinson spent a great deal of time looking over the proposed ground, and despite actually having a more favourable sector than that occupied by I Corps, he was not happy, recording in his diary that it was ‘no easy task to get Hill 70’.16 As he spent more time working on his plans, Rawlinson’s gloom increased. By 20 August he was lamenting that ‘it will cost us dear and we shall not get far’.17 The plan he submitted was, therefore, not surprisingly, notable for its ‘extreme caution’.18 ‘After a very careful personal reconnaissance of the ground,’ Rawlinson explained,‘I am strongly of opinion that the capture of Hill 70 cannot be undertaken successfully in one rush, but in two or three stages.’19 The first step would be an attack on the German front line between the Vermelles–Loos road and the La Bassée–Lens road. As the opposing trenches were relatively close together – between 150 and 200 yards – once the wire had been cleared away, the German lines could be ‘successfully assaulted without serious loss’. And again like Gough, Rawlinson handed the main attack to a New Army division with which he had been favourably impressed. Sometime between 7 and 9a.m., 15th (Scottish) Division would move forward in two columns and attack the German line.20 Getting the enemy wire cut was vital therefore, and to achieve this Rawlinson advocated a lengthy seven to ten day bombardment along the whole front of IV Corps.
Once the German defences had been sufficiently softened up, the second stage of Rawlinson’s plan could begin. He believed that this would offer a much more serious obstacle. The ‘formidable’ German second line, known in this sector as the Loos Defence Line, was ‘well-constructed and strongly wired’. It ran closely in front of the village of Loos, about 500 yards from the German first line, and was built at the bottom of an open slope. To take Loos, Rawlinson recommended two simultaneous attacks, one by 15th Division against Loos, and another by 47th (London) Division further to the south. This latter attack would capture the Double Crassier (a slag heap that enfiladed any advance upon Loos) and the mining buildings of Puits 16, thus both securing the flank and offering something of a diversion. But this would take time. Rawlinson wanted to sap forward from the German first line, down the slope towards Loos – possibly taking a week or more – and then make further attacks, well-supported by artillery and large discharges of gas. A subsequent advance would then, presumably, take place towards Hill 70, although this was not explicitly mentioned in Rawlinson’s report.21
Haig’s response was mixed. Whereas after visiting Gough and his BGRA, Brigadier-General J.F.N. Birch, Haig thought their bombardment plans were ‘very good’ and was impressed by the two ‘keen, energetic officers’,22 he was apparently disappointed with Rawlinson’s cautious plan, especially the role he allocated to gas. Because the British and German front line trenches were so close, Rawlinson believed there was no need to use it for the first stage of his operations, preferring instead to reserve it for the attack on Loos itself. Alongside the report, Haig wrote that ‘gas must be used by I Corps, and the element of surprise will disappear after its first use! ’These remarks revealed much about both Haig and the relationships he had with his two senior corps commanders. Although Gough had admitted that the use, or not, of gas did not materially affect his plans, Haig seems to have read Gough’s report first and instinctively taken his side. It would have been relatively simple to alter I Corps’ arrangements to suit Rawlinson’s plans, but this did not occur. Haig’s instinctive preference for Gough, his ‘uncertain’ attitude towards Rawlinson,23 and his grand hopes for the gas, meant that the assault at Loos would follow the ‘rush’ tactics favoured by Gough, rather than Rawlinson’s ‘bite and hold’ operation.
Following Lord Kitchener’s visit to France between 16 and 19 August, GHQ informed Haig that the ‘artillery plan’ was no longer viable.24 Instead of conducting an artillery battle and not hazarding its infantry, First Army had now to prepare for a major action in which they would ‘co-operate vigorously’ with the French. Haig’s exact orders regarding the battle have not often been consulted, but they deserve to be analysed in some detail. First Army was to launch an attack in concert with the French, scheduled at this point for 8 September. Haig was ordered to ‘support the French attack to the full extent of your available resources, and not to limit your action in the manner indicted in the above quoted letter [i.e., the “artillery” plan]’.25 Sir John’s order did, however, give Haig some room to manoeuvre, something that all commentators have missed.
This instruction is not, however, to be taken as preventing you from developing your attack deliberately and progressively, should you be of the opinion that the nature of the enemy’s defences makes such a course desirable.
In other words, as long as First Army attacked with commitment and power, it was Haig’s battle. Yet the commander of First Army seems to have either ignored or misunderstood this latter sentence, and this interpretation contained the seeds of the problems that would bear fruit both during the planning and execution of the battle.
Haig seems to have taken the ‘full extent of your available resources’ to mean an all-out infantry attack, and in many of the subsequent conferences and in his correspondence, he always quoted Sir John on this matter. It is clear that that Haig confused the strategic need for a ‘full’ attack with the tactical arrangements for the battle.26 Indeed, a phrase that had begun life as a strategic order from Lord Kitchener to French, now began to appear in the tactical arrangements for the coming offensive. Instead of using all of First Army’s resources to effect a strong, supporting attack, Haig simply passed down, without modification, the phrase ‘to the full extent of your power’ to corps and division, from where it reached brigades and battalions. For example, Brigadier-General M.G. Wilkinson’s 44 Brigade ‘Preliminary Operation Order’ of 13 September, urged that ‘the attack of the brigade must be pushed home to the full extent of its power’,27 and likewise on 4 September, Haig arranged with Rawlinson that 1st Division’s attack would be conducted with ‘full power’.28 When he received a pessimistic letter from Lieutenant-General Sir J. Willcocks (GOC Indian Corps) regarding the coming operations, Haig was exasperated, noting that First Army had been ordered to support the French attack ‘to the full extent of its resources’. ‘The Indian Corps’, Haig added, ‘must do it, I have!’29 This confusion was undoubtedly down to Haig and would have a considerable impact on how the battle was planned and executed lower down the chain of command.
Was an ‘all-out’ tactical assault what Sir John French wanted? It seems that he desired First Army to attack with commitment and power, but would have preferred a slower, more progressive attack. And although it was not the case that Sir John did not know what type of attack Haig was planning – he himself had urged Haig to attack on ‘as wide a front as possible’30 – it seems that French rapidly lost interest in the whole operation once the decision to embark on an autumn offensive had been taken. A major reason for this seems to have been Sir John’s health. During this period it was noticeably in decline. Between the end of August and mid-September, Sir John spent much of his time in bed, suffering from a series of fevers and heavy head colds. This may well have increased the isolation of GHQ and allowed issues, which should have been sorted out earlier – such as the matter of the General Reserve – to continue unresolved.31 It certainly meant that Sir John exercised a much looser control over operations than he previously had done. Sir William Robertson, French’s CGS, had apparently complained that ‘he can’t get Sir John to do anything’, and that ‘he is not well’.32 Similarly, on 29 August, French was ‘not at all well’ according to his Private Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Brinsley Fitzgerald. He did improve over the following days, but his high temperature was worrying, with Sir John being ‘very feverish and excitable’.33 This continued into the following month. By 19 September, Major Sidney Clive (Head of the British Mission at GQG) thought Sir John was ‘certainly not well’,34 and it was evidently becoming a serious problem; three days earlier Haig had written to his wife about French’s illness, commenting that it was ‘unsatisfactory having him laid up at this time’.35 It was in this ‘command vacuum’ that Haig planned his battle.
The breezy First Army conference of 6 September was a far cry from the pessimism of the summer.36 Indeed, grave doubts had now turned to considerable optimism. In concert with the powerful French attacks from Arras and Rheims, First Army would secure the line Loos–Hulluch and the ground extending to the La Bassée canal. The ultimate objectives, Haig pointed out, were Hill 70 and the crossings over the Haute Deule canal at Pont à Vendin. In response to both Gough’s and Rawlinson’s concerns about enfilade fire, Haig agreed that the central portion of the German line, opposite 7th and 1st Divisions, would also be attacked.37 Now all six divisions of I and IV Corps, containing over 75,000 men, were to attack simultaneously; from 2nd Division astride the La Bassée canal, to 47th (London) Division, dug in around the mining village of Maroc. This gave the British a considerable numerical superiority. Intelligence indicated, with some accuracy, that there were only 13,000 enemy troops within five miles of the battlefield. There were roughly 6,000 in the front and support lines with 4,000 in local reserve and 3,000 resting in billets.
But even given a similar superiority of men First Army had signally failed to dent the German defences at Aubers Ridge in May. What now would be different? In order to understand how First Army planned the Battle of Loos it is necessary to examine Haig’s military education and his thoughts on the nature of warfare. It is clear that the plan subsequently adopted had less to do with the harsh realities of either the ground or the state of the BEF, and more with Haig’s belief in what a proper offensive should be like. Haig’s ideas contained a curious mix of the old and new. While counting, somewhat optimistically, on a ‘lavish’ discharge of gas – the most recent addition to the British Army’s arsenal – the offensive itself was structured within a paradigm of ‘classic’ nineteenth-century warfare. Tim Travers has shown how the lessons Haig learnt during his time at the Staff College between 1896–7 had a direct influence on the planning and execution of the battles of 1916–17, but the same was evidently true of 1915.38 So dominant were the ideas of the 1890s that Haig actually mentioned them during the conference. After explaining the orders First Army had received, Haig added that:
Anything I now say regarding the scope of the forthcoming operations is based on a study of the map, and on the principles which were taught by the late Colonel Henderson at Camberley.39
Evidently, the experience of total war in 1914–15 did not compare with the lessons that Henderson had inculcated into his students before the South African War of 1899–1902.
The officer of whom Haig had spoken was Colonel G.F.R. Henderson, author of numerous works of military history and, by all accounts, inspirational lecturer at the Staff College.40 Henderson’s forte was the campaigns of the American Civil War. He had published a celebrated life of‘Stonewall’ Jackson and a study of the Battle of Fredericksburg, both designed to educate the British officer.41 Like many of his contemporary military writers, Henderson was keen to stress the importance and power of the offensive and of the absolute necessity to achieve decision on the battlefield. Henderson’s influence on the strategic and tactical thought of the British Army has often been investigated and it clearly lingered on into the early years of the Great War. At the conference on 6 September, Haig had announced that it was ‘not enough to gain a tactical success’, but First Army must advance upon the enemy’s rear, cut his communications and ‘force him to retreat’. This was a typically Henderson-like ambition; in The Science of War (1905), he had written that one of the great secrets of victory was ‘by threatening or cutting his [the enemy’s] line of communications’.42 ‘Briefly then,’ Haig added, ‘the question is how to turn our tactical success into a strategical victory.’ The seeming confusion of the strategic with the tactical arrangements for the battle was again in evidence. ‘All corps on my front,’ Haig told the assembled officers, ‘must co-operate to the full extent of their power.’43 Haig repeatedly stressed four key points: secrecy, rapidity, initiative and a vigorous pursuit, as well as urging his corps to attack with the utmost energy.44
Haig was therefore very familiar with the importance of gaining a swift, irresistible and decisive victory on the battlefield. These ideas had been stressed both in his Cavalry Studies, a discussion of Staff Rides and tactical exercises from his time in India, and in Field Service Regulations, the first British Army manual on war organisation and administration that he had co-authored in his capacity as Director of Staff Duties at the War Office between 1907–9.45 While Haig declared in 1907 that ‘the real object in war is a decisive battle’,46 part I of Field Service Regulations also contained numerous references to vigorous and decisive offensives.47 And although Field Service Regulations proved capable of considerable flexibility and interpretation,48 Haig’s stamp was clearly upon it. ‘Decisive success in battle’, it maintained, ‘can be gained only by a vigorous offensive’.49 In Chapter Ten, ‘War Against an Uncivilised Enemy’, this stress on the offensive was even more apparent. ‘A vigorous offensive, strategical as well as tactical, is always the safest method of conducting operations.’50 There was also a considerable emphasis on the power of morale in military operations: ‘success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities’ was a not untypical remark.51
Secure both in the continued relevance of the lessons he had first encountered at the Staff College and in the principles he had held ever since, Haig formulated his plans for Loos. But instead of a limited, subsidiary operation on very unfavourable terrain, Haig believed this was to be a decisive offensive, which would unfold in clear-cut stages and end in the total defeat of the enemy. The German defenders would be engaged on a wide front, their reserves drawn in and then exhausted, before the decisive blow was struck by one’s own reserves.A cavalry pursuit would then scatter the enemy.52 It is clear that by the summer of 1915, Haig still thought of battle in these rather traditional, almost Napoleonic, terms. In a letter to the Prime Minister in late June, Haig explained that:
With such changed conditions it might be thought that the old principles of war had also changed. But I do not think that is so. On the contrary the values of surprise and of concentration on the decisive point, is as great as ever. The difficulty is to apply these great principles under the changed conditions.53
‘And so I feel sure,’ Haig added, ‘that we ought to aim at engaging the enemy on a very wide front, 25 miles say, with many divisions, and [the] aim of wearing him down – the “bataille d’usure” of Napoleon – at the same a large reserve should be retained in a central position in readiness to strike at that point.’ Barely a month later Haig’s ideal frontage had quadrupled. While dining at St Omer with Sir John French and Lord Haldane, the conversation turned onto how to win the war, and Haig apparently told one of the guests that only by ‘applying the old principles to the present conditions’, could victory be achieved. ‘Engage the enemy on a wide front, the wider the better, 100 miles or more, then after five or six days, bring up a strong reserve of all arms, attack by surprise and break through where the enemy had shown he was weak.’54 But this was not mere fantasy and Haig genuinely seems to have believed that such a decisive victory was possible. His letters to his wife in the run-up to the battle betrayed this optimism. On 15 August he explained to her that it would not be many months ‘before the Germans are reduced to make peace on our terms’.55 Likewise, on 24 August he talked of imminent German bankruptcy and of his hopes that ‘the end may come by the direct result of a victory on this front – and I have great expectations from our next effort’.56 As the battle crept ever closer, Haig’s confidence seemed to increase, admitting on 22 September to feeling ‘pretty confident of some success’ and how by October, ‘we may be a good distance on the road to Brussels’.57 Haig’s confidence in the coming battle did not, however, merely rest upon abstract theories, but on the expected devastating effect of a new weapon: poison gas.
As well as witnessing the debut of a number of New Army divisions, the Battle of Loos was also unique in that it was the only offensive in British military history to be preceded by a discharge of cylinder-released chlorine gas. The gas attack at Loos has been much criticised, with lurid tales of the gas being blown back onto the attackers tending to overshadow the considerable logistical feats that allowed it to take place.58 In that over 150 tons of gas could be manufactured and then delivered to the front, barely five months after the German gas attack at Ypres in April, was nothing short of miraculous. But the gas attack was largely a failure; a fact that had less to do with the unfavourable weather conditions that have usually been blamed, and more with the over-optimism and ambition that pervaded all aspects of Haig’s plan.
The decision to equip the BEF with a form of gas retaliation and the forming of the Special Brigade – the unit that would put this into effect – has been covered elsewhere,59 but suffice to say, it was one of the most unique formations in the British Army.60 It was also led by a suitably eccentric officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Howard Foulkes. Although Foulkes had cheerfully admitted his complete ignorance of either chemistry or gas on taking up his position on 26 May, he was, in many ways, an ideal choice. A 40 year-old sapper with extensive experience in West Africa, India and the West Indies, Foulkes was possessed of a tough, athletic build and a burning determination in everything he did. He took to his task with characteristic single-mindedness and by late summer, through a mixture of voluntary recruitment and sometimes less-than-legal transfers, four companies (numbered 186 to 189) of the Special Brigade had been formed, each split into ten sections and based at Helfaut, six miles south of St Omer.
There were few officers in the BEF who worked harder than Foulkes during the summer of 1915.61 Within a week of being appointed, he had worked out a detailed scheme for future offensive and defensive gas warfare, which – somewhat understandably – drew heavily from the German gas attack earlier in the year.62 Chlorine gas was the preferred weapon, to be carried in metal cylinders, three feet in length and between eight and twelve inches in diameter. Clusters of cylinders, or batteries as they were known, were to be placed all along the front trenches in secure, sandbagged bays at 25 yard intervals. When a discharge was to be made, rubber pipes, about ten feet in length, would be connected to the cylinders and thrown over the parapet into no-man’s-land.63 The valves would then be turned on and, given the correct weather conditions, a cloud of gas would form and drift towards the enemy positions.
What then was expected from a chlorine gas attack? Foulkes had told Sir William Robertson (CGS GHQ) that for the first time in which gas was successfully employed ‘important results may be achieved’64 and it was hoped that the gas would enter the German trenches, sink into the deep dugouts and either incapacitate its garrison or force them to the surface where they would suffer from an accompanying bombardment. With this in mind, Foulkes organised a major demonstration of chlorine at Helfaut on 22 August and invited all the senior officers of First Army to attend. By all accounts it was a most successful operation, and although many officers found the use of such a weapon deeply disquieting, not to mention problematic, it was a revelation to Haig. He was deeply impressed by Foulkes’s arrangements and was immediately drawn to the new weapon with all the fervour of a religious convert.65 Haigs views on what a gas discharge could achieve have rarely been explored, but they are vital to understanding what subsequently occurred. The seeming success of the demonstration on 22 August may have reflected well on Foulkes’s organisational ability, but it was ironically perhaps ‘too successful’ and far from being regarded as a novel, double-edged and limited weapon – a ‘boomerang ally’66 as Gough later called it – Haig saw gas as a panacea that would solve all of First Army’s problems.67 It seems that, as had (partly) happened at Ypres in April, Haig believed ‘one whiff of the gas’68 would cause a panic, clear out large sections of the enemy line and allow the attackers to get through the first and second German positions without heavy casualties69. Alongside Rawlinson’s report of 22 August, Haig had written that:
The moral effect of the gas on the foremost hostile troops may be such that the defenders of Loos may be affected as was the case North of Ypres after a distance of near five miles.70
As this was to be a decisive offensive, gas would be the decisive weapon that would allow this to occur. ‘Under certain conditions,’ Haig had told the assembled officers on 6 September,‘the gas is effective up to two miles, and it is practically certain that it will be quite effective in many places, if not everywhere along the whole front attacked.’71 These sentiments undoubtedly had a great impact on Haig’s decision to plan for a major ‘all-out’ attack at Loos.
How valid were these assumptions? Haig’s attitude to technology has been much discussed and he was certainly not the technophobe of legend.72 On the contrary, as regards gas, it must be stressed that Haig was simply too keen, letting his natural optimism get the better of him and believing it could work wonders on the battlefield. There were certainly some senior officers who were not as sanguine as Haig and had grave reservations about the great reliance placed upon a new and untested weapon.73 Rawlinson was one of them. He regretted (as he saw it) the abandonment of lessons revealed by earlier engagements, believing that too much reliance had been placed on the gas and ‘not enough on the artillery’.74 Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney (GOC III Corps) was also less than enthusiastic, and raised his concerns at the conference on 6 September. In order to maximise the terrific shock against the German lines, Haig wanted gas to be released at the same time for both First Army’s main and subsidiary attacks. In reply, Pulteney made the point that for the successful use of gas on his front, the wind would have to blow in a different direction for that required further to the south.75 Pulteney may not have been known for his brilliant insights, but his interjection was a sensible one and brought up serious concerns about the feasibility of what Haig was proposing. Yet, as with much unpalatable information, Haig simply ignored or dismissed it. Haig’s reply is not recorded, but from what Lieutenant-Colonel John Charteris (First Army Intelligence Officer) remembered, Haig was in no mood for ‘difficulties’.76
In Haig’s mind, then, the gas attack was a possibly never-to-be-repeated opportunity – a single, one-shot weapon, capable of winning a battle in one bloody stroke. Little was allowed to interfere with this. But even given that gas was still a new, untested and, to a certain extent, unknown weapon, Haig was being not only optimistic, but also unrealistically ambitious. Even Sir James Edmonds, who thought Haig’s plan was ‘sound’, noted that the First Army’s attacks were based on the assumption that the gas would be one hundred percent successful!77 This was simply never a possibility and Haig either did not consider, or he dismissed, two very real concerns and, in this case at least, it is difficult to disagree with Travers’s thesis that Haig ‘sometimes asked technology to adapt to his plans rather than setting plans that made the best use of the available technology’.78 Given the problems then being experienced in Britain in producing enough chlorine, there was the possibility that not enough gas would be available to drench the German positions. There was also the knowledge that whereas at Ypres in April, Allied troops had very little protection – nothing but damp socks and handkerchiefs – German defenders now had access to two types of respirator.79 Infantrymen were equipped with cloth pads, which when tied around the nose and mouth and dipped into an anti-gas solution, could neutralise poisonous fumes for around fifteen minutes. To continue working, the pads would then have been re-soaked. The German machine gun crews, however, had been issued with sturdier mine-rescue breathing apparatus with an attached supply of around thirty minutes of oxygen. It was therefore decided that a gas discharge of forty minutes would suffice to exhaust both the cloth pads, even if re-dipped, and the air supply of the machine gunners. It is clear that Haig knew this to be the case,80 although rather curiously, Charteris recorded on 7 September that the ‘Germans opposite us have no respirators’.81
By 21 August, the day before Foulkes’s demonstration at Helfaut, Haig’s plans called for a relatively modest gas attack on a frontage of 6,300 yards.82 As each cylinder took over average two minutes to empty, a forty-minute discharge would require at least twenty cylinders per battery.83 Foulkes saw Haig the same day and promised to supply the required amount of gas by the date of the attack, then scheduled for 15 September. He also confidently assured Haig that he would probably be able to supply First Army with a ‘good deal’ more by the date mentioned.84 This was to prove a hollow promise, however, and having been misled by over-optimistic reports from the War Office, Foulkes was forced to see Haig five days later and tell him that owing to manufacturing delays, only half the total gas could be delivered on time.85 Haig was crestfallen, recording that this ‘seriously’ affected his plans. Foulkes was told to let him know as soon as possible what realistic amount of gas could be furnished on time. ‘As matters stand at present’, Haig subsequently informed GHQ, ‘unless immediate steps are taken to ensure the necessary supply of gas, either the date of our operations will have to be postponed or my plan of operations will have to be modified.’86
Haig and Foulkes worked reasonably well together, but tensions lay beneath the surface of their relationship. Foulkes was, and always remained, a great advocate of gas warfare (particularly cylinder discharge), but Haig’s grand expectations about what gas could do, and how much would be available, sometimes unsettled him and led to friction. More than once Foulkes tried to steer Haig’s thoughts in a more modest direction. When the commander of First Army ‘perhaps chaffingly’ told him that ‘I understand that you guarantee that your gas [will] put the whole of the Germans [sic] out of action, and that no artillery preparation will be necessary,’ Foulkes quickly countered this, assuring Haig that wire-cutting was absolutely essential.87 But relations between the two men were not always so good-natured and on 4 September Foulkes recorded a ‘slight contretemps’ with Haig in his diary over delays in cylinder arrival.88 He also later complained of how he ‘had to bear the brunt of the dissatisfaction felt at the headquarters of the First Army’ when supplies failed to meet demand.89
It would be inaccurate, however, to say that First Army was misled over the amount of gas that would be available for Loos. GHQ replied to Haig’s request on 28 August.90 4,440 cylinders would be available for 6 September, with possibly an additional 800 by that date. It was also hoped that by mid-September a further 1,500 cylinders could be supplied, alongside 9,000 smoke candles and twenty-four Stokes mortars and 5,000 smoke shells. This forecast proved surprisingly accurate. The War Office had predicted that 5,240 cylinders would be available and on 25 September I and IV Corps used 5,028 cylinders between them.91 Indeed, it seems that the shortage of gas at Loos was not as crippling as has been generally assumed. On the contrary, had Haig’s earlier plan for modest attack on a frontage of 6,300 yards been adopted, First Army would have had more than enough gas.92 But this was jettisoned after Sir John had told Haig to attack to the ‘full extent’ of his power and between 22 August and 6 September, the frontage of attack was gradually increased, initially to 10,400 yards and finally to 14,500 yards.93 This created problems. It was simply not true, as Haig had told his officers on 6 September, that the main attacks would be preceded by a ‘lavish’ discharge of gas. Nowhere on the entire front would a full forty-minute discharge take place; even on the most favourable fronts only twenty-four minutes of gas were available. The amount of cylinders then arriving in France simply could not compete with the expansion in First Army’s front. And instead of curtailing the attack, the number of cylinders in each battery was simply reduced and the attack was, in effect, diluted with the addition of smoke candles, in between short bursts of gas. On 17 September batteries that had previously contained fifteen cylinders, which in itself could only create a discharge of half an hour, were reduced to twelve cylinders. North of the canal, batteries now only contained three cylinders.94
Historians have sometimes criticised Haig for assuming that smoke would complement the gas attack, claiming that as long as only twenty-four minutes of gas were being released, the German defenders would not fall victim to gas poisoning.95 Although this is largely correct, perfectly illustrating the problems inherent in the gas plan, it does not entirely make sense. German padded respirators could only last around fifteen minutes before having to be re-dipped in the anti-gas solution. More importantly, for the German machine gunners and their oxygen helmets, as long as the gunners were breathing from them during the gas/smoke discharge, it was irrelevant what atmosphere they were in. After thirty minutes their oxygen supply would be empty, thus leaving them susceptible to poisoning during the last ten minutes of the discharge, two minutes of which contained gas. This was, of course, still far from ideal. Haig was probably hoping that after half an hour of wearing masks (or pads) the German defenders would be tired, confused and unable to function properly. In 1915 gas masks were far from pleasant to wear.
The planning of the gas attack was, as shown, deeply affected by both Haig’s over-optimistic appreciation of the likely effectiveness of gas and of the amount required for success. And although it may be argued that Haig was forced to attack over such a wide front, thus compelling the dilution of the gas, this is problematic. The orders Sir John gave to Haig left considerable room to manoeuvre. It seems that on 22 August Haig thought he had stumbled upon a ‘wonder weapon’, and because he believed gas would prove extremely lethal, Haig did not feel under such pressure to make sure cylinder batteries were capable of delivering a sustained gas attack for forty minutes. As Brigadier-General R.D. Whigham (Deputy CGS) noted, there was ‘a strong feeling that if only we could use gas all would be well’.96 So instead of making it clear to Sir John that gas resources only permitted a limited, relatively narrow attack, Haig ‘fudged’ it and spread his resources thinly over a wide area, hoping for the best. But, as shall be seen, this was not the only difference of opinion between Sir John and Haig.
Nothing has caused more controversy regarding the Battle of Loos than the fate of the two reserve divisions that saw action on the second day of fighting. 21st and 24th Divisions of XI Corps, inexperienced and worn out after a tiring approach march, were fed into the fighting and suffered over 8,000 casualties between them. By mid-afternoon the bewildered battalions, having run into German reinforcements, were streaming back towards the British lines in some disorder. It was only with the arrival of the third and final division of XI Corps, the Guards Division, that the gaping hole in First Army’s southern sector was plugged and the line steadied. This action was to have far-reaching results, being the prima facie reason for the dismissal of Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief in December 1915, and of his replacement by Haig. Much has been written about the debacle of the reserves. Most accounts do, however, tend to take a similar line. Sir John French has generally been blamed both for holding the reserve divisions too far back, and of only then handing them over to First Army when it was too late.97 Admittedly, much of this story is true, but previous accounts have failed to give adequate weight to Sir Douglas Haig’s role in the affair, particularly when considering the over-optimism of his plan and the importance this placed on the reserves. XI Corps’ fate must therefore be seen, not just as a local difficulty over reserves, but symptomatic of the confusion about what exactly First Army was preparing. For while French wanted a more limited attack, with the reserves being employed once success had been achieved, Haig’s ‘all-out’ plan called for the reserves to be used to ensure this initial success.
How did this confusion emerge? Five days after being ordered to attack ‘to the full extent of his available resources’, Haig issued a tentative plan of operations. The role of any reserves in the forthcoming attack was to be as ‘detailed by GHQ’.98 By the late summer of 1915, what was known as Sir John’s General Reserve consisted of the newly-formed XI Corps,99 Cavalry Corps and Indian Cavalry Corps, although the later was stationed behind Third Army in the region of the Somme and would not be available to support Haig’s attack. The key element of the reserve forces was undoubtedly XI Corps.100 On 1 September Robertson visited Hinges and discussed with Haig who should be placed in charge. Haig was anxious that a reputable ‘thruster’ be appointed and believed that Major-General R.C.B. Haking (GOC 1st Division) was the ideal choice. Robertson apparently agreed and promised to see Sir John about the matter, once ‘The Chief’ was out of bed and feeling better.101
Haig’s choice for command of XI Corps was an understandable one. Because First Army was making such a major attack, reserves were vital to its success, and it was essential, as Haig saw it, that they be commanded by someone with proven aggression and commitment to the offensive. This was something that Haking did not lack. Although he may have been one of the foremost ‘educated soldiers’ of the pre-war British Army, having lectured at the Staff College (1901–6) and been the author of Company Training (1913), he is widely seen as the archetypical ‘butcher’.102 Although Haking was an infantryman, he was one of Haig’s protégés, whose infamous handling of 1st Division at Aubers Ridge in May, when the attacking brigades lost sixty percent of their fighting strength in little over an hour, only added to his notoriety.103 While Haking settled into his new position – his promotion had been confirmed on 4 September – and Haig completed his plans, GHQ was curiously silent over the reserves. What was the matter? As has been noted previously, during this period, Sir John French fell ill and was confined to his bed for days; not even his closest staff could stir much activity from him. Sir John caught another ‘nasty cold’ on 12 September.104 Haig’s note was left unanswered and he was forced to use a meeting at St Omer on 18 September, barely a week before the attack was to go in, to try and settle the matter. After giving a short talk about the operations he had planned, Haig urged the importance of‘having the General Reserve with the lead divisions at Nouex Les Mines and Verquin respectively by the morning of the 25’.105 According to Haig, Sir John’s only reply was to state that ‘he did not agree’; evidently not wanting the reserves so far forward.106
What then were Sir John’s thoughts on the role of the reserve divisions in the coming offensive? They seem to have been somewhat mixed; a matter only clouded by a number of post-battle claims. According to his Loos Despatch of 15 October, Sir John believed that a strong central reserve under his own control was necessary, ‘in view of the great length of line along which the British troops were operating’.
This reserve was the more necessary [French added] owing to the fact that the Tenth French Army had to postpone its attack until one o’clock in the day; and, further, that the corps operating on the French left had to be directed in a more or less south-easterly direction, involving, in case of our success, a considerable gap in our line.107
But these seemingly straightforward reasons were only made after the battle had ended, and it is more difficult to assess accurately what Sir Johns thoughts were before it. In the numerous discussions and conferences in the run-up to Loos, French remained unclear and inconsistent. Most of those at GHQ recorded different versions of Sir John’s motives.108 While the gossipy Chief Liaison Officer, Wilson, recorded that XI Corps was kept under GHQ control because French wanted ‘to have some control’, was jealous of Haig’ and ‘wanted to fight an action on his own!’,109 Edmonds’s memoirs included a rumour that Sir John personally wanted to lead the reserve divisions forward,‘sword in hand’.110
On the contrary, it does appear that although Sir John may have dreamt of leading his men forward, this remained in the realms of fantasy. French’s thoughts were darkened by his strategic pessimism and far from wanting to ‘huroosh’ the reserves forward, he remained fearful of what would happen to XI Corps if he gave in to First Army’s demands. Sir John was concerned that if the reserves were placed too far forward, they would prove too big a temptation to Haig, who would push them forward in unfavourable circumstances.111 But there were certainly other reasons. The Deputy-Chief GS remembered that Sir John had claimed that because it was possible the French attack might be repulsed, it was therefore wise to have some troops under his own control for emergencies.112 Robertson also noted Sir John’s lack of faith in a French victory.113
Whatever Sir John’s reasons for wanting to keep the reserves back and under his own hand, there was no excuse for what subsequently occurred. It was a prime example of how French lacked an effective grip on his subordinates.114 During this period a dual process of persuasion seems to have occurred between French and Haig over the reserves. Because of their different opinions about the nature of the planned assault, their understanding of the reserves also diverged. Although not comfortable getting involved in the intricacies of Haig’s plan, Sir John effectively tried to use the reserves to influence the scope of First Army’s operation; by keeping them back, French, in effect, tried to rein Haig in and limit the attack.115 Instead of, as Rawlinson’s Chief of Staff later wrote, ‘insisting on Haig carrying out his plan, Sir John tried to compel him to do so by keeping back the infantry reserve’.116
Rather curiously, Haig seems not to have realised this was going on. Instead of modifying his plans to take account of this, he cheerfully carried on with his arrangements, putting it all down to, as he saw it, the stupidity and timidity of GHQ.117 And this was surely not Haig’s fault. It was certainly Sir John’s responsibility to make sure Haig was clear on exactly what he was to do and if any confusion existed, French was to blame. While this was occurring, however, Haig was – as he admitted to Edmonds – simultaneously doing his ‘utmost to get outside influence to bear on Sir John’, including appeals by Kitchener and Foch, to place the reserves under First Army control.118 The sullen response to his appeals at St Omer on 18 September only sharpened Haig’s temper. When Robertson confirmed Sir John’s deployment of XI Corps, some 20,000 yards from the front trenches, in the fields and villages surrounding Lillers, Haig was incensed, recording in his diary that this was ‘too late!’119 Haig’s MGGS, R.H.K. Butler, was immediately despatched to St Omer, carrying a letter repeating these demands.
I wish again to draw attention [Haig wrote] to the fact that the whole of the disposable troops of the First Army are being employed in the attack of 25 September from its commencement, that there are no Army reserves, and that, as stated in my memorandum, dated 28 August, the only troops in General Reserve are those detailed by GHQ.
The whole plan of the First Army is based on the assumption that the troops in the General Reserve will be close at hand, and I consider it essential that the heads of the two leading divisions of the XI Corps should be on the line Nouex Les Mines – Beuvry by daylight on 25 September.120
This caused one final twist in the month-long struggle over the reserves. Butler returned at 3p.m. bearing a reply from Robertson. ‘The Chief’ had apparently given in. Robertson was able to confirm that XI Corps would be where Haig desired them – between 5,000 and 7,000 yards from the front line on the morning of 25 September.121 As Haig explained to Brigadier-General Philip Howell (ex-BGGS Cavalry Corps), ‘I had difficulty in getting reserves out of the authorities and in pushing them close enough up,’ adding that ‘all goes well here and I have every confidence’.122 All that was required was for them to march into place.
Why then had Sir John seemingly given in at this late stage? A definitive answer eludes the historian, although it may well have been down to the efforts of those Haig enlisted on his side; it seems that the change of heart did not originate within GHQ.123 It must be stressed that this was, however, not as clear-cut as it may have seemed. The reserves divisions may have been (in theory) closer to the front, but they remained firmly under GHQ control. Sir John explained to his mistress, Mrs Winifred Bennett, that ‘I’ve got several cavalry and infantry divisions in reserve ready to push in where they are wanted’.124 As was repeatedly explained to the eager men of XI Corps, they would only be pushed forward after the enemy had been ‘absolutely smashed and retiring in disorder’.125 Unfortunately this did not occur and the final settlement of the reserves – if indeed it can be called such – was like so much in the planning prior to Loos, an uneasy compromise between French and Haig, with neither party being totally satisfied. While Sir John still believed the reserves were too far forward, Haig still wanted them to be placed directly under his command. It was clearly unsatisfactory.
As the issue of the reserves rumbled on throughout September, other plans were taking shape. If the gas discharge was to fulfil Haig’s ‘lavish’ expectations, favourable weather conditions were required. Captain Ernest Gold, First Army’s meteorological officer, had calculated that for a successful discharge, the wind needed to blow between north-west and south-west, with a speed of at least four miles per hour.126 Gold did warn, however, that the wind must not be too strong, because that would dissipate the gas too quickly. In other words, First Army needed a flexibility when to strike to ensure the correct weather conditions. But this was to be denied. On 4 September the assault was delayed for ten days and on 15 September, the day initially pencilled in, Haig attended a conference at Chantilly presided over by Joffre and Foch.127 Various matters of small detail, such as the exact boundaries between the French and the British advances, and more importantly, the use of gas, were discussed. As the French attacks were not reliant upon gas, both Joffre and Foch made it clear that all attacks must go in on 25 September, regardless of weather conditions. Haig protested but without success. The following day, and evidently in some alarm, Haig complained to Robertson.128 ‘As regards the gas question,’ he explained, ‘I cannot see where the difficulty lies in deciding!’ ‘On the one hand,’ Haig added, ‘with the very extensive gas and smoke arrangements which have been prepared, decisive results are almost certain to be obtained. On the other hand, without gas, the fronts of our attack must be reduced to what our guns can satisfactorily prepare, with the results normally attendant on small fronts; namely, concentration of hostile guns on point of attack, large losses, small progress!’ Haig was unequivocal that in his opinion,‘under no circumstances should our forthcoming attack be launched without the aid of gas’.
Despite Haig’s unwillingness to change his plans, he met Gough and Rawlinson on 16 September and asked them to furnish proposals as soon as possible for ‘carrying out the attack on as broad as front as possible without the use of gas’.129 Gough’s alternative plans offered no radical revision on his draft of 22 August.130 He proposed two schemes. The first (A) ran ‘a greater risk of failure’, but ‘greater results’ were to be obtained should it be successful. Because artillery was now the most important weapon – which in itself was limited – Gough wanted to curtail the frontage of attack. He recommended that unless gas could be used or an ‘overwhelming mass of heavy artillery’ brought up, the attack of 2nd Division should be jettisoned. Instead, I Corps should deploy its main strength further south. After a preliminary bombardment lasting four days, 9th and 7th Divisions would attack the enemy positions between the Vermelles railway and the Vermelles–Hulluch road. This would take place an hour before dawn. Gough promised ‘a moderately good chance of success if there is an element of surprise’. The ‘suddenness and size of the force employed’, he hoped, would enable the capture of the German second line ‘in practically one rush’. The second scheme (B) was more cautious, which although not offering such ‘far-reaching’ objectives, did give a greater chance of success. Gough believed the operation would probably take between two and seven days. I Corps’ artillery would concentrate its fire for two hours on three separate areas of the battlefield in turn. This was intended to deceive the enemy as to the target area and hopefully draw attention elsewhere. At midday the guns would fire on Fosse 8, and at 2p.m. 9th Division would attack. The guns would then turn against the enemy trenches opposite 7th Division and continue firing until nightfall. 7th Division would attack under the cover of darkness.
If gas was not to be used, wrote Rawlinson,‘it appears to me most undesirable to attack the enemy on as wide a front as is present contemplated’.131 The Commander of IV Corps was emphatic that the front of attack must be reduced. He bluntly informed Haig that the ‘number of guns and the ammunition at our disposal will not permit of a front of nearly 5,000 yards being adequately and simultaneously bombarded’. Rawlinson offered three alternative schemes. Plan A was for a simultaneous dawn attack by 1st and 15th Divisions, aimed at securing Hulluch and Loos respectively. But Rawlinson was not keen, lamenting that the number of guns ‘available to support the attack of IV Corps are, in my opinion, not sufficient to cover the attack of both 1st and 15 th Divisions simultaneously’. He was, however, more positive about his second and third ideas. Plans B and C were both similar, being based on two staggered attacks stretched over two days. Covered by an intense ‘hurricane’ bombardment, 15th Division would attack Loos on the afternoon of 25 September. All available artillery would then be switched to support 1st Division’s assault on Hulluch, to take place either the following morning, or under the cover of nightfall. Like Gough, Rawlinson admitted that it may have been possible to surprise the enemy by attacking with both divisions at the same time, but this did entail a ‘greater risk’, albeit with ‘more far-reaching results’ if successful.
Armed with his corps commanders’ reports, Haig considered his response. He felt that the only option available, as he had told Robertson on 15 September, was to delay the assault.132 If the weather on the morning of 25 September was unsuitable for the gas to be released, a smaller, two division attack would be staged. 9th Division would take the Hohenzollern Redoubt, while 15th Division attacked the Loos salient. The subsidiary attacks scheduled north of the canal would also take place. The main attack would be postponed until the following morning, by which time it was hoped the weather would have improved. If the wind was blowing in the desired direction on the morning of 26 September, the gas would be released and the remaining divisions of I and IV Corps would attack. If, however, the weather was still proving obstinate, the positions gained the previous day would be consolidated and the main attacks would go in on 27 September. Haig added that ‘it seems improbable that the weather conditions on one of these days will not be suitable for the use of gas’. It is almost certain that Haig knew his remarks would be unwelcome. Five days earlier Robertson had told him that ‘although no objection is likely to be raised to our waiting a few hours, we shall most probably be expected to attack sometime during the day [25 September]’.133 Also when considering Haig’s earlier opposition to using gas once his attacks had begun, it is clear that the smaller two-division plan was never regarded as being feasible. Nevertheless, Robertson did speak to Sir John about Haig’s plans, but to no avail. French remained inflexible. ‘The Commander-in-Chief desires me in order to avoid any possibility of error’, wrote Robertson, ‘to repeat his instructions as to the date of the infantry attack, namely, that it will take place on the 25 September.’134 It was Haig’s battle – irrespective of gas or reserves. If the weather was unsuitable, Sir John expected Haig to revert to the two-division assault.
Although Sir John’s previous orders regarding the attack First Army had been the subject of some confusion, it was clear from the letter of 18 September what type of attack he wished Haig to prepare. ‘With regard to your suggested postponement of the remainder of your attacks until the 27,’ Robertson continued, ‘the Field-Marshal desires me to say that as our operations are to be carried out in cooperation with those of the French Tenth Army, such a postponement may be highly undesirable. Should the attack of the French Tenth Army be successful, it will be of the utmost importance that your offensive should be continued at the earliest possible moment and in the greatest possible strength.’ Haig was ordered to make sure the ‘remainder’ of his attacks took place either later on 25 September or whenever directed. The final paragraph of Robertson’s letter confirmed that Sir John wanted First Army’s operation to be more limited (and clearly subsidiary to the French) than it perhaps was:
You will realise that the Commander-in-Chief attaches primary importance to pressing the attack south of the La Bassée canal immediately if the French attack is successful,135 and therefore if your plans for giving effect to this are dependent upon the use of gas, which in the nature of things must be uncertain, they should be altered, if necessary, at the expense of the subsidiary attacks north of the canal.
Barely a week before the battle was to begin, Sir John was only just beginning to tamper with Haig’s tactical arrangements. So loud had Haig’s persistent demands become – for reserves, gas and now a flexibility when to strike – that French was forced to clear up some ground rules: Haig was simply to attack on 25 September with commitment and power. Anything that interfered with this was unacceptable. After a summer-long saga of trying to escape from Joffre’s clutches, Sir John had been given clear and unambiguous orders by the British Government to support the offensive operations. He had thus ordered First Army to make a ‘full power’ attack, but, at the same time, made it clear that the arrangements for this were to be left to Haig’s discretion. If First Army had not attacked on 25 September – for essentially a tactical reason (the gas and the weather) – it would have had repercussions not only on the strict instructions Sir John had been given, but also on the strategic rationale behind the battle. He was understandably unable to contemplate this. But French cannot, however, escape severe censure. Although feeling far from well, he should have made it clear early on what type of attack Haig was to make and what he was to use. Instead, matters that should have been cleared up were either left unresolved or simply ‘fudged’ to the complete satisfaction of neither party. Perhaps the greatest flaw in Haig’s plan was that it was not capable of execution without the gas; something General Foch had apparently warned against.136 What would happen on 25 September if the weather was unsuitable was never truly resolved. The order left Haig waiting for the wind.
As has been shown, the ambitious attack adopted by First Army emerged from a number of factors: Sir John French’s ill health and his virtual abdication of responsibility for the coming attack after 19 August; Haig’s over-optimistic appreciation of the effectiveness of the chlorine gas discharge; his adherence to a view of warfare that emphasised ‘decisive’ battles and was uneasy with anything that diverted from this; and a fundamental misunderstanding concerning the orders he had been given by Sir John. Finally, the poor state of communication between GHQ and First Army should also be noted; something that prevented an open and honest discussion about the aims and objectives of the coming offensive from taking place. The final operations orders were issued on the evening of 19 September.137 All six divisions of I and IV Corps would attack the German lines between the La Bassée canal and Lens on the morning of 25 September after a forty-minute discharge of chlorine gas and smoke, and a preliminary bombardment that had lasted for over four days. Ill, Indian and V Corps, the latter from Second Army, would also make subsidiary assaults. Plans had greatly mutated since late August when Haig originally had asked Gough and Rawlinson to plan for a short advance in the wake of French successes south of Lens. Instead of a minor push forward, First Army was now to make the biggest and most ambitious British offensive of the war to date. It was to do this in spite of general agreement about the unsuitability of the ground, untrained troops, lack of ammunition and heroic but rushed gas preparations. But how was the battle planned closer to the front?