5

THE FIRST DAY (I): 25 SEPTEMBER 1915

At 6.30a.m. on 25 September 1915, following a forty-minute discharge of chlorine gas and smoke, the first waves of six British divisions clambered out of their trenches and began making their way across no-man’s-land. Simultaneously, British artillery, which had been bombarding the German front line with shrapnel, lifted to engage targets further into the enemy position. This marked the beginning of First Army’s main ‘all-out’ infantry assault south of the La Bassée canal. Fighting was heavy and continuous all morning. Although stubborn German resistance slowed and even stopped the advance in places, some striking success was achieved on the southern sector of the battlefield. 47^th (London) Division took all its objectives with relatively light casualties, and in what was the most spectacular advance of the day, 15^th (Scottish) Division stormed two German defensive lines, captured the village of Loos and took Hill 70. On the northern sector of the battlefield, however, a different battle was unfolding. 2^nd Division’s attacks were repulsed, and while 9^th (Scottish) Division managed to take the Hohenzollern Redoubt, it could not get much further, becoming bogged down around Fosse 8. In the central section of the British line, 7^th and 1^st Divisions had managed, after initial setbacks and heavy resistance, to capture their first objectives, but were unable to reach the second German position.

From a close study of the available eyewitness accounts, war diaries and after-action reports it is possible to reconstruct the events of the morning of 25 September and provide a full account of what occurred once the main assault began. It will be seen that even before the infantry had left their trenches, the ambitious plans drafted in the run-up to the battle began to unravel. The gas attack was perhaps the most obvious example, the inflexibility of General Sir Douglas Haig’s plan demanding that it be released even in the face of an unfavourable wind. The discharge of smoke undoubtedly helped, but the gas was largely a failure. The subsequent infantry assault also experienced mixed success. The bravery and determination of the British infantry was as noticeable as ever, but against uncut wire, which still existed in many places, and facing heavy German fire, the attacking battalions sustained severe casualties. Owing to the looseness of the ‘all-out’ tactical plan, combined with relatively poorly trained infantry and heavy officer casualties, many battalions had virtually ceased to exist as coherent formations once the German front line had been crossed. The actions of the German Army on 25 September will only be alluded to, but it should be understood that they were heavily outnumbered. Facing the eighteen British brigades were only five German regiments belonging to 117^th and 14^th Divisions of General Sixt von Armin’s IV Corps.¹

Before looking at what happened on the British front south of the La Bassée canal after the infantry went ‘over the top’, it will be useful to review the discharge of chlorine gas and smoke, which was perhaps the most memorable feature of the fighting on 25 September. How effective had the gas and smoke been in killing or incapacitating the German defenders or weakening their morale? Although this has been obscured by both the general confusion of the battlefield and a number of post-war writings, it seems to have been mixed, being particularly unhelpful on the left of the British line, but becoming more useful over the more favourable terrain on the right.² However, some aspects of the gas attack have been misunderstood and require further explanation, particularly the series of protests that were mounted by several officers in the face of unfavourable weather conditions and the confused series of events at the Chateau of Hinges during the early morning as Haig and his staff agonised over whether to go ahead and release the gas.

The most glowing account of the gas operation at Loos was written – as perhaps was to be expected – by Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. Foulkes (CO Special Brigade). With selective quotes culled from various intelligence sources, German newspapers and prisoner reports, Foulkes concluded that ‘our gas attack met with marked success, and produced a demoralising effect in some of the opposing units, of which ample evidence was forthcoming in the captured trenches’.³ Foulkes’s account may be deeply biased – he was keen to show how effective gas was – but it is not entirely inaccurate. It is clear that where the ground and weather conditions were not too unfavourable, the gas could assist the infantry advance. This was especially the case on the southern sector of the battlefield occupied by 15^th and 47^th Divisions. A report by 46 Brigade confirmed that once the gas was released, rifle and machine gun fire immediately erupted from the German trenches, but ‘it was distinctly noticeable how the hostile rifle fire gradually decreased in volume as the fumes reached the German line’.⁴ Because 47^th Division occupied higher ground than the Germans, the gas rolled down the valley and travelled ‘fairly well’ towards the enemy positions.⁵ Again, enemy rifle and machine gun fire was immediately opened, but it was inaccurate and after all the cylinders had been emptied and the discharge completed, there was a noticeable slackening off in enemy fire.⁶

The smoke had also proved successful. Although it can be difficult to assess the effectiveness of the smoke candles (and bombs in some cases) because the discharge was mixed with gas, it is clear that they were of considerable use. Aided by a line of smoke candles and a barrage of phosphorous smoke balls, 7/Seaforth Highlanders stormed the southern face of the Hohenzollern Redoubt without prohibitive casualties.⁷ 15^th Division also benefited from smoke. According to Captain K.G. Buchanan (2/Royal Scots), 44 Brigade had apparently ‘suffered no casualties from the time of leaving their trenches until they had gone forward some forty yards’. Up to this point they had been hidden by the gas and smoke.⁸ Two subsequent reports confirmed that the smoke candles had been ‘extremely effective’ in forming a screen for the attacking infantry.⁹ Even on the more unfavourable fronts the positive impact of smoke was widely recognised. 19 Brigade’s ‘Summary of Operations’ recorded that its attacking waves were safe within the smoke screen, but as soon as this lifted ‘the assaulting troops came under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire’.¹⁰ Because no smoke candles had turned up in the front trenches of 1 Brigade, the attacking battalions were left with only a number of smoke bombs available to throw out into no-man’s-land. Nevertheless, even these crude devices proved ‘entirely successful’ in screening the attacking waves.¹¹ Similarly, on the front of 2 Brigade the clouds of smoke ‘protected all the men from German fire’.¹² Although the German Official History believed that the effect of the gas ‘varied between temporary disability and total loss of the ability to fight’, it also admitted that under the ‘smoke cloud, the British advanced in large, well-structured groups’.¹³

Nevertheless, however useful smoke proved, it seems to have been completely overshadowed by the problems experienced with the gas. Even on those areas where the gas was believed to have succeeded, reports were often conflicting. While 140 Brigade admitted that the ‘enemy had not suffered to any great extent by our gas’,¹⁴ 44 Brigade also noted that a burst cylinder had caused problems when it caught the leading waves in its gas.¹⁵ On parts of 46 Brigade’s sector, the local effect of the gas was far from beneficial. Indeed, if a lone piper had not marched up and down the parapet oblivious to the dangerous fumes and ‘piped’ the men out of the trench, 7/KOSB may have been seriously delayed.¹⁶ Two optimistic reports by 7^th Division also concluded that although gas and smoke ‘were a leading factor in the success… the effect was moral and in no way physical’.¹⁷ In the central section of the British line the gas had poor results. The Medical Officer of 8/Black Watch (26 Brigade) could only find three Germans killed by gas, although he did believe it had a ‘considerable morale effect’.¹⁸ 22 Brigade’s gas discharge was ‘ineffective’,¹⁹ if not the ‘utter failure’ one senior officer believed.²⁰ On the front of 20 Brigade, the wind ‘blew very lightly towards the enemy’ so that ‘the whole of no-man’s-land became hidden in dense fog’.²¹ According to Sir James Edmonds:

The advance was at first completely enveloped in the gas cloud, and here, too, the smoke-helmets brought more curses than blessings from all ranks. After a few minutes the men, almost suffocated, had to remove them to get breath, many being subsequently incapacitated by the gas fumes.²²

1 Brigade’s discharge was equally unsuccessful. Colonel C. Russell Brown (CRE 1^st Division, 2 October 1915) remembered how the gas had ‘a very stupefying effect on the troops’, which ‘did much to spoil the impetus of the attack’.²³ The wind conditions were unfavourable and no-man’s-land was soon filled with a dense cloud of gas.²⁴ Some cylinders then began to leak into the front trenches, causing a number of casualties and some confusion.²⁵

Things were even worse in 2 Brigade. The wind was not only unfavourable, beginning to change direction as soon as the gas was released, but owing to the slope of the ground, it rolled back towards the British lines.²⁶ 2 Brigade also suffered from occupying a bulge in the front; the result of the attempt made throughout August and September to close with the distant German defences. This proved to be ‘singularly unfortunate’ as clouds of gas that had been released by 15^th Division further to the south began to roll across its fire trenches.²⁷ An officer of the Special Brigade, Captain J.N. Pring, remembered how the gas ‘formed a dense cloud lying only a few feet above the ground’, which blew across the front line when the wind changed direction.²⁸ In the resulting confusion about 400 men from the assaulting battalions were put out of action. More men were brought up, only for them to be gassed by a further discharge. While the gas may have been of limited success on the south of the battlefield, it was to prove particularly troublesome on the front of 2^nd Division in the north. The failure of this discharge has been the subject of sustained criticism. In particular there are numerous references to a series of protests by a number of senior officers, including several members of the Special Brigade, about the feasibility of releasing the gas in such poor conditions. It seems that their concerns were either ignored or refused, at least initially.²⁹ The gas officers then released the gas, so the accounts tell, only for it to be blown back in the faces of their own men with predictably dire consequences. Although somewhat overstated, these instances highlight not only the difficult weather conditions on the morning of 25 September, but also, more importantly, the confusing and inflexible plan that First Army had adopted for the Battle of Loos.

The best-known protest is perhaps the ‘bloody balls-up’ episode from Robert Graves’s Goodbye to All That (1929). According to Graves, a captain belonging to the Special Brigade had contacted divisional headquarters and told them that owing to the poor weather conditions it was impossible to discharge the ‘accessory’. He had apparently been told that the ‘accessory’ was to be ‘discharged at all costs’.³⁰ Another officer within 2/Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Captain J.C. Dunn, recorded a similar story, albeit with the brigade commander, Brigadier-General P.R. Robertson, trying to cancel the discharge, again without success.³¹ Similar stories echo back from this sector of the battlefield, but according to Edmonds, the only ‘really strong’ protest came from Lieutenant A.B. White, attached to Brigadier-General A.C. Daly’s 6 Brigade.³² The wind conditions were especially unfavourable in this sector. White remembered how just before Zero Hour the wind was ‘blowing very lightly from the south-south-west and varying considerably in direction’. He therefore ‘decided not to carry on and warned the men to do nothing without further orders’.

At 5.48a.m. [White continued] I got on to the Brigade on the telephone and informed the general that I was unable to carry on. He replied that he had already spoken to the 2^nd Division about the wind being unsuitable, and that he had received a direct order to carry on. In these circumstances he ordered me to let the gas off.³³

With White in the trenches was Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Potter (CO 1/ King’s, 6 Brigade) who was told by 2^nd Division that he must ‘order the officer to discharge the gas, if he refused shoot him!’ Somewhat alarmed, White replied that ‘he was quite ready to discharge the gas only fearful of the consequences’. Fortunately, Potter was then told that if the wind was still not favourable the gas could immediately be turned off.³⁴ It was 5.58a.m. before White and his officers – struggling with leaking cylinders and rusting stopcocks – managed to start the discharge. Although the chlorine started encouragingly, drifting ‘slowly towards the German lines’, ten minutes before the infantry were to attack, the wind changed direction and began blowing back towards the British line. White turned the gas off, but this did not prevent ‘large quantities’ of it swamping the front trenches and causing considerable confusion.

A similar situation occurred further north. Attached to Brigadier-General C.E. Corkran’s 5 Brigade, north of the canal, was Captain C.E.S. Percy-Smith and Second Lieutenant J.W. Sewill, both of whom protested against the discharge.³⁵ According to Sewill:

I immediately rang up and spoke to the Brigade Major – a Major in the KRR – and told him I had reported unfavourable [sic] on the wind all night, that it was then calm and drizzling and that I would not be responsible for the effect of the gas on our own men. He replied, ‘very well I will inform division. Ring me up again.’ Only twenty minutes before Zero I got onto him again and he said ‘carry on. It is a Corps order.’³⁶

With a faint wind blowing almost parallel to the British trenches, the gas was released, with predictably lamentable consequences. Sewill recorded how he lost half his section ‘gassed in 5 minutes’. A dense volume of chlorine then enveloped the front trenches of 5 Brigade – much of it probably emanating from 6 Brigade on the right – and badly gassed the leading platoons of 9/Highland Light Infantry.³⁷ Unsure of the situation in front a reconnaissance patrol was sent out, but being met by heavy gunfire the attack was abandoned.³⁸

Who was to blame for this fiasco? Sewill thought Foulkes was at fault,³⁹ while Edmonds criticised both Captain Ernest Gold, First Army’s meteorological officer, and ‘a hopelessly dull, but rigidly obedient divisional commander’ who can only be Major-General H.S. Horne (GOC 2^nd Division).⁴⁰ Both Liddell Hart and Foulkes agreed with Edmonds that Horne was at fault because he had overruled a number of protests. This remains problematic, however. Although Horne was later to become one of Haig’s most reliable army commanders, relatively little is known about him.⁴¹ Were there any other candidates? Foulkes did hint that the decision to go ahead with the gas discharge might have come ‘perhaps from still higher authority’,⁴² and Sewill was apparently informed that it was a corps order.⁴³ What about GOC I Corps, Lieutenant-General Hubert Gough? He is perhaps a stronger candidate than Horne. His offensive zeal was well known, he had counselled Haig against the cancellation of the gas discharge earlier in the day and had been criticised by subordinates officers in 9^th Division for his interference in brigade orders.⁴⁴

But this debate was a little irrelevant and neither Edmonds nor Liddell Hart correctly guessed who was really responsible. They missed the point that the plans for the ‘all-out’ attack simply did not entertain any possibility that the gas would not be released. Therefore, Horne had little choice in the matter. Despite the fact that Foulkes (and Haig) had made it clear that Special Brigade officers would have executive responsibility for the discharge on their fronts, these arrangements collapsed in the frantic moments before the attack. Because the plans were so dependent on the gas, subordinates who acted upon this theoretical independence were bluntly told that they must go ahead and release the gas. The roots of this debacle stemmed not from the poor weather conditions that have often been blamed, but from the contradictory and inflexible attack plans that had been drafted at First Army. Indeed, it seems that the one person who has never been blamed for what occurred on 25 September has been the man who was responsible for planning and executing the attack. He devised the plan for Loos and enshrined its contradictions, and he ordered the gas discharge to go ahead even in unsuitable weather conditions. It was Haig’s fault.

As has been discussed earlier, the forty-minute discharge of gas and smoke was naturally dependent on the strength and direction of the wind, but because First Army’s plan had been placed in the grey area between Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig, what would happen if the weather was unsuitable – the one factor the British could not control – was left unresolved. While French had been insistent that Haig must press his main attacks on 25 September, the commander of First Army was adamant that major offensive operations could only go ahead when covered by a gas discharge. The contradictions and flaws inherent in First Army’s plan, which had not been resolved in the planning stages, were finally played out in the grounds of the Chateau of Hinges on the morning of the attack when a decision whether to go ahead or not had to be made. What had happened at Hinges? The weather had been fitful all night, with low clouds, light rain and, more ominously, a faint south-south-westerly breeze. Captain Ernest Gold had calculated that for a successful gas discharge the required wind direction lay between north-west and south-west with a speed of at least four miles per hour.⁴⁵ His weather reports had been filtering into Hinges all night with frustratingly inconsistent results.

At 9p.m. the wind had changed from south-east to south. By 10p.m. it was south-south-west and west, but its speed at five feet about the ground was only two to four miles per hour. At midnight the wind remained in the south-west; but at times the speed fell so low in some places that conditions could only be described as calm.⁴⁶

Haig met Gold at 3a.m. and asked his opinion. Gold replied that although he could not guarantee anything, it was probable that the wind would be stronger and at its most favourable at sunrise, which was at 5.50a.m. Accordingly Haig fixed Zero Hour for this time. The infantry would attack forty minutes later.

It is a commonly held assumption that Haig made his decision whether to go ahead or not with the gas discharge on the basis of smoke that issued from a cigarette belonging to his ADC, Major Alan Fletcher. This episode was recorded in Haig’s diary, with the smoke drifting ‘in puffs towards the north-east’, and has generally been accepted by historians.⁴⁷ However, it seems that this was little more than a dramatic tale and the key factor that swayed Haig’s decision came not from Fletcher but from Foulkes. Just after 5a.m. Haig asked Foulkes if his Special Brigade officers would turn on the gas if the wind was not favourable on their particular fronts. Foulkes replied that ‘they won’t turn the gas on if the wind is not favourable’.⁴⁸ This seemed to reassure Haig, allowing him to order the attack secure in the knowledge that on the fronts where the conditions were completely unfavourable no gas would be released. No British troops would therefore become gassed.

Haig was still not sure. He put a phone call through to Lieutenant-General Hubert Gough to ask him whether it was too late to stop the main attack and go through with the smaller two-division programme instead. Alarmed at the seemingly fatal paralysis of command at such a crucial time (it was now nearly 5.20a.m.), Gough replied that no such change could take place in time.⁴⁹ Although Gough has since been criticised for this, he ‘considered it was too late to get the orders to the men in the front trenches. Nor did it appear at the moment that the wind was definitely unfavourable. To postpone the attack would have exposed the men assembled for the attack in the trenches to serious risks and disadvantages.’⁵⁰ Whether it would have been possible to alert the attacking divisions in time is a moot point; certainly there were a number of schemes that had been arranged to ensure the swift delivery of orders to the troops in the trenches, but time was running out fast. Haig’s mind was therefore made up for him. The main attack would to go ahead as planned. This decision was made not on the basis of a lone cigarette, but on the reassurance that gas would not be released on any unfavourable fronts. And because the wind was not completely unsuitable, Haig went ahead with the main attack using this ‘fail-safe’ system only to see it collapse lower down the chain of command.⁵¹

The dramatic events at Hinges and the horrid dilemma at the front over whether to release the gas have dominated writing on the first day of the battle. But the historian must be aware of overemphasising the role that gas played in what subsequently occurred when the infantry went ‘over the top’. While gas was of immense importance in how the ‘all-out’ attack was planned and developed, its impact on the battlefield was not as significant and has perhaps been overstated. The release of chlorine gas undoubtedly caused a number of problems for the attacking infantry, by dislocating several brigades and causing casualties (and certainly making going ‘over the top’ a more trying experience than it otherwise might have been), but it did not always define the success or failure of the British assault. Of far more importance was how the battle had been planned at the operational level, the effectiveness of the preliminary artillery bombardment and the resistance of the Imperial German Army. How then had the British attacks fared?

The left-hand attack was conducted by Hubert Gough’s I Corps, which enjoyed a troubled day on 25 September. Difficulties were especially evident with Major-General H.S. Horne’s 2^nd Division, tasked with forming the northern flank guard. Situated on the extreme left of the British line just north of the La Bassée canal around the village of Givenchy, 5 Brigade had to secure the line Chapelle St Roch–Canteleux, while 6 and 19 Brigades, further to the south, were to advance on Auchy and the Railway Triangle, eventually reaching a German support trench known as Canal Alley, which was to be converted into a strong defensive line. 2^nd Division’s attacking brigades may have, in places, entered the German line, but nowhere did they hold any enemy ground by the end of the day. Although further attacks were planned for later in the morning, in response to appeals from lower down the chain of command, these were cancelled at 9.45a.m.⁵² The failure of 2^nd Division stemmed from a number of factors, most notably the poor ground conditions, the lack of thorough artillery preparation and the troubled discharge of the gas, but some progress had been initially made. The unenviable task of creating a diversion half an hour before the main infantry attacks went in was given to 5 Brigade. Despite the unfavourable wind conditions, but aided by surprise, the attack initially went well. The attacking battalions (2/Highland Light Infantry, 1/Queen’s and 2/Oxfordshire) were able to capture the opposing German trench, but once through the enemy position, the leading companies ran up against fierce resistance. Owing to a lack of bombs and an inability to light the ones they had, they were forced to evacuate their gains.⁵³ By 9.40a.m. both battalions were back in the relative safety of their own trenches. A second, smaller attack was to take place by 9/Highland Light Infantry at 6.30a.m., but owing to the disabling effects of the gas discharge and heavy machine gun fire, it was abandoned.

The bad ground conditions were particularly acute on the front of 6 Brigade in the Cuinchy sector. Although only 200 yards wide, no-man’s-land was of a most inhospitable nature and huge craters littered the landscape. Because the attacking battalions (1/South Staffordshire and 1/Kings) were forced to tread narrow paths between the craters in single file, they were easy targets for enemy riflemen and machine gunners. The attack of 6 Brigade simply withered away under enemy fire. Only scattered groups of men reached the German wire, which was uncut and impossible to get through.⁵⁴ The attack of 19 Brigade was little better. As the opposing lines were so close together, its leading battalions (1/Middlesex and 2/Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders) had to vacate the original front line (which was used as the gas trench) and launch their attack from a supporting position about 30–40 yards to the rear. When the infantry finally moved out, advancing into clouds of their own gas, they could make little progress against stubborn resistance.⁵⁵ According to Colonel F.G.M. Rowley (CO 1/Middlesex), the attacking waves ‘were all shot down within ten minutes’.⁵⁶ It was equally bleak on the left, where 2/Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders were attacking Mine Trench. When the leading platoons encountered the German wire, still uncut, the advance stopped. Two platoons of the supporting battalion, 2/Royal Welsh Fusiliers, were hurriedly brought forward to assist the stricken attack, but they ‘lost 150 men immediately on getting over the parapet’ and could not assist.⁵⁷

Attacking on the right of 2^nd Division was Major-General G.H. Thesiger’s 9^th (Scottish) Division. Deployed along a frontage of 1,500 yards, 28 and 26 Brigades were ordered to carry the German front trenches from the Vermelles–La Bassée railway to the left of 7^th Division, including capturing the formidable Hohenzollern Redoubt. Once these objectives had been secured (and supported by 27 Brigade), the division would head eastwards through the mining area of Fosse 8 towards the German second line between Haisnes and Cité St Elie. The operations of 9^th Division on 25 September have been remembered largely for 26 Brigade’s epic capture of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, an achievement that founded the excellent reputation that 9^th Division would subsequently enjoy within the BEF. Even so this attack had initially got off to a bad start. 5/Cameron Highlanders, delayed by the refusal of the gas cloud to move towards the German line, were badly enfiladed by Mad Point, but 7/Seaforth Highlanders managed to drive through a storm of machine gun and shellfire and break into the redoubt.⁵⁸ The thorough artillery bombardment had cleared away most of the wire entanglements in this sector.⁵⁹ After hastily securing the redoubt, the battalions reformed and pushed on towards Fosse 8. By 7.40a.m. 7/Seaforth Highlanders were east of the mining buildings and moving towards Cité St Elie trench. By 8a.m. both battalions were in touch.⁶⁰

The achievement of 26 Brigade would prove, however, to be the high point for 9^th Division during the Battle of Loos and the attack of 28 Brigade on the left was reminiscent of what had happened further north; the wire had not been cut and the infantry were unable to progress. The divisional history gloomily wrote that ‘before vicious machine-gun fire from Madagascar Trench, Railway Work and Mad Point, the attack melted away’.⁶¹ While 10/Highland Light Infantry was faced with ‘very well aimed and directed rifle and machine-gun fire the moment they got over the parapet’,⁶² 6/KOSB ‘disappeared into a motley fog’ and when no news was forthcoming, the second-in-command, Major WJ.S. Hosley, ordered the two remaining companies to move out. Unfortunately, as the regimental history recorded, they walked into ‘the jaws of death’ and ‘were met with terrific gusts of machine-gun fire’.⁶³ Incredibly, some men managed to get into Madagascar Trench, but they could not hold out for long.

The ordeal of 28 Brigade had, however, only just begun. 9^th Division had received a message from 28 Brigade at 9.10a.m. reporting that its attacks had been repulsed.⁶⁴ Shortly after an order arrived from I Corps that 28 Brigade must renew the attack against the German defences north of the Hohenzollern Redoubt. 9^th Division’s subsequent order made it clear who was responsible.

Corps have ordered a bombardment of Madagascar houses – Mad Point – Madagascar Trench – Railway Work and support trench in rear. Bombardment to begin at 11.30a.m. Finish 12 noon. Last five minutes intensive. 28 Infantry Brigade will assault at 12 noon. Attack at 12 sharp.⁶⁵

The result was a tragic example of how not to conduct an attack on fortified trenches manned by an alert, determined defence. The scheduled bombardment crashed down upon the German lines at 11.30a.m. as planned, until it abruptly ceased at noon. Yet 28 Brigade was in no position to take advantage of the shellfire. Its battalions received their orders at different times and had only minutes to prepare. 9/Scottish Rifles were handed their orders at 11.53a.m. while 11/Highland Light Infantry only received a copy ten minutes later. At 12.15p.m., the two battalions scrambled out of the trenches but were ‘very quickly held up by machine-gun and rifle fire’.⁶⁶ The bombardment had not suppressed the enemy defenders and merely alerted them to the new attack.

Why had 28 Brigade been ordered to renew its attack in such unpromising circumstances? The corps commander, Hubert Gough, made little mention of this episode in his memoirs and perhaps for good reason. Something had clearly gone wrong. The History of the 9^th (Scottish) Division (1921) was scathing in its criticism of its corps commander, calling the attack a ‘forlorn hope’, ‘an offence against a well-understood military principle’, ‘futile’ and of betraying ‘an almost unbelievable optimism’. The history also believed that ‘the persistence in a frontal attack showed a serious lack of flexibility in the Higher Command in making use of the division’.⁶⁷ Indeed, on reflection it is difficult to avoid being critical of Gough who was beginning to show an over-optimism, aggression and impatience that would become his hallmark when commanding operations on the Western Front.⁶⁸ It seems that he made a number of errors on the morning of 25 September, firstly by abandoning his headquarters for crucial periods, and then by showing a marked reluctance to accept that the battle had already turned against him.

After speaking to Haig earlier in the morning over whether or not to release the gas, Gough had spent his time anxiously awaiting news at his headquarters. As a troubled, overcast morning wore on it seemed that 2^nd Division had encountered fierce resistance, 26 Brigade had taken their initial objectives, and 7^th Division had done well but been held up outside the German second line.⁶⁹ The absence of news from 28 Brigade was, however, of some concern. According to his biographer, Gough went forward during the morning:

along the side road from Vermelles to Auchy, hoping to discover what was happening in 28 Brigade; but the headquarters had been shelled out of its original position and after two wasted hours Gough realised he was completely out of touch with events. He returned to corps headquarters frustrated and worried, with the result that he answered sharply to a young member of his staff who passed him a light remark.⁷⁰

Such an action was not untypical of Gough, who was a very ‘hands-on’ commander, and is indicative of his inexperience in commanding large formations. He had perhaps not realised that if he was to have any influence on the battle at all, it would be from the end of a telephone line.

News from the battlefield gradually worsened during the day, but this did not make such an impact upon Gough. It seems that he could not get the early – and generally favourable – reports out of his mind. Though ‘he realised that he must not rely on these first messages, Gough could not completely suppress a hope that the picture they drew him was in essence correct’.⁷¹ He therefore ignored later, more pessimistic reports and still insisted that a breakthrough was at hand. Frustrated at having wasted two hours riding around behind his lines, Gough seems to have felt under pressure to do something and, therefore, ordered 28 Brigade to renew the attack. And while it is possible that he dismissed the possibility of a flank attack because of concerns over whether it would be possible for his troops to move around to the right through the congested trench network, his decision was still problematic. Surely he had enough experience of trench warfare to understand that if one attack failed, it was usually futile to send more men forward over the same ground? The attitudes of Gough’s subordinates should perhaps be considered. There was probably more opposition to renewed attacks in 2^nd Division. The sector was generally recognised as being completely unfavourable to a successful advance and the divisional commander was Major-General Henry Horne, an intelligent artillery officer who had commanded the division since the start of the year. On the contrary, Major-General Thesiger had only arrived to command 9^th Division on 9 September, just over a fortnight before the offensive began. After arriving he had shown a marked reluctance to become involved in the intricacies of the plan of attack and it is perhaps understandable if Thesiger did not protest strongly about Gough’s decision being so new to the job.⁷²

The attacks of I Corps were completed by Major-General Sir T. Capper’s 7^th Division, which was deployed on the right flank of 9^th Division. 7^th Division held a frontage of 1,400 yards up to the Vermelles–Hulluch road and was tasked with capturing Quarry and Breslau Trenches, including the Pope’s Nose Redoubt. The Quarries and an intermediate position called Gun Trench would then be secured, before the leading troops (supported by the reserve brigade) went through the German second line between Hulluch and Cité St Elie. In many ways the experience of 7^th Division was similar to that encountered by both 2^nd and 9^th Divisions, in that heavy German resistance was met all along its front. But in sharp contrast to what had happened further north, both attacking brigades were able to overrun the first series of enemy trenches and in some cases even reach the German second line.

The ground conditions in this central portion of the British front were certainly an improvement on the difficult positions elsewhere on I Corps’ front, but they were hardly ideal. Because no-man’s-land was a forbidding place – 500 yards wide with long grass that concealed much of the enemy wire – both leading battalions of 22 Brigade (2/Royal Warwickshire and 1/South Staffordshire) suffered from heavy machine gun fire and were unable to break into the German trenches.⁷³ Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Ovens (CO 1/South Staffordshire) complained of suffering ‘terribly from uncut wire’ and how ‘becoming a casualty seemed only a matter of time’.⁷⁴ But showing considerable fighting spirit a further attack by the supporting battalion (1/Royal Welsh Fusiliers) managed to penetrate the German trenches, which were cleared just after 7.30a.m. Although Slit Redoubt held out for another hour, by 9.30a.m. the brigade was firmly established in the Quarries.⁷⁵ Parties of 2/Queen’s even pushed on towards Cité Trench and Cité St Elie, but owing to a British bombardment, had to withdraw.⁷⁶

The attack of 20 Brigade on the right also managed to overrun the German front line. As might have been expected, the wind showed no more inclination to blow in the required direction here than it had elsewhere. Lieutenant-Colonel H.H. Tudor (CO XIV Brigade RHA) recorded how ‘the whole of no-mans-land became hidden in dense fog’.⁷⁷ Enemy resistance was also fearsome, with the Germans manning the parapet of Breslau Trench ‘firing away furiously’.⁷⁸ But despite these handicaps progress was still made. This probably had much to do with Brigadier-General Hon. J.E.H.S.E Trefusis’s (GOC 20 Brigade) decision to keep the German front line under artillery fire as the leading waves were advancing through no-man’s-land. Standard tactics called for artillery fire to cease the moment infantry stepped out of their trenches, but because of the width of no-man’s-land and the experience of previous battles, it was decided to ‘keep our guns firing on the enemy for three minutes after our infantry had gone over the top in order to keep down the Hun fire from rifles and machine-guns as long as possible’.⁷⁹ This seems to have worked. And while 8/Devonshire came up against uncut wire, which slowed up the advance, the battalion on the right (2/Gordon Highlanders) fared better.⁸⁰ Because the wire had been cleared and the enemy parapets smashed in by the bombardment, it was able to crash through the German front line. By 9a.m. these battalions had hastily reformed and reached the Lens road in front of the German second line at Hulluch.

While the attacks of I Corps had been partly unsuccessful, with progress only being made on the right half of the corps frontage, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s IV Corps achieved considerable success over the more suitable terrain in the south. In what was one of the most well-known attacks of the entire war, 15^th (Scottish) Division advanced up to two miles into the German defences and 47^th (London) Division, attacking on its right, also performed extremely well, taking its objectives with minimal casualties. Nevertheless, IV Corps had not met with complete success and 1^st Division, on Rawlinson’s left, encountered similar difficulties to those units further north. Attacking in poor weather conditions, facing intact enemy defences and meeting stubborn resistance, only its left-hand brigade was able to bludgeon a path through the German front line with its opening attack. 2 Brigade, on the right, was unable to take the enemy strongpoint at Lone Tree and repeated attacks foundered on uncut wire. It was midday by the time German resistance crumbled in this sector, having been outflanked by British supporting battalions from the rear.

Before looking at the epic advance of 15^th Division through Loos and up Hill 70, it is necessary to analyse the attack of Major-General A.E.A. Holland’s 1^st Division in more detail. 1^st Division was deployed between the Vermelles-Hulluch Road and the left of 15^th Division and faced the forbidding German defences on the Lone Tree ridge. After taking the first line Holland’s men were to advance down the Loos valley and link up with 7^th Division at the southern end of Hulluch and with 15^th Division at Puits 14 bis on the Lens–La Bassée road. Owing to the configuration of the ground, both leading brigades would be moving on slightly divergent lines. While 1 Brigade went directly eastwards, 2 Brigade headed off to the south-east. In order to fill in any gap that would be created between them, a separate sub-brigade was formed, known as ‘Green’s Force’. 3 Brigade, in reserve, was stationed at Le Rutoire.

The attack of 1 Brigade can be briefly summarised. Because the gas was unhelpful (and sorely missing its smoke candles), the leading battalions (10/Gloucestershire and 8/Royal Berkshire) had to contend with heavy machine gun fire from advanced German positions in two small, shell-splattered copses (La Haie and Bois Carré), which had escaped the attentions of the preliminary bombardment. Although these were swiftly dealt with, it was found that much of the wire in front of the German line was uncut, presenting a formidable obstacle. Nevertheless, the battalions managed to get into the enemy trenches, chasing after the garrison, which had retreated to the support line.⁸¹ By 8a.m. the two battalions had established themselves in the southern end of Gun Trench and 1/Cameron Highlanders, the supporting battalion, was moving up in support. The attack of 2 Brigade, however, did not progress according to plan. It had a disastrous day on 25 September, illustrating all the myriad problems with planning, artillery preparation and communication that dogged the British throughout this period.⁸² The opening attack, badly dislocated by clouds of gas (probably from 15^th Division on its right) delayed the advance by four minutes, and when the leading battalions (1/Loyal North Lancashire and 2/KRRC) began moving out, they were badly enfiladed by two saps, which had not been shelled.⁸³ Casualties quickly mounted and as the leading lines – mixed up, panicking and confused – reached the German line, it was found that the wire was uncut, and the attack stalled.⁸⁴ A second attack at 7.30a.m. by the supporting battalions (2/Royal Sussex and 1/Northamptonshire) again failed to dislodge the enemy defenders.⁸⁵ This was, however, not for want for courage. The later award of four Victoria Crosses to members of 2 Brigade bore eloquent testimony to how determined the attacks had been pressed.⁸⁶

The failure to take a strong German position was certainly not unfamiliar to the BEF in 1915, but the events that followed make the action at Lone Tree worth more than a cursory glance. Despite the failure of 2 Brigade’s two attacks, the morning also witnessed the employment of Green’s Force in the battle for Lone Tree. Although it had originally been intended to link the divergent advances of 1 and 2 Brigades, the two battalions of Green’s Force (1/14^th London and 1/9^th King’s) became involved in the attempts to clear Lone Tree around midday. Unfortunately, when faced with heavy gunfire and rows of uncut barbed wire, its attack – like all previous attempts – came to nothing and was abandoned close to the enemy wire.⁸⁷ The decision to continue attacking Lone Tree head-on has been heavily criticised with blame falling on the divisional commander, Major-General Holland. According to Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Holland’s decision to use Green’s Force against Lone Tree was ‘a baffling decision’, which reinforced failure.⁸⁸ Similarly, Robin Neillands has written that Holland’s orders showed either ‘excessive optimism, or a complete misjudgement of the enemy’.⁸⁹ However, from a close study of 1^st Division’s papers, it is possible to see that the real problem at Lone Tree was not the stupidity of the divisional commander, but a tragic misunderstanding that reveals much about the problems with command and control on the Western Front at this period.

The main criticism of Holland centres on his decision to order Green’s Force to make a frontal assault on Lone Tree. Because the enemy trenches on either side had been overrun by British forces it is assumed that he should have ordered a more promising flanking manoeuvre in order to bypass the uncut belts of wire and get behind the German defenders.⁹⁰ The order that Holland sent to Green’s Force is central to this argument. According to both the British Official History and the two regimental histories of the London Scottish, at 9.10a.m. Holland ordered Green’s Force to attack, ‘with one battalion on either side of Lone Tree’.⁹¹ However, after a lengthy search of 1^st Division’s papers, such an order has not come to light. According 1^st Division’s log of messages, an order was issued at 9.10a.m., but it read as follows:

Sussexs [sic] are reported to be held up by wire in front of German trenches south of LONE TREE. Support with your two battalions attacking Germans on flank if possible.

Therefore, far from ordering a renewed frontal assault, it seems that Holland was very aware of the need to attack on the flank ‘if possible’. Similarly, another message was sent to Green’s Force at 10a.m.

It is essential that the 2^nd Brigade should get forward without delay. Push in your attack on the German flank at once.

Once again Holland mentioned the possibility of attacking the German flank rather than its frontal defences. The message at 10a.m. is perhaps attributable to the influence of IV Corps’ commander, Henry Rawlinson, who had phoned Holland and bluntly informed him that ‘it would be as well to ignore the Germans still holding them up [2 Brigade], and push on’.⁹² Nevertheless, Holland’s preference for flanking manoeuvres can also be seen in his conduct of operations during the rest of the day. By 10.55a.m. Holland had arranged for a ‘strong bombing party’ to begin rolling up the German front line from Northern Sap, and likewise, elements of 3 Brigade had been ordered forward at 11.10a.m. in the wake of 1 Brigade on the left.⁹³ Although the war diaries differ on the exact time (or times) of surrender, it seems that just before 3p.m. resistance finally ended at Lone Tree. 1^st Division’s account records that at 2.50p.m. the Germans opposite 2 Brigade surrendered, but a second group held out until 3.30p.m. when 2/Welsh (3 Brigade), which had crossed no-man’s-land at Bois Carré and then wheeled right, found itself directly behind Lone Tree.⁹⁴

This reassessment of the attack at Lone Tree may have lifted some of the blame that has fallen on Major-General Holland’s shoulders, but there are still unanswered questions that surround the conduct of Green’s Force during 25 September. Owing to the death of three runners, Holland’s order to attack Lone Tree did not reach Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar Green (CO Green’s Force) until 10.55a.m. and it was past midday by the time he was ready to launch the assault.⁹⁵ Puzzlingly, it seems that Green did indeed receive an order to attack ‘on either side of Lone Tree’ because it formed the subject of a heated discussion between Green and Major J.H. Lindsay (CO 1/14^th London). According to the London Scottish regimental history, Lindsay was so concerned about these orders that he suggested to Green that if his men were allowed to move to the rear and then swing around to take the enemy in the flank, the ‘spirit’ of the order would be complied with and better results obtained.⁹⁶ Unfortunately, Lindsay was ignored. It seems that Green felt that the specific mention of attacking ‘on either side of Lone Tree’ precluded any prospect of conducting a flanking manoeuvre. As Major J. Paterson (1/14^th London) later argued, Green believed his orders ‘made it necessary to say no’ to Lindsay.⁹⁷ So why, if he had received orders that allowed the possibility of attacking Lone Tree from the flank, did Green insist on another frontal assault? This remains unclear, but if Green had – through whatever means – received orders to attack‘on either side of Lone Tree’ he may well have simply misunderstood them. It is possible that while Green thought of‘Lone Tree’ as the cherry tree in no-man s-land (and, therefore, directed his attack on either side of this tactical feature), this was not what 1^st Division actually meant. Holland probably saw ‘Lone Tree’ as the 600 yards of front trench still held by the enemy and wanted Green’s Force to attack on either side of this, in other words, by conducting a flank attack. In any case, Holland had made it clear before the battle (in an order penned to his brigadiers) that ‘any offensive action taken will be his orders and that he will accept full responsibility for the results’,⁹⁸ and it is not inconceivable that these words were in Green’s mind when he was considering his actions at Lone Tree.

Fortunately for First Army, the factors that had caused such difficulties for 2 Brigade did not apply to the remaining divisions of IV Corps. Major-General F.W.N. McCracken’s 15^th (Scottish) Division was deployed between just north of the Vermelles–Loos road and Fosse 7. Attacking on a front of 1,500 yards, the leading brigades had to capture two large strong-points, known as the Loos and Lens Road Redoubts, before they could advance eastwards towards Loos. Once the village was secured, 15^th Division would head towards Hill 70, and supported by 45 Brigade, push past the German second line at Cité St Auguste. As has been mentioned previously, 15^th Division conducted the most spectacular attack on 25 September, with both leading brigades breaking the German line and advancing deeply into the enemy position. Facing the Loos Road Redoubt on the left of the divisional frontage was 46 Brigade. Because the thick belts of wire that protected the German trenches had been ‘cut thoroughly’, the attacking battalions (7/KOSB and 10/Scottish Rifles supported by two companies of 12/Highland Light Infantry) were able to push through the clouds of gas and clear the German front line.⁹⁹ On the right, heavy enemy resistance and the shelling of its crowded front trenches could not prevent 44 Brigade from pressing home its attack against the Lens Road Redoubt with ‘great dash’.¹⁰⁰ And while the leading battalions (9/Black Watch and 8/Seaforth Highlanders) suffered heavy casualties from machine gun fire, they pressed on ‘in good order and with determination’ towards the village of Loos, still shrouded in smoke.

The second phase of the assault, as 46 and 44 Brigades pushed on eastwards through the village of Loos and up to the long slopes of Hill 70, remains one of the enduring and celebrated images of the battle. Sir James Edmonds even compared the British troops that captured the village to ‘a bank holiday crowd’.¹⁰¹ However, there was a darker side to this advance that has rarely been discussed. Very soon after the German front line had been broken the attack of 15^th Division began to go wrong. For 46 Brigade the situation was far from secure. The failure of 2 Brigade to capture Lone Tree meant that its left flank was completely open and although elements of its leading battalions had pressed on across the Loos Valley and reached Puits 14 at about 9a.m., these forward troops soon became isolated. A prebattle order had warned against being ‘drawn into an attack on Loos’, but after being fired on by snipers, the rest of the brigade changed direction and became mixed up in the streets of Loos.¹⁰² Regarding 44 Brigade, it had breached the Loos Defence Line by 7.10a.m. and soon after began to filter into the village.¹⁰³ As the Scottish soldiers bombed and bayoneted their way through Loos, the attack began to lose its initial cohesion. Battalions became mixed up, entangled and disorientated in the ruined village.¹⁰⁴

It has often not been realised just how debilitating the initial advance had been, even for battalions that had taken their objectives successfully. Casualties were everywhere heavy, and many battalions, having few officers left, became disorientated in the gas and smoke. The direction of 15^th Division’s advance also began to waver. By 10a.m. most of the attacking battalions were thoroughly mixed up, and as they filtered through the shattered, sniper-infested streets of Loos, their line of advance suddenly began to warp to the right. Captain D. Strang (8/Seaforth Highlanders, 44 Brigade) believed that ‘the pylons [‘Tower Bridge’] seemed to exercise a fascination on the firing line’,¹⁰⁵ and Brigadier-General M.G. Wilkinson (GOC 44 Brigade) also recorded that during the fighting through Loos, ‘there was a tendency for the left of the attack to swing round towards the south pivoting on the right flank – this was partly due to the confirmation of the ground but principally I think from a natural tendency to follow prominent features such as the PYLONS at Loos and the [Double] crassier.’¹⁰⁶ This loss of direction and cohesion was undoubtedly connected to the crippling officer casualties, but it was also the result of the decision to attack ‘all-out’ with little chance to pause and reform before pushing onto further objectives. The very looseness of the attack plans mitigated against any attempt to control the advance.

There also seems to have been a lowering of discipline as units overran German defensive positions, especially in Loos village. Contained in numerous personal accounts, and (more interestingly) in several war diaries, are references to a seemingly widespread abuse of German prisoners. Although every battle surely contains such instances, Loos seems to have gained an unenviable reputation as a battle that was particularly bad for captured German soldiers. It is extremely doubtful whether any divisional or brigade orders specifically requested attacking troops not to take prisoners – indeed none has ever been found – but abuse clearly occurred on a greater scale than was usual for British operations. Although the Germans made no serious stand in Loos village – the Scottish advance had simply been too fast – it is clear that the fighting was close, bitter and bloody. Sergeant J.M. Cavers (10/Gordon Highlanders, 44 Brigade) remembered how the ‘street fighting was very hot; barricades were climbed, houses bombed and enemy detachments made prisoner’.¹⁰⁷ Private A.G.C. Townsend (20/London, 141 Brigade) also noted how ‘a lot of the Germans threw down their rifles and put up their hands for mercy’, and were then captured.¹⁰⁸ But it was often not so simple and Townsend also recorded how those German machine gunners hidden in houses ‘made a stubborn resistance’ and were ‘soon made short work of’. Indeed, so close was the fighting that it was often difficult to control those men who were intent on murdering Germans, especially because there were so few officers to rein them in.¹⁰⁹

Perhaps the most outspoken account of the murder of German prisoners at Loos was recorded by Private H. Panton (7/Cameron Highlanders, 44 Brigade).¹¹⁰ When in the village Panton took a German officer prisoner, recording the following:

The German we did not know what to do with so we sent him on in front and as he got a few yards away I shot him. At another part of the village we came across three or our lads who had discovered some Huns in a cellar hiding. Once lad was fair [sic] mad and wanted to bayonet each one as they came up the stair. We held him back for a little but the fourth Hun was a huge chap and as we came up his brains were scattered along the wall by a shot from this chap. The others we eventually disposed of. I could tell you hundreds of other such incidents but they are all too gruesome.

Although it is rare to find such a candid account of murder, this was, as Panton suggests, not an isolated incident.¹¹¹ A number of other sources also testify to the collapse of discipline after the front line had been crossed. Major J. Stewart (9/Black Watch, 44 Brigade) told his wife that his battalion took very few prisoners at Loos and that ‘the main thing’ was ‘to kill plenty of HUNS with as little loss to oneself as possible.’¹¹² On 13 February 1916, Captain J.L. Jack (2/Cameronians) recorded a‘highly disgusting incident’, very similar to Panton’s account, told to him by an army chaplain who had served at Loos.¹¹³ Other parts of the battlefield also witnessed instances of prisoner killing. When 8/Gordon Highlanders (26 Brigade) overran the Hohenzollern Redoubt on 25 September, between 40–50 Germans were found ‘apparently hidden in deep dug-outs’. The war diary records that ‘these men were attended to’.¹¹⁴ Why did such episodes occur? It is difficult to make any wider, generalised conclusions about the reason for these murders. It certainly does not indicate a kind of ‘barbarisation’ of warfare that Omer Bartov has described on the Eastern Front during the Second World War,¹¹⁵ but it is perhaps indicative of a collapse of morale following the extreme shock of battle on inexperienced troops who had lost most of their officers, were frightened by the gas and smoke, and maddened by sniper fire.

In vivid contrast to the dramatic events around Loos, the attack of Major-General C. St L. Barter’s 47^th Division, was a much more controlled affair. 47^th Division conducted the most successful attack of the entire day, achieving its limited objectives within three hours and spending the rest of the day consolidating its newly won positions. The reason why such success had been achieved seems to have stemmed from a combination of the limited objective, which allowed for thorough preparation, the promising ground conditions and a concentrated artillery bombardment. Overlooking a series of open fields south-west of Loos, 141 and 140 Brigades were ordered to breakthrough the first German line between the right of 15^th Division and the Double Crassier, before forming a defensive flank along a German support trench. The opening attack had been aided by a diversionary ‘Chinese’ attack with specially made dummies and wooden figures that had been organised by 142 Brigade. This seems to have drawn considerable enemy rifle and machine gun fire.¹¹⁶

With a favourable wind and good ground, the leading battalion (1/18^th London) of 141 Brigade swept over no-man’s-land and was soon upon the German front line, where after a swift fight, most of the bewildered defenders broke and ran. Within ten minutes it was through the first line of trenches, and had been ‘leapfrogged’ by the two supporting battalions (1/19^th and 1/20^th London), which continued the advance. After reaching the Loos Defence Line the brigade then changed direction and headed south-east, through Garden City towards the Loos Crassier and Chalk Pit Copse.¹¹⁷ By 9.30a.m. these positions had been taken, although some confusion had been experienced over the exact extent of 1/19^th London’s objectives. As a result, some men became lost and mixed up with the Scottish troops that were fighting in Loos and moving up the slopes of Hill 70.¹¹⁸ Although some dislocation and confusion was inevitable in such large-scale operations, 47^th Division’s attack was remarkable for its crisp execution. The leading battalions of 140 Brigade (1/6^th and 1/7^th London) were equally successful in capturing the German support trench that ran from the Double Crassier to the Béthune–Lens road. 1/6^th and 1/7^th London reached the German front line without hindrance; the gas and smoke rolling down into the valley and effectively screening their advance.¹¹⁹ By 8a.m. the battalions had reached their final objectives and started consolidating their gains.

Reviewing the events of the morning of 25 September 1915, it will be seen that the key to understanding them does not lie, as so many commentators have alleged, with the gas attack before the infantry went ‘over the top’. Although the gas was undoubtedly a highly novel feature of the battle that has made an indelible impression on many of the memoirs, novels and secondary accounts that deal with Loos, it was not of supreme importance to the success (or not) of the British attacks. This lay with the four-day preliminary artillery bombardment that had shelled the German lines in the days preceding the attack. Where the British guns had been able to concentrate their fire upon well-observed sections of the German line, considerable damage could be achieved, as occurred on the southern sector of the battlefield occupied by 15^th and 47^th Divisions. But where the German lines were difficult to observe or where British artillery was weak (particularly in 1^st and 2^nd Divisions), the results were far from satisfactory. As a result the attacking infantry found it very difficult to make gains without at least heavy, and sometimes devastating, casualties.

Writing about battlefield command and control in 1917, John Lee has argued persuasively that ‘After two years of bitter experience the British army was perfectly aware that modern battle was a truly chaotic environment’, and had learnt to cope with this chaos in two ways. Firstly,‘the whole attack was subordinated to the artillery plan’, which meant the infantry were given precise, achievable objectives, would follow closely a ‘creeping’ barrage and would also be protected by various standing barrages. Secondly, infantry battalions were organised and trained ‘in a totally standardised way’. They were split into four sections, with the Lewis gun and rifle grenade troops providing fire support, while rifle and bombing sections were to close with the enemy as quickly as possible.¹²⁰ This standard operating procedure was reproduced in various tactical pamphlets, notably SS143 (Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Operations) and SS135 (Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action), and was well understood throughout all levels of the BEF. These reforms provided the basis for much British success from 1917 onwards.¹²¹ However, regarding Loos, it will be seen that both these points do not apply. Firstly, the plan of attack had been subordinated to the gas attack, not the bombardment, and had been formulated on the assumption that it would prove utterly devastating and allow British troops to clear two German defensive lines without facing heavy resistance. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 3, the tactical plan at Loos was based not on precise, achievable objectives, but on the assumption that units would attack ‘all-out’, and go as far as they could ‘into the blue’. Indeed, when a number of battalion commanders had expressed concerns over the scope of these orders, they were discouraged from halting their advance and told by senior officers that no intermediate objectives could be given.

How important were infantry tactics to the success of failure of the main attacks? Of course, the manner in which British troops moved across no-man’s-land cannot be ignored, but it seems not to have been the vital factor and complements recent work on 1 July 1916. According to Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson:

As long as most German machine-gunners and artillerymen survived the bombardment, the slaughter of the attacking infantry would occur whatever infantry tactics were adopted. To rush German machine-guns might slightly increase the rate of survival over those who walked towards them, but the different was not significant.¹²²

A similar situation existed at Loos. Even when battalions involved used simple and slow-moving formations success could be achieved, often because the pre-battle artillery preparation had cut the barbed wire and smashed the German trenches. 9/Black Watch (44 Brigade) captured the Lens Road Redoubt with ‘Perfect steadiness… There was no shouting or hurry; the men moved in quick time, packing up their ‘dressing’ as if on ceremonial parade.’¹²³ Similarly 7/Seaforth Highlanders (26 Brigade) crossed no-man’s-land at a ‘steady walk’ but were still able to make their way into the Hohenzollern Redoubt.¹²⁴

This is not to say that all battalions attacked in inflexible or slow, linear formations and it seems that a considerable proportion of battalions used ‘fire and movement’ tactics on 25 September. According to the regimental history the attack on Pekin Trench by two battalions of 27 Brigade (11 and 12/Royal Scots) was ‘striking proof of the efficiency of their training and would have done credit to a battalion of regulars. Working by small groups, each supporting the advance of its neighbour by covering fire, they swiftly lessened the distance between them and their goal by a series of short sharp rushes.’¹²⁵ Similarly, 5/Cameron Highlanders (26 Brigade) apparently advanced upon the German line by rapid rushes, each of eighty yards, and Rifleman Walter Young (1/18^th London, 141 Brigade) recorded how his battalion crossed no-man’s-land in ‘rushes of about 80 yards at a time, then down for a minute, then another rush and so on’.¹²⁶ 1/20^th London (141 Brigade) also captured Chalk Pit Copse by using ‘fire and movement’ tactics.¹²⁷

But even if ‘fire and movement’ tactics were used success was not guaranteed. This depended upon the state of the German defenders, whether the wire had been cut and the situation on either flank. Green’s Force attacked Lone Tree with ‘short rushes’, but it was unable to bypass thick belts of uncut wire,¹²⁸ and 2/Worcestershire (5 Brigade, attached to Carter’s Force) failed to recapture the Quarries on 26 September, despite advancing in successive lines ‘at a steady double’.¹²⁹ Poor tactics, however, undoubtedly meant that greater casualties were sustained than might otherwise have been the case had looser, more flexible attack formations been employed. According to one eyewitness, the men of 1/Middlesex (19 Brigade) ‘went over the top as though on parade and were all shot down within ten minutes’ during their doomed attack on Railway Redoubt.¹³⁰ Similarly, within 8/Devonshire (20 Brigade) ‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies started off too early and ran into ‘C’ Company in no-man’s-land. This resulted in great crowds of men at the gaps in the German wire, which only increased the casualty rate.¹³¹

Why was there so much difference in what tactics were used? Considering the inexperience of a great number of British troops, it is perhaps surprising that there was no real discussion within high command about which tactical formations should be employed at Loos. As Prior and Wilson have noted, even with the complete mix of divisions within IV Corps (regular, territorial and new army), ‘there was virtually no heart-searching about the infantry tactics that should be adopted, and no suggestion that non-regular troops might be incapable of conforming to the relatively sophisticated attack formations of the old army’.¹³² It seems that as long as the attack was pressed home with speed and momentum – to the ‘full extent’ of its power in other words – commanding officers were free to devise their own formations. Artillery tactics were equally ‘loose’. While 20 Brigade kept its artillery firing on the German front line for at least three minutes after most batteries had ceased (to cover the movement of infantry through no-man’s-land), this effective tactic seems not to have been replicated by other brigades.¹³³

To conclude then, it is probable that even had the wind conditions been perfect on 25 September, First Army would have achieved a similar level of success. This is not to say that the gas and smoke were unimportant, but they must be seen within their proper context. Certainly the smoke seems to have been useful in screening the movement of many battalions through no-man’s-land, but when this cover was broken the German defenders were free to wreak havoc on the exposed British battalions. It also had the unfortunate effect of disguising a number of tactical features on the battlefield and helping to cause some confusion and loss of direction amongst the attacking battalions. Admittedly, the chlorine gas may have been effective on certain local sectors, particularly for 47^th Division, but the primary reason why the attacks of 15^th and 47^th Divisions were successful stemmed from the ground conditions that gave the British good artillery observation over the German lines, as well as the detailed prebattle preparation that both divisions had undertaken. Again, for other divisions artillery seems to have been the key factor. The failure of 2^nd Division emanated from the inability of British guns to destroy the belts of wire that protected the German trenches and the strength of enemy resistance in this sector, and likewise, it is doubtful whether 2 Brigade would have been able to capture Lone Tree even if the gas had reached the enemy trenches because the wire was so thick as to delay any frontal advance for a considerable time. Whatever else the gas and smoke might do, it could not cut belts of barbed wire. But would First Army be able to exploit the gains that had been made at such cost during the morning and continue the advance into the afternoon?