[1] See Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2016), p. 5.
[2] See The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences, 2013), pp. 198–200; “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” The Central People’s Government of The People’s Republic of China, 2000; and “Full text of Anti-Secession Law,” People’s Daily, March 14, 2005, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/print20050314_176746.html.
[3] Of many examples, see Cao Zhengrong, Sun Longhai, and Yang Yin (eds.), Informatized Army Operations [信息化陆军作战] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2014), pp. 109–112. The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences, 2013), pp. 198–200; Liu Haijiang and Li Zhiyuan (eds.), Research on Joint Tactical Thought [联合战术思想研究] (Beijing, Lantian Press, 2012), p. 156; Cao Zhengrong, Wu Runbo, and Sun Jianjun (eds.), Informatized Joint Operations [信息化联合作战] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2008), pp. 143–144; and Zhang Yuliang (ed.) Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2007), p. 293.
[4] See Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. and Colin Clark, “Threats from Russia, China Drive 2017 DoD Budget,” Breaking Defense, February 2, 2016, at http://breakingdefense.com/2016/02/russia-china-drive-2017-budget/; Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 2015), pp. 227–246; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011); and Robert Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic, June 2005, pp. 49–64.
[5] December 7, 1949, is the date that the ROC government officially re-established its capital in Taipei. See Bruce A. Elleman, High Seas Buffer: The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950–1979 (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2012), p. 10.
[6] Among various sources, see Zhu Feng, “Why Taiwan Really Matters to China,” China Brief, Vol. 4, Issue 19, September 30, 2004, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3680#.U5dMffldXxY; Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005); Alan Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); and Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010, at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66205/robert-d-kaplan/the-geography-of-chinese-power.
[7] For a good resource on contemporary dynamics in Northeast Asia, see Donald S. Zagoria, “NCAFP Visit to Taipei, Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo: October 13–27, 2015,” National Committee on American Foreign Policy, at https://www.ncafp.org/ncafp/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2015-NCAFP-Asia-Trip-Report.pdf.
[8] See Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2016), at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016 China Military Power Report.pdf. See also Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences, 2013), pp. 198–200.
[9] “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” The Central People’s Government of The People’s Republic of China, 2000; and “Full text of Anti-Secession Law,” People’s Daily, March 14, 2005, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/print20050314_176746.html.
[10] Tseng Wei-chen and Chen Wei-han, “Unification support dives: poll,” Taipei Times, July 26, 2015, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/07/26/2003623930.
[11] See Ian Bremmer, “5 Statistics That Explained the World This Week,” Politico, March 2, 2014, at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/statistics-that-explained-the-world-this-week-104088; and Yuan-kang Wang, “Taiwan Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Security Issues: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2013, p. 100, available online at http://homepages.wmich.edu/~ymz8097/articles/wang_taiwan public opinion.pdf.
[12] Fang-Yu Chen, Wei-Ting Yen, Austin Horng-en Wang, and Brian Hioe, “The Taiwanese see themselves as Taiwanese, not as Chinese,” Washington Post, January 2, 2017, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/02/yes-taiwan-wants-one-china-but-which-china-does-it-want/?utm_term=.7bc908f3504c.
[13] Alison Hsiao, “No such thing as the ‘1992 Consensus’: Lee Teng-hui,” Taipei Times, May 3, 2015, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/05/03/2003617348.
[14] For one of best assessments to this effect, see Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010, at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66205/robert-d-kaplan/the-geography-of-chinese-power.
[15] Michael Thim, “Why Removing Taiwan Strait Missiles is Not the Real Issue,” Ketagalan Media, November 20, 2015, at http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2015/11/20/why-removing-taiwan-strait-missiles-is-not-the-real-issue/; Stephen Young, “Pageantry without a hint of real substance,” Taipei Times, November 10, 2015, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2015/11/10/2003632092; and Wang Yu-chung, “Ma talks peace deal with China,” Taipei Times, October 18, 2011, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/10/18/2003516029.
[16] Author’s discussion with ROC government officials in Taipei, 2016.
[17] For an excellent resource and background on the Sunflower Movement, see J. Michael Cole, Black Island: Two Years of Activism in Taiwan (Taipei, Taiwan: Createspace Publishing, 2015).
[18] See Republic of China 2013 National Defense Report [中華民國一0二年國防報告書2013] (Taipei, Taiwan: Ministry of National Defense, 2013), p. 56. See also Michael Gold and Ben Blanchard, “Taiwan says China could launch successful invasion by 2020,” Reuters, October 9, 2013, at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-idUSBRE99809020131009. MND reporting was further backed up by a series of authoritative, but not widely disseminated, Chinese military studies on the invasion of Taiwan. These show that PLA strategists and operational planners undertook a series of internal operational studies on the invasion of Taiwan around the year 2012. While these studies did not result in published books until 2014 and 2015, MND presumably knew that these research efforts were underway. Xi Jinping, as then-Vice Chairman of the CMC, presumably also knew.
[19] Ibid.
[20] See Douglas Paal, “China, the U.S. and the Coming Taiwan Transition,” The Diplomat, December 29, 2015, at http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-the-u-s-and-the-coming-taiwan-transition/; and “Assumption in US, China of Tsai victory, Glaser says,” Taipei Times, September 11, 2015, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/09/11/2003627457.
[21] Luo Tian-bin, “Communist Military Holds Repeated Landing Exercises Ahead of May 20 Inauguration (520前 共軍頻頻登陸演習),” Liberty Times, May 18, 2016, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/990759; and “Sword Pointed at Taiwan? PLA Exercise Held in Zhangzhou, Fujian (劍指台灣？解放軍福建漳州軍演),” Apple Daily, December 23, 2015, http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20151223/759559.
[22] See Alan Romberg, “Tsai Ing-wen Takes Office: A New Era in Cross-Strait Relations,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 50, June 22, 2016, at http://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Tsai-Ing-wen-Takes-Office-New-Era-Cross-Strait-Relations.pdf; and Richard Bush, “Tsai’s inauguration in Taiwan: It could have been worse,” Brookings Institute, May 23, 2016, at http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/05/23-tsai-ing-wen-inauguration-taiwan-bush.
[23] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 109–119.
[24] Ibid. pp. 119–121.
[25] See J. Michael Cole, “Unstoppable: China’s Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan,” The National Interest, March 23, 2015, at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/unstoppable-chinas-secret-plan-subvert-taiwan-12463; and Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, October 2013), at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/unstoppable-chinas-secret-plan-subvert-taiwan-12463.
[26] See Cao Zhengrong et al. (eds.), Informatized Army Operations, pp. 119–121. For background, see Thomas J. Christensen, “Coercive Contradictions: Zhanyixue, PLA Doctrine, and Taiwan Scenarios,” in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein (eds.), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses [CNA Corporation], 2002), pp. 317–321.
[27] J. Michael Cole, “Chinese Propaganda: Coming Soon to a Conference Near You,” The Diplomat, September 23, 2015. This assertion is also based on the authors private discussions with graduate students, university professors, and think tank researchers in Boston, Princeton, San Diego, and Washington, D.C., from 2015–2017.
[28] Ibid. See also the respective testimonies of Michelle Van Cleave, John Costello, David Major, Peter Mattis, and Mark Stokes before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 9, 2016, at http://www.uscc.gov/Hearings/hearing-chinese-intelligence-services-and-espionage-operations.
[29] For example, see Richard Bush, “Taiwan’s security policy,” The Brookings Institution, August 3, 2016, at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-security-policy/.
[30] For details see Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 2014), pp. 42–47, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf.
[31] While the list is long, one of the most notable examples is retired U.S. Navy Admiral, Bill Owens, “America must start treating China as a friend,” Financial Times, November 17, 2009, at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/69241506-d3b2-11de-8caf-00144feabdc0.html.
[32] See Yuan-kang Wang, “China’s Growing Strength, Taiwan’s Diminishing Options,” Brookings Institute Paper, November 2010, at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/11/china-taiwan-wang; Ralph Jennings, “Taiwan Resisting China’s Most Ambitious Plans For Stronger Ties,” Voice of America, February 13, 2014, at http://www.voanews.com/content/taiwan-resisting-chinas-most-ambitious-plans-for-stronger-ties/1850454.html; and Jonathan Adams, “Chinese compete for ‘worst tourist’ label,” Global Post, July 13, 2009, at http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/china-and-its-neighbors/090711/chinese-tourist-taiwan.
[33] Informatized Army Operations, p. 112.
[34] Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 143–144.
[35] Ibid. See also Science of Campaigns, p. 293.
[36] While often translated as “motherland,” in Chinese this is written in the paternalistic Zuguo (祖国).
[37] Of many examples, see Informatized Army Operations, p. 112.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid., p. 113.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Bai Guangwei (ed.), Course Book on the Taiwan Strait’s Military Geography [台海军事地理教程] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 2013), pp. 56–58.
[42] Ibid., pp. 56–57.
[43] Ibid., pp. 57–58.
[44] Yang Pushuang (ed.), The Japanese Air Self Defense Force [日本航空自卫队] (Beijing: Air Force Command College, 2013) pp. 190–191.
[45] Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 58.
[46] Science of Military Strategy, pp. 198–200; and Science of Campaigns, p. 293.
[47] Informatized Army Operations, p. 113.
[48] Richard C. Bush and Michael E. O’Hanlon, A War Like No Other: The Truth About China’s Challenge to America (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2007).
[49] David Shambaugh appears to be one of the first American “China Hands” to recognize and record this phenomenon. See his book, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 307–311.
[50] This is a complex but diminishing problem that appears to be especially pronounced among the older generation of American “China Hands” who generally spent less time in China, developed less proficiency in Chinese, were few in number, and divided themselves into easily defined camps. The younger generation, in contrast, is a larger and better educated (if less experienced) group, which is generally more open to a plurality of viewpoints. For an excellent assessment of the American PLA-watching community, see Peter Mattis, Analyzing the Chinese Military: A Review Essay and Resource Guide on the People’s Liberation Army (Middletown, DE: Createspace Publishing, 2015).
[51] In China, cruise missile is written xunhang daodan (巡航导弹). In Taiwan, it is written hsun-yi fei-dan (巡弋飛彈).
[52] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy: The Beginning and End of Planning and Preparation for Taiwan Liberation Operations just as New China was Established (台海攻略： 新中国成立前后解放台湾作战计划与准备始末),” Junshi Lishi (Military History Monthly), No. 1, Issue 130, January 2005, p. 10. See also Zhao Yiping, “Early Liberation, Operational Planning for Attacking Taiwan (解放初期的攻台作战计划),” Juece Tansuo (Policy Research and Exploration Journal), 2005 (2).
[53] Lu Shizhong, “1949–1950: The Chinese Communists’ Preparations to Attack Taiwan and America’s Gamesmanship Behind the Scenes (1949-1950：中共准备攻台背后与美国的博弈),” People’s Daily, December 27, 2013; and Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 11.
[54] In Chinese, their names are written 粟裕 and 张震, respectively.
[55] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 11. See also He Libo and Song Fengying, “Preliminary Examination of Mao Zedong’s Military Thought on Sea-Crossing and Island Landing Operations (毛泽东渡海登陆作战军事思想初探),” Henan Shehui Kexue (Henan Social Science Journal), January, 2004, p. 40.
[56] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 12.
[57] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 12.
[58] For an outstanding study in this pivotal event, see Maochun Miles Yu, “The Battle of Quemoy: The Amphibious Assault that Held the Postwar Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2016 (Vol. 69, No. 2), pp. 91–107.
[59] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 16.
[60] Tang Hongsen, “Discussing the Taiwan Strait Standoff and the Battle of Dengbu (论登步之战与台海对峙),” Zhejiang Xuekan (Zhejiang Journal), No. 2, 2012, pp. 59–68; and Lu Hui and Zheng Huaisheng, “Thoughts on the Experience of the Sea-Crossing and Landing Operations against Dengbu Island (登步岛渡海登陆作战经过与思考), Junshi Lishi (Military History Journal), No. 3, 2007, pp. 21–25.
[61] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 17.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid., p. 14.
[64] Ibid., p. 15.
[65] Ibid., p. 16.
[66] Ibid., pp. 16–17.
[67] Ibid., p. 17.
[68] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 17.
[69] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 17.
[70] Lu Shizhong, “1949–1950: The Chinese Communists’ Preparations to Attack Taiwan and America’s Gamesmanship Behind the Scenes (1949-1950：中共准备攻台背后与美国的博弈),” People’s Daily, December 27, 2013.
[71] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 11. See also Lu Shizhong.
[72] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 15.
[73] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 15.
[74] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 15.
[75] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” pp. 12–15.
[76] Ibid.; and Lu Shizhong.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 13.
[79] Shen Zhihua, “The CCP’s Taiwan Attack Campaign: Policy Changes and Limiting Factors, 1949–1950 (中共进攻台湾战役的决策变化及其制约因素，1949-1950), Shehui Kexue Yanjiu (Social Science Research Journal), No. 3, 2009, pp. 48–49.
[80] “Traitor to Chinese Communism: Cai Xiaogan (中共叛徒蔡孝乾),” Phoenix News Net, January 21, 2013, at http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2013_01/21/21426217_0.shtml.
[81] Ibid.; and “Cai Xiaogan, Chinese Communist General Secretary for Taiwan Operations, Betrayed Taiwan Underground Party Organizations, Entire Army Annihilated (中共台湾书记蔡孝乾叛变台地下党组织全军覆没), Sohu News, May 26, 2014, at http://history.sohu.com/20140526/n400044379.shtml.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid. and Shen Zhihua, “The CCP’s Taiwan Attack Campaign: Policy Changes and Limiting Factors, 1949–1950 (中共进攻台湾战役的决策变化及其制约因素，1949-1950), Shehui Kexue Yanjiu (Social Science Research Journal), No. 3, 2009, p. 49.
[84] Note that many of the Communist agents who evaded capture in the ROC’s 1950 roundup eventually wound up in Hong Kong, where they established new centers of underground work which reportedly continue operating to this day. See Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, October 2013), p. 8.
[85] Shen Zhihua, “The CCP’s Taiwan Attack Campaign: Policy Changes and Limiting Factors, 1949–1950 (中共进攻台湾战役的决策变化及其制约因素，1949-1950), Shehui Kexue Yanjiu (Social Science Research Journal), No. 3, 2009, p. 49.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Shen Zhihua claims that additional troops were allotted to Su Yu’s invasion force in June 1950. Zhao Yiping writes that more troops were not assigned. However, he seems to suggest that the issue was under consideration when the Korean War broke out.
[88] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 14.
[89] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 14; and Shen Zhihua, p. 50.
[90] Zhao Yiping, “Taiwan Strait Attack Strategy,” p. 17.
[91] Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing the Ring (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Riverside Press, 1951), p. 87.
[92] Ibid. p. 575. See also, Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), pp. 418–420.
[93] Phelim Kyne, “Operations CAUSEWAY: The Invasion that never was,” China News, August 10, 1997, accessible online at https://sites.google.com/site/operationcauseway/.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] See Robert Ross Smith, “Luzon Versus Formosa” in Kent Roberts Greenfield (ed.), Command Decisions (Washington, D.C.: Defense Department Army Center of Military History, 1960), pp. 461–477.
[97] Xiaobing Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), p. 127.
[98] Quote drawn from Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and prospects (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 17.
[99] Edward J. Marolda, Ready Seapower: A History of the U.S. Seventh Fleet (Washington, D.C.: Naval History and Heritage Command, 2012), pp. 33–35; and Bruce A. Elleman, High Seas Buffer: The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950–1979 (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2012); and Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security, p. 18.
[100] See Kao Zhi-yang, “Record of U.S. Military Forces Formerly Stationed in Taiwan (駐台美軍曾經的記錄),” Quanqiu Fangwei Zazhi (Defence International), No. 320, April 2011, pp. 88–95; and American Footsteps in Southern Taiwan: Our People in a Defining Era (Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-Sen America Center, 2010), p. 75.
[101] Survey and Mapping Bureau of the PLA General Staff Department, China’s Military Geography [中国军事地理] (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 2008), p. 577.
[102] Elleman, pp. 60–61.
[103] Ibid. pp. 59–62.
[104] Ibid., pp. 62–70; and Marolda, pp. 40–42.
[105] Elleman, pp. 99–102.
[106] The following discussion on the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis draws from, Cole, Taiwan’s Security, p. 23; Marolda, pp. 49–51; and Elleman, pp. 99–102.
[107] See Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011).
[108] See Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010); Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine (New York: Walker & Company, 2010); and Yang Jisheng, Mubei: Zhongguo Liushi Niandai Da Jihuang Jishi [Tombstone: A Record of the Great Chinese Famine of the 1960s] (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 2008).
[109] Of many excellent sources on the PLA, see Mark Cozad, “The PLA and Contingency Planning,” in Andrew Scobell, Arthur S. Ding, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott W. Harold (eds.), The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015), pp. 15–32; and Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars,” in Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (eds.), Chinese Lessons from Other People’s Wars (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 153–199. For further background, see David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007 ); and James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein (eds.), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses [CNA Corporation], 2002).
[110] For background, see and Richard Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005); and Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).
[111] For details on the crisis, see Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989–2000 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 200–263; Robert S. Ross, “The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87–123. .
[112] Ibid.
[113] See Wen Dong-Ping (聞東平), The Intelligence War Now Underway [正在進行的諜戰] (New York: Mirror Books, 2009); and Guo Nairi (郭乃日), The Unseen War in the Taiwan Strait [看不見的台海戰爭] (Xizhi, Taiwan: Gaoshou Publishing, 2005).
[114] Ibid.
[115] For background on PLA modernization, see Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders, The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012); Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang (eds.), The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011); Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, Andrew Scobell, Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009); and Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (eds.), Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies institute, 2007).
[116] For background, see Cliff, Roger. China’s Military Power: Assessing Current and Future Capabilities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (eds.), The Chinese People’s Liberation Army in 2025 (Carlisle, PA: The Army War College Press, 2015); Eric Heginbotham, et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Washington, D.C., RAND Corporation, 2015), at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html; Peter Navarro, Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2015); Larry M. Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach: Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2013); and Richard D. Fisher Jr., China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Westport, CT: Praeger Security Studies, 2008).
[117] The most notable example is U.S. Naval War College professor, William Murray, who assumes Taiwan would be completely surprised by a Chinese attack. See William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2008, pp. 13–38. For a more nuanced analysis, see Jim Thomas, John Stillion, and Iskander Rehman, Hard ROC 2.0: Taiwan and Deterrence Through Protraction (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, 2014).
[118] Cynthia M. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2002), pp. 3–4, available online at http://www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Anticipating_Surprise_Analysis.pdf.
[119] Ibid.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid.
[122] See National Security Bureau, R.O.C., “Policy Guidelines,” at http://www.nsb.gov.tw/En/En_index01.html, accessed October 24, 2016.
[123] See Ian Easton and Randall Schriver, Standing Watch: Taiwan and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Western Pacific (Arlington, Virginia: Project 2049 Institute, December 2014), p. 15; and Ian Easton, Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy in an Age of Precision Strike (Arlington, Virginia: Project 2049 Institute, September 2014), pp. 30–31.
[124] See MND, National Defense Report 2015 [國防報告書] (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2015), p. 112.
[125] See Ian Easton, Mark Stokes, Cortez Cooper, and Arthur Chan, Transformation of Taiwan’s Reserve Force (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2017), p 11.
[126] For example, see J. Michael Cole, “The Spies Are Coming! The Spies Are Coming To Taiwan!” The Diplomat, January 22, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-spies-are-coming-the-spies-are-coming-to-taiwan/; and Peter Mattis, “China’s Espionage Against Taiwan (Part 1), Analysis of Recent Operations,” China Brief, November 7, 2014, p. 7, at https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/China_Brief_Vol_14_Issue_21_2.pdf. See also Peter Mattis, “Chinese Human Intelligence Operations Against the United States,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 9, 2016, available online at http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Peter Mattis_Written Testimony060916.pdf.
[127] For example, see Luo Tianbin, et al., “China’s State Media Accuses Taiwan Spies of Recruiting Chinese Students (中國官媒控台諜策反中生),” Ziyou Ribao (Liberty Times), October 28, 2014, pp. A1–A3; and Wendell Minnick, “The Men in Black: How Taiwan spies on China,” Asia Times, February 26, 2004, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FB26Ad05.html.
[128] See Wen Dong-Ping, The Intelligence War Now Underway [正在進行的諜戰] (New York: Mirror Books, 2009); and Guo Nairi (郭乃日), The Unseen War in the Taiwan Strait [看不見的台海戰爭] (Xizhi, Taiwan: Gaoshou Publishing, 2005). See also Wendell Minnick, “Spook Mountain: How U.S. Spies on China,” Asia Times, March 6, 2003 at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EC06Ad03.html; and Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan-US Link Up on SIGINT,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 24, 2001, at https://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/01/jdw-taiwan-sigint.html.
[129] See Xu Lisheng and Wang Zhaoyong, Research on Port Landing Operations [港口登陆作战研究](Beijing: National Defense University, 2015), pp. 37–38.
[130] Unless where otherwise noted, the following section draws from Chen Qing-lin (ed.), National Defense Education: Defense Mobilization [全民國防教育防衛動員] (New Taipei City: New Wun Ching Development Publishing, 2013), pp. 36–39; and Li Qingshan (ed.), Taiwan Military Exercises [台军演习](Shenyang: Baishan Publishing, 2008), pp. 185–187.
[131] For an illuminating study on how a command group might be organized and structured in an non-invasion scenario, see Mark A. Stokes, “Employment of National-Level PLA Assets in a Contingency: A Cross-Strait Conflict as Case Study,” in Andrew Scobell, Arthur S. Ding, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott W. Harold (eds.), The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015), pp. 135–147.
[132] For an illustrative example, see “Authorities eavesdrop on social media chat of Chinese military brigade’s wives,” South China Morning Post, April 6, 2015, at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1757560/authorities-eavesdrop-social-media-chat-chinese-military-brigades-wives.
[133] For details on PLA mobilization, see Dean Cheng, “Converting the Potential to the Actual: Chinese Mobilization Policies and Planning,” in Andrew Scobell, Arthur S. Ding, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott W. Harold (eds.), The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015), pp. 107–134.
[134] Specific offshore locations where increased PLA activity is anticipated include Pingtan Island, Nanri Island, Dongshan Island, and Nan-ao Island. See Chang Zong-Tsai, “Research on Tactics and Techniques of Communist Military ‘Decapitation Operations’ through the lens of the U.S. Military’s ‘Operation Neptune Spear’ (共軍’斬首行動’戰術戰法--以美軍’海神之矛行動’研析),” Journal of ROC Aviation and Special Forces Command, No. 56, 2012, p. 11.
[135] These include airbases at: Fuzhou, Longxi, Denghai, Liancheng, Xingning, Chong’an, Longtian , Hui’an, (Taizhou) Luqiao, Weixian, Xincheng, Zhangqiao, Hangzhou, Daishan, Jiaxiang, Shanghai, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Haikou, Wazhuo, and Shuimen.
[136] For an illustrative example, see Adam Minter, “Flight Delayed in China? Blame the Military,” Bloomberg, September 1, 2015, at https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-09-01/flight-delayed-in-china-blame-the-military.
[137] See Chang Zong-Tsai, p. 11.
[138] See Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), p. 168.
[139] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 251.
[140] For background on China’s nuclear warhead management system, see Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,” Project 2049 Institute Occasional Paper, March 12, 2010, at http://www.project2049.net/documents/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf.
[141] For more on this, see Informatized Army Operations, pp. 130–131. See also Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “Chinese Cargo Ships Get the Military Option,” Popular Science, June 23, 2015, at http://www.popsci.com/chinese-cargo-ships-get-military-option.
[142] For excellent background on the PRC’s shipbuilding industry, see Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016).
[143] See Wang Yongping, et al. (eds.), Space Information Support Operations [空间信息支援作战] (Beijing: National Defense University, 2014), pp. 199–201.
[144] Ibid., p. 201.
[145] Ibid., pp. 159–162.
[146] In addition, it should be expected that unmanned aerial vehicles and submarines, including unmanned underwater vehicles, could also be used for supplementing manned reconnaissance missions near Taiwan. Chinese cyber espionage and reconnaissance efforts for intelligence-gathering and preparation of the battlefield would probably increase at this point as well. In addition, Chinese “patriotic hackers” might at this or a later point start to engage in “cyber disruption” through DDoS attacks, etc. The author is indebted to Elsa Kania for these points.
[147] For background, see Peter Mattis, “A Guide to Chinese Intelligence Operations,” War on the Rocks, August 18, 2015, at https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/a-guide-to-chinese-intelligence-operations/; and Peter Mattis, “The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 47–57, at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-56-no.-3/pdfs/Mattis-Understanding Chinese Intel.pdf.
[148] See Mark Stokes and Russel Hsiao, The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, October 2013).
[149] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 120–121.
[150] See J. Michael Cole, “China Intensifies Disinformation Campaign Against Taiwan,” Taiwan Sentinel, January 19, 2017, at https://sentinel.tw/china-disinformation-tw/; and J. Michael Cole, “Chinese Propaganda: Coming Soon to a Conference Near You,” The Diplomat, September 23, 2015, at http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/chinese-propaganda-coming-soon-to-a-conference-near-you/.
[151] As an illustrative example, China used a non-official backchannel to make nuclear threats against the U.S. during the Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis. See A War Like No Other: The Truth About China’s Challenge to America, pp. 1–2.
[152] See Informatized Joint Operations, p. 250.
[153] For example, see Chang Hsueh-chang, “Discussion on Military Police Missions in Wartime (戰時憲兵任務之探討),” ROC Military Police Command Journal, No. 80 (June 2015), pp. 34–40; and Chang Zong-Tsai, pp. 10–12.
[154] Authors discussions with ROC military subject matters experts .
[155] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 120–121.
[156] See Informatized Joint Operations, p. 225; and Guo Ming (ed.), Course Book on the Art of Special Warfare Operations (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 2013), 184.
[157] Ibid. For details on the legal procedures involved in declaring an emergency, see Chang Hsueh-chang, “Discussion on Military Police Missions in Wartime,” pp. 25–34.
[158] See Li Daguang, “Latest Secrets Revealed on Deception during the Normandy Landing Campaign (诺曼底登陆战役欺骗的最新揭秘),” Junshi Shilin (Military History Facts), No. 4, 2011, pp. 41–46; Ji Guangzhi, Liu Shunping, and Zhang Zhiwei, Camouflaged Landing Campaigns [登陆战役伪装] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 2003), op cit.; and Zhang Wei, Zhang Guangming, and Liu Yaxing, “Insights from the Application of Stratagems during Normandy Landing Campaign (诺曼底登陆战役的谋略运用及其启示), Junshi Shilin (Military History Facts), No. 1, 2001, pp. 3–6.
[159] Informatized Army Operations, p. 115.
[160] Note that Blasko also points out mobilization could be used to signal intentions as part of a deterrence strategy, and operational and tactical surprise might still be possible if military deception measures are successful. See Dennis J. Blasko, “The PLA Army/Ground Forces,” in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (eds.), The PLA as an Organization: Reference Volume v2.0 (Fairfax, VA: Defens Group Inc. 2015), p. 259.
[161] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 225.
[162] Ibid.
[163] See Course Book on Special Warfare Operations, 184.
[164] See Informatized Joint Operations, p. 223.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Informatized Army Operations, p. 130.
[167] Ibid., pp. 140–142.
[168] Ibid., p. 142.
[169] Zhang Zhiwei and Huang Chuanxian (eds.), Research on Operational Theory of Army Aviation Troops [陆军航空兵作战理论研究] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2014), p. 94.
[170] Informatized Army Operations, p. 146. See also Research on Operational Theory of Army Aviation Troops, p. 85.
[171] Informatized Army Operations, p. 147.
[172] Song Jian, “Risk Assessment on Camouflaging a Landing Campaign (登陆战役伪装风险评估), Jisuanji yu Shuzi Gongcheng (Journal of Computer and Digital Engineering), Vol. 41, No. 8, 2013, pp. 1232–1234.
[173] Unless otherwise noted, the following section draws from Chen Qing-lin (ed.), National Defense Education: Defense Mobilization [全民國防教育防衛動員] (New Taipei City: New Wun Ching Development Publishing, 2013), pp. 36–42; and Chen Qing-lin, Hwuang Zhen-yi, and Kuo Wen-liang (eds.), National Defense Education (全民國防教育) [New Taipei City: New Wun Ching Development Publishing, 2010], pp. 185–191.
[174] Major PLA sources for the following discussion include: Informatized Army Operations, pp. 109–215; Research on Port Landing Operations, pp. 36–160; Space Information Support Operations, pp. 143–212; Research on Operational Theory of Army Aviation Troops, pp. 80–202 ; and Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 208–235. Taiwanese sources include: Tsai Ho-Hsun, “Research on the Communist Military’s Division Landing Operations (共軍師登陸作戰之研究),” ROC Army Journal, Vol. 50, No. 537, October 2014, pp. 60–78; Hsieh Chih-Peng, “Research on the Communist Military’s New Campaign Guidance (共軍新時期戰役指導之研究),” ROC Army Journal, No. 50, Vol. 536 (August 2014), pp. 35–50; and Yang You-hung, “Research into Communist Military’s Joint Island Landing Offensive Campaign Capabilities (共軍聯合島嶼進攻戰役能力研究),” ROC Reserve Force Journal, No. 88, October 2013, pp. 88–109.
[175] See Informatized Army Operations, pp. 109–110; and Hsieh Chih-Peng, “Research on the Communist Military’s New Campaign Guidance (共軍新時期戰役指導之研究),” ROC Army Journal, No. 50, Vol. 536 (August 2014), pp. 44–45.
[176] See Informatized Joint Operations, p. 156; and Chen Yue-Yang, “Analysis of Chinese Communist Army’s Electronic Warfare Developments (中共陸軍電子戰發展之研析),” ROC Army Journal, No. 49, Vol. 528 (April 2013), pp. 58–64.
[177] Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 156–157.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.; and Lan Jong-Sheng, “Xi Jinping’s Strong Military Dream: Discussing Plans for Rocket Force Buildup (習近平強軍夢: 論火箭軍建軍規劃),” ROC Army Journal, No. 52, Vol. 548 (August 2016), pp. 120–121; and Wang Cheng-Fang, “Assessment of the Communist Military’s Missile Threat to Taiwan’s Theater-Level Underground Command Posts (共軍導彈對我作戰區級地下指揮所威脅之評估),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, Vol. 145, 2014, pp. 2–6. See also, Ian Easton, “Able Archers: Taiwan’s Defense in an Age of Precision Strike,” Project 2049 Institute Occasional Paper, September 2014, pp. 3–14.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 180. See also Space Information Support Operations, p. 147.
[183] In addition to above sources, see Su Mao-Hsien, “Discussing Future Operational Concepts of Communist Military’s Application of Special Operations Units During Attack on Taiwan (淺談未來共軍攻台運用特種作戰部隊作戰構想),” ROC Army Aviation and Special Forces Journal, Vol. 57, 2013, pp. 22–29.
[184] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 179.
[185] Ibid., p. 157.
[186] Ibid., p. 158.
[187] Ibid. p. 160. For a detailed Taiwanese assessment of the role of Chinese submarines in a blockade, see Lieu Shien-Chu, “Discussion on Chinese Communist Submarine Threat to Taiwan and Their Blockade Capabilities (中共潛艦對台威脅及對封鎖能力探討),” ROC Navy Journal, No. 46, Vol. 4 (August 1, 2012), pp. 56–74.
[188] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 159.
[189] Ibid., pp. 160–161. For a detailed Taiwanese assessment, see Chang Sheng-Kai and Tseng Chen-yang, “Analysis of Chinese Communist Mine-laying Operations off Taiwan’s East Coast (中共對我東岸海域布雷行動之研析), ROC Navy Journal, No. 49, Vol. 4 (August 1, 2015), pp. 132–140.
[190] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 163.
[191] Ibid., pp. 160–161.
[192] Ibid., p. 161.
[193] Ibid., p. 158.
[194] Ibid., p. 159.
[195] Ibid. pp. 159–160.
[196] Space Information Support Operations, pp. 166–167.
[197] Ibid., p. 169.
[198] Ibid., p. 170.
[199] The PLA’s naval armadas and task forces would have their own dedicated SATCOM lines throughout the pre-invasion battle, with satellites providing admirals at sea with links to all their dispersed ships. In wartime, the PLA would also theoretically attempt to build a navy-to-air force tactical communications network. In practice, however, there are concerns that this satellite communications system would not work, apparently because it is assumed the rival services would be unable to work well together. See Space Information Support Operations, pp. 171– 172.
[200] Ibid., pp. 173–174.
[201] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 122–123.
[202] For background, see Mark A. Stokes, “The Chinese Joint Aerospace Campaign: Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Modernization,” in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein (eds.), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses [CNA Corporation], 2002), pp. 221–305. For a recent PLA source, see Space Information Support Operations, pp. 159–162.
[203] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 179. See also Space Information Support Operations, pp. 146–147.
[204] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 180.
[205] Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 224–225. Note that the PLA has built a full-scale model of Taiwan’s Presidential Office. This reportedly has been hit in live-fire exercises with cruise missiles that targeted the president’s desk. While unclear, that test may have occurred in 2013–2014. More recently, the Presidential Office model has been used to train Chinese ground forces in close quarters combat. See J. Michael Cole, “Chinese PLA Simulates ‘Attack’ on Taiwan’s Presidential Office,” The Diplomat, July 22, 2015; Lo Tien-pin and Jake Chung, “China simulates attack on Presidential Office,” Taipei Times, July 23, 2015, page one; and Victor Robert Lee, “Satellite Imagery: China Staging Mock Invasion of Taiwan,” The Diplomat, August 9, 2015.
[206] Note that PLA writings do not refer to ROC government organizations by their official titles. Instead, they refer to them as the “enemy’s principal brain organizations, where strategic political, economic, and military problems are decided.” See Informatized Joint Operations, p. 180.
[207] Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 180–181.
[208] Space Information Support Operations, p. 157.
[209] Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 180–181.
[210] Ibid. .
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid., p. 182.
[214] Research on Operational Theory of Army Aviation Troops, p. 166.
[215] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 182.
[216] Ibid., p. 184.
[217] Ibid.
[218] Ibid., pp. 183–185. See also Space Information Support Operations, p. 148.
[219] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 185.
[220] Ibid.
[221] Ibid, p. 162.
[222] Space Information Support Operations, p. 174.
[223] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 115–116
[224] Space Information Support Operations, p. 175.
[225] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 109–112, and 115.
[226] Ibid., p. 115.
[227] Ibid, p. 116.
[228] See Informatized Army Operations, pp. 196–215; and Informatized Joint Operations, p. 198. See also Li Jun and Zhang Qi, “Research on how to Optimize the Deployment of Artillery Forces for Offensive Combat against Near Coastal Islands Based on FCE (基于ＦＣＥ对近岸岛屿进攻战斗炮兵部署优化研究),” Jianchuan Dianzi Gongcheng (Ship Electronic Engineering Journal), December 2012, pp. 43–47; and Liu Zengyou, et al., “Shipping and Equipment Support Force Deployments for Joint Operations against Offshore Islands (近岸岛屿联合作战船艇装备保障力量),” Binggong Zidonghua (Ordnance Industry Automation Journal), April 2010, pp. 58–62.
[229] Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, pp. 166–167.
[230] “Geographic Location,” Wuqiu Township Office Website, at http://web.kinmen.gov.tw/Layout/sub_B/AllInOne_en_Show.aspx?path=6370&guid=47592e10-2854-4eaf-876b-26d579bda533&lang=en-us.
[231] Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, pp. 172–173.
[232] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 198.
[233] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 210–211.
[234] Ibid., p. 208.
[235] Ibid., pp. 211–213.
[236] See Informatized Army Operations, pp. 111–113, 196–201, and 204–205; and Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 187–188; and 198.
[237] Ibid.
[238] Ibid.
[239] Ibid.
[240] See Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, pp. 166–177.
[241] Research on Operational Theory of Army Aviation Troops, pp. 105–135.
[242] Ibid., pp. 116–118. Note that the main island of Kinmen is anticipated to be the most difficult to capture. It is described as having two major defensive lines that protect a central stronghold area located around the highest point of elevation. The central bunker complex reportedly serves as the island’s last redoubt. It is believed to be connected to points across the island by long tunnels. Other offshore islands are thought to have one defensive line backed up by a stronghold. Some islands, including Kinmen, are thought to have natural sea caves which have been created over centuries by pounding waves and then expanded by Taiwan’s army engineers. These caves are viewed as places where fresh supplies and troops could be clandestinely brought in at night from the sea and where fast missile boats could safely hide.
[243] Ibid., p. 121.
[244] Ibid., pp. 120–121.
[245] Informatized Army Operations, p. 210.
[246] Ibid.
[247] Ibid., p. 209.
[248] Ibid, p. 210.
[249] Ibid.
[250] Ibid., p. 215.
[251] See Informatized Army Operations, pp. 127–164; Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 186–207; and Space Information Support Operations, pp. 188–212. See also Research on Operational Theory of Army Aviation Troops, pp. 80–104.
[252] Informatized Army Operations, p. 154.
[253] Informatized Army Operations, p. 155; and Informatized Joint Operations, p. 199.
[254] Informatized Army Operations, p. 155; Informatized Joint Operations, p. 199; and Space Information Support Operations, pp. 207–208.
[255] Space Information Support Operations, pp. 191–199.
[256] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 200.
[257] See Informatized Army Operations, p. 155.
[258] Ibid., p. 156.
[259] Ibid.; and Informatized Joint Operations, p. 200. See also Chen Songhui, Qiu Hongli, and Du Hu, “Research and Analysis on an Amphibious Formation’s Comprehensive Landing and Assault Capabilities (两栖编队综合登陆突击能力的分析研究),” Jianchuan Dianzi Gongcheng (Ship Electronic Engineering Journal), No. 5, 2014, pp. 34–37, 64.
[260] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 201; and Research on Operational Theory of Army Aviation Troops, p. 81.
[261] Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 49–50.
[262]Informatized Army Operations, p. 156; and Informatized Joint Operations, p. 200.
[263] Tsai Ho-Hsun, “Research on the Communist Military’s Division Landing Operations (共軍師登陸作戰之研究),” ROC Army Journal, Vol. 50, No. 537, October 2014, p. 67. For excellent studies on the PLA’s amphibious order of battle, see Pan Shih-Yeong and Shen Qi-lin, “Analysis of the Chinese Communist’s Amphibious Landing Combat Force (中共兩棲登陸戰力之研析),” ROC Navy Journal, No. 46, Vol. 3 (June 1, 2012), pp. 69–84. See also, Chu Bih-wei, “The Communist Military’s Amphibious Operational Thought and Platform Developments (共軍兩棲作戰思維與載台發展),” ROC Navy Journal, No. 47, Vol. 1 (February 1, 2013), pp. 120–129.
[264] Informatized Army Operations, p. 156; and Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 200–201.
[265] Ibid.
[266] Informatized Army Operations, p. 157. See also Liu Runcai, et al., “Analysis and Modeling of Communications Environment during Landing Operations (登陆作战中的通信环境分析与建模),” Sichuan Binggong Xueshu (Sichuan Ordinance Studies), December 2010, pp. 63–65.
[267] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 157–158.
[268] Informatized Army Operations, p. 159; and Informatized Joint Operations, p. 201.
[269] Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 201–202. See also Wang Dazhong, et al., “Initial Evaluation of Ship Fire Support Effectiveness and Fire Distribution during Landing Operations (登陆作战中舰艇火力支援效能及分配模型初探),” Jianchuan Dianzi Gongcheng (Ship Electronic Engineering), No. 2, 2010, pp. 32–34, 44.
[270] This draws from studies conducted by the PLA Navy’s schoolhouse for amphibious operations, which used high-powered computer simulations to find the best composition of a beach assault battalion. These studies found that an optimal Chinese amphibious unit would have a blend of amphibious tanks, amphibious assault vehicles outfitted with mortars and heavy machine guns, and infantry equipped with machine guns, anti-tank weapons, and air defense missiles. They assumed notional assault battalions would have three infantry companies, three amphibious assault vehicle/tank companies, one air defense company, and one anti-tank company. Ideally, each assault team would be supported by four helicopter gunships providing close air support. See Jia Ziying, Chen Songhui, and Wen Rui, “Analysis of Troop Unit Effectiveness During Systemized Landing Operations Based on Data Field (基于数据场的登陆作战体系兵力编组效能分析),” Zhihui Kongzhi yu Fangzhen (Command Control & Simulation Journal), Vol. 36, No. 6, December 2014, pp. 92–95; and Wang Yinlai, Chen Songhui, and Jia Ziying, “Analysis of Troops Unit Effectiveness During Landing Operations Based on Complex Networks (基于复杂网络的登陆作战兵力编组效能分析),” Huoli yu Zhihu Kongzhi (Fire Control & Command Control Journal), Vol. 39, No. 8, August 2014, pp. 87–90. Note that both studies received the PRC’s National Social Science Grant for Military Study Programs (12GJ003-127). See also Yang Fengshou and Hu Xiaoyun, “Infantry Unit Landing Operations Decision Plan Evaluation based upon Improved Three Marker Method (基于三标度改进方法的步兵分队登陆作战决心方案评价),” Zhihui Kongzhi Yu Fangzhen (Command, Control, and Simulation Journal), December 2009, pp. 48–51.
[271] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 160–161.
[272] Ibid. pp. 160–162. For a remarkably detailed discussion on PLA amphibious attacks against Taiwan’s ports, see Xu Lisheng and Wang Zhaoyong (eds.), Research on Port Landing Operations [港口登陆作战研究](Beijing, National Defense University Press, 2015), pp. 36–70; and Yan Feilong and Jia Ziying, “Airborne Landing Operation Target Selection Method Based on Complex Networks (基于复杂网络的机降作战目标选择方法),” Huoli Yu Zhihui Kongzhi (Fire Control and Command Control), April 2014, pp. 38–41.
[273] Informatized Army Operations, p. 162.
[274] Ibid., p. 163.
[275] Ibid. See also Wang Yongping, p. 210. See also Liu Hongkun, “Analysis of our Tank Companies’ Offensive Operational Capabilities against Combat Vehicles on the Island (坦克连对岛上战车排进攻作战能力分析),” Huoli Yu Zhihui Kongzhi (Fire Control and Command Control), September 2006, pp. 64–66, 78.
[276] Informatized Army Operations, p. 164.
[277] Informatized Army Operations, p. 164. Cai Junfeng and Mei Sijun, “Design of Protective Storage for Ordinance to be carried during Amphibious Strait Crossing and Island Landing Operations (渡海登岛作战弹药两栖携行防护装具设计),” Baozhuang Gongcheng (Packaging Engineering), March 2015, pp. 140–143.
[278] Space Information Support Operations, pp. 210–211.
[279] Note, for example, that while the 2008 version of Informatized Joint Operations offers a mere two pages of discussion on this topic, books like Joint Army Operations and Research on Operational Theory of Army Aviation Troops, which were last published in 2015 and 2014, respectively, dedicate entire chapters to a post-Zero Day fight on Taiwan.
[280] Informatized Army Operations, p. 188.
[281] Informatized Army Operations, p. 188.
[282] Research on Operational Theory of Army Aviation Troops, p. 172; Research on Port Landing Operations, p. 33;
[283] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 188–189.
[284] Ibid.
[285] Ibid., p. 190.
[286] Ibid., p. 189.
[287] Research on Port Landing Operations, p. 42.
[288] Informatized Army Operations, p. 190.
[289] Ibid., pp.190–191.
[290] Ibid., pp. 192–193.
[291] Informatized Army Operations, p. 194; and Course Book on the Art of Special Operations, p. 184.
[292] Informatized Army Operations, p. 194.
[293] Ibid., p. 195.
[294] Informatized Army Operations, p. 195; and Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 234–235.
[295] Informatized Army Operations, p. 195.
[296] Ibid.
[297] Port Landing Operations, p. 29.
[298] Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 234–235.
[299] Informatized Army Operations , p. 195.
[300] Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 234–235.
[301] For example, see Course Book on the Taiwan Strait’s Military Geography, pp. 57–58; and The Japanese Air Self Defense Force, pp. 190–191.
[302] It must be noted that the PLA would also be limited by its budget. How much money would it have available? How many material resources could be pulled over from the civilian economy? How would financial and other resources be managed and channeled into the war effort? When it comes to financial matters, however, almost nothing specific is known. China’s military economy is extraordinarily opaque and difficult to assess. One former Taiwanese vice president, Wu Den-yih, has stated that an invasion of Taiwan would probably cost the PRC somewhere between 30 trillion to 50 trillion U.S. dollars. It is not known how he reached this figure, but it may have been derived from intelligence assessments Taiwan has conducted. See Alison Hsiao, “PRC would pay dearly for taking Taiwan, Wu says,” Taipei Times, January 25, 2017, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/01/25/2003663766.
[303] In practice, this would mean reducing CCP political interference in military matters, not just in operations, but in selection and promotion, as well as in education and training. Examples from the PRC’s past as well as the civil-military experiences of other militaries, both Communist and Fascist, show that reduced political interference results in improved capabilities, at least man-for-man. Political interference may have its benefits, but only if the PLA wanted to do relatively simple (think human wave) tactics that result in high causality rates for its own forces. The author is indebted to Ian McCaslin for this point.
[304] See MND’s Chinese-language website portal titled, “Military Periodicals (軍事刊物),” at http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?Prod=軍事刊物&Title=軍事刊物&style=軍事刊物&s=1.
[305] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 140–141.
[306] China’s Military Geography, p. 351. See also Informatized Army Operations,
p.133.
[307] “Han Kuang Exercise 32 Series 2: Critical Node Hsuehshan Tunnel Blockade Operation (漢光32號演習系列2--關節要點雪山封阻作業),”Quanqiu Fangwei Zazhi (Defence International), No. 385, September 2016, pp. 36–40;
“Reserve Mobilization: Counterattack after Tamsui Raid and Taipei Port Attack (後備動員淡水反突擊台北港反擊), Quanqiu Fangwei Zazhi (Defence International), No. 362, October 2014, pp. 37–38.
[308] According to Taiwanese studies, the options open to the Chinese for landing on the west coast are especially limited by giant mudflats stretching between the cities of Taichung and Tainan. The high tide and low tide waterlines in this extremely flat and shallow area are approximately two to three miles apart, making it treacherous for amphibious operations. Lin Chang-Sheng, “Chinese Communist Amphibious Landing Forces for Taiwan Strait War (中共台海戰爭兩棲登陸軍力),” in Lin Chong-bin, Calculating the Taiwan Strait: The Strategic Situation in the Strait in the New Century [廟算台海：新世紀海峽戰略態勢] (Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 2002), pp. 405–406.
[309] Informatized Army Operations, p. 115.
[310] Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 83.
[311] Ibid.
[312] Author’s discussions with Taiwanese defense authorities.
[313] Author’s discussion with Colonel Andrew Drake (USMC).
[314] Author’s discussions with Taiwanese defense authorities.
[315] Wu Qi-Yu, “Research on Executing Surf Zone Mining Operations with Combat Engineer Units (工兵部隊執行激浪區布雷作業之研究),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, no. 147, 2015, pp. 24–27 (of 30); and Wu Ding-an, “Discussion on ROC Military Beach Obstacle Enterprise in Light of Chinese Communist’s ‘Mission Action 2013’ Exercise, Landing Tactics, and Platforms (從中共【使命行動2013】演習之登陸戰法與輸具探討我軍灘岸阻絕作為),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, no. 147, 2015, pp. 14–18 (of 23). See also Ma Li-te and Chang Nan-Zong, “Analysis of Communist China’s New Type Amphibious Transports and the Communist Military’s Landing Operation Models (中共新型兩棲載具對共軍登陸作戰模式的研析),” ROC Navy Journal, February 2013, p. 80.
[316] See Research on Operational Theory of Army Aviation Troops, pp. 82–88
[317] Informatized Joint Operations, pp. 202–203.
[318] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 203.
[319] Informatized Army Operations, p. 115.
[320] Informatized Army Operations, p. 166.
[321] Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 83. For ROC Military assessments, see Wang Hsiu-Hung, “Analysis of Communist China’s Landing Craft Air Cushion Vehicle Developments and Military Applications (中共軍用氣墊登陸艇發展與軍用之研析),” ROC Army Journal, No. 52, Vol. 548 (August 2016), pp. 83–103; and Chang You-ching, “Research on Combat Engineer Support in River Crossings during Defense Operations--The Case of the Third Theater of Operations and the Tamsui River (防衛作戰中工兵支援渡河作業之研究—以第三作戰區淡水河為例),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 147, 2015, pp. 1–24.
[322] Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 83. For Taiwanese sources, see Wang Wei-hsien and Ong Ming-hui, “Discussion on History, Development, and Application of Communist Military’s Amphibious Armored Assault Vehicle for Landings (共軍兩棲裝甲戰斗車輛發展歷程與運用上陸之探討),” ROC Army Journal, No. 52, Vol. 546 (April 2016), pp. 53–54; and Chien Yi-jian and Ong Ming-hui, “Research on Armor Brigade Counterattack Operations during Defense Operations--The Case of a Suitable Landing Area (防衛作戰中裝甲旅反擊之研究 --以適宜登陸地區為例),” ROC Armor Journal, No. 240, July 2015, pp. 15– 42.
[323] Of many assessments to this effect, see Chang You-ching, “Research on Combat Engineer Support in River Crossings during Defense Operations--The Case of the Third Theater of Operations and the Tamsui River (防衛作戰中工兵支援渡河作業之研究—以第三作戰區淡水河為例),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 147, 2015, pp. 5–18. See also, Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 70.
[324] After Taoyuan, the Chuoshui River delta and the areas around Tainan are described as the next-most suitable locations for amphibious landings because they offer sandy beaches and flat open spaces for engaging tanks in maneuver warfare. Texts note, however, that non-traditional landing operations would be required. This is a reference to the huge mudflats that dominate the coast, especially at the Chuoshui River mouth. Located some 230 miles south of Taipei, the Chuoshui river is Taiwan’s largest. It picks up silt along the steep sloops of the central mountain range and discharges extraordinary mounds of it into the Taiwan Strait. Hovercraft, hydrofoils, and sea skimmers could cross the shallows here, but few other vessels could avoid being beached in the attempt. See Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 83.
[325] Indeed, in the absence of suitable beaches near Taichung, the ROC Military assumes that the PLA may try irregular landings at the Dajia River delta and plans accordingly. See Chang You-ching, “Research on Combat Engineer Support in River Crossings during Defense Operations--The Case of the Third Theater of Operations and the Tamsui River (防衛作戰中工兵支援渡河作業之研究—以第三作戰區淡水河為例),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 147, 2015, pp. 2–4.
[326] Taiwan Strait Military Geography, pp. 196–205.
[327] For an excellent Taiwanese assessment, see Lin Zhe-chun, “Discussion on Defense Operations in Urban Infrastructure with Support of Defense Combat Engineers (防衛作戰城鎮設施防工兵支援之探討),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 144, 2014, pp. 1–23.
[328] See “Han Kuang Exercise 32 Series 2: Key Node Hsuehshan Tunnel Blockade Drill (漢光32號演習系列2：關節要點雪山封阻作業), “Quanqiu Fangwei Zazhi (Defence International), No. 385, September 2016, pp. 36–40.
[329] Informatized Army Operations, p. 133.
[330] Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 59. Research on Port Landing Operations, pp. 16–23.
[331] China’s Military Geography, p. 337.
[332] Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 67.
[333] China’s Military Geography, p. 394.
[334] This of course does not account for the Himalayan and Pamir mountains in southwestern China.
[335] Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 63.
[336] Author’s discussions with local residents in Magong City and elsewhere on the Penghu Islands, May 2008.
[337] See Research on Port Landing Operations, p. 19; and Liu Haijiang and Li Zhiyuan (eds.), Research on Joint Tactical Thought [联合战术思想研究] (Beijing: Lantian Press, 2012), pp. 141–142.
[338] Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 59.
[339] Bai Guangwei (ed.), Course book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 60.
[340] Ibid.
[341] See Informatized Army Operations, p. 147; and Research on Port Landing Operations, pp. 17–18.
[342] Ibid. Note that the latter source asserts that the PLA’s amphibious landings on Jintang Island were a success in large part because the tides were carefully studied beforehand and the attacking commander chose to hit the beaches on a high tide day (October 3, 1949). In contrast, the landing attempt on Kinmen later that same month failed because the commander ignored the tides and attempted to land when the tides were receding. This greatly hindered his operations and contributed to a total defeat.
[343] Research on Port Landing Operations, p. 17.
[344] See Ganning Zeng, Jianyu Hu, Huasheng Hong, and Yiquan Qi, “Numerical Study on M2 Tidal System in the Taiwan Strait,” Procedia Environmental Sciences, 12 (2012), pp. 702–707. Note that the researchers are affiliated with the PRC State Key Laboratory of Satellite Ocean Environmental Dynamics (Hangzhou), the PRC State Key Laboratory of Marine Environmental Science (Xiamen), and the PRC State Key Laboratory of Tropical Marine Environmental Dynamics (Guangzhou).
[345] Author’s discussions with Taiwanese locals in New Taipei City, Kaohsiung, and Hengchun.
[346] Course Book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 60; Research on Port Landing Operations, pp. 20–21; and Research on Joint Tactical Thought, pp. 141–142.
[347] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 133–134.
[348] Ibid., p. 140.
[349] Ibid., pp. 141–142.
[350] Course Book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 60.
[351] Ibid.
[352] Ibid., p. 59.
[353] Ibid.
[354] See Informatized Army Landing Operations, p. 133. Note that an added danger of this approach would be that preparing for an invasion and then not being able to launch it due to bad weather conditions would tip China’s hand to Taiwan, the U.S., and the rest of the world, signaling that the PLA was actually going invade Taiwan and would likely try again the next opportunity the weather allowed. Given the time lag between suitable weather and other factors, a scenario like this could be problematic for Chinese invasion plans, as it might result in the U.S. becoming much closer to Taiwan and more involved in its defense, as happened after every Taiwan Strait Crisis. The author is indebted to Ian McCaslin for this point.
[355] See Research on Port Landing Operations, pp. 19–23; Course Book on Taiwan Strait Military Geography, p. 59; and Research on Joint Tactical Thought, pp. 141–142.
[356] See Dennis J. Blasko, “The PLA Army/Ground Forces,” in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (eds.), The PLA as an Organization: Reference Volume v2.0 (Fairfax, VA: Defens Group Inc. 2015), pp. 244–245; and Kenneth W. Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, and John F. Corbett, Jr., “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What is Known, Unknown, and Speculation,” China Brief, February 4, 2016, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45069&no_cache=1#.V0NWo-RrMgs.
[357] For a dated but still relevant study, see Lin Chang-Sheng, “Chinese Communist Amphibious Landing Forces for Taiwan Strait War (中共台海戰爭兩棲登陸軍力),” in Lin Chong-bin, Calculating the Taiwan Strait: The Strategic Situation in the Strait in the New Century [廟算台海：新世紀海峽戰略態勢] (Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 2002), pp. 394–395.
[358] Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, p. 50; and author’s discussions with ROC Military subject matter experts.
[359] See “PLA Doubles Size of Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division,” Want China Times, January 5, 2015, at http://stt.soundthetrumpet.ca/media/?m=0&id=25664. See also Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Just Doubled the Size of Its Amphibious Mechanized Divisions,” The Diplomat, January 9, 2015, at http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/china-just-doubled-the-size-of-its-amphibious-mechanized-infantry-divisions/.
[360] For example, a low estimate might assume for two amphibious mechanized infantry divisions capable of attacking with 6,000 troops apiece, two special forces groups capable of attacking with 1,000 commandos each, three helicopter regiments capable of attacking with 1,000 light infantry each, and one armored brigade with 3,000 personnel. Such a force would have a total of 20,000 combat troops. A high-end estimate might assume the PLA could field four amphibious mechanized infantry divisions with 12,000 troops apiece, two special forces groups with 3,000 commandos each, three helicopter regiments with 3,000 light infantry each, and one armored brigade with 5,000 personnel. Such a force would have a total of 68,000. Assumptions would vary depending on numbers of trained and equipped combat troops (as opposed to administrative personnel), fully mobilized unit sizes, pre-invasion force attrition, transportation limitations, and many other factors that affect unit size and availability.
[361] Kenneth W. Allen, “PLA Air Force Organizational Reforms: 2000–2012,” in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (eds.), The PLA as an Organization: Reference Volume v2.0 (Fairfax, VA: Defens Group Inc. 2015), p. 322.
[362] Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, p. 103.
[363] For background, see Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Amphibious Capabilities: Structured for Deterrence,” China Brief, August 19, 2010, at https://jamestown.org/program/pla-amphibious-capabilities-structured-for-deterrence/; and Chia-Shin Wu, “The Assessment of Communist China’s Threat to Launch Amphibious (or Sea-Air-Land) Invasion against Taiwan,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 2004), p. 76.
[364] The author is indebted to Dennis Blasko for this point.
[365] The most important of the PLA’s approximately 17 ship groups for the invasion of Taiwan would be the one based at Dongshan Island, which regularly trains for supporting amphibious operations. Others are mostly used for logistics, with some reconnaissance and amphibious roles, and have landing craft that are unsuitable for crossing the Taiwan Strait. Dennis J. Blasko, “The PLA Army/Ground Forces,” in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (eds.), The PLA as an Organization: Reference Volume v2.0 (Fairfax, VA: Defens Group Inc. 2015), p. 239.
[366] Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, pp. 94–100; and Lin Chang-Sheng, p. 394.
[367] Note that in addition to other bases, there are several significant shipbuilding yards in the Shanghai area. The Jiangnan shipyard currently produces advanced destroyers, frigates, submarines, and large support vessels. The Hudong shipyard produces frigates and supply ships. The Honghua shipyard has been a major supplier of amphibious warfare ships, and Qiuxin makes minesweepers. It should be assumed they would all be cranking out massive numbers of amphibious landing craft and other needed vessels before and during the invasion. See Andrew Erickson, Chinese Naval Ship Building; and Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 74
[368] Nan Li, “The People’s Liberation Army Navy as an Evolving Organization,” in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (eds.), The PLA as an Organization: Reference Volume v2.0 (Fairfax, VA: Defens Group Inc. 2015), p. 286.
[369] Ibid., p. 279
[370] Ibid., pp. 287–288.
[371] Ibid., p. 280.
[372] Ibid., pp. 278, 285
[373] People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010 (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2010), p. 25.
[374] Mark Stokes, “China’s Air Defense Identification System: The Role of PLA Air Surveillance,” Project 2049 Institute, May 9, 2014, pp. 4–5, at http://www.project2049.net/documents/Stokes_China_Air_Defense_Identification_System_PLA_Air_Surveillance.pdf.
[375] Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, p. 32.
[376] Mark Stokes, “China’s Air Defense Identification System: The Role of PLA Air Surveillance,” pp. 4–5.
[377] Among many excellent sources, see Michael S. Chase, Daniel Yoon, and Mark Stokes, “The People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force as an Organization,” in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (eds.), The PLA as an Organization: Reference Volume v2.0 (Fairfax, VA: Defense Group Inc. 2015), pp. 356–362; and Mark Stokes, “Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite Taiwan,” Asia Eye, Project 2049 Institute, April 18, 2011, at http://blog.project2049.net/2011/04/expansion-of-chinas-ballistic-missile.html.
[378] Murray Scot Tanner, “China’s People’s Armed Police Force Leadership, Command, and Organization in the Wake of the 2009 PAP Law,” in Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (eds.), The PLA as an Organization: Reference Volume v2.0 (Fairfax, VA: Defense Group Inc. 2015), pp. 378–379.
[379] Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, pp. 109–111.
[380] Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, pp. 111–113.
[381] For excellent background on the maritime militia, see Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia,” CNA Corporation, March 7, 2016, pp. 22–28, at https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/Chinas-Maritime-Militia.pdf.
[382] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 172
[383] Informatized Joint Operations, p. 176.
[384] Informatized Army Operations, p. 167. For a ROC Military source confirming this, see Wang Chung-fung, “Discussion and Analysis on Combat Engineering Support to Force Preservation Actions (探討工兵支援戰力保存作為之研析),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 146, 2015, pp. 1–28.
[385] Informatized Army Operations, p. 112.
[386] Informatized Army Operations, p. 127.
[387] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 127–128.
[388] Informatized Army Operations, p. 128.
[389] Zhao Feng (ed.), The Taiwan Military’s 20 Year Transformation [台军20年转型之路] (Beijing, National Defense University Press, 2015), p. 171.
[390] See “Taiwan Spends 30 Billion to Build Missile Defense Net: Second Phase has Runway Repair and Camouflage to Trick Enemy [第二階段搶修跑道 偽裝欺敵 台砸三千億 建導彈防禦網], Sing Tao Daily, September 6, 2010, at http://news.singtao.ca/calgary/2010-09-06/taiwan1283761644d2712081.html. For further details see Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy in an Age of Precision Strike, p. 55.
[391] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 123–124.
[392] Ibid.
[393] Ibid., p. 131.
[394] Ibid., p. 129.
[395] Ibid., p. 131.
[396] Ibid., pp. 131–2.
[397] Informatized Army Operations, p. 131.
[398] Ibid., p. 124.
[399] Ibid., pp. 141–144, 150–157.
[400] Zhang Qingzhi, et al. (eds.), Informatized Warfare and Psychological Protection [信息化战争心理防护] (Beijing, The People’s Military Medical Press, 2008), p. 113.
[401] Ibid.
[402] Ibid., p. 114.
[403] Ibid.
[404] Ibid., pp. 114–115.
[405] Ibid., p. 116.
[406] Ibid., p. 117.
[407] Ibid., p. 118.
[408] Ibid.
[409] Informatized Army Operations, p. 113.
[410] Tsai Ho-Hsun, “Research on the Communist Military’s Division Landing Operations (共軍師登陸作戰之研究),” Lujun Xueshu Shuangyue Kan (Army Studies Bimonthly), Vol. 50, No. 537, October 2014, p. 69; and Wang Yunlei and Wang Guangyuan, Guidebook on Operational Calculations (作戰計算指南) [Beijing, Blue Skies Press, 2013], p. 47 (op cit.). Note that Blue Skies Press (蓝天出版社) is the official publishing house of the PLA Air Force.
[411] Author’s discussions with ROC military subject matter experts.
[412] Informatized Army Operations, p. 125.
[413] Ibid, p. 113.
[414] Ibid.
[415] Ibid., p. 115.
[416] Ibid., p. 115.
[417] Research on Joint Tactical Thought, p. 156.
[418] In Chinese, the Gu’an Operational Plan is written: 固安作戰計劃. See “ROC Military 2016 ‘Hang Kuang 32’ Exercise Live Fire Training Regulations (國軍105年”漢光32號”演習實兵演練規劃),” ROC Ministry of National Defense Website, posted August 19, 2016.
[419] Lauren Dickey, “Taiwan’s Han Kuang Exercises: Training for a Chinese Invasion One Drill at a Time, China Brief, Vol. 15, Issue 18 (September 16, 2015), at https://jamestown.org/program/taiwans-han-kuang-exercises-training-for-a-chinese-invasion-one-drill-at-a-time/.
[420] “The Gu’an Operation Plan! National Military Forces Arrived to Assist at Formosa Fun Coast within Half Hour (固安作戰計畫！國軍半小時內抵八仙支援),” Yahoo News, June 28, 2015. For a description of a previous exercise in the Port of Taipei area, see “Reserve Mobilization: Counterattack after Tamsui Raid and Taipei Port Attack [後備動員淡水反突擊台北港 反擊], Quanqiu Fangwei Zazhi (Defence International), No. 362, October 2014, pp. 36–43.
[421] Author’s discussions with U.S. military subject matter experts.
[422] Author’s discussions with U.S. and ROC military subject matter experts.
[423] Author’s discussions with ROC military subject matter experts.
[424] For a brief descriptions of how mobilization and force preservation fit into Taiwan’s overall defense strategy, see Republic of China 2011 National Defense Report [中華民國2011國防報告書](Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2011), pp. 85, 168–173; and Republic of China 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2013), pp. 33, 60–61. Military education course materials offer a far more detailed picture. For example, see Defense Mobilization [防衛動員] (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense Political Warfare Bureau, December 2011).
[425] Note that some aspects of the law are necessarily vague and subject to parliamentary approval to prevent it from being abused by a would-be dictator. See Chang Hsueh-chang, “Discussion on Military Police Missions in Wartime (戰時憲兵任務之探討),” ROC Military Police Command Journal, No. 80 (June 2015), pp. 34–40
[426] Ibid.; and Chang Zong-Tsai, “Research on Tactics and Techniques of Communist Military ‘Decapitation Operations’ through the lens of the U.S. Military’s ‘Operation Neptune Spear,’” pp. 10–12.
[427] Dual-use civilian assets in the war reserve system include 10,000 fixed facilities, 2,000 pieces of heavy machinery, 300 fishing boats, 60 aircraft, and 50 large ships. See Easton, Stokes, Cooper, and Chan, p. 17.
[428] Author’s discussion with ROC military subject matter experts.
[429] Author’s discussion with ROC military subject matter experts.
[430] Author’s discussions with ROC military subject matter experts.
[431] According to the ROC military’s mine-laying doctrine, if it is assumed that all of the 14 most suitable invasion beaches’ surf zones were mined at 90% density, then 4,788 total mines would be required. The standard shallow-water minefield would be four kilometers long and 150 meters wide. They would be laid by LCUs and, where necessary, Type-V and Type-M inflatable boats with outboard motors. See Wu Qi-yu, “Research on Executing Surf Zone Mining Operations with Combat Engineer Units (工兵部隊執行激浪區布雷作業之研究),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, no. 147, 2015, pp. 1–30.
[432] Taiwan’s reserve system reportedly includes 71 CT-6 fishing boats and around 230 CT-5 fishing boats, which are required to report to their naval duty stations within 24 hours of an emergency mobilization order. Within 72 hours, they are to be refitted with specialized equipment and able to carry out mine-laying operations. Ibid., p. 13. See also Sun Chi-dao, “Military Applications of Taiwan’s Fishing Boats (台灣漁船與軍事應用),” ROC Navy Journal, August 2014, pp. 95–108.
[433] Liu En-kuang, “Briefing on Mechanized Mine-Laying Systems--Sharp Weapons for Countering Enemy Mobility Operations (反機動作戰利器—機械布雷系統簡介),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 146, 2015, pp. 1–21; and Wu Qi-lun and Huang Zhen-ge, “Analyzing Application and Effects of Smart Mines (智能地雷運用效益之研析),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 142, 2013, pp. 1–18.
[434] Zhao Feng (ed.), The Taiwan Military’s 20 Year Transformation [台军20年转型之路] (Beijing, National Defense University Press, 2015), p. 89.
[435] Ibid. Unless otherwise noted, the following section is based on this source.
[436] Ibid.
[437] Ibid
[438] Ibid.
[439] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 147–148.
[440] These would presumably include breakwater structures comprised of shaped concrete armor units, such as locally produced variants of Dolos, Xbloc, and Tetrapods. See Informatized Army Operations, pp. 147–148, and The Taiwan Military’s 20 Year Transformation, p. 189.
[441] See Informatized Army Operations, pp. 147–148, and The Taiwan Military’s 20 Year Transformation, p. 189.
[442] Zhao Feng (ed.), The Taiwan Military’s 20 Year Transformation, p. 189
[443] Ibid. p. 190.
[444] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 122–123.
[445] Author’s discussions with U.S. and ROC military subject matter experts in Taiwan. See also Chang You-ching, “Research on Combat Engineer Support in River Crossings during Defense Operations--The Case of the Third Theater of Operations and the Tamsui River (防衛作戰中工兵支援渡河作業之研究—以第三作戰區淡水河為例),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 147, 2015, pp. 1–24.
[446] Author’s discussions with U.S. and ROC military subject matter experts in Taiwan. See also Chang You-ching, “Research on Combat Engineer Support in River Crossings during Defense Operations--The Case of the Third Theater of Operations and the Tamsui River (防衛作戰中工兵支援渡河作業之研究—以第三作戰區淡水河為例),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 147, 2015, pp. 1–24.
[447] Research on Operational Theory of Army Aviation Troops, p. 168.
[448] Ibid, p. 167.
[449] Ibid, p. 106. According to this source, the notable exception to this rule might be the outer island groups of Kinmen and Matsu, where masses of helicopters and artillery, all in close proximity to their Chinese bases, would give the PLA a sizable advantage.
[450] Author’s discussions with ROC military subject matter experts; and Informatized Army Operations , pp. 122–123; Wu Qi-yu, “Analyzing the Application and Effects of HESCO Bastions (組合式掩體運用效益之研析),” ROC Army Journal, No. 52, Vol. 545 (February 2016), pp. 111–126; Wang Chung-fung, “Discussion and Analysis on Combat Engineering Support to Force Preservation Actions (探討工兵支援戰力保存作為之研析),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 146, 2015, pp. 1–28; and Wang Chung-fung, “Discussion on Various Types of Blast Door Designs by Overpressure Level (探討各類型爆壓下防爆門之設計),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 144, 2014, pp. 1–27.
[451] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 132–134, 142–144.
[452] Unless otherwise noted, the following section on ROC Air Force plans and capabilities draws from Ian Easton, Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy in an Age of Precision Strike (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, September 2014), pp. 47–56; and Ian Easton, “Taiwan, Asia’s Secret Air Power,” The Diplomat, September 25, 2014, at http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/taiwan-asias-secret-air-power/.
[453] “Taiwan to spend HK$19 billion on home-made missile defense against Beijing,” South China Morning Post, August 30, 2014, at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1581963/taiwan-spend-hk19-billion-home-made-missile-defence-against-beijing.
[454] Luo Tien-pin and William Hetherington, “Purchase of U.S. naval system finalized, “Taipei Times,” January 22, 2017, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/01/22/2003663563.
[455] At the current time, highway runway strips are located at the No. 1 National Freeway’s Minsyong section (near Chiayi), the Rende and Madou sections (near Tainan), the Huatan section (near Changhua); and at Jiadong Provincial Highway (near Kaohsiung). Reportedly, other emergency strips may exist on the east coast, but this cannot be confirmed at the current time.
[456] For an excellent overview of Taiwanese electronic warfare capabilities, including those for jamming satellites, see Chen Chiu-yang, “Analyzing Application of Electronic Warfare Techniques in Taiwanese Urban Warfare using of other Countries’ Experiences (從各國經驗探討我城鎮戰中電子戰應用作為之研析),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 147, 2015, pp. 1–20
[457] Author’s discussions with ROC military subject matter experts.
[458] Unless otherwise noted, the following section on ROC Navy plans and capabilities draws from Ian Easton, Taiwan’s Naval Role in the Rebalance to Asia (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, March 2015), at http://www.project2049.net/documents/150303_Easton_Taiwans_Naval_Role_in_the_Rebalance.pdf; Ian Easton and Randall Schriver, Standing Watch: Taiwan and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Western Pacific (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, December 2014), at http://www.project2049.net/documents/141216_Taiwan_Maritime_Domain_Awareness_Easton_Schriver.pdf; and James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Defending the Strait: Taiwan’s Naval Strategy in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2011).
[459] Author’s discussions with ROC military subject matter experts.
[460] Author’s discussions with ROC military subject matter experts.
[461] Author’s discussions with ROC military subject matter experts.
[462] See “Han Kuang Exercise 32 Series 1: ROC Army 5th Support Department at the Fulcrum (漢光32號演習系列1--陸軍五支部前支點),”Quanqiu Fangwei Zazhi (Defence International), No. 385, September 2016, pp. 32–34; and author’s discussions with ROC Military subject matter experts.
[463] See Ian Easton, Mark Stokes, Cortez Cooper, and Arthur Chan, Transformation of Taiwan’s Reserve Force (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2017), pp. 15–23.
[464] Author’s discussions with ROC military subject matter experts.
[465] For background, see Grabo, pp. 38–50.
[466] For a brief description of how joint interception fits in with Taiwan’s overall defense strategy, see Republic of China 2011 National Defense Report [中華民國2011國防報告書] (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2011), p. 89; and Republic of China 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2013), p. 39.
[467] For an excellent overview of Taiwanese electronic warfare capabilities, including those for jamming missile guidance systems, see Chen Chiu-yang, “Analyzing Application of Electronic Warfare Techniques in Taiwanese Urban Warfare using of other Countries’ Experiences (從各國經驗探討我城鎮戰中電子戰應用作為之研析),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 147, 2015, pp. 1–20
[468] “Taiwan to spend $2.5 billion on anti-missile systems,” Defense News, August 30, 2014, at http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140830/DEFREG03/308300024/Taiwan-spend-2-5-billion-anti-missile-systems?odyssey=mod_sectionstories.
[469] This assumes for a 600 kilometer range ballistic missile shot along a standard trajectory. Ballistic missiles launched from 300 kilometers away would only take five minutes and thirty seconds. Those with ranges of 1,000 kilometers would take nine minutes and twenty seconds to arrive. All times are approximate and they assume for standard ballistic missile trajectories. See Liu Xing (ed.), Air Defense and Space Defense Information Systems and Their Integrated Technologies [ 防空防天信息系统及其一体化技术] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2009), p. 25.
[470] See Wendell Minnick, “Chinese Spy Radio?” Defense News, April 26, 2010, at http://minnickarticles.blogspot.com/2010/04/chinese-spy-radio.html.
[471] This following discussion on ROC Air Force plans and capabilities draws from Ian Easton, Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy in an Age of Precision Strike (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, September 2014), pp. 47–56; and Ian Easton, “Taiwan, Asia’s Secret Air Power,” The Diplomat, September 25, 2014, at http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/taiwan-asias-secret-air-power/.
[472] For a Chinese study supporting this assertion, see Tao Guiming, et al., “Modeling the Order of Surface to Surface Missile Strikes on Airfields (地地导弹打击机场排序模型),” Computer and Information Technology Journal, February 2013, pp. 12–14.
[473] The PLA Strategic Rocket Force has custom-designed its ballistic missile warheads to release bomblets for annihilating Taiwan’s sapper teams, and its plans apparently call for staggering missile raids to increase the probability of kill. As such, it seems likely that raids would involve small numbers of missiles raining down at regular intervals to keep airbases closed for as long as possible. For Chinese studies on this issue, see Huang Guangyan, et al., “Method for Assessing Effects of Joint Anti-Runway and Area Blockading Sub-munitions (反跑道与区域封锁子母弹联合对封锁效能的评估方法),” Dandao Xuebao (Journal of Ballistics), March 2013, p. 46; Jiang Zengrong, et al., “Numerical Modeling of Blast Depth Influence on Destruction Effects of Runway Penetrating Warhead (炸点深度对反跑道侵爆战斗布摧伤效果影响数值模拟),” Conference Paper Presented at China’s Ninth National Forum on Blast Dynamics, undated, pp. 175–179; Jiang Zengrong, et al., “Numerical Modeling of Blast Depth Influence on Destruction Effects of Penetrating Warhead (炸点深度对侵爆战斗布摧伤效果影响数值模拟),” Binggong Xuebao (Acta Armamentarii Journal), April 2010, pp. 28–31; Li Xinqi and Wang Minghai, “Research on Standard Problems of Conventional Missile Effects for Blockading Airfield Runways (常规导弹对封锁机场跑道效能准则问题研究),” Zhihui Kongzhi Yu Fangzhen (Command Control and Simulation Journal), Vol. 29, No. 4, August 2007, p. 78; Li Yong, et al., “Simulation and Calculation Research on Terminal Course-Correcting Submunitions’ Airfield Runway Blockade Probability (末修子母弹对机场跑道封锁概率计算仿真研究),” Xitong Fangzhen Xuebao (Journal of System Simulation), Vol. 18, No. 9, 2006, 2397–2400; and Guan Baohua, et al., “Calculation of Terminal Course-Correcting Submunitions’ Blockade Probability Against Airfield Runway (末修子母弹对机场跑道封锁概率的计算),” Dandao Xuebao (Journal of Ballistics), No. 4, 2005, pp. 22–26.
[474] For a detailed PLA perspective on Taiwan’s air defense network, see PLA General Staff Department 54th Research Institute, “Compilation of Air Defense Early Warning Information (防空预警资料汇编),” Informatized War and Information War Information Compilation Series, No.2. October 29, 2008, p. 34.
[475] Informatized Army Operations, p. 131.
[476] See Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy in an Age of Precision Strike, p. 33.
[477] See Tsai Cheng-chang, “Weapons for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses-Discussion on Process of Surface Unit Fire Support Operations (制壓敵防空武力—地面部隊火協作業程序探討),” ROC Artillery Forces Journal, No. 169, 2015, pp. 47–64.
[478] Author’s discussions with United States and ROC military subject matter experts.
[479] Mike Yeo, “Taiwan to upgrade indigenous missile capabilities,” Defense News, February 6, 2017, at http://www.defensenews.com/articles/taiwan-to-upgrade-indigenous-missile-capabilities.
[480] The Taiwan Military’s 20 Year Transformation, p. 187.
[481] Ibid. See also Wendell Minnick and Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan, Taiwan Upgrade Strike Capability,” Defense News, May 6, 2013, available at http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/japan-taiwan-upgrade-strike-capability; and
Michael Thim, “Prickly Situation: Taiwan’s missile program spurs debate on pre-emptive, porcupine strategies,” Strategic Vision, Vol. 2, No. 7 (February 2013), p. 18, at http://www.mcsstw.org/web/SV/sv2013-0207.pdf.
[482] For a detailed account of the exercise, see “Penghu Wude Joint Counter Amphibious Exercise ( 澎湖五德聯信聯合反登陸操演 ),” Quanqiu Fangwei Zazhi (Defence International), May 2013, pp. 32 - 40.
[483] For an excellent assessment, see Wu Kuang-chang, “Discussion on Integration and Application Model of AH-64D Attack Helicopter and Joint Defense Operations (AH-64D 攻擊直升機於聯合防衛作戰之整合與運用模式探討),” ROC Aviation and Special Forces Journal, No. 56, 2012, pp. 1–18.
[484] Informatized Army Operations, p. 145. Note that anchorage points used by amphibious assault ships carrying helicopters and hovercraft are expected to be much farther in the rear, some 30 miles from Taiwan’s coast. The ROC Army has rocket artillery that can reach these points as well.
[485] Huang Wei, “What Joint Service Command Officers Should Understand about Fire Support and Coordination (聯合兵種指揮官應了解之火力支援協調作為),” ROC Army Journal, No. 52, Vol. 546 (April 2016), pp. 83–98.
[486] See Hsu Niu, “Analysis of Ray-Ting 2000 Multiple Launch Rocket System Application and Operational Effects During Attacks on Anchorage Areas (雷霆2000多管火箭系統運用於泊地攻擊作戰效能之研析),” ROC Artillery Forces Journal, No. 171, 2015, p. 10.
[487] See Yang Hou-sheng, “Analyzing the Operational Effectiveness of the Communist Military’s Type ZLT-05 Amphibious Assault Artillery Vehicle (共軍ZTL-05型兩棲攻擊跑車作戰效能之研析), ROC Army Infantry Journal, No. 258, 2016, pp. 1–24; Wang Wei-hsien and Ong Ming-hui, “Discussion on History, Development, and Application of Communist Military’s Amphibious Armored Assault Vehicle for Landings (共軍兩棲裝甲戰斗車輛發展歷程與運用上陸之探討),” ROC Army Journal, No. 52, Vol. 546 (April 2016), pp. 53–54; and “Penghu Wude Joint Counter Amphibious Exercise ( 澎湖五德聯信聯合反登陸操演 ),” Quanqiu Fangwei Zazhi (Defence International), May 2013, pp. 32–34.
[488] For a brief description of how homeland defense operations fit into Taiwan’s overall defense strategy, see Republic of China 2011 National Defense Report [中華民國2011國防報告書](Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2011), pp. 89–91; and Republic of China 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2013), p. 38. Note that homeland defense (國土防衛) overlaps with ground defense (地面防衛), but the latter is more limited in scope. For ROC military studies on maximizing the advantages of the home grounds, see Lai Chih-ming, Research on Optimal Army Force Defense Deployments, Size, and Structure: the Application of Defense Position and Geometry Theory with Quantified Judgment Model [陸戰防禦兵力部署、規模及結構適切性之研究-定量判定模型結合防禦幾何學之應用] (Taipei: National Defense University Management College Master’s Thesis, 2010 ); Chen Shian-ruei, Research on the Deployment of Seacoast Defense Brigades: An Application of Quantified Judgment Method Analysis [海岸守備旅兵力配置之研究-定量判定分析模型應用] (Taipei: National Defense University Management College Master’s Thesis, 2008); and Tim C.K. Shen, The Optimal Size and Defensive Location of the Army Force in Northern Taiwan: The Application of Defense Position and Geometry Theory [陸軍北部地區地面部隊規模與部署適切性之研究-防禦部署與幾何圖形理論之應用]( Taipei: National Defense University Management College Master’s Thesis, 2001).
[489] Informatized Army Operations, p. 134; see also Chien Yi-jian and Ong Ming-hui, “Research on Armor Brigade Counterattack Operations during Defense Operations--The Case of a Suitable Landing Area (防衛作戰中裝甲旅反擊之研究 --以適宜登陸地區為例),” ROC Armor Journal, No. 240, July 2015, pp. 15–42.
[490] Ibid.
[491] Liu Ching-chong, “Discussion on Application of Mechanized Infantry Units in Future Defense Operations (機步部隊在未來防衛作戰運用之探討),” ROC Army Journal, No. 49, Vol. 529 (June 2013), pp. 4–22; and Hsu Yi-Lien, “Homeland Defense Integrated Land-Air Operations: Research on Application of Army Aviation Units (國土防衛地空整體作戰：陸航部隊運用之研究),” ROC Army Journal, No. 49, Vol. 529 (June 2013), pp. 23–37.
[492] Informatized Army Operations, pp. 134–135; and Sun Shu-hwua, “Responding to Chinese Communist Urban Warfare Operations Against Taiwan—the Case of Army Aviation Units (中共對我城鎮作戰之因應之道—以陸航部隊為例),” ROC Army Aviation and Special Forces Journal, No. 56, 2012, pp. 1–15.
[493] Luo Zhen-jun, “Joint Surface Defense: Analyzing the Application of Special Operations Units in Urban Areas (聯合地面防衛--以城鎮地區運用特種作戰部隊為分析對象),” ROC Army Aviation and Special Operations Forces Journal, No. 56, 2012, pp. 1–18.
[494] Lin Zhe-chun, “Discussion on Defense Operations in Urban Infrastructure with Support of Defense Combat Engineers (防衛作戰城鎮設施防工兵支援之探討),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 144, 2014, pp. 1–23. See also Chen Chiu-yang, “Analyzing Application of Electronic Warfare Techniques in Taiwanese Urban Warfare using of other Countries’ Experiences (從各國經驗探討我城鎮戰中電子戰應用作為之研析),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 147, 2015, pp. 1–20; Lin Sheng-jie, “Discussion on Combat Engineer Units Application of Robots in Support Missions during Urban Warfare Operations (城鎮戰中工兵部隊運用機器人直行支援任務之探討), ROC Combat Engineer Journal, No. 144, 2014, pp. 1–20; and Hsu Chi-po and Chen Jun-hung, “Discussion on Taiwan’s Highway Bridges and Their Military Support Levels (本島公路橋樑與軍用載重等級之探討),” ROC Army Combat Engineer Journal, No. 142, 2013, pp. 1–16.
[495] Fung Chiu-kuo, “Research on Military Value of Urban Underground Infrastructure (城鎮地下設施軍事價值之研究),” ROC Army Infantry Journal, No. 256, 2015, pp. 1–22.
[496] Chang Kuo-ta, “Research on Application of Advanced Infantry Platoon Firepower in Urban Defense (精進進步兵排城鎮防禦火力運用之研析),” ROC Army Infantry Journal, No. 257, 2016, pp. 1–18.
[497] Informatized Army Operations, p. 167.
[498] Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Taiwan could withstand attack for a month: Yen,” Taipei Times, March 7, 2014. See also Rich Chang, Lo Tien-pin, and Jake Chung, “Taiwan would not survive month of attack, NSB says,” Taipei Times, March 11, 2014.
[499] Author’s discussions with ROC Army officers. See also Hung Che-Cheng, “American Military Observers in Taiwan: Chang-Ching Exercise Exposes ROC Military’s Homeland Defense Ops (美軍來觀摩：長青操演曝光-揭露陸軍國土防衛戰),” United Daily News, October 31, 2016, at https://udn.com/news/story/1/2057947.
[500] Liu Ta-sheng, Menq Jau-yan, Chang Cheng-chang, and Chen Shian-Ruei, “Study on the Homeland Defense Operations Deployment of Seacoast Brigades (國土防衛海岸守備旅兵力配置之研究),” Conference paper presented at the 16th Annual Joint National Defense Management College and National Armaments Management College Seminar, 2009, pp. 2–13.
[501] For example, see Informatized Army Operations, p. 167.
[502] The following discussion on US-PRC competition draws from the author’s, “Strategic Standoff: The U.S.-China Rivalry and Taiwan,” Project 2049 Institute Occasional Paper, March 2016, at http://www.project2049.net/documents/Strategic Standoff_US_China_Rivalry_Taiwan.pdf.
[503] Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 2015), pp. 227–246; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011); and Robert Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic, June 2005, pp. 49–64.
[504] Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. and Colin Clark, “Threats from Russia, China Drive 2017 DoD Budget,” Breaking Defense, February 2, 2016, at http://breakingdefense.com/2016/02/russia-china-drive-2017-budget/.
[505] Matthew Pennington, “US-China tensions persist despite progress on NKorea,” Associated Press, February 23, 2016, at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/4e0a8c6d263d4aad897fb5464d4f1f72/top-diplomats-meet-fraught-time-between-us-china.
[506] See Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010); Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine (New York: Walker & Company, 2010); and Yang Jisheng, Mubei: Zhongguo Liushi Niandai Da Jihuang Jishi [Tombstone: A Record of the Great Chinese Famine of the 1960s] (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 2008).
[507] China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) 2014 Human Rights Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, undated) at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2015 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: CECC, 2015), at http://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2015-annual-report.
[508] Robert D. Atkinson and Stephen Ezell, “False Promises: The Yawning Gap Between China’s WTO Commitments and Practices,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, September 17, 2015, at https://itif.org/publications/2015/09/17/false-promises-yawning-gap-between-china’s-wto-commitments-and-practices; Stephen Ezell, “China’s Economic Mercantilism,” Industry Week, July 24, 2013, at http://www.industryweek.com/public-policy/chinas-economic-mercantilism; Derrick Scissors and Dean Cheng, “Preparing for the New Chinese Government,” China Business Review, January 1, 2013, at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/preparing-for-the-new-chinese-government/.
[509] Dennis C. Blair and Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. (Chairs), The IP Commission Report: The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property (Washington, D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013), at http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip_commission_report_052213.pdf.
[510] Elbridge Colby and Ely Ratner, “Roiling the Waters,” Foreign Policy, January 21, 2014, at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/roiling-the-waters/.
[511] Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues (Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, 2015), at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India-China Border Talks Make No Headway,” Defense News, May 23, 2015, at http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/leaders/2015/05/23/india-china-border-dispute-summit-talks-lac-tibet-pakistan/27601373/; and Patrick M. Cronin, The Challenge of Responding to Maritime Coercion (Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security, September 2014), at http://www.cnas.org/Challenge-Responding-to-Maritime-Coercion#.VusOv-ZrMgs.
[512] See Cary Huang, “Xi Jinping goes back to the future,” South China Morning Post, January 22, 2016, at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1903831/back-future-chinese-president-xi-jinpings-middle-east?edition=international; Alain Guidetti, “The Silk Road, Sand Castles and the US-China Rivalry,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, July 2015, at http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/The-Silk-Road-Sand-Castles-and-the-US-China-Rivalry; Liu Mingfu, “The World Is Too Important to be Left to America,” The Atlantic, June 4, 2015, at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/china-dream-liu-mingfu-power/394748/; Curtis Chin, “Xi Jinping’s ‘Asia for Asians’ mantra evokes imperial Japan,” South China Morning Post, July 14, 2014, at http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1553414/xi-jinpings-asia-asians-mantra-evokes-imperial-japan; and Jane Perlez, “Strident Video by Chinese Military Casts U.S. as Menace,” New York Times Sinosphere, October 31, 2013, at http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/strident-video-by-chinese-military-casts-u-s-as-menace/?_r=0.
[513] James Griffiths, “Marco Rubio: Xi Jinping ‘devestating’ for human rights in China,” CNN, October 8, 2015, at http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/08/world/rubio-congress-china-xi-human-rights/; Edward Wong and Yufan Huang, “Col. Liu Mingfu on the U.S. and China as Rivals,” New York Times Sinosphere, October 8, 2015, at http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/col-liu-mingfu-on-the-u-s-and-china-as-rivals/; and “A very long engagement: Xi Jinping’s state visit to Washington will do little to resolve growing tensions,” The Economist, September 19, 2015, at http://www.economist.com/news/china/21665034-xi-jinpings-state-visit-washington-will-do-little-resolve-growing-tensions-very-long.
[514] Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2014), pp. 113–146. See also Dan Blumenthal, “China’s discomfort in an American world,” American Enterprise Institute, October 2015, at https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Chinas-discomfort-in-an-American-world.pdf; Adam Taylor, “Zimbabwean strongman Robert Mugabe wins China’s version of the Nobel Peace Prize,” Washington Post, October 22, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/22/zimbabwean-strongman-robert-mugabe-wins-chinas-version-of-the-nobel-peace-prize/; Adam Taylor, “Yes, Kim Jong Un is receiving an international peace prize,” Washington Post, August 3, 2015; and “Vladimir Putin in China Confucius Peace Prize fiasco,” BBC News, November 16, 2011, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/03/yes-kim-jong-un-is-receiving-an-international-peace-prize/.
[515] Peter Mattis, Analyzing the Chinese Military: A Review Essay and Resource Guide on the People’s Liberation Army (Middletown, DE: Createspace Publishing, 2015), pp. 1–2; and Amelia Friedman, “America’s Lacking Language Skills,” The Atlantic, May 10, 2015, at http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/05/filling-americas-language-education-potholes/392876/.
[516] See A War Like No Other: The Truth about China’s Challenge to America.
[517] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2015), pp. 6 & 57–61; and The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century (Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015), p. 9.
[518] Ian Easton, “The South China Sea is Not Beijing’s Next Battlefield,” The National Interest, September 19, 2015, at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-south-china-sea-not-beijings-next-battlefield-13881. See also Michael Martina and Ben Blanchard, “Don’t read too much into military drills, China says after Taiwan alarm,” Reuters, January 22, 2016, at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-security-idUSKCN0V00IM.
[519] See Victor Robert Lee, “Satellite Imagery: China Staging Mock Invasion of Taiwan?” The Diplomat, August 9, 2015, at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/satellite-imagery-from-china-suggests-mock-invasion-of-taiwan/; and Lo Tien-pin and Jake Chung, “China simulates attack on Presidential Office,” Taipei Times, July 23, 2015, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/07/23/2003623689.
[520] Tom Wright and Aries Poon, “Taiwan Grapples With Closer China Ties,” Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2014, at http://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-grapples-with-closer-china-ties-1418000788; Ricky Yeh, “Over-Dependence on China will Doom Taiwan,” The Diplomat, August 26, 2014, at http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/over-dependence-on-china-will-doom-taiwan/; Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2010-05-01/geography-chinese-power; Stephen Nelson, “Falling into China’s Orbit,” CBC News, December 18, 2008, at http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/falling-into-china-s-orbit-1.747292.
[521] See Kin W. Moy, “U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a Changing Regional Landscape,” Remarks of Director of American Institute on Taiwan, September 30, 2015, at https://www.ait.org.tw/en/officialtext-ot1523.html.
[522] See John J. Mearsheimer, “Say Goodbye to Taiwan,” The National Interest, March-April 2014, at http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931; and Thalia Lin, “Don’t Say Goodbye to Taiwan,” The National Interest, February 27, 2014, at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-say-goodbye-taiwan-9966; and Nat Bellocchi, “Say goodbye to Taiwan, say goodbye to peace,” Taipei Times, Match 9, 2014, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2014/03/09/2003585202.
[523] Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8 96th Congress), January 1, 1979, at http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html.
[524] See Bruce A. Elleman, High Seas Buffer: The Taiwan Patrol Force, 1950–1979 (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2012); Edward J. Marolda, Ready Seapower: A History of the U.S. Seventh Fleet (Washington, D.C., Naval History & Heritage Command, 2011), and Robert Ross Smith, “Luzon Versus Formosa” in Kent Roberts Greenfield (ed.), Command Decisions (Washington, D.C.: Defense Department Army Center of Military History, 1960).
[525] Ibid. See also Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010. For an excellent analysis of Chinese perspectives, see Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Barriers, Springboards, and Benchmarks: China Conceptualizes the Pacific ‘Island Chains,’” China Quarterly, January 21, 2016, at http://www.andrewerickson.com/2016/01/barriers-springboards-and-benchmarks-china-conceptualizes-the-pacific-island-chains-firstview-version-of-article-now-available-on-the-china-quarterly-webs/.
[526] See, “The South China Sea is Not Beijing’s Next Battlefield.”
[527] See Eric Heginbotham, et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Washington, D.C., RAND Corporation, 2015), at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html; David A. Shlapak, et al., A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2009), at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG888.html; and Roger Cliff, et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2007), at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG524.html.
[528] See J. Michael Cole, “Taiwan’s Master Plan to Defeat China in a War,” The National Interest, March 31, 2015, at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/taiwans-master-plan-defeat-china-war-12510; and J. Michael Cole, “Five Taiwanese Weapons of War China Should Fear,” The National Interest, July 8, 2014, at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-taiwanese-weapons-war-china-should-fear-10827. See also, Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy in an Age of Precision Strike.
[529] See Easton and Schriver, Standing Watch: Taiwan and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Western Pacific; and Stokes and Hsiao, The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics.
[530] Eric Heginbotham, et al.; David A. Shlapak, et al.; and Roger Cliff, et al.
[531] For example, see Charles Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security, Spring 2015, pp. 49–90.; and Lyle J. Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015).
[532] For example, see Daniel Twining, “The Future of Japan-Taiwan Relations,” American Enterprise Institute, November 10, 2011, at https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/-the-future-of-japantaiwan-relations-strategic-diversification-in-pursuit-of-security-autonomy-and-prosperity_145415896141.pdf.
[533] For an excellent assessment of why Taiwan’s values matter to U.S. foreign policy interests, see Mark A. Stokes and Sabrina Tsai, The United States and Future Policy Options in the Taiwan Strait (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, February 2016), at http://www.project2049.net/documents/160130_ ALTERNATE_FUTURE_POLICY_OPTIONS_IN _THE_TAIWAN_STRAIT.pdf.
[534] See “Top Trading Partners - December 2016,” United States Census Bureau, undated, at https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/toppartners.html.
[535] Jeff Demmin, “The business of chip-making,” The Economist, October 17, 2013, at http://www.economistinsights.com/technology-innovation/opinion/business-chip-making. See also Doug Young, Unigroup Boosts Taiwan Ties In Global Chip Challenge,” Forbes, December 14, 2015, at http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougyoung/2015/12/14/unigroup-boosts-taiwan-ties-in-global-chip-challenge/#330a88822766.
[536] For background, see Craig Addison, Silicon Shield: Taiwan’s Protection Against Chinese Attack (Irving, TX: Authorlink, 2001).
[537] See Glaser and Goldstein. For background see, John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History.
[538] Shirely Kan, “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test,” CRS Report for Congress, April 23, 2007, at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22652.pdf; and Ian Easton, The Great Game in Space: China’s Evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for Future U.S. Strategy (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, June 2009), at https://project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf.
[539] Brian Weeden, “Through a glass, darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian anti-satellite testing in space,” The Space Review, March 17, 2014, at http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2473/1.
[540] Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories and Strategic Implications (Washington, D.C., The Jamestown Foundation, May 2013), at http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/China-ASBM_Jamestown_2013.pdf; and Mark Stokes, China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability: The anti-ship ballistic missile challenge to U.S. maritime operations in the Western Pacific and beyond (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, September 2009), at https://project2049.net/documents/chinese_anti_ship_ballistic_missile_asbm.pdf.
[541] For example, see Robert Windrem, “Exclusive: Secret NSA Map Shows China Cyber Attacks on U.S. Targets,” NBC News, July 30, 2015, at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/exclusive-secret-nsa-map-shows-china-cyber-attacks-us-targets-n401211; Sam LaGrone, “China Sends Uninvited Spy Ship to RIMPAC,” USNI News, July 18, 2014, at http://news.usni.org/2014/07/18/china-sends-uninvited-spy-ship-rimpac; Jon Harper, “Chinese warship nearly collided with USS Cowpens,” Stars and Stripes, December 13, 2013, at http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/chinese-warship-nearly-collided-with-uss-cowpens-1.257478; Madison Park, “Why China’s new air zone incensed Japan, U.S.,” CNN, November 27, 2013, at http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/china-japan-island-explainer/; Esther Tran Le, “China and Philippines in Standoff Over Resource -Rich Islands,” International Business Times, April 11, 2012, at http://www.ibtimes.com/china-and-philippines-standoff-over-resource-rich-islands-436190;
Elisabeth Blumiller and Michael Wines, “Test of Stealth Fighter Clouds Gates Visit to China,” New York Times, January 11, 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/world/asia/12fighter.html?_r=0.
[542] Elbridge Colby and Ely Ratner, “Roiling the Waters” Foreign Policy, January 21, 2014, at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/roiling-the-waters/.
[543] Catherine Putz, “Campbell: The History of the 21st Century Will be Written in Asia,” The Diplomat, April 15, 2015, at http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/campbell-the-history-of-the-21st-century-will-be-written-in-asia/; Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “Far Eastern Promises: Why Washington Should Focus on Asia,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2014-04-18/far-eastern-promises; Kurt Campbell and Brian Andrews, “Explaining the U.S. ‘Pivot’ to Asia,” Chatham House, August 2013, at https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf; and Hilary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, at http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.
[544] See Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over U.S. Military Strategy in Asia (New York: Routledge , 2014); and Jan Van Tol, AirSea Battle, A Point of Departure Operational Concept, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), at http://csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/.
[545] Fareed Zakaria, “Whatever happened to Obama’s pivot to Asia?” Washington Post, April 16, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-forgotten-pivot-to-asia/2015/04/16/529cc5b8-e477-11e4-905f-cc896d379a32_story.html.
[546] “A ‘Great Wall of Sand’ in the South China Sea,” Washington Post, April 8, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-great-wall-of-sand/2015/04/08/d23adb3e-dd6a-11e4-be40-566e2653afe5_story.html; and Derek Watkins, “What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea,” New York Times, October 27, 2015, at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html.
[547] Ellen Nakashima, “Hacks of OPM databases compromised 22.1 million people, federal authorities say,” Washington Post, July 9, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/; and Ellen Nakashima, “Chinese hack of federal personnel files included security-clearance database,” Washington Post, June 12, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-hack-of-government-network-compromises-security-clearance-files/2015/06/12/9f91f146-1135-11e5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.html. For an excellent study on PLA hackers, see Mark A. Stokes, The PLA General Staff Department Third Department Second Bureau: An Organizational Overview of Unit 61398 (Arlington VA: Project 2049 Institute, July 2015), at http://www.project2049.net/documents/Stokes_PLA_General_Staff_Department_Unit_61398.pdf.
[548] Wendell Minnick, “China’s Parade Puts U.S. Navy on Notice,” Defense News, September 3, 2015, at http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/2015/09/03/chinas-parade-puts-us-navy-notice/71632918/.
[549] Author’s discussions with Taiwanese officials.
[550] Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan Turning the Screws on Washington’s Sub Deal,” Defense News, December 5, 2015, at http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/2015/12/05/taiwan-turning-screws-washingtons-sub-deal/76676188/.
[551] Christopher P. Cavas, “US Frigates Approved For Transfer - Finally,” Defense News, December 19, 2015, at http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2014/12/19/navy-frigates-ships-taiwan-china-mexico/20642841/.
[552] See Kevin V. Cunningham, “Stetham Arrives in Shanghai to Promote Cooperation with PLA (N) East Sea Fleet,” America’s Navy, November 16, 2015, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=92020; Megan Eckstein, “USS Blue Ridge Pulls into Zhanjiang, China for Port Visit,” USNI News, April 20, 2015, at http://news.usni.org/2015/04/20/uss-blue-ridge-pulls-into-zhanjiang-china-for-port-visit; and Jacob Waldrop, “Blue Ridge Strengthens Cooperation with PLA(N) North Sea Fleet in Qingdao, China,” America’s Navy, August 5, 2014, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=82580.
[553] Andrew Browne, “For U.S., Taiwan Vote Changes Calculus over ‘One China,’” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2016, at http://www.wsj.com/articles/for-u-s-taiwan-vote-changes-calculus-over-one-china-1453183661; Dan Blumenthal, “Will the ‘One China’ policy survive the new Taiwan?” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2016, at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/19/will-the-one-china-policy-survive-the-new-taiwan/;
and Jeremy Page, Jenny W. Hsu, and Eva Dou, “Taiwan Elects Tsai Ing-wen as First Female President,” Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2016, at http://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwans-historic-election-set-to-test-china-ties-1452925430.
[554] Jennifer M. Turner, “DPP Plans to Enhance Taiwan Defense: Prospects and Cross Strait Implications,” China Brief, January 12, 2016, at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=44973&cHash=8f92be95d5297ca78d025cd5724cdcc6#.VuwGkeZrMgs; and Defense Policy Advisory Committee, Bolstering Taiwan’s Core Defense Industries (Taipei, Taiwan: New Frontier Foundation, October 2014), at http://english.dpp.org.tw/seventh-defense-policy-blue-paper-released/.
[555] The following discussion draws from the model of, “United States National Security Decision Directive Number 75: U.S. Relations with the USSR,” The White House, January 17, 1983, accessible at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-75.pdf. For an excellent discussion on the significance of this strategy document, see Thomas G. Mahnken, “The Reagan administration’s strategy toward the Soviet Union,” in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich (eds.), Successful Strategies: Triumphing in War and Peace from Antiquity to Present (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 403–430.
[556] Author’s discussions with American officials and subject matter experts.
[557] See Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, October 14, 2013), at http://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf.
[558] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2015), pp. 57–61.
[559] The author is indebted to Ian Mccaslin for this point.
[560] Of many examples, see Yan Chung-yi, “Insights for Our Military on Counter-landing Operations from the Battle of Iwo Jima (硫磺島戰史對國軍反登陸作戰之啟示),” ROC Navy Journal, No. 49, Vol. 6 (December 2015), pp. 108–117; Hsiao Ing-li and Wu Kuang-chung, “Research on American and Japanese Pacific Island Combat during World War Two: Examples from Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and Formosa (第二次世界大戰美，日太平洋島嶼作戰之研究-以沖繩島，硫磺島及台灣為例),” ROC Army Journal, Vol. 51, No. 543 (October 2015), pp. 102–123; Chen Sheng-chang and Jia Chi-hao, “Insights for ROC Army from German Army Defense Operations during Normandy Campaign (諾曼第戰役-德軍防衛作戰對我之啟示),” ROC Army Journal, Vol. 50, No. 534 (April 2015), pp. 5–25; and Huang Tai-Chi, “Insights from the Okinawa Campaign for ROC Counter-landing Operations and Artillery Unit Force Preservation (沖繩島戰役對我反登陸作戰砲兵部隊戰力保存之啟示),” ROC Army Artillery Journal, No. 170 (2015), pp. 8–23.
[561] See Informatized Army Operations, pp. 111–113, 130–132, 196–199. See also Space Information Support Operations, pp. 148–149; and A Military History of Fifty Years in the Taiwan Area, p. 228.
[562] See Informatized Army Operations, pp.112, 122–123, 146–148, 177, 183, 198–199; and A Military History of Fifty Years in the Taiwan Area, pp. 84, 116.
[563] See Cao Zhengrong et al. (eds.), Informatized Army Operations, pp. 127–128, 178; and Space Information Support Operations, pp. 156–165, 200, 212.
[564] For example, see “Penghu Wude Joint Counter Amphibious Exercise (澎湖五德聯信聯合反登陸操演),” Quanqiu Fangwei Zazhi (Defence International), May 2013, pp. 32–40.
[565] For more on this topic, see Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy in an Age of Precision Strike, p. 30; and Easton and Schriver, Standing Watch: Taiwan and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Western Pacific.
[566] Ibid.
[567] For example, see “Reserve Mobilization: Counterattack after Tamsui Raid and Taipei Port Attack (後備動員淡水反突擊台北港反擊), Quanqiu Fangwei Zazhi (Defence International), No. 362, October 2014, pp. 36–43.
[568] See Informatized Army Operations, pp. 172, 190.
[569] For example, see Liu Ching-jong, “Examining the Application of Mechanized Infantry in Future Defense Operations (機步部隊在未來防衛作戰運用之探討), ROC Army Journal, Vol. 49, No. 529, June 2013, pp. 4–22. At the time of this article the author was a ROC Army LTC serving as the Director of the ROC Infantry Academy’s Tactics Group.
[570] For example, see Liu Wen-hsiao, “Taiwan’s Chiashan Air Force Base: Combat Effectiveness Preservation and Tactics,” Ping-Ch’i Chan-shu T’u-chieh (Illustrated Guide of Weapons and Tactics), July 2007; and A Military History of Fifty Years in the Taiwan Area, p. 84.