List of Taiwan’s Fourteen Invasion Beaches

Red Beaches:

Yellow Beaches:

Source: Wu Qi-Yu, “Research on Executing Surf Zone Mining Operations with Combat Engineer Units (工兵部隊執行激浪區布雷作業之研究),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, no. 147, 2015, pp. 24–27.

After beach suitability, the next most important thing that would be considered is the potential Z-Day battlefield’s proximity to airborne landing zones. As we have seen, the invasion force would include large numbers of paratroopers and helicopter assault troops who would need flat open spaces to land. Airborne units are comprised of light infantry with little in the way of heavy weaponry, let alone armored transportation. If cutoff from the main force during an invasion, their supplies would be exhausted in hours, not days. They rely on heavy divisions landed on the beaches to sustain them once their initial objectives have been seized.

Airports near the invasion beaches are ideal targets for airborne assaults because they are easy to identify from the air and offer purpose-built landing zones, close to the main scenes of action. In addition to accommodating airdrops during the initial attack, their runways could allow for the inflow of reinforcements. Once seized and repaired, airports might be turned in to airheads where transport planes and helicopters could land in great flocks. Beachheads and airheads are mutually reinforcing, but capturing runways far from landing beaches does little good. If paratroopers cannot quickly make contact with regular army troops pushing inland from the beaches, they will be in peril of being surrounded and defeated in detail.

According to PLA studies, during the invasion, Chinese airborne units will be landed in battalion sized groups (approximately 500 men). As a general rule, they would assault targets between one and three miles from the invasion beaches and avoid operating far away from the main army. Close proximity to the beaches is vital because it is assumed that they could only carry on independent combat operations for three to four hours. After that, it is expected that they would have exhausted all their ammunition, making them extremely vulnerable to being overpowered by local defenders. To avoid that fate, they would have to rapidly break out of their isolated pockets to join up with those on the beaches, while staying under the protective umbrella of firepower provided by warships parked offshore.[316]

In addition to airports, the selected invasion beaches will necessarily be close to harbors, needed because offloading heavy equipment onto beaches from transport ships is impractical when large volumes are required and speed is essential to sustain momentum. Weather and sea conditions are ever changing, and Taiwan’s narrow beaches would be highly limited in throughput capacity. Prefabricated portable piers and docks might be moved into place by engineers to facilitate the rapid offloading of men, vehicles, and supplies. However, artificial harbors would take a long time to tow across, and they would be tough to establish in choppy waters. It would be a monumental feat of engineering to set them up, and the manmade harbors could not be brought online until large coastal fronts had been secured. Counterattacks would first have to be dealt with, and the area swept clear of mines, obstacles, and debris.

Pre-existing port facilities, on the other hand, could be brought into action much sooner, providing they were captured intact, which is deemed unlikely, or at least readily repairable. When combined with beachheads and airheads, serviceable ports would greatly ease the PLA’s immense logistical burdens. The estimated tonnages required by operational planners are unknown, but they are depicted as vast. PLA writings strongly indicate that major amphibious landing zones would be designed to include beaches, airports, and harbors, and obtaining this transportation trinity would be the main objective of Z-Day attacks. Without it, the entire operation is likely to stall out, and the landing forces driven back into the sea.[317]

Internal Chinese military writings judge close proximity to Taipei as a critical factor to consider when planning the invasion. Landing close to the island’s capital city, readers are told, could help alleviate much of the risk of being bogged down in a long war of attrition. Landing in the center of the western coastline and then fighting north under a hailstorm of defensive fire, with the potential of being pinned down in every city street and mountain pass, would be impractical. The rugged geography of Taiwan provides ample opportunity for the defender to drop bridges and explode tunnels to block the invader’s path. The PLA’s professional literature assumes most Taiwanese will fight to the death for their homeland, destroying whatever they must to prevent it from falling into their hands.[318]

The rapid seizure of Taiwan’s seat of government is viewed as something that could have a sizable shock factor, shaking the confidence of ROC military personnel all over the island. It might also shock American decision makers so much they could give up on their ally and call off intervention operations.[319] The beaches northwest of Taipei are the closest suitable points to China. Landing here would greatly reduce the length of the voyage and the amount of time troops had to spend aboard vulnerable ships as they crossed the sea. Close proximity would have other advantages. Rocket artillery could reach across the Strait to provide covering fire. Fighter jets, bombers, and helicopters could arrive faster and stay on station longer. Supply ships could deliver fresh reinforcements more swiftly.

In addition to other factors, PLA texts advise commanders to consider each beach’s proximity to highways and their distance from major defense units that could counterattack to repel the landings. The closer beaches were to accessible roads the better. Transportation infrastructure would be critical for lightning attacks inland once the main landing zones were secured. Chinese officers are told, however, not to land in the teeth of the defender. Taiwanese units armed with tanks, self-propelled artillery, rocket launchers, air defenses, and helicopters are to be avoided. This poses an unavoidable dilemma. According to PLA assessments, those locations most suitable for amphibious landing operations have been built up, with large concentrations of defenders dug-in nearby. Moreover, roads and bridges spared by pre-invasion bombing runs could facilitate the movements of invading forces inland, but they could just as easily allow defenders to mount overwhelming counterattacks.[320]

According to both Chinese and Taiwanese military writings, Taoyuan is where the PLA is expected to establish the prime landing zone. [321] Taoyuan is a special municipality at the outer edge of greater Taipei. Located approximately 30 miles from the capital, Taoyuan is a satellite city and the fourth largest metropolitan area on the island. It hosts Taiwan’s largest international airport and features a huge number of residential buildings and hotel blocks. In addition, Taoyuan is home to aerospace industrial parks, tech companies, logistical hubs, and oil refineries. Hemmed in by the Taiwan Strait and surrounded by mountains, Taoyuan’s flatlands feature hundreds of irrigation ponds, fed by heavy rains and highland runoff.

Numerous PLA and ROC military writings, which appear to be indicative of doctrine, agree that this is by far the most likely spot to be targeted for invasion.[322] The landing beaches around Taoyuan are appealing to Chinese generals because they are the only workable locations close to Taipei with the needed trinity of beaches, airfields, and ports. A notional landing zone here could stretch from the mouth of the Tamsui River and the Port of Taipei at Bali in the north down to the Yong’an Fishing Harbor. At its heart would be Haihu Beach, Taoyuan International Airport, and the Zhuwei . After it was built up, strategic terrain that would be attacked early on in breakout operations include the plateaus at Linkou, Zhongli, and Hukou.[323] These are where the highways meet and cluster together and where key military bases are located. According to PLA writings, these vital crossroads would have to be taken as soon as possible.[324]

Northern Taiwan

Taoyuan landing zone