In the joint interdiction phase of Taiwan’s anti-invasion plan, ROC military forces would emerge from their bunkers and safe zones to give battle to Chinese amphibious forces before they crossed the Taiwan Strait and stormed the beaches.[466] It is not clear when the military intends to transition to the joint interception phase, but PLA writings assume Taiwanese counterstrikes could begin against their fleets soon after war was initiated. Although many defenders would remain inactive until the aggressor’s opening blows were spent, some might engage in combat as soon as the first waves of missiles were fired at them.
Taiwan’s missile defense shield would probably be the first to go into action. Launch batteries, sandbagged into mountainside revetments around major cities, would release radiant lines of projectiles high into the upper atmosphere, their warheads racing toward incoming rockets at ultra fast speeds. Supporting them, electronic warfare squadrons would blast the airwaves with carefully tuned beams of electrons, designed to scramble mini-computers imbedded within PLA missile seekers. With luck, some enemy missiles might be lured away from their real targets and driven into decoys. Others might slam harmlessly into rivers, empty fields, or mountains.[467] Billions of defense dollars and countless hours of engineering and training would be put on trial.[468] The verdict would come within minutes. The average Chinese ballistic missile, once fired, takes just seven minutes and twenty seconds to reach Taiwan.[469]
Sharp fighting would light up along the PRC coastline, as Taiwanese artillery guns on the fortress islands came under fire and gave their retorts. In the interest of survival, each side would attempt to knock out the other’s gun emplacements first. Some artillery batteries, knowing their time was short, might turn their sights on more profitable mainland targets within range. Taiwanese special operations forces could be infiltrated behind enemy lines to begin their deadly sabotage work. Spymasters in Taipei could send out clandestine signals via number stations to bring long-dormant sleeper agents to life.[470] Submarines and ships, stalking each other in the tense pre-war hours, would begin dueling, the stricken disappearing forever into the black waters below.
It seems unlikely that the entire ROC Air Force would bunker down ahead of the first strike. Some squadrons may be required for combat air patrols. Fighters on strip alert, responsible for the protection of the national capital, might plan to scramble just ahead of the missile storm, clawing their way up to meet any approaching fighter-bombers. Those already on patrol high above would descend on their targets, tearing into them with missiles and cannon fire. In an air war, the large numbers of modern fighter jets available to China would give it a distinct advantage, especially because they would have the initiative. Taiwanese pilots, however, are superior in terms of skill thanks to their robust, American-style training regimes.[471]
When they were joined, losses in aerial engagements would be staggering on both sides. Taiwanese pilots that were shot down might have good prospects of parachuting back into their homeland. The same could not be said of Chinese fliers. It does not seem probable that all Taiwan’s many runways could be cratered by missile strikes in the first hours of fighting, but many strips would be wounded and inoperable.[472] Taiwan’s rapid runway repair crews are arguably the best trained and equipped in the world, but they would have to stay sheltered with their equipment until the first two or three waves blasted down, lest they risk being caught out on open tarmacs and cut to pieces by Chinese cluster bombs.[473]
To confuse PLA targeting cells, who would be receiving information piped in from satellites, drones, and local spies, Taiwan’s airbases would employ their stockpiles of fake debris and use smoke machines to mimic battle damage and obscure observation. False radio chatter would assist with deception operations. Clearing and re-opening airstrips in the dead of night seems to be a favored option. It could allow air squadrons to exit their mountain lairs unseen and jet off into the fray when least expected. Night fighting is a skill emphasized by Taiwan’s air force for giving pilots a comparative advantage over their numerically superior adversaries.[474]
It would be operationally unsound and wasteful for Taiwanese air planners to focus their main effort on a war of attrition in the skies. Rather than fight uphill battles against swarms of enemy fighters, they are much more likely to aim at high value surface targets along the Chinese coast. Taiwanese strike groups would speed toward PLA invasion staging areas at low altitude, flying below the radar to avoid detection. Once in range of their targets, they would launch missiles in multi-axis attacks. Assisting them would be electronic jamming planes, cruise missiles, and drones capable of kamikaze-style attacks on shore-based early warning sites. If successful, counterattacks would create widespread chaos and open holes through China’s radar networks, knock-out the command centers that orchestrate each sector’s air defense operations, and paralyze the system.
The soft underbelly of any amphibious operation against Taiwan would be the window of time after war was initiated, when Chinese armadas were loading assault troops and their equipment. It is imagined that Taiwan, in the final countdown to Z-Day, would launch a well-knit campaign of air and missile attacks to gut the aggressor at the very moment its ships were sprawled out along the shore and being fed. The PLA’s professional literature summarizes their understanding of Taiwan’s interdiction operations as follows:
The Enemy on the Island emphasizes cross-Strait maneuvers to execute suppression operations, mainly in the form of air raids. Landing troops will be easily stricken by enemy assaults while moving, assembling, and boarding ships. The Enemy on the Island emphasizes suppression operations every step of the way, placing particular importance on engaging in firepower raids against important targets including the assembly areas on the land and at sea for the landing troops and the landing ships, and ports, docks, airports, ground transportation nodes, road infrastructure, and missiles.[475]
Some fighters would be armed with Taiwan’s self-built Wan Chien (Ten Thousand Swords) joint standoff weapon. This is a heavy, air-launched missile designed to engage ground targets from outside the effective ranges of Chinese air defenses. These missiles work by gliding stealthily through air defense nets, raining down sub-munitions on enemy targets. According to reports, each bomblet is capable of punching through a solid foot of concrete. Because they are fired at great distances, they increase the survivability of Taiwanese fighters and minimize their losses.[476]
Other fighter jets would be armed with Harpoon and Maverick missiles, which are designed for precision air-to-surface strikes against tactical targets including ships, harbor facilities, fuel storage sites, ground transportation infrastructure, and tanks. Different than joint standoff weapons, these missiles require jets to get close to their targets before firing, making missions more risky for the pilots. Taiwan is believed to have a plan for tightly interwoven raids and strikes in the form of missiles hurled great distances across the sea. Only once China’s air defenses had been degraded could fighter groups shred apart the armadas.[477]
Taiwan has a considerable arsenal of self-made, truck-mounted cruise missiles for striking operationally and strategically significant targets in the depths of China. The ROC Air Force also maintains elite fighter squadrons for a potential Doolittle-style raid in retaliation for PLA missile attacks. Their mission would be to demonstrate to Beijing that all of China is vulnerable to Taiwanese attacks. Pilots selected for this mission are said to “punch a one-way ticket” because the odds of coming home are low. To increase striking range, speed, and payload, plans for deep interdiction apparently call for pilots to bailout after servicing their targets or crash their aircraft into secondary targets after all their munitions were exhausted. In addition, Taiwan is believed to maintain a modest inventory of indigenous ballistic missiles for strategic strikes on targets deep in China.[478]
Whether or not any of Taiwan’s long-range counterstrike capabilities would be used in anger is likely to depend a great deal on Taipei’s wartime strategic calculations. If American support was viewed as sufficient to ensure Taiwan’s survival, deep interdiction would likely be held in abeyance. On the other hand, if the strategic picture looked desperate, and Taiwan was heavily bombed and tightly blockaded and about to be invaded, retaliatory attacks on political targets in Beijing and Shanghai could be conducted. Because of the distances involved, this could only be on a small scale compared with what the PRC was doing to Taiwan from nearby Fujian and Guangdong. Yet it would almost certainly be judged as good to hit back, raise the stakes, and defy the aggressor. Taiwan’s president would have no better option for impressing and disturbing the Chinese political leadership, making Taiwanese wrath and willpower perfectly clear to them before they took the plunge across the Strait.
If the PLA armadas put to sea, concerted naval attacks on them would begin. After many years of research, testing and refinement, Taiwan has developed a system of coastal defense missiles for sinking the main ships of the Chinese amphibious fleet. The Hsiung Feng (Brave Wind) anti-ship missile is larger and faster than almost any other weapon of its kind in the world. Many of its operational characteristics are classified, but it’s believed to have a range of 60–250 miles (depending on variant) and the ability to impact targets at supersonic speeds. It is widely deployed on Taiwan’s warships and fast missile boats, and can be launched from inside shore-based bunkers and truck launchers.[479]
According to PLA assessments, Hsiung Feng anti-ship missiles have advanced warheads allowing them to fly over the horizon and lock onto visible targets selected from databases loaded with known enemy ship characteristics. They are reportedly programmed to differentiate between ship group types, attacking known PLA amphibious formations first, then amphibious support groups, then irregular formations (when no better target can be acquired). Large amphibious assault ships, loaded with helicopters and located at the center of formations, are the priority. If these could not be found, warheads would be commanded to strike Chinese aircraft carriers, destroyers, or frigates. If these were not found, then missiles would obliterate smaller warships, like minesweepers. In the event that automated target selection systems were jammed, the computer fail-safe mode would kick-in, directing missiles to hit large ships, not small ones, concentrated groups, not dispersed ones, and leading ships, not rear echelon ones.[480]
Taiwan has a network of hardened anti-ship missile bases that allows for overlapping fields of fire against approaching armadas. These missile bases give Taiwan the ability to “control the sea from the land.” Bases near Tamsui and Keelung, and on Dongyin Island, protect against hostile Chinese warships approaching from the northwest. Bases in Kaohsiung and on Xiao Liuqiu (Lamay) Island protect the southwest approaches. A missile base on Siyu Island in the Penghus covers the central area of the Taiwan Strait; and a base south of Hualien protects Taiwan’s east coast. Since fixed positions known to the enemy are in peril of being knocked out by precision munitions, Taiwan fields hard-to-find truck launchers, guaranteeing that a steady stream of steel would meet the invader. In peacetime, truck launch batteries are garrisoned at concealed locations. In wartime, they would motor to wherever they were needed.[481]
Taiwanese strategists recognize that their navy does not have the resources to match the Chinese ship-for-ship or submarine-for-submarine. However, that does not necessarily mean Taiwan would lose control over its surrounding waters in the opening days of war. Taiwan’s anti-invasion plan calls for using a missile-centric strategy to deny Chinese fleets access to its territorial waters. The concept of operations appears sound because Taiwan has home-built the advanced systems needed to see and strike an invasion force from great distances. It also appears sound because Taiwanese planners have decided they would not wait for heavily loaded troop transport ships to get close to the invasion beaches before turning them into giant steel coffins.
Joint interdiction operations would open with strikes on PLA ship groups at their coastal embarkation points. If raids failed to significantly disable or delay the enemy’s amphibious plan, waves of strikes would be hurled against the armadas as they put to sea and steamed toward Taiwan. Attacks would grow in intensity as Chinese ships crossed the centerline and steamed into minefields and prepared kill boxes. It is envisioned that the battle would crescendo decisively off of Taiwan’s coastline. In recent years, the live-fire iteration of the Han Kuang national defense exercises have publically demonstrated how the military would defend against an invasion of the Penghu Islands. During one such drill, a joint force unleashed a spectacular series of missiles, rockets, artillery, mines, decoys and jammers at the simulated invasion fleet. The result was that not a single “Red” infantryman made it to shore.[482] Taiwanese planners know that only by refusing to cede the initiative do they stand a chance of keeping their country’s heavily populated western coastline from becoming a horrific battlefield.
It cannot be known in advance when Taiwan’s surviving naval task forces would steam out of their safe zones and into the Strait to enter the fray. Chinese analysts seem to assume naval attacks might be launched on their fleets at anytime, although they seem far more concerned about air raids. The protective shield provided by the PLA’s own coastal defense batteries is such that Taiwanese naval strategists are likely to judge it better to wait and spring the trap once the armadas are far from the Chinese coast. One approach that might be considered would be to keep all large surface ships out of the Strait, allowing the entire area to become an open target range for coastal missile batteries, attack jets, helicopter gunships, and stealthy fast attack craft. Once these had done their maximum damage, Taiwan’s fleet could steam in at whatever time and place was judged to be the most advantageous. In practice, however, it seems likely that the navy could be anxious to engage earlier to gain its fair share of glory. Sinking the PLA armadas is principally a naval mission. The brother services have supporting roles to play, but their supreme missions are elsewhere.
In the event that long- and medium-range interdiction failed to halt advancing ship formations, Taiwan’s surviving defense force would begin attacking Chinese ships as they anchored and disgorged troops into hovercraft, amphibious tanks, and landing craft. Attack helicopters would have a leading role to play in striking more distant offshore disembarkation points.[483] The forward anchorage points are approximately ten miles from shore, placing thousands of exposed and vulnerable infantry and sailors within artillery range.[484] Taiwan’s ground forces plan to be waiting for them with mobile rocket launchers and large artillery guns perched on coastal hills. They would spray fire on Chinese ships approaching from over the horizon.[485]
Perhaps the most notable capability in Taiwan’s arsenal for attacking enemy forces as they approach is the Ray-Ting 2000 (Thunderbolt 2000), a wheeled multiple-launch rocket system. Rockets have longer ranges and considerably larger payloads when compared to traditional artillery, but they can be relatively inaccurate and slow to reload. To overcome this, the Ray-Ting 2000 combines rockets into tubes that can fire volleys simultaneously. They have guided munitions, with shotgun-like projectiles filled with tens of thousands of ball bearings. They are anticipated to create macabre kill zones around the anchorage sites and along amphibious lines of approach.[486] If long-range interdiction failed to turn back the attack, Taiwanese tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and infantry would greet Chinese invaders up close on the beaches with murderous firepower.[487]
| Assembling and loading amphibious ships along PRC coast | |
| Interdicting Forces | Potential Targets |
|---|---|
|
Surface-launched cruise missiles (HF-2E) |
Strategic (politically sensitive) targets, command posts, power grid |
|
Fighter jets (F-16, IDF) armed with joint standoff weapons, Harpoon missiles, Maverick missiles, etc. |
Airfields, docked ships, ground transportation infrastructure (rail and road bridges), logistics (fuel depots), radars |
|
Ballistic missiles (Yun Feng, TK-B) |
Strategic (politically sensitive) targets, command posts, power grid |
|
Special operations forces (frogmen) |
Harbor facilities, radars, command posts, bridges |
|
Anti-radiation drones |
Early warning radars |
| Crossing the Taiwan Strait | |
| Interdicting Forces | Potential Targets |
|
Anti-ship missiles (Harpoons, HF-2, HF-3) launched from aircraft, ships, subs, land bases |
Large amphibious assault ships, escort vessels, mine sweepers |
| Anchoring and disembarking troops | |
| Interdicting Forces | Potential Targets |
|
Multiple launch rocket systems (RT-2000) |
Amphibious assault ships, escort vessels, mine sweepers, hovercraft, helicopters |
|
Attack helicopters (AH-1W Super Cobras) |
|
|
Fighter jets (F-16, IDF, Mirages, F-5s) |
|
|
Frigates (Perry, Knox, Layette class) |
|
|
Stealth corvette (Tuo-Chiang class) |
|
|
Missile boats (Kuang Hua VI class) |
|
| Approaching coast in landing craft | |
| Interdicting Forces | Potential Targets |
|
Artillery (203mm, 155mm, 105 howitzers, 120mm mortars) |
Landing craft, amphibious tanks |
|
Attack helicopters (AH-64E Apaches) |
|
|
Multiple launch rocket systems (Kung Feng IV) |
|
| Storming the beaches and moving inland | |
| Interdicting Forces | Potential Targets |
|
Heavy tanks (M60A3, M48H) |
Landing craft, amphibious tanks, bulldozers, officers, combat engineers, infantry |
|
Armored fighting vehicles (M48A3, M42, CM-32 “Clouded Leopard”) |
|
|
Infantry with anti-tank missiles (FGM-148 Javelin, etc.) |
|
|
HUMVEE with anti-tank missiles (BGM -71 TOW, etc.) |
|
|
Snipers |
|
|
Gun emplacements, machine gun nests, mortar pits, grenade launchers |
|
* This table is notional and for illustrative purposes only. Based on available ROC military and PLA assessments.
In the seemingly impossible event that everything else failed to stop the invasion and Chinese troops actually began landing in force, Taiwan’s generals would turn to their defense plan’s final chapter. The homeland defense phase of the Gu’an Plan is designed to crush amphibious forces at the water’s edge and wipe out airborne troops on their landing zones. In this phase, any surviving air force planes and naval ships would join army artillery and helicopter units in lethal volleys against landing ships. Infantry would defend fortified beaches, airbases, and ports, while rapid reaction units enveloped and smashed into enemy lodgments. The full weight of Taiwan’s superior ground force, including elite army and marine units, would finally come into action on well-prepared home grounds.[488]
It cannot be known by anyone what would actually happen on Z-Day. Nonetheless, the ROC Army has planned it out in fine detail. It is assessed that the first wave of Chinese tanks and troops landed on their assigned beach sectors would likely be spread out in small battalion sized pockets, each around 500 men strong. They would be showered with artillery shells and hit with mechanized counterattacks, which would probably commence 40–60 minutes after they had slogged ashore, or just as they were about to break through beach obstacles and penetrate the perimeters of frontline bases. It is expected that bloody battles would continue for hours, as units struggled for mastery over the shore and the nearby terrain. If Taiwanese forces were unable to push landing forces back into the sea, they would regroup at fortified bases and try again, encircling and destroying amphibious tanks and firing down the beaches from the flanks.[489]
Second wave counterattacks would be launched in the afternoon or at dusk, after it was clear where the main thrusts of Chinese landings were concentrated. These are envisioned to be larger, continuous, and multi-directional assaults on beachheads. They would be directed by the ROC Army’s local theater headquarters, who would direct armor and mechanized brigades against long coastal stretches, now likely to be held by division sized units, each around 10,000 men.[490] Assuming the interior roads were passable, additional brigades would at this point arrive from other theaters, pouring on the scene to reinforce any counterattacks that got bogged down. Meanwhile, a giant joint force would be gearing up for the big night fight.
If needed, Taiwan’s anti-invasion plan reportedly envisions third wave counterattacks, which would be the supreme and final event of the war. It is assumed the Chinese might be able to defend their footholds throughout Z-Day, stabilizing beach landing areas and expanding into nearby airports and seaports. This could allow them to bring forces ashore throughout the tumultuous day. As night grew deeper, the landing troops, having fought all daylong after a harried crossing the night before, would feel their energy drain away. Equipment could start to run low. More reinforcements might be brought ashore in the dark, but the tempo of offloading operations would have to slow. Any light that was turned on would become a homing beacon for artillery guns perched in the surrounding mountains. Mines and obstacles would still be littered everywhere, making coastal movement in the dark perilous. The tides would be changing again and again, and perhaps the weather too.
In the early morning hours of Z+1, the shadowy scene would light up with explosions and flares. It is anticipated that strategic rapid reaction units (the 66th and 99th Marine brigades), armor, self-propelled artillery, and helicopter gunships would come streaming down out of the hills and the cities, followed by multitudes of infantrymen, who would wash over the invaders like a human tsunami.[491] Airborne assault troops would drop right on top of the astonished enemy, landed by parachute or Blackhawk helicopter. Special forces teams, highly proficient at night fighting, would plunge behind PLA lines from the land, air, and sea. Others would emerge from tunnels and urban hide-sites. Fighter jets, ships, and submarines that had survived to this point in the conflict would now converge on the soft flanks of the landing zones. Ships anchored offshore and beached along the coast would be torn apart. Ammunition and fuel drums piled on the beaches would be blown up in garish eruptions of flame and smoke.[492]
By dawn, it is anticipated that the war would have surged to its culmination point. PLA command posts ashore and afloat would likely be shattered, Chinese tanks, artillery pieces, and air defense guns everywhere smoldering wrecks. Mass casualties, with entire units driven back into the sea and drowned, some consumed by the toxic smoke of burning chemical plants and tank farms, others surrendered and captured. Ships sunk in vast numbers, the lucky ones limping wounded back to their home ports. Havoc would reign across southeastern China. Communications blackouts across the mainland would follow, purges in Beijing, the possibility of an impending regime change.
This is one way the invasion could end. There are others. If the Chinese attacks prior to Z-Day were devastating enough, Taiwan’s president, political advisors, and high command (the General Staff Department at the MND) could be dead, or cut off in isolated bunkers and unable to communicate. If the theater-level command bunkers and mobile brigade command posts were also neutralized, no one could organize the counterattacks. Fighting would be localized and disjointed. If there were no surviving helicopters and jets, and no ships and submarines left, and the roads were rendered impassable to tanks and armored vehicles, the landing zones would be safe. PLA divisions could continue swarming ashore. Taiwanese special operations forces could make sharp attacks, backed up by masses of local infantry, but the enemy would probably have helicopter gunships and ground attack fighters over their heads, raking them with cannon fire and missiles. During daylight hours, the defenders would also be at the mercy of warship guns and bombers.[493]
In this nightmare scenario, the anti-invasion plan envisions a grueling war of attrition, which would commence amidst the rubble of cement buildings, through fragmented factories and residential neighborhoods. If Taiwan’s ground forces were not able to achieve their objective of winning a decisive battle along the shore, they would fall back onto prepared defensive lines running across cities and mountains. These control the transportation arteries and bottlenecks. As citizen-soldiers fell back, they would demolish bridges, tunnels, supply depots, fuel stores, airport tarmacs, and anything else that might be of aid to the enemy. They would move and regroup within one fortified network after the next, steeling themselves for a marathon of fierce and drawn out battles. They would fight without control over the air or seas, but on familiar terrain that is highly favorable to the defense.[494]
The objective at this stage of operations would be to prevent the PLA from conquering key inland points around the island, while protecting rear area sanctuaries so that reinforcements could marshal and move to the front. The Taiwanese army would fight, move, wait; fight, move, wait. As the aggressor ground his way closer to the capital, some defenders would hideout and fight from underground metro lines, or subterranean parking garages, or from under bridge overpasses.[495] Others would fight in the streets, moving from one building to the next, others outside in the jungle and hills.[496] All of them hoping and praying that the Americans (and/or the Japanese) used their superior air and naval firepower to seal off the Strait, strangling the PLA’s lifelines to Taiwan.[497]
According to one former defense minister, the Gu’an Plan apparently estimates that the ROC military would be able to hold out unassisted for at least 30 days. Other Taiwanese defense ministers have posited that American forces would have to arrive at Taiwan’s side sooner―within 21 to 28 days, or even in as little as two weeks. They argue that, though highly improbable, it is possible everything might go awry for defenders in the first days of fighting. The political and military leadership might be neutralized, air control lost, and morale subsequently shattered. It is not clear if the notional clock on this grim thought experiment would begin ticking on Z-Day or when pre-invasion hostilities commenced. The latter seems much more probable.[498] Not everyone in Taiwan’s defense community assumes American military assistance is critical to victory, and some generals are optimistic they could handle the invasion on their own. Most Taiwanese military officers, however, believe that they would need American air and naval support. Nonetheless, they are highly confident in their ability to resist and repulse invasion on the ground alone, if necessary.[499]
ROC military research teams have used advanced modeling techniques to simulate a worst-case invasion scenario. In one computer war game, they assumed the PLA could have complete mastery over the electromagnetic, air, and sea domains 12 days into the onset of hostilities. They further assumed that on Z-Day the PLA could land three group armies (105,000 men) at multiple points along Taiwan’s west coast (apparently at Taoyuan, Taichung, and Tainan), paving the way for a huge follow-on wave of troops to land. They also assumed that the ROC Army suffered pre-war defense cuts, and China achieved complete strategic surprise, which meant the reserve forces were not mobilized before Z-Day. Finally, they assumed that the transportation grid was paralyzed by bombing, so defense units could not move up or down the island to reinforce each other. These assumptions left the Taiwanese side a meager force of 98,000 troops, divided between three isolated theaters of operations. Despite embracing remote possibilities, their simulations nonetheless found that in 17 out of 18 trial runs, the defense was able to repulse invasion by Z+8. In the 18th trial, northern Taiwan was lost on Z+45, after a grueling fight, but central and southern Taiwan held fast.[500]
Modeling and simulation can only do so much. Operational researchers and army officers in Taiwan warn that war gaming is neither reliable nor predictive. Urban warfare, in particular, is so complex that it defies modeling and crashes military-grade supercomputers. The unending exponential multiplication of variables over time simply overwhelms software. Just to play through Z+1 requires that analysts make leaps of faith and dumb down their coding. In truth, it is unknowable in advance how things would really play out. How long could the outer island perimeter and the Penghus hold? How severe might the blockade and bombing be? How many days would it last? After that, how many divisions could the PLA really land on Z-Day and the days following? How long could the PLA sustain its operations ashore? How long might defenders stand against a full-scale invasion if the Americans never showed up? Would the Japanese enter the war and conduct fleet and air actions or assist Taiwan in other ways? Would the democracies of the world join the fight to save Taiwan, or would they cower in fear?
Taiwanese military analysts have scrutinized the possibilities open to the invader. If the enemy landed on Taiwan, they predict he would probably not be able to stay for long. For their part, PLA theorists, in full recognition of the complex problems facing campaign plans, hope their ground forces could move fast to achieve a decisive victory on the island, but worry the war would drag on for a protracted period of time. Taiwan’s government and military, in their eyes, will probably be fiercely resolved when the crunch comes and fight courageously to the bitter end.[501]
If the impregnable fortress of Taiwan was actually breached, the contextual peculiarities of the situation would decide what happened next. As much would depend on luck and determination as on plans and preparation. More than anything else, the prospects of war and peace, invasion and survival, hinge on what the United States and its allies do in the years ahead.