NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1Sir J.E. Edmonds (comp.), History of the Great War: Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, Battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos (London/Nashville: Imperial War Museum/Battery Press, 1995; first published 1928).

2The standard popular work has, for many years, been P. Warner, The Battle of Loos (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 2000; first published 1976). It is, however, deeply flawed and should be treated with caution. It is not a history of the fighting, but a rather uneven collection of personal letters and memoirs from veterans. See also I. Hay, The First Hundred Thousand. Being The Unofficial Chronicle of a Unit of “K(I)” (London: Blackwood, 1916); A. Clark, The Donkeys (London: Pimlico, 1997; first published 1961), Chapters 10–12; R. Prior & T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front. The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–18 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 100–34; D. Richter, Chemical Soldiers. British Gas Warfare in World War One (London: Leo Cooper, 1994), pp. 36–93; A. Rawson, Battleground Europe, Loos — Hill 70 (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2002) and Battleground Europe, Loos — Hohenzollern Redoubt (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003). For the origins of the battle see R. Williams, ‘Lord Kitchener and the Battle of Loos: French Politics and British Strategy in the Summer of 1915’, in L. Freedman, P. Hayes & R. O’Neill (eds.), War, Strategy and International Politics. Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 117–32.

3P. MacGill, The Great Push (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1916); J.C. Dunn (ed.), The War the Infantry Knew 1914–1919 (London: Abacus, 2004; first published 1938), Chapter 6; F. Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die (London: Anthony Mott, 1983) Chapter 9; R. Graves, Goodbye To All That (London: Penguin, 1960; first published 1929), Chapter 15; A. Stuart Dolden, Cannon Fodder (Poole: Blandford Press, 1980), Chapter 5; R.B. Talbot-Kelly, A Subaltern’s Odyssey (London: William Kimber, 1980), Chapter 2; P. Maze, A Frenchman in Khaki (Kingswood: William Heinemann, 1934). Loos also appears in several novels, including F.S Brereton, Under French’s Command. A Story of the Western Front from Neuve Chapelle to Loos (London: Blackie & Son, 1915); H. Willamson, A Fox Under My Cloak (Stroud: Sutton, 1996; first published 1955); J. Masters, Now, God be Thanked (London: Sphere Books, 1979).

4Graves, Goodbye To All That, p. 156; Stuart Dolden, Cannon Fodder, p. 30.

5D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs (2 vols., London: Nicholson & Watson, 1933), I, p. 487.

6B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (London: Pan, 1975; first published 1930), p. 193; Clark, The Donkeys, passim.

7Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. ix, 399.

8TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Brigadier-General J. Charteris to Brigadier-General Sir J.E. Edmonds, 24 February 1927.

9LHCMA: Burnett-Stuart Papers, ‘Memoirs’, 6/1–12, Chapter 7, p. 76.

10J. Terraine, Douglas Haig. The Educated Soldier (London: Cassell, 2000; first published 1963), p. 154.

11G. Corrigan, The Unwanted Battle (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006); N. Cherry, Most Unfavourable Ground. The Battle of Loos 1915 (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2005). Unfortunately, Corrigan’s book was not available before this account went to press. Major G. Corrigan to author, 14 February 2006.

12Perhaps the most extreme books in this school are J. Laffin, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One (Stroud: Sutton, 1992) and D. Winter, Haig’s Command (London: Penguin, 1992). Laffin’s text contains a number of errors. For example he confuses that German gas attack at Ypres in April 1915 with the British gas attack at Loos in September. Although initially well received Winters Haig’s Command has been found to contain major problems with its use of evidence and archive material. See J. Grey, ‘Denis Winter s “Haigs Command: A Reassessment”, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 71, no. 285 (Spring 1994), pp. 60–3.

13T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900–1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2003; first published 1987);T. Travers, ‘Technology,Tactics, and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory, 1900–1914’, Journal of Modern History, vol. 51, no. 2 (June 1979), pp. 264–86; ‘The Hidden Army: Structural Problems in the British Officer Corps, 1900–1918’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 17, no. 3 (July 1982), pp. 523–44; ‘Learning and Decision-Making on the Western Front, 1915–1916: The British Example’, Journal of Canadian History, vol. 18, no. 1 (April 1983), pp. 87–97; ‘A Particular Style of Command: Haig and GHQ, 1916–1918’ Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 10, no. 3 (1987), pp. 363–76; How the War Was Won (London: Routledge, 1992); Gallipoli 1915 (Stroud:Tempus, 2004; first published 2001).

14The only chapters to deal with 1917 and 1918 in Travers, The Killing Ground are mainly concerned with the writing of the Official History, especially the controversial Passchendaele volume and the German Spring Offensive of March 1918. A staunch defence of Edmonds and the Official Histories can be found in A. Green, Writing the Great War. Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories, 1915–1948 (London: Frank Cass, 2003). Criticism of How The War Was Won can be found in P. Simkins, ‘Somme Reprise: Reflections on the Fighting for Albert and Bapaume, August 1918’ in B. Bond (ed.), ‘Look to your Front’ Studies in the First World War by The British Commission for Military History (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999), pp. 147–162; A. Simpson, ‘The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914–18’, D. Phil., University College, London, 2003.

15For a concise introduction to recent revisionist work on the British Army during the First World War see G.D. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myths and Realities (London: Headline, 2001). For important other works see J. Bailey, ‘The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare’, The Strategic & Combat Studies Institute, The Occasional, 22 (1996); S. Bidwell & D. Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904–1945 (Boston: Allen Unwin, 1982); R. Prior & T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front. The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–18 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916–1918 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994).

CHAPTER 1: THE ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE OF LOOS: MAY-AUGUST I915

1The Schlieffen Plan has attracted a considerable body of literature. A brief selection will suffice. See G. Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan (London: Oswald Woolf, 1958); F. Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: WW Norton, 1967); G.E. Rothenberg, ‘Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment’, in P. Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 296–325; T. Zuber, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. German War Planning 1871–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) has called into question traditional interpretations of the Schlieffen Plan. See A. Schliffen, Schlieffen’s Military Writings, ed. & trans. R.T. Foley (London: Frank Cass, 2002) and R.T. Foley, ‘Origins of the Schlieffen Plan’, War in History, vol. 10, no. 2 (2003), pp. 222–32. For a comprehensive modern account of the historiography see H. Strachan, The First World War. Volume I, To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 163–80.

2See R.T. Foley, ‘East or West? General Erich von Falkenhayn and German Strategy, 1914–15’, in M. Hughes & M. Seligmann (eds.), Leadership in Conflict, 1914–1918 (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000), pp. 117–137; and H.H. Herwig, The First World War. Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918 (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 130–5.

3For an excellent recent discussion of Falkenhayn’s strategic ideas see R.T. Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun. Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

4R. Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 52–3.

5E. Falkenhayn, General Headquarters 1914–16 and its Critical Decisions (London: Hutchinson, 1919), P· 56.

6J. Terraine, The Great War (Hertfordshire:Wordsworth, 1997; first published 1965), p. 89.

7Much of the following is taken from P. Bernard & H. Dubieff, The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914–1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 29–32.

8See M.M. Farrar, Principled Pragmatist. The Political Career of Alexandre Millerand (Oxford: Berg, (1991) ; ‘Politics versus Patriotism: Alexandre Millerand as French Minister of War’, French Historical Studies, vol. 11, no. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 577–609.

9J.F.V Kreiger, Raymond Poincaré (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 217.

10L.V. Smith, S. Audoin-Rouzeau & A. Becker, France and the Great War, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 80.

11S.R. Williamson,‘Joffre Reshapes French Strategy, 1911–1913’, in P.M. Kennedy (ed.), The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), pp. 133–54.

12C. Barnett, ‘The Western Front Experience as Interpreted Through Literature’, R. U.S.I.fournal, vol. 148, no. 6 (December 2003), p. 56.

13J.C. Joffre, The Memoirs of Marshal foffre, trans. T. Bentley Mott (2 vols. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1932), II, p. 327.

14IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C32, French Diary, ‘Minutes of Meeting at Chantilly’, 24 June 1915.

15Joffre, The Memoirs of Marshal foffre, II, p. 394.

16D. Stevenson, ‘French Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–1918’, in R. Chickering & R.S. Forster (eds.), Great War, Total War. Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 306.

17LHCMA: Robertson Papers, 3/1/13, ‘Notes from Conversations 4 June’.

18Basil Liddell Hart declaimed ‘What a majestic conception was this plan of Joffre s, and how utterly unrelated to the material conditions of modern warfare!’ B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (London: Pan, 1975; first published 1930), p. 195. For other criticisms of Joffres strategy see D. Porch, ‘The French Army in the First World War’, in A.R. Millett & W Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness Volume I: The First World War (London: Unwin Hyman, 1998), p. 215; G.H. Cassar, Kitchener. Archited of Victory (London: William Kimber, 1977), p. 3 79; Terraine, The Great War, p. 61.

19For example, in September 1914, 12,000 75mm shells were being manufactured daily. By October 1915 the total had risen to over 150,000 per day. Joffre, The Memoirs of Marshal foffre, II, p. 391.

20For the ‘cult of the offensive’ see A.J. Echevarria II, ‘The ‘Cult of the Offensive’ Revisited: Confronting Technological Change Before the Great WarJournal of Strategic Studies, vol. 25, no. 1 (March 2002), pp. 128–57. See also D. Porch, The March to the Marne. The French Army 1871–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 11 and ‘The French Army and the Spirit of the Offensive 1900–1914’ in B. Bond & I. Roy (eds.), War and Society. A Yearbook of Military History (London: Croom Helm, 1975), pp. 117–43; M. Howard, ‘Men Against Fire:The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914’, in Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, pp. 510–26.

21TNA: PRO WO 158/13, ‘Note for the General Officers Commanding Army Groups’, 14 September 1915.

22A. Clayton, Paths of Glory, The French Army 1914–1918 (London: Cassell, 2003), p. 22.

23Ibid., p. 30.

24Porch, ‘The French Army in the First World War’, p. 202.

25Porch, The March to the Marne, p. 213.

26See P. Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, 1914 to 1918 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965); J. Gooch, The Plans of War. The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900–1916 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974); D. French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986) and British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905–1915 (London: George Allen & Unwin, (1991); W.J. Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18 (London: Macmillan, 1996)

27A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 34.

28G.H. Cassar, Asquith as War Leader (London: Hambledon, 1994), p. 109.

29M. Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914–1918 (2 vols., London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961), I, P. 334.

30For Kitchener see G. Arthur, Life of Lord Kitchener (3 vols., London: Macmillan, 1920); Viscount Esher, The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener (London: John Murray, 1921); P. Magnus, Kitchener. Portrait of an Imperialist (London: John Murray, 1958); Cassar, Kitchener. Architect of Victory, T. Royle, The Kitchener Enigma (London: Michael Joseph, 1985); P Warner, Kitchener. The Man Behind the Legend (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1985); J. Pollock Kitchener, Comprising the Road to Omdurman and Saviour of the Nation (London: Constable, 2001).

31D. French, ‘The Meaning of Attrition, 1914–1916’, English Historical Review, vol. 13, no. 407 (April 1988), p. 389.

32French, British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905–1915, p. 155.

33TNA: PRO 30/57/50, Kitchener Papers, Lord Kitchener to Field-Marshal Sir J. French, 2 January 1915.

34TNA: PRO WO 159/4/6, ‘An Appreciation of the Military Situation in the Future’, 26 June 1915.

35Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18, p. 77; French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916, p. 103.

36TNA: PRO CAB 22/2, Minutes of Dardanelles Committee Meeting, 7 June 1915.

37LHCMA: Clive Papers, 2/1, Clive Diary, 6 June 1915.

38H.H. Asquith, Memories and Reflections, 1852–1927 (2 vols., London: Cassell, 1928), II, pp. 106–7.

39TNA: PRO CAB 37/131/4, Memorandum by A.J. Balfour, 2 July 1915; Cassar, Kitchener, p. 382; Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18, p. 79; French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916, p. 107.

40‘Joffre’s view’s about the need for a new offensive were accepted by both Governments with the proviso that we must exercise prudence and caution.’ IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C32, French Diary, 6 July 1915. Original emphasis. See also Viscount Esher, The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener, p. 141.

41Asquith, Memories and Reflections, 1852–1927, II, p. 107.

42Viscount Esher, Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher, Vol. 3, 1910–1915 (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson, 1938), p. 252.

43Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914 — 1918, I, p. 349.

44Joffre, The Memoirs of Marshal Joffre, II, pp. 380–1.

45IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C32, French Diary, ‘Minutes of Meeting at Chantilly’, 24 June 1915.

46TNA: PRO WO 159/11, Kitchener Papers, Brigadier-General Hon. H. Yarde-Buller (British Mission with GQG des Armées Françaises) to Kitchener, 11 July 1915, p. 7·Yarde-Buller seems to have confused his dates. He erroneously recorded that Chantilly followed the conference at Calais on 5 July.

47LHCMA: Clive Papers, 2/2, Clive Diary, 6 July 1915; Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914–1918, I, P· 348.

48Magnus, Kitchener, p. 348.

49Cassar, Kitchener, p. 380.

50Ibid., p. 381.

51Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18, p. 79; French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916, p. 107

52Cassar, Kitchener, p. 381; K. Neilson, ‘Kitchener: A Reputation Refurbished?’, Canadian Journal of History, vol. 15, no. 2 (1980), pp. 220–1; French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916, p. 108.

53Neilson, ‘Kitchener: A Reputation Refurbished?’, p. 221.

54Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914–1918,1, p. 351.

55LHCMA: Robertson Papers, 7/5, Lieutenant-General Sir W. Robertson to C. Wigram, 13 July 1915.

56TNA: PRO WO 159/11, Kitchener Papers,Yarde-Buller to Kitchener, 11 July 1915, p. 11.

57I.M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 103.

58Between 22 April and 31 May 1915 General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien’s Second Army was involved in fighting around Hill 60 and the battle of Second Ypres. Although British attacks were made, they were (strictly speaking) part of a wider defensive operation.

59Sir John French has attracted relatively little biographical attention: See G. French, The Life of Field-Marshal Sir John French. First Earl of Ypres (London: Cassell, 1931); R. Holmes, The Little Field Marshal. Sir John French (London: Jonathan Cape, 1981); G.H. Cassar, The Tragedy of Sir John French (London: Associated University Presses, 1985). See also Sir John’s controversial memoirs, 1914 (London: Constable, 1919).

60Supported by his officers, Brigadier-General Hubert Gough (GOC 3 Cavalry Brigade) threatened to resign if he was ordered to take part in any move to coerce Ulster into accepting Irish Home Rule. See A.P. Ryan, Mutiny at the Curragh (London: Macmillan, 1956); Sir J. Fergusson, The Curragh Incident (London: Faber, 1964); I.F.W Beckett (ed.), The Army and the Curragh Incident (London: Army Records Society, 1986).

61R. Holmes, ‘Sir John French and Lord Kitchener’, in B. Bond (ed.), The First World War and British Military History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 128.

62See Sir W. Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal (London: Constable, 1921) and Soldiers and Statesmen 1914–1918 (2 vols., London: Cassell, 1926); V. Bonham-Carter, Soldier True. The Life and Times of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson (London: Frederick Muller, 1963); D.R. Woodward, Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson. Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the Great War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). For discussions of Robertson’s performance in 1914 see E. Spears, Liaison 1914 A Narrative of the Great Retreat (London: Cassell, 1999; first published 1930), p. 217; Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919, pp. 56–56.

63Sir William Robertson, ‘Conduct of the War’, 8 November 1915, cited in Woodward, Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, p. 19.

64N. Gardner, Trial by Fire. Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. 2.

65See Sir C.E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (2 vols., London: Cassell, 1927); B. Collier, Brasshat. A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (London: Seecker & Warburg, 1961).

66LHCMA: Robertson Papers, 4/3/24, Robertson to Lieutenant-Colonel A. Fitzgerald (Kitchener’s Private Secretary), 19 October 1915.

67Sir J.E. Edmonds (comp.), History of the Great War: Military Operations France & Belgium, 1914, vol. 1, Mons, the Retreat to the Seine, the Marne and the Aisne. August–October 1914 (London/Nashville: Imperial War Museum/Battery Press, 1996; first published 1933), Appendix 8, pp. 499–500.

68Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18, pp. 53–66.

69TNA: PRO 30/57/50, Kitchener Papers, French to Kitchener, 3 January 1915.

70Holmes, ‘Sir John French and Lord Kitchener’, p. 124.

71LHCMA: Clive Papers, 2/1, Clive Diary, 3 and 4 June 1915; Robertson Papers, 3/1/13, ‘Notes from Conversations 4 June’.

72TNA: PRO 30/57/50, Kitchener Papers, French to Kitchener, 11 June 1915.

73IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C32, French Diary, 19 June 1915.

74IWM: French Papers, 7/2 (1), Haig to GHQ, 23 June 1915.

75Sir D. Haig, The Haig Papers from the National Library of Scotland, part 1, Haig’s Autograph Great War Diary (Brighton: Harvester Press Microfilm, 1987), 20 June 1915.

76Ibid., 22 June 1915.

77Haig split the battlefield into four sectors. The first lay south of the Béthune–Lens road. An attack here was not recommended. Not only were the British trenches too far away from the enemy lines, but they were also badly enfiladed by a feature known as the Spoil Bank. Any attack would be stopped by the heavily wired second line. The ground between the Béthune–Lens road and the Vermelles-Loos road formed a more promising second sector. Observed artillery fire could be brought to bear on part of the German second line (known in this sector as the Loos Defence Line), the trenches were reasonably close together and forming up areas could be dug without too much difficulty. Haig did not recommend an attack on the third sector, running from the Vermelles–Loos road north to the Vermelles–La Bassée railway. The difficulties of the ground, distant trenches, hard soil and enemy observation, were similar to those further south. And again, if an advance proved successful, moving men and supplies up would be far from easy. The fourth sector lay between Cuinchy and La Bassée, an area that Haig believed would offer ‘serious resistance’. An attack was practicable, however, because forming up places could be constructed and artillery fire directed onto much of the German position. IWM: French Papers, 7/2 (1), Haig to GHQ, 23 June 1915.

78Sir J.E. Edmonds (comp.), History of the Great War: Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, Battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos (London/Nashville: Imperial War Museum/Battery Press, 1995; first published 1928), p. 117.

79IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C32, French Diary, 23 June 1915.

80When asked by French if his plans had changed, Joffre said that they had not. Although the French Commander-in-Chief did admit that there were ‘slight differences’ between his position and Foch’s (who wanted a major effort in Artois), a second attack would be made, at a place, ‘not yet determined’.

81LHCMA: Clive Papers, 2/2, Clive Diary, 17 July 1915; IWM: Wilson Papers, DS/MISC/80, HHW 25, Wilson Diary, 28 July 1915.

82IWM: French Papers, 7/5,‘Meeting at St Omer, 11 July 1915 10 a.m.’.

83IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C32, French Diary, 27 July 1915; C. Falls, Marshal Foch (London: Blackie & Son, 1939), p. 95; F. Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, trans.T. Bentley Mott (London: William Heinemann, 1931), pp. 237–8.

84IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C32, French Diary, 12 July 1915.

85IWM: Wilson Papers, HH W 2/80/41,‘Note for Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson’, 15 July 1915.

86IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C32, French Diary, 20 July 1915.

87Ibid., 22 July 1915.

88LHCMA: Clive Papers, 2/2, Clive Diary, 25 July 1915.

89IWM: French Papers, 7/2 (1), GHQ to Haig, 22 July 1915.

90IWM: French Papers, 7/2 (1), Haig to GHQ, 23 July 1915.

91IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C32, French Diary, 24 July 1915.

92IWM: Wilson Papers, DS/MISC/80, HHW 25, Wilson Diary, 24 July 1915.

93LHCMA: Clive Papers, 2/2, Clive Diary, 4 August 1915.

94IWM: Wilson Papers, HHW 2/80/44, ‘Report of a Meeting Between Field-Marshal Sir John French and General Foch, Frevent, 27 July 1915’.

95TNA: PRO WO 158/13, French to Joffre, 29 July 1915.

96IWM: Wilson Papers, HHW 2/79/33, Joffre to French, 5 August 1915.

97Apparently Robertson had tried to get Sir John to omit this sentence, which would place the British unreservedly in the hands of the French. Cassar, The Tragedy of Sir John French, p. 257.

98IWM: Wilson Papers, HHW 2/79/35, French to Joffre, 10 August 1915.

99See R. Prior & T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front. The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–18 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), Chapter 4.

100Haig, who was informed of the ‘artillery plan’ on 7 August, confirmed that it was ‘to be made chiefly with artillery and I am not to launch a large force of infantry to the attack on objectives which are so strongly held as liable to result only in the sacrifice of many lives’. Haig, The Haig Papers, 7 August 1915. Emphasis added. The ‘artillery plan’ seems to have originated soon after the Frevent conference. Sir John drafted a letter to Foch on 29 July asking him whether Joffre would be satisfied with the neutralisation of enemy batteries south of the La Bassée canal by British artillery fire. It seems that Sir John made this decision without the poisonous influence of Wilson who was away on other matters. He may also have been encouraged by a meeting between Clive and Joffre on the following day. Clive was apparently told that the attack on Vimy Ridge, to be made by the French Tenth Army, was ‘going to be an artillery, not an infantry battle.’ TNA: PRO WO 158/26,‘Note for General Foch Commanding the Group of Armies of the North’, 29 July 1915, not sent; LHCMA: Clive Papers, 2/2, Clive Diary, 30 July i9i5;TNA: PRO WO 158/13, Handwritten Note by Major G.S. Clive, 31 July 1915.

101IWM: Wilson Papers, HHW 2/79/36, Joffre to French, 12 August 1915; Wilson Papers, DS/ MISC/80, HHW 25, Wilson Diary, 12 August 1915.

102Joffre to Millerand, 30 July 1915, cited in Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18, pp. 98–99.

103BLO: Asquith Papers, MS. ENG. LETT. C. 542/2, Asquith to Mrs S. Henley, 15 August 1915.

104WS. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1915 (London:Thornton Butterworth, 1923), p. 432.

105IWM: French Papers, 7/4 (2), Kitchener to French, 20 August 1915.

106R. Williams, ‘Lord Kitchener and the Battle of Loos: French Politics and British Strategy in the Summer of 1915’, in L. Freedman, P. Hayes & R. O’Neill (eds.), War, Strategy and International Politics. Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 119.

107Ibid., p. 120.

108P.J. Flood, France 1914–18. Public Opinion and the War Effort (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 107–17, 147–78.

109K. Neilson, Strategy and Supply. The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914–17 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. viii.

110Neilson, ‘Kitchener: A Reputation Refurbished?’, pp. 207–27.

111Haig, The Haig Papers, 19 August 1915.

112Magnus, Kitchener, p. 348.

113Cassar, Kitchener, p. 386.

114Warner, Kitchener, p. 187.

115TNA: PRO CAB 22/2, Minutes of Dardanelles Committee Meeting, 20 August 1915.

116Royle, The Kitchener Enigma, p. 328.

117See the account in Churchill, The World Crisis, 1915, pp. 410–1.

118IWM: French Papers, 75/46/3, Kitchener to French, undated but from the summer of 1915. According to Sir John this telegram was sent on 18 December 1914. See French, 1914, p. 355.

119See M. Hughes, “Revolution Was in the Air’: British Officials in Russia During the First World War, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 31, no. 1 (January 1996), pp. 75–97. Knox’s experiences are recounted in his With the Russian Army (New York: Arno Press, 1971; first published 1921).

120Neilson, Strategy and Supply, p. 30.

121TNA: PRO WO 106/1058, Knox’s Despatch U, 26 May 1915.

122TNA: PRO WO 106/1062, Knox’s Despatch Y, 8 June 1915 and WO 106/1060, Knox’s Despatch W, 12 June 1915.

123TNA: PRO WO 106/1063, Knox’s Despatch Z, 18 June 1915.

124Ibid. One of Knox’s colleagues told him that unarmed soldiers were being sent into the trenches ‘to wait till someone with a rifle gets killed or wounded’.

125In a telegram to Kitchener (dated 29 June), Knox reported that the Russian Third Army had suffered 75 percent casualties.TNA: PRO WO 159/13, Knox to Kitchener, 29 June i9i5·The following month Knox also reminded Kitchener of the ‘colossal’ losses Russia had suffered since the outbreak of war, something amounting to 3,800,000. WO 106/1064, Knox’s Despatch A1, 4 July 1915.

126TNA: PRO WO 106/1060, Knox’s Despatch W, 12 June 1915. Despatch E2 of 29 August 1915 (WO 106/1068) also commented upon the ‘bitter’ feelings towards the French.

127TNA: PRO 30/57/67, Kitchener Papers, Hanbury-Williams to Kitchener, 13 June 1915.

128TNA: PRO WO 106/997, Despatch LXXIII, 4 August 1915.

129Viscount E. Grey, Twenty Five Years, 1892–1916 (2 vols., London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925), II, p. 211.

130BLO: Asquith Papers, 117, Memorandum by Sir George Buchanan, 7 August 1915.

131TNA: PRO 30/57/67, Kitchener Papers, Hanbury-Williams to Kitchener, 11 August 1915.

132TNA: PRO 30/57/67, Kitchener Papers, Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich to Kitchener, 19 July 1915.

133TNA: PRO WO 159/11, Kitchener Papers,Yarde-Buller to Kitchener, 24 July 1915.

134R.H. Bruce Lockhart, Memoirs of a British Agent (London: Pan Macmillan, 2002; first published 1932), p. 126. In a vivid illustration of the interconnectedness of the Western and Eastern Fronts, Lockhart’s brother, Norman, was killed at Loos. Lockhart’s reports – that, arguably, added some pressure on the British to do something in the west – yielded a tragic personal result.

135BLO: Asquith Papers, 117, Buchanan to Kitchener, 18 August 1915.

136Brace Lockhart, Memoirs of a British Agent, p. 126.

137TNA: PRO WO 106/997, Despatch LXXIII, 4 August 1915.

138TNA: PRO WO 106/998, Despatch LXXIV, 7 August 1915.

139TNA: PRO WO 106/1067, Knox’s Despatch D2, 14 August 1915.

140TNA: PRO WO 106/998, Despatch LXXV, 15 August 1915.

141TNA: PRO WO 106/998, Despatch LXXIV, 7 August 1915.

142TNA: PRO WO 159/4, ‘General Staff Note on the General Military Situation’, 3 August 1915.

143TNA: PRO CAB 22/2, Minutes of Dardanelles Committee Meeting, 3 September 1915.

144TNA: PRO 30/57/57, Kitchener Papers, Kitchener to Millerand, 20 August 1915. Millerand replied on 26 August 1915, telling Kitchener how he was ‘deeply touched by your kind letter’. ‘Please believe that’, he wrote ‘I myself have very happy memories of the three days I had the pleasure of spending with you.’

145TNA: PRO CAB 22/2, Minutes of Dardanelles Committee Meeting, 20 August 1915.

146Williams, ‘Lord Kitchener and the Battle of Loos: French Politics and British Strategy in the Summer of 1915’, p. 129.

147TNA: PRO CAB 22/2, Minutes of Dardanelles Committee Meeting, 20 August 1915. Original emphasis.

148The meeting did contain, however, one more surprise. After discussing Sir John French’s requirements, Kitchener stated that there was ‘another new factor in the situation’. What this new factor was is unknown, being apparently too secret to include in the minutes. The author has been unable to shed any light on this mystery.

149French, British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905–1915, p. 126; R. Jenkins, Asquith (London: Collins, 1978), pp. 342–3.

150Kitchener to Hamilton, 20 August 1915, cited in W.S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill. Volume III Companion, Part 2, Documents, May 1915-December 1916, ed. M. Gilbert (London: Heinemann, 1972), pp. 1149–50; Foreign Office to Buchanan, 20 August 1915, cited in Neilson, Strategy and Supply, p. 96; IWM: French Papers, 7/4 (2), Kitchener to French, 20 August 1915.

151E. Greenhalgh, ‘Why the British Were on the Somme in 1916’, War in History, vol. 6, no. 2 (1999), pp. 143–73; W. Philpott, ‘Why the British Were Really on the Somme: A Reply to Elizabeth Greenhalgh’, War in History, vol. 9, no. 4 (2002), pp. 446–71; E. Greenhalgh, ‘Flames Over the Somme: A Retort to William Philpott’, War in History, vol. 10, no. 3 (2003), pp. 335–42.

152Liddell Hart, History of the First World War, p. 193.

153K. Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 1914–18 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), Chapters 1 & 2; Gooch, The Plans of War. The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900–1916, P· 317·

154See N. Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1975), pp. 180–91.

155‘The Russian Army has been so weakened by the blows it has suffered that Russia need not be seriously considered a danger in the foreseeable future.’ General Erich von Falkenhayn to Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg, 31 August 1915, cited in Herwig, The First World War, p. 179.

CHAPTER 2: OPERATIONAL PLANNING: AUGUST–SEPTEMBER I915

1TNA: PRO WO 95/158, ‘Précis of First Army Conference of Monday, 6 September 1915’.

2J. Terraine, Douglas Haig. The Educated Soldier (London: Cassell, 2000; first published 1963), p. 156.

3For a discussion of Haig’s command of First Army see N. Lloyd, “‘With Faith and Without Fear”: Haig’s Command of First Army During 1915’, forthcoming Journal of Military History, 2006.

4Haig does not lack biographical study. For a comprehensive historiography see K. Simpson, ‘The Reputation of Sir Douglas Haig’, in B. Bond (ed.), The First World War and British Military History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 141–62. Also see B. Bond & N. Cave (eds.), Haig. A Reappraisal 70 Years On (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999) for the results of modern research. Terraine, Douglas Haig, remains the standard defence of Haig’s leadership, but for a more critical appraisal see G.J. De Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861–1928 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900–1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2003; first published 1987), Part II; and Travers, ‘A Particular Style of Command: Haig and GHQ, 1916–1918’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 10, no. 3 (1987), pp. 363–76. The recent publication of D. Haig, War Diaries & Letters 1914–1918, eds. G. Sheffield & J. Bourne (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005) marks a new stage in studies of Haig.

5Although the two divisions (Lahore and Meerut) of Indian Corps were both smaller than a comparable British division. The corps only totalled around 20,000 men. See G. Corrigan, Sepoys in the Trenches (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999).

6Lieutenant-General Sir C. A. Anderson replaced Lieutenant-General Sir James Willcox as GOC Indian Corps on 7 September 1915.

7Sir D. Haig, The Haig Papers from the National Library of Scotland, part 1, Haig’s Autograph Great War Diary (Brighton: Harvester Press Microfilm, 1987), 13 August 1915.

8The only biography is A. Farrar-Hockley, Goughie: The Life of General Sir Hubert Gough (London: Hart-Davis, Mac Gibbon, 1975). See also H. Gough, The Fifth Army (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1931), his autobiography Soldiering On (London: Arthur Baker, 1954) and G. Sheffield, ‘An Army Commander on the Somme: Hubert Gough’, in G. Sheffield & D. Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front. The British Army’s Experience 1914–1918 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004), pp. 71–95.

9Gough, The Fifth Army, p. 94.

10See I.F.W. Beckett, ‘Hubert Gough, Neill Malcolm and Command on the Western Front’, in B. Bond (ed.), ‘Look to your Front’ Studies in the First World War by the British Commission for Military History (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999), pp. 1–12.

11P. Simkins, ‘Haig and the Army Commanders’, in Bond & Cave (eds.), Haig. A Reappraisal 70 Years On, p. 88.

12R. Prior & T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front. The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–1918 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). See also F.B. Maurice, The Life of Lord Rawlinson of Trent (London: Cassell, 1928).

13Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, pp. 70–3.

14TNA: PRO WO 95/158, ‘I Corps Scheme for the Operations’, 22 August 1915.

159^th (Scottish) Division was the senior division of the First New Army It had been in France since mid-May.

16NAM: Rawlinson Papers, 5301–33–25, Rawlinson Diary, 13 August 1915.

17Ibid., 20 August 1915.

18Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 104.

19TNA: PRO WO 95/158, ‘IV Corps Proposals for an Attack on Loos and Hill 70’, 22 August 1915.

2015 ^th (Scottish) Division was the senior division of the Second New Army. It had been in France since 13 July and had joined IV Corps on 17 July.

21Rawlinson showed a similar reluctance to plan beyond the capture of the initial locality at Neuve Chapelle in March. See Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, pp. 25–35.

22Haig, The Haig Papers, 1 September 1915.

23IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C32, French Diary, 28 July 1915.

24TNA: PRO WO 95/157, GHQ to Haig, 23 August 1915.

25Ibid.

26This was apparently not unusual. See T. Travers, ‘The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British Military Thought, 1870–1915’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 13, no. 3 (July 1978), pp. 531–53.

27IWM: Wilkinson Papers, 44 Brigade, ‘Preliminary Operation Order’, 13 September 1915. Emphasis added.

28NAM: Rawlinson Papers, 5301–33–25, Rawlinson Diary, 4 September 1915.

29Haig, The Haig Papers, 30 August 1915.

30Ibid., 17 August 1915.

31During September Major-General J.P. DuCane (MGRA GHQ) complained that GHQ was ‘unapproachable expect by mail’. Cited in Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 120, n. 23.

32IWM: Wilson Papers, DS/MISC/80, HHW 25,Wilson Diary, 13 September 1915.

33IWM: Fitzgerald Papers, PP/MCR/118, Fitzgerald Diary, 29–31 August 1915.

34LHCMA: Clive Papers, 2/2, Clive Diary, 19 September 1915.

35Haig, The Haig Papers, Haig to Lady Haig, 16 September 1915.

36TNA: PRO WO 95/158,‘Précis of First Army Conference of Monday, 6 September 1915’.

37Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 106.

38Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 95.

39TNA: PRO WO 95/158,‘Précis of First Army Conference of Monday, 6 September 1915’.

40Much of the following is taken from J. Luvaas, The Education of an Army (London: Cassell, 1965), pp. 216–47.

41G.F.R. Henderson, Campaign of Fredericksburg (London: Gale & Polden, 1886); The Battle of Spiceren, August 6^th, 1870, and the Events that Preceded it: A Study in Practical Tactics and War Training (London: Gale & Polden, 1891).

42G.F.R. Henderson, The Science of War. A Collection of Essays and Lectures 1892–1905, ed. N. Malcolm (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1905), p. 40.

43TNA: PRO WO 95/158, ‘Précis of First Army Conference of Monday, 6 September 1915’.

44Rather curiously, in The Science of War, Henderson had criticised military history that did not make mention of ‘the spirit of war, to moral influences, to the effect of rapidity, surprise and secrecy’. Cited in Luvaas, The Education of an Army, p. 225. Emphasis added.

45This point is made in Travers, ‘The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British Military Thought 1870–1915’, pp. 540–1.

46D. Haig, Cavalry Studies. Strategic & Tactical (London: Hugh Rees, 1907), p. 142.

47Field Service Regulations, Part I, Operations (London: HMSO, 1909; amended 1912). See Travers, ‘Technology, Tactics and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory, 1900–1914’, Journal of Modern History, vol. 17, no. 3 (June 1979), p. 273.

48See A. Simpson, ‘The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914–1918’, D. Phil., University College, London, 2003, passim.

49Field Service Regulations, Part I, Operations, p. 126.

50Ibid., p. 192.

51Ibid., p. 126.

52See Travers, The Killing Ground, pp. 85–100. To be fair to Haig many senior German officers also shared this adherence to ‘decisive’ battles. See R.T. Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun. Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), passim.

53BLO: Asquith Papers, 13–14, Haig to Hon. H.H. Asquith, 25 June 1915.

54Haig, The Haig Papers, 30 July 1915; Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 127.

55Haig, The Haig Papers, Haig to Lady Haig, 15 August 1915.

56Ibid., Haig to Lady Haig, 24 August 1915. Emphasis added.

57Ibid., Haig to Lady Haig, 22 September 1915.

58For the classic account see R. Graves, Goodbye To All That (London: Penguin, 1960; first published 1929), pp. 155–66. See also H. Willamson, A Fox Under My Cloak (Stroud: Sutton, 1996; first published 1955). Williamson was not, as some commentators have alleged, at Loos. A Fox Under My Cloak is a fictional account of Loos. Personal Communication, Henry Williamson Society to the Author.

59C.H. Foulkes, “GAS!” The Story of the Special Brigade (London: Blackwood, 1934), Chapter 4; L.F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud. Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 52–58; G. Hartcup, The War of Invention. Scientific Developments, 1914–18 (London: Brassey’s, 1988), pp. 96–102; D. Richter, Chemical Soldiers. British Gas Warfare in World War One (London: Leo Cooper, 1994), Chapters 2–4, and ‘The Experience of the British Special Brigade in Gas Warfare’, in H. Cecil & PH. Liddle (eds.), Facing Armageddon. The First World War Experienced (London: Leo Cooper, 1996), pp. 353–64; A. Palazzo, Seeking Victory on the Western Front. The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), Chapter 2. Palazzo correctly shows how gas became the ‘central, controlling feature of British planning’, but misses the fundamental disagreement between French and Haig over the scope of the attack.

60Although accepting volunteers, it was believed essential that the Special Brigade be composed of men who knew something of chemistry. Transfer requests were therefore sent out for members of the armed forces with any relevant knowledge or skills. Because it was believed that the Special Brigade would only control the discharge of the gas – this was to be proved false – usual standards of height, fitness and age were waived. In order to help differentiate members of the Special Brigade, who would be working in crowded fire-trenches, successful applicants were promoted to corporal and issued with revolvers.

61Travelling on average a hundred miles per day, Foulkes gave numerous demonstrations and lectures, and visited virtually every division and corps in First Army to arrange the detailed plans for the use of gas. Foulkes, “GAS!”, pp. 61–2.

62Richter, Chemical Soldiers, p. 23.

63The rubber pipes, however, proved very difficult to manufacture in sufficient numbers and rigid iron ones were substituted instead. Unfortunately, the large number of joints they contained proved leaky.

64Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. Foulkes to Lieutenant-General Sir W. Robertson, 31 May 1915, cited in Foulkes, “GAS!”, p. 40.

65Haig, The Haig Papers, 22 August 1915.

66Gough, The Fifth Army, p. 101.

67This point was made in B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (London: Pan, 1975; first published 1930), p. 198; Richter, Chemical Soldiers, p. 36. Foulkes later denied that the demonstration on 22 August had been ‘too successful’, because ‘only a few cylinders were used to show how gas was emitted’.TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. Foulkes to Brigadier-General Sir J.E. Edmonds, undated.

68‘The arrangement for dropping bombs has been perfected, also a bomb containing chloroform and prussic acid has been produced which is of usually deadly nature. One whiff of the gas is said to be sufficient to kill.’ Haig, The Haig Papers, 15 August 1915.

69LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 7/1, ‘Lecture on Battle of Loos Given on 14 December 1915’; TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Lieutenant-General Sir R.D. Whigham to Edmonds, 9 July 1926.

70TNA: PRO WO 95/158, ‘IV Corps Proposals for an Attack on Loos and Hill 70’, 22 August 1915.

71TNA: PRO WO 95/158,‘Précis of First Army Conference of Monday, 6 September 1915’.

72See M. Crawshaw, ‘The Impact of Technology on the BEF and its Commanders’, in Bond & Cave (eds.), Haig. A Reappraisal 70 Years On, pp. 155–75.

73Lord Kitchener had apparently wanted a smaller gas frontage. See Foulkes, “GAS!”, p. 60.

74NAM: Rawlinson Papers, 5201–33–18,‘Letter Book Volume II, May 1915-Aug 1916’, Lieutenant-General Sir H. Rawlinson to Lieutenant-Colonel A. Fitzgerald (Kitchener’s Private Secretary), 29 August 1915.

75TNA: PRO WO 95/158,‘Notes on the Conference Held at Hinges at 10.30 a.m. on the 6^th September by the GOC First Army’.

76‘At the conference,’ wrote Charteris, ‘the Indian Corps made difficulties, and were very roughly dealt with by D.H.’J. Charteris, At G.H.Q. (London: Cassell, 1931), p. 107.

77Sir J.E. Edmonds (comp.), History of the Great War: Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, Battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos (London/Nashville: Imperial War Museum/Battery Press, 1995; first published 1928), p. 396.

78Travers, The Killing Ground, p. xx.

79Foulkes, “GAS!”, pp. 44–45.

80‘Moreover up to the present on my front all prisoners taken have had most inefficient respirators. This looks as if the enemy did not anticipate a gas attack here. His machine gunners are said to have oxygen inhalers which can last for half an hour.’ Haig, The Haig Papers, 26 August 1915.

81Charteris, At G.H. Q., p. 107.

82Haig, The Haig Papers, 21 August 1915.

83Foulkes records that the first batches of metal cylinders, manufactured in Runcorn, when filled, took five minutes to empty. Owing to a breakdown in cylinder supply, different sizes of cylinders were employed and emptied much quicker. Foulkes, “GAS!”, p. 45.

84Haig, The Haig Papers, 21 August 1915.

85Ibid., 26 August 1915.

86TNA: PRO WO 95/157, Haig to GHQ, 26 August 1915.

87TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Foulkes to Edmonds, undated.

88LHCMA: Foulkes Papers, 2/16, Foulkes Diary, 4 September 1915.

89Foulkes, “GAS!”, p. 56.

90TNA: PRO WO 95/157, Robertson to Haig, 28 August 1915.

91Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, pp. 158–9.

92For a full forty-minute gas attack on a frontage of 6,300 yards, 5,040 cylinders would be required in 252 bays.

93Foulkes, “GAS!”, p. 60.

94TNA: PRO WO 95/158, First Army Memorandum, 17 September 1915.

95Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 115.

96TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Whigham to Edmonds, 9 July 1926.

97See for example Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 397; Liddell Hart, History of the First World War, pp. 200–2; Terraine, Douglas Haig, pp. 156–70; J.H. Johnson, Stalemate! Great Trench Warfare Battles (London: Cassell, 1999; first published 1995), p. 49; R. Neillands, The Great War Generals on the Western Front 1914–18 (London: Robinson, 1999), p. 218.

98TNA: PRO WO 95/157, Haig to GHQ, 28 August 1915.

99XI Corps was formed on 29 August 1915 consisting of 23^rd, 24^th and the Guards Division. On 4 September it was decided that 23^rd Division would be replaced by 21^st Division once the latter had arrived in France. TNA: PRO WO 95/880, XI Corps War Diary, 4 September 1915.

100The decision to use 21^st and 24^th Divisions at Loos is a controversial one. The Official History records that they were chosen to form a reserve corps because ‘not another seasoned division could be withdrawn without endangering the British front’. Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 139. This is, however, debatable. According to Haig, Sir John believed that ‘not having been in the trenches, but fresh from training in open warfare,’ 21^st and 24^th Divisions ‘would be better for the attack and pursuit resulting from a successful assault and then our more seasoned units which had become sticky and disinclined to leave their trenches because of the “trench habits” which they had learnt’. TNA: PRO CAB 44/28, Haig’s comments on the draft chapters of the Official History, 7 January 1928.

101Haig, The Haig Papers, 1 September 1915.

102‘Loyalty to and consideration for his troops did not appear to have been characteristics of Haking,’ P. Warner, The Battle of Loos (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 2000; first published 1976), p. 23. See also Graves, Goodbye To All That, p. 114; R. Kipling, The Irish Guards in the Great War (2 vols., London: Macmillan, 1923), II, pp. 6–7;Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 48.

103Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 23.

104IWM: Fitzgerald Papers, PP/MCR/118, Fitzgerald Diary, 12 September 1915.

105Haig, The Haig Papers, 18 September 1915.

106TNA: PRO CAB 44/27, Haig’s comments on the draft chapters of the Official History, 20 February 1927.

107Sir J. French, ‘Loos’, 15 October 1915, in Complete Despatches of Lord French, 1914–1916 (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 2001; first published 1916), p. 396.

108See Travers, The Killing Ground, pp. 16–9.

109IWM: Wilson Papers, DS/MISC/80, HHW 25, Wilson Diary, 24 September 1915.

110LHCMA: Edmonds Papers, 3/10, ‘Memoirs’, Chapter XXVI, p. 8.

111R. Holmes, The Little Field Marshal. Sir John French (London: Jonathan Cape, 1981), p. 302.

112TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Whigham to Edmonds, 9 July 1926. Whigham was not impressed by this, believing it was ‘a bit of special pleading’ by Sir John.

113TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson to Edmonds, 10 August 1926.

114For this in 1914 see N. Gardner, Trial by Fire. Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), passim.

115Apparently, Sir John told Robertson on 2 October that the second day of the battle was the correct day for the reserves to go into action. Haig, The Haig Papers, 2 October 1915.

116LHCMA: Liddell Hart Papers, 1/520, General A. Montgomery-Massingberd to Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, 29 September 1927.

117T. Travers, ‘The Hidden Army: Structural Problems in the British Officer Corps, 1900–1918’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 17, no. 3 (July 1982), p. 532.

118TNA: PRO CAB 44/28, Haig’s comments on the draft chapters of the Official History, 1 January 1928.

119Haig, The Haig Papers, 19 September 1915.

120TNA: PRO WO 95/158, Haig to Robertson, 19 September 1915. Emphasis added.

121TNA: PRO WO 95/158, Robertson to Haig, 19 September 1915.

122LHCMA: Howell Papers, 6/2/126–6/2/158, Haig to Howell, 22 September 1915, Thanks to Professor Gary Sheffield for this reference.

123Sir William Robertson was apparently undecided about who should have control of the reserves. TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Whigham to Edmonds, 9 July 1926.

124IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C33, French to Mrs W Bennett, 24 September 1915.

125TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Major-General G.T. Forestier-Walker (GOC 21^st Division) to Edmonds, 24 January 1927.

126Foulkes, “GAS!”, p. 58.

127Haig, The Haig Papers, 15 September 1915.

128TNA: PRO WO 95/158, Haig to Robertson, 16 September 1915. Original emphasis.

129TNA: PRO WO 95/158, First Army to I and IV Corps, 16 September 1915.

130TNA: PRO WO 95/158, ‘I Corps Scheme for the Operations’, 17 September 1915.

131TNA: PRO WO 95/711, ‘IV Corps Proposals for an attack on Loos and Hill 70’, 17 September 1915.

132TNA: PRO WO 95/158, Haig to GHQ, 18 September 1915.

133TNA: PRO WO 95/158, GHQ to Haig, 13 September 1915.

134TNA: PRO WO 95/158, GHQ to Haig, 18 September 1915.

135Emphasis added.

136TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Whigham to Edmonds, 9 July 1926.

137TNA: PRO WO 95/158, First Army Operation Order No. 95, 19 September 1915.

CHAPTER 3: PRE–BATTLE PREPARATION: SEPTEMBER I915

1E. Wyrall, The History of the 2^nd Division, 1914–1918 (Uckfield, East Sussex: Naval & Military Press, 2000; first published 1921), p. 218.

2IWM: 87/33/1, War Diary of Major E.S.B. Hamilton (45^th Field Ambulance, 15^th Division), 7 September 1915.

3TNA: PRO WO 95/158,‘Précis of First Army Conference of Monday, 6 September 1915’.

4TNA: PRO WO 95/1229, Memorandum by Major-General A.E.A. Holland, 10 September 1915.

5J. Buchan & J. Stewart, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 1914–1919 (Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood, 1926), pp. 28–9.

6See K. Simpson, ‘Capper and the Offensive Spirit’, R. U.S.I. Journal, vol. 118, no. 2 (June 1973), pp. 51–6.

7TNA: PRO WO 95/1629, Capper’s Note to Troops, 18 September 1915.

8IWM: French Papers, PP/MCR/C32, French Diary, 28 May 1915; Sir D. Haig, The Haig Papers from the National Library of Scotland, part 1, Haig’s Autograph Great War Diary (Brighton: Harvester Press Microfilm, 1987), 20 June 1915.

9P. Gibbs, Realities of War (London: William Heinemann, 1920), p. 133.

10P. Maze, A Frenchman in Khaki (London: William Heinemann, 1934), p. 119.

11Sir J.E. Edmonds (comp.), History of the Great War: Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, Battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos (London/Nashville: Imperial War Museum/Battery Press, 1995; first published 1928), p. 147.

12G.C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks. The Battle in Depth in the West (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1975; first published 1940), p. 66.

13TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Colonel W.G.S. Dobbie (GSOI 1^st Division) to Brigadier-General Sir J.E. Edmonds, 7 October 1926.

14‘Between Loos and Fosse 8 the country is flat and open, therefore, there will be problems of sending up supplies and reinforcements when the German front line of trenches has been captured (much difficulty is likely to be experienced in supporting an attack on the German trenches). Villages in the rear of German line are strongly defended, and the ground between them is flat and open, so that a further advance eastward would be extremely difficult.’ IWM: French Papers, 7/2 (1), Haig to GHQ, 23 June 1915.

15These were Vermelles–Hulluch–Vendin Le Vieil, Hulluch–Wingles–Meurchin and Haisnes– Douvrin–Berclau. The Béthune–Lens road led directly south-east.

16IWM: MISC 134 (2072), ‘Administration Arrangements During the Battle of Loos’, by Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. M.A. Wingfield, 4 January 1916.

17The Sixth Army held the front from just north of the River Lys near Messines to south of Arras.

18A good description can be found in A. Clark, The Donkeys (London: Pimlico, 1997; first published 1961), p. 168.

19LHCMA: Robertson Papers, 4/1, Captured German Pamphlet (issued in November 1915), ‘Experiences gained in the winter battle of Champagne from the point of view of the organisation of the enemy’s lines of defence and the means of combating an attempt to pierce our line’, 13 May 1915.

20For the evolution of German defensive doctrine see M. Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995), Chapter 7; R.T. Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun. Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter 7.

21See for example I. Passingham, Pillars of Fire: The Battle of Messines Ridge June 1917 (Stroud: Sutton, 1998), pp. 35–8.

22TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Rainsford-Hannay to Edmonds, 8 March 1926.

23TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Purvis to Edmonds, 27 February 1926.

24TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Brigadier-General M.G. Wilkinson to Edmonds, 8 June 1926.

25BLL: GS 0309, Account of General Sir Philip Christison.

26TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Brigadier-General W.C. Walton to Edmonds, 28 April 1926.

27IWM: MISC 134 (2072), ‘Administration Arrangements During the Battle of Loos’, by Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. M.A. Wingfield, 4 January 1916.

28TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Colonel G.H. Boileau to Edmonds, 28 February 1926.

29TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Colonel D.W. Cameron of Lochiel to Edmonds, 17 September 1926. See also Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 236.

30IWM: 88/52/1, ‘Narrative of the Operations of the First Battalion of the Post Office Rifles in France 1915–1918’, by Captain G.N. Clark, p. 17.

31TNA: PRO WO 95/2698, ‘47^th Division at Loos’.

32I.M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).

33LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 6/4, ‘Report of 25 September 1915 by OC 187 Company RE’.

34TNA: PRO WO 95/1275, 3 Brigade War Diary, 19 September 1915.

35Although written later on in the battle, one account will suffice to illustrate how trying these logistical preparations could be: ‘Struggling through a communication trench, carrying not only one’s own kit of some 6olbs – but also sundry dead weights like gas cylinders; two r gallon petrol tins filled with water, boxes of bombs, chunks of duck-boards, with constant wire overhead; wire underfoot; shells bursting around, wounded men enviedly [sic] going back, bodies lying waiting to be put over the top at dark – was a seething nightmare. . .’ IWM: 88/52/1, ‘My Life with the Post Office Rifles’, Account of Rifleman (later Wing Commander) W.J. Shewry.

36Buchan & Stewart, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 1914–1919, pp. 23–4, n. 1.

37Haig, The Haig Papers, 4 September 1915.

38IWM: 87/33/1, War Diary of Major E.S.B. Hamilton, 5 September 1915.

39This distinction between ‘gas’, ‘accessory’ and ‘roger’ seems to have been largely dismissed. ‘Take those new gas-companies – sorry, excuse me this once, I mean accessory-companies – their very look makes me tremble.’ R. Graves, Goodbye To All That (London: Penguin, 1960; first published 1929), p. 151. See also J.C. Dunn (ed.), The War the Infantry Knew 1914–1919 (London: Abacus, 2004; first published 1938), p. 146.

40Dunn (ed.), The War the Infantry Knew 1914–1919, pp. 146–7.

41IWM: MISC 26/ITEM 469, German Account of Christmas Truce 1914 and Loos, September 1915; D. Richter, Chemical Soldiers. British Gas Warfare in World War One (London: Leo Cooper, 1994), p. 89.

42See for example F. Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die (London: Anthony Mott, 1983), pp. 114–5. When the gas was released in this sector the German defenders placed bundles of straw, which had been doused in petrol and set alight, onto their parapet in order to form a barrier to the gas. Graves, Goodbye To All That, pp. 157–8.

43TNA: PRO WO 95/1911, 15^th Division War Diary, August-September 1915; Buchan & Stewart, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 1914–1919, pp. 23–4.

44TNA: PRO WO 95/1733, ‘Lecture Given on the Part Played by 9^th Division in Battle of Loos’, by Lieutenant-Colonel S.E. Holland (GSOI 9^th Division).

45C.T. Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 1914–1918 (London: John Murray, 1927), p. 199.

46TNA: PRO WO 95/1629, 7^th Division War Diary, September 1915.

47IWM: 82/30/1, Brigadier-General Hon. J.F.H.S.F. Trefusis Diary, 4 September 1915.

48TNA: PRO WO 95/2698, 47^th Division War Diary, August-September 1915.

49IWM: MISC 134 (2072), ‘Administration Arrangements During the Battle of Loos’, by Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. M.A. Wingfield, 4 January 1916.

50TNA: PRO WO 95/1229, 1^st Division War Diary, August and September 1915.

51TNA: PRO WO 95/1229, Brigadier-General A.J. Reddie to Major-General A.E.A. Holland, 7 September 1915.

52TNA: PRO WO 95/1229, Major-General A.E.A. Holland to Brigadier-General A.J. Reddie, 8 September 1915.

53TNA: PRO WO 95/1275, 3 Brigade War Diary, 1 August 1915.

54‘Hostile shelling - support trenches blown in. It appears difficult to keep them in good repair and fit for use.’TNA: PRO WO 95/1275, 3 Brigade War Diary, 16 September 1915.

55TNA: PRO WO 95/1287, 2^nd Division War Diary, September 1915.

56Dunn (ed.), The War the Infantry Knew 1914–1919, p. 144.

57See Chapter 5.

58TNA: PRO WO 95/1733,‘General Staff Special War Diary Dealing with Battle of Loos’; A.H. Maude, The History of the 47^th (London) Division, 1914–1919 (Uckfield, East Sussex: Naval & Military Press, 2000; first published 1922), pp. 26–7.

59Sir WG. Macpherson, History of the Great War. Medical Services General History, vol. 2, The Medical Services on the Western Front, and During the Operations in France and Belgium in 1914 and 1915 (London: HMSO, 1923), p. 453.

60Ibid., p. 467.

61IWM: 91/23/1, Diary of Major R.C. Ozanne (Medical Officer 15^th Division), 25 September I9i5·

62IWM: 8 7/33/1, War Diary of Major E.S.B. Hamilton, 30 September 1915.

63Macpherson, Medical Services General History, vol. 2, p. 467.

64See the account in J. Ewing, The History of the 9^th (Scottish) Division (London: John Murray, 1921), p· 59.

65At Chocques and Merville.

66Macpherson, Medical Services General History, vol. 2, p. 457.

67Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919, p. 102.

68TNA: PRO WO 95/181, AA&QMG First Army War Diary, 29 August 1915.

69See entries to Haig, The Haig Papers, 25 June and 14 September 1915.

70‘Much careful forethought is necessary in order to have the requisite stores of all kinds available and on the spot when required.’ TNA: PRO WO 95/158, ‘Précis of First Army Conference of Monday, 6 September 1915’.

71For ‘umpiring’ see Samuels, Command or Control?, pp. 49–53.

72Sir J.E. Edmonds & G.C. Wynne (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 1, Winter 1914–15: Battle of Neuve Chapelle: Battles of Ypres (London: Macmillan, 1927), p. 125–6.

73R.E. Priestley, The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 1918 (France) (Chatham: W & J Mackay, 1921), p. 64.

74LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 7/1, ‘The IV Corps Artillery at the Battle of Loos’, P· 24.

75Priestley, The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 1918 (France), p. 74.

76TNA: PRO WO 95/158, ‘Communication Between Cavalry and Artillery of Army Corps and Divisions in the Event of an Advance’, 24 September 1915.

77For Loos I Corps had fifteen lofts, each containing eight birds. It is not known whether any were available for IV Corps. The pigeons were to fly to a loft in Béthune with messages. Yet pigeons were obviously not invulnerable and fourteen were killed during the subsequent fighting. Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 99, n. 1; Priestley, The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 1918 (France), p. 92.

78For the battle of Loos ‘a wireless section consisting of two lorry sets, two pack sets, and six short range sets was attached to First Army under a specially-qualified senior officer. Previous to the battle, one pack set was installed in a dug-out on the Béthune–Lens Road near Vermelles, and the short range sets. . . were arranged to provide emergency communication between each of four divisions and one of their brigades in the line.’ Priestley, The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 1918 (France), pp. 88–9.

79See D. Jordan, ‘The Battle For the Skies: Sir Hugh Trenchard as Commander of the Royal Flying Corps’, in M. Hughes & M. Seligmann (eds.), Leadership in Conflict 1914–1918 (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000), pp. 73–4.

80TNA: PRO AIR 1/529/16/12/70, General Sir Douglas Haig to the War Office, 13 September 1915.

81H.A. Jones, History of the Great War: The War in the Air (6 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), II, pp. 78–9.

82Each Wing contained four squadrons each of twelve aircraft.

83The resulting ‘Fokker Scourge’ arrived, however, too late to be of real importance during the fighting around Loos. When the offensive opened, Leutnant Oswald Boelcke, one of Germany’s leading pilots, had only four victories to his credit. P. Kilduff, Richthofen, Beyond the Legend of the Red Baron (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1994), p. 39.

84There were no bomb racks and bombing remained very much a case of the pilot or observer throwing explosives out of the plane onto the intended target. In order to improve accuracy some form of sight was needed. This did arrive in time for Loos; a primitive sight developed by two RFC officers, Second Lieutenants R.B. Bourdillon and G.M.D. Dobson, but bombing would remain wildly inaccurate into the Second World War.

85Jones, The War in the Air, II, p. 117. A much-quoted statistic, but one that gives some idea of the fledgling nature of the air war.

86Heavier sets had been used since the beginning of the war, but because they were heavy (weighing 75lbs) and extremely bulky, they had to be installed in the passenger seats of B.E.2c’s, thus leaving no room for an observer. The pilot, therefore, had to do everything himself: fly, spot targets and send messages back, and understandably, even experienced flyers found this very testing.

87The clock code was developed in January 1915 and was a method for simplifying wireless code. It required a celluloid disc with lettered concentric circles upon it and the figures of the clock written around the outside. These circles represented 10, 25, 100, 200, 300 and 400 yards, and by placing the target at the centre of the disc, fire could be brought to bear onto the target. The letter of the circle would be called for the distance of the shell from the target and the number on the clock for the direction. Zone calls allowed targets of opportunity to be engaged quickly. The battlefield was divided into numbered squares each covering about 3,000 yards. See Jones, The War in the Air, II, pp. 86–7, 175–6.

88R. Prior & T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front. The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–18 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 40–1.

89TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Account of E.R. Ludlow-Hewitt, 22 September 1926.

90Each section contained one balloon and its crew.

91On 4 May 1915 First Army finally got hold of an observation balloon, kindly lent by the French. TNA: PRO AIR 1/529/16/12/70, Haig to GHQ, 25 June 1915.

92TNA: PRO WO 95/592,1 Corps Memorandum, 20 September 1915.

93Jones, The War in the Air, II, p. 130. This is perhaps not surprising when considering the lamentable standard of training possessed by aerial observers during this period and also the reluctance of infantry to signal their position. See D. Jordan, ‘The Army Co-Operation Missions of the Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air Force 1914–1918’, Ph.D., Birmingham, 1997, pp. 45–54, 92–5.

94See G. Sheffield, The Redcaps. A History of the Royal Military Police and its Antecedents from the Middle Ages to the Gulf War (London: Brassey’s, 1994), pp. 58–62.

95TNA: PRO WO 95/158, First Army to GHQ, 21 October 1915.

96TNA: PRO WO 95/158, XI Corps to First Army, 3 November 1915.

97The letter of 10 October does not seem to be in the relevant army files.

98LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 6/4–4, ‘Telephone Conversations of Lieutenant-General Rawlinson’, 25 September 1915.

99T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900–1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2003; first published 1987), p. 17.

100TNA: PRO WO 95/158, First Army to GHQ, 4 November 1915.

101TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Major-General G.T. Forestier-Walker to Edmonds, 24 January 1927.

102TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Major R.B. Johnson to Edmonds, undated.

103TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Major J. Vaughan to Edmonds, 16 June 1926.

104TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Major-General B.R. Mitford to Edmonds, 23 January 1926. Although this military policeman has generally been blamed for incompetence, the question remains as to why Mitford had not been given the correct pass.

105TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Lieutenant-Colonel H.J.C. Piers to Edmonds, 17 June 1926.

106TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Major T.G.E Paget to Edmonds, 14 June 1926.

10724^th Division only left England at the end of August. TNA: PRO WO 95/2189, 24^th Division War Diary, 28 August 1915.

108The entry to 63 Brigades War Diary of 21 September reads:‘The Brigade marched very well and there were very few stragglers.’ TNA: PRO WO 95/2151.

109TNA: PRO WO 95/2151, Lieutenant-Colonel C.G. Stewart to Major A.E Becke, 3 August 1925.

110IWM: PP/MCR/185, Lieutenant-Colonel A. de. S. Hadow to his wife, 21 September 1915.

111TNA: PRO WO 95/2189, Lieutenant-Colonel C.G. Stewart to Major A.E Becke, 3 August 1925.

112TNA: PRO WO 95/2128, 21^st Division War Diary, 24 September 1915.

113TNA: PRO WO 95/2189, 24^th Division War Diary, 24 September 1915.

114TNA: PRO WO 95/2128, 21^st Division War Diary, 24 September 1915.

115TNA: PRO WO 95/880, Robertson to Haig, 23 September 1915.

116T. Travers, ‘The Hidden Army: Structural Problems in the British Officer Corps, 1900–1918’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 17, no. 3 (July 1982), p. 532.

117Sheffield, The Redcaps, p. 60.

118IWM: 88/52/1, ‘Narrative of the Operations of the First Battalion of the Post Office Rifles in France 1915–1918’, by Captain G.N. Clark, p. 17.

119TNA: PRO WO 95/2268, ‘General Pereira’s Statement as to 85 Brigade Taking over on 27 September’. 28^th Division was moved up to support operations around the Hohenzollern Redoubt on 27 September 1915.

120TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Major-General C. Coffin to Edmonds, 19 February 1927.

121TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Major J. Buckley (9/KOYLI, 64 Brigade) to Edmonds, 1 January 1927.

122TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Major-General C. Coffm to Edmonds, 19 February 1927.

123IWM: 96/29/1, Account of Second Lieutenant J.H. Alcock (8/Lincolnshire, 63 Brigade).

124TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Captain E.H. Smythe to Becke, 8 April 1927.

125TNA: PRO WO 95/885, AA&QMG XI Corps War Diary, 14 September 1915.

126IWM: MISC 134 (2072), ‘Administration Arrangements During the Battle of Loos’, by Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. M.A. Wingfield, 4 January 1916.

127TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, H.M. de F. Montgomery to Edmonds, 12 January 1926.

128TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Major-General Sir F. Maurice to Edmonds, 10 January 1926.

CHAPTER 4: THE PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT: 21–24 SEPTEMBER I915

1Sir J.E. Edmonds (comp.), History of the Great War: Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, Battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos (London/Nashville: Imperial War Museum/Battery Press, 1995; first published 1928), Chapter 9; R. Prior &T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front. The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–18 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 117–8. See also Sir M. Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. Western Front 1914–18 (Woolwich: Royal Artillery Institution, 1986), p. 116–27.

2See I.M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), Chapter 3; R.Q.J. Adams, Arms and the Wizard. Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions (London: Cassell, 1978), passim.

3TNA: PRO WO 95/158, ‘General Principles for the Attack’, contained in First Army War Diary, 6 September 1915.

4Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, Part II.

5Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 40; A. Bristow, A Serious Disappointment, the Battle of Aubers Ridge, 1915 and the Subsequent Munitions Scandal (London: Leo Cooper, 1995), passim.

6Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 85.

7M. Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 107.

8Sir D. Haig, The Haig Papers from the National Library of Scotland, part 1, Haig’s Autograph Great War Diary (Brighton: Harvester Press Microfilm, 1987), 11 May 1915; Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 94.

9TNA: PRO WO 95/157, ‘Notes of Conferences held at Advanced First Army HQ, Hinges, at 2 p.m. 24 August 1915’.

10LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 7/1,‘The IV Corps Artillery at the Battle of Loos’, p. 7.

11There are similarities here with the discussions regarding what the preliminary bombardment would be like before the So mine offensive of the following year. Haig had wanted a short bombardment but this was rejected by Rawlinson (GOC Fourth Army), because he did not have enough guns. This, however, does not seem to have been made clear to Haig.

12‘Artillery conquers, infantry occupies.’J.M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War 1914–1918 (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), p. 39. Original emphasis.

13The definitive discussion can be found in S. Bidwell & D. Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904–1945 (Boston: Allen Unwin, 1982), Chapter 5.

14J. Bailey, ‘British Artillery in the Great War’, in P. Griffith (ed.), British Fighting Methods in the Great War (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 29. Bailey also mistakenly writes that the attack at Loos began on 15 September 1915.

15TNA: PRO WO 95/728, ‘Organization of Artillery for Forthcoming Operations’, 31 August 1915.

16Figures taken from TNA: PRO WO 95/181, AA&QMG First Army War Diary, December 1914-December 1915.

17Figures taken from Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 174.

18TNA: PRO WO 158/12, ‘Notes on British Offensive’, 1 September 1915.

19TNA: PRO WO 95/1752, LI Brigade RFA War Diary, 23–24 September 1915.

20TNA: PRO WO 95/2712,VI (London) Brigade RFA War Diary, 23 September 1915.

21TNA: PRO WO 95/2718,VIII (London) Brigade RFA War Diary, 24 September 1915.

22Bidwell & Graham, Firepower, p. 79. For the Somme see M. Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme (London: Penguin, 1984; first published 1971), p. 88.

23R. Graves, Goodbye To All That (London: Penguin, 1960; first published 1929), pp. 148–9. See also J.C. Dunn (ed.), The War the Infantry Knew 1914–1919 (London: Abacus, 2004; first published 1938), p. 151.

24TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Prothero to Brigadier-General Sir J.E. Edmonds, 1 March 1926

25TNA: PRO WO 95/728, IV Corps to First Army, 18 September 1915.

26TNA: PRO WO 95/728, First Army to IV Corps, 20 September 1915.

27IWM: MISC 175 (2658), Major-General Sir H.H. Tudor Diary, 15 September 1915.

28Ibid., 15 September 1915.

29J. Bailey, ‘The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare’, The Strategic & Combat Studies Institute,The Occasional, 22 (1996).

30T. Travers, ‘Technology, Tactics, and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory, 1900–1914 ’, Journal of Modern History, vol. 51, no. 2 (June 1979), pp. 264–86.

31Bidwell & Graham, Firepower, p. 68.

32Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 41.

33Getting accurate and up-to-date maps were a constant problem. As has been shown, a ‘cartographic and survey chaos’ existed in First Army during this period that did little to help accurate artillery fire. For example, one of the HAR groups was issued with a map that was three months old, and many of the batteries were using the 1:10,000 trench maps; the points on which were about 260 yards too far north! P. Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers. A History of British Survey and Mapping on the Western Front 1914–1918 (Lewes: Mapbooks, 1999), pp. 104–9.

34I Corps was equipped with 144 18-pounders and IV Corps received 100.

35S. Marble, ‘Artillery, Intelligence and Optimism. Wire-Cutting During the Somme Bombardment’, Stand To! The Journal of the Western Front Association, no. 61 (April 2001), pp. 36–9. Experimental firing took place during the build-up to Loos. On 14 September 7^th Division experimented with 6o-pounder guns, firing both shrapnel and lyddite (high explosive) at barbed wire. The War Diary recorded how ‘more damage was done by the lyddite, but that a clear and more well-defined lane was cut by shrapnel’. TNA: PRO WO 95/1629, 7^th Division War Diary, 14 September 1915.

36By August 1915 only 4.4 percent of 18-pounder ammunition in France was high-explosive. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919, p. 96.

37Bidwell & Graham, Firepower, p. 97.

38TNA: PRO WO 95/728, ‘Organization of Artillery for Forthcoming Operations’, 31 August 1915.

39T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900–1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2003; first published 1987), p. 93. Haig hoped that the artillery would ‘add to the moral effect produced by the gas’. Haig, The Haig Papers, 24 August 1915.

40Field Artillery Training 1914 (London: HMSO, 1914), p. 230.

41Birch to Edmonds, 8 July 1930, cited in Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 138.

42Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, p. 121.

43LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 7/1, ‘The IV Corps Artillery at the Battle of Loos’, p. 1.

44Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 174.

45S. Marble, “The Infantry Cannot do with a Gun Less”: The Place of the Artillery in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914–1918 <www.gutenberg-e. org>, Chapter 9, p. 5. On 13 August Haig saw Major-General H.S. Horne (GOC 2^nd Division). ‘We discussed the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of forming Corps Artillery,’ wrote Haig. ‘He is to think over the function and send me his views in writing.’ Haig, The Haig Papers, 13 August 1915.

46A.P. Palazzo, ‘The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I’, Journal of Military History, vol. 63, no. 1 (January 1999), pp. 55–74.

47Details of artillery organisation taken from Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, p. 120.

48Marble, “The Infantry Cannot do with a Gun Less”, Chapter 9, p. 6.

49See Chapter 2.

50See Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, p. 115.

51Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 175;TNA: PRO WO 95/157, ‘Notes of Conferences held at Advanced First Army HQ, Hinges, at 2 p.m. 24 August 1915’·

52IWM: Wilson Papers, HHW 2/80/47, ‘Proceedings of a Meeting held at Beauquesne, 4pm 26/08/15’.

53TNA: PRO WO 95/728, ‘Organization of Artillery for Forthcoming Operations’, 31 August 1915.

54See TNA: PRO WO 95/711,‘Order Regarding Demonstrations’, contained in IV Corps War Diary, 21 September 1915.

55See N. Lloyd, ‘Note on Decoys and Dummies’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 81, no. 237 (Autumn 2003), pp. 290–1.

56TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Colonel H.E. Braine (Brigade Major 19 Brigade) to Edmonds, undated.

57TNA: PRO WO 95/1315, CRA 2^nd Division, ‘Progress Report’, 21 September 1915.

58TNA: PRO WO 95/1746, CRA 9^th Division, ‘Operation Report’, 21 September 1915.

59R.B. Talbot-Kelly, A Subaltern’s Odyssey (London: William Kimber, 1980), p. 51.

60J. Ewing, The History of the 9^th (Scottish) Division (London: John Murray, 1921), p. 34.

61C.T. Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 1914–1918 (London: John Murray, 1927), p. 204.

62TNA: PRO WO 95/1638, CRA 7^th Division War Diary, 21 September 1915.

63TNA: PRO WO 95/1643, XXXV Brigade RFA War Diary, 21 September 1915.

64LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 7/1, ‘The IV Corps Artillery at the Battle of Loos’, P. 5.

65J. Buchan & J. Stewart, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 1914–1919 (Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood, 1926), p. 31.

66TNA: PRO WO 95/1919, CRA 15^th Division War Diary, 21 September 1915.

67LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 7/1, ‘The IV Corps Artillery at the Battle of Loos’, P· 1·

68R.G.A. Hamilton, The War Diary of the Master of Belhaven 1914–1918 (Barnsley: Wharncliffe, 1990; first published 1924), p. 69. Although 24^th Division was one of the reserve divisions (XI Corps) and did not take part in the opening attacks, its artillery had been sent up to the front. By 19 September CVI Brigade RFA was deployed in Vermelles in support of 7^th Division, CVII Brigade RFA was in divisional reserve, while CVIII Brigade RFA was deployed in Grenay and CIX Brigade RFA had recently taken over gun-pits at Philosophe.

69TNA: PRO WO 95/1924, LXX1I Brigade RFA War Diary, 21 September 1915.

70TNA: PRO WO 95/2708, Macnaughten Group, ‘Progress Report No 1 6pm 21 September 1915’.

71See Ibid. and TNA: PRO WO 95/1638, CRA 7^th Division War Diary, 21 September 1915.

72TNA: PRO WO 95/1638, CRA 7^th Division War Diary, 21 September 1915; PRO WO 95/1315, CRA 2^nd Division, ‘Progress Report’, 21 September 1915.

73TNA: PRO WO 95/619, CRA I Corps War Diary, 21 September 1915.

74TNA: PRO WO 95/728, First Army to IV Corps, 21 September 1915.

75TNA: PRO WO 95/1746, CRA 9^th Division, ‘Operation Report’, 22 September 1915; PRO WO 95/2708, CRA 47^th Division War Diary, 22 September 1915; PRO WO 95/1315, CRA 2^nd Division War Diary, 22 September 1915.

76IWM: 91/23/1, Diary of Major R.C. Ozanne, 22 September 1915.

77TNA: PRO WO 95/1315, ‘Report on Result of Day’s Firing’, 22 September 1915; PRO WO 95/1326, XLI Brigade RFA War Diary, 22 September 1915.

78TNA: PRO WO 95/1324, XXXIV Brigade RFA War Diary, 22 September 1915.

79TNA: PRO WO 95/1746, CRA 9^th Division, ‘Operation Report’, 22 September 1915.

80TNA: PRO WO 95/1638, CRA 7^th Division War Diary, 22 September 1915; PRO WO 95/1643, XXII Brigade RFA War Diary, 22 September 1915.

81TNA: PRO WO 95/728. ‘General Report by IV Corps Artillery’, 22 September 1915.

82TNA: PRO WO 95/728, 47^th Division to IV Corps, 23 September 1915, ‘Report by Divisional Artillery’.

83IWM: MISC 175 (2658), Major-General Sir H.H. Tudor Diary, 22 September 1915.

84IWM: 82/30/1, Brigadier-General Hon. J.F.H.S.F. Trefusis Diary, 22 September 1915.

85TNA: PRO WO 95/1638, CRA 7^th Division War Diary, 22 September 1915.

86TNA: PRO WO 95/728, ‘General Report by IV Corps Artillery’, 22 September 1915.

87Ibid.

88TNA: PRO AIR 1/752/204/6/61, ‘Instructions by Lieutenant-Colonel E.B. Ashmore, Commanding First Wing, RFC’, 20 September 1915.

89TNA: PRO AIR 1/2166/209/11/11, First Wing War Diary, 20–22 September 1915.

90H.A. Jones, The War in the Air (6 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), II, pp. 126–7.

91TNA: PRO AIR 1/2166/209/11/11, First Wing War Diary, 21 September 1915.

92Communiqué No. 11, cited in C. Cole (ed.), Royal Flying Corps Communiqués 1915–1916 (London: Tom Donovan, 1990; first published 1968), pp. 48–9.

93TNA: PRO WO 95/1746, CRA 9^th Division War Diary, 23 September 1915; ‘Very cloudy, this combined with smoke and dust raised by our fire made observation extremely difficult.’ PRO WO 95/2197, CVIII Brigade RFA War Diary, 23 September 1915.

94Hamilton, The War Diary of the Master of Belhaven 1914–1918, p. 71; Dunn (ed.), The War the Infantry Knew 1914–1919, p. 151.

95Haig, The Haig Papers, 23 September 1915.

96TNA: PRO WO 95/1643, XXII Brigade RFA War Diary, 23 September 1915.

97TNA: PRO WO 95/1315, CRA 2^nd Division, ‘Daily Report’, 23 September 1915.

98Graves, Goodbye To All That, p. 152.

99TNA: PRO WO 95/1324, XXXIV Brigade RFA War Diary, 23 September 1915.

100TNA: PRO WO 95/1325, XXXVI Brigade RFA War Diary, 23 September 1915.

101TNA: PRO WO 95/1746, CRA 9^th Division, ‘Operation Report’, 23 September 1915.

102TNA: PRO WO 95/1752, LII Brigade RFA War Diary, 23 September 1915.

103TNA: PRO WO 95/728, ‘Progress Report IV Corps Artillery’, 23 September 1915; PRO WO 95/1250, XXVI Brigade RFA War Diary, 23 September 1915.

104V. Tiede, Das 4. Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 157 (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1922), p. 24.

105TNA: PRO WO 95/1924, LXXII Brigade RFA War Diary, 23 September 1915; PRO WO 95/728,‘Progress Report IV Corps Artillery’, 23 September 1915.

106TNA: PRO WO 95/2708, CRA 47^th Division, ‘Artillery Summary’, 23 September 1915.

107TNA: PRO WO 95/2708, 47^th Division to IV Corps, 24 September 1915.

108TNA: PRO AIR 1/1182/204/5/2595, RFC War Diary, 23 September 1915.

109Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Die Operationen Des Jahres 1915 (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1933), p. 45.

110TNA: PRO AIR 1/1182/204/5/2595, RFC War Diary, 24 September 1915.

111TNA: PRO WO 95/1315, CRA 2^nd Division, ‘Daily Diary Z2 Group’, 24 September 1915.

112TNA: PRO WO 95/1324, XXXIV Brigade War Diary, 24 September 1915; PRO WO 95/1325, XXXVI Brigade RFA War Diary, 24 September 1915.

113TNA: PRO WO 95/1746, CRA 9^th Division, ‘Operation Report’, 24 September 1915.

114TNA: PRO WO 95/1751, L Brigade RFA War Diary, 24 September 1915.

115IWM: 82/30/1, Brigadier-General Hon. J.F.H.S.F. Trefusis Diary, 24 September 1915.

116TNA: PRO WO 95/1250, XXVI Brigade War Diary, 24 September 1915; PRO WO 95/1923, L and LI Brigade RFA War Diaries, 24 September 1915.

117TNA: PRO WO 95/728, CRA IV Corps, ‘General Progress Report’, 24 September 1915. The ‘second line’ referred to is almost certainly the Loos Defence Line and not the actual German second line.

118TNA: PRO WO 95/619, CRA I Corps War Diary, 24 September 1915. Emphasis added.

119See TNA: PRO WO 95/1352, 6 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915; PRO WO 95/1362, 19 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915; PRO WO 95/1343, 5 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915; PRO CAB 45/121, Major-General P.R. Robertson (GOC 19 Brigade) to Edmonds, 19 February 1926.

120TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Colonel H.C. Potter to Edmonds, 27 September 1927.

121TNA: PRO WO 95/1265, 8/Berkshire and 10/Gloucestershire War Diaries, 25 September 1915.

122TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Major PJ.R. Currie (2/KRRC, 2 Brigade) to Edmonds, 16 July 1926. Currie’s letter also states that ‘even after the surrender of the trench garrison gaps had to be cut to allow the passage of troops moving forward’.

123‘It was quickly seen that the barbed wire, an unusually formidable obstacle, some ten yards in breadth and staked low on the ground, was practically undamaged in front of the brigade.’ Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 211; TNA: PRO WO 95/1267, 2 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

124E. Wyrall, The Die-Hards in the Great War (London: Harrison & Sons, 1926), I, p. 145.

125TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Lieutenant-Colonel A.C. Northey to Edmonds, 27 September 1926.

126TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Lieutenant-Colonel E.A. Beck (Brigade Major 45 Brigade) to Edmonds, 3 February 1926.

127Ewing, The History of the 9^th (Scottish) Division, p. 34.

128TNA: PRO WO 95/1229, 1^st Division War Diary, 3 August 1915.

129J. Terraine, Douglas Haig. The Educated Soldier (London: Cassell, 2000; first published 1963), p. 204.

130Dunn (ed.), The War the Infantry Knew 1914–1919, p. 150.

131TNA: PRO WO 95/1262, 26 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

132TNA: PRO WO 95/1774, 28 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

133TNA: PRO WO 95/1660, 22 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

134TNA: PRO WO 95/1652, 7^th Division, ‘Narrative of Events on Recent Operations’.

135TNA: PRO WO 95/1934, ‘Report by D.W.P. Strang (Captain & Adjutant) 8/Seaforths’; PRO WO 95/1948, 46 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

136TNA: PRO WO 95/712, 47^th Division to IV Corps, ‘Effect of Our Artillery on German Trenches’, 4 October 1915.

137P. MacGill, The Great Push (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1916), p. 80.

138Ibid., p. 85.

139Buchan & Stewart, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 1914–1919, p. 34.

140J. Buchan, ‘The Battlefield of Loos’ in The Times, 6 October 1915. Thanks to Andrew Rawson for this reference.

141TNA: PRO WO 95/712, IV Corps War Diary, October-December 1915, ‘Report from 1^st Division to IV Corps on Damage Done to Enemy’s Trenches by Our Fire During Bombardment’, 4 October 1915; PRO WO 95/1658, 21 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

142TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Captain B.A. Fenwick (9/East Surrey, 72 Brigade) to Edmonds, 20 December 1918; PRO WO 95/2210, 72 Brigade War Diary, 26 September 1915.

143TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Account of E.R. Ludlow-Hewitt, 22 September 1926.

144TNA: PRO AIR 1/753/204/4/69, ‘Memorandum on the Work of the 1^st Wing, RFC in the Operations of the 1^st Army Between September 21 and October 11 1915’, 25 October 1915.

145Communiqué No. 12, cited in Cole (ed.), Royal Flying Corps Communiqués 1915–1916, p. 52.

146TNA: PRO AIR 1/753/204/4/69, ‘Operations of the Royal Flying Corps 22–26 September’, 29 September 1915.

147Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, p. 114.

148Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, p. 54; C.J.C. Street, With The Guns (Uckfield, East Sussex: Naval & Military Press, 2003; first published 1916), p. 74.

149LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 7/1,‘IV Corps Artillery at the Battle of Loos’, p. 11.

150TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Warren (CO Brigade Artillery, Lahore Division) to Edmonds, 21 May 1929.

151Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 167.

152LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 7/1,‘Lecture on Battle of Loos Given on 14 December 1915. Notes on the Line Held by 117^th Infantry Division about 25/09/15’.

153Tiede, Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 157, p. 24.

154Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, p. 45.

155TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Lieutenant-Colonel H.W. B. Thorpe to Edmonds, 18 January 1926.

156Graves, Goodbye To AU That, p. 155.

157TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Lieutenant-Colonel Warren to Edmonds, 21 May 1926.

158Figures taken from TNA: PRO WO 95/181, AA&QMG First Army War Diary, December 1914-December 1915.

159Figures taken from Ibid.

CHAPTER 5: THE FIRST DAY (1): 25 SEPTEMBER I915

1All German units will be indicated in italics. Each German division consisted of 3 regiments, each one being roughly the equivalent of a British brigade, and deployed in the same standard manner. With an average strength of 780 men, a battalion was stationed in the front line, with one in support (usually in and around the second line) and one in reserve (usually resting in villages or towns east of the second line). 117^th Divisions frontage ran from Fosse 8 to Puits 16, just south of the Double Crassier, and totalled a monumental 8,700 yards, nj¯ Division was deployed as follows: 11 Reserve Infantry Regiment was in the line from the Railway Redoubt to Bois Carré. 157 Infantry Regiment’s sector ran from opposite Bois Carré to just north of the Loos Road. On the left of 157 Regiment was 22 Reserve Infantry Regiment, deployed along the Loos Road to Puits 16 bis. Northwards from Fosse 8, 14^th Division was in the line. North of the La Bassée canal 56 Infantry Regiment was deployed. It linked up to 16 Infantry Regiment, which held the line south of the canal to the Railway Redoubt.

2A. Palazzo, Seeking Victory on the Western Front. The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), p. 68.

3C.H. Foulkes, “GAS!” The Story of the Special Brigade (London: Blackwood, 1934), p. 84.

4TNA: PRO WO 95/1948, ‘Report of 46 Infantry Brigade on Operations Between 21^st and 30^th September 1915’.

5A.H. Maude, The History of the 47^th (London) Division, 1914–1919 (Uckfield, East Sussex: Naval & Military Press, 2000; first published 1922), p. 29.

6TNA: PRO WO 95/2733, 141 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915. See also See G.C. Wynne, ‘The Other Side of the Hill. The Fight for Hill 70: 25^th–26^th September 1915’, Army Quarterly, vol. 8 (April 1924 and June 1924), pp. 261–73.

7TNA: PRO WO 95/1765, 26 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915; 7/Seaforth Highlanders ‘Report of Action Sept 25–27’.

8TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Captain K.G. Buchanan to Brigadier-General Sir J.E. Edmonds, 15 January 1927.

9TNA: PRO WO 95/1934, ‘Report by D.W.P. Strang (Captain & Adjutant) 8/Seaforths’; PRO CAB 45/120, Report by IV Corps, 2 October 1915.

10TNA: PRO WO 95/1364, 19 Brigade, ‘Summary of Operations, 25 Sept 1915’.

11TNA: PRO WO 95/1265, 8/Royal Berkshire War Diary, 25 September 1915.

12IWM: 01/46/1, Diary of Captain J.N. Pring, 25 September 1915.

13Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Die Opemtionen Des Jahres 1915 (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1933), p. 55.

14TNA: PRO WO 95/2727, 140 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

15TNA: PRO WO 95/1934, ‘Report by D.W.P. Strang (Captain & Adjutant) 8/Seaforths’.

16This was Piper D. Laidlaw who ‘with a complete sangfroid, strutted about the parapet playing the “Blue Bonnets’”. He was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross. S. Gillon, The K O.S.B. in the Great War (London:Thomas Nelson, 1930), p. 390.

17TNA: PRO WO 95/1652, ‘Notes on Recent Operations by Major-General Commanding 7^th Division’, 4 October 1915; ‘Report on Recent Operations, 5 October 1915’.

18A.G. Wauchope (ed.), A History of the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War, 1914–1919 (3 vols., London:The Medici Society, 1925–6), III, p. 12.

19TNA: PRO WO 95/1660, 22 Brigade, ‘Narrative of Operations Sept 25–29’.

20TNA: PRO CAB 45/120: Colonel G.H. Boileau (CRE 7^th Division) to Edmonds, 25 January 1926.

21IWM: MISC 175 (2658), Major-General Sir H.H. Tudor Diary, 25 September 1915.

22Sir J.E. Edmonds (comp.), History of the Great War: Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, Battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos (London/Nashville: Imperial War Museum/Battery Press, 1995; first published 1928), p. 227.

23TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Colonel C. Russell Brown to Edmonds, 31 October 1929.

24Foulkes, “GAS!”, pp. 73–4.

25TNA: PRO WO 95/1265, 8/Royal Berkshire War Diary, 25 September 1915.

26TNA: PRO WO 95/1270, 1 /Loyal North Lancashire War Diary, 25 September 1915.

27All along the front the gas seems to have drifted north, meaning that often assaulting battalions benefited from the gas released by the battalion on their right. This is commented upon in Foulkes, “GAS!”, p. 73. Paul Maze’s account also confirms this. He wrote that ‘the gas which we had released was drifting heavily down across the left of our front, obviously in the wrong direction’. See A Frenchman in Khaki (Kingswood, Surrey: William Heinemann, 1934), p. 120.

28IWM: 01/46/1, Diary of Captain J.N. Pring, 25 September 1915.

29See for example A. Clark, The Donkeys (London: Pimlico, 1997; first published 1961), pp. 147–8; B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (London: Pan, 1975; first published 1930), p. 199.

30R. Graves, Goodbye To All That (London: Penguin, 1960; first published 1929), pp. 157–8. See also TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Colonel H.E. Braine (Brigade Major 19 Brigade) to Edmonds, undated.

31J.C. Dunn (ed.), The War the Infantry Knew 1914–1919 (London: Abacus, 2004; first published 1938), P. 153.

32LHCMA: Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/259/35, Edmonds to Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, 5 December 1930.

33‘Attack of the 2^nd Division 25/09/15’, Lieutenant A.B. White’s Account, contained in Sir F. Maurice (ed.), The History of the London Rifle Brigade, 1839–1919 (London: Constable, 1921), p. 357.

34TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Colonel H.C. Potter to Edmonds, 27 September 1927.

35Captain C.E.S. Percy-Smith, cited in D. Richter, Chemical Soldiers. British Gas Warfare in World War One (London: Leo Cooper, 1994), p. 67.

36LHCMA: Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/259/35, Second Lieutenant J.W. Sewill to Liddell Hart, 4 July 1930. Original emphasis.

37TNA: PRO WO 95/1347, 9/Highland Light Infantry War Diary, 25 September 1915.

38TNA: PRO WO 95/1343, 5 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

39LHCMA: Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/259/35, Second Lieutenant J.W Sewill to Liddell Hart, 4 July 1930.

40LHCMA: Edmonds Papers, 3/10, ‘Memoirs’, Chapter XXVI, p. 8; Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/259/35, Edmonds to Liddell Hart, 5 December 1930.

41Liddell Hart, History of the First World War, p. 199. For Horne see P. Simkins, ‘Haig and his Army Commanders’, in B. Bond & N. Cave (eds.), Haig. A Reappraisal 70 Years On (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999), pp. 91–2. Horne’s letters to his wife, held in the Imperial War Museum, do not exist for September or October 1915.

42Foulkes, “GAS!”, p. 71.

43LHCMA: Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/259/35, Second Lieutenant J.W Sewill to Liddell Hart, 4 July 1930.

44TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Colonel D.W. Cameron of Lochiel (CO 5/Cameron Highlanders, 26 Brigade) to Edmonds, 17 September 1926.

45Foulkes, “GAS!”, p. 58.

46Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 170.

47Sir D. Haig, The Haig Papers from the National Library of Scotland, part 1, Haig’s Autograph Great War Diary (Brighton: Harvester Press Microfilm, 1987), 25 September 1915; For the importance of this cigarette see for example J. Charteris, At G.H.Q. (London: Cassell, 1931), p. 114; B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (London: Pan, 1975; first published 1930), p. 199; R. Holmes, Tommy. The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914–1918 (London: Harper Perennial, 2005; first published 2004), p. 420; K. Coleman, A History of Chemical Wafare (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 22–3.

48TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Captain E. Gold to Edmonds, 13 December 1925.

49The (incorrect) recollection of Lieutenant-Colonel John Charteris (First Army Intelligence Officer) was that Gough replied ‘gas was already turned on’.TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Brigadier-General J. Charteris to Edmonds, 24 February 1927.

50H. Gough, The Fifth Army (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1931), p. 106.

51Richter, Chemical Soldiers, p. 87.

52Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, pp. 255–6.

53TNA: PRO WO 95/1347, 2/Highland Light Infantry War Diary, 25 September 1915.

54TNA: PRO WO 95/1352, 6 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915. Captain A.F.G. Kilby (2/South Staffordshire) was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for leading his men along the canal towpath towards Embankment Redoubt against heavy enemy fire.

55TNA: PRO WO 95/1365, 2/Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders War Diary, 25 September 1915.

56TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Colonel F.G.M. Rowley to Edmonds, 17 July 1926.

57TNA: PRO WO 95/1364, 2/Royal Welsh Fusiliers, ‘Summary of Operations, 25 Sept 1915’.

58TNA: PRO WO 95/1762, 7/Seaforth Highlanders, ‘Report of Action Sept 25–27’.

59TNA: PRO WO 95/1762, ‘Report of the Action of the 26^th Infantry Brigade on 25, 26, 27 Sept 1915 in Vermelles District’.

60TNA: PRO WO 95/1767, 5/Cameron Highlanders War Diary, 25 September 1915.

61J. Ewing, The History of the 9^th (Scottish) Division (London: John Murray, 1921), pp. 36–7.

62TNA: PRO WO 95/1774, 28 Brigade, ‘Narrative of Events on 25/09/15’, 3 October 1915.

63Gillon, The K.O.S.B. in the Great War, p. 326.

64Ewing, The History of the 9^th (Scottish) Division, p. 37.

65TNA: PRO WO 95/1775, 9/Scottish Rifles War Diary, 25 September 1915.

66Ibid.

67Ewing, The History of the 9^th (Scottish) Division, pp. 38–9.

68See G. Sheffield, ‘An Army Commander on the Somme: Hubert Gough’, in G. Sheffield & D. Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front. The British Army’s Experience 1914–1918 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004), pp. 71–95.

69At 8.34a.m. 2^nd Division wired the following message: ‘Germans still hold Embankment Redoubt. . . 19 Brigade returned to our front trench. . . 6 Brigade lying out in front of Brickstacks.’ 9^th Division wired between 8.40 and 9.30a.m. that 7/Seaforth Highlanders had taken the Slag Heap and 8/Gordon Highlanders were ‘going well’. At 9.42a.m. 7^th Division was reported to be ‘held up west of Cité St Elie’ and at 10.03 a.m. the remaining Germans in the front trench opposite 22 Brigade had surrendered. All reports taken from TNA: PRO WO 95/592,1 Corps War Diary, 25 September 1915.

70A. Farrar-Hockley, Goughie: The Life of General Sir Hubert Gough (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1975), p. 169.

71Ibid., p. 169.

72Unfortunately, we do not have Thesiger’s account of the battle; he was killed in action two days later. See F. Davis & G. Maddocks, Bloody Red Tabs (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1995), pp. 106–7.

73It was described as ‘a fire zone of about 500 yards exposed to by heavy-gun, machine-gun and rifle fire, and the battalion had to storm a powerful line of trenches protected by broad strong lines of thick barbed wire’. TNA: PRO WO 95/1664, 1/South Staffordshire War Diary, 25 September 1915. Private A. Vickers (2/Royal Warwickshire) won a Victoria Cross in this attack for cutting two gaps in the wire.

74TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Brigadier-General R.M. Ovens to Edmonds, 20 January 1926.

75TNA: PRO WO 95/1660, 22 Brigade, ‘Narrative on Operations of September 25–29’.

76TNA: PRO WO 95/1664,‘The 2 Battalion “The Queens” Regiment at the Battle of Loos, 25 Sept 1915’.

77IWM: MISC 175 (2658), Major-General Sir H.H. Tudor Diary, 25 September 1915.

78C.T. Atkinson, The Devonshire Regiment, 1914–1918 (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co, 1926), p. 95.

79IWM: MISC 175 (2658), Major-General Sir H.H. Tudor Diary, 23 September 1915.

80TNA: PRO WO 95/1655, 8/Devonshire War Diary, 25 September 1915.

81TNA: PRO WO 95/1265, 8/Royal Berkshire War Diary, 25 September 1915.

82For a full analysis of the events at Lone Tree see N. Lloyd, ‘Command and Control in i9i5:The Attack on Lone Tree, 25 September 1915’, Stand To! The Journal of the Western Front Association, no. 73 (September 2005), pp. 5–10.

83Northern Sap, on the right of the attack, enfiladed the whole line of advance.

84According to one officer, the barbed wire that protected the German defences at Lone Tree was ‘one of the strongest and widest belts I saw during the war’, being about ten feet in width and staked low in the ground.TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Major PJ.R. Currie (2/KRRC) to Edmonds, 16 July 1926. See also PRO WO 95/1272, 2/KRRC War Diary, 25 September 1915.

85TNA: PRO WO 95/1269, ‘Narrative of the Part Taken by the 2^nd Royal Sussex in the Action of September 25^th 1915’.

86These were Private G.S. Peachment (2/KRRC), Private H.E. Kenny (1/Loyal North Lancashire), Captain A.M Read (1 /Northamptonshire) and Sergeant H. Wells (2/Royal Sussex).

87See J.H. Lindsay, The London Scottish in the Great War (London: Regimental HQ, 1925), p. 77.

88R. Prior & T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front. The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–1918 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 122.

89R. Neillands, The Great War Generals on the Western Front (London: Robinson, 1999), p. 208. Similar criticism can be found in Clark, The Donkeys, pp. 158–9.

90Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 216.

91Ibid., p. 217; Lindsay, The London Scottish in the Great War, p. 76; M. Lloyd, The London Scottish in the Great War (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2001), p. 61.

92LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 6/4–4, ‘Telephone Conversations of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson’, 25 September 1915; Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 122.

93TNA: PRO WO 95/1229, ‘Narrative of the Operations of the 1^st Division 25^th, 26^th and 27^th September 1915’.

94TNA: PRO WO 95/1281, 2/Welsh War Diary, 25 September 1915.

95Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 217.

96Lindsay, The London Scottish in the Great War, pp. 76–7.

97TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Major J. Paterson to Edmonds, 21 January 1926. Original emphasis.

98TNA: PRO WO 95/1229, Memorandum by Major-General A.E.A. Holland, 10 September 1915.

99TNA: PRO WO 95/1948, ‘Report of 46 Infantry Brigade on Operations Between 21 and 30 September’.

100TNA: PRO WO 95/1934, 44 Brigade, ‘Report on Attack on 25 September’, 2 October 1915.

101Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, pp. 197–8.

102TNA: PRO WO 95/1948, 46 Infantry Brigade Order No. 11, 15 September 1915.

103Fortunately, the Loos Defence Line was unmanned. Its thick wire defences did, however, slow down the advance. Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 195.

104J. Buchan & J. Stewart, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 1914–1919 (Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood, 1926), p. 37–8.

105TNA: PRO WO 95/1934, ‘Report by D.WP. Strang (Captain & Adjutant) 8/Seaforths’.

106IWM: Wilkinson Papers, ‘Report on Attack on 25^th Sept 1915’.

107TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Account of Sergeant J.M. Cavers, 20 November 1918.

108IWM: 86/65/1: Private A.G.C. Townsend, Letter of 1 October 1915.

109It is worth noting that the famous heroine of Loos, a 17-year-old local girl called Emillenne Moreau, allegedly killed two German snipers in the village. When placed within this context her actions do not seem particularly remarkable, but they do perhaps add weight to the idea that the normal laws of war had broken down in Loos.

110IWM: P262, H. Panton, Letter of 29 September 1915. Much of Panton’s account is recorded in T. Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), pp. 260–3.

111Writing in 1920, the war reporter, Philip Gibbs, compared small groups of Scottish soldiers to ‘packs of wolves’, prowling around the streets looking for cellars or basements, which were ‘crammed with Germans, trapped and terrified, but still defending themselves’. P. Gibbs, Realities of War (London: William Heinemann, 1920), p. 144.

112Major J. Stewart cited in E. Spiers, ‘The Scottish Soldier at War’, in H. Cecil & PH. Liddle (eds.), Facing Armageddon. The First World War Experienced (London: Leo Cooper, 1996), p. 326. See also N. Ferguson, The Pity of War (London: Allen Lane, 1998), p. 384.

113J.L. Jack, General Jack’s Diary 1914–18. The Trench Diary of Brigadier-General J.L. Jack, ed. J. Terraine (London: Cassell, 2000; first published 1964), pp. 126–7. Original emphasis.

114TNA: PRO WO 95/1767, 8/Gordon Highlanders War Diary, 25 September 1915. Original emphasis.

115See O. Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001; first published 1985), passim.

116N. Lloyd, ‘Note on Decoys and Dummies’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 81, no. 237 (Autumn 2003), pp. 290–1.

117TNA: PRO WO 95/2733, 141 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

118Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 189.

119TNA: PRO WO 95/2727, 140 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

120J. Lee, ‘Command and Control in Battle: British Divisions on the Menin Road Ridge, 20 September 1917’, in Sheffield & Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front, pp. 119–20.

121See J. Lee, ‘Some Lessons of the Somme: The British Infantry in 1917’, in B. Bond (ed.),‘Look to your Front’ Studies in the First World War by the British Commission for Military History (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999), pp. 79–87; C. McCarthy, ‘Queen of the Battlefield: The Development of Command, Organisation and Tactics in the British Infantry Battalion During the Great War’, in Sheffield & Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front, pp. 173–93.

122R. Prior &T. Wilson, The Somme (London:Yale University Press, 2005), p. 115.

123Wauchope (ed.), A History of the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War, 1914–1919, III, p. 124.

124TNA: PRO WO 95/1762, 7/Seaforth Highlanders, ‘Report of Action Sept 25–27’.

125J. Ewing, The Royal Scots, 1914–1919 (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1929), p. 189.

126TNA: PRO WO 95/1762, ‘Report on Operations by 5/Cameron Highlanders on 25/26/27 Sept’; IWM: 88/57/1, ‘My Life with the Post Office Rifles’, Account of Rifleman (later Wing Commander) W.J. Shewry.

127See the extract from the war diary of 26 Infantry Regiment in Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 189, n. 1.

128Lindsay, The London Scottish in the Great War, p. 76.

129TNA: PRO WO 95/1351. 2/Worcestershire War Diary, 26 September 1915.

130TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Colonel F.G.M. Rowley (CO 1/Middlesex) to Edmonds, 17 July 1926.

131TNA: PRO WO 95/1655, 8/Devonshire War Diary, 25 September 1915.

132Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 108.

133IWM: MISC 175 (2658), Major-General Sir H.H. Tudor Diary, 23 September 1915.

CHAPTER 6: THE FIRST DAY (II): 25 SEPTEMBER 1915

1Sir J.E. Edmonds (comp.), History of the Great War: Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, Battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos (London/Nashville: Imperial War Museum/Battery Press, 1995; first published 1928), pp. 197–8.

2TNA: PRO WO 95/1934, 44 Brigade, ‘Report on Attack on 25 September’, 2 October 1915.

3See G.C. Wynne, ‘The Other Side of the Hill. The Fight for Hill 70: 25^th–26^th September 1915’, Army Quarterly, vol. 8 (April 1924 and June 1924), pp. 261–73.

4The presence of several officers was vital in steadying the advance. These officers included Colonel J.W. Sandilands (CO 7/Cameron Highlanders); Lieutenant-Colonel H.R. Wallace (CO 10/Gordon Highlanders); Captain D.WP. Strang (8/Seaforth Highlanders); a Major Crichton (10/Gordon Highlanders), and Second Lieutenant F.H. Johnson (73 Field Company, 44 Brigade) who was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross.

5Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Die Operationen Des Jahres 1915 (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1933), p. 55.

6Reichsarchiv, Das Koniglich Sachsische 13. Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 178 (Dresden: Wilhelm und Bertha V. Baensch Stifung, 1935), p. 59.

7B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (London: Pan, 1975; first published 1930), p. 200.

8A. Clark, The Donkeys (London: Pimlico, 1997; first published 1961), p. 156.

9P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front (New Haven & London:Yale University Press, 1994), p. 53.

10R. Prior & T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front. The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–1918 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 126.

11Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1913, vol. 2, p. 213, n. 1; TNA: PRO WO 95/1264, 1/Cameron Highlanders, ‘Full Accounts [sic] of Operations by 1^st Battalion on 25 September 1915’.

12IWM: 82/30/1, Brigadier-General Hon. J.F.H.S.F. Trefusis Diary, 25 September 1915.

13TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Captain PS. Brindley to Brigadier-General Sir J.E. Edmonds, 26 October 1926.

14J. Ewing, The History of the 9^th (Scottish) Division (London: John Murray, 1921), p. 45.

15J. Ewing, The Royal Scots, 1914–1919 (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1929), p. 188.

16TNA: PRO WO 95/1658, 21 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

17TNA: PRO WO 95/1942, 45 Brigade, ‘Report on Operations From 21 September to 30 September 1915’.

18Ewing, The Royal Scots, 1914–1919, p. 188.

19TNA: PRO WO 95/1772, Extract from Private Diary of Lieutenant-Colonel H.H. Northey, ‘The 6/R.S.F. at the Battle of Loos’.

20IWM: 88/57/1,‘With the Post Office Rifles in France and Flanders 1915–18’, by Rifleman W. Young.

21TNA: PRO WO 95/1275, 3 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

22TNA: PRO WO 95/1767, 5/Cameron Highlanders War Diary, 25 September 1915.

23TNA: PRO WO 95/1762, ‘Report on Operations on 25^th to 27^th September as far as concerns 8/Black Watch’.

24C.T. Atkinson, The Devonshire Regiment, 1914–1918 (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co, 1926), p. 97.

25TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Colonel G.H. Boileau (CRE 7^th Division) to Edmonds, 28 February 1926.

26TNA: PRO WO 95/1769, ‘Report by the 12/Royal Scots on the Operations from 24–29 September 1915’.

27Ewing, The Royal Scots, 1914–1919, p. 189.

2821 Brigade was ‘literally frittered away and was never employed as a brigade at all. It was order, counter order, disorder. Before Zero Hour our plans were cut and dried. Before any information came in they began altering them.’TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Colonel G. Crossman (Brigade Major 21 Brigade) to Edmonds, 18 February 1926.

29TNA: PRO WO 95/1658, 21 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

30Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1913, vol. 2, pp. 212–3.

31TNA: PRO WO 95/1924, LXXV Brigade RFA War Diary, 25 September 1915.

32TNA: PRO WO 95/1643, XXII Brigade RFA War Diary, 25 September 1915.

33TNA: PRO WO 95/1325, XXXVI Brigade RFA War Diary, 25 September 1915.

34TNA: PRO WO 95/1752, LII Brigade RFA War Diary, 25 September 1915.

35TNA: PRO WO 95/1751, L Brigade RFA War Diary, 25 September 1915.

36IWM: Con Shelf, ‘The War Diary of an Artillery Officer 1914–1918’, by Major PH. Pilditch, pp. 160–1.

37E. Wyrall, The Die-Hards in the Great War (London: Harrison & Sons, 1926), I, pp. 147–8.

38‘Should the infantry attack be checked at any period prior to 1.20, a special bombardment may be demanded of, and ordered by, the corps. The hour at which this special bombardment will commence will be notified. It will last for thirty minutes from first to last gun, the last five minutes of this period being marked by a rapid rate of fire.’ Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1913, vol. 2, Appendix 21, p. 467.

39TNA: PRO WO 95/1924, LXXII Brigade RFA War Diary, 25 September 1915.

40TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Brigadier-General R.M. Ovens to Edmonds, 20 January 1926.

41TNA: PRO WO 95/1924, LXXII I Brigade RFA War Diary, 25 September 1915.

42LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 7/1, ‘The IV Corps Artillery at the Battle of Loos’, p. 26.

43TNA: PRO WO 95/1643, XXXV Brigade RFA War Diary, 25 September 1915.

44IWM: MISC 175 (2658), Major-General Sir H.H. Tudor Diary, 25 September 1915.

45Within 9^th Division, by ip.m. a battery of L Brigade RFA had occupied positions behind the British front line south-west of the Hohenzollern Redoubt. It was joined later by LII Brigade RFA and a battery of LIII Brigade RFA. Further south, Brigadier-General J. G. Rotton (BGRA 7^th Division) ordered XXII Brigade RFA forward just after 8a.m., and in the following hour, also ordered XXXV and XXXVII Brigades RFA to move up. By the end of the day two batteries of 1^st Division’s artillery were at Bois Carr#x00E9;, another two were stationed at Le Rutoire (XXVI Brigade RFA), and one brigade was north of Loos. The artillery of 15^th Division had been delayed because 2 Brigade was unable to take the German positions at Lone Tree until late afternoon. Once this had been cleared, however, two batteries of LXXII Brigade RFA moved into position north of Loos, another two dug in around Fort Glatz (north-west of Loos), while the remainder stayed in its gun-pits around Fosse 7. See Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 230; TNA: PRO WO 95/1923, LXX Brigade RFA War Diary, 25 September 1915; LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 7/1, ‘The IV Corps Artillery at the Battle of Loos’, pp. 17–9.

46TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Major J. Buckley to Edmonds, 1 January 1927.

47IWM: 96/29/1, Account of Lieutenant J.H. Alcock.

48That the reserve divisions had to fall back on approximate compass bearings perfectly highlights the absolute lack of any planning for their deployment. Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson (Brigade Major 64 Brigade) recorded that it was ‘still pouring and pitch dark, and it was obvious that in these circumstances and in our complete ignorance of the ground and without a guide or any idea where the 63 Brigade whom we were to follow, was, that our move could only be by compass bearing across the two trench systems’. IWM: DS/MISC/2, Account of Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson.

49TNA: PRO WO 95/2189, Lieutenant-Colo nel C.G. Stewart to Major A.F. Be eke, 3 August 1925.

50TNA: PRO WO 95/1619, 71 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

51TNA: PRO WO 95/2210, 72 Brigade War Diary, 25–6 September 1915.

52Ewing, The History of the 9^th (Scottish) Division, p. 51.

53TNA: PRO WO 95/2157, 63 Brigade, ‘Report of Operations 25^th, 26^th and 27^th September 1915’.

54TNA: PRO WO 95/2151, 62 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

55See for example Liddell Hart, History of the First World War, p. 202; G.C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks. The Battle in Depth in the West (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1976; first published 1940), pp. 72–3; L. Macdonald, 1915. The Death of Innocence (London: Penguin, 1997; first published 1993), pp. 514–5.

56Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 282.

57Sir D. Haig, The Haig Papers from the National Library of Scotland, part 1, Haig’s Autograph Great War Diary (Brighton: Harvester Press Microfilm, 1987), 25 September 1915.

58See for example J. Terraine, White Heat. The New Warfare 1914–1918 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980); M. Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme (London: Penguin, 1984; first published 1971), pp. 148–50; G. Sheffield & D. Todman, ‘Command and Control in the British Army on the Western Front’, in G. Sheffield & D. Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front. The British Army’s Experience 1914–1918 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004), pp. I–II.

59M. van Creveld, Command in War (London & Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 158.

60TNA: PRO WO 95/1774, 28 Brigade, ‘Narrative of Events on 25/09/15’, 3 October 1915; WO 95/1775, 10/Highland Light Infantry War Diary, 25 September 1915.

61TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Lieutenant-Colonel D.W Cameron of Lochiel to Edmonds, 3 August 1926. Lochiel also stated that the first message he received ‘was to remind me that my weekly strength return due the previous day had not been received and requesting me to expedite; and the second late in the afternoon telling me to hold on to the Fosse 8 at all costs if possible.’

62TNA: PRO WO 95/1934, 10/Gordon Highlanders to 44 Brigade.

63IWM: M.G. Wilkinson Papers, ‘Report on Attack on 25 September 1915’.

64BLL: GS 1612, Account of Major-General R.H.D. Tompson.

65TNA: PRO AIR 1/1182/204/5/2595, Royal Flying Corps War Diary, 25 September 1915.

66Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, pp. 255–6.

67TNA: PRO WO 95/1229, ‘Narrative of the Operations of the 1^st Division 25^th, 26^th and 27^th September 1915’. For example, 2 Brigades message to 1^st Division, despatched at 7.01a.m. only took eight minutes to arrive at divisional headquarters and similarly, a second message timed at 7.37a.m. arrived at 7.42a.m. Even after 2 Brigade had passed Lone Tree and was heading for the Lens-La Bassée road, messages only took between twenty and twenty-five minutes to reach divisional headquarters.

68A.H. Maude, The History of the 47^th (London) Division, 1914–1919 (Uckfield, East Sussex: Naval & Military Press, 2000; first published 1922), p. 35.

69TNA: PRO WO 95/1934, 10/Gordon Highlanders to 44 Brigade.

70Unless stated otherwise, the following messages are taken from TNA: PRO WO 95/158, First Army War Diary, 25 September 1915.

71LHCMA: Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 6/4–4, ‘Telephone Conversations of Lieutenant-General Rawlinson, 25/09/15’.

72LHCMA: Liddell Hart Papers, HL1/520, Montgomery-Massingberd to Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, 29 September 1927.

73See R. Holmes, The Little Field-Marshal. Sir John French (London: Jonathan Cape, 1981), p. 303; TNA: PRO CAB 44/27, Haigs comments on the draft chapters of the Official History, 20 February 1927. This rather startling decision of Sir John’s to absent himself from his headquarters at such an important time probably reflected both his natural desire to be closer to the fighting, and his belief that Haig’s battle would develop more slowly and methodically than it actually did.

74TNA: PRO WO 95/880, XI Corps War Diary, 25 September 1915. See also T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900–1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2003; first published 1987), pp. 17–8.

75TNA: PRO WO 95/880, XI Corps War Diary, 25–6 September 1915.

76At 1.05 p.m. Sir Henry Rawlinson telephoned First Army ‘to say the news from the 15^th Division is not so good. They might be turned off Hill 70. Being pretty heavily attacked.’ TNA: PRO 95/WO 95/712, ‘Telephone Conversations of Lieut-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Bt., K.C.B., C.VO., from the Commencement of the Attack’, 25 September 1915.

77TNA: PRO WO 95/158, First Army War Diary, 25–6 September 1915.

78These discrepancies remain a mystery. Although 21^st Division had been briefly placed under IV Corps’ control at 1.13p.m., this was cancelled at 2.30p.m.

79Prior & Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 127.

80Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 267.

81See Appendix II: Total Recorded British Deaths, 25 September 1915 and 1 July 1916.

82Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 392.

83C.T. Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 1914–1918 (London: John Murray, 1927), p. 231.

84Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, pp. 220–3, n· 1, 3·

85J. Buchan & J. Stewart, The Fifteenth (Scottish) Division, 1914–1919 (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood, 1926), p. 49.

86Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 191.

87E. Wyrall, The History of the 2^nd Division, 1914–1918 (Uckfield, East Sussex: Naval & Military Press, 2000; first published 1921), p. 230.

88TNA: PRO WO 95/1767, 5/Cameron Highlanders War Diary, 25 September 1915; Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 241, n. 3.

89Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 238, n. 1.

90TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Brigadier-General G.S. Cartwright to Edmonds, 7 February 1926.

91TNA: PRO WO 95/1265, 10/Gloucestershire War Diary, 26 September 1915; Edmonds (comp.), Military Operations France & Belgium, 1915, vol. 2, p. 229, n. 2.

92TNA: PRO WO 95/1664, 2/Royal Warwickshire War Diary, 25 September 1915.

93TNA: PRO WO 95/1267, 2 Brigade, ‘Operations 25–30 September 1915’.

94Maude, The History of the 47^th (London) Division, 1914–1919, p. 30.

95TNA: PRO WO 95/1934, ‘Report by T.O. Lloyd (OC 9/Black Watch) on Operations of 25/9/15’.

96TNA: PRO WO 95/1265, 10/Gloucester War Diary, 25 September 1915.

97TNA: PRO WO 95/1655, 8/Devonshire War Diary, 25 September 1915.

98TNA: PRO CAB 45/120, Captain P.S. Brindley (9/Devonshire, 20 Brigade) to Edmonds, 26 October 1926.

99TNA: PRO WO 95/1658, 21 Brigade War Diary, 25 September 1915.

100TNA: PRO WO 95/1762, ‘Report of the Action of the 26^th Infantry Brigade on 25, 26, 27 September 1915 in Vermelles District’.

101TNA: PRO WO 95/1775, 10/Highland Light Infantry War Diary, 25 September 1915; S. Gillon, The K.O.S.B. in the Great War (London: Thomas Nelson, 1930), p. 326.

102See Appendix III: Senior British Officer Casualties.

103Maude, The History of the 47^th (London) Division, 1914–1919, p. 31.

104TNA: PRO WO 95/1934, ‘Report by D.W.P. Strang (Captain & Adjutant) 8/Seaforths’.

105TNA: PRO WO 95/1775, 10/Highland Light Infantry War Diary, 25 September 1915.

106Capper was well known for his belief in the ‘offensive spirit’. As he had written in 1908, ‘success in war on a large scale can only be achieved if the troops are possessed of this unconquerable and determined offensive spirit’. K. Simpson,‘Capper and the Offensive Spirit’, R.U.S.I. Journal, vol. 118, no. 2 (June 1973), p. 53.

107IWM: 82/30/1, Brigadier-General Hon. J.E.H.S.F. Trefusis Diary, 25 September 1915.

108Atkinson, The Seventh Division, pp. 207–8.

109E.M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868–1902 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 113.

110G.D. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 146.

111M.A. Ramsey, Command and Cohesion: The Citizen Soldier and Minor Tactics in the British Army, 1870–1918 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p. 188.

112E. Wyrall, The History of the King’s Regiment (Liverpool) 1914–1919 (3 vols. London: Edward Arnold, 1928, I, p. 187.

113IWM: Con Shelf, ‘The War Diary of an Artillery Officer 1914–1918’, by Major PH. Pilditch, p. 155.

114S. Bull, Brassey’s History of Unforms World War One British Army (London: Brassey’s, 1998), pp. 25–7.

115BLL: POW 043, Account of Captain L. McNaught-Davis.

116Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, p. 77. 22 guns were also lost (p. 55). It should be understood that whereas the British Army recorded casualties every day, the German Army recorded them much less frequently, sometimes only a few times a month. The German system was less accurate than the British and would not record lightly wounded soldiers who returned to their units within a few days of being hurt.

117Ewing, The History of the 9^th (Scottish) Division, p. 57, n. 1.

118Maude, The History of the 47^th (London) Division, 1914–1919, p. 31.

119Wyrall, The History of the 2^nd Division, 1914–1918, p. 228.

120Wauchope (ed.), A History of the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War, 1914–1919, III, p. 10.

121TNA: PRO WO 95/1364 19 Brigade, ‘Summary of Operations’, 25 September 1915.

122Atkinson, The Seventh Division, 1914–1918, p. 208.

123TNA: PRO WO 95/1364, 19 Brigade, ‘Summary of Operations’, 25 September 1915.

124TNA: PRO WO 95/1265, 8/Royal Berkshire War Diary, 25 September 1915.

125Atkinson, The Devonshire Regiment, 1914–1918, p. 99.

126TNA: PRO CAB 45/121, Colonel L.G. Oliver to Edmonds, 20 February 1926.

127TNA: PRO WO 95/1281, 2/Welsh War Diary, 26 September 1915.

128Wynne, ‘The Other Side of the Hill. The Fight for Hill 70: 25^th-26^th September 1915’, pp. 261–73.

129Reichsarchiv, Das Koniglich Sachsische 13. Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 178 (Dresden: Wilhelm und Bertha V Baensch Stifung, 1935), p. 61.

130TNA: PRO WO 95/1942: 45 Brigade, ‘Report on Operations 21 Sept to the 30 Sept’.

131See Chapter 8.